


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# DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1919-1939

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## PREFACE

THIS volume begins the publication of Documents on British Foreign Policy for the year 1920. In planning this documentation it appeared that it would be most satisfactory to follow the broad lines of the arrangement for 1919. Therefore, as a necessary introduction to the diplomatic correspondence of the Foreign Office for 1920, minutes of the allied conferences on high policy held that year in succession to the Peace Conference of Paris are being published in Volumes VII and VIII. The present volume comprises the records of the meetings of the First Conference of London which sat from February 12 to April 10, 1920. This was the first allied conference held after the conclusion of the main session of the Paris Peace Conference on January 21, 1920, and the records, as here printed, are considerably the longest in the series for that year. With the exception of some extracts and appendices, as indicated in footnotes, none of the records in this volume has hitherto been published.

Mr. Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, was President of the First Conference of London, which was also attended by the French and Italian Prime Ministers, M. Millerand and Signor Nitti. Japan was represented by her Ambassador in London at most, but not all, of the meetings. The American Ambassador did not accept an invitation from Lord Curzon, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to attend the conference on behalf of the United States of America, where the Senate was unwilling to ratify the treaty of peace with Germany. Smaller allied powers such as Belgium, Greece and Rumania participated in the conference on occasion in connexion with questions of special interest to them.

The main work of the First Conference of London was the preparation of terms of peace with the broken Ottoman Empire. The application of the resultant peace treaty, signed as the Treaty of Sèvres on August 10, 1920, was to be vitiated by the Turkish movement of national revival under Kemal Atatürk in distinction from the weak Ottoman Sultanate at Constantinople; the rise of this national movement, which was especially opposed to the Greek occupation of Smyrna, was a preoccupation during the allied preparation of the treaty and the accompanying Anglo-Franco-Italian agreement concerning Anatolia. On March 3, 1920, when the Allied Conference was considering measures of coercion against the Ottoman Government after Armenian massacres in Cilicia, the following statements by Mr. Winston Churchill, the British Secretary of State for War and Air, and Mr. Lloyd George were recorded:

*'Mr. Churchill considered that the military aspect of the question must not be overlooked. He agreed that the power of the Allies, as represented by their fleet and armies, over Constantinople and the Turkish administration was unlimited.*

Any action could be taken under the menace of the guns of the ships, and Great Britain alone could do all that was necessary in Constantinople. But the fact must not be overlooked that the real difficulties would have to be faced in districts remote from Constantinople and from the sea. It would be in these far off districts that sullen resistance to the terms of the Peace Treaty would arise, and in those districts the Allies at present possessed no power or forces sufficient to exercise any satisfactory control. He agreed that the Turkish armies in Asia could not be compared in efficiency to the trained forces employed by Turkey during the war, but they would be quite good enough to inflict heavy losses on any small forces sent against them. Consequently, military operations of the first importance in those remote districts must be contemplated if the conference desired to enforce its decisions. It must be fully realised that the Turkish armies in Asia would not be controlled by any decision of violence extorted from the Turkish Government in Constantinople. Consequently, whatever action might be taken at Constantinople, the same would never result in compliance by Turkey as a whole, and, furthermore, the Allies did not possess sufficient forces to take the necessary action outside Constantinople.

*'Mr. Lloyd George* thought that it would still be possible to enforce the decisions of the conference with regard to keeping the Turks out of Thrace and with regard to Smyrna. He proposed, however, that the question should be adjourned. . . .'

(Document No. 45, minute 4.)

On the proposal of Mr. Lloyd George, the sessions of the conference in London had been divided on February 27, 1920, in much the same way that, at the Paris Peace Conference the year before, the Council of Ten had split into the Council of Four and the Council of Five or of Foreign Ministers. After the first fortnight of the First Conference of London the main allied council continued to meet at the Prime Minister's residence at 10 Downing Street while a complementary Conference of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors sat in Lord Curzon's room at the Foreign Office. The records of both series of meetings are here printed in a single sequence, as originally filed. The Conference of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors supervised the detailed preparation of the clauses of the Turkish peace treaty, especially after the departure from London of the French and Italian Prime Ministers (cf. Chapter II). In assigning this work to the meetings in the Foreign Office after the Prime Ministers, in important discussions, had in general determined the main lines of the treaty, Mr. Lloyd George had, in particular, arranged that other 'meetings regarding high prices and exchanges should take place in Downing Street' (document No. 32, minute 2). This urgent economic preoccupation resulted in the 'Declaration by the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference on the economic conditions of the world' (Cmd. 646) which was approved on March 8, 1920, and reflected the extent to which, in the aftermath of the First World War, the European allies endeavoured to prolong the wartime coordination of their financial policies. In this field, as in the preparation of peace with Turkey, the absence of the United States from the conference was a noticeably heavy factor. President Wilson, although ill, addressed strong communications to the conference with

reference to the Turkish settlement and to the still unsolved question of the Adriatic, wherein he retained a personal interest.

The First Conference of London held other important discussions, as here recorded, upon such questions as policy towards Soviet Russia and adjacent territories, the conclusion of the peace treaty with Hungary (signed as the Treaty of Trianon on June 4, 1920), the execution by Germany of the Treaty of Versailles, war-crimes and the unsuccessful allied demand for the extradition from the Netherlands of the former German Emperor William II; the conference also deliberated upon developments in German affairs arising from the Kapp Putsch.

The minutes of the First Conference of London printed in this volume were, unlike those of the Council of Heads of Delegations printed in Volume I and the first chapter of Volume II, not prepared by an Allied Joint Secretariat. The records here printed were made by the British Secretary, either Sir Maurice Hankey or a member of his staff, as indicated at the head of each document. These minutes carry the notation I.C.P. Nos. 24-93 in direct continuation of those in this series printed in Chapter II of Volume II. The British minutes of the conference in London were regularly circulated for approval to the delegations of the other Principal Allied Powers and, when relevant, to those of the smaller powers, though there appear to have been occasional omissions in this latter respect: thus it is not recorded that copies of documents Nos. 2 and 4 were sent to the Belgian Delegation. To this extent, then, the British records became agreed minutes as established, where necessary, by the circulation of corrigenda; here also, however, there were evidently occasional omissions: see, for instance, document No. 30. Except where otherwise noted, as in document No. 30, the file copies here printed embody all corrigenda.

In accordance with the practice adopted in Volumes I and II, the Foreign Office file number is not here printed at the head of each document since the reference is uniform. Except for occasional additional documents cited in footnotes, the general reference for the records in this volume is Secret/General/202/1. The texts are printed from this file, which is the only complete one in Foreign Office archives for these meetings. These texts are corrected final copies printed in the Confidential Print of the Foreign Office. They have, however, been collated throughout with the original typewritten texts prepared in the British secretariat of the conference. Minor variations between the two texts in form, spelling, etcetera have not been noted, but significant verbal variations between the typescript text and the file copy here printed are either indicated in footnotes (e.g. note 10 to document No. 19) or inserted in the main text in italics and square brackets (e.g. document No. 6, page 48). All insertions in square brackets in plain type are, as usual, editorial additions (e.g. document No. 6, page 46).

The present volume has been edited by Mr. Rohan Butler under the standing conditions, which continue to be fulfilled, of access to all papers in the Foreign Office archives, and freedom in their selection and arrangement.

The Editor again thanks the Acting Librarian of the Foreign Office, Mr.



A. D. Wilson, C.M.G., the Deputy Librarian, Mr. C. H. Fone, M.B.E., and their staff for kindly continuing to afford their indispensable help. In the preparation of this volume I have been much indebted to Miss I. Bains, M.A. and to Miss M. E. Lambert, B.A., who has especially contributed to the editing. I am further grateful to Mrs. J. D. Ede, M.A., D.Phil. for her perseverance in collating texts, and to Miss H. M. Sullivan, B.A., who has prepared the Chapter Summaries.

ROHAN BUTLER

*May 1957*

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## CHAPTER I

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<b>4 MEETING OF ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES: 4 p.m. I.C.P. 27</b>	Feb. 13	1. German breaches of the laws of war: approval of the reply to Germany. 2. Non-compliance of Germany with her agreement to supply coal to France according to the Treaty of Versailles. 3. Extradition of the former German Emperor: decision to despatch letter to Netherland Govt. if no objections to the revised draft. 4. Decision to allow the Hungarian Delegation one week in which to reply to the proposed conditions of peace. 5. Agreement that Mr. Lloyd George should sign communications from the conference.	31 32 37 37 37



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		3. Greek claims to Smyrna: nature of future Allied control over Turkey in Asia, and of the financial liabilities of Turkey to the Allies.	54
8 MEETING OF ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES: 11 a.m. I.C.P. 30	Feb. 16	1. Leakage of information from the conference.	60
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41 MEETING OF ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES: 4 p.m. I.C.P. 58  A.J. 53  DRAFTING COMMITTEE	Mar. 1	1. Discussion relative to the re-establish- ment of peace in eastern Europe. 2. Adoption of the draft memo. on the subject of high prices and foreign ex- changes <i>ad referendum</i> to French Govt. 3. Question of the appointment of Allied Ambassadors to Berlin. App. 1 Memo. relative to the re-establish- ment of peace in eastern Europe. App. 2. Memo. based on Italian proposals concerning the subject of high prices and foreign exchanges.	326 329 330 336 337
42 MEETING OF ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES: 11 a.m. I.C.P. 59	Mar. 2	1. Congratulations sent to M. Millerand on the termination of the French rail- way strike. 2. Preparation of peace with Turkey: consideration of questions asked by naval advisers. 3. Discussion of certain principles re- lating to financial clauses of Turkish peace treaty.	338 339 341
43 MEETING OF ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES: 4 p.m. I.C.P. 60	Mar. 2	Discussion of the general outline of the Allied announcement on high prices and foreign exchanges.	350
44 MEETING OF ALLIED FOREIGN MINISTERS AND AMBASSADORS: 11.30 a.m. I.C.P. 61	Mar. 2	1. Continued discussion of the report of the Committee on the Straits.	352
45 MEETING OF ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES: 11 a.m. I.C.P. 62	Mar. 3	1. Preparation of peace with Turkey: discussion of the military clauses con- cerning the strength of the Turkish army. 2. Approval of the Turkish air clauses. 3. Clauses relating to the French Foreign Legion. 4. Consideration of a telegram from Admiral de Robeck at Constantinople. 5. Date for the completion of the draft Turkish peace treaty. 6. Decision, subject to M. Millerand's acceptance, to appoint Allied Ambas- sadors to Berlin three months after ratification of the Treaty of Ver- sailles.	358 361 361 361 364 365
MARSHAL FOCH Versailles A.J. 56	Feb. 28	App. 1. Letter to Mr. Lloyd George covering draft military, naval and air clauses to be inserted in the Turkish peace treaty.	367

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46 MEETING OF BRITISH, FRENCH AND ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVES: 3.30 p.m. I.C.P. 62A	Mar. 3	1. Discussion on Rumania and approval of statement on Bessarabia. 2. Discussion of draft Tripartite Agreement: powers to be responsible for the protection of minorities in the areas of the Turkish Empire where they have economic priorities. 3. Adoption of revised article concerning the evacuation of French and Italian troops from their Turkish zones. 4. Agreement to refer the question of railways in Turkey to the Conference of Foreign Ministers. 5. Decision regarding economic priority in mandatory territories. 6. Consideration of article 4 (on finance) of draft Tripartite Agreement postponed. 7. Reservation of article 5 (concerning Heraclea) of draft Tripartite Agreement. 8. Consideration of Hungarian reply relative to the frontiers of Hungary. 9. Next meeting of the Supreme Council to be held in Italy. 10. Discussion of the proposed Allied announcement concerning high prices and foreign exchanges.	379 381 381 382 382 383 384 384 389 389
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47 MEETING OF ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES: 12 noon I.C.P. 63	Mar. 4	Text of the Allied announcement concerning high prices and foreign exchanges adopted subject to M. Millerand's acceptance.	392
48 MEETING OF ALLIED FOREIGN MINISTERS AND AMBASSADORS: 11 a.m. I.C.P. 64	Mar. 4	1. Japanese request for representation on the proposed High Commission of the Straits. 2. Consideration of the draft proposals for the financial conditions of peace with Turkey.	393 399
49 MEETING OF ALLIED FOREIGN MINISTERS AND AMBASSADORS: 4 p.m. I.C.P. 65	Mar. 4	1. Continued discussion of the draft proposals for the financial conditions of peace with Turkey.	403
50 MEETING OF ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES: 11 a.m. I.C.P. 66	Mar. 5	1. Question of action to be taken at Constantinople as a result of the massacres of Armenians in Cilicia, and enforcement of the terms of peace.	411

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51 MEETING OF ALLIED FOREIGN MINISTERS AND AMBASSADORS: 3 p.m. I.C.P. 67	Mar. 5	1. Discussion of the Netherland note of Mar. 2 concerning the extradition of the former German Emperor, and agreement on the form of the Allied reply. 2. Decision that Lord Curzon should interview the American Ambassador in London to invite American co-operation in the proposed Allied action at Constantinople. 3. No French reply yet received in regard to the draft Allied announcement on high prices and foreign exchanges.	423 428 430
SIR R. GRAHAM The Hague Tel. No. 56	Mar. 4	App. 2. Paraphrase of telegram reporting conversation with Dutch M.F.A. regarding internment of the former German Emperor: his purchase of Doorn.	431
52 MEETING OF ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES: 12 noon I.C.P. 68	Mar. 8	1. French amendments to the draft Allied announcement on high prices and foreign exchanges, and agreement on its publication date. <i>Note 3.</i> Reparation Commission letter No. C.R. 751 of Mar. 4 to the German War Burdens Commission regarding the application of article 235 of the Treaty of Versailles.	432 432
53 MEETING OF BRITISH, FRENCH AND ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVES: 12.15 p.m. I.C.P. 68A	Mar. 8	1. Question of the Adriatic: consideration of reply to President Wilson's note of Mar. 6 and decision to refer the matter to Signor Nitti. 2. Confirmation of Italian co-operation in the proposed Allied action at Constantinople.	436 438
54 MEETING OF ALLIED FOREIGN MINISTERS AND AMBASSADORS: 4.30 p.m. I.C.P. 69	Mar. 8	1. Consideration of the Hungarian reply to terms of Hungarian peace treaty; Delimitation Commission given authority to suggest specific frontier modifications to the League of Nations. <i>Note 6.</i> Memo. of Mar. 8 by Mr. Leeper on the Hungarian observations on the peace treaty and the reply thereto of the Rumanian, Yugoslav and Czechoslovak Govts. 2. Draft instructions for the Allied commission supervising the Rumanian evacuation of Hungary referred to the Italian delegation.	440 440 449

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## CHAPTER II

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<b>59 MEETING OF ALLIED FOREIGN MINISTERS AND AMBASSADORS:</b> 4.30 p.m. I.C.P. 73 BRITISH DELEGATION A.J. 70	Mar. 12	1. Consideration of clauses for insertion in the Turkish peace treaty concerning the functions of the Constantinople Superior Council of Health and the Turkish Sanitary Administration. App. Memo. containing draft clauses relative to Turkish health organization.	486 490
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MR. LINDSAY Washington	Mar. 11	App. 4. Paraphrase of a telegram reporting the American attitude to the Turkish peace treaty.	501
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## CHAPTER I

# Earlier proceedings of the First Conference of London

February 12—March 10, 1920

### No. 1

I.C.P. 24.]<sup>1</sup> *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, S.W., on Thursday, February 12, 1920, at 11 a.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; **SECRETARY,** Sir M. Hankey.

*France:* M. Millerand, President of the Council; M. Berthelot; **SECRETARY,** M. de Béarn.

*Italy:* Signor Nitti, President of the Council; **SECRETARY,** Signor Trombetti.

**INTERPRETER:** Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. **MR. LLOYD GEORGE** suggested that the council should begin with a general discussion on the future work of the Peace Conference.

*The Future Work  
of the Peace  
Conference* M. MILLERAND and SIGNOR NITTI agreed, and suggested that Mr. Lloyd George should open the discussion.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had a few general observations to offer on the questions awaiting settlement. There was first the question of the Turkish treaty.<sup>2</sup> There were other difficult and even dangerous questions arising out of the execution of the German treaty. As regards the Turkish treaty,<sup>3</sup> he felt that the conference had waited perilously long before taking this up. It was not the fault of the conference. The difficulty was due to the fact that President Wilson had led the conference to expect that when he returned to the United States of America he would be in a position very shortly to give a decision as to whether the United States of America would accept a mandate. He had hoped to do so at the latest by August or September. The difficulties, however, had proved to be greater than he had anticipated. The result was that, instead of giving a reply in September, he was not able to give a reply to-day, nor was he likely to do so three months hence. Hence it was right for

<sup>1</sup> Documents I.C.P. 1-23 are printed in Volume II, Chap. II.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Volume IV, Chap. III, *passim*.

<sup>3</sup> The following passage (beginning 'As regards the Turkish treaty', and ending '... weeks in the aggregate') is printed with minor variation by David Lloyd George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties* (London, 1938), vol. ii, pp. 1268-9.

the other Powers concerned to bring the matter to a conclusion. There were also our own difficulties to be considered. He believed that the British as well as the French press, and, he thought, even the Italian press, had said that the only thing to be done was for the heads of Governments to talk quite frankly to one another. This was about the only good advice that the press had ever given to the Peace Conference. The first difficulty was the physical difficulty of the heads of Governments meeting and continuing together in the same place for their deliberations. This applied not only to the Turkish treaty, but to the other questions also. The meetings must either take place at Paris, Rome or London; that is to say, in either case two-thirds of the council had to be in some country that was not their own. He understood that M. Millerand found it difficult to remain in London on this visit. This would give him some idea of what his own difficulties had been in staying for seven months in Paris last year. It was not only he himself that had stayed, however. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had remained for nine months, and other Ministers had remained for weeks in the aggregate. Although Lord Curzon was exceptionally experienced in foreign affairs, he had felt himself crippled during the Peace Conference by the prolonged absence of the officials of the Foreign Office. Those were the difficulties, and frankly he would say that he thought the heads of Governments ought to share these difficulties between them. When M. Clemenceau had been in office<sup>4</sup> there had been the fact of his great age to consider. When they were told that it was very difficult for him to be away for a long time, taking his great age into consideration, it was natural that his colleagues would go far to meet him. At that time he had observed that when domestic difficulties arose in France, M. Clemenceau could attend to them. The conference was, if necessary, put off. In the case of Great Britain, however, affairs had had to be left in the hands of a mutilated Cabinet, which often had not liked to take the responsibility of decisions in the absence of three or four of the most important Ministers. We could not repeat that experience. He fully understood M. Millerand's difficulties in the matter. It was impossible, however, for him to leave England again this year. When the British Foreign Office had been deprived of a great part of its staff for nine months of last year, it was too much to ask Lord Curzon to leave. Moreover, as he was reminded by Lord Curzon, the latter was also leader of the House of Lords, which made it impossible for him to leave London for any length of time. Italy was entitled to say that it was just as difficult for her Ministers to come to London or Paris. He himself had felt this difficulty so much that he was prepared to hold a meeting in Italy. It would be a great inconvenience to him, but, nevertheless, he would agree to it as a recognition that Italy had the same right as Great Britain and France in this matter. It might be said that the heads of Governments only had to settle the principles, and that the remainder of the questions of detail could be settled by experts. He himself had been engaged in this business for a year, and he could say definitely that this was not a correct description of what happened. During the Peace

<sup>4</sup> As President of the French Council of Ministers, November 1917-January 1920.

Conference there was not a day during which questions of principle had not come up at the Supreme Council. M. Clemenceau, President Wilson, Signor Orlando and he himself had found the business could not be done in that way, and every day great questions of principle were coming up before the council which could only be settled by the heads of Governments or the Foreign Secretaries. Moreover, by leaving the details to experts it would result that one country was represented by its chiefs and the others only by subordinate officials. It was not a question of prestige. He himself had been opposed to the holding of the conference in any capital. He thought this was a mistake, because the press of that capital always took part in the discussions. He had seen confidential discussions published on the following morning to the meeting, giving the attitude of this or that delegation. In these circumstances, business had been almost impossible, and at one time he himself and President Wilson as well had thought that they would have to withdraw from the Peace Conference. The accounts published were, of course, incomplete and distorted, but were sufficiently accurate to indicate the line that had been taken. For these reasons he himself was opposed to holding the conferences in any capital. M. Clemenceau, however, had pleaded his age, and that France had suffered more severely than any other nation, and this was an appeal that he had not been able to resist, more especially when the German treaty was under consideration. France, however, had not been the principal sufferer against Turkey. The British Empire had lost scores of thousands of lives; they had engaged about a million and a half troops, and had spent 750 millions sterling in the war against the Turks. He was not basing on these facts a claim to have the treaty discussed in London, but to show that the same argument could not be used for the Turkish treaty being worked out in Paris. Hence, he would urge the French Ministers to meet the convenience of their colleagues. He knew how difficult it was for them, but it was not harder for them than it had been for himself last year. He would, therefore, ask them to make the same sacrifice to the Alliance as he himself had made in the previous year. He could not possibly be absent from London for months again this year, and he felt sure that the French Ministers would see the reasonableness of this. Otherwise a serious crisis would arise. On two points he must be quite definite. First, British Ministers could not go to Paris to work out the Turkish treaty, and second, Turkey could not be left at war with us. If the French Ministers could not agree to his proposals, we should be confronted with a situation which would be a serious menace to the goodwill which had existed between the two countries. He would be prepared to continue the discussion on this point at once, or, if his colleagues preferred, to continue his statement in regard to the Turkish treaty.

SIGNOR NITTI begged the conference to do everything possible to reduce the time which it would be necessary to spend in London to accomplish its work. In Italy the times were very difficult, more particularly from a Parliamentary point of view, and it was extremely difficult for him to leave Italy for weeks together. He had had to ask Parliament to adjourn to enable him

to come on this occasion, and they had agreed, but if the conference lasted long it would be impossible for him to remain away. He was very willing to come either to Paris or to London, but his colleagues must understand that it was not at all easy for him. If the English Prime Minister encountered difficulties in coming to Paris, he was ready, so far as this was possible, to come to London. He hoped, however, that if he should at any time find it impossible to leave Rome, his British and French colleagues would come there, as Mr. Lloyd George had suggested, and he would be very glad to see them. The important thing to remember at the present time was how difficult the situation remained. What was required was a definite and durable peace. The situation, however, was getting worse. All knew how difficult the situation was in Europe, not only for Italy, but for France and Great Britain also. There were millions of people in the centre and east of Europe who were not certain of having even the means of existence. This was a danger which might lead to revolution. There was complete lack of food and raw material. The nations could not get exchanges. However productive countries were we could not get from them the raw materials they [*sic*] required for lack of exchanges. During the war, the United States of America had given both raw materials and credits. Now, however, America had adopted a very stiff attitude, and would give no credits, so that no raw materials could be obtained. He would not refer in detail to the recent note by Mr. Glass.<sup>5</sup> The exchange situation was, therefore, very difficult in Italy, and almost equally so in France. So long as it was impossible to obtain raw materials from East and Central Europe, the situation would continue to get worse. The United States of America would not give credits because they thought that there would be no durable peace in Europe. This was the egoism of America. Hence, it was necessary to show that we intended to have peace at all costs and to indicate that our policy was one of making every sacrifice to obtain peace. For this it was necessary to settle four fundamental points. First, there was a question of Russia and what our relations were to be with her.<sup>6</sup> The Allies still had the Ambassadors of the former régime at their capitals. The Bolsheviks had, however, overrun the whole of Russia. The question arose as to whether we could successfully make war on the Bolsheviks. He thought not, so we had to consider what was to be done. A second group of questions arose in regard to the state of Germany. Thirdly, there was the Turkish question, and finally there was the question of the Adriatic.<sup>7</sup>

Even from the international point of view—he would say nothing of the Italian point of view—the question of the Adriatic must be settled and could not be prolonged. It was for this reason that he had made every sacrifice to

<sup>5</sup> i.e. the letter of January 28, 1920, addressed by Mr. Carter Glass, Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, to the President of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. This letter, which was published in *The Times* on January 31, 1920, is printed in *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the state of the finances for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1920* (Washington, 1920), pp. 80–84.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Volume II, Chap. II and Volume III, Chap. II.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Volume II, Chap. II and Volume IV, Chap. I.

try and reach a settlement. The state of Europe was horrible and might at any moment become very critical. The credit situation, to which he had alluded, corresponded with the economic situation. For the above reasons he would make every effort to be at the disposal of Great Britain and France for the conclusion of peace. He begged, however, that this conference would not separate without settling these questions in their fundamentals. Otherwise he feared that all the revolutionary forces of Europe would coalesce against us. It was essential, therefore, not to part until a decision had been reached on these four questions, which were fundamental to the peace of Europe.

M. MILLERAND said he was very happy to have been able to come to London, and much regretted that, for reasons which his colleagues knew and of which he thought they realised the importance, it was impossible for him to prolong his stay as much as he would like. He accepted the statement of the position as formulated by Mr. Lloyd George, with a very slight modification. Mr. Lloyd George had summed up the situation in two terms: first, he could not go to Paris for a prolonged stay, and, second, it was of great urgency to conclude peace with Turkey. He agreed, but in stating that the British Ministers could not come to Paris he would ask his English colleague to recall that the position was the same before all of them. Signor Nitti had shown that he could not leave Rome for an indefinite period. If he could make a personal remark, he would point out that at Paris he had to perform the double duty both of Mr. Lloyd George and of Lord Curzon. He would, however, do everything, except what was impossible, in order to come to London and to remain as long as was necessary. It was his ardent desire not only to maintain but, if possible, to tighten the cordial and close relations which had existed between the Allied Governments. For that he personally would make great sacrifices. What then was to be the procedure of the council? First, he would like, without any *arrière-pensée*, to put forward the agreement which had been reached between the British Ambassador and himself in a very frank talk.<sup>8</sup> What were the difficulties of the situation? Mr. Lloyd George had remarked, with reason, that he could not repeat his seven months' stay in Paris. This was evident and the French Government realised it. The same thing applied to the French Government. In 1919 all the Allied Governments, even those which had remained in their own capitals, had had to spend most of their time over negotiating the Treaty of Peace with Germany. As this dominated everything, all questions had been subordinated to it. Those problems, however, which had remained behind the scenes had, as it were, taken their revenge and had now become very serious. These were the internal problems, which were equally serious in England, Italy and France. Only two days before he had been threatened with a general strike on the railways in France. To-morrow they might be threatened with a general strike in the mines. The fact was that all the Allied countries were under the menace of a certain Bolshevik infiltration, the object of which was to provoke a revolt. He himself believed that Germany was trying to make capital out of this. It was impossible for the three

<sup>8</sup> See Volume IV, Nos. 679-80.

Governments to disinterest themselves in their internal problems and devote themselves exclusively to the making of peace. Would it not be possible, therefore, to arrange so that the heads of Governments should not be so completely absorbed in the making of peace with Turkey as they had been in the case of Germany? He agreed with Mr. Lloyd George and Signor Nitti that a different procedure must be pursued in the case of Turkey from what had been followed in the case of Germany. He would ask, however, whether it would not be possible to do with less conversation between the heads of Governments and more between their representatives? This must be possible, because the affair could be dealt with in no other way. He did not understand that the question had been raised of changing the seat of the Peace Conference from Paris to London. Mr. Lloyd George had not said so. Mr. Lloyd George had said, with good reason, that the British Empire had made the greatest sacrifices in the war with Turkey. He recognised that their sacrifices were out of all comparison to the other nations. When Paris, however, had been chosen as the seat of the Peace Conference, it had not been so selected because France was the country which had made the greatest sacrifices against Germany, but because France had had the privilege of making the greatest sacrifices in the war as a whole, and had suffered for all. They had lost most in men, and their country had been most devastated. We had not, therefore, proposed that the Treaty of Peace with Germany should be concluded in Paris, the treaty with Austria in Rome and the treaty with Turkey in London. The question had been considered as a whole, and it had been decided that the seat of the treaty negotiations should be Paris. He understood, however, that there was no question of changing the seat of the treaty. Therefore no difficulty should arise on that point. The Turkish delegation would be invited to Paris to receive the treaty, which would also be signed and ratified there. He was prepared, however, that the real work should be done in London. There should be reciprocity from every point of view. As head of the French Government he understood this, and he would make no difficulty in going to London as often as necessary. It might happen on occasions that something would occur, as was happening next week, which would make it impossible for him to remain in London, but he would give a formal assurance that he was ready to come as often as necessary to discuss matters here. He agreed with Signor Nitti that it was a capital interest which dominated all others that the heads of Governments should agree on principles. It was only the heads who could discuss these and settle them. Hence he would do his best to speed matters up. If, as he hoped, they were all in agreement, he would assure his colleagues that, as far as he was concerned, he would take every precaution, at those meetings which had to be held in Paris, against the indiscretions of the press. The offence, however, was often not committed in the local press of the seat of the conference, but elsewhere; in which connection he alluded to the recent disclosures which had been made in London of discussions at the Peace Conference. He was entirely at the disposal of his colleagues, to come to London in order to settle those questions that required decision at the earliest possible moment.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the recent disclosures had been given in Paris to the representative of the London 'Times'<sup>9</sup> which was a journal strongly opposed to the Government.

M. BERTHELOT said this was impossible, because the 'Times' had the information before the conversation took place with the Lord Chancellor. The 'Times' said that this came from their Paris correspondent, but it was probably only a ruse.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this information was not such that a Government would be likely to give to a journal that was opposed to it. Articles had also appeared in the 'Temps' but he would not pursue the matter.

SIGNOR NITTI said he was perfectly in agreement with what had been said about the seat of the Peace Conference. He would do all he could to carry out what had been proposed. There was, however, another matter on which he wished to say a word. He thought they ought not to separate without settling certain questions. It was necessary that all the world should know what had been decided, for what most created a spirit of revolution was uncertainty. Towards Russia we must know what was meant by the 'exchange of commodities.'<sup>10</sup> And, besides Russia, the questions of Turkey and relations with Germany, and the Adriatic, must be settled. Towards Germany we must show that we were working for peace, and not for revolution. A bad solution would be better than no solution at all. The general lines of the four questions he had mentioned must be settled, not necessarily, in detail, but on the broad principles.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed with Signor Nitti that the most important thing was to establish peace in Europe. The only point where the selection of the place of the conference was a matter of importance was that it would be a disaster if the council were unable to agree where the discussions were to be held. In that event, each would have to make its own arrangements for peace in the East, and this would be a great misfortune and a deplorable ending of a great alliance. He was not quite clear what M. Millerand proposed. Would he leave M. Berthelot or someone else in London to continue the discussions? For, having once met, it was necessary to find a solution to the various questions, as Signor Nitti said. He agreed with M. Millerand that the Turkish Treaty should be handed to the Turkish delegates in Paris and signed there. He had absolutely no desire to take that away from Paris. He could assure M. Millerand that he was not fighting the battle of London *versus* Paris. The only question was that, if he remained for seven or eight months in Paris again, he could never overtake the arrears of work.

LORD CURZON emphasised what he thought the interpreter had over-

<sup>9</sup> For these disclosures see *The Times* of February 7, 1920, p. 12, col. f. This report related to British and French viewpoints concerning the question of the surrender of German nationals accused of war-crimes (see Volume IX, Chap. VII), and to the attendance of Lord Birkenhead, the Lord Chancellor, at a meeting on February 6 of the Conference of Ambassadors. This conference sat in Paris from January 26, 1920, under the regular chairmanship of M. Jules Cambon, to determine questions of interpretation and execution of the treaties of peace.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Volume II, No. 76, appendix A.



looked, that the most important point of Mr. Lloyd George's statement was that, if a difficulty arose between settling the peace either in Paris or London, there was a real danger of a separate peace being made. The only result would be that each nation would have to make its own arrangements.

M. MILLERAND said it was quite certain that if the alliance broke up each nation would have to make its own arrangements. This was an eventuality, however, that he had not envisaged. Moreover, we seemed very far from it, for there appeared to be complete agreement on the only point which might have caused difficulty, namely, that the seat of the Peace Conference should continue at Paris. Signor Nitti and Mr. Lloyd George had both agreed on this. It was only the method of our work which had to be changed, and he wanted to arrive at a solution of that as soon as possible. The question of whether M. Berthelot should be left here might be settled on Saturday,<sup>11</sup> when we could see what progress had been made. His colleagues would find that he was anxious only to arrive at a solution as soon as possible.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested, therefore, that the discussion of the future procedure should be adjourned until Saturday. The question arose now as to whether the council should take up the question of the Turkish peace or the execution of the German Treaty, on which there were various outstanding questions, including that of the Kaiser,<sup>12</sup> the war criminals and certain points relating to reparations which he wished to raise. There was also the question of Russia.

LORD CURZON suggested that the Japanese representatives ought to be present for discussions on the execution of the treaty.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that for to-day they should confine themselves to a general discussion.

M. MILLERAND said that Belgium would have to be represented when the war criminals were discussed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested a preliminary talk.

SIGNOR NITTI agreed, and proposed that they should begin with the subject of the war criminals.

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, in view of the misunderstandings which had taken place, he would explain the position of the British Government in this matter. They did not recede from the position that the war criminals ought to be punished. That was a fundamental. They thought, however, that it ought to be clear that, in choosing the persons to be punished, political and criminal questions should not be mixed up. Nor should men be punished who were merely carrying out the war, it might be ruthless war, but were not doing what would be generally recognised as a moral outrage. It was unfortunate that, although the British representatives had given their colleagues the names on the British list, they had not themselves received the Allied lists. Hence it came as a great surprise to the British Government to find such names as those of Marshal Hindenburg, Bethmann-Hollweg<sup>13</sup> and Ludendorff<sup>14</sup> on

<sup>11</sup> February 14, 1920.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Volume II, Chap. II and Volume V, Chap. I.

<sup>13</sup> German Chancellor, 1909-17.

<sup>14</sup> Formerly First Quartermaster-General of the German Army.

the list. He did not know what crimes were laid to their charge. All he knew was that to demand the surrender and prosecution of Hindenburg before a tribunal of his enemies was to ask something which no nation could agree to, however crushed and defeated it might be. Hindenburg had become a sort of mythical personage, who was popular with all classes, and had become the idol of the German people. It was exactly as though, if the situation had been inverted and France had been beaten, Germany had demanded Marshal Joffre or Marshal Foch to be tried before a German court-martial for an infringement of the laws of war. Or as though, if Great Britain had been beaten, the Germans had demanded Lord Kitchener, who had occupied a position somewhat similar to that of Marshal Hindenburg. Rather than surrender him, the British people would have received a German garrison in all parts of the country from Land's End to John o' Groats, and taken their chance of rebelling. To demand Hindenburg was a political mistake of the first magnitude. This question had been discussed here in London with M. Clemenceau, when M. Berthelot had also been present, and afterwards in Paris. He had then been given to understand that the French demand was limited to persons accused of debasing women, and crimes of that kind, which would be recognised not only by soldiers, but by the whole German people. If the Germans said that they would not give up Hindenburg, what would be the position? Would any country go to war for that reason? Would Italy, Great Britain or France go to war in order to force the surrender of Hindenburg? It was incredible. He confessed that, looking over the British list, he would have liked to cut it down. If the curtailment of their lists presented difficulties to the French and Belgian Governments, he would be willing to cut down the British list. He would give up the names of a similar character, and confine the list to those who had carried out direct outrages. He hoped, therefore, that his colleagues would not press for the handing over of men in these categories. It meant a new war, in which the British Government would not engage, and against which the common sense of the world would protest, and the Allies would be humiliated.

(At this moment Mr. Lloyd George said he had only just heard that Marshal Foch and M. Cambon<sup>15</sup> were still waiting outside. He had thought it was understood that they would return home and that they were to be informed if their presence was required. He much regretted that they should have been detained.

Mr. J. T. Davies<sup>16</sup> was instructed to explain the position to them.)

M. MILLERAND said that in the declaration which Mr. Lloyd George had just made there were two points which seemed to him quite impossible to agree to. He hoped, however, that on reflection and further discussion agreement would be reached. The first question was one of fact. It was said that the names on the French and Belgian lists had not been communicated to the British representative. There must certainly be a mistake here in regard to

<sup>15</sup> M. Paul Cambon, French ambassador in London.

<sup>16</sup> Private Secretary to Mr. Lloyd George.

the facts. M. Ignace, the French Under-Secretary for Justice, and representative on the commission on this subject, had repeated to him that he had communicated to his British colleague the French list, who had kept it for some days.

(During the interpretation of this passage Mr. Lloyd George interpolated that the list had not been communicated. He had summoned the experts and had asked them the question as to whether they had seen the list, and they had replied that they had not seen it and that they had no notion that Hindenburg and the others were on it.)

This was very curious, as M. Ignace had made it quite clear that the experts had seen the lists and kept them for several days. He thought possibly that they had thought that only numbers mattered, and had not considered it their duty to examine the names. Perhaps two mistakes had been committed. The British experts had made a mistake in only examining the question of numbers, and the French in putting names in the list that should not be there. He would not examine this point, as it appeared to him impossible, after so many months' discussion and after the list had been communicated to the Germans, to alter it. Were we to say to the Germans that some names that had been put in by mistake would now be taken off? That position was, in his opinion, absolutely incompatible with the dignity of the Allies. That was his first point. The second point he had to deal with was Mr. Lloyd George's suggestion that no nation would agree to deliver for trial a man who occupied the position of Hindenburg in Germany, Lord Kitchener in Great Britain, or Marshal Foch or Marshal Joffre in France. He would recall, however, that Germany was a nation so humiliated that she had signed a treaty to hand over the persons demanded. Great Britain, France or Italy would never have signed such an undertaking. It would be very dangerous to recognise that Germany had signed and accepted an engagement which she was unable to carry out. This would be to recognise that Germany had only to show that she could not carry out an article for it to be dispensed with. If this point of view were accepted there would be no treaty. Finally, he must deal with Mr. Lloyd George's point that, if we insisted on this, there would be a renewal of the war. He must disagree from this idea. He would explain the attitude that we ought to take up, and would show that the situation was not so dangerous as appeared. It seemed to him that there was a solution whereby the Allies would be able to maintain the position they had taken up, which they could not morally abandon, and at the same time to avoid all danger. What had we said to Germany? We had said: 'You have undertaken to hand over to us persons accused of crimes against the laws of war, to be judged by us.' Germany had accepted that situation and put her signature to it. The question, therefore, that was forced on us to decide was as to whether Germany was to be made to keep the treaty or whether, at the first sign of resistance, the Allies were to give way. It was, he maintained, essential for them to keep Germany to the treaty. He would therefore say to Germany: 'We have demanded that you hand over the accused persons for trial.' If

they would not hand them over, he would conduct a trial under the rules existing in all countries for the trial of defaulting criminals. All the rules should be observed—the hearing of the witnesses, the public accusation, and the public defence, if need be. Before the world this would appear the solemn trial which had been promised on the conclusion of the war. In this way the position of the Allies would remain what it had always been. All that Germany could do would be to protest against this procedure, but no violence was to be feared. If Germany declined to carry out part of the treaty, the treaty itself gave the Allies the right to take such measures as they might consider desirable. If it was thought advisable to take economic measures against Germany without endangering the Allies themselves, this might be done. The Allies had the power, but they need not use it unless they considered it necessary. If Germany declined to execute articles 228 to 230 of the treaty, it was the Allies who held, as it were, the tap and could turn on some penalties or not as they thought fit. This, therefore, was the solution, to maintain the position of the Allies the first time that Germany resisted, and yet to protect themselves against dangerous complications. It was the Allies who remained masters of the situation, to use or not to use the sanctions provided for in the treaty.

SIGNOR NITTI said that the situation was a very delicate one, which must be discussed in tranquillity and with serenity of mind. It was true that the Allies had the rights of the treaty, and they had the right to demand the handing over of these men; but there was the question of the facts of the present situation, and he thought it was clear that a distinction must be made between those who had directed policy and those who had committed crimes. He thought it was very difficult to demand the handing over of Marshal Hindenburg, and he agreed with Mr. Lloyd George that no self-respecting nation could consent. He recalled that Serbia, after the murder of the Archduke,<sup>17</sup> had been called upon by Austria to hand over men suspected of connection with the crime. Serbia had preferred the sacrifices for herself and for the Allies. It was, therefore, important to distinguish between the criminals and the heads of the Government. Mr. Lloyd George suggested that if Germany declined there would be a reopening of the war, while M. Millerand said this would not take place, and that, if Germany should refuse, the persons should be tried as defaulting criminals. This would give the public the impression that we were not in reality applying the treaty, and he did not see much use in that. It was the question of fact that pre-occupied him most. If we confined ourselves to the question of right we should have to apply the whole treaty. If, however, we considered it from the point of view of the question of fact, he thought that Germany could not be compelled to make the necessary effort to hand over the criminals. There was a risk of revolution and of the fall of the democratic forces in Germany which all the Allies wished to support. There was a danger that Germany might turn to Bolshevism, which, indeed, was partly a product of the German

<sup>17</sup> i.e. the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand by a Bosnian assassin at Sarajevo on June 28, 1914.

mind. What, then, was to be done? In his opinion, the best solution would be that Germany should try the prisoners herself. The Germans might try them well or they might try them badly. If well, then they would be supporting us; if badly, then Germany would come out of the ordeal more discredited than ever, while the Allies would have the credit of having made a *beau geste*. It was a question of moral probity. He thought it was not to the interest of the Allies to carry the question to extremes, and that a disinterested attitude should be taken up.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed an adjournment, and asked whether, on reassembly, the Belgians should be invited.

M. MILLERAND said that the only observation he had to make on this question was that the question bore a moral character. He could not hide that any change in the list, and particularly the disappearance of those who had given orders such as Hindenburg and the Crown Prince of Bavaria, would have an extraordinarily bad effect in the ten devastated departments of France, which were abominably situated at the present time, particularly owing to the orders of Hindenburg. The inhabitants of these provinces knew that Hindenburg's surrender had been demanded, and they would know that it had been cancelled. Another country in exactly the same position was Belgium. Therefore he did not think that the discussion ought to be continued, even on the question of principle, without hearing what Belgium had to say as to the effect on her of an alteration of the list.

LORD CURZON undertook to invite the Belgian representatives that afternoon.

*(At 1.30 p.m. the conference adjourned until 3.30 p.m. the same afternoon.)*

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 12, 1920.

## No. 2

I.C.P. 25.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10 Downing Street, London, S.W., on Thursday, February 12, 1920, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: *Belgium*: M. Delacroix, Prime Minister; M. Rolin Jacquemyns.

*British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel STOTT.

*France*: M. Millerand, President of the Council; M. Berthelot; SECRETARY, M. de Béarn.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, as M. Delacroix had happened to be in London, the council had been fortunate enough to secure the presence of the Belgian Prime Minister at their deliberations that afternoon. He would now call on Lord Curzon to make a statement.
- Breaches of the  
Laws of War*

LORD CURZON said that he desired to invite attention to one point made by M. Millerand at their meeting that morning, namely, as to the circumstances in which the list of war criminals had been handed to, and presumably seen by, the British representatives. Since the morning he had seen the Solicitor-General, who had informed him that the two lists had been drawn up at different times. The first list had contained several thousand names. This list had subsequently been very materially cut down, and the second list had been prepared, which contained over 800 names, and this list, again, had later been reduced.<sup>1</sup> The Solicitor-General had never seen the French portion of any list subsequent to the second list. He would now pass to the other points made by M. Millerand at the earlier meeting: first, that the list of criminals had been drawn up and submitted officially by the Allied Governments to Germany; second, that we ought not to recede from the full application of the terms of the treaty, which had been signed by the Allies and by Germany; third, that if Germany refused to hand over the various men named on the several lists, they should be tried *in absentia*; and, fourth, that if Germany refused to produce these men the Allies would be entitled to adopt measures of retaliation, though M. Millerand did not precisely specify what measures he had in mind. As regards the proposal to try the accused in absence, Lord Curzon said that he had received information to the effect that the German Government were now collecting evidence of alleged acts of atrocity on the part of officers of the Allied Armies, which they threatened to publish if we persisted in our present demand. Again, it was possible that the Germans would, on their part, try *in absentia* the various Allied officers and others whose names would appear on their own lists, which would make the whole thing ridiculous. Further, what we desired was not only the trial of the accused, but also the punishment of those convicted, and M. Millerand's proposal rendered their punishment impossible. Again, M. Millerand wanted the treaty strictly adhered to, but his proposal would involve the violation of the treaty by the Germans. In his view, the first thing to do was to ensure that the men to be tried were forthcoming. Next, what he wished was that the trial should be conducted by a court which was not exclusively composed of enemies, but should include some neutral judges—a point to which he attached great importance. Lastly, there was the necessity to uphold the treaty. Signor Nitti had alluded that morning to a counter-proposal by the Germans that the accused should be tried by Germans in Germany, which had been put forward by von Lersner.<sup>2</sup> It was suggested by the latter that the trial should be conducted by the High Court of Appeal at Leipzig; that the Allies should provide prosecutors for the various cases, and that they should also find assessors to sit on the bench with

<sup>1</sup> See Volume II, No. 73, minute 3, and No. 78, minute 1; see also in the present volume, No. 3, note 4.

<sup>2</sup> For this proposal, made by Baron von Lersner, former head of the German Peace Delegation, in note No. 88 of January 25, 1920, to M. Clemenceau, see Cmd. 1325 of 1921, *Protocols and correspondence between the Supreme Council and the Conference of Ambassadors and the German Government and the German Peace Delegation between January 10, 1920, and July 17, 1920, respecting the execution of the Treaty of Versailles of June 28, 1919*, pp. 19–22.

the German judges; and, lastly, if the Allies were dissatisfied with the verdict, that they should have a right of appeal to a higher court instituted by the League of Nations. As regards the last suggestion, he would only say that it was not within the region of practical politics, as no such higher court had yet been appointed, and it was impossible at present to forecast what the power and authority of the League of Nations would be. Having regard to all the circumstances, he wondered whether we should be well advised to turn down von Lersner's proposal. Would it not give us what we wanted, and also involve no departure from the treaty? He himself was disposed to believe that the Germans were really willing to try the accused, and, if the evidence permitted, to condemn them. He suggested, therefore, that the Allies should test the sincerity of the Germans by seeing if they were prepared to arrest the accused persons. Suppose the Germans said that they were ready to arrest, say, 50, 80 or 100 of the people mentioned in our lists, would we not gain more by having such a limited number tried and sentenced by a German court than having a much larger number sentenced *in absentia* by an Allied court? Further, his proposal would not involve any abrogation of our treaty rights, as, if we were not satisfied with the result of the trial by the German court, we could still insist on the surrender of the men named on the lists and try them ourselves. As regards the place of trial, he thought that it should be in occupied German territory rather than in Leipzig. Lord Curzon concluded by saying that he had prepared for their consideration, if the council so desired, a draft reply to the German Government.

M. MILLERAND said that, as regards the German threat to publish counter-lists of alleged atrocities on the part of Allied troops, he thought we could await their publication and see what they were like. The French Government had anticipated something of the sort, and it was impossible for us to take any steps to arrest their publication. The Germans would certainly publish, if they thought it would serve their purpose. The essential criticism that he addressed to Lord Curzon's most interesting proposal was this: if the council acted on his suggestion it would mean that we should start a discussion with the Germans as to how the Germans must be tried; and if once we entered upon a discussion of this kind, who could say where it would end? He himself was convinced that this proposal was merely another instance of trickery and bluff on the part of the Germans, whose intention it was to engage us in a discussion which would be drawn out interminably. The Allies had drawn up their respective lists with the utmost care, and they had submitted them to the Germans, who were now employing all their ingenuity to avoid surrendering to Allied justice the men named. He perceived that if we departed from the text of the treaty we should be driven to substitute new articles for those in the original instrument, and who could say what this might not lead to? The Germans would say that the Allies evidently recognised that the treaty as it stood was not a just treaty, and that they were prepared to recede from it, and we should be made to appear to think that the proposed Allied tribunal was not a suitable court. His own view was that we must abide by the treaty as it stood, and be as moderate and prudent as

circumstances would permit in its application. He recognised the undoubted difficulties standing in the way of exacting the full terms of articles 228, 229 and 230, but he submitted that we could not abandon them. The aim of the Allies was not so much that punishment should be exacted on the persons of the various criminals but that the evidence on which the charges against those men were based should be brought conspicuously to the knowledge of the whole world. He was afraid that if we gave way on this point, it was quite possible that the result might be a breakdown of the whole treaty. We must maintain our position, for if the Germans found that they could evade us on this point they would certainly endeavour to evade us on others. His own proposal had the advantage of avoiding any discussion which, as he had pointed out, might have most unfortunate results.

SIGNOR NITTI said, with regard to M. Millerand's proposal to try the German accused in their absence, he agreed that the President of the French Council was correct in stating that we had the right to demand their surrender, and that we could convict them in their absence if the Germans refused to hand them over; but if they were not surrendered, what could we do? It was impossible for us to take up arms again, and to try them *in absentia* would amount to a confession of impotence. In Germany to-day the forces of reaction and revolution were working simultaneously. The last thing we wanted was that chaos should prevail in Germany. Further, in his view, it was useless for us to press for the surrender of popular heroes like Marshal Hindenburg. Lord Curzon had suggested a compromise in the form of an inter-Allied court, to sit in occupied German territory to try the criminals. This proposal offered a way out, but it presented certain difficulties. An alternative was that we should say to Germany: 'We leave the trial of these men to you, and we rely upon you to see that they are adequately punished.' This solution was not without its dangers, but he thought that it might be tried. We might say to Germany: 'You maintain that the execution of the exact terms of the treaty will cause a revolution in your country; well, as we are deeply interested in the maintenance of law and order, we will ask you to try and to punish the men named in our lists.' Then, if Germany tried them in their courts and did not convict them, or if she did not bring them to trial, the German nation would stand for ever self-condemned before the world. As he had said, he perceived many dangers in this solution, but he believed that they were less serious than those which might arise from any other proposals that had yet been suggested.

M. DELACROIX stated that he had a proposition to make which was in the nature of a compromise, designed to unite the three solutions advocated respectively by Lord Curzon, M. Millerand and Signor Nitti. It was of the highest importance that the Allies should maintain their unity, and it would be profoundly dangerous to give to the Germans the impression that we were in any way in disagreement. It was for us to present to the world a united front, solid as a rock. We could admit privately among ourselves that it was impossible for us to stand by every word of the treaty, but we must not make this confession to the enemy. M. Millerand wanted to stand by the letter of



the treaty, and suggested the trial of the accused in their absence. Signor Nitti was of opinion that this would mean the bankruptcy of the treaty. He himself submitted that to try them *in absentia* did not mean that we should obtain the full execution of the treaty. The result would merely be a parody of justice and we should have the Germans laughing at us. Again, if we tried these men in their absence we should be confronted with the difficulty of fixing the responsibility as between subordinates and superiors who gave the orders; and, further, certain essential documents would not be forthcoming; all of which would gravely embarrass our judges. These latter, therefore, trained as they were to the strictest impartiality, would tell the Allied Governments that they could not convict or proceed owing to lack of evidence. He would now pass to Lord Curzon's suggestion, that we should parley with the Germans and come to an agreement by which the accused might be brought before a German Court of Appeal at Leipzig, or a mixed tribunal in occupied territory. He thought that the latter suggestion was open to the objection that the trial would take place in the midst of populations who would be sympathetic to the accused; whereas it was our great desire to see those populations sympathetic to the occupiers. Supposing, for instance, General Ludendorff was brought there for trial and received a popular ovation, it would have a most unfortunate effect. Again, we specially wanted to avoid discussion with the Germans, as this would indicate a weakening on our part. Signor Nitti had pointed out the embarrassing position of the Allied judges sitting on the same bench as the Germans, and had put forward an alternative proposal that we should, with a *beau geste*, cancel article 228 of the treaty. We might have done this some time ago on humanitarian principles, but it was impossible for us to proceed on this high plane when the Germans had refused to hand over the accused. He himself, therefore, suggested that the Allied Governments should entrust to a mixed commission the preparation of a full accusation against each accused, making use of every possible means to ensure that the accusations were based on the clearest evidence, and irrefutable. The commission should not be instructed to modify the lists, and they should not be a court to try the accused in their absence. After the evidence against each criminal had been most carefully examined, and, if necessary, restated, we would hand over the evidence and the lists to the Germans, and say to them: 'Here are the names of the men, the crimes with which they are charged, and the evidence against them; it is for you to try them, and, on conviction, to punish.' If they brought them to trial, well and good; if not, the German nation, as Lord Curzon had said, would stand self-condemned.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he felt strongly with the Belgian Prime Minister that it was essential that the Allied Governments should decide on some action in which they were all in full agreement. To send in full lists, and to insist upon the surrender of all the people mentioned thereon would not mean full agreement, and so this solution might be set aside. M. Millerand was anxious that we should stand by the treaty in its integrity, on the ground that if once we gave way we should not know when to stop. Mr. Lloyd

George said that he did not quite agree with the French President of the Council. Everything depended upon the Allied Governments having public opinion behind them. It was no use their trying to enforce anything if they were not fortified by this public opinion. He was sure that public opinion generally would not stand Marshal Hindenburg and General Ludendorff being surrendered for trial, as this would be repugnant to the ordinary citizen; nor, indeed, had the British Government ever contemplated such cases as these. He wished to point out that M. Millerand's proposal to try in absence would be contrary to article 228 of the treaty, which definitely stated that 'Germany shall hand over,' &c., and this proposal was actually made after the Germans had refused to surrender the criminals. Again, article 229 laid down that: 'Criminal acts by Germans against certain Allied Powers would be brought before tribunals of those Powers.' So if we adopted this alternative it would mean that we did not intend to stand by the strict letter of the treaty. If the Allies, many months back, had enforced the treaty, it might have been possible to stand by the letter of its terms, but this was not now feasible. Public sentiment had undergone a change, and there was a general desire to return to the ordinary business of life. British public opinion only desired the punishment of men who had been guilty of certain unconscionable crimes, especially those committed against women. He was sure that it was better that we should have 100 convictions of men guilty of such crimes than a parade of sham tribunals, sham courts, sham verdicts, and sham punishments. The Belgian Prime Minister had tried to assimilate three previous alternatives; he himself would try to graft on to M. Delacroix's proposal a suggestion of his own. There was no necessity, he thought, to discuss the question at length with the Germans. The latter had put forward a suggestion, and he submitted that what we should do was to say to the Germans: 'We do not fully understand your proposal: what exactly does it mean?', and thus get them to define it more precisely. He was still of opinion that the trial should be in occupied territory, where the court and the witnesses could not be intimidated; otherwise, it might degenerate into a farce. He recognised, however, that there were possible objections to this course, as had been pointed out by M. Delacroix, but he doubted whether the disturbances apprehended by the latter would in reality take place. The Belgian Prime Minister had suggested an Allied Commission to examine all the evidence and documents. He agreed that a commission should be set up to prepare what he would call a 'First List,' which would include all the very worst criminals, whose crimes must offend even the Germans; that is to say, men who had been guilty of shooting drowning men, or of offences against women. He did not wish to offend fair, decent, German opinion by the inclusion of names which would find no support from public opinion. We would submit this First List to the Germans, and tell them that we wished to see whether they were really sincere in their proposal and meant business. If these tribunals worked well and convicted the worst offenders, then he suggested that we should not insist on the punishment of the remainder. His proposal would not mean abandoning the treaty. In conclusion he

would urge that the last thing we wanted was to destroy the present Government, and to have it succeeded by a Spartacist or militarist Government, which would inevitably be the case. If the council agreed in principle with his proposal, he suggested that a small informal committee, consisting of M. Berthelot, with an Italian, a Belgian and a British representative, should prepare a draft joint reply to von Lersner which the council might consider at a meeting on the following morning.

M. DELACROIX said that the reason why he pressed the question of an inter-Allied or mixed commission was that he wished to reconcile the proposals of Mr. Lloyd George and M. Millerand respectively. M. Millerand's contention was that we had sent in our lists, and if we went back upon them ourselves it would place us in a difficult and untenable position. But a mixed commission was a different matter; it would give an opportunity to arrive at a classification of the various cases, and possibly a reduction of those whose inclusion might hurt susceptibilities, and he agreed that the elimination of certain names might be advisable.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if the idea of a commission was accepted, it would take a very long time for it to conclude its business. In the meantime, what answer did the Belgian Prime Minister suggest we should give to the Germans? He reminded the council that they ought to send a reply to von Lersner with the least possible delay.

M. MILLERAND suggested that our reply should be that we were proposing to set up a commission, and that it should indicate its nature and functions.

M. DELACROIX agreed with M. Millerand.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the council were more or less generally agreed in principle to adopt his proposal to set up an informal committee to prepare a draft reply which could be examined on the following day, when the council could discover the points of agreement and disagreement. He did not think that it was a sufficient answer to von Lersner merely to say that we were projecting a commission. His own view was that it was not desirable to resubmit the whole lists a second time. This had already been done. He preferred his own proposal to send in a short list, to see what the Germans would actually do. It would not be a revised list, but an abbreviated list, which would give the Germans a chance to show their *bona fides*. He had a further proposal to make. He suggested that the council should adjourn for a quarter of an hour, and he would submit his proposal when they resumed their deliberations.

*(The council adjourned temporarily at 5.45 p.m.)*

M. DELACROIX said he agreed with Mr. Lloyd George's proposals except in one point and that was the suggestion to send a provisional list to Germany. He did not believe that the Germans would agree to the arrangements proposed and then the Allies would have to recede again from their position. If a provisional list were sent the German Government would be at once wondering whether certain names were going to be included later on. The main thing which was troubling them now was the fate of certain men such

as Hindenburg and Ludendorff, and so long as the fate of these people was unknown he did not think they would accept any proposals. The great danger was the Germans refusing to [*sic*] any new proposals and the Allies having to recede again. He would like to ask if it would not be feasible to prepare as soon as possible a full list, and in the meantime to tell the German Government that an Inter-Allied Commission had been appointed to draw up a revised list. As regards the place of meeting of the tribunal for the trial of prisoners, if his colleagues thought the occupied territory would be a suitable place he was quite prepared to agree.

SIGNOR NITTI thought the difficulties should not be avoided but solved. Under the terms of the treaty with Germany, the Allies had the right to demand the surrender of criminals and try them. It was, however, now open to them to say that they realised the difficulties and dangers, and that if the German Government were prepared to arrest the criminals themselves and try them, this solution would be agreed to. The full list should be prepared as soon as possible and the Allies should tell the Germans that it was now up to them to deal with the criminals and be entirely responsible for their trial. He agreed with M. Delacroix that the preparation of a provisional list would only cause anxiety and lead to trouble, and the first question everyone would be asking in Germany was whether Hindenburg and Ludendorff or somebody else would be on the second or third lists. As regards the place where the trial should take place, he was doubtful about the expediency of this being done in the occupied territories where we were responsible for keeping order. It was clear that the Allies must either tell Germany that she had got to surrender the prisoners and that we would use force to make her do so, or else they must say that they were aware of the dangers which such insistence on the original demands might lead to in Germany, and in the circumstances were prepared to agree to the criminals being tried in Germany itself. He was strongly opposed to any half measures which, in his opinion, would have the dangers of both and indicate a weakness on the part of the Allies. It was very necessary to come to a clear decision and that everyone should be agreed on the matter, and the solution should be of such a nature that there was no doubt as to what was to be done. An answer should be sent to Germany telling them what we proposed to do and in the meantime a complete list should be prepared as soon as possible.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if he were right in thinking that Signor Nitti approved of the proposals with the exception of the trial taking place in the occupied area.

SIGNOR NITTI replied in the affirmative.

M. MILLERAND said that he agreed with the proposals. It would be necessary for the Allies to take note of the undertaking by the Germans to try the criminals themselves. It was very desirable that it should be pointed out to the German Government that they were being permitted to try the criminals as a test of their good faith, and he quite agreed that they should be given full responsibility for doing so, and that the proceedings of their courts should not be interfered with except as suggested by Mr. Lloyd George in so far as

witnesses would have to be sent to give evidence. He also agreed that it might be left to the Germans to determine where the court should sit, and further that while the list was being prepared communication should be made to the German Government telling them that this was being done.

SIGNOR NITTI quite agreed in the proposal that the Germans should be instructed to carry out the trials themselves. It was most important that they should be given the list as soon as possible, and that everything should be done not to arouse any feeling of uncertainty. The question was whether the list which they already had was to be regarded as the final one. If not it must be altered and put in a new form, and if this were done he proposed that all names of people charged with political crimes should be removed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that a final decision should now be arrived at and that this should be to send to the German Government a letter on the lines proposed informing them that an Inter-Allied Commission was drawing up a joint list of war criminals and leaving out any reference to the trials taking place in the occupied territories. Continuing, he suggested that a draft of the letter might be prepared for consideration on the following day and this might be done by M. Berthelot, Sir M. Hankey and Signor Martino.<sup>3</sup> A short discussion then ensued during which M. Berthelot undertook to prepare the draft single-handed and to arrange for it to be ready by 8 a.m. on the following day.

M. MILLERAND raised the question of Marshal Foch attending on the following day for a discussion in connection with coal supplies, and it was agreed that in view of the questions which had to be considered in the morning it would be better to warn Marshal Foch that he would not be required before the afternoon.

SIGNOR NITTI referred to the other questions which had to be considered, viz.: the treaty with Turkey, question of the Adriatic, and Russian question, on all of which it was very important to come to an agreement. M. Millerand had to go away on Sunday,<sup>4</sup> and it appeared to him that a good deal of time was being taken up in discussing things which were more or less past and leaving those which vitally affected the future. He did not wish to make difficulties, but it took him forty-eight hours to reach London from Rome and he merely suggested the desirability of considering an agenda.

M. MILLERAND said that although he had to go back on Sunday he would arrange for M. Cambon to assist M. Berthelot in discussing the various questions, and he would be prepared to return himself on Monday the 23rd instant to resume the discussion.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was very grateful to M. Millerand for undertaking to do this, as there were certain questions which he thought must be discussed by the heads of the Governments concerned. The most urgent questions were the execution of the German treaty, the answer to be sent about criminals, the answer to be sent to Holland,<sup>5</sup> reparations, the

<sup>3</sup> Secretary-General of the Italian Peace Delegation.

<sup>4</sup> February 15, 1920.

<sup>5</sup> i.e. the reply to the Netherland note communicated on January 23, 1920, concerning

Adriatic, the Turkish treaty, and Russia, and he also thought the question of exchange should be taken up. Perhaps it might be possible to appoint a committee of Finance Ministers to examine the question of exchange and he would suggest a decision being arrived at on this point at once.

After a short discussion it was agreed that a committee of the Finance Ministers concerned should be appointed at once to go into the question of exchanges and European finance.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed with Signor Nitti that too much time ought not to be taken up with things which were more or less past, but at the same time these questions ought to be got out of the way.

LORD CURZON said that as M. Berthelot was going to submit a draft reply to Germany in connection with the trial of criminals, this matter was settled. There was, however, another point, and that was the reply to be sent to the letter of the Dutch Government refusing to hand over the Kaiser.<sup>5</sup> No reply had yet been sent, but he understood that one had been drafted by M. Berthelot and submitted to the Paris Council,<sup>6</sup> which was in effect a repetition of the request for the Kaiser's extradition in strong terms. He was inclined to think that this draft did not put forward the aspect of the case as it appealed to the British Government. He felt very doubtful as to the Dutch Government agreeing to surrender the Kaiser, and the question to be considered was, what did the Allies want? So long as the Kaiser was within a few miles of the German border there was danger not only to Germany itself, but to all other countries, Holland included. He thought, in replying, the Allies might say that they could not tolerate the Kaiser being left as a focus of intrigue in Holland. Further, it might be pointed out that the treaty had been signed by all the Powers of the world, which added seriously to the responsibility which the Dutch Government would undertake in refusing his surrender. He had had prepared an alternative draft reply based on that of M. Berthelot, in which attention was called to the strength of the case already put forward, and to the serious position in which the Dutch Government would place themselves in refusing to comply, but leaving them a loophole to suggest his internment in Java or some such place.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that both M. Berthelot's draft reply to Germany on the question of criminals and Lord Curzon's draft reply to the Dutch Government might be circulated on the following day in sufficient time for them to be read before the meeting, which he suggested should take place at 11.30 a.m.

(The conference agreed to this proposal.)

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 12, 1920.

the question of the extradition of the former German Emperor, which is printed in the Netherland Orange Book, *Mededeelingen van den Minister van Buitenlandsche Zaken aan de Staten-Generaal Juni 1919-April 1920*, pp. 12-13.

<sup>6</sup> i.e. the Conference of Ambassadors.

I.C.P. 26.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Friday, February 13, 1920 at 11.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: *Belgium*: M. Delacroix, Prime Minister; M. Rolin Jacquemyns.

*British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; [The Right Hon. Lord Birkenhead, Lord Chancellor]<sup>1</sup>; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr.

*France*: M. Millerand, President of the Council; M. Berthelot; SECRETARY, M. de Béarn.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti, President of the Council; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda.

[INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.]<sup>1</sup>

1. MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed to the council that they should continue the discussion, adjourned from the previous day, on breaches of the laws of war. The council had before them a draft reply to the German Government's communication of the 25th January, 1920, which had been prepared at their request by M. Berthelot (Appendix 1),<sup>2</sup> and a rough translation of the note into English, which had been hastily prepared just before the meeting. Mr. Lloyd George said that a more exact English rendering would be circulated shortly. He would ask M. Berthelot to read his note to the council, and he would then invite members to signify their acceptance of it or to suggest amendments.

M. BERTHELOT then read his draft in French.

The council accepted the first paragraph without alteration.  
*M. Berthelot's Draft* MR. LLOYD GEORGE questioned the advisability of retaining the following words in the second line of the second paragraph:—

'et en fait se dérobe ainsi à l'exécution',

as he doubted the wisdom on the Allies' part of accepting Germany's refusal to execute these obligations. He thought it would be better that we should merely say that we recognised her difficulties.

M. MILLERAND thought that if we said that, this would mean that we admitted the fact that Germany's alleged difficulties did actually exist.

The council agreed

- (i) To omit the words quoted above.
- (ii) For the words 'des obligations' to substitute 'les obligations'.
- (iii) In line 4 of the paragraph,<sup>3</sup> to omit the words 'en conséquence'.

LORD CURZON doubted whether the last part of the third paragraph was correct. Germany undertook to take proceedings against all whose names

<sup>1</sup> This name was here omitted by mistake from the filed copy.

<sup>2</sup> In the filed copy M. Berthelot's draft was headed 'Appendix 1A', as printed below. Appendix 1B (not printed) was the provisional 'rough translation' of the draft into English: see below. <sup>3</sup> i.e. in the third line of the second paragraph of appendix 1A below.

should be noted on the list; not merely those names which appeared on the list. His contention, he submitted, was borne out by von Lersner's own words.

SIGNOR NITTI said that the Germans stated that they would arrest men whose names would appear. According to the lists submitted, their acceptance of this obligation would mean the surrender of men like Marshal Hindenburg and General Ludendorff. He doubted whether it was really the intention of the Allies to insist on the surrender of these famous generals.

M. DELACROIX suggested that, at the end of the paragraph, for the words 'all the Germans whose names appear on the list', &c., should be substituted: 'all the Germans whose extradition shall be demanded'.

The council agreed that it was desirable to quote the actual words used by Baron von Lersner, and decided—

That for the words 'noms figurent sur la liste qui lui a été remise le 7 février 1920'<sup>4</sup> should be substituted 'Puissances alliées et associées ont l'intention de demander l'extradition (lettre No. 88<sup>s</sup> du 26 [25] janvier 1920)'.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the Mixed Commission should not only prepare a list of the worst criminals, but should also carefully revise and state the actual charges against them. He had quite recently received communications from the British representatives in Berlin to the effect that if we insisted on the surrender of all the people named in our lists the present German Government could not exist, and the last thing we wanted was a revolution in Germany. He thought that it would be desirable to give the Germans the impression that our lists were undergoing revision, and that they would not include men like Hindenburg.

M. DELACROIX proposed the omission of the following words in line 7 of paragraph 4:<sup>6</sup>—

'et garder eux-mêmes toute leur liberté',

as he thought they were superfluous and might give the impression that whatever the Leipzig Court might decide would not count with the Allies.

LORD BIRKENHEAD pointed out that this particular reservation was stated much more strongly in the concluding paragraph of the draft.

The council agreed that the above words should be omitted, and decided, further, in the last line of the paragraph, to omit the words 'les arrêter pour', and to insert after 'juger' the word 'lui-même'.

M. MILLERAND suggested that for the words 'chacun des coupables', should be substituted 'chacun de ceux dont son enquête aura établi la culpabilité'.

The council agreed to accept this suggestion.

M. DELACROIX questioned whether the last sentence of the final paragraph to the draft was necessary.

<sup>4</sup> See Cmd. 1325, pp. 28–29, where the Allied communication is wrongly dated February 8, 1920.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 2, note 2.

<sup>6</sup> i.e. in the sixth line of the fourth paragraph of appendix 1A below.



As both Mr. Lloyd George and M. Millerand attached great importance to the retention of this sentence, the council agreed to accept the paragraph without alteration.

M. Berthelot's draft as finally approved is attached in Appendix 2.<sup>7</sup>

2. The council had before them—

- Extradition of  
the Kaiser*
- (a) A copy of a communication in French by M. Clemenceau to the Netherlands Government on the question of the extradition of the Kaiser,<sup>8</sup> and a copy of the reply of the Netherlands Government<sup>9</sup> to the Allied note of the 15th January, 1920.<sup>8</sup>
  - (b) A draft reply to the Dutch note, prepared, in the first instance, by M. Berthelot and amended by Lord Curzon and Lord Birkenhead (Appendix 3).

LORD CURZON explained that M. Berthelot's original note had been submitted in Paris to the Allied delegates. The view of the British representatives was that the note was admirably framed, but it was perhaps somewhat too firm and uncompromising in tone. The view of the British Government was that, if the Dutch would voluntarily intern the Kaiser in one of their overseas possessions, we should not insist on demanding his extradition. He had therefore prepared an alternative draft for the consideration of the council, the first part of which was M. Berthelot's draft without alteration, while the latter part had been drawn up by himself in consultation with the Lord Chancellor. He himself believed the Dutch would accept our suggestion as to the internment of the Kaiser overseas, and that this would solve the difficulty.

M. BERTHELOT then read in French the draft reply as prepared by himself and amended by Lord Curzon and Lord Birkenhead.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said he wished to draw attention to the fact that, whereas in the note to the Dutch Government of the 15th January the words 'les Puissances' had been used, the present draft in the first line spoke of 'les Alliés.'

M. BERTHELOT explained that the French Government perceived no essential difference between the words 'les Alliés,' 'les Puissances' or 'les Puissances alliées,' which were really equivalent terms. The words used in the Treaty of Versailles were 'The Allied and Associated Powers.' As, however, we could not use this legal terms [*term*],<sup>10</sup> the word 'Alliés,' or 'Puissances,' had been substituted.

VISCOUNT CHINDA, proceeding, said that Japan had not been associated with the other Allies in the submission of the first note to the Dutch Government, and he wished to know whether, in the view of the council, the substi-

<sup>7</sup> Not printed. This revised draft, which was the same as that in appendix 1A subject to the amendments indicated above, was further revised at the next meeting of the conference: see No. 4, minute 1.

<sup>8</sup> See Volume II, No. 76, appendix B.

<sup>9</sup> See No. 2, note 5.

<sup>10</sup> See No. 34, minute 1(g).

tution of the words 'les Alliés' would have the effect of including her now in this second communication.

M. BERTHELOT enquired whether Japan desired definitely to dissociate herself from the action of her Allies on the present occasion.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said he would explain the difficult position in which the Japanese delegates were placed. On the occasion of the submission of the first note the Japanese delegate was unable to associate himself, for reasons which had been given at the time;<sup>11</sup> he had, however, at once cabled to his Government for instructions. Up to date neither the Japanese Ambassador in Paris nor he himself had received any instructions from their Government. Personally, neither of them objected to this document, but their position was a difficult one, and in the circumstances he thought he could only agree to it *ad referendum* to his Government. He hoped that this would in no way embarrass his colleague[s] on the council.

The council agreed—

That in the first line of the draft the words 'les Puissances' should be substituted for 'les Alliés'.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had two suggestions to make. First, he would like to introduce a few lines pointing out that over 10 millions of the world's youth had been killed owing to the action of Germany in going to war, drawing attention to the devastation of formerly prosperous provinces of Allied countries, and laying stress upon the fact of the terrible destitution which still continued in the countries of Central Europe owing to the war, for the initiation of which the Kaiser was held responsible; and, secondly, he thought that the final paragraph should be couched in firmer language. He proposed that this paragraph should include something in the following sense:—

The Dutch Government will create a very serious situation for themselves *vis-à-vis* the Allied Powers.

M. DELACROIX suggested the addition to the words suggested by Mr. Lloyd George of 'inasmuch as the security of Europe is menaced.'

LORD CURZON pointed out that twice over in our draft we said to the Dutch Government: 'You offer no alternative'; it was therefore for us to suggest the alternative.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that it might be put to the Dutch Government: 'What would have happened supposing Napoleon, instead of being captured and interned overseas, had managed to escape to Switzerland?'

LORD CURZON drew attention to the fact that in two places in the new draft the phrase had been used: 'We have renewed our demand,' &c.; and at the end of the draft we hinted that the Dutch might themselves offer to intern the Kaiser in one of their distant colonies. The words 'however unacceptable' had been deliberately inserted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested—

<sup>11</sup> See Volume II, No. 76, minute 2.

(a) That the following should be included in the final paragraph:—

‘The Allies hardly think it necessary to point out how serious a situation must develop if the Dutch Government cannot give the assurances which are so imperatively required by the security of Europe.’

(b) That in the second paragraph on page 3 of the draft,<sup>12</sup> which referred to the crimes committed by the Kaiser, something on the following lines might be introduced:—

‘They cannot refrain from reminding the Government of the Netherlands that through the policy and acts of this man over 10 million human beings, most of them in the flower of youth, have been killed in Europe, and three times that number have been mutilated or impaired in health; that thousands of square kilometres of territory allied [alive] with industry and happy homes have been utterly devastated; and that millions of people are at this moment suffering from bereavement and material losses, and bearing the burden of war debts exceeding £30,000,000,000 incurred in defending their own freedom and that of the Netherlands and of the world. They would have expected some expression at least of condemnation of those crimes and of sympathy and understanding for those who have sustained such suffering in restoring law and liberty to Europe.’

SIGNOR NITTI said he would wish that something should be said in the note about the danger which the Kaiser’s presence in Europe and proximity to his own country involved to German democracy.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the real danger for [*sic*] the Kaiser lay in the fact that he offered a figurehead to the German militaristic party.

M. Berthelot, at the request of the council, undertook to submit a fresh draft reply to the Netherlands Government, in the light of the above discussion, and in the sense desired by the members of the council.

The council agreed—

To adjourn the discussion of this question until their meeting the same afternoon.

3. M. MILLERAND said that while the council were on the question of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, he wished to draw attention to the non-delivery of coal promised by the Germans. The point was that Germany would not deliver the quantities she had undertaken to supply. This was a matter of capital importance to France, and, on behalf of his Government, he had certain suggestions which he wished to put before the council, with a view to ensuring that Germany should fulfil her obligations, and when the matter was discussed he hoped that the council would agree to Marshal Foch being present. The Germans did not supply this coal, not because they were not

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<sup>12</sup> The eleventh paragraph of appendix 3.

in a position to do so, but because they had no intention of doing so. This was borne out by the fact that they had even made contracts to supply coal to Holland.

M. BERTHELOT then gave details of the amounts due and those actually supplied. He stated that under the terms of the treaty Germany was bound to supply 1,660,000 tons of coal to France in January 1920. The actual amount delivered by Germany was only 300,000 tons, and the amount she was supplying was diminishing monthly. The quantity of coal available in Germany per head was one and a-third times more than what was available in France per head of the population.

SIGNOR NITTI enquired whether, if Marshal Foch was to be present during the discussion, other Allied military experts should not be also invited.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that this depended upon whether Marshal Foch meant to discuss any military question.

M. MILLERAND said that this was the case, as Marshal Foch would put forward certain proposals with a view to enforcing the Germans to fulfil their obligations.

4. M. DELACROIX said that, before the Council adjourned, he wished to raise the question of the constitution of the proposed Inter-Allied Mixed Commission to revise the list of German criminals. Should the Commission be similarly constituted to the body which had been responsible for drawing up the lists in the first instance?

M. BERTHELOT thought it was strange that the preparation of these lists had been going on for at least six months and yet the representatives of one country had never apparently had the curiosity to examine those of other Allies.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, in regard to the composition of the mixed commission, he attached great importance to the necessity of having a fresh mind brought to bear upon the subject. He hoped that the council would agree to the chairman not being a legal authority, but somebody who would view the matter in its political aspect. He suggested that the British Lord Chancellor might be invited to preside, and that he should, in consultation with M. Ignace, summon the commission to meet at some place like Brussels or other town selected by the council.

M. MILLERAND said that as France and Belgium had much heavier lists of criminals than Great Britain, he thought that the commission should sit in one or other of these two countries. M. Delacroix had just informed him that he agreed to a commission sitting in Paris, and he himself would undertake to see that the commission, if this proposal was agreeable to the council, would follow the lines desired by the council.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that M. Ignace was an able lawyer, of great experience. This, however, was not a question of law, but an important question of politics. He hoped, therefore, that a chairman would be appointed who would have the political sense, and that he would guide the

commission along the lines which the council desired. For this reason he would object to M. Ignace or any other member of the old commission,<sup>13</sup> whether he be English or Belgian, or French, being appointed chairman. He suggested that M. Millerand should think the matter over and put forward one or two names as possible chairman to the council when they met that afternoon.

M. MILLERAND suggested the name of M. Jules Cambon.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had no objection to the appointment of M. Jules Cambon.

*(The council adjourned at 1.15 p.m. until 4 p.m. the same afternoon.)*

*2, Whitehall Gardens, February 13, 1920.*

### APPENDIX 1A<sup>2</sup> TO NO. 3

#### *Draft Reply to German Government*

Les Alliés ont examiné attentivement la communication qui a été adressée, le 25 janvier 1920, par le Gouvernement allemand pour exposer les graves conséquences, tant politiques qu'économiques, qu'aurait, pour l'exécution même du Traité de Paix du 28 juin 1919, la poursuite des dispositions contenues dans les articles 228 à 230 sur la livraison des Allemands accusés d'avoir violé les coutumes et lois de la guerre.

Les Puissances constatent d'abord que l'Allemagne se déclare hors d'état d'exécuter et, en fait, se dérobe ainsi à l'exécution des obligations résultant pour elle des articles susdits du traité qu'elle a signé. Elles se réservent en conséquence d'user, dans la mesure et sous la forme qu'elles jugeront convenables, des droits que leur donne le traité dans cette hypothèse.

Les Alliés prennent acte, cependant, de la déclaration faite par le Gouvernement allemand qu'il est prêt à ouvrir sans délai une procédure pénale entourée des garanties les plus complètes et soustraite à l'application de tous jugements, procédures ou décisions antérieures des tribunaux allemands civils ou militaires, devant la Cour suprême de Leipzig contre tous les Allemands dont les noms figurent sur la liste qui lui a été remise le 7 février 1920.<sup>4</sup>

La poursuite que le Gouvernement allemand propose ainsi d'engager lui-même immédiatement est compatible avec l'exécution de l'article 228 du Traité de Paix et expressément prévue à la fin de son premier alinéa. Fidèles à la lettre et à l'esprit du traité les Alliés se garderont d'intervenir en rien dans la procédure, les poursuites et le jugement, pour laisser au Gouvernement allemand sa pleine et entière responsabilité et garder eux-mêmes toute leur liberté. Ils se réservent d'apprécier par les faits la bonne foi de l'Allemagne, la reconnaissance par elle des crimes commis, et le sincère désir de s'associer à leur punition. Ils verront si le Gouvernement allemand, qui s'est déclaré hors d'état d'arrêter, pour les remettre aux Alliés aux fins de jugement, les inculpés figurant sur la liste susdite, est réellement décidé à les arrêter pour les faire juger par la Cour de Leipzig.

<sup>13</sup> The Commission on the Organization of Mixed Tribunals: cf. Volume V, Nos. 241, 242, 344.

En même temps, les Alliés, poursuivant la manifestation de la vérité et de la justice, ont décidé de confier à une commission mixte interalliée le soin de rassembler, de publier et de communiquer à l'Allemagne le détail des charges relevées contre chacun des coupables.

En dernier lieu, les Alliés tiennent à rappeler d'une manière formelle que la procédure devant une juridiction telle que celle qui est proposée ne peut en aucun cas annuler les dispositions des articles 228 à 230 du Traité. Les Puissances se réservent d'apprécier si les procédures proposées par l'Allemagne pour assurer suivant elle aux inculpés toutes les garanties de la justice n'ont pas en définitive pour effet de les soustraire au juste châtiment de leur[s] forfaits. Les Alliés exerceraient dans ce cas leur droit dans sa plénitude en saisissant leurs propres tribunaux.

*Paris, le 13 février 1920.*

### APPENDIX 3 TO No. 3

#### *Projet de Réponse à la Hollande, le 13 février 1920*

##### (Extradition de l'ex-Empereur)

Les Alliés ont pris connaissance de la réponse du Gouvernement hollandais<sup>9</sup> à leur note du 15 janvier 1920,<sup>8</sup> relative à la remise entre leurs mains de Guillaume de Hohenzollern, ex-Empereur d'Allemagne, afin qu'il soit jugé.

Les sacrifices immenses faits par les Alliés pendant la guerre, dans l'intérêt général, leur donnent le droit d'inviter la reconsidération d'un refus s'inspirant des considérations respectables mais toutes personnelles d'un État qui s'est tenu à l'écart de la guerre et ne mesure peut-être pas exactement tous les devoirs et les dangers de l'heure présente.

Les engagements des Puissances à l'égard des peuples, l'importance de la question posée, les répercussions politiques si graves qu'aurait l'abandon des revendications de droit contre l'ex-Empereur, les obligent à maintenir et à renouveler leur demande.

Les Alliés ne demandent pas au Gouvernement de la Reine de se départir de sa politique traditionnelle, mais ils croient que la nature de leur demande, qui, selon leur opinion, ne dépend pas seulement ou même principalement de la loi municipale néerlandaise, n'a pas été suffisamment appréciée.

Aucune question de prestige n'est en jeu et les Alliés accordent autant d'attention aux sentiments consciencieux d'un État qu'à la décision réfléchie de[s] grandes Puissances; mais pour juger l'auteur responsable de la catastrophe de la grande guerre, ils ne peuvent attendre la création d'un tribunal mondial, chargé d'instruire les crimes internationaux; c'est précisément le jugement envisagé qui préparera les voies à ce tribunal et qui marquera l'action collective de la conscience universelle.

Les Alliés désirent de faire observer que la Société des Nations n'a pas encore atteint un point (degré) de développement suffisant pour admettre qu'un recours à elle ou à un tribunal (quel qu'il soit) érigé par elle donne cette prompte satisfaction qui est nécessaire. Le refus du Gouvernement de la Reine de livrer l'ex-Empereur ne créera-t-il pas, s'il est appuyé, un précédent malheureux qui tendra à rendre ineffective la procédure de tout tribunal international contre les inculpés haut placés?

Le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas expose que la demande de livraison de l'ex-

Empereur ne peut être envisagée par lui que du point de vue de ses propres devoirs. Il ne considère pas qu'il ait, en commun avec les nations civilisées, le devoir d'assurer la punition des crimes contre le droit et les principes de l'humanité dans lesquels Guillaume de Hohenzollern a assumé, d'une manière aujourd'hui indéniable, la lourde responsabilité.

La note du 13 [15] janvier fut remise au nom de toutes les Puissances alliées (au nombre de vingt-six) signataires du Traité de Paix et qui représentent collectivement la plus grande partie des nations principales du monde.

It is<sup>14</sup> impossible to ignore the collective force of this demand, which represents not merely the outraged sentiment of those who have suffered, but the demand for justice of the conscience of mankind.

Le Gouvernement hollandais paraît accepter comme un fait qu'il n'a d'autres devoirs dans le cas présent que ceux qu'il dit lui être imposés par ses propres lois et sa tradition nationale, et semble seulement considérer l'ex-Empereur comme le vaincu d'un conflit international auquel la Hollande n'a pas participé. Cependant, c'est [*sic*] remarquable que, tandis que le droit d'asile est accordé à Guillaume de Hohenzollern, les réfugiés russes et polonais en Hollande, qui ne sont pas du tout des criminels, ont été internés par elle.

Les Alliés ne peuvent dissimuler la surprise qu'ils ont éprouvée en ne trouvant pas dans la réponse hollandaise un seul mot de désapprobation pour les crimes commis par l'Empereur, crimes qui révoltent les plus élémentaires sentiments d'humanité et de civilisation et dont, en particulier, tant de nationaux hollandais ont été eux-mêmes les innocentes victimes en haute mer.

Aider à juger l'auteur de tels crimes s'accorde clairement avec la comité [*sic*] des nations, des crimes pour lesquels, selon les paroles de Grotius, les coupables sont 'puniendi aut dedendi aut certe amovendi'<sup>15</sup> (livre II, chap. 21, [sect. v.] § 4).

Comment pourrait-on, en effet, ne pas être impressionné par les manifestations réactionnaires qui ont suivi le refus de la Hollande<sup>16</sup> et le dangereux réconfort ainsi donné à tous les partis de résistance à la juste punition des coupables et à leur jugement exemplaire, si haut placés qu'ils soient.

La Hollande, dont l'histoire n'est qu'une longue lutte pour la liberté, et qui a souffert si gravement du mépris de la justice, ne saurait, par une conception tellement étroite de ses devoirs, se placer en dehors de la communion de [du] monde.

Le devoir auquel nul ne peut se dérober pour des raisons nationales, si sérieuses qu'elles soient, est de s'unir pour punir d'une manière exemplaire les auteurs responsables des désastres et des abominations de la guerre, et pour s'efforcer de ramener à des conceptions de solidarité et d'humanité la nation allemande, qui reste encore hésitante sur la fausseté des théories de ses Gouvernements, qui préféreraient que la force crée le droit et que le succès innocent le crime.

C'est de ce point de vue et non pas exclusivement du point de vue national que les Alliés ont prié le Gouvernement de la Reine de remettre Guillaume de Hohenzollern, et que, encore une fois, ils renouvellent cette demande.

Les Alliés voudraient rappeler au Gouvernement de la Reine que, s'il persistait à se désintéresser de la présence de la Famille impériale sur leur [*sic*] territoire, si près de l'Allemagne, avec les moyens financiers si considérables mis par le Gouvernement allemand à sa disposition, sous forme de pension, il prendrait une responsabilité

<sup>14</sup> English insertion thus in filed copy: cf. minute 2 above.

<sup>15</sup> Translation: 'To be punished or surrendered or at least removed'.

<sup>16</sup> The reference may have been to a meeting of the Fatherland Party at Berlin on January 25, 1920.

directe à la fois dans la mise d'un criminel à l'abri des revendications du droit, et dans la propagande qui doit, sans doute, se créer pour le plus grand danger et de l'Europe et du monde.

It would<sup>14</sup> seem incontestable that the continued presence, under a control which cannot in the circumstances be rendered effective, of the ex-Emperor within a few miles of the German frontier, where he must continue to be the centre of an active and ever-increasing intrigue, is a menace which the Allies, who have undergone such superhuman sacrifices in order to extirpate this particular danger, cannot be expected to accept.

The rights which they possess under the strictest rules of the Law of Nations authorise and require them to take such steps as self-preservation requires. The limits of action permissible under these rules must always vary for the reason that in human affairs dangers exactly identical seldom recur. The matter is not one, therefore, in which precise legal precedents are to be expected.

The Allies have observed with profound surprise that the refusal of the Dutch Government to hand over the ex-Emperor is unattended, even by a proposal to undertake the responsibility of internment and keeping him interned at a distance from the scene of his crimes and the area of his future power for evil. Such a proposal, however unacceptable, would at least have indicated some realisation of the actual situation on the part of the Government of the Queen.

The Allied Powers fail to discover the traces of such realisation in any part of the Dutch note. Accordingly they feel themselves constrained with the utmost solemnity and urgency to press upon the Dutch Government the importance of giving early reconsideration to the case under discussion. They desire especially to impress upon the Dutch Government the conviction that the present situation is one to the prolongation of which the Allies cannot remain indifferent.

#### No. 4

I.C.P. 27.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Friday, February 13, 1920, at 4 p.m.*

PRESENT: *Belgium*: M. Delacroix, Prime Minister; M. Rolin Jacquemyns.

*British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; The Right Hon. the Lord Birkenhead, Lord Chancellor; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Brigadier-General S. H. Wilson, Mr. Leeper, Mr. Waterlow.

*France*: M. Millerand, President of the Council; M. Berthelot, Marshal Foch, General Weygand; SECRETARY, M. de Béarn.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti, President of the Council; General Cavallero, Lieutenant Bodio; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. Some drafting amendments in the reply to Germany in connection with the trial of war criminals were agreed to, and it was decided—  
*Breaches of the*      That the reply as amended should be sent to Berlin  
*Laus of War*      (Appendix 1).<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This appendix contained the French text, dated at Paris (cf. No. 3,



2. With reference to I.C.P. 26,<sup>2</sup> Minute 3, M. MILLERAND explained the amount of coal which, under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was bound to deliver to France during the next ten years. It had been agreed that the maximum which should be delivered during the first five years should be 20,000,000 tons per year and 8,000,000 tons for each of the next five years. On the 29th August the protocol had been signed,<sup>3</sup> and according to this the Allied Powers had agreed that the delivery up of coal should not begin on the day of the

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treaty, because of the difficulties involved, but Germany had undertaken to deliver from the 20th April, 1920,<sup>4</sup> 1,666,000 tons per month, that is, 20,000,000 tons per year, and, in addition to this, the difference between the normal pre-war output and the present output of the French coal mines which had been destroyed. How had this undertaking been executed? The actual amount which ought to have been delivered under the conditions of the protocol worked out at 2,500,000 tons per month, whereas as a matter of fact only 600,000 tons per month had been received in December, 1919, and 300,000 tons in January, 1920. He had no doubt that it would have been possible for Germany to send more, as he had definite proof that they were selling hundreds of thousands of tons to Holland, and also a large amount of coal to private firms. According to his calculations, which he thought were correct, there was in Germany one-third more coal per head of population than was the case in France. This was quite clear from the January figures, and it was his opinion that the Germans were not carrying out the treaty, not because they could not, but because they did not want to. It was not necessary for him to emphasise what a vital question it was to France. France was now trying to get coal not only from Belgium but also from the United Kingdom, and it was a matter of life and death to her to have it. She could not agree to Germany being allowed to violate her obligations. Article 18 of the second annex of the reparations part of the treaty reserved to the Allies the right, in the case of the treaty not being executed and if it were shown that the Germans could so execute it, of taking steps to enforce the terms; and the Germans had on their part pledged themselves not to regard the taking of such steps as hostilities. He would like to remind the conference that there were many precedents for such action, Great Britain and France having taken measures in the past temporarily to occupy territory in order to enforce the terms of treaties. He gave as examples the case[s] of Mexico and Nicaragua.<sup>5</sup> Such occupation of territory was an international

appendix 1A), of the note whereof the English text, dated at London, February 13, 1920, is printed in Cmd. 1325 of 1921, p. 32. <sup>2</sup> No. 3. <sup>3</sup> See Volume V, No. 99, annex 2.

<sup>4</sup> In the rough notes of the British Secretary for the minutes of this meeting, this passage read, evidently correctly: 'to deliver per month from then to 20 April 1920,' &c.

<sup>5</sup> In 1861 British, French and Spanish forces had jointly occupied Mexican territory with a view to enforcing financial claims against Mexico; the British and Spanish forces withdrew in the following year. In 1895 a British naval force temporarily occupied the Nicaraguan port of Corinto with a view to securing redress for the arrest and expulsion from Nicaragua of a British vice-consul.

procedure which was recognised and did not necessarily mean hostilities. Considering the situation as it now existed, the French Government thought the Ruhr Basin should be occupied, and that the right of the Allies to do this could not be questioned. It was consequently necessary to see how this could be done, and Marshal Foch was there to give information on that point. Such a proposal was not meant in any way to put Germany in an impossible position from an economic point of view. South Germany would still get coal, and coal would also be provided for working the manufacturing establishments in the Ruhr district. France had no ambition whatever to cripple Germany. He asked the Allied Governments, in view of the gravity of the situation, to concur in the occupation of the Ruhr Basin, with a view to forcing Germany to carry out her undertakings, which at the present time she was deliberately avoiding.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he thought the question was one which ought, in the first instance, to be laid before the Reparation Commission. He did not for one moment wish to challenge any of the facts as stated by M. Millerand; nor did he wish to suggest that the terms of the treaty should not be respected. He was not, however, altogether convinced that the failure of Germany to carry out the conditions of the treaty was tantamount to a refusal. The information in the hands of the British Government as regards the internal situation in Germany led them to believe that conditions were very bad. Every day reports were being received of the lack of vitality shown by German workmen, due to malnutrition. Reports were also to hand to the effect that German industry was crippled because they could not get coal. He thought, therefore, that before deciding on such an extreme course as the occupation of the Ruhr Basin, it was necessary for the conference to be convinced that the German failure was not [*sic*] due to a determination to avoid their undertakings so much as to it being impossible for them to carry them out. Broadly, he was not convinced, and he thought the whole aspect of the question should be examined by an impartial commission, with a Frenchman, probably M. Jonnart,<sup>6</sup> in the chair. He thought that before the conference came to any decision the report of this commission should be considered. He earnestly hoped, therefore, that M. Millerand would agree to the course he suggested. He saw no reason why the question should not be considered by the commission he proposed, within the course of the next few days, and then a decision could be taken by the conference. A letter had just been put into his hand in connection with the internal situation in Germany, and the following was one of the statements contained in it:—

‘Thus work is lacking for want of food, and food is lacking for want of work. Coal is not produced in sufficient quantity for want of both. Industries are being closed down on a terrific scale for want of coal.’

This letter was dated the 6th February, 1920.

SIGNOR NITTI said he was in full agreement with Mr. Lloyd George. Before such a very serious decision as that suggested by M. Millerand was

<sup>6</sup> Chairman of the Reparation Commission.

come to he thought the conference ought to be convinced that Germany was deliberately trying to get out of carrying out her undertakings. He said this although he knew that the situation as regards coal in Italy was very difficult indeed. The Italian[s] had been trying to get machinery and other goods from Germany, but it was almost impossible to get anything, and he thought this rather confirmed Mr. Lloyd George's views of the internal situation that existed in the country. In view of the gravity of the steps which it was proposed to take to enforce the conditions of the treaty, he thought that before doing anything it was most desirable that the conference should be fully informed and convinced that the German action was deliberate and not forced upon them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would like to remind M. Millerand that even in England the output of coal was down 70,000,000 tons per annum as compared with the pre-war output, and that at the present moment it was not possible to get anything like enough coal for British industries.

M. MILLERAND said it was not necessary again to refer to the gravity of the situation, as that was not contested. On the other hand, if France could not get the coal she was promised by Germany, it would be necessary not only to stop coal supplies going to Italy, but also to enter into negotiations with England for a further supply. Apart, however, from that question, he would like to say, as regards the terms under which the matter should be referred to the Reparation Commission, that it was not necessary for that commission to go into the question of what Germany was to supply, because this was already laid down in the treaty. It then became a question as to whether the Reparation Commission were to be asked to consider if Germany was in a position to supply coal to France at the rate of 1,666,000 tons per month. In this connection it was laid down in the protocol that she should deliver up this amount when her monthly output was equal to or exceeded 9,000,000 tons. In December last her output of coal had not been 9,000,000, but as much as 10,450,000 tons. According to the protocol, therefore, she should not only have handed over 1,666,000 tons but also the surplus. They had not delivered 2,500,000 tons in that month, but only 600,000 tons, or even not quite so much as that. If the Reparation Commission were asked whether Germany could have carried out her undertakings they could not give any reply but one, because it was quite evident that the output of coal was such as to allow her to do so. If it was intended to ask them merely to do this, he could have no objection, but he would urge its being done as soon as possible. When the Reparation Commission had reported as to whether the German output had been such as to enable her to carry out her undertakings, it would then be for consideration what should be done. But above all things, it was necessary to have an early decision.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he agreed broadly with what M. Millerand had said, but M. Millerand must not think for a moment that the coal situation in this country was as rosy as it might appear. As regards the terms under which the matter should be referred to the Reparation Commission, he thought that there were several questions, in addition to that suggested by

M. Millerand, which arose. For example, he understood that the Germans said that the French were behindhand in their deliveries of iron ore, and it was very desirable that this should also be examined. The Reparation Commission had the right to summon anyone they liked as witnesses, even people from Germany, and now that we were at peace with Germany we ought to follow peace methods, and he saw no reason why the Reparation Commission should not call witnesses from Germany in the ordinary way and try to find out whether there were any real grounds for the German Government not carrying out their undertakings. He quite agreed with M. Millerand that the matter should be considered at once, and he did hope that the commission would not be hampered in any instructions which they might be given. As regards the steps to be taken ultimately, that would, of course, be for the conference to decide when they had received the commission's report.

M. MILLERAND said he quite agreed that the Reparation Commission should be given a free hand to use every means of making investigations. He also agreed as to their right to call German witnesses if they wished. It was most desirable, however, that the question should be considered promptly, and that the conference should get a definite answer, and, in order to get such an answer, it was essential that a definite question should be put to the commission. He would ask Mr. Lloyd George to refer the matter to the Reparation Commission, not as a general question of output and of German goodwill, but on the following lines: whether in December 1919, and in January 1920, the output of coal in Germany had not been equal to 9,000,000 tons, because, if it was proved that that amount had been produced, there was no doubt that she had broken her undertaking to deliver up 1,666,000 tons plus any surplus. There was no doubt that in December she had only delivered up 600,000 tons, and in January 300,000 tons. If, therefore, it was proved that her output had been 9,000,000 tons in either of these months, it followed that she had deliberately broken her obligations. In any case, he thought it would be useful if the conference would allow Marshal Foch to give them some idea as to what the occupation of the Ruhr Basin would mean if it had to be carried out.

SIGNOR NITTI said that Italy's interest was almost greater than that of France, but he thought that the whole question must be investigated, and that the main thing was to decide whether Germany's failure was an act of bad faith or one that was forced upon her by conditions out of her control. He thought it would be very interesting to hear the views of Marshal Foch, to whom everyone owed their gratitude for what he had done. If, on the other hand, it was necessary to take reprisals, he asked if they must be military ones. If so, it meant crossing the Rhine, when the whole of Europe might be in a blaze. It was essential to see, first, whether some alternative method could not be resorted to. The situation was very difficult. America was refusing to give credit to European countries because she thought Europe was on the verge of war. He would be very glad to hear the views of Marshal Foch, but at the same time he sincerely hoped that no final decision would be arrived at without very careful consideration of the consequences which military action might entail.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he cordially agreed with Signor Nitti. He hoped that Marshal Foch did not propose returning to France at once, and that he would be available in London in case the conference wished to have his advice. He hoped sincerely that M. Millerand would not insist upon confining the reference to the Reparation Commission to one point of fact. In this connection, he would like to point out that there were various reasons, such as shortage of transport and floods, which might have interfered considerably with Germany carrying out her undertaking. There was also the question as to whether there was anything in the German statement that France had failed to carry out her undertaking as regards iron ore. Lord Curzon had just suggested to him terms of reference to the Reparation Commission which he thought might meet the case. They were these:—

- (i) To examine into and report on the facts concerning the failure of Germany to discharge her treaty obligations in respect of the delivery of coal since the 1st October, 1919.
- (ii) To make any recommendations as to the measures by which the German production of coal may be stimulated.

He would like to ask what the conference thought of this proposal.

M. MILLERAND said he had no objection to the question being examined from a broader point of view. He fully realised the importance of the point raised by Mr. Lloyd George as regards transport, and that this must be taken into account. He would like to say, however, that France had even gone so far as offering to supply the transport if the coal was delivered at the pit mouth. He had no objection to the terms of reference as proposed, but he would like to suggest the addition of the reference which he had already proposed as regards an examination of the question whether in the last quarter of 1919 Germany did not produce at least 9,000,000 tons of coal a month. In view of the fact that a reply could not be received for at least a week, he thought it would be as well to hear from Marshal Foch his views as to the steps which might be taken.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he hoped that Marshal Foch would not leave London while the conference was sitting, as he was their military adviser, and there might be other questions on which he would have to be consulted. He hoped, therefore, that, in any case, he would be able to remain in London until the end of the following week.

The conference decided—

To refer to the Reparation Commission the question of the failure of Germany to carry out the conditions of the treaty as regards the delivery of coal to France, in the following terms:—

- (i) To examine into and report on the facts concerning the failure of Germany to discharge her treaty obligations in respect of the delivery of coal since the 1st October, 1919.
- (ii) To make any recommendations as to the measures by which the German production of coal may be stimulated.

(iii) To examine whether, in the last quarter of 1919, Germany did not produce at least 9,000,000 tons of coal per month.

3. With reference to I.C.P. 26,<sup>2</sup> Minute 2, MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that M. Berthelot had been good enough to redraft the reply which it was proposed to send to the Netherlands Government in connection with the extradition of the Kaiser. He proposed to circulate copies of the revised draft to members of the conference, and he thought, unless anyone raised any objection, it might be assumed that the draft was agreed to and that the letter should be despatched accordingly (Appendix 2).<sup>7</sup>

(This course was approved.)

4. M. BERTHELOT referred to the letter which had been received from the Hungarian delegation, which he then proceeded to read (Appendix 3). He pointed out that it was not really an answer to the proposed conditions of peace, and that the Hungarian delegation were asking for another fortnight in which to send their reply. Although they had already communicated several different notes and memoranda, nothing at all had been contained in these on certain important questions, such as minorities, criminals, reparation, finance, naval clauses, political clauses in Europe, the interests of Hungary outside Europe, and various sundry questions. The Council of Ambassadors at Paris had now asked that the conference should express an opinion as to the time limit which should be given to the Hungarian delegation, and suggested three or four days. One suggestion was that the delegation should be asked to send one or two copies of their reply without waiting to have it printed. Every delay meant more intrigue.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought the Hungarian delegation were behaving very unfairly. He did not know what difficulty they were in as regards replying, but he suggested that they should be given a time limit of a week, as by that time M. Millerand would be back. Roumania wished to be represented at the conference when the Hungarian reply was under consideration, and it would be necessary to let her representatives know when this would be.

It was agreed—

That a time limit of one week from 3 p.m. that day should be given to the Hungarian delegation in which to reply.

5. MR. LLOYD GEORGE raised the question as to how communications which had to be sent by the conference were to be signed.

Conference Procedure M. BERTHELOT thought that this ought to be done by Mr. Lloyd George, as president, on behalf of the different heads of Governments concerned.

It was agreed—

<sup>7</sup> Not printed. The French text of this letter is printed in the *Netherland Orange Book*, op. cit., pp. 13-14.

That communications should be signed by Mr. Lloyd George in his capacity as president of the London session of the Peace Conference.

6. SIGNOR NITTI said that at the last sitting of the Peace Conference, at which he had been present, a communication from Yugoslavia, *The Adriatic* in connection with the Adriatic question, had been considered,<sup>8</sup> and the decision arrived at by the conference was really based on a compromise. This decision had only been accepted by him, as the Italian representative, in view of the importance of the peace of Europe. He understood that the Yugoslavia[n] Government had been asked for a definite 'Yes' or 'No' to the proposals, but he did not know what answer had been received. He had done everything possible to get the compromise agreed to in the Italian Chamber. He had met with much opposition, and he was not yet sure whether it would be accepted by Italian public opinion. If he could not get it accepted, the only thing to do would be to claim adherence to the Treaty of London.<sup>8</sup> He, personally, had accepted the compromise proposals because M. Clemenceau had impressed on him the importance of doing so in the general interest. It was very essential to arrive at an early solution, as the situation was very delicate even now, and would become more so. He must ask, therefore, for a prompt decision.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if the reply from the Yugoslavia[n] Government,<sup>9</sup> which had been sent to the British Government on the 28th January last from Paris, had not been also transmitted to the Italian Government.

SIGNOR NITTI said he did not regard the document in question as a reply; it was only a memorandum, and did not say 'Yes' or 'No.'

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that that was the only communication which the British Government had received. It was for Signor Nitti to say what decision he wanted the conference to come to. He, himself, and M. Clemenceau, acting on behalf of their respective Governments, had already stated that if the Yugoslavia[n] Government refused the compromise proposals, and if the Italian Government demanded adherence to the Treaty of London, they would be bound by that treaty.<sup>8</sup> It was, therefore, for Signor Nitti to say what he felt inclined to do. He, personally, wanted a solution which would be acceptable to all and would ensure a real peace, but the British Government wanted to be loyal, and if Signor Nitti asked them to adhere to the terms of the Treaty of London they would do so.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he desired most sincerely to thank Mr. Lloyd George for what he had said. He wished, however, to point out to the council that the terms of the Serbian note of the 28th January constituted no real reply to the proposals which were submitted to the Yugoslav Government, on behalf of the Supreme Council, on the 13th of that month.<sup>10</sup> He himself had, at a great sacrifice, made certain concessions in those proposals; but he wished to state that he had now reached the extreme limit of concessions that he was

<sup>8</sup> See Volume II, No. 79, minute 3.

<sup>9</sup> Printed in Cmd. 586 of 1920, *Correspondence relating to the Adriatic Question*, pp. 22-23.

<sup>10</sup> See Volume II, No. 70, appendix A and No. 71, minute 1.

prepared, on the part of the Italian nation, to make. It was impossible for him to agree to the latest demands contained in the last note received from the Yugoslav Government. If no definite answer was received from the Yugoslav Government before the present conference broke up, he must insist upon the full terms of the Treaty of London. What he desired was, not conquest, but peace in the Adriatic. Even if he were personally prepared to make any further concessions, he could never get them accepted by the Italian nation. He would, therefore, have to demand that the terms of the Treaty of London should be carried out in their entirety, though he was prepared to interpret those terms in the most liberal spirit.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the Treaty of London, as Signor Nitti knew, involved the evacuation of Fiume. What was the next step? He assumed that it must be to intimate to the Yugoslav Government that we must now have a definite and final answer.

M. MILLERAND said that the French and British Governments had already communicated the text of the Treaty of London to the Yugoslav Government, but the latter appeared to have only just received it. He anticipated that some further delay might be occasioned by the fact, if it were true, that the Yugoslav Government had fallen, and that a new Government would probably shortly be formed, with M. Vesnitch<sup>11</sup> at its head.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he understood that M. Trumbitch<sup>12</sup> was now in London, and he suggested that the views of the council might be communicated to him.

M. MILLERAND said that he had that day approached M. Trumbitch and semi-officially pointed out the urgent necessity for an immediate reply from his Government. If Signor Nitti had no objection, he suggested that the Yugoslav Government might, in the circumstances, be granted a few days' grace in which to prepare and submit their reply.

SIGNOR NITTI raised no objection.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that, as M. Millerand's communication had been semi-official, it would be as well if he were to send an official communication.

(This was agreed to.)

*(The Council adjourned at 6.30 p.m. until 10.30 a.m. the following day, Saturday, February 14, 1920.)*

*2, Whitehall Gardens, February 13, 1920.*

#### APPENDIX 3 TO NO. 4

##### *Hungarian Delegation to President of Peace Conference*

NEUILLY, le 12 février 1920

M. le Président,

Conformément à la décision prise par les Puissances alliées et associées, décision que votre Excellence a bien voulu porter à notre connaissance par sa note du

<sup>11</sup> Yugoslav Delegate Plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.

<sup>12</sup> Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs.



31 janvier dernier,<sup>13</sup> la délégation hongroise n'a pas manqué de remettre aujourd'hui même, sa réponse générale aux conditions de paix, ainsi qu'une partie des observations spéciales.

À mon vif regret, je ne suis, toutefois, pas à même de vous présenter aujourd'hui l'ensemble de nos observations. Les difficultés techniques ainsi que la préparation de la traduction du texte en deux langues ont beaucoup retardé notre travail. Je me permets donc d'adresser à votre Excellence la prière de vouloir bien nous accorder la permission de faire suivre les parties non encore présentées de nos observations au fur et à mesure qu'elles seront imprimées dans le nombre voulu d'exemplaires. J'espère que nous serons à même de surmonter toutes les difficultés dans un court délai et que la Haute-Conférence de Paix sera en possession de l'ensemble de nos réponses d'ici en quinze jours.

Veuillez, &c.,  
APPONYI<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> This note is printed by Prof. Francis Déak and Dezső Ujváry, *Papers and documents relating to the Foreign Relations of Hungary* (Budapest, 1939), vol. i, p. 137.

<sup>14</sup> Count Apponyi was head of the Hungarian Peace Delegation.

## No. 5

I.C.P. 27A.] *Financial Sub-committee.*<sup>1</sup> *Notes of a Meeting held at the Treasury on Friday, February 13, 1920, at 5.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: *Belgium*: M. Delacroix, M. Rolin Jacquemyns.

*British Empire*: The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain (*in the Chair*), Mr. Blackett.

*France*: M. François Marsal, M. Avenol.

*Italy*: Signor Beneduce, Commendatore Ceresa, Signor Giannini.

Mr. Leith Ross (*Assistant Secretary*, British Cabinet).

Mr. Gower (*British Treasury*).

1. MR. CHAMBERLAIN welcomed the members of the committee and invited the Prime Minister of Belgium to open the proceedings.

2. M. DELACROIX outlined a scheme which he had been considering for meeting the exchange difficulties. He proposed the creation of an international financial institution with power to issue bonds repayable after a period of years and secured either by guarantees from banks, insurance and shipping companies, &c., or on customs and railway revenues, &c. The bonds would thus have a more tangible basis than a Government guarantee, but they should also be guaranteed jointly by the States which participated in the scheme, as such a joint guarantee would be a strong moral factor in securing their acceptance by the public. Each State would be responsible for seeing that the bonds were accepted—subject to fair discount—by the State Bank or Treasury. He thought that participation in the scheme would attract

<sup>1</sup> See No. 2, minute 1.

purchasers and divert orders to such an extent as to lead all countries to come in. Such an institution could then take over the control of German or Russian industries and revive the economic life of Europe. At any rate, he thought that an international conference should be called and this proposal considered.

During the discussion which ensued, various practical difficulties were pointed out and Mr. Chamberlain suggested that unless private investors could be induced to take up and hold the bonds, their acceptance must necessarily involve further inflation, which would be contrary to the policy he was pursuing. He agreed, however, that the scheme should be examined.

3. M. MARSAL explained an alternative scheme for the issue by the Reparation Commission of bonds guaranteed by each of the Allies individually (but not jointly or severally) in proportion to their shares in the German indemnity and secured on that indemnity. The reconstruction programme of France necessitated the immediate liquidation of a substantial part of the reparations to which she was entitled, and bonds thus secured, with adequate guarantees and a proper sinking fund, would, he had reason to believe, be accepted by neutrals and by the banks in the United States. It would, however, be essential for the Reparation Commission to fix, as quickly as possible, some definite sum—not necessarily the final sum, but a minimum sum—as due from Germany. He suggested that this might take the form of an annuity of say 3,000,000,000 gold marks; and bonds secured on this annual payment by Germany could then be issued. This suggestion might appear favourable to Germany, but the restoration of European economic life was bound up with the restoration of that of Germany.

M. DELACROIX agreed with the last remark of M. Marsal, but pointed out that banks were not likely to accept any German paper till the definitive amount of the indemnity and not merely the minimum had been fixed.

SIGNOR BENEDEUCE agreed generally with regard to the need for fixing the total German indemnity, but said that M. Marsal's proposal would not meet the difficulty of Italy, i.e., to raise credits in neutral markets. If it did it would only do so at the expense of the French exchange, if for example, as<sup>2</sup> the bulk of the bonds were subscribed in France.

4. During the discussion, a message was received that the Council of the League of Nations had decided to convene a conference to examine the international financial situation and on the motion of Mr. Chamberlain, the committee decided—

‘That the alternative schemes outlined by M. Delacroix and M. Marsal should be formulated in writing and submitted to the conference to be convened by the League of Nations, an opportunity being given to the Allied Ministers concerned to consider them beforehand.’

5. MR. CHAMBERLAIN briefly mentioned the question of relief for Austria and Poland, where the situation was very grave. He had informed the United

<sup>2</sup> This word was included in the text in error.

States Government that Great Britain would contribute one-half of any sum granted by the United States, up to a maximum of £10,000,000; and he invited the representatives of the Allied Governments to co-operate.

M. MARSAL said he could not reply to Mr. Chamberlain's appeal without consideration. France too had her difficulties in getting food, and anything she could do would be confined to the grant of a credit in francs, up to some moderate maximum, to be used for purchases in France. That was his first impression, but he would readily examine the proposal.

SIGNOR BENEDUCE gave a similar assurance.

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 14, 1920.

## No. 6

I.C.P. 28.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Saturday, February 14, 1920, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Brigadier-General S. H. Wilson, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr.

*France*: M. Millerand, President of the Council; M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer, M. de Fleuriau; SECRETARY, M. de Béarn.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti, Signor Galli; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. With reference to I.C.P. 27,<sup>1</sup> Minute 3, MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether any member of the council had any questions to raise in regard to the draft reply to the Netherlands Government in respect of the surrender of the Kaiser.

*Extradition of  
the Kaiser*

No observations being made, the draft reply was held to be accepted by the council.

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the council should confine themselves that morning to considering the general principles of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. Unless some member had special observations to make, he proposed that Lord Curzon should make a brief statement of the questions which required an answer, without at this stage expressing any opinion about those questions.

*Treaty of Peace  
with Turkey*

M. Millerand, Signor Nitti and Viscount Chinda having signified their assent—

LORD CURZON said that he understood that the council was to discuss questions of principle, and that he was to state these questions without at

<sup>1</sup> No. 4.

present expressing any opinion thereon. The council started, he thought, with certain principles which were accepted by all the Allies:—

- (a) That, although Turkey was defeated, it was desirable that an independent Turkish State should be maintained in some form or other.
- (b) That some machinery should be set up in order to establish international control of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus.
- (c) That it was undesirable to leave large Turkish forces free to disturb and menace the peace of the world.
- (d) That the Allies were pledged to constitute an independent Armenia.
- (e) That it was resolutely the intention of the Powers to separate from Turkey proper the non-Turkish States of Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine, &c.
- (f) That proper protection must be afforded for Christian minorities in Turkey.

The delay in negotiating<sup>2</sup> the treaty was exclusively due to the Powers having to await the decision of the United States. They would have been glad to have welcomed any disposition on the part of the United States to bear her share of the burden, but we had reluctantly come to the conclusion that it was useless now to expect this. America had clearly shown her determination not to accept any mandate. No European Power would, he thought, be wise to accept a mandate for an independent Turkey. The decisions of the council that day were required on the following points:—

- (i) What authority ought to exercise control of the Straits? Should it be a commission? If so, how should it be composed? What forces should be at its disposal? What should be the area of its jurisdiction? What should be the extent of its administrative or executive powers?
- (ii) As regards the future of Turkey in Europe—should the Sultan and his Government be maintained at Constantinople? If so, what would be their powers? What military and naval forces should they have? What should be the area of their jurisdiction? How were their powers to be reconciled with those of the commission? How would it be possible to arrange for two different authorities, viz., the Turkish Government and the commission, to be exercising authority in European Turkey [at] the same time?
- (iii) As regards the Adrianople Vilayet and the Turkish Empire north of the Straits—what was to become of those areas? Were they to be handed over to Greece, and if so within what boundaries?
- (iv) As regards the other side of the Straits, assuming the Turks were to remain there, and assuming that no Power desired a mandate over that territory, what was to be the form and degree of sovereignty? What should be the degree of financial control? Should there be any spheres of political, geographical or commercial influence of the

<sup>2</sup> The following passage (beginning 'The delay in negotiating' and ending 'for an independent Turkey') is printed by D. Lloyd George, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 1269.

Powers? This, again, led to the question of the Greek occupation of Smyrna. How long was it to continue? Again, there was the question of the Italians at Adalia and elsewhere, and the French occupation of the Turkish Province of Cilicia.

All the above, he submitted, hung upon the question of an independent Turkish State in Asia. The council had to consider what degree of control should be exercised over the future Turkish administration, whether the latter had its centre at Constantinople or at some other capital. Other questions also arose, e.g., the payment of pre-war debt, and of the cost of occupation by the Allied forces, claims for reparation, the future administration of the Turkish debt, and the guarantees to be secured for Christian minorities. Arising out of the question of the liquidation of the Turkish debt—to what extent would the different Powers to whom mandates over hitherto Turkish territories were assigned take their share of the pre-war debt of those provinces? Further, was Turkey to have a navy? He thought probably not. To what extent was her army to be reduced? What were the size and constitution of her gendarmerie to be, and should it be under European control? What were to be the size and limits of an independent Turkey? Lastly, decisions were required on questions such as the limits of the new Armenia, the nature of the mandates for Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. As regards Arabia, the Allies had already agreed upon the question of an Independent State of the Hedjaz. Lord Curzon concluded by expressing the opinion that it was desirable that the representatives of the Allies that day should indicate to the council in what way they thought the above problems should be solved.

M. MILLERAND thought that Lord Curzon had made an admirable statement of the case, and he had nothing to add. Unless Signor Nitti had some general observations to make, he suggested that the council should now proceed closely to examine each question, and they would then ask for an expression of the views of the British Government.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he agreed with M. Millerand.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed that the council should address themselves first to the question of Constantinople. Was the Sultan to remain there? If so, what would be his position, and what arrangements should be made for the protection of the Straits?

M. MILLERAND said that he thought the solution to be given to this first question was dominated by the circumstances in which the council had to examine it. They had frequently deplored the unavoidable delay in concluding the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. Whatever might be the cause of it, the delay was a fact, and one which had its inevitable consequences. The Powers could not do now what was possible fifteen months ago, and conditions were no longer the same. He reminded the council that France had very great Mahometan interests, and that she was bound to consider these when addressing herself to the problem of Constantinople. To expel the Turks from their capital would raise a very big question, and would mean a

veritable adventure on which France shrunk from embarking, as she could not forecast the results either in Turkey itself or in the French Mahometan possessions. To-day, and he wished again to emphasise this fact, the Powers had not the same freedom of decision in regard to the fate of Turkey. The French Government felt that, for very cogent reasons, it was desirable to maintain the Turks at Constantinople. He thought that it was indispensable to establish an international control over the Straits.

SIGNOR NITTI said that experience gained from the application of other Treaties of Peace showed that it was useless to demand things unless we were certain of getting them. This was especially inadvisable in the case of Oriental countries. The question immediately before the council was, he considered, a simple one. We must not antagonise the populations of Turkey; we must be liberal, and we must pursue economical advantages—in the interests of the populations as well as of ourselves—rather than political changes. In his view, there could be no question of expelling the Turks from Constantinople, where the Turkish population amounted to about 80 per cent.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE interposed to say that he did not accept this figure, and he understood that the Turks were not more than 40 per cent.

LORD CURZON said that his information was that the Turkish percentage was between 40 and 50.

SIGNOR NITTI said that, in any case, Balkan statistics were very unreliable. As regards the question whether to maintain the Sultan and the Ottoman population at Constantinople, he said that the head of the Turkish nation was both Sultan and Khalifa, that is to say, he enjoyed both temporal and spiritual sovereignty. One solution of the problem would be to keep the Sultan at Constantinople as the spiritual head of the Mahometans, just as the Pope at the Vatican was the spiritual head of the Roman Catholic Church. He himself was convinced that the Sultan must remain at Constantinople and that he must be a sovereign in the full sense of the word, both in a temporal and in a spiritual capacity. In regard to the Straits, it was a common interest to the whole of Europe to have the freedom of these waters fully guaranteed. Italy was especially concerned in this question, as she was greatly in need of raw materials from South Russia. He agreed that the first point to settle was the problem of Constantinople and of the Straits.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether Viscount Chinda had any observations to make.

VISCOUNT CHINDA replied that Japan's interest in the questions now before the council were of a general nature, as, unlike the other Allies, the Japanese had no direct interest. At present, therefore, he did not wish to express any opinion.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said<sup>3</sup> that the conclusion at which His Majesty's Government had arrived in regard to the retention of the Sultan at Constantinople was one which had been reached after the most careful consideration, and with reluctance, hesitation and apprehension, and they even now felt

<sup>3</sup> The following passage (beginning 'Mr. Lloyd George said', and ending 'the beginning of fresh trouble') is printed with minor variation, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 1271-2.

apprehensions as to the wisdom of the course which finally commended itself to them. He himself thought that the objections to turning the Sultan out of Constantinople were theoretical. The Turk had been in Europe for hundreds of years, and was always a curse, an oppressor and a source of trouble. He had never become a European, he had never assimilated European civilisation, and he had been a perpetual cause of war. He would be a sanguine man who would expect the nature of the Turk to change. Again, Constantinople differed from any other capital: e.g., Paris was conspicuously French; London was British; Rome was Italian; but Constantinople was not Turk, and the majority of the population was not Turkish. Further, if the seat of Government were removed from there, the Turkish population at Constantinople would be to a very considerable extent reduced. The population immediately round the town was Greek. Therefore, by retaining the Sultan at Constantinople we were departing from principles by which the Allies had settled most of their problems, and we were retaining an alien monarch ruling over an alien population. At Constantinople the Sultan would be a perpetual source of disputes, jealousies and intrigues between the Western Powers. It was said that his presence there would give us a hold over Asia Minor. He himself did not believe thus [this]. The Turks would know that any edicts issued by him were dictated by foreign domination and would consequently ignore them. He feared that to leave the Turk at Constantinople would not mean a settlement of the problem, but only the beginning of fresh trouble. There was, of course, much to be said on the other side. First, that our Allies took, unfortunately, a different view from the British. Next, that we have troubles of our own in Europe and the United States, and that the expulsion of the Turk would mean trouble in the Moslem world. He thought that Signor Nitti exaggerated the physical difficulty of expelling the Turk. There might certainly be a considerable religious repercussion with the Moslem world. But against all this must be set the fact that we might now really be missing a great opportunity of ridding Europe once for all of this pest and potential source of trouble. It was only with great reluctance<sup>4</sup> that the British Government had come to the conclusion to support the view which was urged by their Allies; but if they gave way on the matter they must insist that the sway of the Sultan in Constantinople and Europe must be as strictly limited as possible. He suggested that the council might now pass to the consideration of the nature of control over the Straits.

M. CAMBON thought that this depended on the council's decision as to the control to be exercised over the Sultan at Constantinople. If the latter control was very strict, then the control of the Straits would not be a difficult matter. The fortifications had been destroyed, and care must be taken to see that they were not re-erected. The Straits must be neutralised, and as regards the forces to guarantee the freedom of passage he thought the simplest plan would be to have a mixed naval division at Constantinople,

<sup>4</sup> The remainder of this paragraph and the following paragraph are printed with minor variation, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 1272-3 and 1275-6.

with various Allied fleets represented, just to exercise a general supervision. There should then be a Special Commission to supervise the arrangements for according always a free passage of the Straits. Any extension of the machinery was, in his opinion, unnecessary. The important thing was to defer to the sensibilities of the Turks, who were a most sensitive people, and whose prejudices it was desirable to respect. Control should be exercised as unostentatiously as possible. The Turk, he thought, could be easily guided and controlled so long as this was done in a delicate manner. The best formula, he thought, would be to say that the commission was one to control the Turkish finances, although really its powers would be of a much more extended character. The commission would frame a budget, would see that the money raised was properly expended, and would supervise the administration of the customs. The Power [of] controlling the purse would really mean control of the whole Government. A few years ago the Powers had established a financial control over Macedonia and had raised sufficient money to pay for the administration, the balance being remitted to the Turkish Government. Under this administration Macedonia had been absolutely quiet, and the system had worked very well until the revolution.<sup>5</sup> This, he thought, furnished an object-lesson. He agreed with Signor Nitti that the Sultan was to remain at Constantinople, both as a spiritual and as a temporal sovereign. All Christian history showed that where these two sovereignties were combined in one person a perpetual struggle went on, as there had been in Europe, until the Pope had relinquished his temporal aspirations. In the Moslem world, however, it was different. There it was important that the reigning sovereign should have both temporal and spiritual authority or his power declined. To sum up, the best system, in his opinion, would be a Financial Commission, which in reality would exercise full powers of administration. If the Sultan were sent to Asia Minor he would become the leader of the Nationalist party, would place himself at the head of the Nationalist army, and would cause endless trouble. M. Cambon thought that the council should not have difficulty in arriving at a practical solution of the problem, even if it were not a perfect solution.

SIGNOR NITTI stated that he agreed with what M. Cambon had said in regard to spiritual and temporal sovereignty. With reference to the Straits, it was very important that there should be complete freedom of passage under an international control, for thereby Russian commodities of enormous value would be available to the European Powers. As the Control Commission would be working for the benefit of the whole world, it would, in his opinion, be entitled to impose such duties and customs as might be necessary to cover the expenses of administration. The question of the control of Constantinople and of the Sultan and the Turkish Government was a much more difficult one. By its nature and tradition Constantinople was the city of perpetual disturbance. The essential thing was to avoid giving the com-

<sup>5</sup> The Young Turk Revolution of 1908. For the Macedonian question at that period, see G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914* (London, 1926f), vol. v.



mission any political aspect. A control, therefore, by the Allied Ambassadors at Constantinople was most undesirable, and would only lead to quarrels among themselves. The commission should be mainly financial in its character, but, as M. Cambon had said, it should in reality supervise the administration generally. Its powers ought to be very clearly defined.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it was quite true that, if the question of the general control of Constantinople was settled, the smaller question of the Straits was a simple matter. Control of the Straits, in his view, was largely a military problem. How were we to keep the Straits open? We had a certain control over the Sultan before the war, but directly war broke out he slammed the door in our faces and prolonged the war by at least two years, because he prevented us from getting supplies to Roumania and also to Russia by the shortest way. How were we to present [*prevent*] this being done in the future? It was, he said, a military question—that is, how were we to establish physical control? Would it be necessary for us to hold and garrison Gallipoli and Chanak? Again, if we held Gallipoli, must we also hold the Bosphorus? To hold Gallipoli did not necessarily give us access to the Black Sea. On the other hand, to hold both ends meant, according to the British military and naval advisers, the maintenance of a force of not less than 30,000 men, which would have to be found by Great Britain, France and Italy. Great Britain could only provide her 10,000 with great difficulty, and France had her commitments on the Rhine, and Italy, again, had various commitments elsewhere. Probably none of the three Allies would wish to be saddled with this burden. He suggested that the council should refer this question, in its military aspect, to Marshal Foch in the first instance, who should confer with the French [*? Italian*], Japanese and British military experts, and later report to the council. He hoped that the council would be able to settle this question before they tackled the larger question of general control. As Lord Curzon had said, the United States could not be relied upon to take up their share of the burden, which was a heavy one, and which fell on the shoulders of France, Italy and Great Britain; and because the burden was heavy he suggested that the council should discuss the question with the idea of limiting rather than extending their present liabilities. Mr. Lloyd George then explained, with the aid of a map, that if the Powers held Gallipoli, no very considerable force would be required, as the Turks would be at the mercy of the Allied fleets. In the old days of the Armenian massacres, when we had remonstrated, the Turks were well aware that our threats were vague, as we had no means of enforcing them. To-day, if we held Gallipoli we should have the Turk and his capital at our mercy.

M. CAMBON stated that he agreed that the control of the Straits was a military and naval question and that in regard to the details of the problem the expert naval and military authorities of the Allies ought to be consulted; and, as Lord Curzon had pointed out, the council had to consider both general principles and the application of those principles. All the Powers concerned had the same preoccupation: they did not wish to send military and naval forces to Turkey, but, if this could not be avoided, they desired strictly

to limit the size of those forces. It was for this reason that he had himself advocated the despatch of a naval division in order to control the Straits.

SIGNOR NITTI stated that he did not think that the question was so very difficult. The solution of the control of the Straits, as Mr. Lloyd George had said, depended upon the control of Constantinople and the Turkish Government. He thought that the council were now generally agreed on three points: first, that the Sultan should remain at Constantinople; second, that steps should be taken to prevent Constantinople in the future being a menace to European peace as it had been in the past; third, they wished to see Constantinople become one of the greatest markets in the Near East, a place of commercial and not of military interest, with a very prosperous future ahead of it. The council would have to decide whether they could consent to the Sultan maintaining any troops at his capital. In the days of the Roman Empire no Turkish soldier had been allowed to enter the city,<sup>6</sup> but he himself thought there would be no objection to permitting the Sultan to have one regiment of infantry there as escort and personal guard. Whatever military force it might be decided to maintain in order to ensure the control of the Straits, Italy would be prepared to contribute an equal number of troops with France and Great Britain. It would be difficult for Italy, as Mr. Lloyd George had suggested, to furnish a full quota of 10,000 men; but he did not think that a garrison of 30,000 would be required, if Turkey were entirely disarmed and if no considerable difficulties with Jugoslavia arose.

LORD CURZON said that the council were discussing what were really two entirely different questions which he thought must be considered apart from each other. The first was the nature and degree of control to be exercised at Constantinople; the second was the military and naval control of the Straits. He deprecated the tendency to assume that in the future there would always be an incompetent and acquiescent Turk at Constantinople; on the contrary, he himself thought that we must contemplate an active, hostile, ambitious Power there with strong Nationalist instinct. What we had to ensure was that this Power would not intrigue with, for instance, Germany, or make terms with a revived Russia. How were we to prevent this? It could only be done by having the Turk at our mercy, and this required that we should hold with military and naval forces a command of the Straits. The financial and administrative control of Constantinople was an entirely different question. What territory was to be left to the Sultan? A decision on this point would solve the difficulty of the military questions of the Straits. Were the Allies to control up to the lines of Chatalja and to occupy Rodosto and the northern shores of the Sea of Marmora for instance? Even this would not solve the whole question of the Straits. Was Turkey to be permitted to fortify the southern shores of the Sea of Marmora? These were questions upon which he agreed the advice of the Allied military and naval advisers should be sought: but in the meantime he thought that the council might proceed with the question of defining the limits of the territorial authority of the Sultan.

<sup>6</sup> In the rough notes of the British Secretary for the minutes of this meeting, this passage read: 'In Roman rule no soldier allowed to enter city.'

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if, as he understood, the general sense of the council was in favour of adopting Lord Curzon's suggestion, he proposed that Marshal Foch should be invited to summon a meeting of the military and naval advisers of the Allies to consider the following terms of reference:—

On the assumption—

- (1) That it is necessary for the Allies to enter into international military occupation of so much territory as is essential to maintain the freedom of the Straits;
- (2) That the military and naval commitments involved must be reduced to the smallest limits compatible with this, and that it is undesirable for political reasons to occupy Constantinople and its vicinity, unless essential to ensuring the freedom of the Straits;
- (3) That the coastal territory occupied by the Turks shall be completely demilitarised;

the military and naval advisers of the four (British, French, Italian and Japanese) Governments, under the presidency of Marshal Foch, should immediately be invited to advise—

- (a) As to what territory it is necessary to occupy permanently.
- (b) As to what military and naval forces are required for the purpose of keeping open the Straits.

This was agreed to.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said a very important naval question was involved in that of Constantinople, and he would like to ask whether the French naval advisers were available. There would be no harm, however, in having a general discussion on the question. Marshal Foch would naturally say, who was to hold the Chatalja lines, and if the Turks were to do so he would look at it from a very different point of view than if they were held by a friendly Power. He thought it had been decided in Paris, at a conference at which he was not present,<sup>7</sup> that Greece should have part of Thrace, and the question was whether Greece was to hold Thrace up to the Chatalja lines. He believed the population in the area in question was largely Greek. A general discussion would give some indication as to what appeared desirable, without finally settling the question.

M. MILLERAND thought that the question in point was largely connected with one which was more political and would have to be solved first, namely, the future of Smyrna. He could arrange, however, for the French naval advisers to be available on the following Monday if necessary.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if there was any reason why the question of Smyrna should not be discussed at the afternoon meeting, which he suggested should be at 4 p.m. As the letter from President Wilson<sup>8</sup> was addressed to

<sup>7</sup> See Volume I, No. 48, minute 2 and No. 49, minute 3.

<sup>8</sup> This note concerning the question of the Adriatic, dated from the American Embassy in London on February 13, is printed in Cmd. 586 of 1920, document 12: cf. No. 9, note 2.

France and England, he would like, however, to have a preliminary discussion with M. Millerand at 3.30 p.m.<sup>9</sup>

(*This was agreed to, and the conference then adjourned.*)

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 14, 1920.

<sup>9</sup> No record of this discussion has been traced in Foreign Office archives.

## No. 7

I.C.P. 29.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Saturday, February 14, 1920, at 4 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Forbes Adam; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Brigadier-General S. H. Wilson, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr.

*France*: M. Millerand, President of the Council; M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer, M. de Fleuriau; SECRETARY, M. de Béarn.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti, Signor Galli; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. With reference to I.C.P. 27,<sup>1</sup> Minute 6, MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that M. Millerand had made certain criticisms on the proposed letter to President Wilson.<sup>2</sup> These criticisms were not so much on the substance of the letter as on the form. He himself was in agreement with M. Millerand's criticisms, and he had asked Mr. Philip Kerr<sup>3</sup> to redraft the letter. He hoped it would not be accepted until the redraft had been examined. In substance the letter as redrafted was the same from the point of view of Italy.

SIGNOR NITTI thanked the conference for the attitude which they took up towards the claims of Italy. On the previous day he had suspected that the United States might be in opposition to the compromise proposals, and he had felt bound to say that in that case, and in the event of the compromise proposals not being accepted, he would have to ask the Allies to adhere to the stipulations of the Treaty of London; but as he had said previously, Italy would be prepared to interpret the terms of that treaty very liberally. He would be much obliged if, in the answer, some reference might be made to what he had said in that respect.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he would like to ask whether the letter which it had been decided on the previous day should be sent to M. Trumbitch was still to be sent. He presumed this was so.

M. MILLERAND thought that the situation had somewhat changed since the previous discussion, as there was no use in pressing proposals which it was

<sup>1</sup> No. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the final text of this communication, dated February 17, 1920, in Cmd. 586, document 13.

<sup>3</sup> Private Secretary to Mr. Lloyd George.

possible could not be maintained in view of President Wilson's opposition. The Jugoslavs had been asked to choose between the compromise proposals and adherence to the Treaty of London, and if they were still pressed for a 'Yes' or 'No' on that point it appeared to him that there would be some little difficulty in writing to President Wilson as proposed.

SIGNOR NITTI reiterated that the Italians, in a spirit of friendliness and conciliation, had done everything possible to reach a compromise acceptable to all. If that compromise could not be accepted by the Jugoslavs, he would have to ask for adherence to the Treaty of London. He hoped, however, that France and Great Britain would still use every endeavour to reach a solution which would be willingly accepted by both sides.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that what was wanted for the moment was a decision as to whether the letter asking the Jugoslavs for a definite 'Yes' or 'No' should be sent.

M. MILLERAND, in reply to Signor Nitti, said that he would certainly still make every effort to reach an amicable solution of the question. The situation was made difficult in view of President Wilson's opposition, but both France and England felt bound by the terms of the Treaty of London, and neither country had any intention of going back upon the conditions agreed to therein. Every effort had been made to get President Wilson to agree, and even after he went away these efforts were continued. The first part of the proposed letter to President Wilson tried to show to him that the conference were not capitulating to the Italians at the expense of the Jugoslavs, and at the same time tried to bring home to him that the proposals were not what he appeared to think them to be. It was suggested that the compromise proposals were preferable to adherence to the Treaty of London, to which France and Great Britain could not but agree if the other proposals were not accepted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he would like to ask again if the letter to M. Trumbitch was to be despatched or not. It contained a definite request for an answer to the letter sent to him on the 20th January,<sup>4</sup> and unless the conference now decided that the letter was not to be despatched, presumably it would have to be sent.

M. MILLERAND said that the question which had been put to the Yugoslav Government on the 20th January was whether they would choose between the compromise proposals or adherence to the Treaty of London. It was now proposed to say to President Wilson that as the compromise proposals were not acceptable to him, we proposed to withdraw them. Was it possible at the same time to write to M. Trumbitch asking him which he would have?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he would like to hear Signor Nitti's views on the subject.

SIGNOR NITTI said he felt some diffidence in offering any opinion in view of the friendly way in which Italy was being treated by France and Great

<sup>4</sup> No such letter of this date has been traced in Foreign Office archives. For the oral communication made by M. Clemenceau to M. Trumbitch on January 20 see Volume II, No. 79, minute 3.

Britain. There was no reason for him to modify in any way what he had said on the previous day. Strict adherence to the Treaty of London would give to Italy more than she would get under the proposals made by France and Great Britain. He thought that this should be made quite clear to the Jugoslavs, and then, if they accepted, there was no reason why President Wilson should be allowed to interfere.

LORD CURZON was of opinion that there was no reason for not sending the letter which it had been decided to despatch to M. Trumbitch on the previous day, but, in order to avoid any inconsistency in the two communications, he would suggest that, in writing to President Wilson, the reason should be given as to why the compromise proposals had been made, at the same time informing him that if the proposals were not accepted, France and Great Britain would withdraw them in deference to the President's opposition, and would fall back upon the Treaty of London.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that what the conference wanted to know was whether the Jugoslavs preferred the compromise proposals or the Treaty of London, and not which of the two President Wilson preferred.

M. MILLERAND said he hesitated to express a definite opinion, because President Wilson, in his telegram,<sup>5</sup> said that if the Jugoslavs agreed to the compromise proposals, he (President Wilson) would consider that they had done so under pressure from the Allies and not of their own free will.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE did not think that President Wilson had any right to make such a statement.

M. MILLERAND suggested that Mr. Lloyd George might see M. Trumbitch and ask him if it were not possible to come to some agreement, impressing upon him the importance of doing so as early as possible.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE doubted if it was desirable that he should do this, especially as he thought that M. Trumbitch knew that a communication was on its way from President Wilson, and he might interpret such a discussion as the showing of a white flag by the conference.

M. MILLERAND thought there was a danger in sending the letter to M. Trumbitch, for if he knew of the action taken by President Wilson he might use the letter to discredit the conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it was quite clear that the letter could not be sent unless everyone was agreed. Personally, he thought that it was essential to know the attitude of the Jugoslavs. President Wilson was going to be told that unless the compromise proposals were accepted, France and Great Britain would have to adhere to the Treaty of London; and it was not practicable to delay the matter simply because President Wilson did not agree.

M. MILLERAND suggested the despatch of the letter to M. Trumbitch in the form proposed by Lord Curzon, and that the terms of the letter should be explained in the reply to President Wilson.

(This course was agreed to.)

<sup>5</sup> See No. 9, note 2.

2. With reference to I.C.P. 28,<sup>6</sup> Minute 2, MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked for statistics as to the populations of the Turkish territory in Europe.

*Treaty of Peace  
with Turkey.  
Populations of  
Turkish Territory  
in Europe*

The only figures available were some which had been prepared in the British Foreign Office, and Mr. Lloyd George said he wished to have the figures which had been laid before the commission in Paris, which had enquired into the situation in these territories.

(It was agreed that these figures should be procured.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he thought before Marshal Foch was consulted it was desirable to consider who was going to hold the Chatalja lines, because clearly the military view would be influenced by whether these lines were held by a friendly or an unfriendly Power. There was, however, another solution, and that was to ask the military advisers to consider the question on two alternative suppositions; and, indeed, this might perhaps help the conference in coming to a decision when fixing the boundaries. He thought, therefore, that the best plan would be to ask the military advisers to consider the question from both points of view.

(This course was agreed to.)

3. MR. LLOYD GEORGE, continuing, said that the next question which ought to be considered was that of Smyrna, and he would like to hear M. Millerand's views.

M. MILLERAND said that it appeared to him a very difficult question. The Greeks had been asked to go to Smyrna by the Allied Powers, and if it was only a question as to where his sympathy lay, he would say that there was no doubt that the Greeks would be left at Smyrna. It was necessary, however, not to lose sight of the general principle which had been suggested by Signor Nitti on the previous day, which was that the attitude shown to Turkey should be as little hostile as possible. This, he thought, was essential in the interests of the *Entente* Powers. He did not think he was exaggerating when he said that the presence of the Greeks at Smyrna was the most thorny point in the Turkish problem. He was led to this belief because their presence there had quite a different significance for the Turks than the presence of British and French troops elsewhere. If an enduring peace was wanted, based on the conditions as they existed to-day, he thought the Greeks must leave Smyrna. He was very sad to have to come to this conclusion, but circumstances, he thought, left no other choice. If the Greeks were made to give up Smyrna, it would be necessary to be very generous to them elsewhere. It would also be necessary to guard Greek economic interests at Smyrna. It was a bitter conclusion to arrive at, but he thought it would be necessary to agree to it.

<sup>6</sup> No. 6.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he would like to put before the conference for their consideration somewhat different proposals. It was quite true that the *Entente* Powers had asked the Greeks to occupy Smyrna. They had done so after having received the reports of a commission appointed by the conference, which had come to the conclusion that the Sanjak of Smyrna was essentially Greek. The population was Greek, and Greek interests predominated in trade, intelligence and practically everything. For these reasons, he thought Smyrna ought to go to Greece. When M. Veniselos had been asked to land troops there, President Wilson was opposed to his doing so, in the first instance, but eventually agreed that Smyrna should go to Greece. The Italians also agreed, and M. Veniselos sent the troops there, not as a temporary measure, but for permanent occupation, and he was quite sure that M. Veniselos was under the impression that the Great Powers intended the step only to be a preliminary to permanent occupation. He would like to ask what it would mean if the conference were now to go back on this decision and throw M. Veniselos over? M. Veniselos had been a true friend to the *Entente* Powers throughout the war. He had undergone greater personal risks than any other Allied statesman. He had raised the standard of rebellion against his own King, who was of German tendencies and was handing over guns, forts, and even a whole division to our enemies. M. Veniselos had done this on behalf of the *Entente*, and he (Mr. Lloyd George) would like to ask, even if only on personal grounds, that M. Veniselos should not now be thrown over, unless there were overwhelming reasons for doing so. If the humiliation of giving up Smyrna was now forced on the Greeks, there seemed no question that the port would eventually suffer. Again, he questioned whether there were any real reasons for leaving it with the Turks, except that they would not like to give it up and that they would regard it as a hostile act. As regards this, the same might be said as to turning the Turks out of Mesopotamia, Syria and Armenia. It was quite natural that the Turks would not like giving up Smyrna. It was necessary to remember, however, that they had challenged Europe, and they must take the consequences. They did their best to destroy the *Entente* Powers, and very nearly did so. In the circumstances, he did not think that they were entitled to any consideration whatever. If the territory in question could truthfully be said to be Turkish territory, he entirely agreed that it should not be taken away from them; but certainly up to 1914 the majority of the population of Smyrna was Greek, and the whole life of the town was Greek. If it was now left to the Turks it would mean handing over the town to a people who had shown themselves utterly incapable of governing, and it would mean throwing over a friend to please an enemy. He (Mr. Lloyd George) was personally in favour of turning the Turk out of Constantinople, but the conference had decided not to do so, in view of Mussulman prejudice. Surely that was sufficient concession to make to the Turks? They cared much more about Constantinople than [than] Smyrna, which place had no special meaning for them. He thought that whatever was done the Turks would be troublesome, and that any idea that they would not give trouble in the future was absolutely futile,



because in his own opinion they would be just as great a nuisance as ever. France and England had saved Turkey from destruction time after time in the last hundred years. On several occasions Turkey would have been wiped out if these Powers had not assisted her with troops and money whenever she was in danger. And on the very first opportunity she had tried to stab them in the back. He did not think there was any hope of making the Turk any better by allowing him to remain in Smyrna. Again, the importance of having a bridge-head at Smyrna in the hands of a Power which had the same interests as the *Entente* Powers must not be forgotten. In this connection he would like to point out what a difference it might have made in the war if the Greeks had been at Smyrna in 1914. Supposing, in the future, there was trouble in Anatolia, how were the *Entente* Powers to get there unless they could use Smyrna? He thought it was essential, in the interests of civilisation, that this great port should be in the hands of a Power which was favourably inclined to the *Entente*. He hoped earnestly, therefore, that the *Entente* would not dream of turning out of Smyrna that statesman who had risked everything to help them in order to put in his place the worst ruler that had ever cursed any land. He would like to add that if any arrangement could be come to of giving nominal sovereignty to the Turks in order to save their face, by allowing them to show the Turkish flag at Smyrna, it might be a solution of the difficulty.

Mr. Lloyd George<sup>7</sup> said that he would like the council to consider very closely the degree of control to be exercised over Turkey in Asia, a question which had been raised early in the day by M. Cambon, and it was a very important problem. Was the control to be purely financial or was it to have an administrative character? In other words, was the Turk to be controlled politically or was he to be absolutely independent, that is to say, was Turkey to be like any other country, free to work out its own salvation?

M. CAMBON said that before the war the Powers had exercised a certain system of financial control, that is, they administered the Turkish debt. That was a special administration which was designed to guarantee to foreign creditors the payment of their dues. He thought that this system might now be extended with a view to obtaining complete control. Due regard must be paid to Turkish *amour-propre*, but subject to this condition he saw no reason why an administrative colour should not be given to our financial control. We might establish a financial commission with full powers and with instructions to work towards complete control of administration. As he had stated that morning, the Turk attached great importance to appearances, and if we were careful not to offend their [*sic*] susceptibilities, we might establish an effective universal control which the Turk would accept.

SIGNOR NITTI agreed that the control must be essentially financial in its character, and it should have no political colour. Whatever happened, it was essential, in establishing the commission, to avoid any possibility of quarrels and jealousies between the Powers setting up that commission.

<sup>7</sup> The next ten paragraphs (ending '... action to enforce their decrees') are printed, with minor variation and some omissions, by D. Lloyd George, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 1276-81.

Further, the commission must administer to the advantage of the country itself. Turkey, left to herself, would go to pieces; it was, therefore, necessary to establish some sort of outside control. At present he was prepared to agree generally to M. Cambon's proposals so long as it was understood that the commission was essentially a financial and administrative body and in no sense a political body.

M. CAMBON said that he himself had seven years' experience of Turkey.<sup>8</sup> Month after month he submitted various plans of reform to the Sultan, Abdul Hamid. The latter invariably agreed to his plans, but he never acted upon them. We had, therefore, never established a real control over the administration of Turkey. The nearest we had approached to such control was just before the revolution of 1908. He was disposed to think that the Powers might now really achieve something if thoroughly competent men were selected for the purpose of the commission. He thought, however, that the question should first be examined by the Allied financial experts.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he would like the council to go more closely into the details of the suggested control. He was apprehensive of antagonising the national sentiment of Turkey by interference in their internal affairs. If Turkey desired to govern herself in her own way, he did not see how we could resist her this demand. After all, Turkey was no more incompetent than Persia. If we really proposed to administer the country, he did not think that this action on our part would conduce to peace in Turkey or to agreement among ourselves. Were the Powers to decide what taxes were to be levied? This was only one of the many difficult questions involved in M. Cambon's proposal. He himself doubted whether the Powers could possibly undertake the actual governing of Turkey. If we decided that certain taxes must be levied, and they were not collected, how were we to insist upon their being paid? Abdul Hamid knew quite well that if he did not collect the taxes suggested by the Powers, the latter had no intention of intervening in order to enforce their collection. M. Cambon's scheme meant the control of the administration of Turkey through a financial commission; but if Turkey declined to execute the orders of that commission, these would have to be enforced by military action. Were the Powers prepared to take such action? In his view it was no use our continuing the same old pretence, which, before the war, had made us the laughing stock of the whole world, because our control was quite ineffective. We had liberated from Turkish sovereignty the Armenians and the Arabs, and we proposed similarly to liberate the Greek subjects of Turkey. Why should the Powers not then allow Turkey proper to administer her own affairs in her own way? He was not speaking of measures to ensure the liquidation of the Turkish debt, which was a matter apart. The real question was, were the Powers prepared to become responsible for the administration of Turkey in Asia, or not? Or did they merely intend to take such measures as might be necessary to secure the liquidation of the debt? Great Britain and France had already incurred many very heavy obligations; and he thought that both countries should be most

<sup>8</sup> M. Paul Cambon had been French ambassador to Turkey, 1891-8.

reluctant to incur other obligations, which they might find it impossible to enforce.

M. CAMBON said that he was still disposed to think that his proposal might work satisfactorily. No doubt the financial system, as suggested by him, would really mean administrative control in disguise, but he thought that it would be a system which would be acceptable to the Turk. The administration set up by the Powers to regulate the Turkish debt had been a complete success. Associated with it had been a number of Turkish officials, who were both well trained and well disposed, and nobody in Turkey had raised any objection to this administration. So far as his experience went, the results of the system had been excellent. When he had been in Turkey, only one objection had been raised by the Sultan—Abdul Hamid—who had once asked him: 'What good is this control so far as I am concerned? All the revenue which accrues from this administration goes to pay its expenses.' He had explained to the Sultan that the effect of this administration had been to establish the good name and the credit of Turkey in Europe. The Turk was a well-disciplined individual and he was quite prepared to accept foreign control; that is to say, Turkish officials were quite amenable to such control so long as they were certain of receiving their salary. Mr. Lloyd George had said that to establish the control envisaged by him (M. Cambon) really meant governing the country: that was true. But if the Powers did not govern the country, who would? He thought that a great opportunity now presented itself of administering Turkey on right lines. If the Powers did not seize this opportunity to intervene and to control the administration of Turkey, the Turks would merely relax into their old corrupt ways.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that M. Cambon, in his statement, clearly indicated that he wished the Powers to be responsible for the government of Turkey. His own view was that it was impossible to administer Turkey through a financial commission, as this involved, in the long run, the use of force. Were the Powers prepared to accept this responsibility? It involved adding a fresh and gigantic responsibility to those which the Allies had already shouldered as the result of the late war, and it would be difficult to exaggerate its magnitude. He understood that M. Cambon proposed to go far beyond the financial control exercised prior to 1914.

M. CAMBON thought that the system advocated by himself would give the Allies, indirectly, the powers to check abuses in Turkish administration and to influence local authorities in the direction of sound methods. He admitted that direct control would be dangerous. An alternative might be to have European inspectors charged with the duties of supervision. In his view, this would be a much less satisfactory solution of the problem than that proposed by himself. What was required was some form of control which would be to the advantage of Turkey herself. The Powers had very important commercial and political interests in Turkey, and it was essential that order should be established in that country. Further, the Powers desired to free non-Turkish populations from the Turkish yoke, and to protect Christian minorities which were now under the sovereignty of the Sultan.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the only real control exercised at present was the control of Constantinople by the guns of our fleet.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he had at first been in favour of M. Cambon's proposal to create a system of financial control, but he had been much impressed by Mr. Lloyd George's observations. The question immediately before the council was that of the control of Turkey proper. Should we endeavour to establish administrative control through a financial commission, as M. Cambon had suggested? Mr. Lloyd George had very forcibly pointed out the extent of our responsibility if we accepted this solution. It would mean that we should be compelled to administer the whole internal politics of Turkey, which was a very different matter from the administration of the Turkish debt. Supposing, for instance, a Turkish debt collector, acting under the instructions of the Inter-Allied Financial Commission, was murdered, what action could the Allies take? The Powers, as had been pointed out, had every interest in a prosperous Turkey, but they could not accept grave responsibilities unless they had corresponding means of action to enforce their decrees. He agreed with Mr. Lloyd George that there were great difficulties in establishing a general control of Turkey through a financial commission. He wished to remind the council that the Allies had great responsibility, not only in respect of Christian minorities in Turkey, but also in regard to Turkey proper itself.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he agreed with what Signor Nitti had just said. Further, he thought, that the Powers must insist upon Turkey guaranteeing, at any rate, part of the cost of occupation of Turkish territory by Allied troops. He understood that Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot had consulted together in regard to this question and had certain recommendations to make in regard to its solution, e.g., charging one-third of the dues paid by ships passing through the Suez Canal to ships passing up the Straits. This might bring in about £1,000,000. He wished to lay stress upon the fact that now, for the first time, Constantinople was absolutely at the mercy of the Allies. It was a different matter in the old days when Armenians had been massacred, and England had desired to intervene. Our then Foreign Minister, Lord Salisbury, had contemplated sending a British fleet to Constantinople.<sup>9</sup> At that time, however, the Straits had been controlled by Turkey. To-day, the Straits were controlled by ourselves. He suggested that we should be satisfied with the power we now had of thus bringing Turkey to heel if necessary.

M. MILLERAND thought that the Council were agreed that, in any case—

- (1) They must secure the payment by Turkey of her pre-war debt.
- (2) They must exact from Turkey the expenses involved in the occupation of Turkish territory by Allied troops.

He suggested, therefore, that the council should ask their respective financial experts in consultation to prepare a scheme which could be sub-

<sup>9</sup> Cf. the statement made by Mr. Lloyd George in the House of Commons on February 26, 1920: *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., *H. of C.*, vol. 125, col. 1969. See also Arthur J. Marder, *British Naval Policy 1880-1905* (London, 1941), pp. 244 ff.

mitted to the council for further consideration, making recommendations as to how the above two desiderata could best be secured. He himself had to return to France the following day, but he was leaving behind him M. Berthelot, who would be prepared to examine this question in concert with other Allied experts in London. He hoped to be back in London on the 23rd instant.

M. BERTHELOT said that during M. Millerand's absence he would get into touch with other financial experts of the Allies in London, and they would endeavour to cover as much ground as possible before M. Millerand returned.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the council should now adjourn and that it should meet again on the following Monday, when he would submit definite proposals on behalf of the British Government in regard to the question of Smyrna.

He understood that M. Veniselos was now in London, and he enquired whether it was the wish of the council that he should be invited to be present when they met on Monday.

SIGNOR NITTI agreed that M. Veniselos should be invited.

M. BERTHELOT said there was one very important question which had not yet been touched by the council, and that was Russia.

*(The Council adjourned at 7.5 p.m. until 11 a.m. on the following Monday.)*

## No. 8

I.C.P. 30.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference, held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Monday, February 16, 1920, at 11 a.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Forbes Adam, Mr. Philip Kerr;

SECRETARIES: Sir M. Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Major Caccia.

*France*: M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer.

*Greece*: M. Veniselos, Prime Minister; Sir John Stavridi.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti, Signor Galli; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, before they proceeded to the ordinary business of the day, Lord Curzon had a communication to make to the conference.

*Leakage of  
Official Infor-  
mation*

LORD CURZON said that on the previous Saturday the conference had discussed the draft reply to President Wilson's letter in regard to the Adriatic settlement.<sup>1</sup> The conference had not then seen the final draft of the reply, and they had certainly not authorised the publication in the press either of President Wilson's letter or of the

<sup>1</sup> See No. 7, minute 1.

answer of the Allies. On Saturday evening the United States Ambassador came to see him in great alarm, as he had learned that the draft reply had been telephoned to Paris and was to appear in the 'Écho de Paris.' Lord Curzon said that he expressed to Mr. Davis the utmost surprise and profound regret. Mr. Davis went on to say that he thought the publication of our reply would inevitably accentuate what was already a very delicate and difficult situation in the United States. The President was at present in a very irritable frame of mind, and might take advantage of this incident to throw over the Treaty of Peace and to withdraw altogether from the Allies and their counsels. Lord Curzon said that he at once informed the Prime Minister of the interview and of what had passed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this was an extremely serious matter. A fairly accurate account had also appeared in the 'Débats' of our reply to Holland about the Kaiser. He felt that it was quite impossible to conduct a conference in such circumstances. If the members of the conference could not keep their counsel, he thought it would be much better that they should not meet at all. The present leakage was particularly unfortunate, as it not only tended to estrange the United States, but it was also liable to cause dissension among the Allies themselves. If the conference could not observe secrecy, it would be much better to take a large hall and hold their discussions in public, with reporters present, so that what was reported might at least be accurate!

M. BERTHELOT enquired what exactly were the facts; what had been actually published in Paris, and in what papers. He asked this in order that enquiries might at once be made.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he took an extremely serious view of this indiscretion. It was a fatal thing to publish, for instance, the following, which had appeared in that morning's 'Times':—

'The United States Ambassador yesterday handed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a memorandum in which the United States Government criticises Mr. Lloyd George's proposal communicated to the Jugoslavs at the sitting of the Supreme Council on the 20th January. Mr. Wilson objects to the Jugoslavs being given the choice between the so-called Lloyd George scheme and the execution pure and simple of the Treaty of London. He also considers that that scheme differs too much from the memorandum drawn up in London last December by Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau, with the collaboration of the United States President.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Wilson declares that the United States cannot continue to interest itself in European affairs if the Allied Powers desire to settle the Adriatic problem without consulting the Government of the United States. The memorandum had also been received in London, and was examined by the heads of the Allied Governments before M. Millerand left this morning.'

Then, again, in either the 'Daily Express' or the 'Daily Mirror' that morning, a quotation appeared from the 'Débats' giving a fairly accurate summary of the Allied reply to Holland about the Kaiser.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Volume IV, No. 169, note 2.

M. CAMBON pointed out that, although this information was published in Paris, it actually came from London. Moreover, Signor Nitti was aware that the actual text of President Wilson's note had appeared in the 'Times.'

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed, but said that it was sent from Paris to London. He asked if Signor Nitti could throw any light on the matter.

SIGNOR NITTI said that an Italian journalist had been to see him both on Saturday and Sunday evenings to ask him about President Wilson's letter and for permission to publish it. He had told Signor Nitti that he was aware that the 'Times' had a copy of this letter, which they would not publish *in extenso*, but they would base their comments upon it. Signor Nitti had told the journalist that he certainly could not publish it, as he could not take the grave responsibility of authorising this. He agreed with Mr. Lloyd George that every possible precaution must be taken to maintain secrecy.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the communication to the 'Écho de Paris' must have been made by someone who had been present in the council chamber. Outside that chamber the only person who had seen the draft was the United States Ambassador in London, who had informed Lord Curzon that the text had been telephoned from London to Paris.

M. CAMBON pointed out that President Wilson's telegram had not only been handed to Mr. Davis, but it had also been sent to the United States Ambassadors in Paris and in Rome.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the draft of the reply had not yet even been seen by Mr. Davis. As he had said, if this leakage continued he would discontinue the meetings of the conference and he would work only with the heads of the various Governments direct, as this would enable the responsibility for any indiscretion to be traced at once.

M. CAMBON thought that the particular skill of journalists trained in foreign affairs should be taken into account. Such journalists went about picking up scraps of information in various places, and displayed great ingenuity in piecing those scraps together and reconstituting the whole. He informed the council that one day in 1894 [? 1904] he and Lord Lansdowne, in connection with the foundation of the *Entente cordiale*, had signed an instrument in Lansdowne House in the morning. Of this document there were only two copies existent, one of which was in Lord Lansdowne's possession, and the other M. Cambon said he kept in his own locked drawer. The same evening a Paris newspaper published not the actual text of the document, but the full sense of its contents. The whole thing was traced to a certain journalist, who, when questioned about the matter, said he had been following the progress of events and had, in various ways and from various people, collected his information in such a way as enabled him to reproduce the substance of the instrument.

LORD CURZON pointed out that M. Cambon's suggested explanation did not really touch the particular circumstances of the present case. The council had received the President's letter on Saturday, and had considered what reply should be sent at their meeting on Saturday afternoon. They did not complete their draft until after 5.30 p.m., and yet the United States

Ambassador said that the actual text was telephoned direct to Paris when no final decision had yet been reached by the council.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Supreme Council had had similar experiences in Paris, when full reports of the council's proceedings appeared in the press. It had therefore been decided that the four heads of the Governments only with one interpreter and one secretary, should meet in future, with the result that nothing leaked out. Leakage of this kind was fatal to negotiation, and any further indiscretion would, he felt, necessitate their reverting to the procedure it had been found necessary to adopt in Paris, and let the heads of the Governments only meet. He himself had actually heard on Saturday night somebody tell a quite casual person that the conference had decided to retain the Sultan in Constantinople. This sort of thing he regarded as most serious and dangerous.

M. BERTHELOT said that the draft reply prepared by Mr. Philip Kerr was presented to the council on Saturday afternoon, and it appeared to have been telephoned the same evening. He wished to know whether it was the first text or the second which was sent to Paris, as M. Cambon and he were anxious to start enquiries at once, and, if possible, to trace the source of the indiscretion.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, as one of the results of this leakage, questions had been put down for him to answer that afternoon in Parliament. For instance, in the name of Lord Robert Cecil, there was one about Constantinople; and a second enquiring whether it was true that a reply had been received from the United States Government regarding the Adriatic. He was quite prepared to defend in Parliament whatever general settlement might be decided upon by the council, but he was not prepared to get up and defend independent and isolated decisions.

M. BERTHELOT thought that, in the circumstances, the despatch of the reply to the President became an even more urgent matter than it was before.

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he wished, on behalf of the council, to extend a welcome to M. Veniselos, who fortunately had been able to attend that morning. He suggested that the council should discuss the questions of Thrace, Constantinople and Smyrna. As regard[s] Constantinople, the council had provisionally agreed that it was desirable that the Turk should be allowed to remain there and that the Allies should have control of the Straits. What this control actually involved in the way of garrison, and how much territory it would be necessary to occupy in order to secure that control, were questions which had been remitted by the council to Marshal Foch, for consideration in consultation with the military and naval experts of the Allies. In respect of Thrace, they had to decide where they should fix the boundary between Turkey and Greece. Should it be, for instance, the Chatalja line, or the Enos-Midia, and so on? In regard to Smyrna they had decided that the nominal sovereignty of the Sultan should be maintained there, but the real authority should rest in the hands of the Greeks. He invited M. Veniselos to address the council on the above subjects, giving the Greek view.

*Treaty of Peace  
with Turkey*



M. VENISELOS said, with reference to Thrace, that if the council decided that the Turk was to remain at Constantinople, then it followed that the Turkish territory in Europe must be as strictly limited as possible. Directly you got outside Constantinople to the north you found a population which was predominantly Greek. In previous conferences the Enos-Midia line had been frequently mentioned, and it had been regarded as a possible compromise between the Balkans and Turkey. This suggested boundary, however, had no relation to any geographical line, and it was not defensible either on strategic, or economic, or ethnological grounds. Between Chatalja and Enos-Midia there was a population of some 260,000, composed of about 86,000 Moslems, 18,000 Armenians, 3,000 Bulgarians and 145,000 Greeks. The Enos-Midia line meant a very long frontier which would involve endless customs difficulties. As regards Gallipoli, the population there before the war had been mainly Greek. They had evacuated the Peninsula during the war, but were now coming back. He did not wish to raise any objection to Great Britain, France and Italy sending a mixed garrison to occupy Gallipoli, but he thought that one side of the Straits should be held by those three Allies and the other could be in the hands of the Greeks. Statistics were not always reliable, and Oriental statistics were less trustworthy than most. The Greek Government, however, was in possession of an official Turkish document of 1894, received from the Greek battalion in the Allied garrison of Constantinople, containing the statistics of population, and after comparing this document with the figures prepared by the Greek statisticians it appeared that the latter were generally correct. As regards Gallipoli, there were about 64,000 Greeks as against 26,000 Turks. He would like to say a word about the guarantees to Bulgaria in respect of Dedeagatch.<sup>3</sup> He suggested that a small commission consisting of one Greek, one Bulgarian and one representative appointed by the League of Nations should be set up in Dedeagatch with a view to controlling the railway-line from that port to the Bulgarian frontier and assuring to Bulgaria free economic access to the sea.

LORD CURZON said that when the council had discussed Smyrna they had thought that special arrangements should be made to safeguard the interests of the minority of the population. He wished to ask M. Veniselos whether any parallel arrangements could be made at Adrianople, allowing for a local Turkish administration there? The council thought this was important, as Adrianople was a Holy City, possessing many mosques and places sacred to the Mahometans.

M. VENISELOS said that, before discussing Smyrna, he would state at once that he would be glad to meet the wishes of the members of the council by promising to satisfy Moslem sentiment in Adrianople. The statistics showed that there were there some 30,000 Turks and 28,000 Greeks. He suggested that it would be as well to appoint a small commission to go into this question and to discover some formula for the approval of the council.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired on what M. Veniselos based his statistics.

M. VENISELOS said that his figures were based on those supplied by the

<sup>3</sup> Cf. article 48 of the Treaty of Neuilly: *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxii, p. 793.

Greek Patriarch, who controlled a large administration and had been at pains to get as accurate figures as possible. He had asked the Patriarch to supply these figures to him, not for purposes of propaganda, but for the purpose of settling the future administration of the district. In Thrace, south of the Bulgarian frontier as laid down in the treaty, the Greek figures gave the Greeks a majority of 50,000, and the Turkish figures gave the majority at 40,000. This was not a very big difference, and could be accounted for by the fact that the two estimates were not prepared at the same time. The Turkish statistics of 1894 were made before the Turco-Greek war. After the war their statistics became much more tainted and open to suspicion.

3. MR. LLOYD GEORGE called on M. Veniselos to make a statement on the question of the retention of Smyrna by Greece.

M. VENISELOS said that before expressing his views in regard to the question of Smyrna, and before replying to the proposals put forward by the president of the conference, he wished to draw attention to the ethnographical situation of the territories claimed by Greece. He thought that point of view had not received due consideration by the conference. The territory at present occupied by Greece in Asia Minor included the whole of the sanjaks of Smyrna, a part of the Sanjaks of Saruchan and of Aidin, and the Kaza of Aivali. This territory contained a population of 590,000 Greeks, 350,000 Turks and 90,000 Armenians, Jews, Europeans and other non-Turkish races, that is to say, a total population of 1,030,000 of which only about one-third was Mahometan. These figures clearly proved that on the mainland alone there existed a very great majority of Greeks. But, if, in addition, the populations of the adjoining islands, Samos, Mitylene, the Dodecanese, &c., which belonged historically, economically and geographically to this part of Asia Minor, were also considered, they would be found to include over 1,000,000 Greeks as compared with only 380,000 Turks.

Having thus established the ethnographical situation in the territory in question, he proposed next to submit his appreciation of the proposals put forward by the conference. He agreed that in politics a solution frequently involved a compromise, but he doubted whether the satisfaction to be given to the Turks by the maintenance of a nominal sovereignty of the Sultan over this territory would in any way compensate the inconvenience which would thereby be caused to the Greeks and to the general interest at large. He thought that a good idea of the serious troubles that would arise by the maintenance of this nominal sovereignty would be afforded by the history of Crete since 1898. For instance, he felt sure that the population would at once insist that its representatives should sit at Athens, but such a proposal would naturally be refused by the Turks as infringing on their sovereign rights. He thought that when the advantages and disadvantages of the proposals were fully considered it would be found that the latter would greatly outweigh the former.

The figures which he had quoted related to the territories actually occupied at present by Greek troops. He did not wish, however, to maintain that the

whole of this territory should definitely remain in the hands of the Greeks. He suggested, for instance, that the part of the Sanjak of Aidin now occupied by the Greeks could be abandoned by them, while, on the other hand, the Kaza of Adramyti should be added to, and form part of the Kaza of Aivali, the inclusion of the Kaza of Adramyti within the Greek area being dictated not only by geographical and strategical reasons, but especially by economic.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked for figures in regard to the population outside the town of Smyrna.

M. VENISELOS replied that he was in a position to give the following figures:—

	<i>Turks</i>	<i>Greeks</i>
Kaza of Smyrna . . . .	100,000	240,000
Kaza of Vurla . . . .	4,000	40,000
Kaza of Cheshme . . . .	7,000	50,000
Kaza of Karaburun . . . .	8,000	15,000
Kaza of Svrie Hissar . . . .	9,000	11,000
Kaza of Fochia . . . .	2,000	19,000
Kaza of Tireh . . . .	20,000	5,000
Kaza of Menemen . . . .	10,000	11,000
Kaza of Kushadasi . . . .	8,000	11,000
Kaza of Bayndyr . . . .	9,000	6,000
Kaza of Odemish . . . .	19,000	7,000
Kaza of Berghana . . . .	22,000	25,000

It would be seen, therefore, that out of twelve kazas there existed a Turkish majority only in three kazas and a preponderance of Greeks in the remaining nine kazas. He wished particularly to point out that he asked for the cession of the Kaza of Adramyti not only for strategic and geographical reasons, but also for the reason that the inhabitants of the Island of Mitylene hold most of their land possessions in the Kaza of Adramyti; consequently, the two territories should not fall under separate jurisdictions. In addition to the two main alterations in the boundaries of the territories claimed by Greece, mentioned by him, there would undoubtedly be other small rectifications to be made, and he suggested that this question should be referred to a commission to be appointed by the conference, this commission to be made acquainted with the report of the Commission on Greek Affairs made to the conference last March. In conclusion he wished emphatically to state that in his opinion a nominal sovereignty over the territories in question would give no real satisfaction to the Turks, whilst opening the way to the greatest troubles in the future. Furthermore, in his opinion, the more the conference yielded to the demands of the Turks, the more would they be encouraged to press for further concessions. He knew that to be the mentality of the Turk.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that in the Kaza of Adramyti there existed a majority of Turks over Greeks equivalent to two to one.

M. VENISELOS agreed. He maintained, however, that geographically the Kaza of Adramyti and the Kaza of Aivali both belonged to the same Vilayet

of Brusa. Taking the two kazas together, a clear majority of Greeks would be found, and, in addition, as he had already stated, the land in the Kaza of Adramyti belonged chiefly to the inhabitants of Mitylene. In regard to the satisfaction of Turkish demands, he would point out that the Sanjak of Aidin, which he proposed should be evacuated by the Greeks, possessed far greater importance and had a greater population than the Kaza of Adramyti, which he claimed. In addition Aidin would be found to be the wealthiest part of Asia Minor.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he wished to put two questions to M. Veniselos. Firstly, what permanent garrison would be required to maintain this territory? Secondly, did M. Veniselos agree that Smyrna should be made a free port so that the Turks might enjoy full use of the same?

M. VENISELOS replied that in regard to the first question it would be impossible for him to give exact figures. Generally speaking he could say that the strength of the garrison to be maintained in the territories in question would bear the same relation to the population as the number of troops to be maintained in any other part of Greek territory. It must be borne in mind that the territory in question was inhabited preponderately [*sic*] by Greeks. Taking into consideration the adjacent islands, the total population numbered about 1,000,000 Greeks. Consequently, in a few days it would be possible in case of difficulties, to mobilise some 100,000 men.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether M. Veniselos did not fear an attack from outside by the nationalist Turkish forces, should this territory be permanently handed over to Greece?

M. VENISELOS replied that during the past eight months they had been able to withstand all such attacks, and he felt confident that on the signature of peace the likelihood of any such attacks would soon disappear. If the worst came to the worst, however, it would be found that the populations of the territory, which it is proposed to constitute into a Turkish State, would contain about the same population as that included in the Greek State, such as will be after the Peace Treaty, that is to say, 9,000,000 as compared to 7,500,000. On the other hand, within the Turkish territory as at present defined some 2,500,000 foreigners would be included, thus reducing the true Turkish population to only 6,500,000.

In regard to the establishment of a free port in Smyrna he absolutely accepted that proposal, since it involved a distinct advantage even to the Greeks. He would go further and say that he would gladly accept the appointment of a representative of the League of Nations for the free port, which would naturally contain only a part of the whole of the port of Smyrna. The free port would thus fall under the supervision of the League of Nations.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed that the geographical consideration of the question be referred to a small commission to be appointed by the conference. He thought it would be impossible for the conference itself to delineate the boundaries. He proposed, therefore, that a few experts, representing each of the Great Powers, should be appointed, and M. Veniselos would then be able to lay his proposals in detail before this commission. He asked that the

names of the members of the commission should be handed in that afternoon. In conclusion he thanked M. Veniselos for the clear statement which he had placed before the conference.

(It was agreed—

That each of the members of the Allied conference should appoint a small commission of experts to submit proposals in regard to the boundaries of the territories in question, and that M. Veniselos be invited to explain his proposals in detail to the commission.)

4. M. CAMBON said that at the last meeting of the Allied conference he had submitted certain proposals to extend the financial control exercised by the Powers in Turkey with a view to obtaining complete control. He had proposed, in fact, to establish a financial commission with full powers and with instructions to work towards complete control of administration. He had left that meeting under the impression that the president of the conference found himself unable to accept his proposals, and Signor Nitti apparently adhered to the views expressed by Mr. Lloyd George. Under those circumstances he had prepared a memorandum (Appendix), which had already been handed to the president of the conference. He would now ask that the same should be taken under consideration.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had received a copy of M. Cambon's proposals, which were now being examined. He thought the question could be discussed on the following day. He proposed that at the session to be held that afternoon the following questions should be considered, viz.:—

- (i) Reply to President Wilson.
- (ii) Armenia and Cilicia.

In addition it would be necessary at an early session to settle the character of the mandates to be applied to Syria, Mesopotamia, Cilicia, &c.

5. M. CAMBON said he had been requested by the president of the Commission of Control at Berlin to invite attention to the terms of articles 160 and 163 of the Treaty of Peace.

*Treaty of Peace  
with Germany.—  
Article 160*

Article 160 laid down that—

'By a date which must not be later than March 31, 1920, the German army must not comprise more than 7 divisions of infantry and 3 divisions of cavalry. After that date the total number of effectives in the army of the States constituting Germany must not exceed 100,000 men, including officers and establishment of depots.'

This article had been drafted on the assumption that the treaty would have been ratified at an earlier date. It had been thought therefore that between the period of ratification and the 31st March a sufficient period would have obtained for the demobilisation of the German forces in excess of the figure (100,000) prescribed. As matters stood the 31st March would soon arrive,

and, should the council insist on the strict fulfilment of the terms of article 160 of the Treaty of Peace, Germany would be obliged suddenly to send home most of the men now under arms. Obviously, this would be impossible. On the other hand, some decision in regard to the non-execution of the terms of the clause in question would have to be taken by the council; for instance, the council might agree to the prolongation of the period laid down in article 163 of the Treaty of Peace.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that M. Cambon had raised a very big question, which required very careful consideration. This question was intimately connected with the maintenance of internal order in Germany. He proposed that the question should forthwith be referred for consideration to Marshal Foch and the Allied military advisers to report how far it might be possible to insist on the fulfilment of article 160 of the Peace Treaty. He suggested that a letter in these terms should be drafted and forwarded to Marshal Foch.

(It was agreed—

That a letter should be drafted to Marshal Foch requesting him, in consultation with the Allied military advisers, to submit a report on the application of the terms of article 160 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.)

(*The council adjourned at 1.15 p.m. until 5.15 p.m. the same afternoon.*)

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W. 1, February 16, 1920.

#### APPENDIX TO No. 8

##### *Turkish Public Debt and Supervision of Turkish Finances*

##### *Note communicated by M. Berthelot to the Prime Minister*

*February 16, 1920*

(Confidential.)

The two following principles should be reconciled as far as possible, viz.:—

1. No fresh responsibility to be assumed in Turkey unless absolutely necessary, i.e., Turkey to be left to herself within the territory which will continue to belong to her, intervention only taking place when absolutely indispensable.
2. A minimum number of financial guarantees to be nevertheless obtained for the purpose of—

- (a) Re-establishing the former rights of foreigners, of which the latter were deprived during the war (service of the Exterior Debt).
- (b) Development as far as possible of Turkish resources, so as to assure receipts to an amount sufficient to meet eventual financial obligations arising under the Treaty of Peace, reparations, restoration, indemnities, &c.

It would appear possible to arrive at this result in the following manner, viz.:—

1. *Ottoman Public Debt*.—The general lines of the present system of administration of the Ottoman Public Debt to be maintained. It is a matter of common

knowledge that this administration—which has for the last thirty years collected certain revenues charged with the guarantee of the Consolidated Turkish Debt and of various Turkish loans—has worked to the satisfaction both of foreign bondholders and of Turkey, whose resources in revenue have been developed and improved thereby. Some of this revenue was paid direct (such as tithes and sheep tax in various provinces); some—such as receipts from various Régies, monopolies and assigned revenues ('revenus affermés')—was, without being collected direct, paid in by the authorities collecting same, the Ottoman Public Debt having nothing to do with this.

The administration of the Ottoman Public Debt commands the services of a staff of collectors for these purposes. They are nearly all natives, and being regularly paid, can be relied upon for honesty.

The foreign bondholders of the Exterior Turkish Debt are absolutely entitled to the retention of this administration, and there can be no question of injuring their well-founded rights. Some 80 per cent. of these bondholders are French or English, and French public opinion would not hear of their being defrauded.

Such retention would not entail any further intervention, or any further responsibility on the part of Turkey.

There would appear to be no objection to the right of direct collection by the Ottoman Public Debt being extended by virtue of the treaty, as it was shortly before the war by the actual wishes of the Ottoman Government. For example, since certain taxes are already directly collected by the Ottoman Public Debt in certain vilayets or sanjaks, there would appear to be no objection to the same taxes being collected by it in other provinces or districts; in the same way, there is no objection to the functions of the Ottoman Public Debt being extended to other indirect taxes, for example, the new taxes, monopolies, consumption taxes (salt, coffee, sugar, &c.), provided that such action is taken judiciously and after examination of each case on its merits.

It should be noted that the collection of taxes by the Ottoman Public Debt, as hitherto practised, should not be placed in the same category as the collection of taxes by a foreign control. The Ottoman Public Debt is the result of internal Turkish legislation, and its development would be hardly observed at home. A guarantee can be given that it would be absolutely accepted by the native population, which is already accustomed to it. This would not imply, so to speak, any further foreign intervention in the interior of the country.

2. *International Supervision.*—It is not sufficient to develop revenues by the method of indirect taxation. It is also necessary to ensure a control over the Turkish bodies, whose duty it is to carry out expenditure, as well as over the revenues provided by direct taxation. In fact one cannot think of entrusting to foreigners the collection of Turkish taxes, which places too directly and in a too obvious manner the Turkish taxpayer in contact with or in opposition to the tax-collector.

It is not, therefore, a question of direct intervention in the administration of the Turkish Ministry of Finance (the Malie), which would keep all its functions, and would remain purely Turkish.

But the minimum of control is indispensable. It is not proposed to organise a vast administration of control with agents in all the branches which remain Turkish. An Inter-Allied Commission, not very large, but composed of competent people sitting at the centre of Government, with representatives of France, Great Britain and Italy (later the United States and Russia), would suffice. This Commission of Control would have under its orders the organisation for the inspection

of Turkish finances, created a short time before the war, which was beginning to take effect. There is no objection to these inspectors being, as hitherto, Turkish, in such a way that the control exercised over them be external and scarcely apparent. It is this body of inspectors, purely Turkish, which would exercise in reality over Turkish administration the control of the Allied Powers. However small and concealed this control should be, in order to be effective it ought to extend to the different branches of the Financial Administration. It should supervise the budget prepared by the Ministry of Finance, it should be consulted in certain cases to be determined, and it should remain in close relations with the Public Ottoman Debt.

Those two foreign institutions, of which one is only the continuance of what exists already with some judicious extensions, and the other new, but with a restricted staff and as much concealed as possible, would control the financial life of Turkey. The first would assure certain returns under satisfactory conditions, and the second would supervise the development of the financial services and their moral improvement, whilst purely Turkish financial institutions (the Malie and its annexes) would keep their complete responsibility for the most difficult collection as that of the direct taxes, the revenue from which would remain, as regards employment, under inter-Allied control.

This proposal appears to take account of the anxieties shown and the scruples expressed by the British Prime Minister who, while acknowledging that the rights of the foreign holders of the Ottoman Public Debt should be respected, fears to see the responsibilities of the Allied Powers in Turkey dangerously expended [? expanded] by a control too much developed and too direct over the finances of the country.

## No. 9

I.C.P. 31.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Monday, February 16, 1920, at 5.15 p.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Philip Kerr; **SECRETARIES,** Sir M. Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. de Fleuriau, M. Kammerer

*Italy:* Signor Nitti, Signor Galli; **SECRETARY,** Signor Trombetti.

**INTERPRETER:** Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. The council approved a letter, dated the 16th February, 1920, which had been addressed by their president to Marshal Foch, in accordance with their decision that morning,<sup>1</sup> inviting him to summon a meeting of military advisers of the Belgian, British, French, Italian and Japanese Governments to consider the application of article 160 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany (Appendix 1).

*Treaty of Peace  
with Germany.  
Article 160*

<sup>1</sup> See No. 8, minute 5.



2. The council had under consideration a message from President Wilson to Mr. Lloyd George and M. Millerand, dated the 13th February, 1920 (Appendix 2),<sup>2</sup> and a revised draft reply to the President (Appendix 3).

*The Adriatic.*  
*Message from*  
*President Wilson*  
*to Mr. Lloyd*  
*George and*  
*M. Millerand*

LORD CURZON said that when the United States Ambassador in London came to see him the previous day about President Wilson's letter, he had urged very strongly that the joint reply should be couched in as courteous terms as possible, in view of the President's present irritability. The same advice had been given by Lord Grey,<sup>3</sup> who, when he had been to see the British Chancellor of the Exchequer that afternoon, had urged that the reply of the two Governments should be conciliatory. As regards the revised draft before the council, he did not suggest any alterations in regard to its substance, but he thought that in one or two places the language used might be somewhat less sharp.

M. BERTHELOT said that he had not been able to make a detailed examination of the revised draft, but he was prepared to make certain observations. In particular, he thought it desirable that the arguments should be marshalled in as simple a form as possible.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the council should now take the draft page by page.

LORD CURZON suggested that the concluding sentence of the first paragraph should be amended as follows:—

'They do not, however, find it altogether easy to understand the steps by which the Government of the United States has arrived at its present attitude.'

(This emendation was accepted.)

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This appendix contained the following letter from the American Ambassador in London to Mr. Lloyd George:

'UNITED STATES EMBASSY, LONDON, February 14, 1920

'(Confidential.)

'My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

'Permit me herewith to confirm the communication from the Secretary of State, received through the American Ambassador in Paris, for delivery to you and to M. Millerand, a copy of which I handed you last night and of which I have delivered a copy to the French Embassy for M. Millerand this morning.

'Believe me, &c.,

'John W. Davis'

This letter enclosed the document, also included in appendix 2, which is printed as document 12 in Cmd. 586. The text in appendix 2 was, subject to occasional minor verbal variation, the same as that printed in Cmd. 586 except that in appendix 2: (i) the document was headed 'Memorandum'; (ii) in the fifth sentence of the fourth paragraph (beginning 'The French and British Governments then expressed') there was, owing to an uncertainty in the transmission of the text, a queried omission in place of the word 'met' in the published text; (iii) the signature 'Lansing' stood at the end of the penultimate paragraph (ending 'no such grave responsibility') instead of at the end of the last paragraph; the quotation marks correspondingly closed at the end of the penultimate paragraph, after the word 'Lansing', the last paragraph thus standing outside the quotation: see No. 16, minute 2, and note 4.

<sup>3</sup> Lord Grey had recently returned from his special embassy to Washington (cf. Volume V, Chap. II).

M. BERTHELOT said that he did not understand that Jugoslavia had ever stated their willingness to make concessions to the Italian point of view in regard to strategic guarantees for Trieste, &c., and he suggested that the sentence in paragraph 3, beginning with the words 'and was willing,' and concluding, on line 13, with the words 'coinciding with its own,' should be omitted.

(This correction was accepted.)

LORD CURZON said that on the same page, in the last line but one<sup>4</sup> he would suggest substituting the words 'cannot possibly accept' for the words 'can only repudiate.'

(This was agreed to.)

LORD CURZON proposed that in paragraph 4, the sentence beginning with the words 'They do not believe' and ending with the words 'associated with it' should be omitted.

(This was agreed to.)

There was then some discussion, initiated by M. BERTHELOT, in regard to that portion of the draft which referred to Albania (paragraph 5), at the conclusion of which it was decided to omit the last sentence in paragraph 5, and to substitute the following:—

'Inasmuch as the Albanian people have never been able to establish a settled Government for themselves, and that the northern part of the population is overwhelmingly Christian and the southern part similarly Mahometan, they thought it best to entrust the responsibility for the government and development of these two parts to Jugoslavia and Italy respectively. They have, therefore, agreed that the whole of Albania should be brought under the mandatory system, and they believe that this will make it all the easier to reconcile the necessity for this system with the aspirations of the Albanian people for eventual unity and self-government.'

At the suggestion of LORD CURZON, the first sentence of paragraph 6 was amended to read as follows:—

'The Governments of Great Britain and France, therefore, must repeat that they find difficulty in understanding the present attitude of the United States Government towards the proposals, and they hope that, in view of these explanations, that Government will see its way to reconsider its attitude. In their view these proposals are the natural outcome,' &c.

M. BERTHELOT said that on the same page, with regard to the last two lines,<sup>5</sup> some reference should be made to the note sent to the Yugoslav Government. If the order of the sentences in this part of the draft were altered, his point would be brought out.

LORD CURZON suggested that M. Berthelot's views might be met if, in the last line but one the words 'They have confined themselves, therefore, to asking' were substituted for the words 'They have, however, asked.'

(This was accepted.)

<sup>4</sup> i.e. in the first sentence of paragraph 4 in appendix 3.

<sup>5</sup> See the last sentence of paragraph 6 in appendix 3.

Paragraphs 7 and 8 were passed by the council without alteration.

LORD CURZON suggested that in paragraph 9, second sentence, the words 'They can hardly believe' should be altered to read: 'They are reluctant to believe.'

(This was agreed to.)

M. BERTHELOT suggested that the whole sentence beginning 'They can hardly believe' and ending with the words 'in any case' should be redrafted, as, in his view, it was liable to create a bad impression. It was unwise, in his opinion, to accentuate that President Wilson might decide to throw the responsibility of withdrawing from the treaty upon other shoulders, and he proposed that the sentence should be omitted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought it was very difficult to know how to address a man whose psychological condition was so uncertain. If the President of the United States were himself attending the council, he (Mr. Lloyd George) would not hesitate to tell him straight out what was in the minds of the council. He fancied that the President might be somewhat alarmed if he thought that the insinuation contained in the portion of the draft now under discussion were likely to be published.

M. BERTHELOT thought that the sentence might easily be altered and put in a negative form.

The council asked Mr. Philip Kerr to re-draft for their consideration this portion of the proposed reply.

Some discussion took place upon the sentence in the middle of paragraph 9, beginning with the word 'Accordingly,' and ending on line 22<sup>6</sup> with the word 'world.'

M. BERTHELOT thought that the argument that the right to alter and improve the treaty had been reserved to the League of Nations might be employed to a greater advantage. Article 9 certainly gave the League of Nations this power. He suggested that the Allies might say that they entertained hope that, when the time came, the League of Nations would improve upon the treaty as it stood at present. In short, he would like to see the argument, as at present presented, reinforced.

Mr. Philip Kerr was asked by the council to re-draft the sentence beginning with the word 'Accordingly' and ending with the word 'world' in the sense desired by M. Berthelot.

LORD CURZON thought that there were objections to the following words in the ante-penultimate paragraph [sentence]: 'because they cannot secure their way in a single case,' and suggested that the following might be substituted: 'because, their view is not adopted in this particular case.'

Again, he would suggest that for [*sic*] the words 'its effects on so slight a ground,' at the very end of the draft, might be altered to read: 'on a ground which has the appearance of being so inadequate.'

(Both the above suggestions were accepted.)

M. BERTHELOT stated that what we were saying to the President was, in effect: 'You say that you cannot accept our arrangement. In those circum-

<sup>6</sup> i.e. line 35 of paragraph 9 in appendix 3 below.

stances we must abide by the Treaty of London, which, again, you say that you can [?] cannot] accept. That is the situation. What is the solution? The only solution is a direct agreement between Belgrade and Rome, and, in that case, you must give us your assistance. We must ask both Jugoslavia, on her part, and Italy, on hers, to make a big effort to come to an agreement.'

LORD CURZON thought it would be dangerous to invite the intervention of the President on this point.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed with Lord Curzon, and thought that such intervention might have disastrous results. He said he would like to see one aspect developed in the re-draft. At present, there was only one sentence to show that, while the Allies had been face to face with all these tremendous difficulties, they had never had a representative of the United States to assist them in their deliberations. The whole of Europe, however, had been in a state of turmoil, and the heads of the Allied Governments had been compelled to go ahead without American co-operation.

M. BERTHELOT thought that President Wilson's present state of mind was clearly indicated by the correspondence which had just been published between him and Mr. Lansing.<sup>7</sup> The President's view apparently was that the whole of the machinery of the United States Government should be suspended from the time that he fell ill, and he evidently took the view that the Allies were not entitled to meet and discuss questions of peace in his absence.

SIGNOR NITTI asked permission to say a few words. The matter that had been under discussion that afternoon was the form of the reply to be sent by the British and French Governments to a letter which the heads of those Governments had received from President Wilson. Italy, of course, was in no way concerned with this question, as the President had not addressed the document to her. All he would say was that he himself intended, on his return to Italy, to be as moderate as possible, in referring to the United States, in the statement which he would make in the Italian Chamber. He hoped that the nature of that statement would meet with the approval of his colleagues on the council. He desired to do nothing to throw any additional burden of responsibility on the shoulders of Italy in a most difficult crisis. He hoped that he had always displayed a really friendly feeling to Jugoslavia. If in future discussions differences of opinion were manifested, he trusted that the way in which he had approached the Adriatic question had given the impression that he had carefully avoided embarrassing in any way his colleagues.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thanked Signor Nitti for his statement, and said that the council deeply appreciated his attitude in regard to the Adriatic. He promised him that both France and Great Britain would stand by the obligations imposed upon them by the treaty.

Some discussion then followed as to who should send the reply to President Wilson. It was stated that the last reply to the President of the United States had been signed jointly by M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George. It was finally decided—

<sup>7</sup> See *The Times* of February 16, 1920.

That Mr. Lloyd George should sign the reply, as eventually approved, and that M. Berthelot should obtain M. Millerand's signature to the document, which should then be handed to Lord Curzon to present to the American Ambassador in London.

*(The conference adjourned at 6.15 p.m.)*

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 16, 1920.

#### APPENDIX I TO No. 9

##### *Mr. Lloyd George to Marshal Foch*

LONDON, February 16, 1920

(Confidential.)

M. le Maréchal,

I have the honour to inform you that at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the Allies this morning,<sup>1</sup> it was decided to invite you to summon a meeting of the military advisers of the Belgian, British, French, Italian and Japanese Governments for the following purpose—

To consider and report to the Supreme Council—

- (a) As to whether, in view of existing conditions in Germany, it is advisable to insist on immediate effect being given to the whole of the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, and more particularly the stipulation in article 160 that by the 31st March, 1920, the total effectives of the army of the States constituting Germany must not exceed 100,000 men.
- (b) If not, what relaxations should be permitted and for what period of time should they be extended.

I am, &c.,

D. LLOYD GEORGE, *President*

#### APPENDIX 3 TO No. 9

##### *Draft Reply to the President of the United States*

(Confidential.)

The Prime Ministers of France and Great Britain have given their earnest attention to the communication made to them in regard to the Adriatic settlement on behalf of President Wilson. They are glad that the Government of the United States has set forth its views so fully and with such complete frankness. They feel bound, however, to state that they are entirely at a loss to understand how the Government of the United States has come to adopt their present attitude.

2. In the first place, they believe that there is no foundation for the assumption which underlies the American communication, that the proposed settlement out-

lined in their telegram of the 20th [22nd]<sup>8</sup> January involves a capitulation to the Italian point of view as opposed to the Yugoslav, and therefore constitutes a settlement with which the American Government can have nothing to do. The memorandum from the United States Government criticises the proposed settlement on four grounds. Firstly, that it cedes to Italy the narrow strip of territory running along the coast as far as the *Corpus Separatum* of Fiume. Secondly, that this strip of territory coupled with the constitution of Fiume as a Free City under the guarantee of the League of Nations clearly paves the way for its annexation to Italy. Thirdly, that the modification of the Yugoslav-Italian frontier operates to the detriment of Yugoslavia in its control of the Northern railway from Fiume; and, fourthly, that it provides for the partition of Albania. The memorandum of the United States Government would appear to have entirely ignored the great advantages conferred on Yugoslavia at the same time.

3. The origin of the proposal of the 20th January lies in the fact that, when the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and France came to deal directly both with the representatives of Italy and Yugoslavia in Paris, they found that nobody desired the constitution of the Free State of Fiume, which had always been the kernel of the American proposals for settlement. They discovered that Yugoslavia would prefer a settlement which did away with the Free State and included as much as possible of its territory and population within its own borders, and was willing to make concessions to the Italian point of view, which desired certain strategic guarantees for Trieste and Pola in the event of the Yugoslav frontier coinciding with its own. Accordingly, the Governments of France and Great Britain, continuing the negotiations from the point at which they had been left on the 7th [9th]<sup>9</sup> December, made the proposal under discussion, including the rectification of the Wilson line and the cession to Italy of a strip of territory running along the shore, so as to connect it with the Free City of Fiume, the net upshot of which was that Yugoslavia was to gain, as compared with the American proposal, an additional 150,000 Yugoslavs, while agreeing to the inclusion within the Italian frontier of a further 50,000 Yugoslavs, in addition to the 400,000 which President Wilson had already agreed to allot to that country.

4. As regards the suggestion that the proposal of the 20th January clearly paves the way for the annexation of the town of Fiume to Italy, the French and British Governments can only repudiate the implication that the guarantee of the League of Nations is worthless, and that the Italian Government has no intention of abiding by a treaty which it enters into. They do not believe that there is a shadow of foundation for this imputation, which they cannot help considering should not have been made by one friendly Government to others associated with it. As regards the railway, the proposal of the 20th January gives to the Yugoslav State the whole control of every yard of the line from the point where it leaves the Port of Fiume, which is under the control of the League of Nations. This railway is a commercial, and not a strategic, railway. Under President Wilson's proposals it is commanded by Italian guns. According to either plan, nothing could be easier than for Italy to cut it in the event of war. They do not, therefore, see that there is substance in this criticism of a proposal whose real effect is to transfer the whole

<sup>8</sup> For the telegram of January 22 from Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau to the American Government cf. Volume II, No. 80, note 3; for the proposals communicated by M. Clemenceau to M. Trumbitch on January 20 see No. 7, note 4 above.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Volume IV, No. 169, note 2.

railway to Yugoslavia instead of leaving it in the hands of the Free State of Fiume, which no one desires.

5. There remains the question of Albania. They are glad to receive the criticism of the American Government on this part of their proposal. They would point out, however, that their telegram of the 20th January states that 'the details of the administration of this country by Yugoslavia, Italy and Greece have yet to be elaborated, and, in working to this end, sight will not be lost of the feelings and future interest of the Albanian people, and every endeavour will be made to carry out the arrangements in full consultation with them.' Further, they would point out that, so far from this proposal being made in the interests of Italy, it was made wholly in the interests of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs pointed out that, though under the proposal of the 20th January the northern part of their territory was guaranteed adequate access to the sea through the port of Fiume, the southern part of Yugoslavia had no such access, and that the natural outlet was to build a line down the Drin River to the mouth of the Boyana River. The French and British Governments thought that there was force in this contention, and their proposal in regard to Albania was designed to enable Yugoslavia, inasmuch as Albania was unable to undertake the work for itself, to develop under international guarantee a railway and port serving the southern part of its territory. Later discussions have shown that it seems probable that this necessity can be reconciled with the aspirations of the Albanian people for eventual unity, and they will certainly do their utmost to meet this desire.

6. The Governments of Great Britain and France, therefore, must repeat that they cannot understand the present attitude of the United States Government towards the proposals and they hope that in view of these explanations they will see their way to reconsider their attitude. In their view they are the natural outcome of the policy of the joint memorandum of the 9th December,<sup>9</sup> once, with the consent of both parties concerned, the idea of the Free State of Fiume was abandoned. It is not, however, the desire of the two Governments to force a settlement which is unacceptable to the President of the United States and they will, therefore, not attempt to insist upon its acceptance until they have heard the view of the United States Government on this despatch. They have, however, asked the Yugoslav Government to give a definite answer to their memorandum of the 20th January, since they must know what the attitude of that Government is.

7. They feel bound, however, to ask the United States Government to consider the effect of their action. The proposal of the 9th December has fallen to the ground, because nobody now wants to set up the artificial Free State of Fiume. The proposal of the 20th January is objected to by the United States, which now has no representative at the deliberations. How does the United States Government propose that this dispute, which prevents the reconstruction and threatens the peace of South-Eastern Europe, and whose settlement is urgently required, should ever be closed?

8. Further the British and French Governments must point out that the failure to secure an agreed settlement between Italy and Yugoslavia must leave them no choice but to acknowledge the validity of the Treaty of London. They would recall to the United States Government that the Treaty of London was entered into in the spring of 1915 at a most critical and dangerous moment of the war. In thus entering the war on the side of human freedom, Italy made it a condition that the Allies should secure for her, as against Austria-Hungary, strategic frontiers which would guarantee her against the Central Powers retaining the strategic command

of the northern plains of Italy. Had the Austro-Hungarian Empire remained in existence as the ally of Germany, the provisions of the Treaty of London would have been sound. Relying upon the word of her allies Italy endured the war to the end. She suffered a loss in killed of over 500,000 men and in wounded of three times that number, while her people are burdened by crushing debt. It was clearly impossible for her allies to declare at the end of the war that their signature to the treaty meant nothing but a scrap of paper, and that they did not intend to apply the terms of their bond. They agreed with President Wilson that the circumstances under which the Treaty of London was concluded had been transformed by the war itself. The Austro-Hungarian Empire had disappeared and the menace to Italy, against which the terms of the treaty were intended to provide, had largely diminished. They, therefore, entirely associated themselves with the efforts of President Wilson to negotiate a settlement between Italy and Yugoslavia which was more consonant with the new conditions and which was acceptable to both sides. But throughout these negotiations they never concealed from him the fact that they regarded themselves as bound by the Treaty of London in the event of a voluntary agreement not being arrived at. The fact, therefore, that when they made their proposals of the 20th January they informed both the Italian and Yugoslav Governments that in the event of their not being accepted they would have no option but to allow the Treaty of London to come into force, can have come as no surprise, and was indeed the obvious method of bringing this long controversy to a close. They would point out that this declaration is not, as the American Government would appear to think, an ultimatum to Yugoslavia on behalf of Italy. Under the Treaty of London, Italy has had to abandon Fiume altogether and hand it over to Yugoslavia. This part of the treaty is as unacceptable to Italians as is the transfer of Dalmatia and the islands to Yugoslavia. The declaration, therefore, in regard to the enforcement of the treaty was an attempt to promote a prompt settlement of this dangerous controversy by pointing out to both sides that if they could not agree upon a settlement which after long negotiation seemed to be a fair compromise between their conflicting views, the only alternative was an arrangement which was less palatable to both.

-9. Finally the Governments of France and Great Britain feel bound to reply to the general observations contained in the latter part of the United States memorandum. They can hardly believe that the threat of the United States to withdraw from all further co-operation with them in the conduct of the world's affairs is entirely due to the modifications which they have proposed in the memorandum of the 9th December. In any case they feel confident that the explanations contained in this reply will remove any misunderstandings as to the nature of the Adriatic proposals. At the same time they are deeply concerned that the United States Government should have seen fit to make the threat contained in the end of their memorandum. One of the principal difficulties encountered by the heads of Governments during the negotiations of peace was that of reconciling treaty obligations with national aspirations which had changed or come into being since the date on which the treaties were signed. It was obviously impossible to ignore these latter aspirations, many of them born during the war, and formulated with unexampled clarity and elevation by the President of the United States himself. It was equally clearly impossible to ignore treaties. In fact the war began in order to enforce upon Germany respect for the solemn treaty she had made nearly 120 [80] years before in regard to the neutrality of Belgium.<sup>10</sup> It is the task of the statesmen

<sup>10</sup> i.e. the agreement of 1839: cf. Volume V, No. 13, note 3.



of the world to endeavour to adjust national aspirations and ideals, many of which are only transitory and ephemeral, with one another and with international treaties. The difficulty of the task, the patience required in order to effect it successfully, the uselessness of endeavouring to enforce preconceived ideas on refractory material have been recognised by no one more clearly than by the President of the United States. In his address at the opening session of the Peace Conference, he pointed out how impossible it was to expect imperfect human beings and imperfect nations to agree at once upon ideal solutions. He made it clear that in his judgment the only course before the Peace Conference was to do the best it could in the circumstances and to create machinery whereby improvements and rectifications could be effected by reason and common sense under the authority of the League of Nations instead of by resort to war.<sup>11</sup> Accordingly not only was the League of Nations established, but article 9 was specially inserted in the Covenant, providing that 'the Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties which become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.' The Governments of France and Great Britain, therefore, view with consternation the threat of the United States Government to withdraw from the comity of nations, because it does not agree with the precise terms of the Adriatic settlement. The difficulty of reconciling ethnographic with other considerations is certainly not greater in the Adriatic case and does not produce more anomalous results than in the case of other parts of the general treaties of peace, difficulties which were recognised by President Wilson and his colleagues when they agreed to the best settlement practicable at the time, because the machinery for peaceful readjustment had come into being. That ethnographic reasons cannot be the only ones to be taken into account is clearly shown by the inclusion of 3,000,000 Germans in Czechoslovakia, and the proposals so actively supported by the United States delegation for the inclusion within Poland of great Ruthenian majorities, exceeding 3,500,000 in number, hostile to Polish rule. Though the British representatives saw serious objections to this arrangement the British Government have not thought themselves justified in reconsidering on that account their membership of the League of Nations. The Governments of France and Great Britain, therefore, earnestly trust that, whatever the final view of the United States Government as to the Adriatic settlement may be, they will not destroy the whole machinery for dealing with international disputes by withdrawing from the treaties of 1919 because they cannot secure their way in a single case. That would be to crush the hopes now entertained by countless millions of people all over the world that the most enduring and the most beneficent part of the Treaty of Peace was the constitution of machinery whereby the defects of treaties could be remedied and the changing conditions and aspirations of mankind could be adjusted by processes of reason and justice, instead of by the balancing of armaments and resort to war. The Governments of Great Britain and France cannot believe that it is the purpose of the American people to take a step so far-reaching and terrible in its effects on so slight a ground.

*February 16, 1920.*

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. iii, pp. 178 ff.

I.C.P. 32.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Monday, February 16, 1920, at 6.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Forbes Adam; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Major Caccia.

*France*: M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer, M. de Fleuriau.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti, Signor Galli; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

LORD CURZON said that the question of Armenia possessed a political and a geographical aspect. The geographical aspect of the question involved the determination of frontiers: a question which could only be settled by a commission working on the spot. In regard to the political aspect of the case, the objects for which the Allies had fought and which they had intended to secure included the creation of an independent State of Armenia. To the achievement of that object all the Allies were equally pledged. He proposed, therefore, to confine his remarks to consideration of the character and boundaries of the State to be so constituted. In this connection two distinct parties existed. The one favoured the creation of a Greater Armenia, including six Turkish vilayets and extending from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean: the other favoured the creation of a lesser Armenia. The nucleus of an Armenian State had already been provided for in the autonomous existence of the old Russian Armenia with its capital at Erivan. The conference at Paris had recognised the independence of that *de facto* State,<sup>1</sup> and it only remained, therefore, to decide what additions should be made thereto. The British Government favoured the establishment of an independent Armenian State under the League of Nations. At one time it had been thought that the United States of America would have accepted a mandate for Armenia. That did not now appear to be possible, though the United States of America would in all likelihood financially assist the new Armenian State. He did not think the council would wish to invite some neutral State to accept a mandate. He merely mentioned this as an alternative, though in his view the best plan would be to place Armenia under the protection of the League of Nations.

In regard to the territories to be included in the State of Armenia a considerable difference of opinion existed. Those in favour of the establishment of a larger Armenia would include the eastern portion of the Vilayet of Erzerum, the fortress of Erzerum and Trebizond on the Black Sea. The British military authorities, however, opposed the inclusion of the fortress of Erzerum, since it would constitute a standing menace to Armenia on account of its being coveted by the Turks. On the other hand, should it be decided

<sup>1</sup> See Volume II, No. 77, minute 2.

to exclude the fortress of Erzerum from Armenia, steps should be taken to destroy the fortifications. Again, others maintained that Armenia should be given room for expansion and an outlet on the Black Sea.

On the eastern or Caucasian side of the new State of Armenia a frontier line would have to be drawn with Georgia and Azerbaijan. Fortunately, latterly the relations between these various States had been friendly, and in his opinion the lines of the frontier would have to be settled on the spot by a commission. Though the relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia were now friendly, he realised that certain parts of the frontiers, notably Zangezur and Karabach, were in dispute and would be difficult to settle.

As soon as the Powers had reached an agreement in regard to the frontiers of Armenia, measures would have to be taken for providing that State with a force sufficient to ensure the maintenance of its independence. The strength of this force could not now be determined but the figure of 10,000 had been mentioned. He thought the United States of America might be counted on to help financially or otherwise in the creation of such a force.

Finally, in regard to the access of Armenia to the sea, he assumed in the first place that Cilicia, now occupied by the French, would not be included in Armenia. On the other hand, should Armenia be supplied with a maritime outlet on the Black Sea?

In this connection two proposals had been put forward. Firstly, that Lazistan on the south-eastern corner of the Black Sea should be given to Armenia as an outlet. Unfortunately, the people who inhabited this area were not Armenians. The people were connected with Georgia and were Mahometans by religion. The proposal could, therefore, only be considered from a commercial standpoint. Secondly, that the Powers should create a free port at Batum with a small surrounding zone of territory to be placed under the League of Nations, as an outlet for Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Batum had always provoked the greed of surrounding nations. In accordance with the Treaty of Berlin, Batum should have been created a free port.<sup>2</sup> It was however promptly occupied by Russia. It had since been restored to Turkey, had been recovered from the Turks, and was at the present moment occupied by British troops, who were however shortly to evacuate. Consequently the fate of Batum was very difficult. It could not be given to any of the surrounding people, and for that reason he favoured the establishment of a free port under the custody of the League of Nations. A great deal would, however, depend on whether Lazistan and Trebizond were added to Armenia or not.

In regard to the form of government to be set up in Armenia, arrangements similar to those made in connection with Turkey would have to be made for the protection of the non-Armenian parts of the population. He (Lord Curzon) had purposely refrained from referring to the southern frontiers of Armenia, as that would have raised the question of Cilicia, which was at present occupied by the French. Should France receive a mandate for Cilicia, special protection would have to be given to the Armenians in that

<sup>2</sup> Under article lix: see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. lxxix, p. 766.

territory. The situation in Cilicia appeared to be critical and troubled. The French had sustained attacks by the Turks, and in the course of these operations many Armenians had been massacred particularly around Marash. The Armenian question would therefore arise in connection with the settlement of Cilicia—a question to which he did not wish to refer to [*sic*] on the present occasion.

M. BERTHELOT said he would preface his remarks by stating, as Lord Curzon knew, that on the main question complete agreement had been reached between Great Britain and France. That is to say, it had been agreed to take the Russian *de facto* State as the nucleus of the new Armenian State, to which would have to be added portions of Turkish Armenia. The determination of the latter areas would undoubtedly raise certain difficulties. The territories originally included in Greater Armenia extended to Lake Van, but at the present moment no Armenians existed in those regions, as all had been massacred or deported. For that reason the problem presented very grave difficulties. Since the country originally occupied by Armenians would now have to be repopulated by Armenians, many of whom had settled elsewhere, these people could however [*sic*] be invited to return. It was possible that one-third or two-thirds of the Armenians now settled in Persia, America and elsewhere might come back, and in that way some 300,000 or 500,000 Armenians might be available to repopulate Turkish Armenia. He agreed, however, that the experiment must be made and everything must be done to compensate the Armenians for the atrocities from which they had suffered.

In regard to the frontiers of Armenia, he agreed that a great deal of the Vilayet of Erzerum should be included in Armenia, but the town of Erzerum should be excluded, since it contained very few Armenians. He, personally, had always been under the impression that the British Government held the view that Erzerum should form part of Armenia: but he accepted the view now expressed by Lord Curzon.

LORD CURZON, intervening, remarked that he had merely given the views of the British military authorities and not those of the British Government.

M. BERTHELOT, continuing, said that in regard to affording outlets to the sea he was authorised to state that the Armenians themselves had abandoned all idea of seeking an outlet through Cilicia. They did not want it. On the other hand, they had pressed for an outlet at Trebizond. He (M. Berthelot) had frankly told the Armenian representatives that they could not have this because Trebizond was not Armenian; it was entirely Turkish. Furthermore, in order to make use of the port of Trebizond a railway would have to be constructed crossing difficult mountainous country. In his opinion, the solution of the question was afforded by Switzerland: it involved the creation of railway outlets. In the case of Armenia, three possible railway outlets could be established:—

- (1) By the construction of a railway from Kars to Batoum, Batoum at the same time being created a free port as proposed by Lord Curzon, a proposal to which he entirely adhered.

- (2) By the construction of a railway line to Alexandretta.
- (3) Via Constantinople, which entailed the construction of a railway line from Erzerum to Angora.

The latter route, in his opinion, constituted by far the most logical and most satisfactory outlet for Armenia, and the construction of a line between Erzerum and Angora presented no great difficulties.

In regard to the defence of the territory of Armenia, in the opinion of the French military experts, a force of 10,000 men would obviously be too small. In their opinion a force of 20,000 men would be required, especially since much of the land would have to be recovered from the warlike people who had seized the same. That question, however, was one which would have to be examined by the military experts, whose figures would have to be carefully scrutinised.

In regard to Lazistan, he entirely agreed with the views put forward by Lord Curzon. Lazistan was not only inhabited by Mahometans; it was also claimed by Georgia, which also claimed Batoum. It would be in the recollection of the council that the *de facto* Government of Georgia had virtually submitted an ultimatum to the Great Powers, to the effect that it would be unable to take steps to oppose the advance of Bolshevism unless it were given Lazistan and the port of Batoum.<sup>3</sup> The whole question therefore required careful consideration. He agreed that Batoum ought not to be given to Georgia, but he thought the question of Lazistan required further consideration.

He wished, in the next place, to refer to the claims of Greece to a strip of territory to be formed with an independent Pontic State along the Black Sea, around Trebizond. In his opinion the claim was a ridiculous one, since the Greeks in that area only constituted 5 per cent. of the whole population, and, should an autonomous State be created, as suggested, the whole of the Greeks would only be slaughtered.

Lastly, in regard to the creation of a Greater Armenia, it seemed to him that already only an insufficient number of Armenians would be found to populate Turkish Armenia, and should a Greater Armenia be created, it was estimated that the Armenians would only constitute one-quarter of the total population, three-quarters being Turks. Consequently, should any question be referred to the vote of the population, the Armenians would be hopelessly out-voted. Under these circumstances, France could not contemplate the creation of a Greater Armenia. Furthermore, he was prepared to say that the Armenians themselves did not want it. The suggestion had merely been put forward by the entourage of President Wilson on grounds which could not bear examination.

He thought he need not refer to the attacks of the Turks in Cilicia as reported by the British and French military intelligence services. He thought the question presented no great danger, and, in the opinion of the French

<sup>3</sup> The Georgian delegation at the Peace Conference of Paris had claimed Lazistan and Batum in a memorandum under dated cover of March 14, 1919. Cf. also Volume III, No. 631.

military authorities, Mustafa Kemal<sup>4</sup> was merely playing a game of bluff. It was true some ten officers had been killed. That undoubtedly was a regrettable incident, but in itself constituted no great danger. Had it been decided to drive the Turks from Constantinople, had the Turks remained at Smyrna, had it been the intention of the French permanently to occupy the whole of Cilicia, undoubtedly grave dangers would have arisen for the reason that the Turks would thereby have been exasperated. In his opinion, the whole question would soon be cleared up by threatening the Turks that a continuance of such attacks would lead to the curtailment of their independence. In conclusion, he wished categorically to state that the French Government did not intend permanently to occupy Cilicia, they intended eventually to withdraw, merely maintaining a certain control, probably similar to the financial control which had been proposed by the French to be applied to Turkey.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that M. Berthelot had just made a very important declaration. But, he thought that the question of Cilicia should be discussed on the following day.

M. CAMBON said that he wished to qualify the statement made by M. Berthelot. The withdrawal of the French from Cilicia would necessarily depend on the intentions of Italy in Asia Minor.

SIGNOR NITTI agreed that an independent Armenian State must be created. In regard to its extent, he agreed that the Armenian State to be so established could not reach to the Mediterranean as that would mean an Armenia without Armenians. The three most important questions calling for settlement related to Erzerum, Trebizond and Batoum. In his opinion, everything possible should be done not to incite the Turks. It had been decided that Arabia should disappear from the Turkish Empire, that the Greeks should remain at Smyrna, and that Thrace should go to the Greeks. He asked, therefore, what would remain to the Turks? Consequently, the new Armenian State must not be made so large as to render it impossible for the Armenians to defend themselves, whilst placing difficulties in the way of the Turks.

Following that train of thought, in his opinion, Erzerum should not be given to the Armenians; it should be retained by the Turks. The Armenians should have the right of using the port of Trebizond, and, lastly, Batoum should be formed into an international port. In his opinion, Georgia had no claim to Batoum. To sum up, the Armenian State should not be too large; it should be in a position to defend itself.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that a general agreement appeared to exist in regard to the question of the setting up of an independent Armenian State. But in regard to boundaries some doubt appeared to exist in regard to the inclusion of Erzerum, and the disposal of Batoum; though agreement appeared to exist that Trebizond should not be included in Armenia. Accepting these conclusions as a general proposition, he suggested that the whole

<sup>4</sup> For the preceding activities of Mustafa Kemal Pasha in leadership of the movement of Turkish national resurgence see Volume IV, Chap. III *passim*.

question should be referred to a commission. He proposed, therefore, that each of the Allied representatives should appoint experts to submit a report on the whole question.

It was agreed—

- (1) That each of the Allied representatives should appoint experts to report on the boundaries of a new independent State of Armenia.
- (2) That the names of the experts so appointed should be handed in on the following day at 11 a.m.

(*The meeting then adjourned till 11 a.m. on Tuesday the 17th February.*)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W. 1, February 16, 1920.*

(Revised February 20, 1920.)

## No. 11

I.C.P. 33.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference, held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, February 17, 1920, at 11 a.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Forbes Adam; **SECRETARIES,** Sir M. Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Major Caccia.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Berthelot; (for first item only) M. Kammerer, M. de Fleuriau.

*Italy:* Signor Nitti, Signor Galli; **SECRETARY,** Signor Trombetti.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda.

**INTERPRETER:** Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. The council had before them the draft terms of reference to the following

*Turkish Finance* commissions:—

*Commission.* Turkish Finance Commission,

*Smyrna Com-* Smyrna Commission,

*mission.* Armenia Commission.

*Armenia Com-* After some discussion the council agreed—  
*mission*

- (a) That the terms of reference to the Turkish Finance Commission should be redrafted so as to include a reference to the question of the liquidation of the Turkish debt in respect of territories taken away from Turkey; that is to say, allocation among the Powers taking from Turkey the responsibility for these territories of their respective shares of the payment of the pre-war debt (Appendix 1).<sup>1</sup>
- (b) To approve the terms of reference to the Smyrna Commission (Appendix 2).

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. The terms of reference in this appendix were identical with those cited in minute 6 below.

- (c) To approve the terms of reference to the Armenia Commission, subject to the following correction, i.e., in line 2 of A (ii) the substitution of the word 'portions' for the words 'a portion,' and an addition suggested by Lord Curzon later in the meeting (see page 12)<sup>2</sup> (Appendix 3).

The representatives of the respective Governments nominated to sit as members on the above commissions are as under:—

	<i>Turkish Finance Commission</i>	<i>Smyrna Commission</i>	<i>Armenia Commission</i>
<i>British Empire</i>	Mr. Armitage Smith. Mr. Blackett.	Mr. Forbes Adam. A representative of the War Office.	Mr. Vansittart. Colonel Gribbon.
<i>France*</i>	M. de Fleuriau. M. Kammerer.	M. de Fleuriau. M. Kammerer.	M. de Fleuriau. M. Kammerer.
<i>Italy</i>	Signor Carlo Galli. Signor Nogara.	Signor Carlo Galli. Signor Nogara.	Signor Carlo Galli. Signor Nogara.
<i>Japan</i>	Mr. M. Nagai, Coun- sellor of Embassy. Mr. K. Mori, Financial Commissioner of the Japanese Govern- ment.	.. ..	Mr. I. Yoshida. First Secretary of Embassy. Lieutenant-Com- mander K. Anno.

\* (When two commissions sit simultaneously, M. Berthelot will replace one of the French representatives on one or other commission.)

Attention was drawn to the fact that as the same gentlemen had been nominated by France and Italy for these three commissions, it would be impossible for the commissions to sit simultaneously, which must cause delay.

M. CAMBON and SIGNOR NITTI stated that their respective nominees need not all sit on each commission, but that they would partition the work up among themselves.

2. M. CAMBON said that there was another question besides that of the Financial Commission which he thought required an early decision on the part of the council, and that was the establishment of a commission to reorganise the judicial system of tribunals. He doubted whether the Financial Commission could undertake this work in addition to financial matters which were about to be referred to it.

At present in Turkey the Capitulations were still in force, and had been since the armistice, but it would be necessary in the future to ensure a system of courts which would give every guarantee of security to the interests of the Christian populations. The French Government had laid this matter before their legal advisers in Paris, and the latter, after studying the question most carefully for a period extending over a great many months, had submitted their report.

<sup>2</sup> See minute 5 and note 8 below.



MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked that the report might be circulated to the council. He himself was personally unwilling to take any responsibility for the internal administration of Turkey.

LORD CURZON was of opinion that the existing system of Capitulations, which was really a system of servitude, must be replaced by a unified system. M. Berthelot and he had agreed in their preliminary discussion that it was desirable to have an Allied commission sitting at Constantinople to take evidence there and to examine the question on the spot.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that it would be better to circulate the report before the council arrived at any decision.

M. Cambon undertook to circulate the report to members of the Council.

M. CAMBON said the only question, in his opinion, now was how to set up the commission to examine the report and its conclusions. They must decide whether the report should be referred to a commission, and whether that commission should sit in Paris, in London or in Constantinople. The report, he thought, agreed in the main with the views that had been expressed by Mr. Lloyd George, and advocated a solution which he had good reason to hope would prove satisfactory to Turkish sentiment. It was advisable to have some new system ready to replace the Capitulations directly the latter disappeared. It would be a serious matter if this precaution were not taken.

SIGNOR NITTI thought that the council recognised, above all, the supreme necessity of arriving at prompt conclusions in order to make peace without delay. They ought to settle the main lines of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey as soon as possible, so that the details could be examined by their experts at once. The question of the future judicial system of Turkey had evidently been most carefully examined in Paris. He himself thought that the commission proposed by M. Cambon ought to sit in London, with a view to securing rapid decisions from the council. It would have very difficult functions to perform. What was it that the Powers intended to do in regard to Turkey? Their policy generally was to liberate the smaller nations and to establish a small, independent State in Turkey proper. As regards financial control, their intention was to put Turkey on its feet. So far as the question of law and order was concerned, they desired to secure justice and religious liberty for those of non-Moslem views. He suggested that the commission should be instructed to prepare its conclusions in such a way as would make them most acceptable to Turkish sentiment, so that the *amour-propre* of the Turk might not be offended.

LORD CURZON thought that Signor Nitti had somewhat misapprehended the special character of the present problem, which had nothing to do with Turkish religious law, which only affected Moslems *vis-à-vis* Moslems in Turkey. The question which had been raised by M. Cambon that morning was concerned with the jurisdiction of the civil courts, which existed for the protection of foreigners. Hitherto, this jurisdiction had been exercised under the Capitulations, as a safeguard against the corrupt and unsatisfactory administration of the Turkish courts. What they desired to see now was to

what extent these Capitulations, which involved a derogation of Turkish sovereignty, could be modified in the interests of the Turks themselves. He reminded the council that such Capitulations had existed in Japan till they had been replaced by a system of competent native tribunals. He did not therefore agree with Signor Nitti that the matter was one of great urgency, since capitulations would continue to function until a new system had been set up. The real people to advise in this matter were the Italians and the French and the British living in Turkey, and it was for this reason that a local enquiry was required.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that obviously the council must study the report before it discussed the question further. He would invite the council to resume the discussion on the following day, or the day after.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he fully appreciated Lord Curzon's arguments. The main thing was to secure equal justice to all inhabitants in Turkey, and to approach the enquiry in that spirit.

M. BERTHELOT said that when Japan had abolished the Capitulations, Europe had accepted this because there was nothing else to be done. There were difficulties, however, and these difficulties would be far greater in the case of Turkey, as the Turkish mind was far less precise than the Japanese. He did not altogether agree with Lord Curzon that there was no immediate hurry, as his own view was that it would be necessary to introduce in the terms of the Treaty of Peace some stipulation that would guarantee the replacement of Capitulations by an adequate judicial system. He concurred with Mr. Lloyd George that the resumption of the discussion and the appointment of the commission should be deferred until the council had seen the report.

3. M. BERTHELOT said he would endeavour in a few words to explain the point of view of France in regard to Cilicia. It was understood that they desired to take into account the wishes of the Turkish populations, as was evidenced by the decisions that had been taken regarding Constantinople and Asia Minor, and also the decision that where the Greek population predominated special rights should be reserved to the Greeks. He did not intend to discuss that morning the wisdom of endeavouring to re-elect [*re-erect*] a Turkish State with which ordinary relations could be resumed. He would address himself particularly to Cilicia. Here the French Government were prepared to make considerable sacrifices, and he would state at once that they did not envisage annexation now or in the future. Further, France would see that Turkey exercised not merely a nominal sovereignty over the province, but she would retain a real sovereignty, subject, of course, always to the general financial and administrative control and the establishment of a native gendarmerie, with foreign instructors, to keep order. The French Government, on the other hand, reserved to itself certain conditions. First, they thought that the very liberal settlement proposed by themselves must be part of the general settlement of Turkey, and France would not undertake to make the suggested sacrifices until she knew

what that general settlement was to be; second, the Treaty of Peace with Turkey as finally decided must be such as not to jeopardise the special interests of France either in the Turkish debt or in the French companies in Turkey, and so on. It was not reasonable that, after the Allies' victory, France should be in a worse position in Turkey than in pre-war days. Her first point, therefore, was that her existing concessions must be retained; second, that the pre-war debts must be paid; and third, that German property and undertakings there must be liquidated. If the railways were to remain in German hands, then his Government believed that it would not be long before we found ourselves in the same situation as we were in on the outbreak of war. The above represented the general conditions which France wished to lay before the council. He would proceed now to conditions of more immediate importance. France thought that the Turkish Government ought to be obliged to stop the Nationalist campaign and to make serious efforts to put an end to the attacks that were now taking place; second, the Allies must obtain general guarantees in regard to the control of the public debt, of the customs and of the Straits; third, we must insist upon the substitution of some sound judicial system to replace the Capitulations. His country attached great importance to this, and it was for this reason that a commission had been appointed many months back to examine the whole question. Fourth, the local gendarmerie must be reconstituted, under foreign instructors. Fifth, in Cilicia France claimed priority for the concessions which were shown on the map<sup>3</sup> in blue. It would be impossible for French troops to evacuate the country until a judicial system had been set up and had become a reality, and the guarantees to which he had alluded had been granted. In any case, M. Berthelot concluded, it was out of the question to have any kind of absolute partition of the liberated areas among the victors, as this would have to take into account the respective position of each Power before the war.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that M. Berthelot, in his statement, had implied that France intended to make some concessions to the Allies in Cilicia, in return for which she expected to receive a *quid pro quo* elsewhere. In reply, he felt compelled to point out that Great Britain had not required France to make any concessions in Cilicia, and that France must only consider her own interests. It would be in the recollection of the council that Great Britain had agreed, as a result of negotiations carried out with M. Clemenceau, to withdraw her troops from Cilicia, so that French troops could go there.<sup>4</sup> So far, Great Britain had addressed no protest to France in regard to her action in Cilicia, and, he thought, he was correct in saying that Italy had not done so. France, of her own accord, had herself come to the conclusion that it would be a mistake to annex and to administer Cilicia directly. In his opinion that was a sound conclusion. Cilicia was a purely Turkish province inhabited almost entirely by Turkish people. Cilicia was not like Syria, where only a few Turks existed, and where, therefore, Turkey could not claim any national right to its incorporation in Turkey. But in Cilicia the

<sup>3</sup> Not appended to filed copy.

<sup>4</sup> See Volume IV, Chap. II *passim*.

population was Turkish; there were there 290,000 Mahometans, as compared with 75,000 Armenians and 20,000 Greeks. Under those conditions, he agreed that France would reap nothing but trouble in endeavouring to hold that country and to administer it. In addition, Cilicia would always prove to be a great drain on her resources. Consequently, France had wisely come to the conclusion that it would not be to her interest to administer Cilicia. But, that decision had not been reached on account of any pressure put either by Great Britain or Italy, in return for which she should claim special concessions and economic advantages in Asia Minor.

Should France decide that she required merely to exercise a certain control over Cilicia, the council, he felt sure, would be prepared to examine any such proposals on their merits; but he could not agree that the decision of France to withdraw from Cilicia gave her any right to claim special concessions in Asia Minor.

M. BERTHELOT, intervening, said that his remarks regarding concessions had referred to Cilicia only and not to Asia Minor.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, continuing, said that the commercial interests of Great Britain throughout Asia Minor were very great; but he suggested that the council should, for the present, confine itself solely to the problems of the future administration of Cilicia, and to the consideration of such proposals as France might wish to put forward relating thereto.

M. BERTHELOT said that he must have expressed himself badly if he had given the impression that France wished to bargain and to obtain concessions elsewhere in return for abandoning her occupation of Cilicia. He had merely intended to put forward the proposition that France could not adhere to any plan for the general settlement of the Turkish question unless her pre-war interests, in every part of the old Turkish Empire, received full recognition to the same extent as those of other countries. He agreed that British commerce occupied a prominent position in the old Turkish Empire, and he further agreed that Great Britain should receive advantages corresponding to that superiority. But, at the same time, France asked that she could [? should] be treated in exactly the same way. She asked that she should not be deprived of those commercial advantages which she possessed before the war.

He feared he had also been misunderstood in regard to Cilicia, if he had given the impression that France's withdrawal from Cilicia demanded concessions elsewhere. Possibly it might be true to say that France had reached her present decision on account of events which had recently occurred there. But, on the other hand, an agreement had been reached between Great Britain and France whereby the former guaranteed certain definite rights to the latter in Cilicia. Consequently, in withdrawing from Cilicia and abandoning those rights, France would, in reality, be making certain concessions to Great Britain.

In general terms, he accepted all that Mr. Lloyd George had said, provided it were clearly understood that France could never agree to the settlement of the Turkish question unless the existing rights of France were fully protected.

In conclusion, he would ask the council closely to examine the French proposals, which had been prepared not only with a view to protecting French interests, but also general interest[s].

MR. LLOYD GEORGE maintained that the question of priority of trade required to be cleared up. He felt certain that similar claims to those of France would be put forward by Italy for the southern portion of Asia Minor, on the ground that, under the Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne Agreement, Italy was to receive certain compensations.<sup>5</sup> He did not recognise that agreement, since it had never been ratified, and America had not subscribed to it. Still, the claims of Italy would have to be given due consideration, as well as those of France.

Should the French proposals be accepted, it appeared to him that France and Italy would thereby be placed in a better position, because they would obtain priority in respect of trade, without the responsibility of maintaining order. He assumed that France would claim a mandate for Syria, and, as a result, France would obtain no trade priorities in Syria. She would merely acquire certain responsibilities without trading priority. In this connection, he wished to enquire from M. Berthelot how he proposed to reconcile his proposals with the clauses of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which prescribed 'the open door' and equal rights for all nations. At this stage he did not wish to express any opinion, he merely put the question to M. Berthelot, especially as a strong feeling existed in Great Britain that similar claims should be put forward by her in respect of Mosul and Mesopotamia. Therefore, he wished to be quite clear on that point, namely, whether the French proposals in regard to Cilicia did or did not conflict with the articles of the League of Nations. To take a concrete case, supposing an American company went to Cilicia to obtain certain commercial concessions, would France maintain that she possessed prior claims? Could the American company thus be effectively disposed of? Furthermore, he wished to enquire whether such prior rights as had been claimed by France in Cilicia carried with them rights of veto, which might prevent the development of a country by others, whilst nothing was being done by France.

It appeared to him that two important questions required to be carefully examined: the one a commercial question, the other a Foreign Office question. And, before a decision could be reached in regard to Italian claims in South Anatolia, French claims in Cilicia, and, it might well be, British claims in Mosul, he thought that a commission, representing partly trade and partly Foreign Office, should be appointed forthwith to examine the various questions which he had raised.

M. BERTHELOT replied that, as far as the 'open door' and equality of rights were concerned, France claimed nothing. All ports would be open to free trade. Consequently, that question did not arise. The claims put forward by France merely had reference to obtaining a priority for industrial enterprises. In other words, France merely claimed a first option. On the other hand, he fully agreed that such rights would not include a negative monopoly. That

<sup>5</sup> See Volume IV, Chap. III, Introductory Note.

is to say, France would have the first right to develop, but should she not exercise that right, she could not prevent other people from doing so. He would be prepared, however, to agree to the appointment of a commission, as proposed by Mr. Lloyd George, though he did not think the commission need necessarily be commercial and political.

He (M. Berthelot) could not accept the statement that, as a result of granting to France priority of industrial enterprise in Cilicia, the council would find itself in conflict with the United States of America. Obviously, such priority could not apply to existing concessions, since every national possessed the right to purchase shares. On the other hand, in regard to the creation of new concessions, copper mines, &c., obviously these, as happens everywhere, would be granted to the highest bidder. Those countries possessing the greatest control or the largest interests in any country would invariably obtain such concessions as might be available. As a matter of fact, in most places, the United States of America possessed the preponderating influence. She would consequently obtain all the concessions she might require.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed that a commission should be appointed, as previously suggested by him, and that the draft terms of reference should be discussed that afternoon.

It was agreed—

That a commission, representing trade and political experts, be appointed to examine the future administration of Cilicia; the terms of reference to be discussed at a meeting to be held that afternoon.

4. LORD CURZON desired to invite attention to the following points arising out of M. Berthelot's proposals in regard to the future of Armenia[?Cilicia]:—

*Armenians in  
Cilicia*

Firstly, the fate of the Armenians in Cilicia. There were at present some 75,000 Armenians in Cilicia, and the Allied Powers, France in particular, were under special obligations towards those Armenians. France had during the war raised large forces of Armenians in Cilicia in order to fight against the Turks in those quarters. As a result the Turks had already begun to massacre them, and when the French withdrew the Turks would be tempted to make a clean sweep of all the remainder. Under those circumstances, he thought that the commission on Armenia which had been appointed yesterday should also consider whether the boundaries of Armenia should not be extended to include portions of Cilicia; or, alternatively, what measures could be taken for the safety of the Armenians in Cilicia, possibly by transferring them to other parts of Asia Minor.

Secondly, M. Berthelot had said that peace, order and security ought to be maintained by a gendarmerie. Did M. Berthelot intend this to be a French gendarmerie? He wished to enquire whether he was correct in assuming that the present French proposals for Cilicia did not imply the assumption of a mandate by France. He assumed that France merely claimed commercial priority and nothing more.

Thirdly, on the assumption that Cilicia would be handed back to Turkey, a new boundary would have to be drawn between Cilicia and Syria. In that event, what did the French consider should be the northern boundaries of Syria in the future?

M. BERTHELOT, in reply, said that the French Government fully realised the importance of obtaining special guarantees for the safety of Armenians in Cilicia. There were at present 70,000 Armenians in Cilicia, but it was expected that considerable numbers would probably return in the near future, raising the total to 150,000. Consequently, special guarantees would be required; but the nature of those guarantees would require further study. On the other hand, the French troops would only be withdrawn from Cilicia after the treaty with Turkey had come into force, and after the guarantees laid down in the treaty had actually been applied.

Regarding the gendarmerie and other branches of the administration, the principles to be applied would be the same as those for other parts of Turkey. In other words, French officers would be appointed to supervise the gendarmerie and French advisers or councillors to control the finances and other branches of administration.

Lastly, in regard to the future boundaries of Cilicia, several alternative lines had been suggested which would have to be studied by an Allied commission of experts.

LORD CURZON expressed the view that the appointment of advisers and councillors to control the various Government Departments would constitute a mandate.

M. BERTHELOT replied that a system of control, both financial and administrative, would obviously have to be applied to the whole of Turkey, and the same control would apply to Cilicia. The only difference would be that the advisers and councillors serving in Cilicia would be French.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE maintained that such a system of control would undoubtedly constitute a mandate. He invited attention to article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which read as follows:—

‘Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as an independent nation could be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone.’

M. BERTHELOT maintained that instructors or advisers would, in his opinion, obviously have to be appointed for the whole of Turkey. Thus, if a gendarmerie were created in Turkey, foreign instructors would have to be appointed thereto. But would that constitute a mandate?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the view that the moment councillors and instructors were appointed in Turkey a mandate would be established over Turkey.

M. BERTHELOT maintained that control must consist of something. In his opinion it would be impossible to apply any military, financial or administra-

tive control in Turkey without some assistance from outside. But this did not mean a mandate. In his opinion a mandate implied a prescribed system of Government applied to a defined area. Were this not the case Turkey would have to be left entirely to herself, leading to confusion and trouble in the near future.

LORD CURZON thought that the council was getting dangerously near to the partition of Turkey in Asia Minor. It had been agreed yesterday that Turkey should retain undisturbed possession of Asia Minor, except in regard to such parts of the Smyrna district as were predominantly Greek. Now, however, the council were arriving at a system whereby Italy in one part of Asia Minor and France in Cilicia would be exercising mandatory powers. M. Berthelot had said that the control of the administration in Cilicia would be French. Was that really what the council was aiming at? And did economic control imply the appointment of officials? In this connection he would point out that when Persia under an agreement between Great Britain and Russia had been divided into two spheres of control,<sup>6</sup> involving economic priority, neither Russia nor Great Britain ever claimed the right to appoint officials. He hoped the conference would not accept the principle that economic spheres of influence implied the power to appoint officials. In his opinion that would mean the establishment of mandates, and the Treaty of Peace would then come into force.

M. BERTHELOT thought that the fact still remained, that in Turkey the appointment of foreign councillors, advisers or instructors to control Turkish administration would be necessary. On that assumption, he maintained that a certain number of foreigners would form part of the Turkish administration, some British, some French, some Italian. Should the French members of the Turkish administration be posted to Cilicia, that would not establish a mandate. He failed to see why the French advisers should not be posted to Cilicia without creating a mandate.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE maintained that the appointment of French advisers exclusively in one place, Italian exclusively in another, Greek in another, British in another, and Russian in another would, in reality, mean the partitioning of Turkey, which was the one thing that the council had decided not to do.

He was quite prepared to discuss the question relating to the creation of spheres of economic influence. But, in his opinion, that question was quite a different thing to the partition proposed. The assent of the United States of America would never be obtained to any such proposal as that put forward by M. Berthelot. He hoped M. Berthelot would not press his claims beyond the claim for priority of economic development.

M. BERTHELOT said he must press for the acceptance of the principle which he had enunciated. That is to say, in his opinion, as soon as advisers and councillors were appointed to assist in the administration of Turkey, it should be possible to admit that it would be unreasonable to place other than

<sup>6</sup> Under the Anglo-Russian Agreement of August 31, 1907, printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. c, pp. 555 ff.



French councillors and advisers in Cilicia in view of the proximity of Syria to Cilicia, and in view of the vested interests which France there possessed. In principle, he would be willing to waive the right of France to appoint only French councillors in Cilicia; but in practice the majority of the councillors should necessarily be French. Any other solution would obviously be against the dictates of common sense and the interests of order in those localities.

In regard to the question of the danger of antagonising the United States of America, her intervention so far had been purely negative. America had merely vetoed: she had given no constructive assistance. The United States had certainly recently intervened on two or three occasions; but that intervention could best be likened to the final flicker of an expiring lamp. The conference was not working for the next six months, but for the future, and the United States of America could not be permitted to be the arbiter of the affairs of all the world. America could not dictate the policy to be followed in Turkey when she was not prepared to shoulder any responsibilities. He fully acknowledged the services rendered by the United States of America, but that did not necessitate complete subordination to America's ideas. The United States of America had done nothing in regard to Turkey. She had not gone to war with Turkey. She would accept no mandate. She would help in no way. Consequently, the conference could not be entirely guided by the wishes of the United States of America.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE held that the conference should not place itself in such a position that when the terms of peace came to be placed before Turkey, the latter should have the support of America in opposing them. In his opinion M. Berthelot's proposals went entirely against the views of President Wilson. The decisions reached by the conference in regard to Turkey would have to be forwarded to America, with the result that the President might encourage the Turks to resist, in the same manner as he had encouraged the Jugoslavs. Should Turkey feel that the terms ran counter to the principles of the League of Nations, the Great Powers would find themselves compelled to surrender to Turkey. He need not remind the conference that considerable trouble had been experienced in regard to the Shantung settlement,<sup>7</sup> on which occasion President Wilson had been supported by his own people.

M. Berthelot had said that considerable French capital had been invested in Asia Minor. He would point out that the money in question had been invested at a time when Turkey was supreme. At that time there was no control over the army, navy, constabulary or finance, and yet French capitalists had invested millions. On the other hand, in the future Constantinople would be under the control of French guns so that far greater pressure could be applied than heretofore.

He (personally) had never realised that the council would be asked to place the administration of Turkey under European instructors. He did not believe Turkey would accept any such proposal. Turkey might ask for instructors just as the Poles had asked for them. But it would be impossible for the council to impose foreign instructors on Turkey, though the conference

<sup>7</sup> See Volume VI, Chap. II *passim*.

might lay down that should instructors be asked for by Turkey they must be Allied instructors. He could not himself accept proposals which would obviously bring the Allies into conflict with the United States of America, whilst at the same time deliberately throwing over the mandatory principles of the Covenant of the League of Nations by establishing a regime whereby all the advantages of a mandate were obtained without any of its responsibilities.

In conclusion, he proposed that the meeting should adjourn until the afternoon when Lord Curzon would give a summary of existing treaties, which confer economic spheres of influence to [*sic*] certain Powers over certain areas.

(It was agreed to adjourn the further discussion of the subject until the afternoon.)

5. MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that an addition should be made to the terms of reference to the Armenian Commission, adopted at the commencement of that meeting, to the effect that since Cilicia would remain in Turkish sovereignty, measures would be necessary to safeguard the future of the Armenians in that territory.

M. BERTHELOT said that he did not wish to prejudice the final decision in regard to the withdrawal of the French from Cilicia, since that question could not finally be disposed of until the terms of the Turkish treaty could be decided. He thought it would be sufficient to say that measures might have to be taken to guarantee the safety of the Armenian population in Cilicia.

LORD CURZON proposed the following text:—

(3.) That steps must be taken for the protection of the Armenian groups in Cilicia.

(This was agreed to. For final text of terms of reference, see Appendix 4.)<sup>8</sup>

6. MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed the following terms of reference to the Turkish Finance Sub-Commission, which were formally approved—

To set up a commission, composed of two representatives each of the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, to prepare for the consideration of the Supreme Council a skeleton draft of the financial clauses of the treaty with Turkey, with directions to secure in particular the payment by Turkey of her obligations, including the expenses incurred by the Allied and Associated Powers in the occupation of Turkish territory since the armistice, and the Turkish share of the pre-war Turkish debt and the

<sup>8</sup> Not printed. In the filed copy appendices 3 (v. sup.) and 4 were transposed, the final text of the terms of reference being that printed in appendix 3. The draft text in appendix 4 was identical with that in appendix 3 except (i) the text in paragraph (a. 2) of appendix 4 read 'a portion' instead of 'portions'; (ii) paragraph (a. 3) was not included in the text in appendix 4. (Cf. minutes 1 and 5 above.)

apportionment among the States accepting responsibility for the administration of territories to be detached from the former Turkish Empire of their respective shares of the Turkish pre-war debt, and the payment of the pre-war obligations of Turkish subjects to Allied nationals.

*(The meeting then adjourned until the afternoon at 3.30 p.m.)*

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 17, 1920.

(Revised February 20, 1920.)

## APPENDIX 2 TO No. 11

### Smyrna Commission

#### *Terms of Reference*

It is agreed to set up a commission, composed of two representatives each of the British Empire, France and Italy, to hear the claims of the Greek delegation and to make recommendations as to the geographical boundaries of the district of Smyrna, on the assumption that this district will be subject to Greek administration and without prejudice to the question of sovereignty.

## APPENDIX 3 TO No. 11

### Armenian Commission

#### *Terms of Reference*

(Secret.)

It is agreed to set up a commission, composed of two representatives each of the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, to hear the claims of the Armenian delegation and to make recommendations—

- (a) As to the geographical boundaries of Armenia on the following assumptions:—
  - 1. That it is to be constituted as an Independent State.
  - 2. That it is to include the present *de facto* Independent Republic of Erivan and portions of the adjacent Turkish vilayets.
  - 3. That steps must be taken for the protection of the Armenian groups in Cilicia.
- (b) As to the future status of Batoum and the Sanjak of Lazistan.

I.C.P. 34.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference, held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, February 17, 1920, at 3.30 p.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Forbes Adam; Mr. Philip Kerr (for the latter part only); **SECRETARIES,** Sir M. Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Major Caccia.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Berthelot; M. Kammerer (for the latter part only).

*Italy:* Signor Nitti, Signor Galli; **SECRETARY,** Signor Trombetti.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda.

**INTERPRETER:** Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. BERTHELOT said that he would venture to offer the following observations in regard to what Mr. Lloyd George had said that morning towards the end of the meeting.<sup>1</sup> In the first place, *Treaty of Peace with Turkey* as to the possibility of our quarrelling with the United States over Turkey, he agreed that everything possible must be done to avoid this contingency; at the same time, he thought that there was a much greater chance of friction with the President arising over the Adriatic question than over the Turkish settlement. The Adriatic had constituted a special preoccupation of the President, and he had particularly addressed himself to its solution. He had, further, closely examined the whole problem of the frontier between Albania and Greece. Consequently, it had become a personal matter with the President, in which he felt his prestige and dignity were involved. But, in regard to Turkey generally, M. Cambon had received just lately a telegram from M. Jusserand with reference to the enquiry that had been made whether the United States wished to be represented in the present discussions on Turkey.<sup>2</sup> The American Government had replied that they did not want this. The United States Ambassador in London might attend the meetings as a silent witness, just to take notes, but not to express opinions. M. Berthelot, proceeding, said that he perceived a marked and growing tendency of the United States to withdraw more and more from European and from Turkish questions. If, however, the Allies took the line of following the Washington lead in Middle Eastern questions, then great difficulties were bound to arise, in regard to Armenia in particular. The idea had been to establish a great Armenia stretching from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and a telegram had recently been received from Mr. Gerrard [*sic*]<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See No. 11, minute 4.

<sup>2</sup> For the draft telegram in this sense to M. Jusserand, French ambassador in Washington, see Volume IV, Nos. 671 and 675.

<sup>3</sup> Mr. J. W. Gerard, former American ambassador in Berlin, had on December 22, 1919, addressed a telegram, on behalf of himself and certain other prominent Americans, to Lord Curzon. Mr. Gerard had therein advocated the 'creation [of] Armenian State that will unite Ararat with Cilicia, extension by America [of] necessary aid to Armenia during her formative period under definite continuing policy and immediate recognition Armenian

giving the views of certain prominent Americans on this question. If it were decided to grant Armenia these two maritime exits, he (M. Berthelot) did not think that Turkey would find these terms too harsh. He did not propose to insist upon this, as it was not a fundamental point. He would now pass to the second point, that of Turkey itself. He did not anticipate that Turkey would complain about our suggested arrangements. The Turks could not contemplate excluding strangers altogether from their country, but they would want their nominal sovereignty to be retained in certain places, like Cilicia. As regards the position of the French in the latter province, he was confident that the council, in addressing itself to this subject, would appreciate questions of sentiment, which could not be regarded as altogether negligible. He certainly could not agree to an undiluted Turkish sovereignty in Cilicia without consulting the French President of the Council. He fully appreciated the cogency of the arguments advanced by Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Curzon, and he agreed that whatever the Powers decided to do in the different parts of Turkey must be consistent. He thought that we might offer to place at the disposal of the Turks technical advisers and instructors for their gendarmerie, and in respect of the latter his Government did not necessarily intend that these should be exclusively French, although they should be predominantly so. This would not amount to anything in the nature of a mandate, but the French Government felt that they were fully entitled to insist upon so much, as the French public would expect no less.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he would repeat what he had already said, that the Allies had not committed themselves to forcing instructors on the Turks, and he expressed the hope that the French would not assume anything of this kind. As regards the attitude of the United States, if exclusive trading rights were granted to one nation, violence would be done not merely to the sentiments, but actually to the interests, of the United States, who might well object to the economic development of any one area by any particular country. One of the provisions of the treaty was that there should be equal trading rights for all nations. That being the case, he thought that M. Berthelot was taking a somewhat sanguine view of the amenability of the Americans. He understood M. Berthelot to mean that, if Turkey should invite the assistance of foreign instructors, the Powers should, by a mutual arrangement, give preference to French instructors in that area where economic preference was to be accorded to them.

LORD CURZON thought that what Mr. Lloyd George had said led to the following general conclusion, to which he believed they all subscribed. Whatever arrangements we might make regarding the employment of instructors or the granting of economic concessions could not be put down in black and white in the treaty, but must be a matter of mutual arrangement between the Powers. If in the treaty we made it appear that Turkey was to be partitioned into spheres, Turkey would never accept these conditions, the United States would reject them, and the sentiments of the civilised world would be Republic etc. . . . We regard Cilicia [as] vital and essential for Armenia. You know how our people feel about Armenia.'

offended. He urged, therefore, that nothing about partitioning should appear in the treaty. If, however, Turkey should ask for the assistance of instructors, the Powers could arrange among themselves for their provision. As regards spheres of influence, he suggested that the Allies should work on the lines of what was known in England as a 'self-denying ordinance'; that is to say, that they should mutually arrange that Great Britain would not interfere in the areas allotted to France or to Italy, and would, moreover, actually support those countries in their administration of such areas, and *vice versa*. Lastly, he would urge that, whatever arrangement of this character might be made by the Powers, it should be widely published, and not kept secret, as nothing else would satisfy the feelings of the civilised world.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed, but thought that it might be inserted in the treaty as a general principle that Turkey is to give economic priority to the Allies in various areas.

LORD CURZON, continuing, said there was one other question, and that was as to the spheres of economic concessions, if the latter ever came into existence. Hitherto the Allies had proceeded on the basis of what was known as the Sykes-Picot map,<sup>4</sup> but the Italian area shown on that map had been extensively modified by recent arrangements with Greece.<sup>5</sup> It did not follow, therefore, that the Italian area of economic priority would be identical with the coloured area shown as hers on the Sykes-Picot map. These areas, he thought, must all be examined afresh.

M. BERTHELOT thought it was quite logical and reasonable not to insert in the treaty the different concessions and proposed partitions into areas of economic influence. Such clauses would be open to criticism as appearing to partition up Turkey. As regards instructors, if the Turks asked for them, we could hardly refuse to supply them. He thought this could be put in the treaty in a fairly definite form, as the Turks were all in favour of having a sound administration. They favoured financial and administrative organisations which were controlled by Europeans and which gave themselves good openings, as they liked handsome salaries, regularly paid, which they did not get under their own Government. He agreed that economic priorities could be arranged by means of letters exchanged between the various Powers, and that these need offer no particular difficulty or cause any dissension. But, as regards the question of Cilicia, whether that question be of administrative control or of instructors for the gendarmerie, he could not ask for a definite decision that day from the council, as so important a matter must be referred by him to Paris. With reference to the frontiers and territorial limits of spheres of interest, he saw no reason why the Powers should not readily come to some agreement if they followed the lines of actual fact and common sense.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that some years previously the northern and southern portions of Persia had been allotted to Russia and Great Britain respectively as spheres of influence by mutual arrangement between those two Great Powers. Lord Curzon had a copy of the Russo-British Treaty with

<sup>4</sup> See Volume IV, Chap. II, Introductory Note, note 1.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Volume IV, No. 17, note 2.

him, and, although the cases were not exactly analogous, the terms of the treaty might be instructive.

LORD CURZON said that the treaty at the time was exceedingly unpopular and was much criticised; moreover, when this instrument was drawn up, Persia herself had not been consulted.

(Lord Curzon then read from the French text a translation of an extract from the convention between the United Kingdom and Russia, relating to Persia, dated the 31st August, 1907,<sup>6</sup> article 5:—

‘Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and not to support in favour of British subjects, or in favour of the subjects of third Powers, any concessions of a political or commercial nature—such as concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, &c.—beyond a line starting from Kasr-i-Shirin, passing through Isfahan, Yezd, Kakhk, and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, the demands for similar concessions in this region which are supported by the Russian Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Great Britain engages not to seek the concessions referred to.’)

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that no real similarity existed between the two cases, which were, as a matter of fact, altogether different. Persia was practically in the hands of Great Britain and Russia, and this was not the fact in the case of Turkey.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that he desired to put to the council the following question: How did they propose to reconcile their idea of spheres of economic priority with their idea of equality of opportunity and treatment which they had been advocating in the case of China?<sup>7</sup>

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that before the council came to any conclusion on the question of Cilicia they must consider first the rest of Turkey, and also the old Turkish provinces of Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, &c., and he would like to know what M. Berthelot suggested as regards these provinces. It was obvious that the general problem of Turkey could not be settled piecemeal. The areas to which he had just referred were the subject of negotiation between the Powers in 1915,<sup>8</sup> and Cilicia formed only a small part of those negotiations. M. Berthelot apparently proposed to abandon the arrangement then made in favour of a scheme of priorities.

M. BERTHELOT said, as regards Cilicia, he would despatch a telegram to Paris giving the gist of the discussion that afternoon, and asking the President of the Council for the definite opinion of the French Government in regard to the questions of economic preference and of instructors.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought it would be premature to ask for such a decision, and suggested that M. Berthelot had better wait until the council found out whether they were in agreement on other related questions.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. No. 11, note 6.

<sup>7</sup> See Volume VI, Chap. II *passim*.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Volume IV, Chap. II, Introductory Note.

M. BERTHELOT agreed not to ask for any definite opinion, and said that he would merely report the discussion instead. The questions that remained were those of the French mandate in Syria, the agreement between the French and the Arabs in the adjoining regions, and the question of Great Britain's position in Palestine, Mesopotamia and the Hedjaz. As regards Syria, after a long discussion France and Great Britain had reached an agreement. The French had also made a provisional arrangement with the Emir Feisal,<sup>9</sup> which he thought would be generally accepted on account of its great moderation. In regard to the frontiers of Syria and Palestine, the Zionists were closely concerned, and one of their particular interests was the question of water-supply. Accordingly, the French proposed, by a definite compact, to arrange that the Zionists should have a sufficiency of water for irrigation purposes. They would, further, do their best to favour the development of a Jewish home in Palestine, so long as this development did not run counter to the wishes of the original inhabitants. The Zionists, as was known, desired the annexation of the Yarmuk River; this river, however, Great Britain regarded as part of a natural alignment for the projected railway from Haifa to Bagdad. He reminded the council that the French Government were relying upon the agreement of the 15th December [? September] last,<sup>10</sup> by which Great Britain undertook to withdraw her troops; this withdrawal was not yet quite complete. To sum up, so far as the Zionists were concerned the French were prepared to give them all the water-power that they needed. In regard to other questions, France would make every endeavour to satisfy the British point of view. To turn now to the question of Mosul, this raised a delicate and difficult problem, as Mosul did not lie in the area which had been allocated either to France or Great Britain, and any final arrangement that might be reached in respect of this place must be made in accord with the Arabs. The question of Mesopotamia depended largely upon the question, what were to be its northern limits? Should Kurdistan remain a Turkish province? Should it come under one of the two mandatory Powers? He perceived objections to any division of responsibility. He thought that the Allies were generally agreed that Palestine should be open to all nations, as Jerusalem was traditionally the home of three great religions, and consequently was a place of particular sanctity. If Great Britain desired to administer the country and to obtain a mandate for Palestine, all the French would ask for would be that the British would respect the traditional rights of the French and pay regard to the interests of those inhabitants who were of the Catholic religion, and especially to the Catholic missions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that Mesopotamia, Mosul, Palestine, and Syria were questions with which the Turks were no longer concerned, and the Turks must be so informed. There was no necessity to delay peace with Turkey until the Powers had mutually agreed upon how these provinces were to be administered. The important thing was to let the Turk understand that he had no sovereignty or shred of authority over these districts,

<sup>9</sup> See Volume IV, Chap. II *passim*.

<sup>10</sup> See Volume I, No. 57, note 10.



which should be handed over to the Allies to settle the question of their future administration. It was essential that before peace with Turkey was concluded, the Allies should come to some clear agreement among themselves. On behalf of the council he thanked M. Berthelot for his frank and straightforward statement. Whatever settlement was reached must be an amicable one, and must have regard to the interests, not only of the Turks, but also of the inhabitants of the various provinces, and, further, the interests of Great Britain and France. He wished to enquire of M. Berthelot as to what the agreement was which had been reached between the French and the Emir Feisal.

M. BERTHELOT said that this agreement was based on a draft drawn up by Colonel House in connection with the 'A' Mandate.<sup>11</sup> He had shown the Emir Feisal this draft, and had pointed out that the French terms were really more favourable to the Arabs than those proposed by the Americans.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would be glad to be given an opportunity of seeing the draft, as whatever arrangements the French might make with the Emir must also be applicable to the British sphere. He felt bound to say that he was rather afraid, so far as his information went, that the Emir Feisal returned to his own country from France in anything but a consenting frame of mind.

Turning next to Palestine, it would be<sup>12</sup> realised that the acceptance of a mandate by Great Britain over that country involved the assumption of a very heavy and constant burden. Palestine was not a productive country; it possessed no trade which would requite Great Britain for such expenditure as she might incur in its development. For these reasons Great Britain would only accept a mandate for a real Palestine, the Palestine of ancient history, which should not merely include the barren rocks of Judea, which might at any moment be rendered a desert through the cutting off of the waters flowing through the same.

In agreement with M. Clemenceau, it had been decided that Great Britain should hold Palestine.<sup>9</sup> It had, however, been recognised that the exact limits of the territories to be included in Palestine might be open to discussion, and on that account it had been proposed that any points in dispute should be referred to an arbitrator to be appointed by the President of the United States of America. He felt sure that the French representatives would agree that the President would be very impartial in regard to any difference as between France and Great Britain. The waters of Palestine were essential to its existence. Without those waters, Palestine would be a wilderness; and all Jews were unanimously agreed that the sources of Hebron and the headwaters of the Jordan were vital to the existence of the country. On the other hand, those same waters were of no use to anyone holding Syria. They could

<sup>11</sup> For this draft cf. the telegram of August 9, 1919, from Colonel House to President Wilson and Mr. Lansing, as printed by David Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris* (New York, 1924 f), vol. xx, pp. 383-9.

<sup>12</sup> The two following paragraphs (ending 'boundaries of Palestine') are printed by David Lloyd George, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 1177-8.

in effect only be used for the purpose of bargaining or for the purpose of obtaining concessions from Palestine. Consequently, he would ask the French representatives to take a liberal view of their obligations in regard to the settlement of the future boundaries of Palestine.

In the next place he would refer to the difficult question of Mosul. In that connection he wished to explain the reasons why M. Clemenceau had agreed to certain definite arrangements with Great Britain.<sup>9</sup> The Sykes-Picot Agreement had been signed on the understanding that a common Franco-British effort should be made to attack Turkey with the object of freeing the countries therein referred to.

He (Mr. Lloyd George) had discussed that question with Marshal Foch and it had been contemplated that French troops should be landed at Alexandretta and marched southwards, while British troops would advance into Palestine and Syria from Egypt. The operation should have been a joint Franco-British one; but as a matter of fact the whole effort had fallen on Great Britain alone. The number of French troops engaged had been quite insignificant and of no account in determining events. The conquest of Turkey had cost Great Britain 750 millions sterling, which meant the payment of interest to the amount of 30 or 40 million pounds per annum. Furthermore, the losses in casualties, sustained by Great Britain, had been considerable. Over 1½ million British troops had been put in the field, and, had Great Britain not done that, the council would not to-day have been discussing the future settlement of Mosul, Palestine or Syria. If at the time of the armistice Turkey had still remained intact, what would have been the position? Would the Allies have started a warlike operation against Turkey to insist on the acceptance of their terms? He felt certain that no soldiers or credits could have been obtained for that purpose. The fact remained, therefore, that the action against Turkey had been purely a British one. In 1918 when he (Mr. Lloyd George) had proposed the campaign for the conquest of Palestine, M. Clemenceau had resolutely opposed his proposals. In this, he had been supported by Sir William Robertson.<sup>13</sup> Great Britain, overriding her military advisers, had undertaken that campaign in spite of the protests of France. M. Clemenceau, who was essentially a great and a fair-minded man, had fully recognised those facts. He felt that Great Britain had carried out the work single-handed, and that he could not therefore appeal solely to past agreements.

The suggestion might be made that Great Britain had withdrawn something from her effort in France in order to enable her to carry out her campaign in Palestine. That was not the case. During the period of her effort in Palestine, Great Britain had suffered her greatest losses in France, losses which were even greater than those incurred by France. M. Clemenceau, fully realising the heavy liabilities incurred by Great Britain in Palestine, admitted that she had thereby acquired a special position in respect to Palestine and Mosul. France claimed to have acquired a certain special position in respect of her investments in Asia Minor. But her investments

<sup>13</sup> Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 1915-18.

there were not comparable with the amount spent by Great Britain in conquering Turkey. For those reasons, M. Clemenceau had agreed that Mosul should be placed within the British sphere of influence. Great Britain did not necessarily intend to occupy Mosul except for the purpose of protecting the oil interests if necessary. M. Berthelot had implied that M. Clemenceau had possessed no full right to abandon France's claims in those territories. France, however, had merely acquired a priority of right to concessions in Mosul, and it was only those rights that she had abandoned. Should France's rights merely be confined to questions relating to the supply of oil, he thought an agreement could be reached.

To sum up, the views of the British Government could be set forth as follows. In regard to Syria, France would accept a mandate, and thereby undertake the responsibilities involved, in return for the exercise of her rights over that country. Similarly, Great Britain would accept a mandate for Palestine. But there remained the very delicate question of the Holy Places. He (Mr. Lloyd George) had during the last few days received many protests against the handing over of the control of the Holy Places to France. Great Britain was not a Catholic power. On the other hand, he did [*not*] know whether either France or Italy claimed to be Catholic Powers. But, the fact remained that a very large Catholic population existed in the British Empire; and he would like to examine very carefully the view set forth by France that she possessed some special claim to the protection of the Catholics in Palestine. He did not know whether it might be possible to obtain the views of the Vatican upon this question. Great Britain did not claim any special rights over the Holy Places; but, either for want of zeal or on account of her innate sense of justice, Great Britain had managed to remain very impartial in respect of all religious questions, and she would be equally impartial in respect to anything she might do in connection with the Holy Places in which both Catholics, Jews, and even Mahometans possessed special interests.

Next, Great Britain would accept a mandate for Mesopotamia, including Mosul. That is to say, Mosul would be included in the Mesopotamian mandate; but as to the details of the administration to be applied to Mosul, the question would be settled directly between the British and Arab Governments, in the same way as the French were doing in regard to Damascus and certain parts of Syria. Furthermore, Great Britain claimed facilities for the construction of a railway line and a pipe-line from Mesopotamia and Mosul to the Mediterranean.

Lastly, in regard to the settlement of Kurdistan, a difficult question had now arisen. He had been under the impression that France would have accepted a mandate for Cilicia. France had, however, wisely, he thought, decided differently. But, as a result, the boundaries of Kurdistan and Turkey would now be coterminous, and the question arose as to whether Kurdistan should be included in the Turkish Empire or remain independent, as Azerbaijan.

M. BERTHELOT said that Mr. Lloyd George had stated that he knew nothing concerning the agreement entered into by France with the Emir

Feisal. Furthermore, he had expressed doubts in regard to the Emir Feisal's feelings towards France. He (M. Berthelot) had proposed to communicate the terms of the Franco-Arab agreement to Mr. Lloyd George. The agreement was a provisional one, and the Emir had asked that it should remain secret until his return to France. He would, however, without communicating the text *verbatim*, give the gist of the agreement at to-morrow's meeting. In regard to Mr. Lloyd George's doubts concerning the Emir's good faith, he could only say that the latter had departed quite pleased and satisfied with the agreement reached, but undoubtedly difficulties may have arisen since his return to Arabia.

Palestine would obviously<sup>14</sup> constitute a heavy load for Great Britain to bear; but Great Britain had herself claimed to shoulder that burden. In regard to the watersheds, undoubtedly the rivers of southern Syria possessed a certain degree of utility for the areas north of the Jordan, but that was all. On the other hand, the snows of Hebron dominated the town of Damascus and could not be excluded from Syria. Again, the waters of the Litanya [*sic*] irrigated the most fertile regions of Syria. On the other hand, the British claim to the waters of the Jordan might appear to be more admissible. Consequently, though unable to agree to the extension of Palestine into Syria in order to include all the watersheds of the waters of Palestine, he felt sure some arrangement could be made in order to protect the waters of Palestine. The historical frontiers of Palestine were unknown. But he thought the latitude of Lake Tiberias indicated roughly the limits of Palestine in that direction.

In regard to the proposal that President Wilson should be asked to arbitrate, should differences of opinion arise as to the territorial limits of Palestine, the French were unable to accept any such proposal, since President Wilson was entirely guided by Mr. Brandeis,<sup>15</sup> who held very decided views.

In regard to Mosul, in 1918 the question of a joint Franco-British effort against Turkey had been discussed, and it had been suggested that French troops should disembark at Alexandretta. He did not think those proposals had been seriously made; but in any case 20,000 or 30,000 French troops would have been of little consequence compared with the 1,500,000 British troops engaged. Undoubtedly the efforts of Great Britain had been considerable, but it must be realised that she was not merely attacking Turkey, but also protecting Egypt and India. In comparison, the efforts of France in Salonica were far greater, and certainly disinterested. On the other hand, it was futile to attempt to isolate either the efforts or the expenditure in men or money made by any one of the Allies. On that account, he did not wish to refer either to the losses incurred by the French in France, or to the devastation of her occupied territories. It was not possible to isolate efforts, for during the first two years of war France had supported the full force of

<sup>14</sup> The two following paragraphs (ending 'very decided views') are printed by David Lloyd George, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 1178-9.

<sup>15</sup> Mr. Justice Brandeis, of the Supreme Court of the United States, was chairman of the Zionist Association in America.

Germany's attack, while Great Britain was getting ready and recruiting her forces. It would be impossible to compare the efforts made by the various Allies. Great Britain had done everything she could; and so had France. But for the same reason Great Britain could not claim that she, in certain theatres of war, had done more than France. For Mr. Lloyd George to say that, but for the British effort in Palestine, Turkey would have been left intact at the time of the armistice, was incorrect. In his opinion it was the Salonika operations that had brought Turkey to her knees after Bulgaria had surrendered. M. Clemenceau in London had, no doubt, made certain general statements out of the generosity of his heart; but he at present only had a very vague recollection of any promises which he may have made, and those promises did not constitute any sound basis for claiming concessions. Nevertheless, in regard to Mosul, France did not wish to ignore the agreements entered into by M. Clemenceau, provided some arrangements, based on equality of rights, could be made in regard to the oil deposits. In this connection he would invite attention to the fact that a draft agreement, signed by the President of the French Council, had been submitted to Mr. Lloyd George for acceptance.<sup>16</sup> Unless some agreement could be reached on the question of the oil deposits, France would remain with the feeling that she had not been fairly treated.

In regard to Palestine, France agreed to Great Britain accepting the mandate, but as he was not himself a Catholic he would prefer to leave the question of the Holy Places to be dealt with by M. Cambon.

Lastly, the settlement of Kurdistan still remained an open question, but he understood that Lord Curzon would make a statement referring thereto.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE declined to enter into a military argument. He could not, however, possibly accept the view that the Turkish Empire had been brought down by the operations in Salonika. Had Turkey not withdrawn her troops to Palestine in order to meet the British attacks, the Salonika forces would have had to meet the armies of Turkey.

In regard to the Mosul Oil Agreement, submitted by the French Government, he hesitated to accept the same because of the rights thereby conferred on certain companies. The administration of Mesopotamia would cost an enormous sum of money, and whatever benefits could be obtained would have to go towards the cost of that administration. The cost of administration was going to be far heavier than the revenue; it was now costing eight times as much as Turkey ever screwed out of the country. It was not at all certain whether it would be worth Great Britain's while to administer the country at all, but whatever happened, the profits derived from the working of the oil-fields should not go to private companies. He personally recognised no rights in any Turkish petroleum concessions, since all these agreements were worthless and could not be enforced in any court of law. He would only be prepared to recognise an agreement whereby France would obtain her share of the oil; but he must refuse to have any dealings with private companies.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Volume IV, No. 705.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he felt compelled to make certain reservations in regard to the economic necessities and rights of Italy. At the end of the war, Italy found herself in a serious situation. The population of Italy was the same as that of France, but Italy only contained three-fifths of the area of France, which meant a total of 560,000 souls per square kilometre [*sic*]. Consequently, it was essential for Italy to have raw materials. That question had been fully admitted in the Treaty of London, article 9 of which gave her full guarantees in that respect. He hoped that a solution would be found in regard to Cilicia without creating international complications. He thought, however, he ought to make certain reservations concerning the Holy Places in Palestine. He fully recognised<sup>17</sup> that the question involved was one of a spiritual nature, but in his opinion the Holy Places should be so administered as to ensure complete equality to all the nations concerned. He had no particular definite proposals to put forward, but he maintained that each form of worship should be respected, and that each country should enjoy equal rights.

M. CAMBON expressed the view that the question of the protectorate of the Holy Places was one which merely concerned the Allied Powers, and it should find no place in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. The Holy Places had been in the hands of the French since the fifteenth century. The Vatican had always recognised that fact, and every French Government, even those who had broken with Rome, had accepted that responsibility. Even during the war, the Vatican had acknowledged the right of France to a protectorate over the Holy Places. The question was one of the greatest importance to French Catholics. Consequently, should a mandate in Palestine be granted to Great Britain, France would be bound to make certain reservations in regard to the Holy Places. Otherwise it would be difficult to induce the French Senate to accept the arrangement.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE requested Signor Nitti to state the views held by Italian Catholics on that point.

SIGNOR NITTI maintained that no useful object would be served by studying or by laying stress on existing rights. The existing rights had been created by the necessities of a Mahometan occupation. The Mahometan occupation was about to cease, and he agreed that equal rights should be granted to all Christian faiths, and that no difference could be made between the rights of the various Catholic countries. Italy had never recognised the French protectorate over the Holy Places, and on this account special agreements had been entered into from time to time. In his opinion, in the future no material protection would be required, since Great Britain would accept the mandate. Italy also attached great importance to that question, because the Catholic party in the Italian Parliament had since the last election greatly increased, and it now took a great interest in all religious matters. For these reasons he maintained that Italy should be granted the same rights as those granted to any other Catholic country.

<sup>17</sup> From here the remaining part of minute 1 (concluding 'the next morning') is printed with variation by David Lloyd George, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 1163-7.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the council would accept Signor Nitti's proposal that complete equality should exist and that each country should protect its own Catholics and its own religions.

M. CAMBON did not object that each Government should protect its own nationalists [*sic*]. Indeed, France had always objected to protect[ing] any but French citizens in a civil capacity; but it was essential that France should preserve her traditions in respect of the protectorate of the Holy Places. Should Mr. Lloyd George agree, he proposed that the French representatives should discuss the question with the Italian representatives, and endeavour to arrive at a mutually satisfactory agreement.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he had no objection to offer to M. Cambon's proposal that they should discuss the question together. On the other hand, it should be realised that a new system of government was about to be introduced into Palestine which, up to the present, had been in the hands of Mahometans. He thought, therefore, it would be necessary to consider how the new situation would affect the question under reference. In his opinion, each Christian nation should receive the same treatment. It was not a question of civil protection by one or another nation. Each religious order, of whatever nationality, would receive full protection. Thus the Italian Capuchines settled in Palestine would be permitted to refer their grievances to their own representatives. Up to the present, owing to the Mahometan occupation of Palestine, political and religious questions had been mixed up, but in the future it was obvious that the nationals of each country would, if necessary, have to turn to their own representative for such religious protection as they might require. For these reasons a special position is to be guaranteed to the Holy Places. No country should have any special privilege in regard to them as well as to religious communities. Each country must protect their own nationals quite independently from their religious status. It is moreover necessary to take into consideration the vindications [*sic*] of the Latins following on the usurpations undergone in past centuries.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that Great Britain also possessed certain interests in the matter. There were some millions of Catholics in Great Britain whose interests could not be overlooked. In the past, when Palestine had been under Mahometan sovereignty, the protection of the Holy Places by France might have been necessary. But could it now be suggested that Great Britain would in the future require to be watched by creating a special protectorate of the Holy Places? Did her Allies wish to imply that they no longer trusted Great Britain to treat their nationals fairly in that matter? He failed to see what advantage there could be in an Alliance if Great Britain was considered to be incompetent to protect French and Italian citizens on a visit to the Holy Shrines. Was it suggested that Great Britain should merely sweep the streets of Jerusalem, patrol the highways, and see that no one robbed either an Italian or a Frenchman travelling to Jerusalem on a spiritual mission, whilst she was not considered fit to protect the Shrines? Apparently Great Britain was expected to supply funds to govern the country, but she was not fit to protect the Sacred Shrines of Jerusalem. Obviously,

Great Britain could not accept any such suggestions. Should any special religious order wish to place itself under the protection either of France or Italy, Great Britain would deal with either of those Governments in respect of any grievances entertained by those communities. But it would be impossible to create an empire within an empire. When the whole responsibility for the administration of the country fell on Great Britain, she could not agree to be left outside in questions pertaining to the Holy Places. He, personally, would be quite willing to consider the request of any other of the Allies to take over the administration of Palestine. But in that event Great Britain would not ask that country to give up her special rights in regard to any British nationals who might visit the Holy Places. He would be prepared to accept Signor Nitti's original proposal, but he thought the discussion had better be adjourned to the next morning.

(It was agreed to continue the discussion at 11.30 a.m. on the following day.)

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he wished to make certain proposals in regard to the drafting of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. It had frequently been found in the past, in putting the decisions taken by the council into proper form for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace, that certain questions of principle still remained to be settled. He was anxious that all such questions should be settled before Signor Nitti's departure.<sup>18</sup> He wished, therefore, to make the following proposals:—

*Drafting of the  
Treaty of Peace  
with Turkey*

- (1) To assemble the Drafting Committee of the Peace Conference in London in order to commence drafting the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.
- (2) That the various commissions set up in regard to the Treaty of Peace with Turkey shall be instructed to attach to their reports draft articles for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace on the questions with which they are dealing.
- (3) That the military, naval and air advisers of the British, French, Italian and Japanese Governments shall be invited to meet under the presidency of Marshal Foch to draw up military, naval and air articles for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

(These resolutions were approved.)

In addition, Mr. Lloyd George asked the council to decide whether a commission should be appointed to consider breaches of the laws of war.

<sup>18</sup> See No. 16, minute 3 and No. 46, minute 9.



(For circulation to French, British and Italian representatives only.)

3. MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether his French colleague was prepared to accept and sign the reply to President Wilson as finally drafted.

*The Adriatic.*  
*Reply to President*  
*Wilson*

M. CAMBON said that he would be prepared to sign the letter in M. Millerand's name.

(The reply to President Wilson was approved and signed.  
For full text see Appendix.)<sup>19</sup>

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 17, 1920

<sup>19</sup> Not printed. This memorandum of February 17, 1920, is printed as document 13 in Cmd. 586. (In the text there printed, in the penultimate line of the third paragraph, the figure '40,000' was a mistake for '400,000', which was correct in the appendix.)

## No. 13

I.C.P. 35.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Wednesday, February 18, 1920, at 11.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Forbes Adam, Colonel Gribbon; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Captain Abraham, Major Caccia.

*France*: M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti, Signor Galli; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that he was informed that Marshal Foch had left London for Paris. He would suggest, therefore, that the drafting of the military and air clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey should be referred to Versailles. It was intended that the Versailles Council should be kept together.<sup>1</sup> On it there were representatives of all the nations interested, and Marshal Foch would take the chair. If this should be agreed to, he would ask the secretary to despatch a telegram to that effect.

*Treaty of Peace*  
*with Turkey.*  
*Military and*  
*Air Clauses*

This proposal was agreed to, and the secretary was directed to draft a telegram asking the Allied Military Council of Versailles, under the presidency of Marshal Foch, to draft military and air clauses for the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had understood that M. Berthelot had a statement to make, or perhaps a draft to propose.

*Cilicia*

M. BERTHELOT said that he had no draft to propose, but, with regard to Cilicia, he had asked for instructions from Paris. It would be

<sup>1</sup> See Volume II, No. 54, minute 2.

necessary for him to obtain these instructions before agreeing to any commission dealing with the matter of instructors and advisers. There were numerous questions which also interested the Italian representatives. He thought that the President of the Italian Council would probably agree to the same terms as the French Government, inasmuch as they might apply to Italian spheres of influence.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he quite agreed.

M. BERTHELOT, continuing, said that he hoped, on the following day, to be able to say something definite regarding the matter of Cilicia.

3. M. BERTHELOT said that he would be able to give the council a general outline of the provisional agreement reached between France and *Palestine* the Emir Feisal. It had been agreed between the parties that the matter should be kept secret, and it must be understood that the agreement was still provisional, in order that the Emir should have time to discuss it with his own people. Nevertheless, the general lines of the agreement he was prepared to explain to the council. It would be found that they followed somewhat closely the lines of the draft mandate prepared by Colonel House.

With regard to the matter of the frontier between Palestine and Syria, M. Berthelot thought it would be very desirable that this matter should not be left in the air, but that it should be settled at the same time as the Turkish Treaty, though, strictly, the matter did not concern the Turks. As he wished to do all he could to meet the views of the British Government, he had asked Lord Curzon to give him the exact limits of the present military occupation in the Kaza of Suffeid and near the head-waters of the Jordan: in other words, the area occupied by British troops in the blue zone.<sup>2</sup> Although his instructions had been to maintain French claims, he would ask the French Government if it could bring itself to agree to the inclusion in Palestine of the area now occupied by British troops in the Kaza of Suffeid. He did not know what the answer would be, but he would personally support acceptance of this solution.

With regard to the frontier between Syria and Cilicia, in M. Berthelot's view this was a difficult matter to determine. The population was very mixed, and rival statistics were open to suspicion. Moreover, it was an area in which the population lived largely by grazing sheep. They were apt to migrate seasonally. For instance, the Arab graziers spent part of the year in the hills near Marash, while the Turks took their flocks into regions more usually considered Arab. The question of capital importance for France in this area was the railway. France had always maintained a one-third interest in the Bagdad Railway. This railway skirted the region in question, and made a loop to the north-east. This loop passed through an area which was probably, in the main, Turkish, but the population there was not dense. In any case, it was essential that the area containing this loop should be within the French Syrian sphere. On the east, in the neighbourhood of Nisibin, the frontier should reach the Tigris, about the point where the usual depar-

<sup>2</sup> i.e. the blue area designated in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916; cf. No. 12, note 4.

ture of rafts takes place. On this point there had been agreement with the British experts with whom the matter had been discussed. These considerations gave a rough outline of what the frontier should be. It was not possible to follow the existing limits of the vilayets. For instance, the Vilayet of Aleppo ran deep into the Turkish area. The abandonment of the Turkish part of the Vilayet of Aleppo more than compensated for the inclusion within Syria of the curve of the railway to which he had previously alluded. He further added that the question of this portion of the railway might be considered in connection with that of the Kaza of Suffeid.

LORD CURZON said that, in reply, he would like to observe that M. Berthelot should not lead the French Government to suppose that the area now occupied by British troops in the Kaza of Suffeid represented exactly the desired limit of Palestine. The area occupied did not bear any strict relation to the historical frontiers of Palestine, but was chosen to meet temporary and military convenience. Mr. Lloyd George had often referred to Palestine as extending from Dan to Beersheba. Dan, otherwise known as Banias, was occupied by neither the French, the British, nor the Arabs. M. Berthelot knew very well what the British views were regarding the northern frontier of Palestine. At a previous meeting he had suggested a compromise line to M. Berthelot,<sup>3</sup> and Mr. Lloyd George, on the previous day, had suggested that if this line could not be accepted by the French Government the matter should be referred to arbitration.<sup>4</sup> As to the northern and eastern frontiers of Syria, he would point out to M. Berthelot that if Syria was to be under the Emir Feisal and France was to be there in the character of mandatory, it was clearly necessary that the Syrian people should be consulted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether he understood aright that M. Berthelot was going to give the council a summary of the French Government's proposals to the Emir Feisal.

M. BERTHELOT replied that he intended to do so when the discussion on the other points was concluded. He would first say a few words in answer to Lord Curzon. There were, in the Scriptures, many places called 'Dan,' and which of these was to be regarded as the northern extremity of Palestine was open to controversy. He did not propose to enter into a controversy of that kind, and noted that Lord Curzon chose to identify the present locality called 'Banias' with the 'Dan' he desired. He had been under the impression that the area at present occupied by British troops was required for inclusion in Palestine. He supposed that the British Government would not support the extreme Zionist claims to areas on the same latitude as Damascus. The Arabs would certainly not agree to this, seeing that they themselves made absurd counter-claims to the detriment of what was surely Palestine. He therefore requested that he be shown on a map—

- (a) The present area in British military occupation.
- (b) The minimum claims of the British Government as mandatory for Palestine.

<sup>3</sup> For earlier discussion of this frontier between Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot cf. Volume IV, Nos. 404-5.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 12, minute 1.

He particularly requested that the real minimum claims be shown. He would be forced to maintain his negative attitude should the previous demand be restated. This would be unfortunate. He wished to be able to accept exactly what was proposed, without bargaining, and in the belief that whatever was asked for would be founded on strict justice. As to the northern frontier of Syria, of course the Arabs would be consulted, although he did not personally think that much advantage would be derived from consulting them. They were only vaguely interested, and more likely to ask for too much than for too little, unless they should make some private arrangement with the Turks to take less than they were entitled to. The guiding principles in a settlement of this kind should be those governing the relations of Europe with Turkey, rather than the views of the local Arabs. He would like to bring to the notice of the meeting that, in comparison with what the 1916 agreement secured to France,<sup>5</sup> France was accepting very little—barely a third. He did not contest that British interests were greater than French interests in the region, seeing that Great Britain was established in Egypt, in India, and now in Persia. Nor did he wish to recriminate. Nevertheless, France could not abandon all that had been secured to her in the past by her political, moral and religious situation in Turkey. France would insist that the Syrian frontier should pass north of the railway. Without this no settlement could be accepted. He would never make himself the channel for excessive demands. Whatever he represented in the conference would have his personal adherence in confidence that he was making a just proposal.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said<sup>6</sup> that he would like to recognise the very conciliatory and helpful spirit in which M. Berthelot had approached the subject, and he begged to assure him that the British Government would respond in a like spirit. These questions were to be settled as between Allies and friends, and not as between competitors. However, he thought the present conference was not one in which details of frontiers could be determined. A book written by a Scottish theological professor, Professor Adam Smith,<sup>7</sup> had been brought to his notice. This book had been written before the war, and, although the work of a theologian, was so accurate in matters of geography that it had been used by Lord Allenby during his campaign. In the book were maps showing the frontiers of Palestine, and various towns. It was hardly possible to go into these intricacies at present, and he would, therefore, suggest that Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot should have another meeting and examine the subject together. He would only make two provisos. Whatever arrangement was made about the assignment of areas in the ex-Ottoman Empire, which applied to the Italian and French as well as to the British areas, he thought every facility should be given to the transit of passengers and goods to Bagdad through any of these areas. He expected no difficulty would arise on this point. Secondly, in the Sykes-Picot Agreement

<sup>5</sup> Cf. note 2 above.

<sup>6</sup> The greater part of the following portion of minute 3 is printed by David Lloyd George, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 1176-7 and pp. 1105-9.

<sup>7</sup> i.e. *The Historical Geography of the Holy Land* (London).

there had been a clause regarding a British line of railway connecting the Bagdad line with the Mediterranean. It was also suggested, though this was not in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, that there should be a pipeline to bring oil to the Mediterranean, with a guarantee that France should obtain a proportion of the oil. He thought it was important that these provisions should be safeguarded. He would like to say that if France had given up two-thirds of what was secured to her by the convention of 1916, this was a spontaneous act of the French. He did not wish it represented in France that this was due to British pressure. With the exception of Mosul, France had not been asked to make any concessions to Great Britain. This particular concession, and the spirit in which it had been made, he wished to recognise gratefully.

LORD CURZON said that M. Berthelot had mentioned certain steps taken by the French Government with the Emir Feisal, and he had promised to give the meeting a *résumé* of the draft agreement between them. He had further said that it was based on the form of mandate suggested by Colonel House. In this connection he would like to remind M. Berthelot that the provisions of the treaty must be respected. He referred to section 22 of the covenant. Mandates must be drawn up either by the League of Nations or by the conference. The latter had set up a Mandates Commission, presided over by Lord Milner. This commission had drawn up the forms of two mandates, Mandate 'B' and Mandate 'C'. These were now operative under the treaty. But the form of Mandate 'A,' applicable to the Near East, had never been drawn up. The draft suggested by Colonel House had not been accepted, and was not official. If the treaty was to be followed, the Mandates Commission should be called together again to determine the form of Mandate 'A.' It was not open either to France or to Great Britain to establish themselves in Syria or Mesopotamia by means of secret agreements. He submitted that the Mandates Commission should be called together, and no doubt the French draft agreement with the Emir Feisal would be of great service in helping to draft a form of Mandate 'A.'

M. BERTHELOT said that he would be pleased to confer with Lord Curzon again, as suggested by Mr. Lloyd George, and he felt sure that an agreement would be reached. He would be delighted to read the book on Palestine, as he was partial both to the Scottish and to theologians. In respect of transit facilities for all coming from or going to Mesopotamia he begged to assure the council that it was not the intention of the French Government to raise any obstacles whatever. As to the railway mentioned in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, no objection would be raised to linking the Bagdad Railway by a British line to Haifa, though he thought it would, on the merits, be far better to make a common railway leading to Alexandretta, where both Powers had equal rights. The doubling of the line seemed to be recommended rather by political considerations than by pure reason. As to the remarks of Lord Curzon, the French Government had no intention of presenting their agreement with the Emir Feisal as a final and tangible document. Conversations had been undertaken with the Emir partly by reason of a number of

misunderstandings which had arisen between them. Mr. Lloyd George himself had suggested that France should make an agreement with the Emir.<sup>8</sup> A certain official standing had been conferred on him, and this standing had been accepted by France—wrongly, in M. Berthelot's private opinion. Nevertheless, as the conference had chosen to regard him as the qualified representative of the Arabs, France had treated with him accordingly. Great concessions had been made to him, and M. Berthelot himself had been blamed for them. He had quoted the mandate proposed by Colonel House, inasmuch as it was an American document, and as the Americans were supposed to be of stricter doctrine on this subject than others; but in any case he assured the council that there was nothing rigid in what had been done, or in its consequences.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that the discussion was dealing with abstractions, and he would like to know the terms of the draft agreement between the French and the Emir Feisal.

M. BERTHELOT said he would now proceed to give a résumé of the terms of the provisional agreement concluded with the Emir Feisal. Before doing so, however, he wished to add that, though the provisional agreement bore the initials of M. Clemenceau and of the Emir Feisal, the French Government had always intended to place the draft in its final form before the Allies for criticism and approval.

The preamble of the provisional agreement referred to the Franco-British Agreement of the 9th November, 1918.<sup>9</sup> It contained no reference to a mandate, neither did it refer to the Peace Conference, for the reason that the Emir Feisal had throughout the negotiations resolutely refused to accept a mandate or to accept any reference to, or interference by, the Peace Conference.

The first article of the provisional agreement proclaimed the rights of the Arab-speaking people, settled in Syria, to unite with the object of governing themselves as an independent nation. It recognised, however, that this people would require the advice and guidance of a Great Power in the management of its affairs; and it appealed to the French Government to undertake that duty.

The second article authorised the French Government to help and defend the State of Syria with the object of ensuring its continued independence.

Furthermore, it laid down that the Syrian Government would ask the French Government to appoint a number of councillors, administrators and advisers to control certain branches of the Administration; such as, the Departments of Finance and Public Works, the gendarmerie, the army, &c.

Finally, the article prescribed that the manner of choosing the French councillors, and the duration and the conditions of service would form the subject of a special agreement between the two Governments.

By article 3, France was granted priority in all matters connected with the

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Volume IV, No. 334, enclosure.

<sup>9</sup> i.e. the Anglo-French declaration agreed upon on November 7, 1918 (cf. Volume IV, Chap. II, Introductory Note) and published on November 9.

raising of loans, and generally in regard to financing the Government of Syria.

Article 4 dealt with foreign affairs. It laid down that the Syrian Government should be represented abroad, but only through the intermediary of French representatives, except at Paris, where a Syrian representative would reside.

Article 5 recognised the Arab language as the official language in Syria.

Finally, article 6 proclaimed Damascus to be the capital of Arab Syria; the French representative to reside at Aleppo.

It would be seen that two important questions, which had been discussed with the Emir Feisal still remained unsettled for the reason that no satisfactory agreement could be reached. The first question dealt with the creation of various autonomous States within Syria, such as the Druses, Liban, &c., together with the eventual federation of these various autonomous States into a confederation. The second point dealt with the setting up of a Syrian Parliament. In that connection France considered that such a system of government would, for the present, prove to be unsatisfactory on account of the variety of racial and religious antagonisms, and the mentality of the peoples inhabiting the country.

In conclusion, he wished to lay stress on the fact that the information which he had given regarding the provisional agreement with Emir Feisal should be kept strictly secret and confidential in accordance with the promises which had been given to the Emir. He would add that the Emir left Paris perfectly satisfied with the agreement which had been reached, and his loyalty to the French Government, as an Oriental, appeared to be irreproachable. He, personally, placed the greatest confidence in his good faith. He fully realised that the Emir possessed a weak character, and that his position would be a difficult one, on account of his being surrounded in Damascus by a group of enemies, who entertained anti-French sentiments. But, should the Emir Feisal lose authority owing to his weakness, it was understood that all agreements entered into would, *ipso facto*, lapse.

4. The following report received from Marshal Foch was read and the recommendations therein contained were adopted:—

*Article 160 of the  
Treaty of Peace  
with Germany*

‘The Versailles Allied Military Council at a meeting held on the 10th February took under consideration the necessity of literally enforcing article 160 of the Treaty of Peace, which lays down that on the 31st March, 1920, the total number of effectives in the army of the States constituting Germany must not exceed 100,000 men.

‘The Allied Military Council admitted that this article, on account of the delay which had occurred in putting the treaty into force could not be reconciled with article 163. It unanimously decided to recommend to the Council of Ambassadors that the German forces should be reduced to 200,000 men by the 10th April, 1920, that is to say, three months from the coming into force of the treaty, and to 100,000 men by the 10th July, 1920.’

[5.] The following terms of reference regarding the Treaty of Peace with Turkey were adopted:—

*Treaty of Peace  
with Turkey*

(1) *Economic Clauses*

It was agreed to set up a commission, composed of representatives of the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, to draw up, for the consideration of the Supreme Council, economic clauses for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

(2) *Ports, Waterways and Railways*

It was agreed to set up a commission, composed of representatives of the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, to draw up, for the consideration of the Supreme Council, clauses dealing with ports, waterways and railways, for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

(3) *Aerial Navigation*

It was agreed that a commission, composed of representatives of the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, be set up to draw up, for the consideration of the Supreme Council, articles on aerial navigation, for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

(4) *Prisoners of War and Graves*

It was agreed to set up a military commission, composed of representatives of the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, to prepare, for the consideration of the Supreme Council, clauses for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey dealing with—

(a) Prisoners of war.

(b) Graves.

5 [sic]. MR. LLOYD GEORGE brought to the attention of the conference a letter which had been received by His Majesty the King from the Crown Prince of Germany, offering to substitute himself for the persons who had been demanded by the Allies under articles 228–230 of the Treaty of Versailles with Germany (appendix).

SIGNOR NITTI said he had received a similar letter and did not propose to make any reply.

It was agreed—

That no reply should be sent by any of the Principal Allied Powers to the letter received from the Crown Prince.

6. There was a short discussion at the end of the meeting as to the desirability of publishing the letter sent to the American Ambassador on the previous day from the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and France to President Wilson.

*The Question of  
Publishing the  
Letter to  
President Wilson*

(It was agreed not to publish the letter.)

(The meeting then adjourned at 1.15 p.m. until 3 p.m. that afternoon.)

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 18, 1920.



APPENDIX TO NO. 13

*To His Majesty the King of England*

(Translation.)

AMSTERDAM, *February 9, 1920*

Your Majesty,

The demand for the handing over of German men of every calling has once more placed my Fatherland, which has been brought low by four years of war and one year of fierce civil strife, before a crisis such as has not been witnessed in the life of a nation in the history of the world.

It is inconceivable that a Government should be found in Germany which would carry out the demand of extradition. The effects upon Europe of carrying out this demand by force are incalculable. Hatred and revenge would thereby be perpetuated.

As former heir to the Throne of my German Fatherland, I am willing to offer myself on behalf of my compatriots in this fateful hour. If the Allied and Associated Governments require a sacrifice, let them take me instead of the 900 Germans whose only fault was that they served their Fatherland in war.

WILHELM

*Insel Wieringen, February 9, 1920*

No. 14

I.C.P. 36.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Wednesday, February 18, 1920, at 3 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart. For latter part only: Mr. Forbes Adam, Mr. Philip Kerr, Colonel Gribbon. SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr.

*France*: M. Cambon (for latter part only), M. Berthelot.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti, Signor Galli (for latter part only); SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.<sup>1</sup>

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it had been agreed among the Powers that Germany should be allowed to maintain an army of 200,000 men up to next April.<sup>2</sup> He wished to put it to the council whether the time had not now arrived for the Allies to communicate with Germany through diplomatic, and no longer through military, channels. His own view was that they should stop their communications through Marshal Foch.

*Channel of  
Communication  
with Germany*

<sup>1</sup> A copy of the present document was circulated to the Japanese Ambassador in London.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 13, minute 4.

M. BERTHELOT agreed that Marshal Foch and the Allied Military Commission should no longer be the intermediary between the Powers and Germany. Marshal Foch and his military council were interested only in the execution of the council's decrees.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that it would be better, if the council agreed with M. Berthelot and himself, to inform the United States in the above sense, and then make their latest communication to Germany through diplomatic channels.

M. BERTHELOT agreed, but urged that it was important that no time should be wasted, and proposed that the United States and Germany should be informed simultaneously.

The council asked Sir M. Hankey to redraft the covering note to the communication to Germany which had been addressed in the first instance to Marshal Foch.

2. <sup>3</sup>The council had before them copies of the proceedings of the inter-Allied naval and military representatives, held at the War Office, London, on the 16th February, 1920, in accordance with the *Treaty of Peace with Turkey.* Supreme Council's instructions (C.P.-638),<sup>4</sup> dated the 14th February, 1920, to examine the question of the measures *Control of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles* necessary to secure the freedom of the Straits (Bosphorus and Dardanelles (Appendix 1)).

(Professor Mantoux read the proceedings, translated into French.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the council were prepared to fix provisionally the boundary between Turkey and Greece in Europe to be the Chatalja line.

M. BERTHELOT asked whether it had not been laid down that the question of this frontier should be decided in connection with the decision taken in regard to Turkey in Asia. He further enquired whether Turkish sovereignty was to be maintained at Smyrna.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this was provisionally agreed. He would prefer, however, the use of the word 'suzerainty' instead of 'sovereignty'. The suzerainty of Turkey at Smyrna, and the boundary between Turkey and Greece at Chatalja, were both arrangements of a provisional character only.

M. CAMBON said he thought that in the council's draft no reference had been made to the suzerainty of Turkey over Smyrna.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE drew attention to the first paragraph of page 4<sup>5</sup> of the draft synopsis of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey (A.J.-21) (Appendix 2), and suggested that note at the end of Part IV (3) should be erased and the following substituted:—

'(Note.) It is provisionally decided that Turkish suzerainty shall continue to exist.'

<sup>3</sup> Cf. No. 15, note 1.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. No. 6, minute 2.

<sup>5</sup> i.e. paragraph 3 of Part IV in appendix 2 below.

It was assumed, he thought, that there should be Turkish suzerainty over the port, and the actual delimitation of the frontiers of Smyrna should be left to the Smyrna Commission.

LORD CURZON said that, according to his recollection, it had been agreed provisionally by the council that there was to be a Turkish suzerainty over Smyrna, but that M. Veniselos had announced his intention of appealing against this decision.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE repeated that the arrangements both in regard to the Turco-Greek frontier in Europe and in regard to Smyrna would be provisional.

It was agreed:—

- (a) To accept the report of the inter-Allied naval and military representatives, dated the 17th February, 1920 (Appendix 1).
- (b) That it should be provisionally decided that the boundary between Greek and Turkish territory in Europe should be the Chatalja line.
- (c) That it should be provisionally decided that the Smyrna district should be under Turkish suzerainty.
- (d) That all the above decisions should be referred to the Drafting Committee.

3. MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether anything was to be incorporated in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey in regard to the League of Nations and the International Council of Labour.

*League of  
Nations and  
International  
Council of  
Labour*

M. BERTHELOT said, in regard to the former question, this had already been put in the case of Switzerland, where the special circumstances of the case had led the Supreme Council to make an exception. The question had been most carefully examined by the Supreme Council, who had decided that Switzerland had a special position as a neutral,<sup>6</sup> but they had also agreed that the privilege conceded to her should not be extended in the case of other countries, as this would only lead to interminable delays in assembling the League of Nations. The question of the delay of two months having been waived in the case of Switzerland, the latter country would not have to wait for that period to elapse after the signing of the Austrian Treaty before she could become a member of the League. This, however, was not the case with China.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that, if the Allies decided not to incorporate the League of Nations in the treaty with Turkey, it might be said that we did not wish Turkey to enter the League. He himself doubted the wisdom of leaving Turkey out. He did not perceive any great difficulty about making certain adjustments in regard to the period of two months.

He enquired whether the council were prepared to accept or to discuss the draft synopsis of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, which he had caused to be circulated to members that morning. It had been prepared simply as a basis upon which the Drafting Committee might work.

<sup>6</sup> See Volume II, No. 78, minute 4.

M. BERTHELOT said that, before offering his considered observations, he would like to examine the synopsis more closely. He would be prepared to discuss the synopsis on the following day.

As regards the other question raised by Mr. Lloyd George, viz., the inclusion of the International Council of Labour in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, he himself was in favour of this course.

LORD CURZON said that in our treaties with European Powers we had included treaties for the protection of minorities. How were we to protect the minorities in Turkey in the future? The only action we could take would be to send our fleet up to Constantinople and to threaten to bombard the Turkish capital. This, however, would hardly be efficacious. He hoped that this point would not be lost sight of when the Treaty of Peace was redrafted.

4. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had received copies of resolutions passed by the London and Provincial Press Conference (Appendix 3)<sup>7</sup> protesting that, whereas information as to the deliberations and decisions of the Supreme Council now sitting in London had been communicated to the Paris press, such information had been denied to the British press. He suggested that it might be expedient to adopt the procedure which had been followed in Paris, when an agreed communiqué had been drawn up by a small committee, consisting of a British, a French and an Italian representative, who had prepared an agreed communiqué to be made to the press of their respective countries. It was important that each representative should give identic information, and should not supplement it in any way.

M. BERTHELOT said that he would be most happy to associate himself with Sir M. Hankey, but he personally had a great horror of the press.

It was agreed—

That a small committee, consisting of—

Sir M. Hankey,  
M. Berthelot,  
Signor Trombetti,

should be established to prepare a daily communiqué, to be identic in character, for the press of their respective countries, giving such information as to the proceedings of the Supreme Council as the council might think it desirable to issue, and that no other information should be given.

(*The council adjourned at 5 p.m. until 11 a.m. the following day.*)

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 18, 1920.

<sup>7</sup> Not here printed. These resolutions were printed in *The Times* on February 20, 1920.

## APPENDIX I TO NO. 14

### *Proceedings of the Inter-Allied Naval and Military Representatives, held at the War Office, London, on February 16, 1920*

(Secret.)

In accordance with the instructions of the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers (C.P. 638),<sup>4</sup> dated the 14th February, 1920, the following naval and military members assembled at the War Office, London, on the 16th February, 1920, with Marshal Foch as president:—

France . . . . .	{ Marshal Foch ( <i>President</i> ). General Franchet d'Esperey. Admiral Levassesseur.
Great Britain . . . . .	{ Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson. Vice-Admiral Sir Osmond Brock.
Italy . . . . .	{ General Cavallero. Commander Ruspoli.
Japan . . . . .	{ Major-General Otami [? Itami]. Rear-Admiral Oida [? Iida].

They adopted unanimously the following recommendations regarding the naval and military measures which should be taken in order to ensure the freedom of the Straits (the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles):—

1. The committee are of opinion that it is essential, in the first instance, to take into consideration the situation as it now exists, and that in consequence, pending the fulfilment of the conditions enumerated in paragraph 3, it will be necessary to put the following measures into effect:—

- (a) To keep a force of approximately two divisions (each of nine battalions).<sup>8</sup>
- (b) To maintain at Constantinople a naval detachment of suitable dimensions.

2. The forces referred to above will be proportionately reduced, as the terms of the treaty are carried into effect, until they reach the limits laid down in the paragraph below.

3. The following conditions should be embodied in the Peace Treaty:—

- (a) The disarmament and demolition of all works, fortifications and batteries in the zone (as defined in the attached map)<sup>9</sup> of the littoral of the Straits and the Sea of Marmora, and also on the Islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace, Tenedos, Mitylene and on the Islands of the Sea of Marmora.
- (b) The reconstruction of such works in the above zone or islands is forbidden, as is also the construction of roads or railways by which mobile artillery could be rapidly brought up.<sup>10</sup> Existing railways which could be used for such a purpose will be prepared for demolition.
- (c) The areas and islands referred to above are not to be used for any military<sup>11</sup> purposes except by the Powers guaranteeing the freedom of the Straits acting in concert.

<sup>8</sup> *Note in original*: 'That is to say, in the vicinity of the Straits.'

<sup>9</sup> Not appended to filed copy.

<sup>10</sup> *Note in original*: 'The measures prescribed in paragraphs (a) and (b) will be carried into effect under the control of an Allied Naval and Military Commission.'

<sup>11</sup> *Note in original*: 'The term "military" includes naval and air.'

- (d) Allied military forces will be maintained in the zone of each of the Straits in order to ensure that no action is either taken or prepared which may be detrimental to the freedom of the Straits. The forces necessary for this purpose are estimated at not less than three battalions, two batteries of garrison artillery and the necessary technical troops, particularly a wireless detachment.
- (e) To complete the measures for the occupation of the Straits, they should include supervision from the naval point of view, which should be carried out under the control of a guard-ship from each of the guaranteeing Powers.
- (f) The committee also considered the following restrictions, which, however, do not fall within their terms of reference:—

The transit (through the Straits) of warlike material is forbidden, except with the authority of the guaranteeing Powers, who have, on these grounds, the right of examining all merchant ships passing through the Straits.

Ships of war wishing to pass through the Straits must first obtain the permission of the guaranteeing Powers, in accordance with the rules governing the entry of a warship into a port.

All the above conditions are applicable, whatever the frontier between Greece and Turkey may be.

Should this frontier be the Chatalja lines, the naval and military forces responsible for ensuring the freedom of the Straits shall be solely provided by the guaranteeing Powers.

*War Office, London, February 17, 1920.*

## APPENDIX 2 TO No. 14

(A.J. 21. Secret.)

### Draft Synopsis of Treaty of Peace with Turkey

#### *Preamble*

(As in other Treaties.)

#### Part I.—*The Covenant of the League of Nations*

(As in other Treaties.)

#### Part II.—*Frontiers of Turkey*

1. In Europe the limits of Turkish territory shall be either (a) the Chatalja line or (b) the Enos-Midia line.
2. In Asia, on the north the Turkish State shall be bounded, except in so far as other measures may be required for the defence of the Straits, by the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora, Bosphorus, Black Sea, as far as the boundaries of Armenia.
3. On the east the boundary will be Armenia on a line to be fixed after the report of the Armenia Commission is available. (The future of Kurdistan remains to be discussed.)
4. On the south the boundary will be the northern frontier of Syria (on which the French delegation will make a recommendation), and the shores of the Mediterranean westward from the Gulf of Alexandretta.
5. On the west the boundary will be the Mediterranean.

### Part III.—*Political Clauses for the Area of the Straits*

1. So long as they loyally execute the terms of peace and respect the rights of minorities within their territory, the Sultan and his Government shall be permitted to remain in Constantinople, which shall remain the capital of Turkey.

2. Turkey shall recognise the transfer to Greek sovereignty of the remainder of what was European Turkey, including the area taken from Bulgaria, subject to—

- (a) The right of the Allies to control the Gallipoli Peninsula and to maintain there any troops they think fit.
- (b) The recognition of certain Turkish rights over the Holy Places of Adrianople.
- (c) Proposals to give municipal rights to the population of that town.
- (d) The creation of a free port at Dedeagatch and the control of the railway from the Bulgarian frontier to that port under the supervision of the League of Nations. (See also Part XII.)

3. Turkey shall recognise the right of the Allies to establish a commission for the purpose of supervising the freedom of the waterways connecting the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, with power to levy such dues as the Allies may authorise, and with such powers of administration over the waterways and European Turkey, including Constantinople, as may be laid down.

(*N.B.*—The nations composing the commission and its powers have still to be determined.)

4. Turkey recognises the right of the Allies to maintain such forces as they may decide on, and to station or move them anywhere in European Turkey, as well as within an area to the south both of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus.

5. Within the above areas only such Turkish forces shall be stationed as the Allies (? or the commission) may from time to time decide. No other Turkish regular troops shall be stationed in Constantinople.

6. The Turkish coasts of the Sea of Marmora shall be neutralised.

### Part IV.—*Political Clauses outside the Area of the Straits*

1. Turkey shall recognise Armenia as an independent State under the League of Nations.

2. Turkey renounces in favour of the Allied Powers all her rights and titles over Kurdistan, Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine and Arabia.

*Note.*—Whether the following falls within the Turkish Treaty or will form a separate document, remains to be decided, but the disposition of the above territories shall be as follows:—

- (a) Syria will be under French mandate. (The French delegation will make a recommendation as regards a northern boundary).

The western boundary will be the Mediterranean.

On the south the boundary will be the northern boundary of Palestine as defined below (see Palestine).

On the east the boundary will be the western boundary of Mesopotamia still to be determined.

- (b) Palestine, the boundaries to be defined in accordance with its ancient limits of Dan to Beersheba, and to be under British mandate.
- (c) Mesopotamia, including Mosul, to be under British mandate with boundaries still to be determined.
- (d) Kurdistan, status and boundaries still to be determined.

- (e) In the event of disagreement in regard to the boundaries between Palestine and Syria, and between Mesopotamia and Syria, the question to be submitted to the arbitration of a referee to be appointed by the President of the United States of America.

3. Turkey to recognise that the administration of Smyrna and the surrounding area shall be in the hands of a Greek administrator nominated by the Greek Government. The local population of this area shall be allowed to send deputies to the Greek Chamber and recruits to the Greek army. The extent and limits of this area are under consideration by a commission set up by the Supreme Council on the 17th February. This commission will be guided as far as possible by numerical factors in the population.

*Note.*—To what extent, if at all, the Turkish suzerainty shall continue to exist remains to be determined.

4. The port of Smyrna shall be a free port under the guarantee of the League of Nations, and a suitable part of the port shall be reserved to the Turkish Government for the use of the hinterland.

#### Part V.—*Military, Naval and Air Clauses*

(Referred to a commission under Marshal Foch by a decision of the Supreme Council on the 17th February, 1920.)<sup>12</sup>

#### Part VI.—*Prisoners of War and Graves*

##### Section 1.—*Prisoners of War*

(This should be referred to a commission.)

##### Section 2.—*Graves*

(This also should be referred to a commission, which should be instructed to make special provision for the vesting of certain areas in Gallipoli containing the graves of Allied soldiers in the hands of the Imperial [War] Graves Commission.)

#### Part VII.—*Penalties*

(An adaptation of the articles in the conditions of peace with Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary.)

#### Part VIII.—*Reparation*

(No decisions have yet been taken.)

#### Part IX.—*Financial Clauses*

(These have been referred to a commission by a decision of the Supreme Council taken on the 17th February, 1920.)<sup>13</sup>

#### Part X.—*Economic Clauses*

(A special commission is to be set up to deal with this highly technical question. It will proceed upon the assumption that economic priority will be given to the several Allies in various areas still to be determined.)

*Note.*—This priority will be secured by a published agreement—in the form of a self-denying ordinance—between the Allied Powers by which they will severally or jointly engage (1) not to apply for commercial or industrial con-

<sup>12</sup> See No. 12, minute 2.

<sup>13</sup> See No. 11, minutes 1 and 6.



cessions in one or other of the above areas, except in the case of surrender of priority by the Power principally concerned, and (2) in the event of the Turkish Government applying for external assistance in the local administration or police of these areas, not to dispute the preferential claim of the Power principally concerned.

#### Part XI.—*Aerial Navigation*

(This should be referred to a commission to draw up articles similar *mutatis mutandis* to the corresponding sections of the other treaties.)

#### Part XII.—*Ports, Waterways and Railways*

(This highly technical subject should be referred to a special commission.)

It should be instructed *inter alia* to provide for the establishment of an International Commission under the League of Nations to supervise the part [*port*] of Degeagatch [*sic*] and the railway from Dedeagatch to the point where it enters Bulgarian territory; also to make provision for the free port of Smyrna and the railway connecting it with territory only under Turkish jurisdiction.

It should provide also for communication by railway and pipe-line between Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean.

#### Part XIII.—*Labour*

#### Part XIV.—*Miscellaneous Provisions*

### No. 15

I.C.P. 36A.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Wednesday, February 18, 1920, at 3 p.m.*<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart. For latter part only: Mr. Forbes Adam, Mr. Philip Kerr, Colonel Gribbon. SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr.

*France*: M. Cambon (for latter part only), M. Berthelot.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti, Signor Galli (for latter part only); SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the council were getting to a very difficult position. France was proposing to secure special concessions and economic priority in Syria and Cilicia. Similarly, Italy was anxious to obtain like concessions and priorities in Southern Anatolia. He himself raised no objection to these aspirations, but he wished to inform the council that, of course, the British Empire must retain their claim to concessions of identical character in such territories where British British [*sic*] interests predominated. What he wished, however, to ask

<sup>1</sup> This document in fact records a discussion which was held after minute 1 and before minute 2 of No. 14.

the council was—how does all this bear on the covenant of the League of Nations? He had noticed that in the mandate drafted by Colonel House it was specifically stated that no Power should receive any special privileges or priorities. Now, as he had said, France was asking for special privileges in Cilicia and Syria; Italy was asking for similar privileges in Southern Anatolia and Great Britain would desire like concessions in Mesopotamia and elsewhere. Would not this evoke, both from the United States and from Japan, a violent protest? What would then be the position of the Powers? He was anxious that the council should come to some agreement in regard to this important question that afternoon, if possible. He would invite special attention to the following extract from the American proposal for the draft of a general form of (Turkey) class 'A' mandate, page 44 of a sketch by the Middle Eastern Political Section of the British delegation of a draft treaty of peace between Turkey and the Allied Governments, dated the 14th August, 1914 [1919]<sup>2</sup>:—

'(2) The mandatory Power agrees not to attempt to obtain special privileges for its own citizens, and, further, undertakes to ensure to all citizens and subjects of States members of the League of Nations, on the same footing as to its own nationals, freedom of transit and navigation, and complete economic, commercial and industrial equality. Nevertheless, the Government of <sup>3</sup> shall be free to organise essential public works and services on such terms and conditions as it thinks just, and nothing herein shall be construed to prevent the imposition of whatever import and export duties may be necessary, provided they are not in any respect discriminatory.

'(3) Concessions for the development of the natural resources of the territory shall be granted by the Government of <sup>3</sup> without distinction on grounds of nationality between the subjects or citizens of States members of the League of Nations, but the right is reserved to the local Government to impose such conditions as will maintain intact its authority.'

M. BERTHELOT agreed that the point made by Mr. Lloyd George raised a very serious difficulty which was not only one of the form to be given to the mandate. No doubt some advantage might be gained by altering certain clauses, but substantially the difficulty would still exist. There were vested interests in these provinces, and various rights would arise later. He thought that whatever European State accepted responsibility for the administration of any province and incurred consequential expenses was entitled to some compensation. It was not very easy to introduce this point into the treaty, and the council on the previous afternoon<sup>4</sup> had inclined to the view of Lord Curzon, that it was desirable that this aspect should be excluded from the

<sup>2</sup> For the American draft in question see No. 12, note 11. For the early sketch by the British delegation of a draft treaty (not printed in full) cf. Volume IV, No. 299, appendix. This sketch was subsequently superseded: cf. Volume IV, No. 665.

<sup>3</sup> Omission in original quotation.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 12, minute 1.

treaty, but that the respective priorities of the various Allies should be secured by means of documents to be exchanged between them, such documents to be made public. He agreed, too, with Mr. Lloyd George that it was undesirable to raise difficulties with the United States and Japan, if these could possibly be avoided. There were precedents for the course suggested by Lord Curzon, as in many cases and by many countries such preliminary arrangements and understandings had been reached in former years. He would venture to use the analogy of auctions, where certain information and guarantees were given beforehand to purchasers. He thought, therefore, that in the wording of the text of mandate 'A' something might be said about compensation for expenditure incurred by any Power accepting certain responsibilities in respect of particular provinces. One of the principal difficulties, perhaps, was that of explaining their present proposed intentions to the United States. The Americans refused to join the Allied Council, and they declined to assist in any way our Drafting Committee. And yet they might at any moment, later, object to the draft which had been agreed upon by that committee.

SIGNOR NITTI thought that the situation was undoubtedly most embarrassing. It must, however, be faced. Unfortunately, the Allies had signed the text of the covenant, and it was doubtful if they could now back out. What was the present situation? The mandate did not confer a benefit, but involved responsibilities and duties. The functions of the mandatory, as defined by Roman law, were the duties of a *paterfamilias* who was bound to give an account of his guardianship. In the present cases he thought that the responsibilities exceeded potential advantages. By specific articles of the covenant, certain countries (e.g., Arabia, Syria and Mesopotamia) were to be assisted by particular Great Powers until they were enabled to fend for themselves. In his view it was necessary to secure certain advantages to such mandatories as might be set up, under article 22 of the covenant, for Cilicia and Southern Anatolia, where the populations were entirely Turkish. The Adriatic [*sic*] question was not interesting from an economic point of view; it was essentially a military problem. He thought that a formula could be found for Adalia and Cilicia, and that it should take the form of a collective mandate to the Powers to help Turkey to her feet. He ventured to refer to the question of Heraclea, which was of special importance owing to the need of coal. Signor Tittoni had once told him that he claimed no territory, but merely sought economic advantages, and he believed that he had told the then Prime Minister of Italy that President Wilson inclined to this view.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he thought Signor Nitti's information was inaccurate, as he was sure that the President was, on the contrary, opposed to this.

LORD CURZON said that the council were faced with a problem which presented considerable difficulties. They had to find a formula which would be consistent with the terms of the covenant and yet not conflict with the interpretation placed upon that covenant by the United States. As regards the suggestion that had been made at the meeting of the council on the

previous day, to insert nothing in the treaty about concessions and economic priorities, but merely to make special arrangements—which were to be published later—according preferential treatment and imposing what he had designated a ‘self-denying ordinance,’ he had the previous evening drawn up a formula which he would put to the council merely as a basis of discussion. To begin with, there were two *desiderata* of a negative character:—

- (a) Each Power undertakes not to apply for commercial or industrial concessions in certain territories to be defined (e.g., Adalia, Cilicia, Syria, Mesopotamia); with the proviso that where any Great Power which was specially interested in such territory declines to develop it, that Power would not use its preferential position to interfere with the development of the territory by some other friendly Power.
- (b) In the event of Turkey asking for external assistance in the matter of her gendarmerie, police, advisers, experts, instructors and, so on, preferential treatment should be given to the Great Power particularly concerned, and the other Powers should agree not to interfere.

These were both negative points, and partook of the nature of what he had called a ‘self-denying ordinance.’ A third point had just been suggested to him by Mr. Lloyd George, which was of a positive character:—

- (c) The Allied Powers undertake to give diplomatic support at Constantinople to any Great Power making a claim for such concessions, and would regard that Power as entitled to special consideration.

He himself saw nothing in these proposals which was inconsistent with the covenant of the treaty, and they need not be afraid of publication.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the only condition that need be inserted in the treaty would be a general clause to the effect that Turkey undertook to grant all reasonable opportunities to the Allied countries to assist her to develop her own resources.

SIGNOR NITTI thought that the formula proposed by Lord Curzon was very interesting. It took, however, the form, as he had said, of an agreement of a negative character between the Allies. But it had this disadvantage, that it did not protect the Allies against outside Powers. They had to envisage the fact that Germany would be their opponent in the future, and possibly also Russia. Moreover, they had to face a potential competitor in the United States, on account of oils and minerals in the countries to be mandated. The interests of the United States in the Middle East were not purely platonic. The solution propounded by Lord Curzon, therefore, did not protect the Allies from outside. He agreed that the mandates must be exploited, and that each Ally must assist the rest in the event of any difficulties arising. Lord Curzon’s formula would typify the friendship of the Allies, but would not secure their rights or the concessions they desired.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he agreed with Signor Nitti that this was one of the chief difficulties. Anything the Allies could do to prevent the United States entering these territories with the support of possibly Germany

and Russia, was greatly to be desired, but no treaty that we could sign could really prevent this. The alternative, however, was still more serious. The council were confronted with the choice of two difficult courses, but he thought that the less dangerous one was that suggested by Lord Curzon. If they insisted upon inserting in the treaty their demands for preferential rights, the first thing that would happen would be that they would receive a note from the United States saying that this action was contrary to the terms of the covenant. The Turks would be well aware that the United States was taking this line, and they would consequently refuse to sign the treaty. In his opinion, it would be much better for the Allies to generalise in the treaty and to come to certain mutually amicable arrangements in regard to concessions and priorities. The other course was, in his view, much too dangerous for them to adopt. He thought the council would be much wiser to accept Lord Curzon's suggestion, although it did not give them all they wanted.

M. BERTHELOT said that the president of the council had hinted that the Allies should leave it to the Turk himself to ask for assistance in the way of expert advisers, instructors, and so on. He thought it was very likely that the Turks would take the initiative in this matter, as the presence of such assistants would enable many of them to live in idleness and comfort and yet to keep up appearances to the outside world, while they would rely on external officials to do all the work. He thought, however, that the Powers should retain to themselves the right of selecting these advisers. Further, we must arrange for the Turks to grant facilities in this or that province to this or that Power; but he agreed that it was inadvisable to put this in too definite a form in the treaty. In adopting any formula, care should be taken to see that it conformed to the conditions and habits obtaining in the East. In his view, it was unlikely that the United States would ask that Americans should be represented among these controllers and other experts, which would make the task of the Allies all the easier.

(At this point Signor Galli entered the Council Chamber.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that they could not carry the question any further that afternoon. Nobody proposed to insert in the treaty any articles allocating preferential rights to particular nationalities. That would be highly dangerous.

(At this point M. Cambon and Colonel Gribbon entered the Council Chamber.)

SIGNOR NITTI wished to ask the council whether the present proposition before them applied only to Turkey proper or also to Mesopotamia, Syria, &c. Unless the conditions were to be identical in the case of Turkey proper and the liberated countries, it would be impossible for him to offer an explanation in the Italian Chamber which would satisfy his country.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, of course, in all the provinces, both in Turkey proper and the liberated territories, the Allied Powers would arrange each to support the others' claims.

SIGNOR NITTI said that this was not exactly what he meant. He wished to know what would be done in regard to Turkey in Asia, since it was proposed that Cilicia and Southern Anatolia were to be administered, whereas Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia were to be mandated. This was provided for by article 9 of the Treaty of London. Were there to be two different situations, viz.:—

- (a) Syria and Mesopotamia under a mandate.
- (b) Adalia and Cilicia under an administration?

If this were the case he would be placed in a very embarrassing position *vis-à-vis* the Italian Chamber.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it was proposed that Mesopotamia, Arabia, Palestine and Syria were to be cut out of Turkey altogether; whereas Cilicia and Adalia and Southern Anatolia were to remain part of Turkey proper. The two situations, therefore, were essentially different. He did not understand that there was at present any question of the partitioning of Turkey proper. The arrangements which were now under the consideration of the council were designed to maintain the integrity of Turkey proper.

SIGNOR NITTI said that the real question was this: In article 9 of the Treaty of London it was never contemplated that an Arab State should be separated from Turkey. Consequently, he contended that no readjustment of that treaty, which was signed in 1915, could be made without Italy receiving substantial compensation. If it appeared, by the interpretation given by the United States to article 22 of the covenant, it would be impossible for the Allies to give mutually to each other preferential privileges for fear that the United States would intervene, he maintained that it would then be necessary to adhere to the strict terms of article 9, unless Italy could receive due compensation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired what exactly Italy wanted? It was not a question of argument, it was merely a question of substance. What exactly did Signor Nitti want inserted in the treaty? He asked this particularly, as it would be necessary to inform the United States.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he was not quite prepared to give a complete answer to this question that afternoon. The matter was very important, and he would like to have time to consider it. He would be ready to give a considered reply on the following day.

It was agreed—

That the discussion should be adjourned until the following day.<sup>1</sup>

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 18, 1920.

I.C.P. 37.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Thursday, February 19, 1920, at 11 a.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Philip Kerr; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Captain Abraham, Major Caccia.

*France*: M. Cambon, M. Berthelot.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. LORD CURZON said that, in view of the difficult situation the council was in regarding the Adriatic, he thought it right to communicate a letter he had received on the previous evening from Lord Robert Cecil. Lord Robert, as chairman of the League of Nations Union, wished to make a suggestion to the presidents of societies analogous to the one he represented, tending to the reference of the Adriatic problem to the Council of the League of Nations. He suggested action under article 11 of the covenant. To this end Lord Robert proposed to send telegrams to ex-President Taft, to M. Léon Bourgeois, and to Signor Bissolati, in their capacity as presidents of local societies for the promotion of the League of Nations. Before sending them, however, he had thought it right to consult the Secretary of State for the Colonies [*sic*]. Lord Curzon felt that this was a matter he should bring before the council. (The letter and telegrams will be found in the Appendix.)<sup>1</sup>

M. CAMBON said that he thought the action suggested by Lord Robert Cecil was a little premature. The council had sent an answer to President Wilson, and though it could not be regarded as certain that he would be

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. Lord Robert Cecil's letter, dated from the League of Nations Union, London, February 18, 1920, read as follows:

'My dear Curzon,

'The Executive Committee of the League of Nations Union propose, if you see no objection, to send the enclosed telegrams to their opposite numbers in the United States, Italy and France. They are anxious not to do anything to hamper the Government in their negotiations, but they feel that if it would not hamper them it would be desirable for the League of Nations Societies to interest themselves in a question which evidently threatens "to disturb the good understanding between nations" within the meaning of article 11 of the covenant. You are, of course, familiar with the fact that under that article it is open to the British Government to bring the whole matter to the attention of the Council of the League if it should regard that course as desirable.

'Yours very sincerely,

ROBERT CECIL'

The proposed telegram to Mr. Taft read: 'Is League to enforce peace taking any action on Adriatic question? Can we help? Would you approve reference of whole question to Council of League?' The proposed telegrams to M. Bourgeois and Signor Bissolati respectively read: 'Would your society approve reference of Adriatic question to Council of League of Nations under article 11 of covenant?'

influenced by this answer, it must be hoped that he would be, and therefore nothing should be done to prejudice a possible agreement. An appeal such as that suggested by Lord Robert Cecil would appear to indicate that there was complete disagreement, which diplomacy was unable to overcome. This, he trusted, was not the case.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he entirely agreed with M. Cambon. It was impossible to submit this question to the League of Nations, firstly, because the Peace Conference was in session, and secondly, because he had no mandate from his Parliament to refer the question to the League of Nations. Should it come to pass that Italy had to enforce the Treaty of London, the matter could be studied at a later time. At present he thought there was no reason for despair. President Wilson's answer should be awaited. If, as he hoped, it was satisfactory, a settlement would be in view. If it were not quite satisfactory, it might yet be possible to find a way out. To mention article 11 of the covenant, which dealt with situations threatening war, would be to start rumours of war unnecessarily. His own Government had given no cause for starting rumours of such a character. Both in its acts and in its declarations his Government had been consistently friendly to the Jugoslavs. The action suggested by Lord Robert Cecil might compromise the solution he hoped would soon be reached.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he agreed.

LORD CURZON said that all he could do was to advise Lord Robert Cecil to refrain from the action he suggested. Lord Robert was a private person and could not be restrained should he choose to neglect the advice tendered him.

M. BERTHELOT said that Lord Robert would doubtless feel that if the Governments were unfavourable, his communication would have no weight, and that this alone would probably suffice to dissuade him.

2. With reference to I.C.P. 30,<sup>2</sup> Minute 1, MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he felt bound to call attention to what had appeared in the Paris *Leakage of Official Information* 'Matin,' and quoted in the 'Evening Standard,' on Wednesday, the 18th February:—

'M. Jules Sauerwein, the London correspondent of the "Matin," to-day declares that the denial by Mr. Tumulty<sup>3</sup> of the statement that the United States have threatened to take no further interest in the affairs of Europe cannot be taken seriously. He then proceeds to give the following particulars regarding the note recently received by the Allies from President Wilson: "I have seen President Wilson's note," he says, "and it consists of at least five pages. It is signed, 'R. Lansing.' There is also a postscript, but I do not know whether Mr. Lansing actually signed this or not. The post[s]cript itself is, however, undoubtedly an addition by the President.<sup>4</sup> I remember practically every word of it.

<sup>2</sup> No. 8.

<sup>3</sup> Secretary to President Wilson.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. No. 9, note 2. The American ambassador in London informed Lord Curzon in a letter of February 26, 1920, that his attention had been called to 'the statement of a French



‘“It says that if the American point of view is disregarded, the President will seriously consider the question of withdrawing the Treaty of Versailles and the special Guarantee Treaty with France which are now being debated in the Senate.”

‘Two days later Mr. Lansing tendered his resignation.

‘In conclusion, M. Sauerwein asks what possible motive can have prompted Mr. Tumulty to deny the official text of the note.’

Mr. Lloyd George said he felt this was a very serious matter. A note had been written by President Wilson in the unfortunate frame of mind in which he then was. It now appeared that he desired to withdraw from it, and it was very important that this process should be made easy for him. Nevertheless, someone had betrayed confidence, and had shown the note to the press, which was enabled to give a very accurate account of what had taken place. Moreover, the ‘Times’ of the 19th February gave a very accurate account (allowance being made for bias) of what he himself had said on the previous day in the council regarding the communication of news to the press.<sup>5</sup> The council was now about to tackle the subject of Russia. Regarding this subject, the ‘Times’ boasted that arrangements had been made with an Allied Government represented at the council to obtain information of the British Government’s attitude, in order that the party represented by that newspaper should be enabled to oppose all the acts of that Government. An action of this kind by any Allied Government would be exactly of the same nature as the action of M. Litvinov when he represented Soviet Russia in this country.<sup>6</sup> It had been found necessary to expel M. Litvinov. It must be obvious to all that it would be idle to continue the conference under conditions of this kind. It would be better far that each Government should act independently, as the premature disclosure of information before an agreed conclusion had been reached would cause nothing but mischief.

M. CAMBON said that Mr. Lloyd George had cited three facts. They were, no doubt, extremely disquieting. The first was the communication of President Wilson’s note to the press; the second was the communication of his own words on the previous day; and the third was the Russian matter.

newspaper man to the effect that the President’s Note of February 10th, delivered on the 14th, concluded with a paragraph which was added after the signature of Secretary Lansing had been appended to the body of the Note. The concluding paragraph, as you will remember, was the one which alluded to the possible withdrawal of the Treaty from the Senate.

‘In order to ascertain what foundation there could have been for this statement, I have looked into the facts and find that, in the haste of preparing a copy for immediate delivery to the Prime Minister, the copy was put together with paste and shears by several hands, and that this last paragraph did, on the copy as presented, follow the signature “Lansing”. Perhaps the same form was carried into the copies which were transmitted the following day. This, however, was an inadvertence, as the Note was an entirety and the signature should properly come at the end.’ This correction was accordingly made in the text of the document printed in Cmd. 586.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 14, minute 4.

<sup>6</sup> For this episode cf. E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917–1923* (London, 1950), vol. iii, pp. 19–20 and 89.

In regard to the first, he was in possession of certain knowledge that President Wilson's note had reached the offices of the 'Times' on Saturday morning, at the same time as it was handed to Mr. Lloyd George himself. It was from the 'Times' office that it had been communicated to the rest of the press.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he had also received similar information.

M. CAMBON, continuing, said that the inference was that someone in the United States was in communication with the 'Times' for reasons of his own, but in any case it was not in the power of the council to put a stop to this. As to press comments regarding the proceedings of the previous day, when it had been decided to issue only agreed communiqués, he would point out that this procedure had begun to be put into execution. In fact, a communiqué had been issued on the previous evening, and no doubt Mr. Philip Kerr, in issuing the communiqué, had given some explanation of the decision reached. This would account for the remarks made in the 'Times,' which, like any other newspaper, was bound to complain if any information was denied it. This, he thought, was the natural explanation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it was the accurate reporting of the observations he had made that he complained of. However, as the council was about to approach a very delicate subject, he wished to ask each member present to take strict precautions to avoid any leakage before a decision had been reached. There could not be an Alliance on any other terms. The 'Times' was an opponent of the Government. It must be clear to his colleagues that if a British delegation went to France, or Italy, or Japan, and gave opposition newspapers secret information, by means of which they could attack the Government, the British delegate at fault would deserve expulsion.

M. CAMBON said that, in his opinion, the boast made by the 'Times' was an idle one. It was made in order to give a spurious value to its alleged information. He thought it quite impossible that the 'Times' should obtain any information from the French Embassy. He asked whether Mr. Lloyd George thought it possible that any representative in the room was capable of giving information of the character described?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he did not. Nevertheless, he was certain that someone was giving information. Previous[ly], in Paris, such information had been given direct from the Quai d'Orsay.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that he was convinced that no one in the room would even inadvertently give information of this sort. However, a delegate might talk over what had happened in the council with some person whom he felt entitled to trust, and this person might unwittingly commit an indiscretion. Consequently, he had taken the precaution to allow no member of his staff, save one or two who had to cable decisions to Japan, to see any record of the council's proceedings.

M. BERTHELOT begged leave to speak a few words. There was one positive fact, namely, that President Wilson's letter had been communicated to the press. He believed, like M. Paul Cambon, that it had been given to the 'Times' by someone in America. As to the boasting of the 'Times' regarding its ability to obtain future information, he thought this was a wild boast, and

not a sufficient ground for instituting an enquiry. The only delegation the 'Times' could possibly be hinting at on the Russian question was the French delegation. It was known that the British and Italian Governments were more favourable than the French to a *rapprochement* of some kind in Russia. French policy was quite open and consistent. M. Millerand had lately made a statement in the Chamber,<sup>7</sup> and M. Berthelot's own attitude was well known. Any newspaper, therefore, could hazard a guess as to what the French, the Italian and the British attitudes to the question would be, and it was easy, in such a situation, for any newspaper to play on the mutual suspicions of the Powers concerned. As to what had happened at Paris, the incident was a very disagreeable one, but he would like to refer to it. At one time Mr. Lloyd George had thought that information was being given by him and by M. Dutasta.<sup>8</sup> As far as he was personally concerned, he never spoke to journalists, or received them. Nevertheless, there had been cause for Mr. Lloyd George's complaint, though he thought perhaps Mr. Lloyd George had taken the matter too much to heart. It was true that the secretary-general used to receive journalists in his room every evening. Being of an easy-going nature, he might possibly have given them a little more information than he meant to. After Mr. Lloyd George's complaint greater precautions were taken. M. Berthelot added that he knew Mr. Wickham Steed<sup>9</sup> very well, but when in London he always avoided seeing him.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had never suspected either M. Berthelot or M. Dutasta. He did not wish to rake up the past, but on one occasion in Paris there had been an almost verbatim account of what he had said in the council on the subject of Poland.<sup>10</sup> This must have been revealed by someone in the room. He could make a shrewd guess as to who gave the information. It was neither M. Berthelot nor M. Dutasta. He had only raised this subject because the conference was about to embark upon a very difficult and delicate subject. He would have several definite proposals to make regarding Russia. These proposals had not yet appeared, and if they should appear in the press it could be inferred that they had been given away, if not directly, indirectly. He would therefore urge on his colleagues that they should all take precautions such as those described by Viscount Chinda.

3. MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the French Government were in a position to hand in the names of their representatives to sit on the various commissions which it had been decided yesterday to appoint in connection with the draft Treaty of Peace with Turkey (I.C.P. 35).<sup>11</sup> He was anxious that these commissions should set to work as soon as possible in order that the council might receive their recommendations before Signor Nitti's departure on Wednesday next.<sup>12</sup>

*Treaty of Peace  
with Turkey.  
Commissions*

<sup>7</sup> On February 6, 1920: see *Journal Officiel: Débats parlementaires: Chambre des Députés: Session Ordinaire*, janvier à mars 1920, pp. 137-41.

<sup>8</sup> Secretary-General of the Paris Peace Conference.

<sup>9</sup> Editor of *The Times*.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. David Lloyd George, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 990.

<sup>11</sup> No. 13.

<sup>12</sup> February 25, 1920. See, however, No. 46, minute 9.

The British and Japanese representatives had been appointed, with the exception of one of the commissions on which, he understood, the Japanese Government did not wish to be represented.

M. CAMBON replied that when endeavouring to obtain the names of the French representatives to serve on the proposed commissions, he and his colleague had come to the conclusion that the appointment of many of these commissions would be unnecessary, and that they would only complicate the work of the conference. M. Berthelot would give the reasons which had influenced them in arriving at that decision.

M. BERTHELOT said that, in the first place, considerable difficulty would be found in obtaining suitable representatives to sit on the numerous commissions it had been proposed to appoint. Irrespective of that, however, it would be found that many of the questions to be dealt with had already been fully studied in connection with the Treaties of Peace with Germany and Austria.

To take each commission in turn, he agreed to the appointment of a small commission to consider the economic clauses for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, and he would nominate M. Kammerer as one of the members, besides M. de Fleuriau, or himself.

In regard to the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways, he thought it would be agreed that the railway question was more a political than a technical one. That question should, therefore, in the first place be discussed by the council from a purely political point of view. In the same way the question of ports and waterways which involved the régime to be established at Smyrna, Alexandretta, &c., was purely a political one; though in the case of the Straits both political and military problems were involved. On the other hand, the question of Dedeagatch had already been discussed in Paris,<sup>13</sup> with the result that it had been agreed to set up a special commission to represent the 'Protecting' Powers, Great Britain and France. Italy had asked to appoint a representative, and Greece and France [?Bulgaria] would also each be invited to nominate a representative. He saw no objection to giving effect to that proposal. On the other hand, he would suggest that the decision of the whole question relating to ports, waterways and railways should be postponed until M. Millerand's return.

In regard to civil aerial navigation, he hardly thought it called for the appointment of a special commission, and he suggested that the economic committee should be instructed to deal with that matter.

Similarly he would suggest that the question of prisoners of war and graves be referred to the Inter-Allied Commission at Versailles.

Before concluding, he would ask permission to refer to the 'Draft Synopsis of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey,' which had been circulated yesterday. Certain statements contained therein could not be said to have so far received the assent of the council. Other matters again required to be put in a more precise manner. He would ask, therefore, to be permitted to submit for consideration at to-morrow's meeting a new revised draft of the synopsis in question.

<sup>13</sup> See Volume I, No. 49, minute 3(b) and No. 52, minute 5.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was prepared to agree that the questions relating to prisoners of war and graves should be referred to Versailles.

The drawing up of articles on civil aerial navigation would constitute a very simple matter, having reference chiefly to the selection of landing places. He thought the whole thing could be disposed of in one sitting, and he would beg M. Berthelot to appoint a representative to undertake that duty here in London.

In regard to ports, waterways and railways, he fully agreed that the question was largely a political one, and that it would eventually have to be dealt with by the council itself. On the other hand, it would be necessary to know exactly what were the points which required to be decided by the council. For that reason, he thought, it would be useful to appoint a commission, so that on M. Millerand's return the council should know exactly what points called for decision.

In conclusion he would lay stress on the necessity of arriving at an early settlement regarding all these questions, as it was imperative that the terms of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey should be settled before Signor Nitti's departure.

SIGNOR NITTI associated himself with Mr. Lloyd George in asking that there should be no delay in settling these various questions.

M. BERTHELOT agreed that he would do his best to appoint representatives. He merely asked that arrangements should be made that the various commissions should not meet at the same hour.

It was agreed—

To instruct the Inter-Allied Military Mission at Versailles to prepare for the consideration of the Supreme Council clauses for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey dealing with—

- (a) Prisoners of war.
- (b) Graves.

4. MR. LLOYD GEORGE called on M. Berthelot to make a statement with regard to Russian policy.

*Russia* M. BERTHELOT said that the Prime Minister's request had taken him somewhat by surprise. He had come to the meeting expecting to hear statements made by his colleagues. Consequently, he could only make a very general statement, and he must ask to be excused for any shortcomings in his statement, either in regard to form or substance.

He would, in the first place, deal with the question of Russian co-operative societies. At meetings held in Paris<sup>14</sup> the decision had been reached to enter into direct relations with the Russian co-operative societies with the object of receiving foodstuffs from Russia in exchange for other goods (boots, articles of clothing, agricultural implements, &c.) to be given in exchange. It was thought that in that way the Allied peoples would be able to enter into direct trading relations with the peasants of Russia. When the practical

<sup>14</sup> See Volume II, No. 74, minute 2 and No. 76, minute 1.

manner of giving effect to that decision came to be discussed, it had been laid down as an axiom that the various Allied Governments would under no circumstances have any dealings with the Soviet Government. It was recognised that the Soviet Government had usurped its power; destroyed all existing institutions; that it kept the country under subjection by the employment of bands of mercenary troops, kept together partly by terror and partly by the necessity of obtaining food.

The Soviets, no doubt, had to deal with a passive, submissive people, who were prepared to suffer extreme privations; but, sooner or later, unless assistance from outside were received, the life of the country would come to an end, the present system would cease, and the destruction of Bolshevism would necessarily follow. For these various reasons it had, in his opinion, rightly been decided by the Allied Governments to hold themselves aloof from the Soviets.

The Allied Governments, therefore, in arriving at a decision in regard to the Russian co-operative societies, had rightly decided that the system merely implied the exchange of goods between individuals. But no sooner had that decision been reached than the Soviet Government of Russia at once 'sovietised' all the co-operative societies, and, instead of leaving them free, placed them under M. Litvinov.<sup>15</sup> In his opinion that action constituted a negation of the principles involved in the exchange of goods between individuals. As far as the French Government were concerned, they could never agree, either to the co-operatives being 'sovietised', or to have any dealings with M. Litvinov.

Next, he proposed to examine the question from a purely practical point of view. In that connection he would ask: 'Was it likely that the Allies would obtain anything from Russia? Would they obtain either grain or flax?' In his opinion the answer to both these questions could only be in the negative, if only for the reason that Russia had no transport. The British Government had managed to obtain flax from Esthonia, and, no doubt, it would be possible to obtain other products from the Border States. But, in his opinion, it would be quite impossible to obtain grain from the centre of Russia. Would the Russian peasants give up their corn without being given something in exchange, either shoes or clothes, which represented money? With the object of affording such an exchange it had been proposed to send goods to the value of £30,000,000 to Russia. The Soviet Government would, no doubt, transport those goods to Central Russia, but would it ever allow any of the corn, to be obtained in exchange, to be given up to the Allies?

In the next place he would say a few words in regard to the relations between the Soviet Government and the Border States, with particular reference to the offers of peace made by the former to the latter.<sup>16</sup> He (M. Berthelot) had spoken to many of the leaders of the Border States—Lithuania, Esthonia, Finland and Roumania. He did not attach too much importance to all that these statesmen had said; but one idea appeared to be

<sup>15</sup> Cf. E. H. Carr, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 238–9.

<sup>16</sup> See Volume III, Chap. II *passim*.

held in common, namely, that the Allies should decide once for all definitely to adopt either a positive or a negative policy. The Border States were told, on the one hand, that they should not make peace with Russia, whilst they received no support from the Allies. The fact remained that the Allies should insist on combined action. A line of demarcation should be laid down beyond which the Russian Soviets should not be permitted to advance. None of the Governments constituting the Border States should be permitted to enter into independent negotiations with the Soviets under penalty of being ostracised by the Allies. At the present moment the Bolshevik Government addressed its offers of peace to each of the Border countries separately and independently, and tempting territorial offers were made to them, which went far beyond their greatest claims. Thus, Poles had been wrong in advancing some 300 kilom. beyond the frontiers laid down by the conference, but the Soviet Government, in offering them terms of peace, had been prepared to abandon to them even a greater stretch of country. Similarly, should the Bolsheviks offer Bessarabia to Roumania, whilst the Allies could give her no help either in money, munitions or men, could Roumania be blamed for falling into the Soviet trap?

Consequently, in his opinion, it was imperative that the Border States should definitely be told that they would drop out of the alliance, and be subjected to the same treatment as Bolshevik Russia, should they have any independent dealings with the Soviet Government.

To sum up, then, in his opinion, the Allies should decide once for all that they would never have any dealings with the Soviet Government, which must be ostracised for ever, however long it might remain in power. Everything went to show that any dealings with the band of brigands, now constituting the Soviet Government, would only eventually lead to loss. The United States of America had, at one time, thought that it could deal with the Bolshevik Government, with the result that millions had been lost and it had been compelled to alter its ideas. The Bolsheviks might be victorious at the present moment, but that was only in appearance. No really military operations had taken place. A squadron of Bolshevik cavalry one day entered a town, which would promptly be evacuated by the anti-Bolshevik cavalry on account of its being weaker in numbers, and the reverse would happen on the following day. From the latest information supplied by the French military advisers it appeared that Denikin<sup>17</sup> had already been able to reform his frontier on the Don and that a new offensive was about to commence. Similarly, in Siberia, a new front was being formed. Irkutsk had been retaken, which accounted for Koltchak having been shot at two hours' notice.<sup>18</sup> Thus, it was and would continue to be a continuous flow and ebb. But the Bolshevik system was in no way triumphant; it would never be capable of organising anything.

<sup>17</sup> For the activities at about that time of General Denikin, commander-in-chief of White Russian forces in South Russia, cf. Volume III, Chap. II *passim*.

<sup>18</sup> *V. ibid.* for the shooting of Admiral Kolchak and the fall of his White Russian administration in Siberia.

In conclusion he would merely add that, in his opinion, it would be a fatal error and a dishonourable action, either to enter into relations with Trotski<sup>19</sup> and his Soviet Government, or to continue any dealings with the Russian co-operative societies.

He would merely repeat that he had had no time to prepare his statement. Consequently he hoped that due allowance would be made if he had expressed himself in somewhat positive terms.

(It was agreed to adjourn the further discussion of this question until the afternoon.)

5. M. CAMBON said that in accordance with the Treaty of Peace with Germany, certain German armaments had to be destroyed, including a number of army rifles. The Polish Government had asked to be given 300,000 German rifles in order to be able to defend itself against Bolshevik attacks. The question had been considered by the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris, and it had recommended that the rifles should be given. It now appeared that the British Government objected to this resolution being given effect to.

LORD CURZON explained that the British Government had, on its merits, no objections to offer to the procedure proposed; but it considered that the surrender of the rifles in question would constitute an infraction of the Treaty of Peace, under which the rifles had to be destroyed. Consequently, it was on grounds of principle that the British representative had opposed the proposal.

M. BERTHELOT explained that the question of putting part of the armaments to be surrendered by Germany under the Peace Treaty to other uses had been discussed on three separate occasions. At one time the Czechoslovaks had asked to be permitted to accept a number of rifles offered to them by the German Government. It had been decided at Versailles that the German Government had no right to offer to the Czechoslovaks rifles which, under the terms of the Peace Treaty, would have to be destroyed.

The question had come up a second time in a slightly different form. On that occasion the Bavarian Government had offered to hand over a certain number of rifles to the Czechoslovaks. It had then been decided by the Allies not to destroy the rifles, and the Bavarian Government had been authorised to hand over a large number to the Czechoslovaks.

The latter precedent had been quoted when the question had come up for consideration with regard to the request made by Poland.<sup>20</sup> It had again been considered that, though Germany would be compelled, under the terms of the treaty, to destroy the rifles in question, the Allies would be entitled to put them to other uses, and they had decided that to be desirable.

SIGNOR NITTI thought that the handing over of arms to the Poles was intimately bound up with the Russian question, and suggested, therefore, that further discussion should be adjourned for the present.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he entirely agreed with Signor Nitti. The Allies certainly did not wish to encourage the Poles to make war against Russia.

<sup>19</sup> Soviet Russian Commissar for War.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Volume II, No. 51, minute 5.



That would be a great mistake. Unfortunately the Polish Government preferred the policy of war in order to remain in power and to prevent the outbreak of internal disturbances.

M. CAMBON agreed to an adjournment of the question until a decision had been taken on Russian policy. On the other hand, he felt compelled to say that it had never been intended to encourage Poland to make war, but merely to supply her with the means of defending herself. Poland was being threatened by the Bolsheviks; it was, therefore, only right and proper that she should be supplied with the means of defending herself. Further, there existed many rumours of peace between Poland and Russia. It was essential, therefore, that Poland should be placed in the best possible position to treat with Russia.

(It was agreed to adjourn the question in order that it could be dealt with in connection with Russian policy.)

(*The meeting then adjourned at 1.30 p.m. until 4 p.m. this afternoon.*)

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W. 1, February 19, 1920.

## No. 17

I.C.P. 38.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Thursday, February 19, 1920, at 4 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Philip Kerr; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Major Caccia.

*France*: M. Cambon, M. Berthelot.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. SIGNOR NITTI said that in regard to the question of Russia he found himself fundamentally opposed to the views which had been expressed by the French representatives that morning. There were two questions. There was the question of principle, and there was the economic question. What did the Allies propose to do? It was an unfortunate thing that, so far, they had developed no united and consistent policy. They had not made war, and they had not made peace. To continue in this way offered no solution at all. In Russia to-day there were some 120 million inhabitants, most of whom were in a state of revolution. On the borders of Russia there were various States with populations numbering many millions, who used to exchange commerce with the Western nations, who are all affected by the situation in Russia, and, equally with Europe, were menaced by the developments in that country. The United States of America still upheld the Monroe doctrine, but the Washington

*Allied Policy in  
regard to Russia*

Government also persisted in interfering in European affairs. This did not make the solution of the question any easier. Further, on the economic side, the exchange to-day was adverse to all European countries; it operated particularly against Italy, which was a deplorable fact in view of the great efforts that his country had made and the heavy taxes that her Government had imposed. How could the Allies improve the situation? It would be a very slow and difficult process. At present, raw materials were only obtainable from the United States; consequently we were dependent upon America unless and until we could once more reopen commercial relations with Russia. The resources at present available to us in respect of raw materials and food supplies were not sufficient to satisfy our needs. Unless, therefore, we could extend our markets in the near future we should be in an almost desperate situation. Then as to the political situation, which was no less grave. No doubt Bolshevism as a creed was mere folly and violence. On the other hand, while we admitted this, we had never waged war against the Soviet armies. Were we prepared to go to war against the Bolsheviks? He understood that neither Great Britain nor France, and certainly not his own country, was in a position to conduct such a war. The Allies had sent arms, ammunition and money to the loyal elements in Russia, and also to some of the neighbouring States, but the result had been extremely poor. Poland certainly showed signs of offering resistance to the inroads of Bolshevism, but her attitude exposed her to the gravest risks. The situation in Roumania, again, was very far from satisfactory. He thought the council would agree that to ask Roumania to resist Bolshevism, and yet to afford her no support, was not fair. To stop the infiltration of Bolshevism outside the Russian borders, it would be necessary for us to give our assistance to the outlying States, and this we were not prepared to do. What was the cause of Bolshevism? He opined that it was a form of that revolutionary force which was an inevitable development in nations after great wars. Its expansion and success were also partly due, he thought, to the fact that the Western nations had bestowed upon it a certain mystical prestige. Although pro-Bolshevik elements in the various countries in Central Europe formed only a limited portion of the populations of those countries, yet it could not be denied that a certain amount of sympathy was being exhibited with Bolshevism. At present we had no relations at all with the Soviet Republic, which extended already from north to south of Russia proper and was spreading more and more to the east. It was possible that the recent successes which had attended Bolshevik arms might induce a greater moderation on the part of the Soviets, and consequently make their influence more powerful. He himself was a Conservative, and, consequently, opposed to Bolshevism, and it was possible that his attitude would be condemned in his own country by the Radical elements, who would say that he was opposed to Bolshevism because he was a Conservative. He desired to assure his colleagues that the difficulties confronting him were very great. Only recently he had refused a request of the Italian Parliament to despatch a commission to Russia to investigate the situation there on the spot, as he said he could not countenance this without

the consent of the Allies. At the same time, he was in sympathy with this request, as he felt that it was essential that we should know more about the internal situation in Russia. Italy was especially interested in the economic side of the question. Before the war, Italy used to receive coal from Great Britain at the prices obtaining in the latter country; now she had to pay enormously enhanced prices. Before the war, again, an English collier would go from Great Britain to Italy with coal, would take on Italian produce from Italy to the Black Sea, would bring back Russian produce to Italy, would then take Italian produce to Spain, and would finally take a cargo of ore from Spain to Great Britain. To-day, a collier, after depositing its cargo in Italy, would, as often as not, return with an empty hull. If the Allies did not shortly resume relations with Russia, they could not get sufficient food supplies or adequate raw materials. Unless we resumed commercial relations with Russia we should never solve the problem of rising prices. Unless, too, Europe could be made one huge market, our position would be desperate. His colleagues could well understand the parlous position of Italian industries when he told them that coal in Italy was now costing fifteen or twenty times the pre-war price. In Italy the Government had to sell bread below cost price, which involved a very heavy burden upon the Exchequer. M. Berthelot had expressed the view that morning that, even if we reopened commercial relations with Russia, we should really get practically nothing from that country because her transport was in such a state of disorganisation. He did not agree with this; and, further, he would point out that the longer we deferred resuming those relations the more disorganised would the transport become. He did not suggest that it was necessary to recognise the Bolshevik Government or to condone their acts of violence, but he did contend that facts must be faced; and unless we resumed our commercial relations we should, in reality, have lost the war. The resumption of those relations was indispensable. The first thing, he thought, was that something should be done to ascertain, by investigation on the spot, the actual conditions in Russia. As he had said, Italy did not wish to assume sole responsibility for this, but hoped that the Allies would decide to despatch a joint commission. He did not pretend to like Lenin or Trotsky, or their methods, but he fancied that all Russian Governments had been based on violence, and Russia, unfortunately, had never possessed a Government which had exerted any powerful moral force. Labour movements in the Allied countries were attacking their respective Governments because the latter had been supporting the reactionary elements in Russia favourable to the old régime. He strongly urged that the situation should be accepted, and that a joint commission of enquiry should be despatched to Russia. He believed, himself, that the Soviet Government would raise no objection to this proposal. Every day increased the dangers of the situation, and he had a suspicion that already there was a growing understanding between certain Bolshevik and certain reactionary elements in Russia for purposes of securing Russian unity. He did not attach too much importance to suggestions of a revolution in Western Europe. In any case, Italy was the only country where there had never been a

revolution, and he himself was not afraid of it, so long as timely measures were taken to relieve the general position. On the other hand, if, in the course of the next year, commercial relations with Russia had not been resumed, and prices did not fall, what would be our position? He did not himself presume to offer any general solution, because M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Curzon were all far better acquainted with the Russian question than himself. He did, however, suggest their adopting his proposal to send a commission. If, on the other hand, this question were left unsettled, if the mystical prestige of Bolshevism was allowed to spread, and if the Allies took no step to rehabilitate the commercial situation in Europe and in the world generally, by securing access to Russia's raw materials and foodstuffs, in his view nothing could prevent a huge universal economic catastrophe.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that his views were based principally upon the situation in Siberia. He had said that morning that any policy on the western side of Russia must have its repercussion in the east. For this reason, the Russian question must, in his opinion, be considered as a whole. From the viewpoint of distant Siberia he agreed substantially with the views of M. Berthelot, that we should keep as far aloof from the present Bolshevik Government as possible. He did not, however, wish to call in question the wisdom of reopening commercial relations with the co-operative societies. This was a different question from recognising the Soviet rule. And to take measures which would install the Bolshevik Government in a position of security, influence and authority seemed to him to be a serious step which should not be taken without the most deliberate and careful circumspection. Signor Nitti had said that Bolshevism was, after all, the concern of the Russians and that it was no business of ours to interfere in Russia's internal affairs. But would Bolshevism be content to reside within its own borders and not to spread beyond them? No. Bolshevism regarded the whole world as the field of its activities, and it intended to spread its doctrines universally. Consequently, Bolshevism was not a domestic matter which concerned only Russia, but it was one which affected us all. Supposing Bolshevism should control all Siberia, then the whole of China, with its long and unprotected frontiers, would be exposed; and Manchuria, in particular, was a fertile soil for the propagation of such a creed. The menace was great not only to China and Japan, but to the whole world. When the council had last discussed the Russian question he had had the pleasure of setting before his colleagues the views of the Japanese Government.<sup>1</sup> Briefly, the view of the then Minister for Foreign Affairs in Japan was that it was very necessary that we should not take the offensive against Bolshevism, but that we should adopt measures to stem its aggressive advance in Siberia beyond Lake Baikal. His Government had then consulted the views of the United States, but the latter had decided to withdraw entirely from Siberia.<sup>2</sup> This involved the collapse of the whole anti-Bolshevik government and movement in the Far East. The Japanese Government to-day were seriously considering whether they

<sup>1</sup> See Volume II, No. 60, minute 1.

<sup>2</sup> See Volume VI, Chap. II *passim*.

should continue single-handed the endeavour to cope with the situation, or whether they should decide to withdraw. They had in Siberia an army of 40,000 or 50,000 men, but this was quite inadequate in present circumstances to achieve anything beyond the protection of the railway and the evacuation of the Czechs.<sup>3</sup> He could not forecast what his Government would eventually decide; but if they should think it necessary to withdraw, it would not be because they were inclined to come to terms with the Bolsheviki, but because they felt that they could not undertake any further opposition to the tide of Bolshevism alone and unsupported. In the circumstances he deprecated the adoption of any policy which might encourage the present Bolshevik Government, as this would inevitably affect the situation in the Far East.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that anybody taking a superficial view of the discussions they had held that day might imagine that there was a fundamental and irreconcilable difference of opinion. This, fortunately, was not the case. The various speeches that had been made merely emphasised the various aspects of the case. M. Cambon<sup>4</sup> and M. Berthelot had stressed their horror of recognising Bolshevism. Signor Nitti had dwelt on the importance of bringing Russia back into the life of Europe. In his own opinion there was no irreconcilability of view here. Signor Nitti had never proposed that the Bolshevik Government should be recognised; nor did the council propose this. The view of His Majesty's Government was that until the Bolsheviki had demonstrated that they could conform to the habits of civilised Governments, until they ceased to perpetrate the horrors which had characterised their rule up to date, and, further, until the Bolshevik Government conformed to the practice of civilised Governments in not interfering in the internal affairs of other nations, we could not recognise the Bolsheviki or their Government. By 'interfering in the internal affairs of other nations,' he meant their endeavours to organise propaganda and disturbances, as they had sought to do in England and Switzerland, and elsewhere. There was no difference of opinion, therefore, in the council in regard to the most important question of all. There was no disposition on the part of any of its members to recognise the Bolshevik Government.

On the other hand, Signor Nitti took a more hopeful view of the possibility of resuming trading relations with Russia than either M. Berthelot or Viscount Chinda. Either view might be correct. It was possible that if we resumed those relations we might still not be able to get the flax and the hides and the other raw materials which were essential to our industries; but no objection had been raised to the resumption of those relations. Upon two principles, he thought, the council were now agreed:—

- (i) There should be no recognition of the Soviet Government until the Allies were satisfied that it conformed to the principles guiding ordinary civilised Governments.

<sup>3</sup> See Volume III, Chap. II *passim*.

<sup>4</sup> It seems possible that this name may have been a mistake for 'Viscount Chinda' (cf. the following paragraph). In the rough notes of the British Secretary for the minutes of this meeting, this name was indicated by 'C'.

- (ii) That we should prosecute our endeavours to secure raw materials essential to the rehabilitation of European trade.

He would now proceed to one or two other questions which had been raised in the House of Commons that afternoon,<sup>5</sup> and to which he thought the Council ought to address themselves. Esthonia had made peace with the Soviet Government.<sup>3</sup> Latvia, he understood, was about to make peace. There remained Lithuania, Poland and Roumania. To take Poland first: that country had received proposals of peace from the Soviet Government.<sup>3</sup> She would ask our advice as to the policy she should adopt, and we must give her a reply. He suggested that we could reply to Poland in one of the three following ways:—

- (a) It is entirely your business and your responsibility, and you must decide yourselves.
- (b) We strongly advise you not to make peace.

Now what would (b) involve? As M. Berthelot had pointed out, the Poles had invaded Russia, and the Bolsheviks were trying to free Russia of Polish troops. Were we to help the Poles, as we were bound to do if we advised them against making peace? If so, we would have to send them money, munitions, supplies and troops. We could not say to them—supposing they refused to make peace and were in serious risk of defeat by the Bolshevik armies—‘You must get out of it the best way you can.’ The Bolsheviks might well force the Poles to a very humiliating peace. No honourable man, therefore, could advise Poland not to make peace, unless he was prepared to help by every means in his power.

- (c) We might say: ‘If you attack whilst you are on Russian territory, or if you attack while you are refusing to make peace on what are really most favourable terms, we cannot support you. If, on the contrary, the Bolsheviks try to invade Poland, we will support you as best we can.’

In his view, the terms which the Soviet Government had offered to Poland were surprisingly liberal and favourable in every way. In these circumstances England could certainly not engage to support Poland in aggression. There was no doubt the House of Commons would not vote another penny to suppress Bolshevism. It had already voted for this purpose more than any other Power, with the possible exception of Japan.

That was one question. The other, and the last question, was that which had been put by Signor Nitti: Shall we endeavour to ascertain what are the real facts in Russia? Mr. Lloyd George said that he had most carefully read and studied documents from the British Foreign Office and the War Office, and everything that had been written in the press about Russia, and he felt that he really knew nothing of the real situation in that country. The British had maintained a mission of some thousand men with General Denikin. We had been told by our representatives on that mission that Denikin would

<sup>5</sup> See *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., *H. of C.*, vol. 125, col. 1022 et seq.

attack and would make a rapid advance, and would shortly capture Moscow; we had then been informed that this advance had been postponed for two weeks; and then for three weeks; and so on. And everybody knew what the present position of General Denikin was. Then, again, we had all heard heartrending stories about the massacres perpetrated by the Bolsheviks in various parts of Russia, and stories had also reached our ears about similar massacres by the White Guards.

In his opinion, therefore, it was of the utmost importance, indeed imperative, to know what was really happening in Russia. In the beginning the council had been told that merely a handful of Allied troops need march into Russia for the whole of the population to flock to its banner and march against the forces of Bolshevism. But, what were the facts? In the north an army consisting of 40,000 Allied troops had been operating without any results. Again, Kolchak's army of 150,000 to 200,000 men, together with a force of 60,000 Japanese in the east, and Denikin's army of 300,000 men, had so far not been able to make any headway against Bolshevism. The peasants, far from volunteering to join the Allied forces against the Bolsheviks, were perhaps to-day far more inimical to the Allies than to the Bolsheviks, and they had frequently harassed the Allied troops and cut their lines of communication. In these circumstances, was it not advisable to know what was happening in Russia? So far they had merely been able to hear one-sided views, given either by pro-Bolsheviks or by anti-Bolsheviks. But, no fair, open-minded enquiry had ever been made.

In that connection, he fully realised that objections could be raised to the Allied Powers themselves sending a mission to Russia, since the Allies had never recognised the Soviet Government. But the same objection could not possibly apply to the League of Nations. He found himself in complete agreement with Signor Nitti that the Allies should know what the facts of the case were; but at the same time he agreed that those facts should be ascertained by some one other than the Allied Governments. It would be agreed that if the League of Nations sent a commission to Russia the question of recognition would not arise. On the other hand, should the League of Nations appoint a commission, that commission would be in a position to find out really what was happening in Russia.

In the next place, he would ask: Would it be possible to trade with Russia? He must confess he had not been impressed with what M. Berthelot had said about the lack of wagons. The British Government alone could supply tomorrow some 3,000 wagons and 70 to 80 engines of the pattern required. He would wish, therefore, merely to emphasise what had been said by Signor Nitti in that respect. Western Europe could not afford, so to speak, to pull down the fire-screen and to allow the theatre of Bolshevism to burn itself out.

Signor Nitti had also referred to the rise in prices. He (Mr. Lloyd George) agreed that prices were going up everywhere, in Great Britain as much as elsewhere. And, when prices went up wages went up also, which again necessitated a further rise in prices, and so on *ad infinitum*. As a result he really did not know what was going to happen in the Western countries; and, whilst

the Allies were fighting Bolshevism in Russia, Bolshevism might well enter their own countries by the back door as a result of these high prices. He earnestly hoped, therefore, that they would do their best to find out what existed in Russia that could be brought out for the benefit of the Allied countries.

With Signor Nitti, he would ask: What were the alternatives? He listened in vain in M. Berthelot's statement for any suggestion of an alternative. All that M. Berthelot could say was that civil war was about to begin again, and that Denikin would shortly cross the Don and advance towards Moscow. But, he asked, what would be the good of that? In his opinion, the Bolsheviks and the anti-Bolsheviks in Russia between them would only destroy everything which was vital to the life of Europe. Such tactics would not destroy Bolshevism, but create militarism.

Did Japan wish to be faced by a militarist nation; by 100 million Russians, who would become militarised for the first time?

He had little hesitation in saying that the power and military knowledge displayed by Trotsky in organising the Bolshevik forces was amazing. Should a gigantic military power be created extending from Vladivostok to Poland—which way would its forces turn? Depend upon it, once Russia became a military power it would become as dangerous as France under Napoleon when the latter utilised the existing revolutionary fervour for his own purposes.

In his opinion, Lenin was no more a militarist than Robespierre; Robespierre was frightened of militarism. He knew that war meant the end of Jacob[in]ism and the beginning of militarism. Should the Allies continue their present policy of war against Russia, he felt they would there create a great military power. The Bolshevik forces had already produced the most remarkable cavalry leader since Murat; he<sup>6</sup> had defeated the cavalry forces of the Cossacks and swept into South Russia by a series of brilliant operations. The fact remained that revolution created soldiers more quickly than old organised republics or monarchies, if only for the reason that revolutionary States got rid of their bad leaders by decapitating them.

He (personally) was not afraid of Bolshevism as long as people could be given plenty of food.

He was far more afraid of a military Russia than of a military Prussia. For Russia had infinite resources and a population twice as large as that of the German Empire. Should the Allies, through detestation of Bolshevism, repeat the old blunders which Europe had committed in respect of the French Revolution? Europe had then considered Jacob[in]ism to be a horrible thing, and it had decided to fight it, with the result that Napoleon arose and destroyed Europe. Therefore, while militarism had not yet completely developed in Russia, chiefly through lack of transport, he would ask the Allies, before Russia became a forcible military country, to break militarism by trading, by getting at the Russian people with goods for exchange. M. Berthelot had said that the net result of such a policy would be to send millions of goods into Russia without getting anything in return. He thought

<sup>6</sup> i.e. General Budenny.



that that did not show much confidence in British and French traders. In reality, what would happen? The traders would send a cargo or two to Russia and bring back goods in exchange. Should they, however, get nothing in return, trading would soon come to an end. There was, therefore, no danger of millions of pounds' worth of produce being poured into Russia without getting anything in return.

To sum up, he wished to put to his colleague[s] the following questions for careful consideration and decision:—

- (1) Should the Allies encourage Poland to continue war against Russia by promising her help?
- (2) If Poland should seek the advice of the Allies, should they counsel her to accept the terms of peace offered by Russia, if favourable?
- (3) If Poland, without seeking the advice of the Allies, should reject such favourable terms of peace as may be offered to her by Russia, would the Allies be ready to support Poland in any war that might ensue?
- (4) Should the Allies be prepared to continue trading relations with the Russian people?
- (5) Should the Allies, through the agency of the League of Nations, take steps to ascertain what is really happening in Russia?

(He understood from the secretary that the League of Nations would be prepared to undertake such an enquiry should they be invited to do so.)

He had intended to put a sixth question, namely: Should the Allies recognise the Soviet Government? He would not, however, now put that question, since they were all agreed in giving a negative reply.

M. BERTHELOT said that he would have a good deal to say on each of the questions raised by the Prime Minister; but as he proposed forthwith to refer the whole of these questions to Paris, he thought it would be best to adjourn the discussion until M. Millerand's arrival in London. He understood that the same questions as had been put in the case of Poland would *mutatis mutandis* be applicable to Roumania, Lithuania, &c.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE urged M. Berthelot to impress on M. Millerand the very great importance of preventing these various questions from getting into the press until some decision had been reached.

(The discussion was then adjourned pending a reference to M. Millerand by the French representative.)

2. LORD CURZON said that the Ambassador of the United States of America had informed him that the information which had appeared in the newspapers with reference to the Adriatic question had created such a profound sensation in America that the American Government intended to publish the whole of the correspondence relating thereto, beginning with the memorandum of the 9th December, 1919.
- President  
Wilson's Adriatic  
Publication of  
certain Memo-  
randums relating  
thereto*

SIGNOR NITTI said that he saw no objection to that procedure being followed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed, provided it were clearly understood that all relevant correspondence would be published.

LORD CURZON said he would ascertain exactly what it was proposed to publish. He agreed that all relevant correspondence should be published. Furthermore, should the American Government decide to publish the papers in question, the Allies would arrange to do the same simultaneously.

SIGNOR NITTI said that if his recollection served him right, he thought the American Ambassador, when handing in the memorandum of the 9th December, 1919, had made a statement to the effect that the memorandum in question should not be taken as the last word of the United States of America on the subject. He would look through his papers and communicate with Lord Curzon on that point.

LORD CURZON said he would, on receipt of Signor Nitti's note, invite the American Ambassador's attention to that point also.

It was agreed—

That Lord Curzon should see the Ambassador of the United States of America in order to ascertain exactly what it was proposed to publish and ensure that the whole of the relevant papers should be published simultaneously in the United States of America and in the Allied countries.

(*The meeting then adjourned.*)

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 19, 1920.

## No. 18

I.C.P. 39.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference, held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Friday, February 20, 1920, at 11.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Forbes Adam, Mr. Philip Kerr; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Major Caccia.

*France*: M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti, Signor Galli, Colonel Castoldi; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. The council had before them the following draft article, prepared by the Italian Prime Minister as a basis of discussion, for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey:—

*Treaty of Peace  
with Turkey*

'In conformity with the request already formulated by the Turkish Government, England, France and Italy agree to furnish all the necessary means for the reorganisation of justice, the finances, the gendarmerie and the police and any other assistance for economic development.'

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Signor Nitti had offered to develop his proposals in regard to Asia Minor, and he would invite him to place them in possession of his views.

SIGNOR NITTI said that, as regards the question of Asia Minor, a solution must be found that was in conformity with the terms of the covenant, and would yet enable the Powers to take whatever action might be necessary in the interests of the populations in that part of the world. The council were in agreement as to what should be done in the case of Armenia. As regards Smyrna, they had not exactly defined the future administration, but they had agreed that it should be predominantly Greek. But he thought that it was desirable, in the interests of the Greeks themselves, that the borders of that administration should not be extended too widely, or the burden of occupation would be very severe. The question of Cilicia was bound up with that of Anatolia. The Council were in accord in respect of the following principles:—

- (a) That the Powers must establish friendly relations with the Turkish populations.
- (b) That there should be no partitioning of Turkey proper, but that it was the duty of the Powers, both in their own interests and in the interests of the Turks themselves, to take such measures as might be necessary to establish internal security, by setting up an adequate judicial and police system. In regard to this, they could be guided by the precedents in the past.

The hope had been expressed at one of their meetings that Turkey herself should seek the assistance of the Western Powers. As a matter of fact, she had already declared her readiness to accept such assistance from one Power, on condition that her independence and the national *amour-propre* were respected. If she was prepared to accept such assistance from one Power, [in] his opinion she would certainly be willing to accept it when it was given by three Powers jointly.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was inclined to doubt this.

LORD CURZON said that he agreed with Mr. Lloyd George, and asked permission to read the following extract from a note addressed by the Porte to the three Allied and American High Commissioners at Constantinople on the 6th January last, with a request that the conditions in it should be submitted to the attention of the Peace Conference (Lord Derby's telegram No. 1571<sup>1</sup> to the Foreign Office, covering telegram No. 22<sup>2</sup> of the 9th [8th] January, 1920, from the British High Commissioner in Constantinople):—

'Failure of reforms which Turkey has attempted to introduce on previous occasions was due to unfortunate circumstances. Porte is now sincerely

<sup>1</sup> The attribution of this telegram to H.M. Ambassador at Paris was incorrect. Constantinople telegram No. 22 to the Foreign Office (see note 2 below) had been repeated by the Foreign Office as telegram No. 1571 to the British Peace Delegation in Paris.

<sup>2</sup> See Volume IV, No. 653.

anxious to adopt our organisations [new organization] on the basis of judicial, financial and police reform and guaranteeing rights of minorities. Porte is ready to accept assistance of one of the Great Powers in this task in such a manner as neither to encroach on Turkish independence nor offend national pride.'

This, Lord Curzon said, clearly showed that Turkey had in mind the assistance of a single Power only.

SIGNOR NITTI, continuing, said that what Lord Curzon had pointed out was true, that in the document forwarded by the High Commissioners, Turkey had asked for the assistance of a single Power only; but he thought that the Allies, in their reply, could inform Turkey that they did not desire to delegate the said assistance to any one Power, and that they would prefer that the Allied Powers should all be associated in this work. From the point of view of treaty-drafting, it might be borne in mind that Turkey was asking for assistance to carry out reforms, and that the Allied Powers had a perfect right to say that such assistance would be given by the three Powers acting together in the general interest.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he did not think that the council should commit themselves at this stage to accept the draft of Signor Nitti, which he himself, had only just seen, nor would it be possible to examine it closely that morning. It was desirable that their respective experts should have an opportunity of studying it before the council came to any decision. At first sight, however, he was inclined to think that Signor Nitti's suggestion offered more chance of success than the proposal to impose various financial, economic and other commissions upon Turkey, which would have the effect of depriving her of her independence. Turkey had invoked the assistance of one Power, but he agreed with Signor Nitti that there was nothing to show that two or three Powers in combination might not be substituted. And to make a suggestion of this character was quite different from inserting a clause in the treaty that Turkey must be guided by foreigners. As a matter of general principle, he thought that Signor Nitti should go somewhat further than merely taking note of the request of Turkey and our readiness to comply. This would not bind Turkey in any way if, in the future, she appealed for assistance to another Western Power—Germany, for instance. In Mr. Lloyd George's view, it was necessary to say specifically that Turkey must not appeal for such assistance to any but an Allied or Associated Power without the consent of those Powers. That should be very clearly stated. We had, of course, no intention of excluding the United States of America in this connection, as we had always contemplated the Americans taking a prominent part in the future of Turkey. We must, for the present, confine ourselves to ensuring that Turkey should not be in a position to appeal to any but an Allied or Associated Power. Mr. Lloyd George enquired whether the French delegates had any remarks to make at this stage upon Signor Nitti's draft.

M. BERTHELOT said that he would like to reserve his observations until he had had time to assimilate Signor Nitti's contribution. There was one point,

however, which he desired to make at once. He strongly doubted the wisdom of using the word 'means' in the fourth line,<sup>3</sup> as this would involve an obligation which would be practically unlimited in character. He suggested, therefore, that another word should be substituted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the word 'assistance' might be inserted in the draft in the place of the word 'means.'

M. BERTHELOT said that he would like to study the draft at his leisure, after which he would perhaps suggest an alternative formula. He was entirely in favour of establishing equality of interest of the Powers in the future. But we could not wipe out the past, and Turkey had infinitely greater obligations to France than to any other Power. Taking the question of finance, France had interests in the Ottoman Public Debt to the amount of 75 per cent, whereas the interest of Great Britain was not more than 8 per cent, and Italy's share was almost negligible. The respective interests of these countries in regard to the railways was [*sic*] more or less in like proportion. There was, as he had said, no reason why Italy's facilities and opportunities should be curtailed *in the future*, but he submitted that their respective obligations and interests in the past must be very precisely defined. Further, they must take into consideration the liquidation of German interests. He did not suggest that their past interests should be worked out in the strictest arithmetical proportion, but the comparative magnitude of those interests could not, he thought, be ignored, and for the future they must have in view the establishment of the principle of equality. With this preliminary observation, he thought that Signor Nitti's formula could serve as a useful basis of discussion.

SIGNOR NITTI thought that the council were now agreed generally as to the question of principle. He accepted Mr. Lloyd George's amendment of his draft, and he adhered generally to the observations made by Mr. Lloyd George and M. Berthelot. It was only natural that the French, with their great interests, should desire to take the past into account. The question of the debt, he thought, would be easily solved when it was divided among the different parts of Turkey. There was another point that he wished to make. There were other than the purely financial interests of the various countries in Turkey to be considered. There was the question of personnel and the number of Western nationals who had gone to that country. At Constantinople alone there was an infinitely greater number of Italians than there were men of any other country; they amounted, in fact, to 30,000. Italy asked, therefore, that the council should take into their careful consideration the large amount of Italian labour—skilled and otherwise—which was proceeding to the areas of Turkey which were to be reconstituted, and he asked that this should be taken into account when a formula was drawn up. The situation in Italy was comparable with that of Japan. Both countries were comparatively small, they had an abounding population, and they desired to find outlets for their excess population. Japan had discovered such an outlet.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that complete equality would eventually be established among the Powers in regard to the functions that they were to

<sup>3</sup> The third line in the text of the draft article printed above.

undertake in Turkey. M. Berthelot had pointed out that France's share of the Turkish Public Debt was 75 per cent; he thought this figure was rather exaggerated, as his information was to the effect that it was not more than 60 per cent. Signor Nitti had pointed out that Italy had very considerable numbers of workmen employed in Turkey, and had asked that this fact might be considered. He himself, on behalf of Great Britain, might draw attention to the fact that our British trade before the war had been twice as great as that of any other country. As regards the debt, this had been £144,000,000, and France's share was £85,000,000. He would point out to the council that the British Empire had spent £750,000,000 on the war with Turkey, but they did not claim any special privileges on that account. They were prepared to work on a basis of complete equality, and he sincerely hoped that this principle would be firmly established and that the representative of no country sitting on the Joint Board at Constantinople should have any predominating influence on account of the alleged greater interests or sacrifices of that country, as this would only lead to dissension and intrigue. He earnestly hoped that Signor Nitti's appeal for equality would be accepted by the French, especially as Great Britain, as he had said, with her preponderating trade had no intention of pressing for any exceptional advantages.

M. BERTHELOT thought that substantially the members of the council were in agreement. He did wish to say, however, that the French representatives on the council felt that they had no right to neglect the very definite and special interests of French nationals in respect of Turkey. The fact that Great Britain had spent £750,000,000, and claimed nothing in consequence, was only in conformity with the general principle that had been accepted both here, in regard to Turkey, and also in Paris when drawing up the Treaty of Peace with Germany. The French agreed that there must be absolute equality in the future; but, as regards the past, this could not be wiped out. For instance, if certain shares belonged to either British or to French shareholders, they ought not to be allowed to go entirely by the board. As regards the point raised by Signor Nitti, he agreed that there was something to be said for the part played by Labour, but he would prefer to defer his observations on this question for the present.

The Council agreed—

That the further discussion of Signor Nitti's draft should be postponed until the draft had been carefully studied, when they would ask Signor Nitti further to develop his views.

2. SIGNOR NITTI said that he had received a telegram from the Italian representative in Constantinople to the effect that the Judicial Commission in Constantinople had presented to the High Commissioners a draft scheme relating to the constitution of provisional mixed tribunals to deal with foreign subjects. The scheme contained a proposal to the effect that the judgments of the mixed tribunal should be promulgated

in the name of the Sultan, should the Sublime Porte be a party to the same. The High Commissioners had accordingly requested the views of the council on that question.

M. CAMBON said that he had been under the impression that the question raised by Signor Nitti was receiving attention. He, personally, would be unable to discuss the same without making enquiries from the French High Commissioner in Constantinople.

LORD CURZON said that he had received no information with regard to the proposal mentioned by Signor Nitti.

M. CAMBON said that in that connection he would wish to invite the attention of the council to the memorandum which he had submitted with regard to the appointment of a Judicial Commission.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the view that M. Cambon's draft proposals would have to be considered by the council before they would [*could*] be referred to a commission. An alternative proposal had been put forward to the effect that the question should be examined on the spot after the treaty with Turkey had been completed. The suggested enquiry would probably take about a year. M. Cambon's proposals were now being examined by the British Foreign Office experts, and, if desired, the memorandum could be discussed at the beginning of next week.

M. CAMBON agreed. He wished, however, to place on record the fact that his memorandum constituted merely a provisional draft, which could be modified, specially in the light of the recommendations received from the commissioners in Constantinople.

M. BERTHELOT said that he had telegraphed to M. Millerand the proposal made by [*Mr.*] Lloyd George that the enquiry concerning the Capitulations should take place in Constantinople. M. Millerand had replied that he could, under no circumstances, accept the proposal. In his opinion the enquiry must be held either in Paris or in London. Furthermore, the enquiry could not be postponed until after the Treaty of Peace with Turkey had been drafted. In his opinion, the question relating to the Capitulations and the procedure that could replace it would have to be settled by the conference.

(It was agreed to adjourn the question until next week.)

3. MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked M. Berthelot to indicate the amendments which he proposed to suggest in the draft synopsis of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey (A.J. 21).<sup>4</sup>

*Synopsis of  
Treaty of Peace  
with Turkey*

M. BERTHELOT said that he had been unable, through pressure of other duties, to prepare a revised draft synopsis. He would, however, briefly point out the few amendments which he had to suggest.

In the first place, he proposed that part 2, paragraph (1), should read as follows:—

‘(1) In Europe the limits of Turkish territory shall be either—

<sup>4</sup> See appendix 2 to No. 14.

‘(a) The Chatalja line, in accordance with the provisional decision taken by the Supreme Council on the 18th February, 1920;<sup>5</sup> or

‘(b) The Enos-Midia Line.’

(This was agreed to.)

He would suggest that paragraphs (2), (3), (4), and (5) be renumbered as follows, namely:—

‘(2) In Asia . . . .<sup>6</sup>

‘(a) On the north . . . .<sup>6</sup>

‘(b) On the east . . . .<sup>6</sup>

‘(c) On the south . . . .<sup>6</sup>

‘(d) On the west . . . .<sup>6</sup>

(This was agreed to.)

He proposed that paragraph (2) (a) should be amended to read:—

‘On the north the Turkish State shall be bounded, except in so far as measures of neutralisation or otherwise may be required for the defence of the Straits, by the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora, Bosphorus and Black Sea, as far as the boundaries of Armenia and (possibly) Georgia.’

In regard to the statement contained at the end of paragraph (2) (b) to the effect that ‘the future of Kurdistan remains to be discussed,’ he was under the impression that the council had provisionally decided to place Kurdistan under Turkish sovereignty. He understood those to be the views of the British Government.

LORD CURZON explained that M. Berthelot had originally unofficially proposed to the British Government that a Franco-British protectorate should be declared over Kurdistan.<sup>7</sup> That proposal did not meet with the approval of the British Government, since Great Britain had no desire to interfere in the affairs of Kurdistan. Eventually, therefore, France and Great Britain agreed that Kurdistan should be independent, either as a single State or as a federation of autonomous States. The Government of India were greatly interested in the future settlement of Kurdistan, since Indian troops were at present employed for the maintenance of order in that territory. He (Lord Curzon), therefore, would wish, after consulting the India Office, to be permitted to place definite proposals before the conference. He could not at the present moment accept even a provisional statement to the effect that Kurdistan should remain under the sovereignty of Turkey. He thought such [a] statement would be very unwise.

M. BERTHELOT agreed to Lord Curzon’s proposal, provided it were clearly understood that the settlement of Kurdistan would form an integral part of the settlement of Turkey as a whole.

It was decided—

That Lord Curzon should submit to the conference a scheme relating to Kurdistan, which would be considered in conjunction with the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 14, minute 2.    <sup>6</sup> Punctuation as in filed copy.    <sup>7</sup> See Volume IV, Nos. 633–4.



M. BERTHELOT next proposed that paragraph (2) (c) should be amended to read as follows:—

‘(c) On the south of [*sic*]<sup>4</sup> the boundary will be the northern frontier of Syria, which the French delegation proposes should be fixed on the northern side of the railway line (see map),<sup>8</sup> and the shores of the Mediterranean, westward from the Gulf of Alexandretta.’

The ethnographical map of Asia Minor showed that the Arabs spread some 20 to 50 kilom. north of the railway line in question. The French Government did not claim the ethnographical line as the boundary; but merely a strip to the north of the railway line, of an average width of 25 kilom., including the towns of Mardin and Birijik. The boundary would not extend to Marash.

It was agreed to amend paragraph (c) as proposed by M. Berthelot.

M. BERTHELOT next enquired whether paragraph (2) (d) should not contain some reference to the islands, including the Dodecanese.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that since the islands were theoretically under Turkish sovereignty, Turkey would have to recognise all rights thereto.

SIGNOR NITTI said he wished to make a few general observations explaining the very delicate position in which he found himself placed in connection with the question of the islands. Article 8 of the Treaty of London clearly laid down that Italy would receive sovereignty over the Dodecanese. Furthermore, article 9 of the treaty recognised that Italy must receive equitable treatment in any settlement relating to Asia Minor, and more particularly with regard to her rights in Adalia.

As matters now stood Italy was expected to renounce her rights over the islands of the Dodecanese; moreover, she found herself in the innermost difficult [*sic*] position in regard to the Adriatic question. In a word, the League of Nations was invoked to prevent Italy from obtaining any recognition of her just rights. On the other hand the League of Nations did not prevent France from occupying Syria, Great Britain from obtaining Palestine and Mesopotamia, and, though the Treaty of London clearly laid down that Italy should receive equitable treatment, he was now asked to tell the Italian Parliament that circumstances had made it necessary for Italy to relinquish all her claims.

He personally did not wish to press the question of Italian sovereignty in the Dodecanese, and at the present moment he was carrying out certain negotiations with Greece on this question. The council would realise that his people possessed feelings of national pride, whilst he himself felt bound to recognise his own responsibilities, both from a political and from a moral point of view. Under these circumstances he would ask the council to say what it was prepared to do to improve the situation. It would be impossible for him to say that the Treaty of London existed, and yet that it meant nothing. Neither could he say that he agreed to renounce everything. He feared he might be placed in such a position as to make it impossible for him to sign the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

<sup>8</sup> Not appended to filed copy.

M. BERTHELOT agreed that the question of the application of article 8 of the Treaty of London with regard to the Dodecanese was a very difficult one, and that Signor Nitti was taking great responsibilities on his shoulders in his endeavour to arrive at a decision. He fully agreed that under Article 8 of the Treaty of London the Dodecanese were to remain under Italian sovereignty, but he had been under the impression that a definite agreement had been reached between Italy and Greece on this question. On the other hand, since the Dodecanese Islands were still nominally under Turkish sovereignty, the council could not escape mentioning the question in the Treaty of [?with] Turkey. He appealed, therefore, to Signor Nitti to communicate to the council any agreement that might be reached between Italy and Greece on the subject.

In regard to article 9 of the Treaty of London, the word 'equitable' had undoubtedly been used. He would point out, however, that the word 'equitable' did not necessarily imply 'equality', and the word 'territorial' had never been used. He had no wish in the least to minimise Italy's claims, but merely intended to show the spirit in which the agreement had been entered into by the Allies.

SIGNOR NITTI felt that he had no doubt in his mind that he was about to be buried with full honours. Before this happened, however, he could not help saying that he occupied a ridiculous position. Every day he was being made to give up something, and thereby his position in Italy daily became more difficult. Each of the Allied countries<sup>9</sup> had obtained something from the war. Italy had merely obtained a few barren, unproductive hills from Austria which only represented a dead loss. The value of Trieste would soon disappear because Austria had died. The council knew how matters stood with regard to the Adriatic question. As to colonies, Italy, which possessed the largest number of emigrants and the smallest area of colonies, found her situation at the end of the war in no way improved. Finally, in Asia Minor, Italy had been guaranteed equitable treatment under the Treaty of London; but the net result would appear to be that she would receive nothing. Under these circumstances the question arose in his mind whether it would not be better to refuse to sign the treaty, and whether it would not be better to enter into direct relations with Turkey.

Would it be possible for him to say to the Italian Parliament that article 8 of the Treaty of London did not exist and that article 9 meant nothing? And though Turkey in Asia had been partitioned, though Greece would, as a result, double its territory, Italy would get nothing. Would it be possible under these circumstances for him to defend himself, either from a national, economic or moral point of view? He had no definite proposals to make. He merely asked that the whole question should be reconsidered from a wide point of view.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he could not help thinking that Signor Nitti took

<sup>9</sup> The remainder of Signor Nitti's statement and Mr. Lloyd George's ensuing statement (as far as the words '... had never been mentioned in Italy') are printed with some variation and omission by D. Lloyd George, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 1283-4.

an unduly dismal view of the statement which he would have to make to the Italian Chamber. He thought Signor Nitti would have no difficulty in explaining to the Italian people a view of the things which Italy would obtain as a result of her entry in the war.

In the first place Italy would obtain a fine natural frontier, a great mountain rampart, instead of being absolutely at the mercy of her greatest foe. The whole of her Irredentist population were now reunited in the Kingdom of Italy, and her greatest foe had been absolutely destroyed. Further, Italy, had obtained a great sphere of economic development in Southern Anatolia, one of the greatest granaries of the world, which would help in feeding Italy with corn, a benefit which she obtained without assuming any great responsibilities. In Mesopotamia, in Palestine, Great Britain had obtained territories which would demand the expenditure of vast sums of money and the employment of considerable garrisons, whilst Italy in Anatolia obtained great economic advantages with no responsibility and no garrisons to maintain.

It seemed to him that the Allies were now holding fast the head of Turkey (Constantinople) in a vice, whilst Italy took all the Adalian dates and France all the Cilician copper out of his pockets. He would remind Signor Nitti that Italy had been offered the mandate of the Caucasus with its enormous riches, but Italy had felt unable to accept that mandate.<sup>10</sup>

Furthermore, Jubaland with its thousands of square miles of the best cotton-growing land in Africa had been offered to Italy.<sup>11</sup> In that connection he could not help saying that he had been struck by the fact that the value of this concession had never been mentioned in Italy. Lastly, France, in pursuance of her treaty obligations, was prepared to hand over tracts of Sahara Desert to Italy.<sup>11</sup> All these things which he had mentioned he thought Signor Nitti could place before the Chamber in a most attractive way. Not only this, but in his opinion the barren Greek islands of the Ægean, which were inhabited wholly by Greeks, who insist on self-determination, would have been found to be very costly to administer, and Italy should have been only too glad to hand them over to the custody of the Greek Government in exchange for the lands of Jubaland, the dates of Adalia and the deserts of the Sahara.

4. MR. LLOYD GEORGE invited attention to the following letter—International Labour Office, League of Nations—which he had just received from Mr. Albert Thomas<sup>12</sup>:—

*Russia*

‘Dear Mr. Lloyd George,

‘I came back to London yesterday morning, and I read in the “Times” to-day that the Supreme Council has taken up the Russian problem yesterday.

‘Excuse my liberty in writing you, but I feel I must take this opportunity to remind you that the governing body of the International Labour Office,

<sup>10</sup> See Volume IV, No. 4.

<sup>11</sup> See Volume IV, No. 17, note 7.

<sup>12</sup> Director of the International Labour Office.

at its meeting of the 28th January, in Paris, has considered the scheme of an investigation into the conditions of labour in Russia and the economic situation there.

'The interest of such a scheme is that the representation in our organisation of employers and workers, as well as Governments, offers to Bolshevism and the public opinion in the West guarantees of impartiality. It is interesting also because the International Labour Office can assume such an enterprise without involving the responsibilities that the League of Nations would in such a case.

'The governing body will meet again on the 22nd March, but we are now at the disposal of the Allied Governments should they require our assistance.

'Yours very sincerely,  
'Albert Thomas.'

'P.S.—I saw M. Millerand before leaving Paris. I did not know then that the Supreme Council would take up the Russian problem now, but of my own accord I reminded him of the scheme of the office. He made a few reservations at first, but he seemed to realise the interest that such an enterprise could present.

'Should you wish to see me, my address is: 7, Seamore Place, W. 1, and telephone number: Mayfair 5840.'

SIGNOR NITTI said that the question dealt with in Mr. Albert Thomas's letter would be considered when Russian policy again came under discussion.

(This was agreed to.)

(*The meeting then adjourned until 11 a.m. on the following day.*)

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 20, 1920.

## No. 19

I.C.P. 39A.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conversation held at 10, Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Friday, February 20, 1920, at 4 p.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Forbes Adam, Mr. Philip Kerr;

**SECRETARIES,** Sir M. Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Major Caccia.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Berthelot.

*Italy:* Signor Nitti, Signor Galli, Colonel Castoldi; **SECRETARY,** Signor Trombetti.

**INTERPRETER:** Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. SIGNOR NITTI announced that he had been informed by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs that a communication had been received from the Italian representative at Warsaw that the Poles declared that the circumstances were such that they must make peace at once.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the British Government had received no information to this effect, so far.

M. BERTHELOT said that all the French had heard was that the Bolshevik terms were so favourable that the Poles thought they must accept them.

SIGNOR TROMBETTI then read out the text of the telegram referred to by Signor Nitti, which was to the effect that the Polish Government would submit, during the course of the week, the basis of a peace with the Bolsheviks, and the terms would be communicated in due course. The Polish Government did not think that the situation permitted of their avoiding peace with the Soviet.

2. The council had under consideration a draft of [a] tripartite agreement as between England and France and Italy on the one part, and the Turkish Government on the other part, which had just been circulated to members. (Appendix.)<sup>1</sup>

*Treaty of Peace  
with Turkey*

M. BERTHELOT said that he understood that this was only a rough draft, and was not necessarily intended to be accepted as a final formula. He had been through the draft, and he thought that Lord Curzon's suggestions had been given due consideration in the framing of it.

SIGNOR NITTI said that it was only a rough draft, and he naturally did not expect it to be treated as a final formula.

M. BERTHELOT said that, if the council allowed it, he would now read out, clause by clause, the draft agreement prepared by Signor Nitti, and he would venture to offer one or two observations thereon.

- (a) The three contracting Powers will enjoy a position of perfect equality in the formation of all international commissions sitting at Constantinople, whether existing or to be established, charged with the duty of reorganising and supervising the different Turkish public services (judicial and financial administrations, gendarmerie and police).

He thought that it would not be necessary to introduce any definite formulæ in order to give Great Britain and France the greater financial consideration to which they were entitled. This was a matter of mutual arrangement.

- (b) A<sup>2</sup> similar equality will be observed in the different services depending on the above and to be established in the Turkish provinces, with the exception of the French and Italian economic zones, where the officials and officers will be respectively French and Italian.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. The document in this appendix was headed '(Very Secret.) Translation from a Memorandum in French, handed privately to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by the Italian Prime Minister.—(February 20, 1920).' This document comprised two parts. The first part, headed 'Draft Article for Insertion in the Treaty', was identical with the draft article cited in sub-paragraph (i) cf. Mr. Lloyd George's statement below. The second part, headed 'Draft of a Tripartite Agreement', comprised twelve clauses which were the same as those printed below, as read by M. Berthelot, except that the clauses in the appendix: (1) bore the notation 1-12 instead of (a)-(l), and (2) in four passages displayed verbal variation as indicated in footnotes below.

<sup>2</sup> This word was not present in the text in the appendix.

He thought that the use of the term 'economic zones' was somewhat too explicit, and might with advantage be varied. The council had agreed that they must be most careful to avoid anything which would suggest the idea of partition.

- (c) Each of the three contracting Powers binds herself respectively towards the two other Allied Powers not to demand or<sup>3</sup> to support any economic priority ('initiative') or any bid for the construction of works of public interest (ports, railways, &c.) or mining or forest concessions in the zones reserved for the interests of the two other contracting parties in the former Ottoman Empire.

He had no observations to make upon this clause.

- (d) Exception is made for specific rights of priority ('initiative') of which the interested State may declare her renunciation or which it cannot execute within a reasonable period.

This raised the very important point of a Power, which had been granted special economic rights or a degree of priority, sacrificing those rights, and particular care ought, in his opinion, to be exercised in drafting this clause. The formula, as suggested by Signor Nitti, might be improved. He did not think there would be any difficulty in finding agreement on the question.

- (e) The contracting Powers bind themselves to ensure for each other the most effective diplomatic support for the application of the above-mentioned privileges.
- (f) Each of the contracting Powers will support<sup>4</sup> the Allied interests established in its own zone. These interests must not be employed as a means of political action, but the signatory Powers will facilitate eventual negotiations which financial groups of the interested Power may desire to conclude with the financial groups of the two other Powers.
- (g) The signatory Powers will enjoy perfect equality for the exercise of commerce as regards transit and customs, &c.

He had no particular comments to make upon the foregoing three clauses. All that was necessary was that the three contracting Powers should work together harmoniously and make amicable arrangements to secure what was laid down in the said clauses.

- (h) The enemy shares in all public enterprises or mining or forest concessions existing in each zone will be reserved for the interested Power as reparation.

This, he thought, was quite satisfactory. Hitherto it had not been possible to satisfy Italian territorial aspirations, but the Allied Powers could arrange to give her full satisfaction by special financial advantages.

<sup>3</sup> The text in the appendix here read 'nor'.

<sup>4</sup> The text in the appendix here read 'respect'.

- (i) The zone reserved to Italy is . . . .<sup>5</sup> (green zone and zone 'C' annexed to the agreement of 1917).<sup>6</sup> Similar recognition is given Italy in respect of the zone of the Basin of Heraclea only so far as coal mines worked and to be worked situated in this basin, with the exception of those owned before August, 1914, by Allied and neutral subjects.

In the Heraclea Basin certain French mines existed, but French rights were covered by the 1914 stipulation in the above clause. There were also certain virgin mines which were sold to German firms, and the question of these must be carefully examined, in view of the liquidation of German property in Turkey. The quality of the coal in most cases was indifferent, but it was indispensable to Constantinople, and it would be necessary for the Powers to arrange that the Turkish capital would not be deprived of that coal and compelled to go far afield for her fuel. The full exploitation of this basin would involve considerable expense and responsibility. The port of Heraclea was small and inconvenient, and both the port and the railways would have to be improved. Experts who had knowledge of the district declared that the exploitation of the mines had, up to date, been very superficial, and they had no reason to believe that coal of a better quality did not exist a little way down below the surface. The French were delighted to have this opportunity of satisfying the aspirations of Italy not only by means of the treaty, but also by means of the agreements which would be mutually exchanged between the Allied Powers. Further, the French and Italians on the spot had already established friendly relations, and he saw no reason why French capital and Italian labour should not, in combination, be used most profitably.

- (j) It will be for the Ottoman Government to indemnify its nationals, and for Italy to furnish them with the means if this can be done.

He had no observations to offer in regard to this.

- (k) France and Italy will withdraw their troops from their respective zones in Anatolia as soon as the agreements contemplated above shall be applied.

As regards the withdrawal of the troops, he had lately seen Nubar Bogos Pasha and M. Akaronian [Aharonian],<sup>7</sup> who were evidently greatly disquieted by the present situation. They had noticed in the newspapers that France was to withdraw her troops from Cilicia, and they were fearful that this would mean further massacres of Armenians. He had told them that he was not prepared to discuss the question, but that the Supreme Council fully realised the duties and obligations of the Allies towards the Armenians. He had further informed these Armenian gentlemen that the Supreme Council had set up a small commission to devise means of protecting the Armenians. The news was, no doubt, very upsetting, and M. Berthelot felt that to guarantee the safety of the Armenians in the future was not at all an easy matter. If the massacres continued after peace was signed, our credit would suffer, and it was for us, therefore, to take measures to counteract this.

<sup>5</sup> Punctuation as in filed copy.

<sup>6</sup> See Volume IV, Chap. III, Introductory Note.

<sup>7</sup> Armenian representatives at the Peace Conference.

- (I) Turkey, having taken note of the agreements above set forth between England, France and Italy declares that she acquiesces in them and accepts them entirely.<sup>8</sup>

M. Berthelot thought that some mention should be made of the expressed desire of Turkey to be given assistance, and it should be made clear that Turkey must adhere to any engagements upon which she might enter in regard to that assistance. The terms of the draft should, he thought, be as moderate and temperate as possible, while securing the substance of what was required. He thought that Mr. Philip Kerr was well qualified to prepare the necessary formula when the members of the council had expressed their views. M. Berthelot concluded by saying that the above observations were of a superficial character only, and were based on a very hurried study of Signor Nitti's draft.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, speaking generally, there was a good deal to be said for the Powers coming to agreements among themselves by which priority of development in certain areas should be accorded to particular Powers. We could not, however, disguise the fact that this would cause trouble in the United States, and the draft, consequently, in its present form could not be accepted. He had one or two suggestions and comments, accordingly, to make, of a rather serious character. First, whatever prior rights in respect of ports, railways, irrigation, &c., might be given, no country must secure to itself preferential *trading rights*. There must be complete equality in regard to commercial intercourse. This was a matter of the first moment, and unless complete equality in regard to trade were secured he would never be able to persuade the British Parliament to accept the treaty. Moreover, as he had said, it would be impossible to secure the adherence of the United States to such an instrument. Second, as regards reparation. He did not quite understand what Signor Nitti intended. Were, for instance, German shares in a particular area to be allocated exclusively to that country which had been given priority in the said area? His own view was that any German shares which might be liquidated must be put into a general pool. It was quite true that France was owed more than any other country by Turkey, but nobody questioned her right to get more out of the pool eventually. The British Empire, however, could not agree that the country which enjoyed economic priority should secure this added satisfaction. Moreover, by the terms of our treaty with Germany it was arranged that all German shares should go into a general pool. These, however, were comparatively small points. Third, what exactly was the Italian zone? M. Berthelot had indicated what he conceived to be the French zone. He (Mr. Lloyd George) hoped that Signor Nitti would elucidate this point and define the proposed Italian zone with greater precision. Fourth, the present agreement was one between the three Allied Powers, and not between those Powers and Turkey. What, then, was the position to be in respect of Syria

<sup>8</sup> In the text in the appendix the preceding passage read '... acquiesces in them ("y accéder") and accepts them ("les agréer") entirely'.



and Mesopotamia? Were the Powers to agree that the nations granted the mandate over those countries were to have special trading rights? If that was the suggestion, he must again affirm that the British Parliament would never accept a mutual policy designed to exclude the commerce of other countries. Fifth, the agreement, as drafted, included no obligations in regard to the protection of the population of Cilicia and the Christian populations of Southern Anatolia. M. Berthelot had referred to the alarm of the Armenians at the French withdrawal from Cilicia, where they were to enjoy economic priority. He thought that the three Powers ought to arrange between themselves that where any Power enjoyed special economic rights that Power must acknowledge, in some shape, the corresponding obligation to protect the Christian populations, viz., France in Cilicia and Italy in Southern Anatolia. Sixth, he would like to see introduced in the treaty with Turkey an engagement by the Turks not to appeal for assistance to any but one of the Allied or Associated Powers, without the consent of those Powers. He would now proceed to present to the council what he considered to be a fundamental difficulty, and that was the concluding clause of the draft, which really made this document a part of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. The Powers could come to any agreement among themselves, by means of what Lord Curzon had described as 'self-denying ordinances'; but directly they inserted in the treaty a clause binding Turkey to grant economic priorities it involved an infringement of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, and it would mean that we should be at once in conflict with the United States, who, on this question, would have practically the whole world behind her. In that case, as he had said at their meeting in the morning, Turkey would become aware that the United States was not seeing eye to eye with the Allied Powers, and Turkey, of course, would back out of the treaty and defy the Powers. Germany and Russia might then be drawn in, and a new and formidable combination of Powers might be formed, nominally to combat the greed of the Allies. It was certain that we must adhere to the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, and any clauses dealing with economic priorities must be confined to agreements among the Allies. He would only include in the treaty—

- (i) Signor Nitti's draft article, which they had discussed that morning—  
'In conformity with the request already formulated by the Turkish Government, England, France and Italy agree to furnish all the necessary assistance for the reorganisation of justice, the finances, the gendarmerie and the police, and any other assistance for economic development.'
- (ii) Something which would impose upon Turkey the obligation not to seek assistance from any other Power than the Allies, without the Allies' consent.

SIGNOR NITTI said that the memorandum which he had prepared was not intended to be a final draft. He asked that the memorandum should be accepted merely as notes to form a basis for discussion. He fully realised that

the final form which the note should take still required to be discovered. All he had tried to do was to take the suggestions made by Lord Curzon, and to adapt those to the situation existing in the old Turkish Empire.

The proposals which he had submitted did not infringe the rights of Turkey in any way, because the draft memorandum merely contemplated an agreement between the Allies with the object of avoiding mutual competition. Turkey would not be obliged to grant any concessions to any of the Allies, but, should she do so, the Allies agreed not to enter into competition with each other. Further, the agreement was entered into by France, Italy and Great Britain for the reason that those were Mediterranean Powers, possessing recognised interests. For that reason the agreement would not apply either to the United States of America or to Japan. On the other hand, nothing in the agreement was intended to limit the rights belonging to others. He fully agreed that in drafting the agreement in its final form the Allies must avoid every expression which might give the idea that some preferential system was being created.

In his note he had especially referred to the sections of the railways which would pass through the zones of special interest, reserved for French and Italian enterprise. In addition, however, certain sections of the railway would remain outside those areas, and he would suggest in that connection that advantage should be taken of the fact for the purpose of granting special compensation to certain of the interested parties. The German treaty gave the Allies full power to distribute among themselves enemy property, and he had no desire to violate the terms of that treaty.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the formula 'no competition between the Allies in the zones of special influence' applied equally to Syria and Mesopotamia.

SIGNOR NITTI thought that an acceptable formula would have to be found.

The last point he wished to raise was whether Turkey should be compelled to sign the agreement, otherwise he thought Turkey, supported by the United States of America, might be induced to resist. He, personally, did not think Turkey would resist, since the agreement did not impose any obligations on her. In any case, he did not think it would be wise at present to ask Turkey to give any undertaking. He thought it would be time enough to settle that question when the treaty came to be signed, and the organisations to be created under that treaty came to be set up. His main thought at the present moment was to do everything to prevent difficulties arising.

LORD CURZON said he had a few points to make which had not been covered by the Prime Minister in his statement. He welcomed what Signor Nitti had said as to the draft memorandum having at present no final form; that it contained only a number of suggestions which would require re-drafting.

Following that train of thought he would enquire in the first place whether it would not be advisable, if the agreement were to be published, to draft a preamble explaining the conditions under which the agreement came to be entered into. The preamble should indicate that the Allied Powers had made an agreement among themselves with the sincere desire of helping Turkey,

and with the object of preventing rivalries among themselves. The Allies on that account agreed to stand aloof in order to give Turkey a better chance, and to avoid disputes arising among themselves leading to serious international incidents.

He proposed now to take the various paragraphs of Signor Nitti's memorandum seriatim. With regard to the second paragraph, M. Berthelot had taken objection to the words 'economic zones.' He agreed that those words were perhaps somewhat too precise as being open to the interpretation that a scheme of partition was intended. He thought that in redrafting the paragraph some better phrase might be discovered. The same criticism applied to the concluding sentence of paragraph 2,<sup>9</sup> wherein reference was made to the French and Italian economic zones where 'the officials and officers will be respectively French and Italian.' Those words gave the idea of a division of Turkey into various parts which would be exclusively French in one place and Italian in another. He thought the clause about the French and Italian officers could be put in a different way, and he would suggest the following text:—

'In the event of the Imperial Ottoman Government being desirous of obtaining external assistance in the local administration or police of any such area which remains under its control, the contracting Powers will not dispute the preferential claim of the Power whose special interests in such area are recognised to supply such assistance.'

Next, with regard to paragraph 3, relating to the construction of works of public interest (ports, railways, &c.) or mining or forest concessions, he did not feel certain as to what was contemplated with regard to the Bagdad Railway. He had been under the impression that the concessions relating to the Bagdad Railway would be cancelled. Could the paragraph in question, then, be interpreted to mean that the portion of the Bagdad Railway within the Italian sphere of influence would go to Italy and the portion within the French sphere of influence to France? He thought such a scheme would create difficulties with regard to the whole railway system. Furthermore, whereas the draft agreement was drawn up with the special object of dealing with the situation in Cilicia and Armenia, the last words of paragraph 3, he thought, inferentially extended it to a wider area, since the words 'former Ottoman Empire' would cover both Mesopotamia and Syria.

The first sentence of paragraph 6 read: 'Each of the contracting Powers will respect the Allied interests established in its own zone.' He felt doubtful whether the clause in its present form would not render expropriation impossible. Under certain circumstances it might become necessary, particularly in Palestine, to expropriate certain landowners, and, he thought, the agreement should not make that impossible. Further, he found some difficulty in giving a correct interpretation to the concluding words of paragraph 6. On the other hand, the point made by the Prime Minister with regard to freedom of trade would require elaboration.

<sup>9</sup> For the notation here and below cf. note 1 above.

To turn next to paragraph 8, dealing with reparations. The Prime Minister had already pointed out that article 260 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany empowered the Reparation Commission to be set up under that treaty to demand that the German Government should become possessed of any rights and interests of German nationals in any public utility undertaking or in any concession operating in Russia, China, Turkey, &c.

He thought the same procedure could be followed in the case of Turkey, a Reparation Commission being set up analogous to the German Reparation Commission. In other words, there would be a pool which would be distributed in a certain order of precedence.

Next, paragraph 11 stated that 'France and Italy will withdraw their troops from their respective zones in Anatolia as soon as the agreement contemplated above shall be applied.' He thought very great care should be taken in drafting that clause to avoid its having the appearance of a direct military menace. The clause should not be open to the interpretation that France and Italy would remain in military occupation of their respective zones until all the conditions of the treaty had been fulfilled.

Lastly, he felt bound to invite attention to a very serious omission in the draft agreement in that no reference had been made to the measures to be taken for the protection of the Armenians in Cilicia. In accordance with the terms of the agreement the French intended to evacuate Cilicia, but the Armenians would remain there; and the French were under special obligations to those Armenians. When the boundaries of Armenia came to be discussed, it had been decided that the Armenians of Cilicia should not be included in the State of Armenia. Nevertheless, the number of Armenians in Cilicia were considerable, and the Nationalist Turkish forces had already begun to massacre them, and they would, no doubt, go on killing. So far, no remedial measures had been proposed by the French. It would be impossible, hereafter, to blame the Sultan, or to expect him to protect the Armenians in Cilicia. The only other remedy would be to remove them from Cilicia. But experience had shown that the Armenians would decline to move, even if murder stared them in the face. Consequently, in his opinion, some direct guarantees must be given in the form of protection by a military force. And he felt that the Allies were being driven into the position that France, being unwilling to protect the Armenians, the Allies, as a whole, would be compelled to take the responsibility. It would be impossible to leave the Allies open to the charge that they were taking all they could out of these countries, putting money in their pockets, and leaving the Armenians to be killed.

With regard to providing spheres of economic priority for France and Italy, the question of Greece indirectly arose. It had been proposed to establish a Greek zone at Smyrna, though no decision had yet been reached as to whether Turkish suzerainty would remain, or whether the Greeks would be granted rights of possession. It appeared, further, that Asia Minor would thus be divided into a Greek zone, an Italian zone and a French zone, and in that connection he wished to enquire whether it was intended that the whole of the rest of Asia Minor should be left for a general scramble.

In the last place, in his opinion, to ask Turkey to accept the agreement and to become a party to it would be absolutely contradictory to what had been decided by the council at its previous meeting. He thought if Turkey were to be made to accept the agreement that would mean the agreement forming part of the treaty. He enquired whether it would not be sufficient to communicate the terms of the agreement to the Turkish Government under cover of a letter explaining how the agreement came to be drafted, and, at the same time, asking for the co-operation of the Turkish Government. But, in his opinion, the Allies could not compel acceptance of the agreement by the Turkish Government.

M. BERTHELOT assured Lord Curzon that the fate of the Armenians in Cilicia was a matter of deep concern to France. The difficulty lay in finding some honest, straightforward formula which could not be interpreted to mean that France intended permanently to retain Cilicia on the pretext of safeguarding the Armenians. But whatever happened, France intended to protect and safeguard the Armenians of Cilicia.

M. CAMBON pointed out that the Prime Minister had stated that the Sultan of Turkey could not be compelled to countersign the agreement under discussion. But, if the Sultan did not sign it, and proceeded to grant concessions in the reserved zones, what would be the solution of the difficulty? The Allies could without question keep engagements entered into with one another, but should the Sultan, for instance, grant concessions to a German——

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, intervening, explained that under the Treaty of Peace with Germany such a contingency would not be possible.

He (Mr. Lloyd George) thought it would be desirable definitely to state in the agreement that France in her zone of influence undertook certain obligations towards the Christian population to protect them against massacre and ill-treatment.

He wished to make a definite proposal, namely, that the British Foreign Office should draft a revised document which would conform to the comments made by Lord Curzon on Signor Nitti's paper. It would be possible then for the council to study the two documents together at the next meeting.

SIGNOR NITTI agreed. He had listened with great interest to Lord Curzon's remarks. With regard to the partition of the railways, he would invite attention to the fact that the railways in the direction of the Sea of Marmora passed entirely through Turkish territory. He thought those sections of the railway might be allotted as compensations to certain of the Allies.

With regard to the question of the Greek sphere of influence, he personally was ready to support all Greek claims. But the Turks detested the Greeks, and on that account care should be taken not to set up, as it were, a Greek lightning conductor to attract Turkish lightning. He strongly supported all that Lord Curzon had said with regard to the necessity of insisting in the preamble on the high moral principles which had guided the Allies in entering into the contemplated agreement.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether he was correct in interpreting Signor Nitti's statement with regard to the Bagdad Railway to mean that the

railway in question should be split up into a Turkish section; a Greek section; an Italian section; the property of Italy into a French section and a British section.

M. CAMBON explained that it would be possible in the case of [an] international railway to have a division of interests, combined with a single international management. That system, indeed, already existed.

It was agreed—

That the British Foreign Office should prepare a new draft agreement embodying the suggestions made by the Prime Minister and Lord Curzon; the second draft agreement<sup>10</sup> (Signor Nitti's and that of the British Foreign Office) to be considered at the next meeting of the council.

*(The meeting then adjourned at 6.15 p.m. until 11 a.m. to-morrow.)*

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 20, 1920.

<sup>10</sup> In the typescript text this phrase was amended to read '...; the two draft agreement[s]'.

## No. 20

I.C.P. 40.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Saturday, February 21, 1920, at 11 a.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Forbes Adam, Mr. Leeper.

SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Major Caccia, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr.

*France*: M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti, Signor Galli, Colonel Castoldi; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. SIGNOR NITTI asked the president of the council to permit him, before the proceedings of the morning commenced, to make a few remarks with regard to the future work of the conference. He wished to urge that every possible effort should be made in order that the work of the council might be brought to an end before his departure from London. His colleagues knew that he would be obliged to leave for Rome before the end of the following week; consequently, only three or four days remained during which many important questions would have to be settled. He thought it would be useful to define what those questions were:—

### *The Adriatic*

First and foremost came the question of the Adriatic. The council were nearing a solution when President's Wilson's note<sup>1</sup> was received, which had

<sup>1</sup> See No. 9, note 2.

considerably altered the situation. He hoped, however, that President Wilson's reply<sup>2</sup> would allow the conference to resume negotiations and so render a solution possible.

#### *Turkey. Asia Minor*

The council next would be required to arrive at a decision with regard to the Turkish Empire and Asia Minor. He thought, as a result of the conversations held during the present week, an agreement should be reached without difficulty.

#### *Russia*

Next came the question of Russia. In this connection the general principles of a common Allied policy would have to be settled.

#### *Germany*

Finally, the council would have to decide what attitude they should assume in regard to Germany. He thought, however, that the question had already been settled.

He, personally, saw no reason why agreement should not be reached on all these questions within the next few days. His colleagues would agree that, in the interests of the peace of Europe and in order that a public communication might be made, it was imperative that these questions should definitely be disposed of.

#### *Montenegro*

Before concluding his remarks, he desired to take that opportunity of raising a further question of particular interest to Italy, namely, Montenegro. So far, no decision had been reached on this subject.<sup>3</sup> But Montenegro had taken part in the war, and had proved herself a faithful ally: therefore, her position would have to be settled.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that Signor Nitti was quite right in pressing for definite decisions in so far as it might be possible to do so before his departure for Italy. He, personally, had always noticed that the moment the leaders of the conference dispersed, discussions dragged on from week to week, and no conclusions were ever come to. The reason for this was obvious. The men who remained behind, though nominally plenipotentiaries, could, in reality, only decide *ad referendum* and await instructions. As a result, questions which, among the leaders, would only take a morning to settle, dragged on indefinitely. It was, therefore, very important that a special and urgent effort should be made to come to final decisions.

In this connection he would merely urge that the French and Italian representatives should leave behind some representative who would be competent to work out the final details relating to the principles agreed upon

<sup>2</sup> To the Anglo-French memorandum of February 17, 1920, for which cf. No. 12, note 19.

<sup>3</sup> See Volume II, No. 33, minute 9, and cf. below.

in regard to Asia Minor, Syria, Mesopotamia and the Straits, and, it might be, even with regard to the Adriatic, although he agreed that that question was so controversial that Signor Nitti might prefer to deal with it himself personally.

In his opinion, the council should be able to reach decisions on each of the following points, namely:—

(i) *The judicial system and Capitulations in Turkey.*

A paper had been circulated by M. Cambon, giving the general lines of action, and, he thought, the question could be settled on M. Millerand's arrival, though the details would naturally take some considerable time to work out.

(ii) *The reparation clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.*

(iii) *The minorities clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.*

Both these latter questions required to be considered.

(iv) *The relations between the administration of the Straits and the Sultan of Turkey: the functions of the Sultan over the Straits.*

Should any of the Allied Governments be in a position to put forward some clearly defined proposals, he thought that would help the solution of the problem very considerably.

M. CAMBON remarked that a report had already been submitted on this subject by the Straits Military Commission.<sup>4</sup>

MR. LLOYD GEORGE explained that the Military Commission had merely reported on the military aspects of the case. His proposals related to the setting up of machinery to regulate the navigation of the Straits.

LORD CURZON stated that the British Foreign Office had prepared a draft scheme dealing with the subject, which they would be prepared to place before the council for discussion.

It was agreed—

That the scheme prepared by the British Foreign Office should be placed before the council.

(v) *Spheres of economic influence in Asia Minor.*

(vi) *The form of the mandates for Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia.*

(vii) *Montenegro.*

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, as Signor Nitti had implied, the question still remained to be settled whether Montenegro should be swallowed up by Serbia or should remain a sovereign, independent State. He was under the impression that an American Commission had originally been sent to Montenegro to enquire and report on the situation, but, so far, no report had been forthcoming.

LORD CURZON explained that an American Commission had certainly gone

<sup>4</sup> See appendix 1 to No. 14.



to Montenegro, but had only remained there one week, failing the receipt of definite instructions.

(viii) *Allied Policy in Russia.*

In this connection MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the council would have to decide what finally to do with Russia. He had that morning received a telegram from Warsaw to the effect that the Poles were about to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Government with the object of making peace. In addition, M. Patek<sup>5</sup> had decided to come to London, in order to obtain the advice of the Allies. Consequently, it would be necessary to decide what advice should be given, so that the Allies might be found to be in agreement on this subject.

(ix) *The Baltic Provinces.*

A report had been received by the British Government on that day, signed by the chief of the Allied Commission in the Baltic Provinces, General Gough,<sup>6</sup> and by the former British Financial Adviser at Murmansk, practically counselling the Allies to enter into relations with the Soviet Government. This document, which he would circulate to the members of the council, bore the signatures of officers who had heretofore been described as fiercely anti-Bolshevik. Mr. Lloyd George thought the above list covered all the questions which he thought should be settled before the conference dispersed. The whole could be summed up by saying that they must make peace with Turkey, and, if possible, also with the Jugoslavs, though he fully appreciated the difficulties of the latter problem.

In conclusion, he would suggest that Signor Nitti should hand in a paper relating to Montenegro, as a basis for discussion.

M. BERTHELOT said, with regard to the appeal made by Mr. Lloyd George, both M. Kammerer and he himself would remain in London as long as required, in order to work out the details of the decisions taken by the council.

With regard to the economic spheres of influence, in accordance with the decision taken on the previous day<sup>7</sup> a draft scheme was being prepared by the British Foreign Office, which would be discussed in conjunction with the scheme submitted by Signor Nitti.

With regard to the form of mandates for Syria and Palestine, he had telegraphed to Paris for a copy of Colonel House's scheme. He was also fully acquainted with the views held by the British Government as to the form of mandate for Mesopotamia. Therefore, taking as a basis the existing systems of mandates approved for other territories, the text of the covenant of the League of Nations, and the views expressed by the Governments interested, it would be possible for him to draw up a draft scheme which he would submit to the council for approval.

Finally, with regard to Montenegro, it would be agreed that the Jugoslavs were entitled to consider that question settled. The Serbians had held a sort

<sup>5</sup> Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Volume III, Chap. I *passim*.

<sup>7</sup> See No. 19, minute 2.

of plebiscite in Montenegro, and though at first sight the Serbian officials had been somewhat indiscreet in their methods in Montenegro, thus creating feelings hostile to themselves, nothing had occurred to suggest that the majority of the population did not favour incorporation with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. But apart from those considerations, should the question now be reopened, he thought that the chance of any agreement being reached between Italy and Jugoslavia on the subject of the Adriatic would become the more impossible. Furthermore, the last time the Yugoslav delegates were heard by the council in Paris,<sup>8</sup> Signor Nitti being present, no reference was made to Montenegro, and the Yugoslavs naturally were entitled to consider that the matter had been disposed of. It was true that a private American commission had been sent to Montenegro to collect information for the personal information of the President of the United States of America. The American commission in no way represented the Great Powers. The members of the commission had fully understood their position, and their report had, therefore, not been submitted to the Allied Governments. On the other hand, he understood that a report had been submitted by Count de Salis to the British Government, but he was not fully acquainted with the contents of the same, so that he could express no decided opinion thereon.<sup>9</sup> No doubt Count de Salis was an expert on that question, but experts were often apt to overlook the general aspects of the case.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the Montenegrins should not be heard on this question.

SIGNOR NITTI agreed. He had no definite proposals to make with regard to Montenegro. He merely asked that the question should not be considered settled; that it was still open to consideration.

M. BERTHELOT suggested that if the Montenegrins were to be heard, the Serbians also should be consulted.

It was agreed—

- (a) That M. Berthelot should submit a scheme dealing with the form of mandates for Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia.
- (b) That Signor Nitti should circulate a paper relating to Montenegro.

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the conference should resume the consideration of the draft synopsis of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey (A.J. 21),<sup>10</sup> Part III: Political clauses for the area of the Straits.

*Treaty of Peace  
with Turkey.  
Draft Synopsis*

M. BERTHELOT proposed that paragraph 1 should be amended to read as follows:—

<sup>8</sup> See Volume II, Nos. 66 and 67.

<sup>9</sup> Count de Salis, H.M. Minister on special mission to the Holy See, had proceeded to Montenegro in May 1919 as British commissioner on an Anglo-American commission of enquiry, from which the American commissioner had withdrawn early (cf. above): see *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., *H. of L.*, vol. xxxix, col. 445; also *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. xii, pp. 736-44.

<sup>10</sup> See appendix 2 to No. 14.

'So long as they loyally execute the terms of peace, and respect the rights of minorities (of which the guarantees will be prepared by a small commission of one representative each for the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan) within their territories, the Sultan and his Government shall be permitted to remain in Constantinople, which shall remain the capital of Turkey.'

The question of the rights of minorities had already been fully studied from every point of view by the French Government, and various draft schemes had been drawn up to meet every possible contingency. He suggested that those schemes should be submitted to a small commission as a basis of discussion.

It was agreed—

To establish a commission, composed as follows:—

Mr. Vansittart for Great Britain,  
M. Kammerer for France,  
Colonel Castoldi for Italy,  
Mr. Uchida for Japan,

to consider all questions relating to the protection of minorities arising out of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

LORD CURZON proposed that the following sentence should be placed at the end of paragraph 1:—

'In the event of the Turkish Government failing to satisfy these conditions, the Allied Powers hold themselves at liberty to reconsider their decision.'

(This was agreed to.)

M. BERTHELOT suggested that paragraph 2 (c) should form part of paragraph 2 (b).

(This was agreed to.)

M. BERTHELOT proposed that the following sentence should be added at the end of paragraph 2 (a):—

'In accordance with the recommendations of the Military Commission under Marshal Foch.'

(This was agreed to.)

M. BERTHELOT said that, with regard to paragraph 2 (c), a decision had been reached in Paris that the scheme for the creation of a free port at Dedea-gatch and the control of the railway from the Bulgarian frontier to that port should be prepared by a commission consisting of one member representing each of the Great Powers and Spain, together with a Greek and a Bulgarian member, and that the scheme so prepared should then be handed over to the League of Nations, who would guarantee its execution.<sup>11</sup> Should the

<sup>11</sup> Cf. No. 16, note 13.

council still consider that to be the best solution of the problem, he proposed that paragraph 2 (c) should be made to read:—

‘The creation of a free port at Dedeagatch and the control of the railway from the Bulgarian frontier to that port, under the supervision of the League of Nations. For this purpose a commission will be set up under the League of Nations, composed of one representative each of France, Great Britain, Italy, Greece and Bulgaria, to consider this question.’

LORD CURZON enquired whether any reference at all should be made to Dedeagatch in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. Turkey possessed no rights over Dedeagatch, and all that was required to give Bulgaria a free outlet through Dedeagatch had already been included in the Bulgarian treaty. Should anything further be required, he thought a separate instrument should be drawn up.

M. BERTHELOT agreed. He thought it would be sufficient if cognisance were taken of the fact that a separate decision had been taken with regard to Dedeagatch when the question of Thrace had been settled.

SIGNOR NITTI wished to lay stress on the importance of ensuring that Bulgaria should have outlets to the sea. In that connection he asked the council to consider the question of the River Maritza, which, in his opinion, constituted the only feasible navigable outlet for Bulgaria.

It was agreed—

- (a) To omit paragraph 2 (c), as proposed by M. Berthelot above.
- (b) That the commission to be set up under this clause should consider the question of the Maritza.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE took exception to the concluding sentence of paragraph 3, which read as follows:—

‘with such powers of administration over the waterways and European Turkey, including Constantinople, as may be laid down.’

He thought it should be clearly understood that the Allies would not administer either European Turkey or Constantinople. He proposed, therefore, that the words ‘and European Turkey, including Constantinople,’ should be omitted.

(This was agreed to.)

M. CAMBON said that, in regard to the question of the Straits, two problems called for solution, namely:—

- (i) The free passage of the Straits; this is to say, the prevention of the passage of ships carrying mines and munitions.
- (ii) The commercial navigation of the Straits, which might require certain works to be undertaken.

The first question was a military one, whereas the second necessitated the establishment of a permanent commission which would ensure the necessary works being undertaken.

M. BERTHELOT said that, in regard to the control of navigation in the Straits, the French Government would be prepared to submit a scheme. He understood that a scheme had also been prepared by the British Foreign Office, and he suggested that the French and British experts should meet together in order to discuss the two schemes and arrive at a common agreement.

It was agreed—

That M. Berthelot should meet the British Foreign Office experts at 5 p.m. that evening to draft a scheme for the navigation of the Straits, Signor Galli also attending to represent the Italian Government.

VISCOUNT CHINDA invited attention to the 'N.B.' at the end of paragraph 3, namely:—

'That the nations composing the commission and its powers have still to be determined.'

He wished to enquire what would be the constitution of these particular commissions. The Japanese Government was not interested in Turkish political affairs, but they were keenly interested in all commercial affairs. Consequently, should a commission be appointed to deal with the control of the navigation of the Straits, the Japanese Government would wish to be represented, since that constituted a purely commercial question.

It was agreed—

- (a) That, in drafting the scheme for the control of the navigation of the Straits, the request of the Japanese Government to be represented should be given effect to.
- (b) To delete the 'N.B.' at the end of paragraph 3.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed that the last sentence of paragraph 4 should be amended to read as follows:—

'as well as within the area proposed by the Military Committee to the south both of the Dardanelles and of the Sea of Marmora and on the Bosphorus.'

(This was agreed to.)

### *Part III*

Paragraph 5: 'Within the above areas only such Turkish forces shall be stationed as the Allies (? or the commission) may, from time to time, decide. No other Turkish regular troops shall be stationed at Constantinople.'

M. BERTHELOT suggested the omission of the word 'other' in the third line and that something to the following effect should be added to the word 'Constantinople'—'except the Sultan's bodyguard, the constitution of which should be determined by Marshal Foch's Council.'

It was agreed that the paragraph should read as follows:—

‘Within the above areas only such Turkish forces should be stationed as the Allies may, from time to time, decide. No Turkish regular troops shall be stationed at Constantinople, except the Sultan’s bodyguard, the numbers of which shall be determined by the Allied Military Council at Versailles.’

Sub-paragraph 6: ‘The Turkish coasts of the Sea of Marmora shall be neutralised.’

LORD CURZON enquired what exactly was meant by the term ‘neutralised.’ He suggested that for the word ‘neutralised’ should be substituted ‘shall be demilitarised.’

SIGNOR NITTI said that if the Turkish coasts of the Sea of Marmora were demilitarised something ought to be inserted in the draft which would ensure that the Greek coast should also be demilitarised. He proposed that the word ‘Turkish’ should be omitted.

M. BERTHELOT said that the Military Council at Versailles had decided upon the demilitarisation line.

It was decided that the sub-paragraph should be amended as follows:—

‘The coasts of the Sea of Marmora shall be demilitarised in conformity with the line of demilitarisation fixed by Marshal Foch’s Committee.’

#### *Part IV*

Paragraph 1: ‘Turkey shall recognise Armenia as an independent State under the League of Nations.’

LORD CURZON enquired what exactly was meant by the League of Nations. The United States, France and Great Britain had at various times been suggested as possible mandatories for Armenia, but none of these powers was able to undertake this charge. It had, however, been suggested as an alternative that the mandate should be given to some small neutral State.

M. BERTHELOT thought it was clear that the League of Nations could not control Armenia, but could only help it. He suggested that the reference to the League of Nations should be deferred until the council came to discuss details later, e.g., questions of volunteer emigration, when it might be laid down that all activities of this kind should be concentrated under the League of Nations.

It was agreed that the paragraph should be amended to read as follows:—

‘Turkey shall recognise Armenia as an independent State.’

Paragraph 2: ‘Turkey renounces in favour of the Allied Powers all her rights and titles over Kurdistan, Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, Arabia.’

It was suggested that to the above countries should be added the islands of the *Ægean*.

M. BERTHELOT proposed that the addition should take the following form:—

‘The islands now remaining under Turkish sovereignty.’

It was agreed that the first part of this paragraph should read as follows:—

‘Turkey renounces in favour of the Allied Powers all her rights and titles over Kurdistan,<sup>12</sup> Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, Arabia, the islands still remaining under Turkish sovereignty.’

Paragraph 2 (continued): MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that with regard to Syria, the eastern boundary was the difficulty, as the council had still to settle the question of Aleppo, Damascus and Homs.

M. BERTHELOT said that in a conversation he had had with Lord Curzon it had been agreed that the best way to define the eastern boundary was to take a degree of longitude to the west of the Khabur Basin, starting from the junction of the Tigris and the Euphrates. He had himself referred to the treaty of 1917<sup>13</sup> and it indicated that the boundary to the north should be near Jezireh and should then go down to the basin of the River Khabur and the 40° of latitude. As regards the northern boundary he suggested the following:

‘The frontier of Syria shall be fixed by the Gulf of Alexandretta as far as the mouth of the Djaihlul Irlak; from the course of this river up to Arabli (to the north of the Osmanie Station), from the crest dominating the railway to the north, for a distance to be fixed on the spot, which should guarantee adequate protection to the Arslan Marsh. Thence a line to the north of the railway going to the Tigris and following the line of the towns of Aintab, Biridjack, Urfa, Mardin and Jezireh-ibn-Omar, which shall remain Syrian.’

It was agreed that sub-paragraph (a) should read as follows:—

‘(a) Syria will be under French mandate (the northern boundary to be as defined above by M. Berthelot).

‘The western boundary will be the Mediterranean.

‘The southern boundary will be defined by Palestine [*sic*]<sup>10</sup> as defined below (see Palestine).

‘On the east, the boundary will be as agreed upon by Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot.

‘(b) Palestine: the boundaries to be defined in accordance with its ancient limits of Dan to Beersheba, and to be under British mandate.

‘(c) Mesopotamia, including Mosul, to be under British mandate with boundaries still to be determined.

‘(d) Kurdistan: status and boundaries still to be determined.

‘(e) In the event of disagreement in regard to the boundaries between Palestine and Syria, and between Mesopotamia and Syria, the question to be submitted to the arbitration of a referee to be appointed by the President of the United States of America.’

<sup>12</sup> *Note in original*: ‘To be provisional, pending the submission of the proposals of the British Foreign Office.’ See No. 18, minute 3.

<sup>13</sup> The Treaty of Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had arranged with M. Clemenceau that Palestine should be under a British mandate. The historical boundaries of Palestine to the north and south were limited by Dan and Beersheba, and the British had no intention of claiming any extension beyond these towns. If the populations wished to make special arrangements to secure an adequate water supply, they must make them with France as the mandatory for Syria. He felt sure that France in this matter would act in the most generous manner.

LORD CURZON pointed out that agreement to this effect had been reached at an earlier meeting of the council.<sup>14</sup> As regards Kurdistan, the British Foreign Office were drawing up certain proposals which he hoped to be in a position very shortly to submit for the consideration of the council.

M. BERTHELOT asked that the final sub-paragraph might be omitted, as he did not feel justified in discussing it in M. Millerand's absence.

M. Berthelot asked that the council might understand that his acceptance of all the paragraphs of the draft under discussion must be regarded as provisional pending M. Millerand's approval.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that before they left the question of Palestine he wished to bring to the notice of the council an important telegram from Mr. Justice Brandeis, of the Chief Court of Justice at Washington, who was a friend of President Wilson, which had been addressed to Mr. Weizmann,<sup>15</sup> who had furnished him with this copy.

M. BERTHELOT said that the French Government had received an identical copy of the telegram.

SIGNOR NITTI said that, so far as he knew, the Italian Government had not seen the telegram.

PROFESSOR MANTOUX then read out a French translation of the following telegram:—

'34. 16th February.<sup>16</sup> Please convey Prime Minister Lloyd George following message from myself and all those associated with me in the Zionist Organisation of America:—

' "My associates of the Zionist Organisation of America cable me from Paris that, in conference in [*sic*] Turkish Treaty, France now insists upon terms of Sykes-Picot Agreement. If this contention of French should prevail, it would defeat full realisation of promise of Jewish Home, for Sykes-Picot Agreement divides country in complete disregard historic boundaries, and actual necessity rational northern and eastern boundaries indispensable to self-sustaining community, and economic development of country on North Palestine must include Litany river, watersheds of Hermon on east, must include Plain of Jaulan Hauran; if Balfour Declaration,<sup>17</sup> sub-

<sup>14</sup> Cf. No. 12, minute 1 and No. 13, minute 3.

<sup>15</sup> Representative of the Executive Council of the Zionist Organization.

<sup>16</sup> The following text of this telegram (beginning '16th February') and the first part of M. Berthelot's succeeding observations (ending '... included in the Jewish State') are printed by D. Lloyd George, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 1179-80.

<sup>17</sup> See Volume IV, Chap. II, Introductory Note.



scribed to by France as well as other Allied and Associated Powers, is to be made effective, these boundaries must be conceded to Palestine. Less than this would produce mutilation promised Home. Balfour Declaration was public promise proclaimed by your Government and subscribed to by Allied Powers. I venture to suggest that in your assuring just settlement boundaries Palestine statesmen Christian nations keep this solemn promise to Israel.” ’

M. BERTHELOT, after commenting on the fact that the contents of the telegram seemed to indicate that Judge Brandeis had a much exaggerated sense of his own importance, said that he had carefully studied an authoritative work on Palestine which Mr. Lloyd George had been good enough to lend him. This work clearly showed that the historic boundaries of Palestine had never extended beyond Dan and Beersheba, and he was quite prepared to recommend to his Government that these should be recognised as the correct boundaries. Judge Brandeis's idea that the Jewish Home should include the Litany River, the watersheds of Hermon, the Plain of Jaulan and Hauran was, in his opinion, too extravagant to be considered for a single moment. What was a legitimate demand was that the Palestinians should have the use of the waters to the south of Dan. The Litany River, however, had never been included in the Jewish State. The Zionists were attempting to arrogate to themselves the position of a Great Power, and this pretension made them merely ridiculous. The Zionist movement was largely mystical in its character, and perhaps the Allies had done something to encourage this aspect of it. From the practical point of view, they had accepted it as a means of rescuing large numbers of wretched Jews in Russia and Central Europe. As a matter of fact, it was probable that the great majority of these so-called Jews had very little real Jewish blood in their veins. As regards the declaration of Mr. Balfour, to which Judge Brandeis had referred, when he said that it could not be held to amount to a formal Allied declaration and as a binding engagement on the part of the Allies, he trusted that his words would not be construed as intending any disparagement of Mr. Balfour, who was a man who was beloved by all.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said<sup>18</sup> that the book which he had asked M. Berthelot to read constituted the greatest authority in the British language on the question of Palestine. In the days of Agrippa the boundaries had stretched slightly beyond Dan and Beersheba, but these latter had always remained Palestine's historic limits. After consultation with Lord Allenby<sup>19</sup> and other authorities, the British Government had decided to accept these as the boundaries for the future, and they had further been accepted by M. Clemenceau, whose acceptance had since been loyally upheld by the present French Government. He proposed, therefore, to reply to Judge Brandeis in the sense

<sup>18</sup> The three following paragraphs (ending ‘ . . . with M. Berthelot’ and omitting the parenthesis concerning Colonel Gribbon) are printed by D. Lloyd George, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 1180-1.

<sup>19</sup> H.M. High Commissioner for Egypt.

that the judge's geography was at fault, and that it might be as well if he studied more authoritative and accurate maps than were apparently at present at his disposal.

(At this point Colonel Gribbon entered the Council Chamber.)

M. BERTHELOT asked that Mr. Lloyd George in his reply would add that, while France, too, could not for a moment admit the extravagant claims put forward by Judge Brandeis, she had no intention of adopting a hostile attitude, but was quite prepared to make liberal arrangements for the supply of water to the Zionist population.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the exact boundaries should be settled by the British Foreign Office with M. Berthelot.

M. BERTHELOT said that M. Millerand would expect on his arrival to go into the question of the arrangements that the British Government were prepared to make in regard to oil supplies. There were two alternatives: (1) that there should be elaborate arrangements between commercial companies in the two countries, or (2) that the matter should be settled by agreement between the heads of the two Governments.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that each Government had better appoint its own experts to examine the question in the first instance.

M. BERTHELOT said that he could not claim to be an expert, but he came of a family which was identified with scientific study, and he thought that he was sufficiently versed in the question to be in a position to discuss it with Sir Hamar Greenwood,<sup>20</sup> who had already had some informal talks with him on the question in Paris.

It was agreed that Sir Hamar Greenwood should be asked to discuss the question of oil supply with M. Berthelot with a view to submitting a concrete draft arrangement for the approval of their respective Governments.

It was agreed—

That sub-paragraph (*d*) should read as follows:—

‘Kurdistan: status and boundaries still to be determined; Lord Curzon to submit proposals.’

Sub-paragraph (*e*) to be omitted pending M. Millerand's return to London.

SIGNOR NITTI thought that something more ought to be said in the draft about the *Ægean Islands*.

The council agreed that they should revert to this question later.

### *Paragraph 3*

‘Turkey to recognise that the administration of Smyrna and the surrounding area shall be in the hands of a Greek administrator nominated by the Greek Government. The local population of this area shall be allowed to send Deputies to the Greek Chamber and recruits to the Greek army. The

<sup>20</sup> British Minister in charge of Petroleum Affairs.

extent and elements [*sic*]<sup>10</sup> of this area is [*sic*]<sup>10</sup> under consideration by a commission set up by the Supreme Council on the 17th February.<sup>21</sup> This commission will be guided as far as possible by numerical factors in the population.'

(*Note*.—To what extent, if at all, Turkish suzerainty shall continue to exist remains to be determined.)

SIR M. HANKEY suggested that after the word 'area' in the second line the following words should be inserted:—

'which shall remain under Turkish suzerainty.'

(This was accepted.)

LORD CURZON enquired what exactly 'suzerainty' meant.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that by it was intended that the Turks should have no power of interference at all in the Greek administration. The insertion of the clauses was designed merely to save their *amour-propre*. The utmost they would be allowed to do was to fly their flag.

It was agreed—

To omit the note at the foot of the above paragraph and to substitute 'The British Foreign Office has undertaken to furnish the precedence [? precedents] as to the meaning of the term "suzerainty."'

M. BERTHELOT remarked that M. Millerand would be accompanied, when he came to London the following day, by M. Fromageot,<sup>22</sup> with whom he (M. Berthelot) would consult in regard to the exact meaning of 'suzerainty.' He understood that there was [*sic*] so many different definitions that the term could be interpreted just as one liked. As regards Smyrna, he thought that it would be necessary that certain technical questions should be most carefully examined, e.g., the question of the future administration; the question of the customs, which was highly important; and the question of the currency. He suggested that the Smyrna Commission, which had completed its examination of the question of the frontiers of the area surrounding Smyrna to be under Greek administration, should now be instructed to examine the above question. As to whether that area should be allowed to send Deputies to the Greek Chamber, he had no objection personally to this course, but he asked that no decision should be taken until M. Millerand's arrival.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that there should be no delay in arriving at a decision, as M. Veniselos attached the greatest importance to this question.

SIGNOR NITTI said there were two questions requiring a decision. First, the Smyrna area to be under Greek administration. He thought it was not in the interest of the Greeks themselves that this area should be too extensive, as the Greeks would find great difficulty in administering a large territory. Moreover, whereas in the port itself the Greek elements predominated, this was

<sup>21</sup> See No. 11, minute 1.

<sup>22</sup> Legal Adviser to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Peace Conference.

not the case outside. Second, should Smyrna send Deputies to the Greek Chamber? This, he thought, depended on whether the *sovereignty* of Smyrna remained with the Turks or shall be transferred to the Greeks. If the Greeks were to be a mandatory Power only, it would be contrary to that form of administration for the Greek population to have representatives in Athens. He thought he was correct in saying that M. Veniselos had been elected the Cretan Deputy when Crete had been under Turkish suzerainty. M. Veniselos, therefore, would see no objection to the present proposal. A very distinguished Italian military officer had lately been elected a member of the Italian Parliament for Fiume, but he (Signor Nitti) had immediately warned him that if he attempted to take his seat he would be at once arrested by the police. Further, there was [*sic*] some 10,000,000 Italians in foreign countries, and the Italian Government had always resisted their endeavours to send representatives to Rome as they held the view that these emigrants owed their allegiance to the Governments of the countries to which they had transferred their homes. In his view, the council must either allow Smyrna to be Greek territory, or they must refuse the Greek population there the right to send Deputies to Athens, as this would be dangerous.

M. CAMBON said that when the Powers had authorised the so-called autonomy of Crete with the son of the King of Greece as head of the executive,<sup>23</sup> there was never any question of allowing the Cretans to send representatives to Athens. Later on M. Veniselos went temporarily out of political life. He was then offered a seat in the Greek Parliament, and M. Veniselos had told him personally that he was not a Cretan, and that he had been born in Greece. He could, therefore, accept a nomination to the Greek Chamber, which he had never entered as a representative of the Cretan population. So long as Crete was under Turkish sovereignty M. Veniselos was opposed to the Cretans sending Deputies to Athens.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, after remarking that he did not think that Signor Nitti's illustration of Italians abroad seeking representation at Rome was quite pertinent to the present question [*sic*]. The suzerainty of Turkey over Smyrna was to be purely nominal. For some time to come the Greeks must retain considerable forces in Smyrna and its vicinity. The maintenance of these troops would involve great expenditure, which must be borne by the Greeks. Smyrna was a very prosperous port, more prosperous probably than Athens itself. Was Greece then not to be allowed to levy any contribution from Smyrna? If they were to be allowed to do this, how could they levy it without having representatives of the big population of Smyrna in the Athens Parliament? As a democratic nation they could not administer a free population, consisting mainly of the same race as themselves, in an autocratic manner. Signor Nitti had said that representation would be inconsistent with Turkish suzerainty. If, however, the Powers decided that Smyrna was to have its representatives in Athens, who was to stop it? There were no inexorable natural laws preventing this. He agreed that, on the surface, it had the appearance of being inconsistent. But if representation were forbidden a very

<sup>23</sup> See *British and Foreign State Papers*, vols. xcii, pp. 1154 ff., and xciv, pp. 1323 ff.

strong argument might be added in support of M. Veniselos's plea against Turkish suzerainty at Smyrna. Was it desired that the council should insert a clause in the treaty that the Greeks were not to have the right of representation at Athens? He reminded the council that the Allies owed much to the democratic elements in Greece, who, when ex-King Constantine had supported the Germans, had formed two divisions to fight side by side with the Allied troops in Salonika. He did not advocate the Turkish suzerainty over Smyrna, as this would tend to create difficulties, but it had been suggested as a means of saving the Turkish *amour-propre*. If, however, it would have the effect of depriving the Greek population of Smyrna of the ordinary privileges of a democratic people, he would oppose it. In regard to the frontier of the Smyrna area, he hoped it would extend as far as the Greek population extended. This was simply granting to the Greeks the right of self-determination. We must in this matter consider the claims of the majority of the population. The Greeks could put forward a special claim in this respect, for they had a preponderant population in Smyrna. On the other hand, there was no Italian majority in Adalia; there was no French majority in Cilicia and Syria; and there was no British majority in Mesopotamia. The council, therefore, was bound to deal liberally with the Greeks in determining the size of the area.

SIGNOR NITTI said that Mr. Lloyd George's observations raised very serious questions. In his view, it was not possible to say that the suzerainty belongs to one State while the representatives go to the Parliament of another State. The council, he thought, had before them two alternatives. The first was a clear-cut solution, and that was to say that Smyrna must belong to the Greeks outright. The other was to say that as there was a Turkish suzerainty over Smyrna the people of this province were not entitled to send Deputies to the Parliament of another State. As regards what Mr. Lloyd George said about the preponderance of the Greek element, both in and outside the port, the statistics at the disposal of the Italian Government did not entirely bear this out. There were a large number of Mussulmans and Turks. Were the council to prevent the Turks and Mahometans there from sending Deputies to the Turkish capital, as they might certainly demand to be allowed to do? If so, an absurd situation must arise—one which would have far-reaching consequences, consequences which might extend to the Arab State. He was all in favour of a clear and final solution, even if it involved Turkey losing her suzerainty. He was not prepared to agree to the Greeks in Smyrna under a Turkish suzerainty sending Deputies to Athens. There were various methods of solution; British emigrants to the British Dominions had their own Parliaments; it might be arranged that Smyrna should have her own Parliament and elect her Deputies to that Parliament. To this he could raise no objection.

M. CAMBON said that Signor Nitti had put forward the logical and juridical aspect. Mr. Lloyd George had suggested another solution. A discussion of this kind might be prolonged interminably, and he suggested that the best solution would be that no mention should be made in the draft at all of the

question of the Greeks in Smyrna sending Deputies to Athens, as he thought the matter should be allowed to settle itself.

(*The council adjourned at 1.45 p.m. until 4 p.m. the same afternoon.*)

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 21, 1920.

## No. 21

I.C.P. 41.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Saturday, February 21, 1920, at 4 p.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Forbes Adam, Colonel Gribbon; **SECRETARIES,** Sir M. Hankey, Brigadier-General S. H. Wilson.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Berthelot.

*Italy:* Signor Nitti, Signor Galli, Colonel Castoldi; **SECRETARY,** Signor Trombetti.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda.

**INTERPRETER:** Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. **MR. LLOYD GEORGE** suggested that the conference should continue the discussion in connection with Smyrna, where it had been left off in the morning by Signor Nitti.<sup>1</sup> Signor Nitti had raised an objection which was undoubtedly very strong and might prove to be a very serious one when it came to the actual working of the scheme proposed in the draft synopsis, which provided for the vesting of the suzerainty in the Turks and at the same time allowing the local Greek population to send Deputies to the Greek Chamber and recruits to the Greek army. Indeed, the difficulties pointed out might well prove insuperable. This fact, he thought, really strengthened the argument for a clean-cut solution and for including in the treaty a settlement which would be one not only in form and appearance, but also one in reality; and the solution appeared to be that Smyrna should be recognised as a part of Greece. As far as the British Government were concerned, they would raise no objection to such a solution. He would like to have the views of M. Berthelot and Signor Nitti on that suggestion.

**M. BERTHELOT** said he had not very much to say on the subject. He could only refer to what M. Millerand had already said; and whether the latter had altered his mind or not he himself alone could say. He agreed that any system under which there should be a Turkish suzerainty over Smyrna and the Greek population allowed to send representatives to the Greek Parliament would have every possible drawback. The situation as regards Smyrna was very much more difficult than that in the case of Crete, where, although

<sup>1</sup> See No. 20.

there was a Moslem element, there was no real Turkish population. He did not know whether a solution arrived at between the two proposals, purely as a transitory measure, would meet the case. He thought a small local Parliament might live for a time, but it could not possibly be lasting. It might be desirable to have complete annexation by Greece, but he suggested that, from the point of view of Greece herself, it might be better, in view of the size of the Turkish population, to defer such annexation at any rate for a short time, since it was necessary to save the face of the Turks and to allow the Turkish flag to be shown. The proposal to have a clear-cut solution appeared to him personally a very desirable one, but on this point he would have to ask the conference to wait and hear what M. Millerand himself had to say.

SIGNOR NITTI agreed that, in view of the importance of the question, it would be necessary to postpone the discussion until M. Millerand could be present. As pointed out, there appeared [*to*] be two alternatives, both of which provided for Turkish suzerainty; one allowing the Greek population to send representatives to the Greek Parliament, and the other providing for a small local Parliament. Personally, he was much in favour of annexation by Greece. There was, however, a strong element of Turks in Smyrna and its surroundings, and he thought the enlistment of the population in the Greek army might lead to a dangerous situation. He thought, at any rate for the time being, it might be better, as suggested by M. Berthelot, to have a transitory arrangement. It was the duty of the conference, so far as possible, to foresee what difficulties might arise, and try to arrive at a solution which would obviate them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, after what M. Berthelot had said, there was no option but to postpone the discussion until M. Millerand's arrival.<sup>2</sup> He would like to ask, however, if the conference did not think it was very desirable, before coming to a decision, to get the views of M. Veniselos. He thought so himself, and he did hope, therefore, that when the discussion was resumed the conference would allow him to invite M. Veniselos to be present and give them his opinion on the subject.

(The further discussion was adjourned until M. Millerand could be present.)

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said the next point to consider was the proposal that the port of Smyrna should be a free port under the guarantee of the League of Nations.

(This was agreed to.)

Mr. Lloyd George, continuing, said he was very doubtful about the proposal that a suitable part of the port should be reserved to the Turkish Government for the use of the hinterland. It would appear that all that was required was for the whole port to be free for trading purposes.

<sup>2</sup> M. Millerand was about to return to London from Paris.

LORD CURZON said that he thought there was no objection to the inclusion of the stipulation referred to by Mr. Lloyd George.

(The inclusion of the clause in question was agreed to.)

3. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the next question he would like to discuss was that of guaranteeing the rights of minorities, and he would suggest some clause in this connection being added. Moreover, in the cases of Cilicia and Anatolia it should be clearly laid down that the Powers having rights of exploitation in those territories should specially guarantee the rights of minorities.

4. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the military, naval and air clauses had been referred to a commission under Marshal Foch, by a decision of the Supreme Council on the 17th February.<sup>3</sup>

*Military, Naval  
and Air Clauses*

(It was agreed that no action was necessary for the time being.)

5. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that these questions had also been referred to Marshal Foch.

*Prisoners of  
War. Graves*

6. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the clauses dealing with penalties should be an adaptation of the articles in the Treaty of Peace with Austria.

LORD CURZON said that he was informed that the articles as drafted in the Treaties of Peace with Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary in connection with penalties were not sufficiently wide, and would not, in the case of Turkey, cover the massacre of Armenians. He would therefore suggest that in adapting the wording of the treaties in question it should be so amended as to make the terms wide enough to cover such cases as Armenia.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if there was any machinery for dealing with this question, and enquired who had drafted the conditions in connection with the German treaty. It would probably be better, he thought, to refer the question to Paris, as the British Lord Chancellor was there at the moment.

LORD CURZON said that the commission which had formerly dealt with the question had ceased to exist, but it would have to be set up again.

(This course was agreed to.)

7. SIGNOR NITTI thought that, in considering the question of reparations, it was necessary to look at it from a very different point of view from that in which the case of Germany was treated. Turkey was left in a very difficult position. She was going to be deprived of Armenia and other territories, and she had very little left to lose. It was in the interest

*Reparations*

<sup>3</sup> See No. 12, minute 2.



of the *Entente* Powers to develop Turkish territory, and he did not think it would be possible to expect much in the way of reparations from her. It would be necessary to be broad-minded, and to remember that we must not crush her by asking her to bear a burden which was too heavy. The amount which it would be practicable to claim would be simply futile.

LORD CURZON said that he thought Turkey must in any case be called upon to carry out certain obligations. One was to pay for the inter-Allied forces which would have to be maintained for controlling the Straits. The second was the expense of maintaining a commission (if there was to be one) to regulate traffic in the Straits. The third was that she must continue to meet her pre-war debts. There were two other points which must not be lost sight of: firstly, compensation was due for the damage caused to Allied nationals living in Turkey. An enormous amount of property had been destroyed, railways had been shut down, and hundreds of thousands of pounds were lost in consequence. No country could be released from its obligations to make good such losses. Again, there was the question of compensating Turkish subjects of non-Turkish race, who had been turned out of their homes. Most of these would have to be re-established. These were, in any case, the views of the British Foreign Office, and he submitted that reparations should be exacted in these respects. He would be inclined, however, to waive any other financial claims against Turkey, as she was a bankrupt State, and it was in the interests of the *Entente* Powers to see her set up again. Certainly reparations on the same scale as might be expected from a rich State could not [*be*] asked for from Turkey.

M. CAMBON quite agreed with Lord Curzon's proposals with regard to Turkey making good the damage and loss incurred which had the advantage of maintaining the principle of reparation and at the same time of showing moderation in the demands. He quite agreed that compensation must be exacted from Turkey in the respects mentioned by the British Foreign Secretary.

SIGNOR NITTI said he thought that Lord Curzon had summed up the situation very well, and had clearly defined what Turkey should be expected to do. He would like to point out, however, that in certain respects the claims suggested, strictly speaking, did not come under the head of reparations and ought to be included in another part of the treaty. For example, the cost of the commission to be set up to control traffic in the Straits could hardly be included under reparations. The main thing which ought to be waived in making claims against Turkey was a great indemnity, but he quite agreed that compensation would have to be exacted from Turkey for damage and losses to communities and individuals.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had just been informed that this question was probably at the very moment being considered by a Financial Commission; but if this was not so he would suggest that arrangements should be made for such a commission to consider it.

(This course was agreed to.)

8. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said, with reference to the economic clauses, that arrangements had been made for a draft to be submitted in this connection, and he thought until this was ready it would be necessary to postpone the consideration of the question.

(This course was agreed to.)

9. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the question of aerial navigation had been referred to a commission, with a view to their drawing up articles on the lines of the sections in the other treaties.

It was agreed—

That no action was necessary for the time being in this connection.

10. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the question of ports, waterways and railways was also referred to a special commission.

*Ports, Water-  
ways and Rail-  
ways*

It was agreed—

That no action was for the time being necessary.

11. MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what had been done as regards labour.

*Labour* SIR M. HANKEY pointed out that it had been agreed that the articles dealing with labour should be on the same lines as in the other treaties,<sup>4</sup> and that the matter had already been referred to the Drafting Committee.

12. M. BERTHELOT asked if it was proposed to occupy a zone on both sides of the Sea of Marmora.

*Sea of Marmora* It was pointed out that the conference had adopted Marshal Foch's recommendations in this direction.<sup>5</sup>

13. SIGNOR NITTI raised the question of the islands in the Ægean. He said that according to the terms of the Treaty of London all the islands of the Dodecanese were assigned to Italy. According, however, to an agreement which had been made between Italy and M. Veniselos,<sup>6</sup> Italy had agreed to hand over all these islands with the exception of Rhodes to Greece. There was also an understanding that a plebiscite should be taken under circumstances to be determined to ascertain the wish of the population as to which Power they should remain under. He had also a small request to make as regards the Island of Castellarizzo [*sic*], and that was that it should be handed back by the French to Italy. He would feel very grateful if the French could see their way to doing this. It was only a very small island with a small population, and France had really no claim to it.

The proposals as outlined by Signor Nitti were agreed to.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. No. 14, minute 3.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 14, minute 2.

<sup>6</sup> See Volume IV, No. 17, note 2.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he did not think the conference could usefully continue the discussion of the treaty with Turkey that day, and he thought it would be better to adjourn until M. Millerand's arrival. On the following Monday there would be two questions ripe for discussion, and they were the question of Russia and that of Smyrna. The Adriatic question could not be dealt with until President Wilson's reply had been received, nor could the question of boundaries be taken up until the reports of the commissions were ready. There was also M. Cambon's report on Capitulations and Adjudications which would have to be considered, but he did not think it would be possible to do this for the moment, as the British Foreign Office had not yet received a letter which they were waiting for. He would be very much obliged if M. Berthelot would inform M. Millerand that it was proposed when the conference met on the following Monday to resume the discussion on Russia, and then again to take up that on Smyrna.

*(The conference then adjourned until the following Monday.)*

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 21, 1920.

## No. 22

I.C.P. 42.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference, held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Monday, February 23, 1920, at 11 a.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Philip Kerr, Mr. Gregory; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Major Caccia.

*France*: M. Millerand, President of the Council; M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti, Signor Scialoja; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was delighted to see M. Millerand back amongst them once more, and he was certain that the council *Allied Policy in regard to Russia* would join with him in offering him a warm welcome on his return. He wished to assure M. Millerand that the latter, during his absence, had been most ably represented by M. Cambon and M. Berthelot. During the past week the council had discussed *inter alia* the question of our policy in regard to Russia, and at their meeting on the afternoon of Thursday, the 19th instant,<sup>1</sup> he had put to his colleagues certain questions for their careful consideration and decision, the discussion being then adjourned pending a reference to the President of the French Council by the French representatives. He expected that M. Millerand had been placed in possession of these questions.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 17, minute 1.

M. BERTHELOT then gave a summary of the following questions (I.C.P. 38)<sup>1</sup>:—

- (a) Should the Allies encourage Poland to continue war against Russia by promising her help?
- (b) If Poland should seek the advice of the Allies, should they counsel her to accept the terms of peace offered by Russia, if favourable?
- (c) If Poland, without seeking the advice of the Allies, should reject such favourable terms of peace as may be offered to her by Russia, would the Allies be ready to support Poland in any war that might ensue?
- (d) Should the Allies be prepared to continue trading relations with the Russian people?
- (e) Should the Allies, through the agency of the League of Nations, take steps to ascertain what was really happening in Russia?

M. Berthelot said that since then Mr. Lloyd George had put a further question, i.e., should we recognise the Soviet Government?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that with reference to this last question, it did not arise, as they were all agreed on this subject. Since the matter had last been discussed, information had been received from Poland (and he understood that similar information was in the hands of Signor Nitti) that Poland intended to make some reply to the Bolshevik offer of peace, but, before doing so, M. Patek was coming to London in order to seek the advice of the Supreme Council as to the nature of that reply. It was, therefore, for the council to make up their minds as to the character of the advice that should be given to M. Patek. Secondly, he had received a letter from M. Thomas,<sup>2</sup> asking whether, in the event of it being decided to send to Russia a commission to investigate conditions on the spot, this commission should be set up by the International Labour Bureau, or through the League of Nations. This question could be approached from two sides. First, if the council were of opinion that it would be best to utilise M. Thomas's offer, the mission would probably be composed partly of employers and partly of workmen. In this case, the workmen would almost certainly have Bolshevik sympathies and tinge all the actions of the Soviet Government with roseate hues, whereas it was likely that the employers would tend to the other extreme. What was required was an absolutely impartial account, by trained observers, who would not be tainted by any political colour. Such an account, and such observers, we were more likely to obtain through the League of Nations. He proposed, therefore, that the council should consider the following questions that morning:—

- (i) What advice should be given to M. Patek in regard to the refusal or acceptance by Poland of the peace terms offered by the Bolshevik Government?
- (ii) If the council decided to advise M. Patek against accepting those terms, were the Allies to undertake to send support to Poland, and, if so, what should be the nature and extent of that support?

<sup>2</sup> See No. 18, minute 4.

- (iii) Should the council decide that it was desirable to send a mission of enquiry to Russia, and if so, how should it be composed?

These were the main questions he submitted to the council for their consideration, unless anyone suggested that there should be a direct recognition of the Soviet Government.

(Professor Mantoux then read out M. Thomas's letter to Mr. Lloyd George (Appendix 1).<sup>3</sup>)

M. MILLERAND said that he was delighted that the president of the Supreme Council had declared so clearly and unequivocally that the council were agreed not to resume relations with the Soviets. He was glad for two reasons. He would speak frankly, and say that this put an end to certain rumours which had been circulated to the effect that the council were wavering on this point. Secondly, if it were the fact that they were all agreed not to resume relations with the Bolsheviks, this decision, in his opinion, embraced all the other questions which Mr. Lloyd George had formulated. It would follow from it, for instance, that we had given certain advice to M. Patek. When M. Patek had last been in France the latter had consulted him as to what line he should take if the Soviet offered peace to Poland, whether in a direct or indirect way. He had replied that, in his view—and he thought that in saying this he was going absolutely in accordance with the common attitude of the Allies, who had been in full agreement on the subject—there could be no political relations between the Allies and the Soviet. He had personally advised M. Patek, therefore, against making peace with the Soviets. M. Patek had pointed out that the consequence of this would be that his country would have a serious mistrust of the Russian Government, and M. Millerand had replied that he thought this would be all the better. If the council endorsed the advice that he had given personally to M. Patek, and counselled Poland to reject the peace offer, it would be necessary for the Powers to give some degree of assistance and support to that country against Russia. She was especially in need, for example, of 150,000 Mauser rifles. He suggested, therefore, that on the one hand we must give Poland clearly to understand the danger of making peace, and, on the other, we must promise to give her the means of defending herself against Russia and of resisting any possible attacks. In regard to the other question of a commission of enquiry, it was not, he thought, the business of the Allies themselves to conduct such an investigation. It would never do for them to undertake it. They had been told, however, that the International Labour Bureau was prepared to conduct this enquiry, and he himself saw no reason why the council should not give their consent to this, so long as the enquiry was confined to that bureau and to them alone. M. Thomas had written in his letter: 'I am at the disposal of the Allied Governments if they wish.' He thought that we must reply to M. Thomas: 'We have no intention of making

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. The text in this appendix was the same as that quoted in No. 18, minute 4, except that the appended text omitted the postscript.

this enquiry ourselves, but if your bureau is anxious to find out what exactly is the position in Russia and to obtain full information on the spot as to the economic conditions, then the Supreme Council have no objection, so long as the Labour Bureau works independently as the bureau and not under the ægis of the Allies.' In his view, it was most undesirable that the Allied Governments should be in any way mixed up in the matter, and for this reason he thought it preferable that the International Labour Bureau rather than the League of Nations, should undertake the mission. Further, the mission must retain an essentially technical character, and not touch on political affairs. He thought it quite natural that the Labour Bureau should wish to ascertain for itself what was happening in Russia. There was no harm in this, so long as the Governments themselves stood aside.

SIGNOR NITTI said that when the council had last discussed this question he had put before them certain views,<sup>1</sup> which he would now venture to summarise for M. Millerand's information. He had said on that occasion that, from many points of view, it was desirable, and, indeed, probably necessary, to resume relations with Russia. We had in Europe to face a political and an economic problem of the gravest nature, and we could not defer tackling the problem until Doomsday. The council must face the facts, however distasteful they might be. Nobody wished to see the Soviets triumphant, but it could not be questioned that they had conquered everywhere. In the east, they had been told by Viscount Chinda that the Japanese would not continue their military effort in Siberia. Further, the United States had put an end to her activities in Eastern Russia. In European Russia the Soviets had won hands down, and though it was just possible that General Denikin might have an occasional ephemeral success, there was no reason to hope that such a success would have lasting results. In the circumstances, did the council really think that they could take the responsibility of encouraging Poland to continue her resistance, unless the Allies intended, in the event of her accepting their advice and refusing the Soviet's terms of peace, to grant her full support, which must involve the sending of troops? It would not be sufficient merely to supply arms and munitions. These might enable Poland to defend her frontiers, but they would never enable her to win in the long run. The resumption of relations with Russia was desirable, again, from the economic point of view. Until we had access once more to the raw materials and the essential supplies which we could get from South Russia, it was impossible for us to hope that the cost of living would go down and that our industries could be rehabilitated. We could not get enough food supplies and raw material from America. We must, therefore, turn to Russia; and this meant that we must resume political relations with her. If we did not, and if Russia then turned to Germany, and these two Powers made common cause, a most gravely dangerous situation would be created. It had been suggested that it was useless for us, even if we did resume relations with Russia, to expect to be able to avail ourselves of her raw materials, and so on, as her railways were in a bad condition, she was short of locomotives, there was general disorganisation, and it was impossible for food and other supplies to be sent

from the interior to the ports. He wished to point out, however, that her position in this respect would be no better next year, when, in fact, the railways would be still more disorganised, and when our delay might have rendered it impossible for us to resume relations on any terms. The council were not unaware how deplorable was the economic distress in Central Europe. Food-stuffs were obtainable from Australia, but it took a long time, and freights were abnormally high. Hugh [*Huge*] prices had to be paid for coal, for corn, and for petrol; and these prices were always mounting. Therefore, he went further than Mr. Lloyd George, and suggested to the council that the time had come when normal political relations must be resumed with Russia, and her present Government recognised. History showed that every revolution began in acts of fearful violence, but gradually moderated until a democracy emerged. The continued isolation of Russia by the Powers would only make her the more revolutionary. As to the question of sending a mission to conduct an enquiry, and whether that mission should be under the auspices of the International Labour Bureau or of the League of Nations, he thought that the council should ask the Soviet Government, first, on what kind of conditions relations between the Allies on the one hand, and the Russian Government on the other, might be resumed. If we decided to send such a mission, and the Soviet agreed to receive it, we must ask that Government what guarantees they would give for the mission's security. Supposing the council rejected the advice he was now offering, and supposing that Poland and Roumania were successively conquered by the Soviets, what would then be the position of the Allies, and what would not the extent of their responsibility be? The revolutionary Government in Russia in the course of the next three or four months might be much more powerful and more firmly established than it was to-day. He wished, therefore, clearly and unequivocally to ask the council to consider favourably his proposal that negotiations and political relations should be resumed with the Soviet Government in order that the raw materials and supplies of Russia might once more be available to relieve the distress from which the whole world was suffering.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that, first, as to the question of reopening relations, he agreed with M. Millerand that the question had been settled before and that there was no need to reopen it. He wished to correct a misapprehension under which the Prime Minister of Italy evidently laboured, as to what he (Viscount Chinda) had said at their last discussion on this question.<sup>1</sup> Signor Nitti apparently understood that the Japanese Government had no intention of taking offensive against the Bolsheviki in Siberia. He had certainly not intended to convey this impression. What he had meant to say was that the Japanese had no intention of taking the offensive beyond Lake Baikal. He had also said that the Japanese army was now confining their [*sic*] efforts mainly to protecting the railway, as well as rendering every possible assistance and facilities that might be in their power to assist the evacuation of the Czechs, which became now the Japanese share of the common duty of the Allies. In conformity with the declared policy of the Allies not to interfere with the internal affairs of Russia, the Japanese had no intention of interfering in the

local political disputes in Siberia, or with the local Governments. The Russians there were supposed to be revolutionaries, but they had not definitely declared their adhesion to the Bolshevik creed, so the Japanese could not take the offensive against them, and were therefore confining themselves to acting on the defensive only. Secondly, he had said that it was very difficult for the Japanese to maintain themselves where they were, and his Government were seriously considering how long the Japanese troops could hold so advanced a position. This did not mean, however, that they had ever relinquished the idea of making further resistance. To come to the second question, of a commission of enquiry, he quite agreed with Mr. Lloyd George that this mission had nothing to do with the present Soviet Government. We did want to know what the real conditions of Russia were, and he understood that the intention of sending this mission was not to open relations with the Soviet, but merely to institute a thorough investigation of the position on the spot. He wished to remind the council that the International Labour Bureau actually formed one branch of the League of Nations. He suggested, therefore, that in asking the League of Nations to undertake the despatch of [a] mission of enquiry, it should be hinted that the enquiry could best be conducted not by some such body as the bureau, but by the League themselves. It should be pointed out to the League of Nations that the intention was not to establish relations with the Soviet Government, but to ascertain, by enquiry and observation on the spot, exactly what the position was in the interior of Russia.

M. MILLERAND stated that he had understood that they were all agreed that in no circumstances would the Allies open relations with the Soviet. It appeared he had been mistaken, as Signor Nitti had just urged with great force that we should at once resume such relations, and he had marshalled very strong arguments in favour of his proposal. This was a very serious proposition, in his opinion, and he felt bound to state the very strong objections which he felt could be raised against a *démarche* of this kind. Signor Nitti had said that the Soviet armies had conquered all along the line, and would continue to do so. That was possible. On the other hand, 'Russia' was synonymous with 'instability,' and no country had ever offered to the world such a series of surprises. Signor Nitti's second point was that the world cannot exist without the supplies available in Russia. He agreed that these supplies were very necessary indeed, but he thought that the council had been of opinion that in any case it would be impossible to get hold of them for many months, and that therefore there was no great urgency. Signor Nitti had rightly said that revolutions started in violence and finished in moderation. He seemed to think that by resuming relations we should, as it were, inject a serum into the Soviet blood which would rid it of its poisonous virus. Why, M. Millerand asked, should we imagine that the Bolshevik would entirely change his character and become a miracle of moderation because the Allied Governments made peace? He thought the result would be quite the reverse of that which Signor Nitti anticipated. A complete *volte-face* of this character, on the part of the Allies, would give an extraordinary



impetus to the Soviets, and strengthen their power and prestige enormously not only in Russia, but all over the world. He ventured to think that he had no need to persuade the Japanese Ambassador of this. He asked whether Signor Nitti had really measured what effect this change of standpoint and the recognition of the Soviets would have. It would be regarded as the greatest victory the Bolsheviks had ever seen. He must therefore insist—and on this point he had maintained a consistent attitude throughout their meetings—that from every point of view it would be disastrous to recognise the Soviets. If the Soviet Government should, *motu suo*,<sup>4</sup> transform itself and display moderation, as he personally sincerely hoped it would, and if it should cease to conduct its propaganda in various parts of the world, then a new problem would arise and a new solution would be required. But so long as the Bolshevik Administration remained what it was, then, from the moral point of view, from the point of view of external relations, and from the point of view of home politics, he must urge that recognition was quite out of the question.

SIGNOR NITTI said he would crave permission to say a few words briefly to summarise what had been said that morning. It appeared, on the one hand, that Japan had no intention of taking the offensive; she merely intended to remain on the defensive and maintain the security of the railway line. Consequently, it would be seen that no military pressure could be exercised on the Bolsheviks from the east. Again, on the west, the Bolsheviks were masters of the situation. The most the Allies could hope was that Poland and Roumania, if attacked, would be able to resist. It was impossible to believe that either the Poles or the Roumanians would be in a position to attack the Bolsheviks, since the Allies could send no troops to their help. Consequently, no military pressure to destroy Bolshevism could be exercised either from the east or from the west.

The question then arose: What could be expected to happen in the near future? M. Millerand had said that something would occur in the internal situation of Russia which would cause Bolshevism to disappear. He, personally, felt convinced that nothing of the kind could possibly happen, especially in the absence of military pressure either from the east or from the west. On the contrary, in his opinion, every day would tell against the Allies and add to their difficulties. M. Millerand had expressed the view that the Bolshevik Government could not last; whereas he, Signor Nitti, doubted whether it would ever end. In any case, it would be agreed that the situation from the Allies' point of view was better last year; it was worse this year, and later on it would be even worse. M. Millerand had wondered what the extreme anti-Bolsheviks in the Allied countries would say should any rapprochement with Russia take place. On the other hand, he himself felt certain that in four or five months' time the situation would become infinitely worse, and any surrender by the Allied Governments then would amount to capitulation. The Allies were still the masters, and they would, therefore, be able to impose their own conditions, since they would be acting

<sup>4</sup> i.e. of its own accord.

of their own free will. Without Russia, what were the Allies going to do for raw materials? The United States of America certainly would not supply raw materials; they refused to give credits. Japan also would not be in a position either to supply money or foodstuffs. Consequently, it was, in his opinion, imperative that the Allies should take immediate steps to consider the situation with an open mind, eliminating all questions of sentiment and political expediency, in order to obtain access to the markets of Russia. In any case, before finally breaking with the Bolsheviks, he begged the council carefully to consider what the result of such action would be. He felt certain that any delay would tell against the Allies. In conclusion, he would ask the Prime Minister to place definite proposals before the council.

VISCOUNT CHINDA asked permission to say with regard to Signor Nitti's statement that the Japanese would be prepared to take action in conjunction with the Allies east of Lake Baikal.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the discussion which had taken place so far appeared to turn largely on the question of the immediate recognition of Soviet Russia. But no proposal to that effect had been placed before the council. On the contrary, the proposals which he had put before the council last week definitely repudiated the idea of any recognition of the Bolshevik Government until that Government had given guarantees that it would conform to the customs of civilised Governments throughout the world. Consequently, there appeared to be no need to argue for the moment against the desirability of the immediate recognition of the Soviet Government, because that was not the issue. In his opinion, the council was merely asked to settle two questions, viz.:—

- (i) What advice were the Allies going to give to Poland? and
- (ii) Should the Allies take steps to ascertain the facts with regard to the situation in Russia?

It would be agreed that the first question would become a very practical one in the course of the next few days. And he entirely agreed with Signor Nitti that the Allies should not encourage Poland not to make peace unless they were prepared to help them right through. Should the Allies decide to advise M. Patek not to make peace with Russia, M. Patek would undoubtedly enquire whether the Allies would be prepared to support him when attacked by the Bolsheviks. Consequently, a definite reply would have to be given to that question. M. Millerand had implied that his reply would be in the affirmative. He had said: 'We will break the Treaty of Versailles and allow the Germans to give 300,000 rifles to Poland.' He (Mr. Lloyd George) thought that it would be extremely dangerous to break treaties in order to supply to Poland the means for fighting Bolshevism. But, irrespective of that, he did not think that the supply of 300,000 rifles would help Poland to make headway against Russia. No doubt at the present moment the Poles were very satisfied with their military exploits; they had advanced far into Russia. But, so far, the Bolsheviks had been fully occupied in resisting the attacks of the North Russia forces, Denikin's forces and Kolchak's forces—

all perfectly equipped both in tanks, arms, munitions, and led by a larger number of trained officers. In a word, the Bolshevik armies had been fighting for the centre of government. The Poles could, therefore, advance quite easily into Russia. No real fighting had taken place. There were no Russian troops on that side, merely half a dozen men holding two or three kilometres of ground. The Polish armies might have marched with a broom and swept the ground without the necessity of using a single gun. But, in the future, the Bolshevik armies, which had destroyed Kolchak and Denikin, would be available to attack the Poles, if it were going to be war, especially as he did not believe that the Bolsheviks would advance against the Japanese armies in Siberia. Consequently, Pilsudski<sup>5</sup> might imagine that he would be able to reach Moscow, but he had never yet come up against the Bolshevik forces. And should disaster overtake the Polish forces, would M. Millerand then say to Pilsudski: 'We have given you 300,000 rifles and broken the Treaty of Versailles and that is all we are going to do'? Would not Pilsudski then turn round and say: 'I could have made a very good peace with Russia; I could have obtained vast territorial gains. You recommended me not to accept peace. You now see the results. Are you not going to send me help and more rifles?' Meanwhile the 300,000 rifles would no doubt have fallen into the hands of the Bolsheviks, and who would then be prepared to supply more rifles, more armaments, or more money to the Poles? Would Italy do so? Would Great Britain do so? He would at once reply to the latter question. Great Britain would most certainly not do so. She would not add a single farthing to her already heavy load of debt in order to help Poland, should she continue the war. Consequently, would France be prepared to undertake the whole of those obligations? If not, would it be right to advise Pilsudski to go on fighting unless the Allies meant to go right through? He thought it would be imperative to deal openly with these small nations, otherwise they would never trust the Allies.

To sum up then, if the Poles did not wish to make peace with Russia, they must accept the whole responsibility and the consequences.

To turn next to the second point, M. Millerand agreed that it would be desirable to know what was going on in Russia. Such an enquiry could not be undertaken by the Allied Governments without recognising the Soviet Government; but the same objection would not apply to an independent body. M. Millerand had argued that the enquiry should be made by the International Labour Bureau and not by the League of Nations. But Baron [*sic*] Chinda had very correctly pointed out that the International Labour Bureau merely formed a part, an office, of the League of Nations. Indeed, the heading on M. Thomas's letter bore the inscription 'League of Nations.' Consequently, it appeared to be merely a question as to whether the Allies should ask the responsible leaders of the League of Nations to make the contemplated enquiry or leave it in the hands of the members of the Labour Bureau. In this connection Lord Curzon had given very sound reasons why the League of Nations should be entrusted with this enquiry.

<sup>5</sup> Polish Chief of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Polish armies.

Firstly, the League of Nations would undoubtedly carry more confidence throughout the world than a mere bureau. The League of Nations, in fact, constituted a more responsible body.

Secondly, the League of Nations would be more impartial. He (Mr. Lloyd George) could not say who would be chosen by the International Labour Bureau, should it be entrusted with the enquiry, but, in any case, those men would not be as impartial as those chosen by the League of Nations, who obviously would be without any bias one way or the other. He laid considerable stress on this question since, in his opinion, the commission of enquiry should be charged to make enquiries into all matters relating to Russia: social, economic and political. He, personally, could not see how M. Millerand's suggestion could be accepted, to omit the political situation. Such questions as the following, namely, Were the peasantry against the Soviet Government? What was the basis of Government? Was it purely a trade union or were the peasants also included? How were the Soviets chosen? All those questions required to be studied and elucidated.

Lastly, the League of Nations would regard it as a compliment that the Allied Governments should have trusted them to make such enquiry, and its position would thereby become more of a reality.

M. Millerand had said that Russia was a country of surprises. He (Mr. Lloyd George) fully agreed, but the only surprise M. Millerand realised as possible was the collapse of the Soviet Government. Had it not occurred to him that the surprise might take another form, and that Bolshevism might turn to militarism? That was the surprise that France gave to Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. One hundred and thirty years ago, at that same table, British statesmen had used exactly the same words against the revolution in France as M. Millerand was now using against Bolshevism in Russia. At that time, British statesmen had been dead against recognising the French revolution, because the French King and Queen had been guillotined, and the Dauphine [*sic*] had been killed in his prison under circumstances of barbarity. Wholesale drownings had taken place in the Loire. He fully realised, however, that those were things which always happened in revolutions. Even Cromwell had burned villagers wholesale in Drogheda. Again, other statesmen had said: 'Don't touch that unclean thing!' But the result of that policy had been twenty years of bloodshed: Jacob[in]ism became Bonapartism, and Europe trembled for twenty years under the power of armies that had been merely unled and undisciplined rabble at the beginning of the revolution. He would ask: 'Was that not a surprise which the Allies might get in Russia should they insist on driving those people into militarism?' Should the council decide to encourage the Poles to reject offers of peace and go on attacking the Russians, whilst supplying them with arms, munitions and money, Lenin and Trotsky might no doubt be got rid of, but someone far more dangerous might arise in their place. He urged the council to be wise in time.

He (Mr. Lloyd George) fully realised the difficulties of having intercourse with people who had stained their records with crimes such as those of the

Bolsheviks. But the Allies did not intend to recognise the Soviet Government. On the other hand, the world could not recover its position without getting Russia into it. He had therefore prepared a document (Appendix 2), which had been drawn up in the most moderate terms in order to give effect, as far as possible, to the views expressed by M. Millerand. He begged the council to accept the proposals therein contained. That is to say, that, whilst declining to enter into diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia in view of the experiences of the past, the Allies would agree to obtain authoritative and impartial information as to the conditions in Russia.

M. MILLERAND expressed his inability there and then to express any final opinion with regard to the proposals contained in the document which Mr. Lloyd George had circulated. He would ask for time to enable him, after having obtained a translation, to draft various amendments which he considered imperative. At the present moment he would merely invite attention to one or two points.

Mr. Lloyd George had not proposed, as Signor Nitti had done, forthwith to enter into diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia. On the other hand, Mr. Lloyd George's proposals, if applied in their present form, would render relations with the Bolshevik Government inevitable.

Again, Mr. Lloyd George had said that the Allies could not advise Poland not to make peace with Russia unless they were prepared to assist her. But, in accordance with Mr. Lloyd George's proposal, the Allies promised to support the Poles to the utmost extent possible, should they fail to obtain peace terms which would be considered fair. In other words, the Allies would have to examine the terms of the Treaty of Peace between Poland and Russia and so become, as it were, guarantors therefor. In his opinion, the Allies would thereby assume an impossible position.

Next, Mr. Lloyd George had made certain statements with regard to the French Revolution which he felt bound to repudiate with his last breath. Mr. Lloyd George had, in fact, used the same arguments as had frequently been addressed to France by the Bolsheviks, namely: 'Why do you, who are the descendants of a revolutionary Government, condemn the Soviet Government? You cannot blame Russia for what you did yourselves in France.' He wished to point out that a great difference existed between the French Revolution and Bolshevism. The French Revolution no doubt brought about some violence, which they all deplored, but that violence was necessary in order to defend 'le droit de l'homme et du citoyen.' But did the Soviet Government offer anything analogous? Had the Allies refused to enter into relations with the Soviet Government because it had used violent measures? Not at all, since it would be agreed that in the past they had frequently had dealings with Governments of violence elsewhere. Why, then, did the Allies refuse to enter into relations with the Soviets? Why would it be a danger to do so? It was because Soviet Government meant the dictatorship of the proletariat not only in Russia, but in every country throughout the world. Should the Allies now agree to grasp the hand of Trotsky and Lenin, would the Bolsheviks abandon their propaganda? He thought not.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, intervening, pointed out that at the time of the French Revolution the same argument that France would impose her advanced views on other countries had been used in order to favour intervention.

M. MILLERAND agreed. On the other hand, in his opinion, there existed nothing in common between the principles advocated by 'le droit de l'homme' and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Mr. Lloyd George, however, had expressed the view that the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' to-day would be replaced to-morrow by a 'military dictatorship.' In his opinion, that might be possible; but did the council propose to support the dictatorship of the proletariat in order to prevent military dictatorship? He thought that would constitute a fatal policy. For the moment, the recognition of the Soviet Government would give a new force to a Government which was about to be blown up by the people of Russia. In his opinion, the day would come very shortly when that Government would receive the fate which attended all such Governments. In his opinion, the council should merely ask themselves wherein lay the interests of their own people and of civilisation. In his opinion, a recognition of the Soviet Government in any shape or form entailed peril to civilisation, because that Government meant to thrust the dictatorship of the proletariat on every country. Consequently, he could never accept Mr. Lloyd George's proposal to invite the Council of the League of Nations to send a commission of enquiry to Russia to examine the facts. On the other hand, should the International Labour Bureau of the League of Nations, as an independent body, desire to make an enquiry, he had no objection to their doing so. But it would, in his opinion, be impossible for the Governments themselves either to take the initiative or to bind themselves to make any use of the results of the enquiries made by the League of Nations.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether M. Millerand's objections would be met by forwarding a reply to the International Labour Bureau of the League of Nations to the effect that the contemplated enquiry should not be undertaken by a branch of the League of Nations, but by the League itself. A reply would have to be given to M. Thomas's official letter. Consequently, a reply in the terms now suggested by himself would not entail the Allied Governments taking the initiative; it would merely be the reply sent to a request.

M. MILLERAND thought that the further consideration of Mr. Lloyd George's memorandum must be deferred until that afternoon.

*(The meeting then adjourned until 4 p.m.)*

*2, Whitehall Gardens, February 23, 1920.*

#### APPENDIX 2 TO NO. 22

(A.J. 34. Confidential.)

The Allies [*?* are] agreed that they should incur no further expenditure in Russia. They further agree to inform the communities bordering on Soviet Russia, and

whose independence or *de facto* autonomy they have recognised, that they cannot accept the responsibility for advising them to remain in a state of war with Soviet Russia. They are further agreed that they should make it clear to these communities that the Allies can give them no support in the event of their refusing terms of peace offered by Russia which would be regarded as fair according to the general principles applied by the Peace Conference to the settlement of Europe. If, however, Soviet Russia attacks them in order to obtain terms which according to these principles would be considered unfair, the Allies will support them to the utmost extent possible.

The Allies are further agreed that they cannot enter into diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia, in view of the experience of the past, until they are satisfied that the horrors of the Bolshevik régime have been brought to an end, and that the Moscow Government will conform its diplomatic practice to that of all civilised Governments. Both the British and Swiss Governments were forced to expel the representatives of the Soviet Government, whom they had admitted, because they abused their privileges in order to attack the established institutions of the country to which they were accredited.<sup>6</sup> The Allies have further agreed that trade between Russia and the rest of Europe, so necessary to the restoration of lower prices and normal conditions in Europe, should be encouraged as much as possible through recognised commercial channels.

Finally, the Allies are agreed that it is highly desirable to obtain authoritative and impartial information as to the conditions in Russia, and they accordingly invite the Council of the League of Nations to send a commission there to examine into the facts and publish a report upon them for the information of the world.

*February 18, 1920.*

<sup>6</sup> Cf. No. 16, note 6.

## No. 23

I.C.P. 43.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Monday, February 23, 1920, at 4 p.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Gregory, Mr. Philip Kerr; **SECRETARIES,** Sir M. Hankey, Captain Abraham, Major Caccia.

*France:* M. Millerand, President of the Council; M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer.

*Italy:* Signor Nitti, Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali; **SECRETARY,** Signor Trombetti.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda.

**INTERPRETER:** Professor P. J. Mantoux.

I. WITH reference to I.C.P. 42,<sup>1</sup> Appendix 2, M. MILLERAND submitted to the council an alternative draft, of which the following is a translation:—

‘The Allied Governments have agreed on the following conclusions:—

<sup>1</sup> No. 22.

'Should the political units on the frontiers of Soviet Russia, the independent or *de facto* autonomy of which has been recognised by the Allied Governments, ask the latter for advice as to what attitude they should take towards Soviet Russia, the Allied Governments would reply that they are unable to assume the responsibility of advising them in this matter. If, however, Soviet Russia were to attack them, the Allies would support them to the utmost possible extent.

'In view of past experiences, the Allies cannot enter into relations with Soviet Russia. Only in the event of their being convinced that the atrocities of Bolshevism have ceased and that the Moscow Government is ready to employ methods in conformity with those of all civilised Governments, would the Allied Governments consider the possibility of a change of attitude. The British and Swiss Governments were both compelled to expel representatives of the Soviet Government from their respective countries. Commerce between Russia and the rest of Europe, which is so essential for the improvement of economic conditions not only in Russia, but in the rest of the world, will be encouraged to the utmost degree possible without relaxation of the attitude described above.

'Furthermore, the Allies agree in the belief that it is highly desirable to obtain impartial and authoritative information regarding the conditions now prevailing in Russia. They have, therefore, noted with satisfaction the purpose of the International Labour Bureau, which is a branch of the League of Nations, of sending a commission to Russia, solely for purposes of information, to examine the facts in a manner which would guarantee the impartiality of the enquiry, and the results of whose investigations would be published.'

SIGNOR NITTI said that the effect of this document would be to inform Poland and Roumania that they could do as they wished. If they chose not to fight Soviet Russia, well and good; but if they did, the Allied Governments were committed to assist them. Was this the best way to attain the principal end which the council must have in view, namely, to resume economic relations with Russia? It was unfortunate, though true, that economic relations could not be obtained without political relations. For instance, as soon as the Allies had proposed to trade with the co-operative societies of Russia, M. Litvinov had been appointed to supervise them. M. Litvinov was a member of the Soviet Government; relations with him, therefore, meant relations with the Soviet Government. In the document it was suggested that a commission should proceed to Russia to study the conditions of the country. Even study involved contact. No doubt, the methods of the Soviet Government were justly criticised, but it was commonly said in Italy that: 'Even the Devil has a right to a hearing.' Moreover, the Governments *ought* to know what was going on in Russia. He thought that a request to study the conditions in Russia should be addressed to the League of Nations. The League of Nations existed to promote peace, and any attempt to obtain it was clearly within their sphere. The isolation of 140,000,000 people in



Russia, together with the walling-up of resources required by the rest of the world, was clearly a situation threatening peace. There could be no better task for the League of Nations. No doubt, the League of Nations would have to get into touch with the Soviet Government. It would not be the first time that the Allied Governments had had relations with Governments whose morality was not above reproach. In any case, raw material could not be obtained from America for lack of credits in that country. If they were to be got they must be got from Russia. He would remind the council that the various Governments were not at war with Bolshevik Russia. Each, therefore, was free to act independently, but it was most desirable that all should act together. He felt quite sure that in three or four months the situation would be far worse, and that the Allies, in approaching Russia, would find that they would obtain far inferior conditions to those they might obtain at the present time. Consequently, he begged M. Millerand to agree to the proposal that the League of Nations should send a commission to Russia, in view of the urgent need of raw materials, without which Europe could not maintain her existence.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had only formed a hasty impression of M. Millerand's document from hearing it read in translation for the first time. His impression, however, led him to hope most sincerely that M. Millerand would not press all the amendments he had made to the British draft. If he did, the council would be involved in very serious differences of opinion. He noted, for instance, that M. Millerand entirely omitted the first sentence of the British draft, to the effect that the Allied Governments would launch no new military enterprise in Russia. This omission, no doubt, did not matter much, as he fancied M. Millerand had no intention of spending French money on military measures in Russia. Great Britain certainly would not, nor would Italy, he presumed. M. Millerand's variation from the British proposals regarding peace between Russia and the Border States was far more important. On this matter he was in entire agreement with Signor Nitti. In effect, we were to say to Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, &c., 'You make peace or war on your own responsibility; but if you make war, we will support you.' The worst feature of such a promise was that it was not meant. He was not aware that any responsible statesman had ever declared in the French Chamber that he was prepared to spend scores of millions to support Latvia or Lithuania against the Russians. If France would not, who would? Japanese troops might go as far as Lake Baikal, but they would not venture further west. If neither Italian, British, French or Japanese troops would go to the assistance of the Border States, why make them such a promise? If Russia were to make a wanton attack on any of them in order to deprive them of their liberties, possibly there might be reason to intervene, but it was clearly unfair to make such a promise as was suggested, and he, for one, would not subscribe to it. If such a message was sent to the Polish Diet the Poles would assume that the powerful military nations of the West, which had crushed Germany, would certainly stand by them and crush Soviet Russia. The Poles, as M. Berthelot had told him, had gone two hundred

miles into Russia proper. Nevertheless, the Russians said that, in order to make peace, they would allow the Poles to retain this territory. Could we say to the Poles: 'Refuse peace, continue war, and we will help you?' Great Britain certainly could not say this. And, much as he would prefer to have a joint document, he could not sign one making such promises. As to the rest of M. Millerand's draft, he thought it was highly desirable to have a real investigation of the facts of the situation in Russia. Why should the council be afraid of facts? The investigation should be made by an impartial and independent body. If the views held in the Allied countries were right, so much the better; if not, they ought to be dispelled. Surely, in order to cling to an uncritical belief, the council was not prepared to keep Russia in civil war and Europe in distress. Nor could he see anything incompatible with the dignity of the Allies in such an enquiry by the League of Nations. He thought it might well be said that the council considered it desirable that an investigation should be made by an impartial and authoritative body, and thought that such an investigation could be made better by the League of Nations itself, than by any subordinate organisation. It might further be observed that the fact of being under observation would probably incline the Bolshevik Government to good behaviour. This might even save thousands of lives in Southern Russia. Since the last meeting of the council he had been reading Burke, and would be glad to show M. Millerand certain passages regarding the French revolutionaries, which bore a striking likeness to what was written daily by 'Pertinax'<sup>2</sup> about the Bolsheviks. The French Jacobins had invaded Belgium and declared war on Holland, and their agents were spreading the doctrine very alarmingly, both in England and elsewhere. Burke did not scruple to call them murderers and assassins. Unless history was to be valueless, the council should not repeat, in regard to Soviet Russia, the blunders made by England in 1792 in regard to revolutionary France.

M. CAMBON observed that revolutionary France could not have invaded Belgium, as no such country then existed. They did invade the Austrian Netherlands, as Austria had previously declared war on them.<sup>3</sup>

M. MILLERAND said that he thought he and Mr. Lloyd George were not so far apart as they might seem. His draft might be divided into two parts. The first related to what the Allies should say to Poland or any other Border State asking for advice concerning its relations with Soviet Russia. He was afraid that he had not expressed himself sufficiently clearly, as both Mr. Lloyd George and Signor Nitti thought he meant to give support to any of these countries in wars against the Bolsheviks. On the previous day he had been asked by the Poles in Paris for his opinion as to what they should do if the Russians proposed peace to them. In guarded language, but with sufficient clearness, he had advised them to refuse. In the document proposed to the council he had made a very considerable step in the direction of Mr. Lloyd George's and Signor Nitti's views. Now, he said, if any such question were

<sup>2</sup> *Nom de plume* of M. A. Géraud, a prominent French political journalist.

<sup>3</sup> France declared war on Austria on April 20, 1792.

put to him, he would refuse to give an answer. It was now objected that he offered help should the country concerned go to war. He would point out that he used exactly the same phrase as was used in the British draft: 'The Allies agree to help if the Bolsheviks assume the offensive.' It must be conceded, therefore, that he had made a great step since the day before. The second part of the document related to the enquiry. He thought it would be easy to reach an agreement on this matter. After noting the suggestion of the International Labour Bureau, the Governments might request the League of Nations to give effect to the suggestion by the means that commended themselves to it. He hoped that what he had said would render an agreement possible.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE recognised that the two points of view had come closer together, but he wished to ask M. Millerand a question. The Polish armies at present stood on Russian territory. If Russia made it a condition that these Polish armies should withdraw to the frontiers of Poland, and Poland refused this, and Russia then attacked, would this be a case in which the Allied Governments must assist the Poles?

M. MILLERAND said that this eventuality was not, so far as he knew, provided for in the British draft, but he was quite ready to introduce a formula in his own to meet such a case.

VISCOUNT CHINDA observed that the first sentence of the British draft was omitted from the French draft, and that M. Millerand had made no observations regarding this omission.

M. MILLERAND said that he had made no particular mention of this because he understood that the omission was agreed to. Moreover, as the British document included a clause promising help to the Border States if over-run, it was clear that in that eventuality expenses would be incurred.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he wished to discriminate between expeditions into Russia and the defence of their own frontiers by any of our Allies. He thought it desirable to state that the Allies would not collaborate in any organised expeditions into Russia, such as those of Denikin, Kolchak, Judenitch, &c.

M. MILLERAND agreed to the introduction of a phrase to that effect.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that, with regard to the resumption of trade, he supposed he was right in assuming that arms and munitions would not be exported from any of the Allied countries into Russia?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was answering a question in the House of Commons on this matter.<sup>4</sup> The British Government would certainly not permit the export of arms to Russia.

LORD CURZON said that during the discussion he had been seeking for a formula which would reconcile the two views. In regard to the first part of M. Millerand's proposals, he would accept the first few lines of the draft, and suggest the following variant for the remainder of the first paragraph:—

'The Allied Governments will reply that they cannot accept the re-

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., *H. of C.*, vol. 125, col. 1284.

sponsibility of advising them to continue a war which may be injurious to their own interests. If, however, Soviet Russia attacks them inside their legitimate frontiers, the Allies will give them every possible support.'

As to the enquiry, he thought it would be better to substitute the word 'proposal' for the word 'purpose' of the International Labour Bureau, and to continue as follows:—

'They think, however, that this enquiry would be invested with even greater authority and with superior chances of success, if it were made upon the initiative, and conducted under the supervision, of the Council of the League of Nations itself.'

This formula, he thought, had the merit of leaving the choice of agency to the League of Nations, without rejecting the suggestion of the International Labour Bureau. It seemed now to be generally agreed that an enquiry conducted by the Council of the League of Nations itself would be more impressive than one conducted by the International Labour Bureau.

M. MILLERAND said that he was ready to accept a draft on these lines. He would like to say that he had met M. Albert Thomas at luncheon, and had concurred with him in the belief that the character and composition of the International Labour Bureau was such as to fit it for the investigation as to Russian conditions. He would rather, therefore, not say definitely that the council preferred any other body to the International Labour Bureau, while leaving the question to the option of the Council of the League of Nations.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that perhaps the terms of the original British draft would meet the purpose.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he was glad to notice that the council was approaching agreement, although, perhaps, agreement was not yet quite complete. It must be remembered that in offering support in certain contingencies the Allied Governments were pledging themselves to sending men and money. The question of which side attacked and which was attacked was very much a matter of tactics. The offer made might induce the Border States to encourage attack on themselves, in the hope of obtaining support from the Powers. As to the enquiry its main purpose was to facilitate the resumption of economic relations, and a prior step to this was the resumption of political relations. One was essential to the other. The International Labour Bureau would not meet the case. The council did not wish to know the condition of Russian factories; it required an investigation by a body able to give a political judgment. The League of Nations, on which so many States were represented, appeared to be the best body for the purpose. The Governments could not undertake the task themselves, but they could, without any evil effects, ask the League of Nations to do it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked Viscount Chinda for his view on this point.

VISCOUNT CHINDA replied that he preferred that the enquiry should be made by the League of Nations rather than by the Labour Bureau. He did not entirely associate himself with the view that the enquiry should sound the

political intentions of the Soviet Government. What he wanted was a weighty, impartial and objective enquiry.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that what was to be asked of the League of Nations was not one of its usual functions. They might refuse to undertake the task. If they were to be asked to undertake it they must be given the widest possible commission. The Labour Bureau was not, he thought, a suitable body. The main interest in Russia, both from the economic and the political points of view, was agriculture. The Labour Bureau would be inclined to confine its attention to industry. There was also a military aspect to the question. Further, it had been stated of late that the old organisation of the Zemstvos [*sic*]<sup>5</sup> had been restored. This was a question to be enquired into. He thought it was desirable, therefore, to ask the League of Nations to make the widest possible enquiry into all the conditions of Russia at the present time.

SIGNOR NITTI thought that the intentions of the Allied Governments would best be expressed by using words to the following effect, viz.:—

‘The Allied Governments will invite the League of Nations to send to Russia a commission composed of representatives of each of the Allied Governments, who will be instructed to submit a report on the general, political and economic situation and also on the possibility of re-establishing economic and political relations with Russia. The conclusions arrived at by the commission will enable the Allied Governments to decide on the attitude which they should adopt towards the Soviet Government.’

M. MILLERAND expressed the view that Signor Nitti had, in the proposal which he had just made, very clearly<sup>6</sup> renewed, under a new form, the proposals which he had made that morning. He (M. Millerand) had been unable to accept them that morning, and he was still unable to accept them that afternoon. On the other hand, he thought it might be possible to arrive at some agreement on the basis of the proposal put forward by Lord Curzon. The only difference which appeared to exist between Lord Curzon and himself was that Lord Curzon desired to invite the League of Nations to institute the contemplated enquiry.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that it would be impossible to limit the scope of its enquiries once the commission reached Russia.

All sorts of opinions besides those suggested by Signor Scialoja were bound to have a bearing on the problem. He hoped Signor Nitti would not press his views. The Allied Governments undoubtedly wished to know what were the real facts with regard to the situation in Russia, but he would suggest that they should not attempt to limit the scope of the enquiry to be undertaken by the League of Nations. The League of Nations might itself ask for more specific instructions, but he hoped that they would not do so. He hoped the League of Nations would send their commission to Russia and that it would report on everything that it saw. Consequently, the less detailed the terms of reference, the more likely would the Allies be to get something serviceable,

<sup>5</sup> Zemstvos were Russian elective provincial and district councils.

<sup>6</sup> The typescript text here read ‘cleverly’.

which would enable them to come to a conclusion. In conclusion, he trusted that M. Millerand would see how temperate were the proposals now put forward by the British Government, and that he would accept the form suggested by Lord Curzon.

M. MILLERAND asked that the concluding part of the last paragraph, as proposed to be amended by Lord Curzon, should be read.

M. MANTOUX read the following draft:—

‘ . . . ’ As a result they have noticed with satisfaction the intention of the Bureau de Travail, an organ of the League of Nations, to send a commission to Russia to enquire into and examine the facts. They think, however, that this enquiry would be invested with even greater authority and with superior chances of success, if it were made upon the initiative and under the supervision of the Council of the League of Nations itself, and they invite that body to take action in this direction.’

(Paragraph 3, as thus amended, was accepted.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE next proposed that the concluding portion of the first paragraph should be amended as follows, in order to meet M. Millerand’s views:—

‘ . . . ’ The Allied Governments will reply that they cannot accept the responsibility of advising them to continue a war which may be injurious to their own interests. Still less, could they advise them to adopt a policy of aggression against Russia. If, however, Soviet Russia attacks them inside their legitimate frontiers the Allies will give them every possible support.’

(Paragraph 1, thus amended, was accepted.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed that the first sentence of the second paragraph should, by the addition of the word ‘diplomatic,’ be made to read:—

‘The Allies cannot enter into *diplomatic* relations with Soviet Russia in view of their past experiences.’

The Allied Governments had agreed to continue trading with Soviet Russia. Great Britain had also had indirect relations with the Soviet Government, both in connection with prisoners of war and trade. Consequently, in his opinion, the Allies could only agree to refrain from having diplomatic relations with the Government.

SIGNOR NITTI said that the Italian Government would be prepared to agree at present not to enter into ‘diplomatic’ relations with Russia, but he claimed the right to enter into economic relations with Russia. The question possessed the greatest interest for Italy on account of her situation nearest to Russia and on account of the great lack of raw materials in Italy. Consequently, Italian business men were clamouring to be permitted to send commissions to Russia, and he wished the council to say that he would be

<sup>7</sup> Punctuation as in original quotation.

perfectly entitled to permit them to do so. He wished that there should be no doubt on that question, as he would not like misunderstandings afterwards to arise. In that connection, it must be clearly realised that economic relations necessarily implied some sort of indirect relations with Soviet Russia.

M. MILLERAND suggested the following text which he thought would meet the case:—

‘The Allies cannot recognise the Soviet Government in view of their past experiences.’

SIGNOR NITTI said that he particularly objected to the views expressed in the second sentence of paragraph 2. Those words could only be interpreted to mean that, in the opinion of the Allied Governments, the Soviet Government was not civilised and consisted of a pack of scoundrels. In other words, it meant breaking with the Soviet Government. At the same time, however, the Allied Governments intended to invite the League of Nations to carry out an enquiry in Russia, with a view to re-establishing, if possible, relations with the Soviet Government.

M. MILLERAND, intervening, said that no doubt Signor Nitti had given expression of his intentions, but they were not those of France.

SIGNOR NITTI, continuing, said that at any rate he would be unable to sign the document, should the views expressed in the second sentence of paragraph 2 remain unchanged. He did not think that the Allies could say that the Soviet Government was an uncivilised Government.

M. MILLERAND suggested that [? the part of] paragraph 2, which shocked Signor Nitti, should be omitted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed. At the same time, he felt compelled to insist upon the inclusion of the word ‘diplomatic’ in the first sentence. He thought the Allied Governments should be careful not to commit themselves to something to which they would later on be unable to adhere. Should the Soviet Government finally establish its régime in Russia, the Allies would eventually be compelled to recognise it.

Some of those present thought that the Soviet Government would not last. But suppose it did stay there this year, next year, and the following year? The Allied Governments would then be compelled to recognise it. It would be impossible to carry on the work of the world without such recognition. Consequently, the statement should not be made that the Allied Governments would never recognise the Soviet Government. They could say that they could not recognise it until something happened; for instance: ‘Until the Soviet Government changed its diplomatic practices.’ It would be in the recollection of the council that the British Government had made a similar statement in the case of Serbia after the murder of the King and Queen,<sup>8</sup> and, yet, now they had made a great war to support the very King they had decided never to recognise. He would suggest, therefore, that the first

<sup>8</sup> For the reaction of His Majesty’s Government to the murder of the King and Queen of Serbia in 1903 see G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 124 ff.

sentence of paragraph 2 should be amended to read: 'The Allies cannot enter into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Government in view of their past experiences until the Bolshevik horrors come to an end, or until it shows it is ready to conform to the diplomatic methods of all civilised Governments.'

M. MILLERAND said that he would agree to the insertion of the word 'diplomatic' in the first sentence, provided the second sentence of paragraph 2 were retained.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he must again put to the council a question to which he had as yet received no answer. The council proposed to say that they would not enter into relations with the Soviet Government, but Italy wished to send commercial missions, and even diplomatic missions of enquiry to Russia. The demand might, indeed, become so insistent, that he would be unable to refuse it. He could not, at any rate, pretend that Russia did not exist. Under those conditions he could not agree to the retention of the second sentence of paragraph 2.

LORD CURZON said that, under the circumstances, he would ask the council to accept the following amended text to replace the first two sentences of paragraph 2: 'The Allies cannot enter into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Government, in view of their past experience, until they have arrived at the conviction that Bolshevik horrors have ceased and that the Soviet Government shows that it is ready to conform to the diplomatic methods of all civilised countries.'

(This was agreed to.)

(The draft memorandum, as amended, was agreed to, subject to a second reading. For full text of amended memorandum see Appendix 1.)

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked that the council should decide to have a full discussion upon the high prices prevailing in Europe. He would ask his colleagues to instruct their advisers to prepare papers setting forth: (1) their reasons for high prices, and (2) any suggestions they may be able to make with the object of bringing prices down. He thought the mere fact that the council were making such an enquiry would have a good effect in the markets of Europe.

SIGNOR NITTI suggested that the connected question of the exchanges should be considered at the same time.

(It was decided that the questions of high prices in Europe and the exchanges should be discussed with experts on Thursday morning next.)

3. SIGNOR SCIALOJA invited attention to a report (Appendix 2) which he distributed, relating to the invasion of Albania by the Serbs.

*Invasion of  
Albania by Serbs*

(The meeting adjourned at 6.30 p.m. until 11 a.m. on Tuesday morning, February 24.)

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 23, 1920.

<sup>9</sup> Cf., however, the text in appendix 1 below.



## APPENDIX 1 TO NO. 23

### Allied Policy in Russia

#### *Conclusions reached by the Supreme Council on February 23, 1920*

The Allied Governments have agreed on the following conclusions:—

If the political groups which border on the frontiers of Soviet Russia, and whose independence or *de facto* autonomy they have recognised, were to approach them and to ask for advice as to what attitude they should take with regard to Soviet Russia, the Allied Governments would reply that they cannot accept the responsibility of advising them to continue a war which may be injurious to their own interests. Still less would they advise them to adopt a policy of aggression towards Russia. If, however, Soviet Russia attacks them inside their legitimate frontiers, the Allies will give them every possible support.

The Allies cannot enter into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Government, in view of their past experiences, until they have arrived at the conviction that Bolshevik horrors have come to an end, and that the Government of Moscow is ready to conform its methods to those of all civilised Governments. The British and Swiss Governments were both compelled to expel representatives of the Soviet Government from their respective countries. Commerce between Russia and the rest of Europe, which is so essential for the improvement of economic conditions, not only in Russia, but in the rest of the world, will be encouraged to the utmost degree possible without relaxation of the attitude described above.

Furthermore, the Allies agree in the belief that it is highly desirable to obtain impartial and authoritative information regarding the conditions now prevailing in Russia. They have, therefore, noted with satisfaction the proposal before the International Labour Bureau, which is a branch of the League of Nations, to send a commission of investigation to Russia, to examine the facts. They think, however, that this enquiry would be invested with even greater authority, and with superior chances of success, if it were made upon the initiative, and conducted under the supervision, of the Council of the League of Nations itself, and they invite that body to take action in this direction.

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 23, 1920.

## APPENDIX 2 TO NO. 23

### *Translation of a Memorandum, dated London, February 23, 1920, submitted by the Italian Delegation, Peace Conference*

For some time past Serbian troops have been concentrating near the Albanian frontier to the north of Scutari. It now appears from telegrams received by the Italian delegation that certain Serbian detachments have crossed the frontier and advanced as far as Royana, thus occupying the stronghold of Tarabosch.

These acts are contrary to the decisions taken at Versailles in the month of October 1918,<sup>10</sup> whereby the Serbians would not have taken part in the occupation of Scutari in Albania. These acts are also contrary to the decisions taken by the conference in the month of January 1919,<sup>11</sup> according to which it was decided to exclude from the contested areas the troops of the States claiming the same.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Volume IV, No. 15, note 2.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. iii, p. 715.

Furthermore, the Serbian military measures in question are producing lively excitement amongst the Albanian population, whose minds are thereby greatly troubled. Sanguinary encounters have taken place, and, at any moment, grave incidents may occur which would compromise peace.

The Italian delegation have the honour to invite the attention of the British and French delegates to these facts, which, no doubt, have already been reported to them by their respective officials residing in these regions, with the request that they should urgently consider the necessity of taking steps so that the Serbian troops may evacuate Albanian territories.

## No. 24

I.C.P. 44.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, February 24, 1920, at 11 a.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Gregory; For Minute 3 only: Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Forbes Adam; **SECRETARIES,** Sir M. Hankey, Captain Abraham Major Caccia.

*France:* M. Millerand, President of the Council; M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer.

*Italy:* Signor Nitti, Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Galli, Colonel Castoldi; **SECRETARY,** Signor Trombetti.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda.

**INTERPRETER:** Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. **MR. LLOYD GEORGE** asked whether the draft, A.J. 34, Revise (Appendix 1),<sup>1</sup> was accepted by all.

*Allied Policy in regard to Russia*

**SIGNOR NITTI** said that he wished to make a comment. He had agreed not to resume diplomatic relations with the Soviet Government, but he understood that each Government had a free hand in resuming economic relations. He had reserved the right to allow Italian commercial missions to go to Russia. They would have no official or semi-official character, but he could see no reason to stop persons with commercial or industrial interests to promote from going to Russia at their own risk.

**MR. LLOYD GEORGE** observed that this would surely lead to the appointment of agents in such places as Odessa and other commercial centres, for the protection of these missions. He observed that, at the time when no relations were being maintained with the Serbian Government, arrangements of this kind had been made in Serbia.

**M. MILLERAND** said that, seeing a whole day had been spent in framing a

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This revise, dated February 24, 1920, of appendix 1 to No. 23 embodied the amendments recorded below and was communicated, with minor verbal variation, to the House of Commons that afternoon by Mr. Bonar Law, Lord Privy Seal: see *Parl. Debs.* 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 125, cols. 1501-2.

draft to regulate the common attitude of the Powers towards Russia, he trusted that no independent action of any one of the Powers would be taken which might be inconsistent with that draft. For instance, he hoped that Signor Nitti would not allow Signor Turati<sup>2</sup> to go to Russia in the guise of a merchant.

SIGNOR NITTI assured M. Millerand that he would not do so.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it was important that there should be no misunderstanding. He thought that there could be no commercial relations with Russia without the establishment of agents to protect the traders of various nationalities.

M. MILLERAND said that he would not object, provided these were not consular agents, and that their appointment involved no renewal of diplomatic relations.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he meant strictly commercial agents.

M. MILLERAND said he assumed that nothing would be done before receiving the result of the enquiry which the League of Nations was to be asked to make. In other words, that no economic relations would be entered into before that.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he did not agree with this view. The resumption of economic relations had already been decided on in Paris. The purchase of wheat and flax was to continue. All he suggested was that the Powers should have agents to whom their nationals trading in Russia could resort for help.

M. MILLERAND said that, to make the matter quite clear, he wished to ask a definite question: Was it proposed to ask Lenin's Government for an *exequatur* for these agents?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had no such intention. As to the draft itself (A.J. 34) (Appendix 1), he wished to suggest a slight amendment. He desired to add a phrase to the first sentence of paragraph 2, as follows:—

'to conform its methods *and its diplomatic conduct* to those of all civilised Governments.'

He wished this for two reasons. The methods of the Bolshevik Government had already been referred to in the same sentence, and he wished to stigmatise the abuse of diplomatic privilege which the Soviet representatives abroad had made. For the same reason, in the following sentence he wished to insert the reason for the expulsion of Soviet representatives, in some such words as 'because they had abused their privileges.'

These alterations in the draft were accepted, and, with the further substitution of the word 'communities' for the word 'groups', in the first line the draft was adopted.

It was further agreed—

That this document should be published in the press by the various Governments at a moment considered opportune by each.

<sup>2</sup> A prominent Italian socialist publicist.

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had to answer a question in Parliament which concerned his Italian colleague. Much pressure had been brought on him to publish the Treaty of London.<sup>3</sup> Would Signor Nitti agree to this?

SIGNOR NITTI replied that he would welcome an official publication, since the essentials were already known as a consequence of publications by the Bolsheviks, the Jugoslavs and the 'Osservatore Romano'.

It was agreed—

That the Governments should be free to publish the Treaty of London when they chose.

3. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that on the subject of Smyrna, there were two points requiring decision. The first was whether Turkish suzerainty should be maintained over the Greek area. The second was, in that event should Deputies be allowed to go thence and take their seats in the Greek Chamber at Athens, according to the request of M. Veniselos.

SIGNOR NITTI said it was very difficult to reconcile the two propositions. Representation of the country in the Greek Parliament was clearly inconsistent with Turkish suzerainty. There must be either Turkish or Greek suzerainty. The latter would involve no contradiction, but might lead to war. There might, on the other hand, be a local Parliament under Turkish suzerainty, a Parliament in which all the elements of the population would find representation, and not only the Greek. Furthermore, to leave the country under Turkish suzerainty while allowing Deputies to go to Athens, would create a bad precedent. Arabs, for instance, remaining within Turkey proper might claim to send representatives to a Syrian Chamber.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that, before reaching a conclusion on this subject, it would be well to hear M. Veniselos, to whom he thought the question had not yet been put.

M. MILLERAND said that he had no objection to this, but he would like to add a word to what Signor Nitti had said. Before he left the conference to return to Paris, he had agreed that the least bad solution for Smyrna was the maintenance of Turkish suzerainty. He thought there was a complete antinomy between Turkish suzerainty and representation of the country in the Greek Chamber. The best plan, he thought, was to declare that Turkey retained her suzerainty, and let the Greek Government make the best arrangements it could in the area. M. Veniselos had a favourable precedent in Crete. From this he could easily infer what was likely to take place in Smyrna.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that it was this very question which had raised so much trouble in Crete. The Cretans insisted on sending their Deputies to Athens, and the Porte strenuously denied their right to do so. This had produced very great tension and threats of war.

<sup>3</sup> *V. op. cit.*, vol. 125, cols. 1485-6.

M. MILLERAND said that he was assuming that the council would decide against the sending of Deputies to Athens.

It was decided—

To defer discussion until M. Veniselos was able to attend the council.

4. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had just heard from The Hague that the Netherlands Government had taken the tone of the last Allied *Extradition of the Kaiser* note, regarding the Kaiser,<sup>4</sup> very much amiss. The document was regarded as offensive, and a very sharp reply had been prepared, which the Queen of the Netherlands had agreed to sign. This reply, however, had been much turned [? toned] down by the various Parliamentary groups consulted on the subject. There appeared to be an impression in Holland that the demand came from Great Britain only, and that the other Powers were indifferent. If the Continental Powers did not care whether or not the Kaiser remained in Holland, he begged them to say so, for it appeared to him that the risks involved affected them more than Great Britain. If they shared the view that the presence of the Kaiser in Holland represented a danger to peace, he thought they should instruct their diplomatic agents to exert pressure on the Dutch Government.

M. BERTHELOT said that the French Minister at The Hague had informed the French Foreign Office one day that his British colleague had instructions to exert pressure on the Dutch Government even to the extent of threatening a rupture of diplomatic relations. At that moment M. Millerand had not assumed office as President of the French Council. Nevertheless, the French Minister had been instructed to back his British colleague. He had communicated this to his British colleague, who told him that, as yet, he had no formal instructions to exert pressure, although the views of the British Government had been communicated to him. The French Minister, consequently, had waited for a cue. When M. Millerand became President of the Council, instructions were sent to the French Minister to support his British colleague in any action he might take. He carried out these instructions, and a report had been received in Paris of a long conversation he had had with M. de Karnebeek.<sup>5</sup> In any case, he believed he was authorised by M. Millerand to say that whatever the British Minister did he would be supported by his French colleague.

LORD CURZON said that he might be permitted to inform the council of the various stages of the affair. The first stage, anterior to the despatch of the last note, he need not deal with. What had happened since was that the Powers had reiterated their demand, had expressed surprise that Holland herself did not perceive the danger of the presence of the Kaiser so close to the German frontier, and had hinted that his removal to safer quarters would be desirable. The Netherlands Government had proposed to send an indignant reply. This reply had been accepted by the Queen, but after further consideration it had been withdrawn. The probable reply would be to the

<sup>4</sup> See No. 4, note 7.

<sup>5</sup> Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.

effect that Holland was not insensible to the considerations set forth by the Allies, and that the removal of the Kaiser further from the frontier, namely, to Doorn, was under consideration. It appeared that the Kaiser had acquired a house there. The British Minister hoped that the British Government would firmly resist this proposal, and he (Lord Curzon) hoped that the council would take the view that it should be resisted. The joint letter had hinted that the Kaiser ought to be removed out of Europe. Possibly the Dutch would suggest Java, or Curaçao in the West Indies. They might prefer the latter, as they seemed to fear some agitation among the Mahometans in their Asiatic Possessions. It mattered little to the Powers whether the Kaiser was removed to the Malay Archipelago or to the West Indies. The principal thing was to checkmate the purpose of removing the Kaiser to Doorn. For this, very emphatic and strong action by all the Powers would be necessary. Lord Curzon then read certain extracts from a letter he had received from the British Minister at The Hague. The British Minister regretted that the penultimate sentence of the joint letter had suggested the internment of the Kaiser in Holland. The document had been published in an attenuated form in the Dutch press; he had had it published in full in the 'Gazette d'Hollande,' and one Dutch paper had copied this. M. de Karnebeek avoided seeing the Allied Ministers, but he thought it was very necessary to make it clear to him that the Allies would not tolerate the presence of the Kaiser at Doorn. This might lead the Dutch to reply that they had no proposals to make, but this seemed improbable. Therefore it appeared necessary to instruct the Allied representatives in Holland to say that the Powers could not agree to Doorn or to internment in Holland at all, and that the strongest possible pressure should be exercised to obtain a more suitable solution.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he thought that this time the Powers should show a firm and united front, and that their Ministers should be instructed to exercise the greatest pressure to say that the Powers could not yield and would eventually be forced to use strong measures, even to the extent of a blockade.

M. MILLERAND said that a question of form and a question of substance were involved. As to the first, could the Powers take any step before they had seen the Dutch reply? He thought not. As to the substance, he must confess that his impression had not been that the council had demanded internment in a colony. He thought the joint document had pointed out that the Powers could not be satisfied with the present conditions of the Kaiser's residence in Holland. Allusion had been made, in a guarded way, to Russians who had been interned. It had been observed that it was not tolerable that the Kaiser should have a privileged position, but the means of guarding against the danger represented by the Kaiser's presence in Holland had been left to the Dutch Government, which might elect to meet it either by internment in Holland or by internment in one of her colonies.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he agreed that no action could be taken until the Dutch answer had been received, but it was possible, in the meantime, to

remove the impression that France and Italy were indifferent. If they were indifferent, he would like to be told so at once. He personally thought the presence of the Kaiser in Holland a danger to Europe, though it must clearly be a greater danger to the Powers on the Continent than to Great Britain. The Powers must be in a position to act together, and Great Britain could not go further in such a question than France.

M. MILLERAND said that he was not at all indifferent to the favourable result of the common *démarche*. He wished it to succeed, and would continue to act in concert with his colleagues. It was essential, however, to know what the Powers could do. After receiving the Dutch answer, this should be considered, and the council should decide whether it was advisable to enter into a course which might ultimately lead to the blockading of Holland. When the answer came the council should decide exactly how far it was desirable to go, and then to go there together.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the view that the character of the Dutch reply would depend entirely on the attitude adopted by the Allied Governments, viz., whether they made their intentions clear and unequivocal, or not. Should the Dutch [? Government] think that the French and Italian Governments were hesitating, it would undoubtedly permit the Kaiser to live in Doorn, where he had purchased a house, at a distance from the German frontier. Should the Dutch Government have reason to believe that the French and Italian Governments were indifferent as to the outcome of this question, it would undoubtedly send a reply merely conceding the very least the Allies might be expected to accept. On the other hand, should the Allied Governments decide to give clear instructions to their representatives in Holland, insisting on the acceptance of their demands, the Dutch Government would undoubtedly remove the Kaiser out of Holland. In his opinion, feebleness in handling the situation might, eventually, place the Dutch Government in such a position as to compel the Allies to use coercion in order to prevent another clause of the Treaty of Peace with Germany being trampled on. It was essential not to create the impression in Germany that the Treaty of Versailles merely constituted a gigantic bluff. Consequently, he would like to know, at this stage, whether the French and Italian Governments were going to insist on the Kaiser being cleared out of Holland or not. It was evident that the British Government should not be permitted to issue instructions to their representative in Holland to bring pressure to bear on the Dutch Government for the surrender of the Kaiser, should that attitude subsequently have to be abandoned because it did not receive the support of the French and Italian Governments.

SIGNOR NITTI said that as far as the past was concerned, the Allied Governments were in agreement, and their solidarity was complete. All the Allied Governments were equally responsible in regard to what had been done up to date. But, in his opinion, a clear distinction must be drawn between past action and present action. He personally was under the impression that when Holland had been asked to give certain guarantees with regard to the Kaiser, the Allies' request could have been interpreted to mean that the

Kaiser should be placed in a place further removed from the frontier. That was the interpretation which he had placed on the note addressed to Holland and, he thought, that Holland too could have taken that view. Presumably he had misunderstood the intentions of the council, for he now realised that removal to a colony had been intended. The question then arose: How far should the Allies insist on that being done? In his opinion the Allies would gain nothing and only place themselves in a difficult situation by insisting on the removal of the Kaiser. In the first place, in his opinion, the question of the execution of the treaty was in no way involved. The treaty concerned the relations of the Allies with Germany. It could not have any binding force on a neutral State. Consequently, the Kaiser question could in no way affect our political relations with Holland in so far as the treaty was concerned. There remained, therefore, purely the question of international morality, and political expediency. He (Signor Nitti) had great admiration for the history of Great Britain, but he doubted whether she had been wise in sending Napoleon to Saint Helena. At the present moment the Kaiser was not popular in Germany, and his restoration appeared to him to be a most improbable event, but to persecute him would be to give him greater popularity than he would otherwise ever be likely to attain.

On the other hand, should Holland refuse to yield to the demands of the Allies, the latter would be compelled, either to make war or to institute a blockade. War, would, in his opinion, be out of the question. And, should the Allies decide to starve Holland by a blockade, grave responsibility would fall upon the shoulders of the Allies, with the inevitable result that the Kaiser would be placed in a better position.

In conclusion, he agreed that the Allied Governments must show complete solidarity, and complete agreement in their representations to Holland. But, would it be wise to insist too strongly on extreme measures, merely on account of the possible danger connected with the retention of the Kaiser in Holland?

M. MILLERAND said that, in his opinion, two distinct acts were involved in the application of article 227 of the Treaty of Peace. The first question had been examined by Mr. Lloyd George. It dealt with the attitude which the Allies should adopt towards Holland. That question turned on the interpretation of the last paragraph of article 227. There could be no doubt as to the attitude of the French Government in regard thereto. Indeed, before that Government had been officially informed that Great Britain intended to make a representation to the Dutch Government, through their diplomatic representative at The Hague, the French Government had instructed its representative to take similar action. Consequently he fully agreed that the Allied representatives at The Hague should receive instructions to make a representation in common to the Dutch Government, in terms to be decided by that council.

The second point, connected with the execution of article 227 of the Treaty of Peace, dealt with the trial of the Kaiser. It was therein laid down that 'a special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby assuring him the guarantees essential to the right of defence.' That question, however,



did not require to be settled to-day, but it should continue to receive due consideration. Sooner or later, public opinion would have to be given the satisfaction of a public trial of the Kaiser by a tribunal which would receive documentary evidence and hear witnesses. In his opinion, that trial would have to be held, whether the Kaiser surrendered or not. The terms of article 227 of the Treaty of Peace must be applied, whatever answer Holland might give to the request of the Allies for the surrender of the Kaiser.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that the question of the trial of the Kaiser in default could be discussed, as stated by M. Millerand, at a later date. The immediate question which demanded a reply that day was whether the representatives of the Allies at The Hague should act in concert in order to press the Dutch Government to exile the Kaiser to one of their colonies; or, whether the Allies were satisfied to leave the Kaiser in Holland. Signor Nitti, being far removed from Berlin, appeared to be indifferent whether the Kaiser remained in Holland or went to Curaçao. On the other hand, he (Mr. Lloyd George) was under the impression that the council had previously decided that it would be desirable to put the Kaiser out of Holland. A reference to the minutes of those meetings would, he thought, convince Signor Nitti. Accordingly, instructions to that effect had been given to the British Minister at The Hague. The question, however, now remained to be settled whether the Allied Governments should, at this stage, bring pressure to bear informally on the Dutch Government and insist on the banishment of the Kaiser. Should that not be the view of the council, the British Government would be compelled to give instructions to their Minister at The Hague to conform to that decision. Up to the present, the British Government had been acting under the impression that the Kaiser must be compelled to leave Holland, as his presence there constituted a danger to Europe. Signor Nitti had expressed a contrary view, which, however, was not in accordance with the information received by the British Foreign Office. He (Mr. Lloyd George) was, however, at the present moment, concerned to know exactly what were the views of the French and Italian Governments in the matter.

M. MILLERAND said that he would be quite prepared on his part to indicate the lines to be followed by the Allies in their instructions to their Ministers at The Hague, both in regard to the language to be used and the attitude to be adopted towards the Dutch Government. He, too, like Signor Nitti, had been under the impression that in their note to the Dutch Government, the Allied Governments had merely intended that the Kaiser should be removed from Amerongen.<sup>6</sup> He appeared to recollect that several solutions had been discussed, and that it had been contemplated that the Kaiser could either be removed to another residence in Holland further from the German frontier, or to a colony. To-day, Mr. Lloyd George had asked what common instructions should be given to the Allied Ministers at The Hague for their guidance. In reply he would propose that the Allied Ministers should suggest to the

<sup>6</sup> The former German Emperor was temporarily occupying the residence of Count Bentinck at Amerongen.

Dutch Government that the Kaiser should be sent to a far off island as the best solution of the difficulty. But, that suggestion should not be made a *sine quâ non* condition, because, if the Dutch Government refused to comply the Allied Governments would have to be prepared to accept the extreme consequences, namely, to apply the blockade. That is to say, the blockade would be used in order that the Kaiser should be sent to Curaçao. In his opinion he could understand a blockade in order to obtain the surrender of the Kaiser, but public opinion would never understand a blockade merely for the purpose of obtaining the transfer of the Kaiser to a distant island.

To sum up, in his opinion the Allied Governments should indicate to the Dutch Government that the best solution of the difficulty would be to send the Kaiser to one of their colonies. Should the Dutch Government then refuse to accede to that request it would remain responsible for the consequence. It would be clearly understood, however, that the Dutch Government would be expected to take all necessary precautions to intern and guard the Kaiser in exactly the same manner as would be done in the case of any other political refugee. Whatever instructions, however, were sent to The Hague, the Allied Governments must act in concert, and maintain in the face of Holland and the world a strictly united attitude.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that if M. Millerand's statement represented the attitude of the conference, the British Government would accept the same. He would merely add that the British Government took a different view; but the matter was not of sufficient consequence to create disagreement amongst themselves. He had not so far invited Viscount Chinda to give the views of the Japanese Government because the question was one which affected European safety.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that in the continued absence of instructions from his Government on the whole question under consideration, he was not in a position to bind his Government. He would, however, recommend his Government to act in consultation with the other Allied Governments. He felt sure, at any rate, that the Japanese Government would fully sympathise with the desire of the Allies to remove to a distance the danger which threatened Europe.

LORD CURZON said that M. Millerand had suggested that the Allied Governments should send common instructions to their representatives at The Hague to the effect that in their view the best solution of the difficulty would be to send the Kaiser to a colony; stress being laid on the agreement thereon existing between the Allies. It appeared to him to be very desirable that the instructions should be in the same terms. He suggested, therefore, that M. Berthelot should prepare a draft for the approval of the council.

It was agreed—

That an identic note should be sent by each of the Allied Governments to their representatives at The Hague, instructing them to urge the Dutch Government to exile the Kaiser to a Dutch colony.

M. Berthelot agreed to draft the note in question, which would be submitted to the Council for approval.

It was further agreed that the note in question should be despatched forthwith, before receipt of any communication from the Dutch Government.

(M. Veniselos entered the Council Chamber.)

6 [*sic*]. MR. LLOYD GEORGE informed M. Veniselos that, in connection with the question of Smyrna, the suggestion had been made that representatives from that area should be allowed to attend the Parliament at Athens in the event of Turkish sovereignty being there maintained. It had been thought, however, that such a procedure would create an anomalous situation, since people who had sworn allegiance to Turkey could hardly go to Athens to swear allegiance to the King of Greece. On the other hand, the subject of a foreign Power could hardly be permitted to attend a Greek Parliament.

An alternative suggestion had likewise been put forward, namely, the establishment of a local parliament for the Smyrna territories, and he asked for an expression of M. Veniselos's views with regard to these proposals.

M. VENISELOS said that he fully realised the incompatibility between allegiance to Turkey and the right, which the inhabitants of Smyrna would demand, to send representatives to Athens. In reply, he would unhesitatingly say that it would be better not to maintain Turkish sovereignty than to prevent representatives going to Athens. But, before giving his reasons for making that statement, he craved permission to make a few introductory remarks with the object of proving that Smyrna formed no part of Asia Minor. The region which must be ceded to Greece contained 960,000 inhabitants. Of those, 562,000 were Greeks, 91,000 Armenians and 306,000 Mahometans. That is to say, the Turks constituted less than one-third of the total population of that region. The argument had frequently been used that Asia Minor constituted a geographical entity, so that no consideration could be given to the fact that in a certain part of Asia Minor the population was entirely Greek. But Asia Minor did not constitute a geographical unit. No Mediterranean peninsula, with the exception of Italy, constituted a unit. The argument did not apply either to Hibernia [*?* Iberia] or to the Balkans, or to Asia Minor, which contained two quite distinct parts: the Anatolian High Plateau and the sea shore. On that point he would invoke the evidence of two great geographers—Philippon and Reclus—the one a German, the other a Frenchman. Thus, M. Elisée Reclus, in the ninth volume of his '*Nouvelle Géographie universelle*,' had stated: 'In fact, the islands, the peninsulas, the river valleys of Anatolia up to the foot of the mountains and the interior plateaux do not possess an Asiatic character; they belong geographically and historically to Europe.' Again, Dr. Alfred Philippon, in his '*Reisen und Forschungen [Forschungen] in Kleinasien*,' had said: 'It is inevitable to recognise a peculiarity in common between Western Asia Minor and Greece which compels one to consider both as constituting a geographical unit, namely, that of the *Ægean*.'

MR. LLOYD GEORGE begged M. Veniselos to give his views with regard to the establishment of a local parliament at Smyrna.

M. VENISELOS said that in his introductory remarks he had merely wished to show that the claims of Greece to the Smyrna region were not based only on its occupation, but on the fact that the Greek people inhabiting that territory must be protected from cession to Turkey. He thought it had been agreed that, in any eventuality, the region in question could only be administered by a local parliament. The local parliament would not, however, in his opinion, be able to solve the difficult questions which would inevitably arise. The situation in Greece presented a complete contrast to the Irish situation in Great Britain. In Ireland the inhabitants demanded a parliament of their own, and did not seek representation in London. In Greece the situation was entirely different. The Greeks refused to accept a separate parliament, and demanded to send representatives to Athens. The council would remember what occurred in Crete, and exactly the same would happen in Smyrna. The Smyrna Parliament would insist on sending representatives to Athens.

He fully realised that diplomacy was obliged to accept half-measures in order to avoid greater difficulties, namely, war. In the present case, however, war had been waged and the victors could now impose whatever conditions they desired. Under these circumstances, he thought it would be unwise for the victors to create causes of future conflict. The question of representation in Athens need not be settled at once. But he would beg the council once for all to free the country from Turkish sovereignty and to create an independent territory. The local people would then subsequently decide on the basis of self-determination, as a result of a referendum, whether they wished to send representatives to Athens or not.

Finally, he would ask permission to add a few words with regard to the Islands of the Dodecanese, which were intimately connected with the adjoining mainland. He felt certain that the islands would demand to form part of one and the same territory with the coastal area. Could the Allies prevent that happening?

Or, would the Sultan interfere and prevent the wished-for union? A nominal Turkish sovereignty as suggested would not satisfy Turkey. In his opinion, Turkey would merely accept a nominal sovereignty as a means of eventually regaining complete possession of those territories, thus constituting a source of unending future troubles.

(M. Veniselos then withdrew and the discussion was adjourned to the afternoon.)

7. SIGNOR NITTI handed in a note relating to Montenegro (Appendix 2),  
*Montenegro* with a request that a discussion thereon should take place that  
afternoon.

(This was agreed to.)

8. SIGNOR NITTI informed the council, in connection with the publication of the correspondence relating to the Adriatic, that he proposed to publish also the Italian reply<sup>7</sup> to the note of the 9th December.

(This was agreed to.)

(The meeting then adjourned until 4 p.m.)

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 24, 1920.

## APPENDIX 2 TO No. 24

### Montenegro

#### *Memorandum by Signor Nitti*

(Translation.)

Immediately on being informed of the Austrian ultimatum<sup>8</sup> by the Serbian Government, the Montenegrin Government replied: 'Serbia can count on Montenegro's fraternal and unlimited assistance at this critical time for the Serbian nation, as also at any other time.' A few days later (7th August, 1914) the decision of the Montenegrin Government was further manifested by its declaration of war upon Austria-Hungary and Germany. Notwithstanding the exhaustion attributable to the Balkan war, Montenegro waged this fresh war with her usual heroism and without setting any bounds to her efforts, even during the collective Austro-German and Bulgarian offensive of 1915.

It must not be forgotten that during the last months of 1915 the Montenegrin nation and army were literally without bread and any supplies whatsoever, notwithstanding the fact that, under a military treaty concluded with Russia in 1908 for fifteen years (in view of any war against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy), all necessary military assistance was secured to Montenegro.

It was only with the help of the Montenegrin army's resistance that the Serbian army—which had lost its line of retreat from Monastir—was able to reach the Adriatic coast across Albania.

It was the Serbian catastrophe which precipitated that of Montenegro in January 1916. Montenegro was invaded by enemy troops, and the Government had to take refuge at Neuilly-sur-Seine.

During nearly three years of enemy domination the Montenegrin nation suffered terribly, the more so as the Government was quite unable to send necessary assistance or even to return to Montenegro.

After the armistice the position of Montenegro became intolerable, and the state of affairs arising thereby appears all the more extraordinary when one considers that it was an allied country. No light has ever been thrown on what took place in Montenegro after the armistice. An American commission went out there, and the British Government sent out a high official, but we do not know what was the result of their enquiries.<sup>9</sup> It is impossible for anybody to advance an opinion as to the validity of the meeting at Podgoritzza in December [November] 1918, which

<sup>7</sup> See Volume II, No. 64, note 2.

<sup>8</sup> The Austrian ultimatum of July 23, 1914, to Serbia arising from the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand: cf. No. 1, note 17.

<sup>9</sup> See No. 20, note 9.

proclaimed the incorporation of Montenegro with Serbia. This meeting was preceded by the arrest of the most influential leaders, others being prevented from attending, whilst bands of native komitats,<sup>10</sup> under Serbian officers, terrorised the population in order to pave the way for Serbian annexation.

Independence could not be withdrawn from the Montenegrin people so quickly by action which did not take more than a day—decisions having been come to in anticipation and voted by acclamation. A protest movement broke out all over Montenegro and gave rise to fresh atrocities, such as forced immigration into Macedonia; women, children and old men made, under threat of machine-gun fire, to walk in front of the Serbians; unlawful use of the British, American, Italian and French military uniforms, &c.

The Allied Governments were duly informed of the worst cases of violence and atrocities, as also of the sanguinary revolt of the Montenegrin nation.

Although it makes reservations on the subject, the Italian Government is not at present concerned with the interests owned by its nationals in Montenegro, interests which predominate amongst those of the Allies, and which have been enormously prejudiced since the armistice; it is, however, anxious that the Peace Conference should in no way reproach it with having neglected to consider a problem of such importance as that of Montenegro.

Neither is it a question, at present, of the Montenegrin claim to the Narenta Basin, or to the regions of Cattaro and Scutari.

The Italian Government is content, for the present, to demand that the Allied Governments should recognise the independence of the Montenegrin nation, by taking a decision on the subject before they separate.

Montenegro, an allied country which sent 47,000 soldiers into the firing line, of whom nearly 50 per cent. were killed, and which lost almost one-third of its population during the war, has a just claim to the goodwill and assistance of the Allied Powers.

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 24, 1920.

<sup>10</sup> i.e. irregulars (Komitadjis).

## No. 25

I.C.P. 45.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, February 24, 1920, at 4 p.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart (for part only), Mr. Forbes Adam (for part only), Mr. Leeper (for part only), Mr. Philip Kerr; **SECRETARIES,** Sir M. Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Major Caccia.

*France:* M. Millerand, President of the Council; M. Cambon, M. Berthelot.

*Italy:* Signor Nitti, Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Galli, Colonel Castoldi; **SECRETARY,** Signor Trombetti.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda.

**INTERPRETER:** Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. **MR. LLOYD GEORGE** opened the meeting by saying that M. Veniselos was in the anteroom, and would attend the council if any member desired to ask him any question.

*Smyrna*

(It was agreed that it was desirable that, in the first instance, the discussion should proceed without M. Veniselos being present.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he thought that M. Veniselos had made out a very powerful case in favour of cutting off Smyrna entirely from Turkey. Further, the difficulty which had been pointed out by Signor Nitti at their discussions the previous week in respect of the retention of the nominal suzerainty of Turkey, and at the same time of parliamentary representation in the Chamber at Athens, seemed to him to be insuperable. After careful consideration, therefore, he inclined to the view that it would probably be better to drop the question of Turkish suzerainty over Smyrna altogether. The Greeks would find that the administration of Smyrna would be an expensive business, but he suggested that they should be allowed to make any arrangements they liked in regard to a local Parliament, the levy of taxation, and administration generally.

SIGNOR NITTI said that M. Veniselos tried to insist on the absolute sovereignty of the Greeks as the only solution. M. Veniselos, however, quite understood the difficulties that this solution would raise *vis-à-vis* the Turks, who would feel very deeply any solution which was definitely in favour of their enemies, and would consequently injure their *amour-propre*. In Signor Nitti's view, the Turks were unlikely to give any trouble so long as they retained a nominal sovereignty of some kind. This had been amply proved in the case of Lybia [*sic*].<sup>1</sup> If complete sovereignty were accorded to Greece over Smyrna it would be a very serious business. Greece, with that sovereignty incompletely established, would find herself face to face with an indignant and resentful Turkey, while the question of Adrianople was still unsolved. Was it possible, he asked, to have a local Parliament and yet not grant representation at Athens? In any case, he regarded the idea of complete Greek sovereignty as a most dangerous thing. The principal object at present of the Allies was to make peace with Turkey, and to be able to maintain peaceful relations with her. If the Allies decided to grant complete Greek sovereignty and a local Parliament for Smyrna, the inhabitants would inevitably demand representation at Athens. He himself did not object to a local Parliament, as such, though he perceived the dangers that might arise from it; but to accord absolute sovereignty over Smyrna to Greece would assuredly mean the possibility of war in the near future. Before granting such sovereignty, he suggested that the Powers should endeavour to pave the way to a more complete and satisfactory solution by granting, in the meantime, a local Parliament and a nominal Turkish sovereignty.

M. MILLERAND was of opinion that, if the council were to reach a solution of this delicate problem, it would be necessary to compromise. When he had first considered the question he had held the view that the best thing would be to hand back Smyrna to Turkey, after securing adequate guarantees for the Christian populations. He no longer adhered to that view, on account of the promises that he found we had made to the Greek Government. He

<sup>1</sup> Cf. article 1 of the Provisional Peace Treaty of Lausanne of October 15, 1912, printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cvi, p. 1097.

deprecated, however, any rapid passage from one extreme to the other, and he felt that the council must be on its guard against any rash decisions. What were the fundamental objections raised by M. Veniselos against Turkish suzerainty? Were they really substantial? If we fell in with his view, would we not be preparing for ourselves further conflicts? He felt he was expressing the sentiments of the council when he said the last thing they wanted was any further fighting in the near future. But if they installed Greek sovereignty in the Smyrna district there was bound to be war, and war almost at once. If, on the contrary, they permitted a nominal Turkish suzerainty, M. Veniselos and his Greek Administration would meet with certain difficulties. But M. Veniselos had proved himself quite equal to adapting himself to any change in the situation. Time was everything, and he hoped that the council would reach no decision which would almost certainly mean war in the near future, but would reach a solution which would avoid that catastrophe and yet would be susceptible later of adaptation to M. Veniselos's views, if necessary.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he wished that he could feel equally confident with M. Millerand that time would settle everything. He agreed that, as a general rule, this was the fact; but Turkey was an exceptional country, and, in her case, delays only made the situation worse. Time, as a solution, had been tried in the case of Armenia and in the Balkans, and the situation had only deteriorated in consequence, because Turkey was a fundamentally rotten empire. M. Millerand and Signor Nitti advocated cutting the Smyrna district almost entirely adrift from Turkey, but placing it under a nominal Turkish suzerainty, flying the Turkish flag. He would ask them, if their proposal were adopted, first, what would be the relations of the district to Greece, for the inhabitants would be nominally under another sovereignty. Would Greece have any power of taxation? How would it be possible for the Greeks to establish a satisfactory administration in these circumstances, and how would the Greeks be able to recoup themselves for the expenses of that administration? Secondly, supposing the local Parliament, which it was proposed to set up in Smyrna, were to vote for the Greek flag, would the Turk then be likely to yield? Or, to put it in another way, would he be more likely to yield than he would be at present, when the Powers could bring pressure to bear upon him? Was war in five years' time less likely to be troublesome than war to-morrow? He agreed with M. Millerand that the one thing we wanted to do was to get right away from wars. This settlement had no element of permanency. Was it not better, therefore, to make a clean cut than to leave a situation which was bound to lead to the most serious trouble in the course of the next four or five years? The council had agreed that the Turk was to be left in Constantinople, which was much more than he ever had the right or reason to expect. And, in this connection, he would mention to the council, what they might have noticed, that there was a very widespread and influential movement at the present time in England protesting against this decision. But if the Turk were left in Constantinople, he would have must [*much*] less reason to worry about being turned out of



Smyrna. He urged, therefore, that the council should not aim at a temporary and provisional solution, which was full of dangerous possibilities in the future, but should attempt now to seize the opportunity to settle the question outright.

M. MILLERAND said he was in general agreement with what Mr. Lloyd George had said, that time, so far as Turkey was concerned, never had solved, and never could solve, anything satisfactorily, and that time would probably bring no acceptable solution of the present problem. He agreed, also, that it was for this reason that the Armenian and the Balkan questions had never been settled so long as the Turks had maintained some sort of sovereignty over those countries. Mr. Lloyd George had put to the council certain questions as to the relation that Turkish suzerainty would bear to the Greek administration of the Smyrna district. He thought the answer was not difficult. Could not Greece maintain Greek troops there? Certainly; for, as he understood, it was intended that there should be a Turkish gendarmerie and a police force raised, which would be officered by the Allies, for the purpose of keeping order. Again, Mr. Lloyd George had asked whether Greece could raise taxes. He saw no reason to the contrary. In the districts which would be administered by Greece under the nominal Turkish suzerainty Greece would supply advisers, controllers, administrators, and so on. The intention of the Powers was to endeavour to establish in Turkey administrations which should be more or less under the guidance of the Allies. He admitted that his proposition did not offer a clear-cut solution, but, at least, it did not involve an immediate conflict. He hardly dared contemplate what might not be the result of the Greeks and the Turks coming to blows over Smyrna. Inevitably, all the Great Powers, who had considerable interests in Turkey—for instance, France, Greece, Italy—would be involved. The conflagration would not be localised, but would spread throughout the Turkish Empire, and involve the Powers in warlike expeditions. In his opinion, it would be better to agree to an illogical solution than risk a conflict the consequences of which could not at present be measured. Objections could be raised to almost any proposal, but he thought it was of pre-eminent importance that the solution which they adopted should be that which was least open to objection.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he gathered that M. Millerand envisaged a Smyrna administered under the same conditions as Adalia, Cilicia and Syria, but he wished to point out that their respective positions were absolutely different. In Smyrna we had a predominant Greek population, and in proposing to grant to Smyrna a Greek administration, we were merely carrying out the principle of self-determination. But in Cilicia there were practically no French; in Adalia there were hardly any Italians; in Mesopotamia the British were a negligible quantity. So the situations, he said, were not comparable. Again, M. Millerand had suggested that Turkish gendarmerie should be introduced into the administration of Smyrna. But this was exactly the intention in regard to Adalia, although in the former case the population was predominantly Greek.

SIGNOR NITTI said that the Smyrna question was one which it was very difficult to solve. If there had existed there a homogeneous population, it would be different, but this was not the case. Unfortunately, the situation was not so simple as it would have been if the inhabitants were all of one race. He was not inclined to attach too much value to statistics, but he ventured to lay the following figures before the council. In the Smyrna Sanjak there were, according to figures which had been placed before the peace delegates in Paris, 325,000 Moslems, 375,000 Greeks, 18,000 Armenians, and 40,000 Jews. On the other hand, in the Sanjak of Sarukhan there were 350,000 Moslems, 95,000 Greeks and 7,000 Armenians. The situation, therefore, was very complex, on account of the distribution of the various nationalities.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE interposed to point out that the latter figures were not really relevant, as Sarukhan was not intended to be transferred to European administration, as was proposed in the case of Smyrna.

SIGNOR NITTI, continuing, agreed that the majority of the population of Smyrna was Greek, and he said that he agreed with M. Millerand that the Powers were specially concerned in the maintenance of order in Smyrna, and in Turkey generally. He was anxious to act in this matter as the friend of Greece, but he was inclined to doubt whether handing over the administration of Smyrna absolutely to the Greeks without any Turkish suzerainty would really be acting in the best interests of Greece, more especially as the question of the frontiers of Thrace had yet to be settled. The question was one which had to be tackled with the greatest tact and delicacy. It was of vital importance to avoid war, and not to precipitate danger.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Lord Curzon had submitted to him the rough heads of a possible solution. These heads he proposed to read out to the council, and he suggested that, if the council agreed with him it was worth while, they might be transmitted that evening to M. Veniselos for his consideration, and that M. Veniselos should be asked to communicate his views on Lord Curzon's proposals to the council the following morning.

- (i) Turkish flag as sole evidence of Turkish suzerainty.
- (ii) Greek administration.
- (iii) Greek garrison.

(*N.B.*—The British had an army of occupation in Egypt while under Turkish suzerainty.)

- (iv) Local Parliament (Greeks and Turks).
- (v) After two years, the local Parliament to have the right to apply to the League of Nations for incorporation in Greece: the League of Nations, if they think necessary, to have the right to insist on a plebiscite.

M. MILLERAND asked why there should not be a local plebiscite at once, as the best means of ascertaining the views of the local population?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was inclined to leave it to the League of Nations to decide whether there should be a plebiscite, with the right to insist upon it if they favoured this course.

It was agreed—

That M. Veniselos should be invited to state his views on Lord Curzon's proposals the following morning.

(At this point Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Forbes Adam and Mr. Leeper entered the Council Chamber.)

2. The Supreme Council had before them a memorandum by Signor Nitti, dated the 24th February, 1920 (Appendix 2 to I.C.P. 44)<sup>2</sup> on the subject of Montenegro.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he regarded Montenegro as part of the Adriatic settlement generally. He specially deprecated the council arriving at any immediate decision on this subject, and he pressed that they should consider the problem with due deliberation. He was anxious that the solution should not be prejudiced in the future by discussions which would be premature until all the relevant documents could be produced and studied. Italy did not demand that the historic frontiers of Montenegro should necessarily be preserved, but he and his advisers attached the greatest importance to the avoidance by the council of any hasty decision. He thought that it would be desirable that the council should hear the supporters on both sides.

LORD CURZON said that Signor Nitti had asked that the council should arrive at any [? no] decision until both sides could be heard. Fortunately, it might be possible, he thought, to meet Signor Nitti's wishes. M. Trumbitch had recently been in London, and the British Foreign Office was thoroughly familiar with his views. Further, the Montenegrin representative, M. Plamenatz, was also in London at the present moment and could attend the council, if required. If, therefore, the Yugoslav representatives were available, the whole question could be discussed by the council the following day. He agreed that it was quite true, as Signor Nitti had said, that the settlement of Montenegro was part of the whole Adriatic question, and the only reason why the Peace Conference in Paris had deferred their decision was that they had desired that the matter of Fiume should be settled first.

M. MILLERAND said that if the proposition he was about to make would not prove too unpalatable, he would suggest that the question should now be put without any further delay. It was a question which was complicated, difficult, and delicate, with many aspects, and the Yugoslavs regarded it as a question which had already been solved. If they heard that the Montenegrin representatives had been summoned to the conference to decide whether Montenegro was to be united to Italy [*sic*], he thought it might react most disastrously upon the Yugoslavs. If the council desired to reach an amicable solution, he warned them that they had better be careful about adopting M. Nitti's proposal.

SIGNOR NITTI said that apparently M. Millerand reproached him for having raised the question at all. He had only done so, however, after the most careful consideration.

<sup>2</sup> No. 24.

M. MILLERAND said the Jugoslavs imagined that the question had been solved. It was, however, primarily a local question, and he himself maintained that no decision had actually ever been reached. He regarded it, as he had said, as part of the Adriatic question, and he certainly had never agreed to Montenegro becoming part of Yugoslavia. If it was decided that Montenegro should be incorporated in Yugoslavia, what guarantees were to be reserved for the Montenegrins? He did not actually advocate the independence of the country at present, as he wished to hear the Montenegrin representatives state their case before he made up his mind about this. On the other hand, if they were to become part of Yugoslavia, then the most ample guarantees must be given to the population. For the present, he maintained, it must remain an open question. Already his attitude on this question had been misunderstood in Italy. He was sincerely desirous of reaching a friendly solution, but he felt it was quite impossible for him to commit himself at the present moment, as he desired both time to study the relevant documents and opportunity to hear the representatives of the respective countries.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the conference might have agreed to hear the Montenegrin delegates on the following morning without giving offence to the Jugoslavs; though the latter could also be invited to put forward the other side of the question. The question of Montenegro had never been decided by the conference, except in that a reference to Montenegro was contained in a letter dated the 9th December, 1919, addressed to Signor Scialoja,<sup>3</sup> wherein it was stated that for the purposes set forth in the letter in question, Montenegro should be considered to form part of the Serbo-Croat Kingdom. The question of the constitution of Montenegro, whether it should be an independent State or an autonomous State, had never been settled. He thought, therefore, that both the Montenegrins and the Jugoslavs should be invited to give evidence. Furthermore, he thought that the Jugoslavs should be given to understand that in connection with the Adriatic question, other things still awaited settlement. The Jugoslavs had been encouraged to resist by the letter of President Wilson, and the knowledge that the Montenegrin question still remained to be settled might prove useful in inducing them to arrive at a decision on the Adriatic question.

M. MILLERAND said that, sad to relate, he still felt compelled to adhere to the views he had already expressed. He would tell the conference the reason why. At the present moment the French Government held the view that, as far as France was concerned, the question of Montenegro had been implicitly settled. Now, Signor Nitti wished to make certain reservations. He had a perfect right to do so. He also had a perfect right to raise the question of Montenegro at some later date. But the conference must carefully safeguard and weigh its actions. The conference had only recently studied the Adriatic question and forwarded definite proposals to the Serbians for their acceptance. Those proposals contained no reference to Montenegro. The note dealt incidentally with the corridor between Fiume and Istria; it dealt

<sup>3</sup> See Volume IV, No. 169, note 2.

with Scutari; but it contained not a word relating to Montenegro. All of a sudden, however, the conference were asked to decide to send for the Jugoslavs and the Montenegrins to enquire from them whether they did or did not wish to be united. He thought such action would create an impossible situation. Suppose the Jugoslavs to-morrow came and said that they would accept all the conditions put forward in the Allied note of the 24th [? 14th] January, 1920.<sup>4</sup> Signor Nitti would then be perfectly justified in stating that a further question still required to be settled, viz., the Constitution of Montenegro. But suddenly to raise the question to-day, when the conditions submitted to the Jugoslavs still remained in the balance, appeared to him to be impossible. In doing so, in his opinion, the Allies would be laying themselves open to a charge of bad faith. He fully agreed that Signor Nitti would be acting within his rights in making reservations and in raising the question at an opportune moment. But the conference could not at the present moment summon the Jugoslavs and the Montenegrins to discuss the question.

SIGNOR NITTI thought that M. Millerand must have misunderstood his statement. He (Signor Nitti) had never asked that the Montenegrin question should be settled at the present time. He had never proposed that the Montenegrins and the Jugoslavs should be summoned to give evidence before the conference. He had merely asked the conference to affirm that the question still remained open, since no decision thereon had ever been taken. The conference must agree that the question of Montenegro still remain unsettled, for under the Treaty of London, should that treaty be applied, Montenegro remained an independent State. Consequently, should the conference decide not to hear the Montenegrins and the Jugoslavs, he entirely concurred, provided it were clearly understood that the Montenegrin question still demanded consideration and settlement.

To turn next to a question intimately connected with the above, he would invite the attention of the conference to the note<sup>5</sup> which he had handed in yesterday, asking the British and French Governments to take measures to prevent Yugoslav troops from entering Albania and remaining at Marash [*sic*].<sup>5</sup>

In conclusion, he would repeat that he did not intend to ask the conference to settle the Montenegrin question at once. It would be time enough to do so when the Adriatic question as a whole came to be settled. Furthermore, he could not himself at the present moment say what the solution should be, whether Montenegro should remain an independent State, or to [*sic*] be united to Jugoslavia. He did insist, however, that the question still remained open and still called for a final decision.

M. MILLERAND said that he would gladly take note of the reservations made by Signor Nitti. France, he thought, was entitled to rest under the conviction that the Montenegrin question had been settled. Indeed, it would be difficult to understand certain Italian proposals relating thereto, except on the supposition that the Montenegrin question had been settled. How-

<sup>4</sup> Cf. document 7 in Cmd. 586 of 1920, also Volume II, No. 70.

<sup>5</sup> See appendix 2 to No. 23.

ever, Signor Nitti wished to make certain reservations, and the conference would take note of them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that under the circumstances it would not be desirable to receive the Montenegrin delegation on the following day. He would suggest, however, that M. Berthelot and Sir M. Hankey should look up all records to find out whether any decision whatever had been taken on that subject. He, personally, had no recollection of any decision, but something might have been done in his absence.

SIGNOR NITTI felt compelled to take exception to M. Millerand's remarks to the effect that certain Italian proposals seemed by implication to suggest that the Montenegrin question had been settled. It would be agreed that tentative 'proposals' put forward with the object of reaching a settlement could not after their rejection be described as 'decisions.'

*(The discussion was adjourned.)*

3. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would very much like to put forward a proposal in regard to the debate on high prices and exchanges, which the conference had yesterday decided<sup>6</sup> should take place on Thursday. The British Government had decided to circulate beforehand documents dealing with those subjects, and he would ask the French and Italian Governments to do the same.

*(This was agreed to.)*

4. MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the following questions should be placed on the agenda paper for the meeting to be held on the 25th February, 1920, at 11 o'clock:—

(1) Smyrna.

(2) Batoum.

(3) Draft instructions to Allied Ministers at The Hague with regard to the Kaiser.

(4) Hungarian reply with regard to the Peace Treaty to be handed in at 3 p.m. on Friday next.

*(The meeting then adjourned at 6 p.m. till 11 a.m. the following day.)*

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 24, 1920.

<sup>6</sup> See No. 23, minute 2.

I.C.P. 46.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Wednesday, February 25, 1920, at 11.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Forbes Adam; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Major Caccia.

*France*: M. Millerand, President of the Council; M. Cambon, M. Berthelot.

*Greece*: M. Veniselos (for Minute 1).

*Italy*: Signor Nitti, Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Galli; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the council, at their meeting the previous afternoon, had agreed to submit to M. Veniselos, for his consideration, *Smyrna* certain proposals in respect of the future administration of Turkey. M. Veniselos was now in the anteroom, and he suggested that he should be invited to state his views upon those proposals.

(M. Veniselos then entered the Council Chamber.)

M. VENISELOS said that he had read the document which he had received, and he thought that the proposals made therein would have the effect of removing a great part of the objectionable side of a system of suzerainty over Smyrna, purely nominal as that suzerainty was intended to be. It was suggested that the proposed administration should be temporary, and that the local Parliament should, after two years, be empowered to appeal to the League of Nations for incorporation in Greece. If the council would permit him to speak quite frankly, he wished to say that he himself saw no reason to maintain suzerainty even for a limited period. He could understand why it was considered desirable that the Turks should be allowed to remain in Constantinople, this being decided upon not for gratifying the Turkish Government, but because of the strong feelings which would be aroused among the Mahometan world. Whereas the maintenance of Turkish suzerainty in the Smyrna district was merely designed to placate the *amour-propre* of the Turkish Government, and because the council wished to establish peace without having to contemplate the contingency of recourse to force, he felt he must remind the council that, in dealing with Orientals, it was everything to be strong and to take a strong line. This was especially necessary in the case of the Turks. If, however, the council felt bound to adhere to their present proposals, he would ask them to make one slight addition to the text, and that was that the Turkish flag, when flown, must be on some fort outside the city. If that flag were hoisted on any Government or other building inside the town, it would be liable to insult, on account of the feelings that it

would certainly arouse in the mixed populations there. If, however, it were stipulated that the flag should only be hoisted on one of the outside forts, he (M. Veniselos) would accept all responsibility for taking the necessary steps to ensure that it would cause no objectionable incident.

M. CAMBON said that there was a precedent for what M. Veniselos now suggested. When Crete had been under Turkish suzerainty, the Turkish flag had been flown on a small island in the bay. It was protected, and fully protected, by the warships of the protecting Powers, and no untoward incident had occurred.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether M. Veniselos desired that the islands in close proximity to Smyrna should also be attached to Greece under the Smyrna Administration and Parliament.

M. VENISELOS said that if this were done it would give great satisfaction to Greece, and he hoped that the Allied Powers might think it possible to arrange that these islands should be under the Smyrna Administration for the probationary period. He did not mean to say that the inhabitants of the islands should vote in the plebiscite, but it would certainly be convenient to include them in the general system of administration.

M. MILLERAND said he was very glad indeed to have the opportunity of welcoming M. Veniselos to their counsels, and it had given him much satisfaction to hear him address them. He fully recognised the great sacrifices that M. Veniselos's country had made in the common cause. He quite agreed with what M. Veniselos had suggested in regard to the Turkish flag.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he had no objection to offer.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether M. Veniselos referred to one of the forts dominating the harbour.

M. VENISELOS said he meant the fort which was nearest to the town, but outside of it.

(M. Veniselos then withdrew from the Council Chamber.)

2. LORD CURZON begged leave to refer to a telegram from the British High Commissioner at Constantinople,<sup>1</sup> which had caused him a certain amount of anxiety. The principle upon which the Allies had been working in Constantinople was that each of the Great Powers should maintain there one High Commissioner, and that any announcement of policy must be made by the High Commissioners jointly and in concert, in order to remove any possible idea of differences of opinion among the Powers. On one or two occasions, however, the British had reason to complain of the French representatives acting independently. The telegram to which he was now referring stated that General Franchet d'Esperey had caused to be published in the Turkish press something to the following effect:—

*Constantinople.  
Action of Allied  
High Commissioners*

<sup>1</sup> The reference was evidently to telegram I.B. 118 of February 23, 1920, from General Sir G. Milne, General Commanding in Chief, Army of the Black Sea, to the War Office (received February 24). This telegram referred to General Franchet d'Esperey, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies of the Orient: see below.



'In regard to Constantinople, the London Conference has adopted the French point of view, and decided to leave the Sultan there.'

The British High Commissioner, in transmitting this communication, had commented upon the action of the French Commander-in-chief, as he regarded it as somewhat curious. There had been more than one case in the last year where the conduct of the French representatives at Constantinople required some explanation. In the course of last year, when the Turkish peace delegation was summoned to Paris, the news was communicated in advance to the Turkish Government, who were told at the time that this concession was due entirely to French intervention. Moreover, the French hurriedly placed one of their ships at the disposal of the delegation, to convey them to France. These were not precisely unfriendly acts, but they placed the representatives of the other Powers in a rather embarrassing situation. He had not a word to say against the present French High Commissioner, M. de France, as our relations with him were admirable. The French Commander-in-chief, however, had more than once caused him inconvenience by his independent action.

M. MILLERAND said that he was very glad that this incident had been brought to the notice of the council by Lord Curzon, as it gave him an opportunity of communicating to the council the contents of a telegram which he had received from Constantinople, which, in other circumstances, he would not have placed before his colleagues. The French representative said in the telegram that he had been informed of the results of the conference in London, and of their decisions in regard to Turkey, but, not having received any official instructions as to the action he should take, he had waited until his colleagues were in possession of similar information, when they could take joint action. The British High Commissioner, however, on receipt of the above information, had acted independently, and had communicated the council's decisions to the Turkish Government direct. That Government had evinced some surprise at this irregular action, but the Grand Vizier had at once telegraphed the news to all the Turkish districts. The moral of this was, he thought, that the Powers must adopt at Constantinople the line that they had followed at The Hague, and that was, they must insist upon their respective representatives acting always in the closest co-operation.

LORD CURZON said that he was glad to be able to give an explanation of the British High Commissioner's action. On the 15th [*sic*] February of this year the council had decided to retain the Turk at Constantinople.<sup>2</sup> Admiral de Robeck had more than once asked that the decision of the council, when arrived at, should be communicated to him officially, and that the Turkish Government should not first hear of it from the press. The Foreign Office had accordingly asked him whether they should transmit the fact of the decision to Admiral de Robeck, and he had replied that this should only be done if a public announcement had been made here. His Department had then shown him a copy of a newspaper, in which appeared an interview with

<sup>2</sup> Cf. No. 6, minute 2.

M. Millerand, who had communicated the news of the Allies' decision to the said journal. He (Lord Curzon), on seeing this, realised that there was no longer any necessity for keeping the matter secret, and a telegram<sup>3</sup> had been sent to Admiral de Robeck stating that he could make the fact public in Turkey. No instructions, however, had been sent to him to communicate it officially or independently, and<sup>4</sup> the Turkish Government and the Foreign Office had no responsibility for his conduct in that respect. This, however, was not the point to which he had desired to draw the attention of the council. What he complained of was that the French Commander-in-chief, in making his communication to the press, had claimed exclusive credit for France for the Allies' joint decision. This, he thought, was an attitude open to serious criticism.

M. MILLERAND said that he did not think that he was responsible for communicating this news to the press. The question of Constantinople had been discussed one day by the conference, and a decision had been reached, and the next morning he saw that the fact had leaked out in the press. In point of fact, however, the two cases were quite different. On the one hand, there was an indiscretion committed by General Franchet d'Esperey. On the other hand, there was the indiscretion committed by Admiral de Robeck in independently and apart from his colleagues making an official communication to the Turkish Government in regard to the decision of the Allied Conference. He saw no necessity, however, to stress the importance of these two incidents. What was necessary was that the Allies should, in the first place, insist upon greater discretion on the part of their representatives, and, in the second, give strict instructions that no official communication must be made to the Turkish Government except by the High Commissioners acting together.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he regretted the fact, but it appeared that M. Millerand did not properly appreciate the gravity of the incident to which Lord Curzon had referred. He offered no opinion on M. Millerand's interview with the press when he communicated an important decision of their council. He regretted it, however, as it was premature, because the decision was only provisional, and, further, because it involved his having to be absent from the Council Chamber the following afternoon in order to attend a debate in the House of Commons arising from this disclosure. What he wished to say most emphatically was that it was essential that the Powers should act in concert at Constantinople. If once they started petty jealousies among themselves, the consequences could not fail to be disastrous. Admiral de Robeck's action may or may not have been an indiscretion, but it was a very different thing from the action of the French Commander-in-chief stating publicly that the London Conference had adopted the French point of view. The French Commander-in-chief held a very exalted position, and it behoved him to act with the greatest circumspection. And yet this was the second time in the last year that the French representative had acted in

<sup>3</sup> Foreign Office telegram No. 123 of February 16, 1920, to Constantinople: cf. No. 45, note 24

<sup>4</sup> This word was a mistake for 'to'.

this way. If this sort of thing were to go on it would undoubtedly end in serious mischief. If a British general had been guilty of such an indiscretion he would certainly have been rebuked, and perhaps recalled. In fact, on the second occasion he would undoubtedly have been recalled at once. He much regretted that M. Millerand apparently did not appreciate the serious nature of General Franchet d'Esperey's action.

M. MILLERAND said that the matter was serious, particularly as the British Government attached such importance to it. Before referring further to it, he desired to make his own personal defence. He absolutely and categorically denied that it was he who communicated to the press the decision of the conference to maintain the Turk at Constantinople. What had happened was this: A journalist had come to his room and had said to him: 'The Powers are going to leave the Turk in Constantinople. We know all about this. That is the council's decision, is it not?' He had said nothing either way in reply, and the whole thing was merely a case of adroit guessing on the part of the journalist. As regards General Franchet d'Esperey, M. Millerand said he was not prepared to tolerate such behaviour on the part of any servant of the French State. Before he could go further into the matter, however, he must have fuller details as to when the indiscretion was committed, and where, and as to the exact words used. If Lord Curzon would kindly place at his disposal the relevant documents and facts, he would take the necessary action. Substantially, he was in complete agreement with Mr. Lloyd George that serious notice must be taken of such indiscretions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed his entire satisfaction with the statement made by M. Millerand. He promised to supply M. Millerand with all the relevant facts and documents in regard to both incidents.

M. MILLERAND desired to make sure that he had correctly interpreted the decision reached by the conference, namely, that each of the Allied Governments should instruct their respective agents at Constantinople henceforth to discontinue the practice of making separate representations to the Turkish Government in regard to all matters of policy.

SIGNOR NITTI urged that the decision in question should be amplified by instructions to the effect that the military attachés were also not qualified to make either representations to the Turkish Government or any public declarations. He thought that instructions to that effect would be necessary, because sometimes military attachés took action independently of the High Commissioners.

It was agreed—

That each of the Allied Governments should forward instructions to their respective High Commissioners and military representatives at Constantinople to discontinue the practice of making independent representations to the Sublime Porte.

3. MR. LLOYD GEORGE invited attention to the fact that the following three questions in regard to Smyrna still called for a decision:—

*Smyrna*

(1) Should particulars of the decision taken by the conference in regard to Smyrna be published?

- (2) Should the decision in question be communicated to the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople?
- (3) Should the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople communicate the decision in question to the Turkish Government?

Personally, he thought that it would be very undesirable to publish the decisions of the conference piecemeal. Would it not, in fact, be better to publish the whole of the terms of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey as a whole after a final decision had been reached.

M. MILLERAND agreed that it would be infinitely preferable to publish the whole of the terms of the treaty simultaneously. On the other hand, could anything really be done to prevent the publication of more or less accurate accounts of what had been decided in regard to Smyrna? Would it not in reality be better to publish something authoritative and correct at once, rather than to allow rumours to spread, which would lead to questions being asked in Parliament to which answers would have to be given?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the view that the council would land itself into great difficulties should every decision be announced separately. Such announcements gave the right to Parliament to interfere, whereas, at the present moment, if questions were asked about Smyrna, he would be justified in saying that the matter was still under discussion and could not, therefore, be considered. In that connection, he would add that the Foreign Office Committee of the House of Commons had decided to ask questions in Parliament about Cilicia. Under present conditions he would refuse to answer any such questions. But, should the conference give information in regard to Smyrna, it would be difficult to refuse to say anything either with regard to Cilicia or to Adalia.

VISCOUNT CHINDA and SIGNOR NITTI concurred in the views expressed by Mr. Lloyd George.

M. MILLERAND agreed that he personally much preferred the decision reached, since it would make his position much easier. He would now be able to say that he was bound by a decision of the conference. He merely urged that the council should record the formal decision that no information of any kind with regard to the treaty should be given, and that each member of the council should respect that decision, both with the press and in Parliament.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, in that connection, he wished to make his position quite clear with reference to the statement which he would have to make to Parliament on the following day. The decision with regard to Constantinople had already been made public, but he could say nothing with regard to Smyrna, Cilicia or Adalia. He did, however, propose to make three definite statements bearing on general principles, namely:—

Firstly, that where a definite clear majority of another race existed in any part of the old Turkish Empire, those communities would be torn away from Turkey. (That statement had reference to Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia, &c.);

Secondly, that measures would be taken for the protection of minorities inside Turkey; and

Thirdly, that the guardianship of the Straits would be taken over by the Allies.

Those were the only things which he intended to say in making his statement to Parliament. He would refuse to give any details, and he thought Parliament would accept the decision.

It was agreed—

That the decision of the council with regard to Smyrna should not be made public until such time as the whole of the terms of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey could be announced.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, continuing, said that the next question to be decided was whether the decision reached by the council with regard to Smyrna should be communicated to the High Commissioners.

It was agreed—

That the decision of the council in regard to Smyrna should not, at the present time, be communicated either to the High Commissioners at Constantinople or to the Turkish Government.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, continuing, said that it would be necessary to prepare a draft of the agreement come to with M. Veniselos in regard to Smyrna. He enquired whether the Smyrna Commission should be charged with that duty.

It was agreed—

That the Smyrna Commission should prepare and submit a draft of the agreement come to with M. Veniselos: the commission to be supplied with a copy of the minutes of the council relating to that question.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the council approved the recommendations of the commission in regard to the boundaries of Smyrna.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> The recommendations of this committee were presented in the following report of February 21, 1920:

*'Composition*

*'British Empire:* Mr. E. G. Forbes Adam, Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Gribbon, C.M.G., C.B.E.

*'France:* M. Kammerer (Chairman).

*'Italy:* M. Galli, Colonel Castoldi.

'The Smyrna Committee was instructed "to hear the claims of the Greek Delegation and to make recommendations as to the geographical boundaries of the district of Smyrna on the assumption that this district will be subject to Greek administration and without prejudice to the question of sovereignty".

'After hearing an exhaustive statement by M. Venizelos and after an examination of the economic, geographical, ethnological and military considerations involved, the Committee unanimously recommend that the boundary of the district to be placed under Greek

It was agreed—

That the recommendations of the Smyrna Commission with regard to the boundaries of Smyrna should be adopted.

M. BERTHELOT invited attention to the fact that a series of administrative questions of great importance required to be settled by the Smyrna Com-administration should be that shown in purple on the attached map [not printed: see at end of note]. On the latter map the orange and green lines represent respectively the boundary of the Greek zone as recommended by the British and French Delegations in the report of the Committee on Greek territorial claims presented to the Supreme Council in Paris on March 6th, 1919, and the line of demarcation of the zone occupied by Greek troops as delimited by General Milne on the instructions of the Supreme Council in September 1919 [see Volume I, No. 70, appendix H].

'In his statement before the Committee M. Venizelos explained that he was prepared to accept the southern frontier of the Sanjak of Smyrna from its most easterly point to the Salaheddin Dag and from thence south of Ayasoluk to a point north of Skalanova on the coast as shown by the purple line on the map, thus leaving to Turkey the Kazas of Aidin and Sokia, recommended for assignment to Greece by the French and British Delegations in the above mentioned report. According to the Greek figures presented to the Conference by M. Venizelos, these Kazas contain a population of 45,783 Greeks and 59,565 Turks. In return for the withdrawal of his claim for the inclusion of this large Greek minority, M. Venizelos asked that the rest of the frontier of the Greek zone should follow that recommended by the French and British Delegations in Paris (the orange line on the attached map) as far as the Madaras Dag instead of the Milne line (the green line on the attached map). He admitted that the area between the Milne line and the Franco-British line would include the Kazas of Soma, Kirkaghatch and Akhissar, the population of which according to Greek figures is:— Soma—5,000 Turks, 1,890 Greeks; Kirkaghatch—35,373 Turks, 5,173 Greeks; Akhissar—14,500 Turks, 9,586 Greeks and 882 Armenians.

'He urged in any case that if the Committee could not see their way to accept this claim they should agree to an extension of the Milne line in the region of Akhissar, primarily for military reasons so as to push the frontier further from Smyrna and Manissa up the Panderma-Manissa railway. The Milne line at this point is about 33 miles from Smyrna. M. Venizelos also contended that the Milne line had been fixed with a view to put[ting] a stop to immediate hostilities between Greeks and Turks but not in any way as a permanent line for the Greek zone from the military point of view. Secondly he urged that such a rectification of the frontier would only include in the Greek zone part of the Kaza of Akhissar. As most of the Greeks (9,586) in this Kaza were concentrated in the town, there was a probability that that portion of the Kaza to be added to the Greek zone would not contain a majority of Turks.

'The Committee were of the opinion that the Franco-British line for which M. Venizelos asked could be followed from the south-eastern corner of the Sanjak of Smyrna as far as the Belen Dag to the north of Kassaba, but that it was impossible to accept the rest of this line as far as the Madaras Dag owing to the large Turkish majorities in the Kazas thus to be added to the Greek zone. They felt, however, that M. Venizelos' two reasons for including the town of Akhissar in the Greek zone were sound and they took into consideration the fact that the Greek population to be left under Turkish rule in the Aidin area was considerably larger than the Greek population to be placed under Greek administration in the Akhissar area. The Committee therefore recommend the frontier shown by the line in purple on the attached map which leaving the Belen Dag includes Akhissar in the Greek zone but excludes the Kazas of Kirkaghatch and Soma.

'The Committee venture also to draw attention to a suggestion made by Monsieur Venizelos that a reciprocal Greco-Turk arrangement should be possible regarding the withdrawal from Aidin and advance to Akhissar.

'From the Madaras Dag M. Venizelos asked that the frontier of the Greek zone should

mission, who had been charged with the duty of drafting the agreement relating to Smyrna. There were two questions, however, in regard to which the commission would undoubtedly require guidance, viz.:—

- (1) The question of customs between Smyrna and Turkey; and
- (2) The question of currency.

be pushed to the north of both the Milne line and the Franco-British line so as to include the whole of the Kaza of Kemer and a part of the Kanza [*sic*] of Edremid or Adramyti as shown by the red line on the attached map. According to the Greek figures the populations of these two Kazas are:—

Kemer—12,409 Turks, 7,239 Greeks; Adramyti—27,393 Turks, 13,033 Greeks. M. Venizelos claimed this extension on four grounds.

‘(1) That this line forms a better military frontier;

‘(2) That the waters in the whole of this basin drains [*sic*] into the Aegean, whereas the streams to the east and north of this line flow towards the east and north;

‘(3) That he has reason to believe that the majority of the Greek population in the Kaza of Adramyti (13,033) live on the coast and therefore in that part of the Kaza of Adramyti which he claims for Greece;

‘(4) That large properties in this area are owned by Greek landowners of Mytilene and Aivali.

‘The Committee could not see their way to accept this claim partly because they were not convinced that the district did not include a substantial majority of Turks but primarily because the line of demilitarisation of the Straits zone recommended by the Military and Naval Commission to the Conference and approved by it passes just to the south of the town of Kemer. The Greek population in the Kazas of Kemer and Adramyti to the north of this line should be therefore fully protected. Moreover the main road communication between Edremid and the interior to the east and north would be cut by the frontier claimed by M. Venizelos. The Committee therefore recommend that the frontier of the Greek zone north and west of the Madaras Dagh should be left to be co-termin[o]us with the line of demilitarisation of the Straits zone, so as to leave the towns of Kemer and the road from Kemer to Edremid outside the Greek zone.

‘The Committee desire to add that they have been influenced in making their general recommendation by the following four considerations:—

‘(1) The most impartial and up-to-date pre-war statistics, available to them but unpublished, give a substantial majority to the Greeks in the Sanjak of Smyrna which forms the bulk of the district to be placed under Greek administration. The figures which are those of Professor Magie, an expert on the staff of the American Peace Delegation in Paris, are for the Sanjak of Smyrna as follows:— Moslems—325,000; Greeks 375,000; Armenians ca. 18,000; Jews 40,000.

‘(2) In that part of the Sanjak of Sarukhan which they recommend for assignment to the Greek administration there is a substantial minority of Greeks. For the whole Sanjak, Professor Magie gives 350,000 Moslems; 95,000 Greeks, and ca. 7,000 Armenians. The majority of these Greeks and Armenians are likely to be in the big towns and in the western portion of the Sanjak, nearest Smyrna i.e. Akhissar, Kassaba and Manissa;

‘(3) It is anticipated that in the Treaty of peace with Turkey or in a separate treaty with Greece clauses will be inserted safeguarding freedom of transit and assigning a part of the port of Smyrna to the League of Nations to serve as a free port. To this M. Venizelos is understood to be prepared to agree. The possible development of the port of Scalanova may also eventually serve in the south as the outlet of the rich Meander Valley which is to remain Turkish, just as the port of Edremid may eventually give similar commercial access to the Turkish area, immediately to the north of the Greek zone;

‘(4) The Committee assume that the civil, educational and religious rights of Moslem, Hebrew and Christian non-orthodox minorities in the area under Greek administration

He thought the council should lay down the principles to be followed by the commission. For instance, should there be a customs' advice [? service] between Smyrna and the remainder of Turkey or not? In Smyrna a great deal of Turkish money still existed, and it would be difficult for the council to say what should happen to that currency. Should Greece be obliged to take a part of that currency or not?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the Financial Commission might be instructed to make some proposals. He proposed that the question of the currency should be referred to a joint session between the Finance Commission and the Smyrna Commission.

It was agreed—

That questions relating to Smyrna finance and customs should be referred to a Joint Commission between the Financial Commission and the Smyrna Commission.

4. LORD CURZON said that it would be in the recollection of the council that Hungary had been given a certain delay within which to present her reply.<sup>6</sup> That reply had now been received and it involved the consideration of an immense amount of documentary evidence. The conference would, therefore, have to decide where that evidence would have to be studied and by whom a decision would have to be taken.

The evidence in question could quite easily be divided into two main groups: one dealing with questions of principle, the other with questions of detail. Under questions of principle would be included economic and territorial matters. That is to say, questions of the first importance, which could only be decided by the conference itself. The Ambassadors' Conference will be safeguarded by suitable clauses in the Turkish treaty or in a separate treaty with Greece. M. Venizelos is understood to be prepared to agree to this.

'The attached annex defines the line recommended by the Committee. This definition can be embodied in the necessary draft articles for insertion in the Treaty of peace with Turkey, as soon as a decision regarding the sovereignty over this area is taken by the Supreme Council.

*'London, February 21st, 1920.'*

Annexed to this report in the original was an 'Article regarding boundary to be inserted in treaty of peace with Turkey'. This draft article began: 'The boundary is defined as follows'. There followed the description of the trace of the boundary as given in article 66 of the Treaty of Sèvres except that the last clause but three of the draft trace read 'thence northwards to a point to be chosen on the ground about 3 kilometres southwest of Keuiluje'. (The purple line on the map appended to the report thus corresponded to the boundary of the territory of Smyrna indicated on map no. 1 appended to the Treaty of Sèvres—Cmd. 964 of 1920.) The description of the trace in the draft article was followed by a concluding paragraph, as follows: 'A Commission of five members, three nominated by Great Britain, France and Italy and one by Greece and one by Turkey will be constituted fifteen days after the coming into force of the present treaty, to trace on the spot the frontier line described above.'

<sup>6</sup> See No. 4, minute 4. For an English text of the reply, communicated under cover of a note of February 12, 1920, from the Hungarian Peace Delegation concerning the draft treaty of peace with Hungary, see *The Hungarian Peace Negotiations* (Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Budapest, 1921), vol. ii, pp. 1 ff.



in Paris hardly possessed the authority to deal with the broader questions of principle. On the other hand, the questions of detail would take a long time to work out; they would best be dealt with in Paris, as the experts were now there and could hardly be expected to come to London.

To sum up, the British Foreign Office held the view that the larger questions of principle should be decided by the conference, and that the minor questions of detail should be referred to Paris, where those matters had already been studied.

M. MILLERAND hardly thought that the conference would be prepared to reopen a full discussion on the questions of the principles involved in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary. He thought the council must maintain the decisions which it had already taken, both with regard to the frontiers of Hungary and with regard to the financial arrangements. Consequently, there remained only minor questions of detail, which should be referred to Paris.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE hoped that the conference would not decide to adopt that line. The conference had now received for the first time the views of Hungary on the decisions which it had originally taken with regard to those matters. In his opinion, therefore, the council would be bound to consider the views now expressed by Hungary, fairly and impartially, exactly as it had done in the case of the document submitted by the Germans. The latter document had been very carefully examined by President Wilson, M. Clemenceau, Signor Orlando and himself, and, as a result, many concessions had been made. He thought the conference should adopt the same attitude with regard to Hungary. At any rate, the council could not decide, without having read Hungary's case, to decline to shift one iota from the point of view originally taken up. Such action would leave the impression of injustice which would rankle in the minds of the Hungarian people. The Allies did not want the Hungarians always to remain hostile, but that would probably happen should the Allies point blank reject (without consideration) Hungary's appeal. In his opinion, the case presented by Hungary must receive impartial consideration, and no one could do that except the responsible Ministers, who would have to answer in Parliament and elsewhere for the decisions taken.

SIGNOR NITTI expressed his entire agreement with the views put forward by Mr. Lloyd George. He thought it would be wise to consider the case presented by Hungary, especially as, in his opinion, that country deserved every consideration.

M. MILLERAND enquired what was the procedure involved in the proposal made by Lord Curzon.

LORD CURZON explained that the reply submitted by Hungary was being examined by the British Foreign Office, and, no doubt, the same was being done both by the French and Italian Foreign Ministries. Their criticisms would be submitted to the conference, which would be required to take a decision with regard to all questions of principle relating to finance and boundaries: other matters of detail being referred to Paris.

M. BERTHELOT expressed the view that it would be a very serious matter to reopen the question of frontiers. The conference had previously steadfastly refused to reconsider its decisions with regard to frontiers, both in the case of Germany and Austria.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, intervening, pointed out that, in the case of Germany, very considerable alterations had been made with regard to the Polish frontier. In addition, the holding of a plebiscite in Silesia had been introduced.

M. BERTHELOT persisted that the conference would land itself into endless difficulties, particularly in connection with Roumania, Jugoslavia and Austria, should the question of frontiers be re-opened. He agreed, on the other hand, that the same criticism did not apply to 'Finance'. He fully realised that the Hungarian people might be unable to support the heavy financial burden which it had been found necessary to impose on them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the question before the conference was not whether any specific alterations in the boundaries of Hungary should or should not be made. The Hungarians had, however, submitted certain counter-proposals, which would have to be considered and a decision taken. That was not a question which could be referred to the Ambassadors' Conference in Paris; it must be decided by the council.

It was agreed—

That the reply of Hungary with regard to the Treaty of Peace should be studied by the Foreign Ministers, and that questions of principle relating to frontiers and finance should be submitted to, and decided by, the conference; other matters of detail being referred to Paris for decision.

5. It was agreed—

<i>M. Berthelot's Draft in regard to the Kaiser</i>	To refer M. Berthelot's draft in regard to the Kaiser to a committee consisting of Lord Curzon, M. Berthelot and Signor Scialoja, for final decision.
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*(The meeting then adjourned at 1.15 p.m. until 4 p.m. this afternoon.)*

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 25, 1920.

I.C.P. 47.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference, held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Wednesday, February 25, 1920, at 4 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Forbes Adam, Mr. Philip Kerr; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Major Caccia, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr.

*France*: M. Millerand, President of the Council; M. Berthelot.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti, Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda (after Minute 1).

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. MILLERAND suggested that the reply received from President Wilson should be read to the conference.

*The Adriatic.*

*President*

*Wilson's Reply,*

*February 25,*

*1920*

(M. Mantoux read a French translation of President Wilson's reply. For English text, see Appendix.)<sup>1</sup>

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether Signor Nitti wished to offer any remarks.

SIGNOR NITTI replied that, if the conference wished to have his opinion, he would say, in the first place, that President Wilson now appeared to have adopted a far more moderate tone than in his previous letter. At any rate, he appeared to recognise that a solution would have to be found, and had expressed the view that if the Italians and the Jugoslavs could together come to an agreement he would be prepared to accept any solution of the problem thus arrived at. On the other hand, should the Italians and the Jugoslavs not be able to come to an agreement, then the Adriatic question must be settled according to his own principles—principles which Signor Nitti could not accept, since they were so elastic as to make it difficult to say exactly what they meant. The situation thus created appeared to him to be an extremely difficult one, because the President continued to travel alone<sup>2</sup> a line which, in his view, was not the right one. He felt sure the conference would agree that the note of the 9th December, to which the President so frequently referred, had only been drawn up as a basis of discussion. In his previous note, President Wilson converted the tentative proposals contained in the note of the 9th December into an ultimatum. Now, however, the President corrected his attitude in that respect, but continued to insist on the application of the conditions contained in the note of the 9th December. As a matter of fact, neither the Italians nor the Jugoslavs were prepared to accept the solution therein proposed. If the Jugoslavs were asked, he felt certain they would repudiate that arrangement, since the

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. The two documents in this appendix were, subject to minor verbal variation, the same as those printed as item 14 in Cmd. 586.

<sup>2</sup> In the typescript text this word was uncertain as between 'alone' and 'along'.

creation of the buffer State proposed therein would constitute for them a source of constant danger. The council had itself fully realised that fact, and as a result the solution set forth in the note of the 20th January, 1920, was reached. In his present note President Wilson criticised that arrangement. In particular, he objected to the three-fold division of Albania, since he was opposed to injuring the Albanian people for the benefit of Yugoslavia. The council would recollect that he (Signor Nitti) had put forward similar objections,<sup>3</sup> but he had not pressed the question, as he had been anxious to arrive at an agreement. To sum up, however, President Wilson's decision appeared to be either that the Jugoslavs and the Italians should come to an understanding, or, in the event of failure, that the solution of the 9th December should be enforced. President Wilson concluded his note under consideration by saying many nice things about Italy, particularly with regard to her heroic sacrifices. He (Signor Nitti) did not think too much importance should be attached to such statements. He felt compelled, on the other hand, to take very serious note of the remarks made by President Wilson in regard to the Treaty of London. The President appeared to imply that the provisions of the treaty could never be recognised, on account of its having been a secret treaty. In that connection, he would ask: Would it have been possible to have made the terms of the treaty public during the war, at a time when France found herself in difficulties and when no real reason existed for Italy joining in the war? It would have been impossible to have laid a treaty of that nature before the Italian Parliament. Consequently, it had been kept secret, in the interests of the Allies. He, personally, hoped that it would not be necessary to enforce the Treaty of London, but, should it be found impossible to arrive at some other satisfactory solution, that treaty would have to be given effect to. At any rate, he must insist that the Treaty of London should not be referred to as something dishonest or unclean. It was a perfectly honest agreement, which had to be come to in secret on account of the necessities imposed by war. He would press for an early solution of the Adriatic question. It was a question which had created great heat in Italy, and should that heat break out into flames the fire would undoubtedly spread to Yugoslavia, Austria, Bulgaria, and even to Germany, thus causing untold miseries throughout Europe. In conclusion, he thought it would be correct to say that the question had already advanced a step. President Wilson's tone had changed; he no longer threatened to withdraw from the conference, or to withdraw the treaty from the Senate. He, no doubt, felt that in his previous note he had gone too far. He now appeared willing to discuss, and Signor Nitti agreed that it was a question which must be discussed in all friendliness and moderation, in order that the solution necessary for the peace of the whole of Europe might be found.

M. MILLERAND said that it appeared to him also, as stated by Signor Nitti, that a distinct change had indeed occurred in the tone now adopted by President Wilson. He thought the council should take advantage of this change to invite the President to join his efforts with those of Great Britain

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Volume II, No. 64, minute 1 and No. 68, minute 1.

and France in inducing the Italians and the Yugoslavs to come to an agreement at the earliest possible moment.

SIGNOR NITTI thought it would be very difficult to give an answer of that kind to President Wilson. President Wilson's principles, in substance, remained the same; he had merely changed his tone. In any negotiations which Italy might attempt to carry out with the Yugoslavs two difficulties would at once be encountered. In the first place, owing to the strife existing between the Serbs and the Croats, the Yugoslav Government would not dare to agree to any concessions. In the second place, the Yugoslavs fully realised the inner meaning of President Wilson's note. They knew they could count on the support and encouragement of President Wilson. So that it would be very difficult for Italy to deal with the Yugoslavs as long as the latter felt themselves in a strong position.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he found considerable difficulty in expressing an opinion by which he could hope to abide on a document which he had only just had the opportunity of hearing read. He agreed with M. Millerand that the tone of the note was much better, and more friendly. But the note also made it quite clear that President Wilson still retained the same unalterable determination as far as fundamentals were concerned. Furthermore, he was not sure that the original threat was not still contained in the tail of the document—a little hidden, perhaps, but there it was. He thought M. Millerand was right that the next step should be an attempt on the part of the Italian Prime Minister to come to terms with the Yugoslavs. But, before Signor Nitti could see the Yugoslav representatives, it was very important that it should be made absolutely clear that President Wilson's note was not the last word as far as the Allies were concerned. If the Yugoslavs thought that, after the threats which President Wilson had put in his first note and explicitly repeated in his second note, the Allies would accept anything, it would be no use Signor Nitti seeing the Yugoslavs. Consequently, he himself held the provisional opinion that, before Signor Nitti saw the Yugoslavs, a cautious answer should be sent to President Wilson, informing him that the document of the 9th December was only a tentative effort to arrive at a decision; that it did not constitute a final solution of the problem. Furthermore, President Wilson should be informed that the French and British Governments remained unshaken in their determination to stand by the Treaty of London in the event of failure to achieve agreement. However much France and Great Britain might regret the results, nations could not enter into negotiations of that kind without standing by them. Consequently, he thoroughly supported the suggestion that Signor Nitti should try to come to terms with the Yugoslavs. That would, in his opinion, be the best solution of the difficulty. But if Signor Nitti attempted to do so at a time when the Yugoslavs thought the Allied Governments were still crouching at the crack of President Wilson's whip, no useful results could be expected. He himself felt certain that President Wilson should first be informed that the Allied Governments quite accepted the principles involved in the question, but that they were bound to abide by their treaty obligations if

Italy demanded their application. In conclusion, he proposed that two or three drafts of suggested replies to President Wilson's latest note should be prepared and taken under consideration by the council at their meeting on the following day.

M. MILLERAND suggested that, before any draft was prepared, the British and French Prime Ministers should meet together to discuss the question.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he had no views to express on that proposal, since President Wilson's letter had been addressed to France and Great Britain. He merely wished to thank Mr. Lloyd George for what he had said in regard to the Treaty of London. He, personally, would do all in his power to avoid the necessity of enforcing the Treaty of London, and even if it had to be applied he would agree to the autonomy of Albania, as he fully recognised his responsibilities in the matter. He asked the British and French Prime Ministers, in drafting their reply to President Wilson, to bear in mind the circumstances existing at the time the Treaty of London was entered into. As he had said, that treaty contained nothing which was either dishonourable or dishonest. They would agree that no open treaty had ever been entered into in time of war.

It was agreed—

That the British and French Prime Ministers should meet on the following morning at 11.30 to discuss the terms of a reply to President Wilson's note.

(At this point Viscount Chinda entered the Council Chamber.)

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Lord Curzon was anxious to raise the question of Batum, and, unless M. Millerand or Signor Nitti desired to bring any matter of urgency before the council, he proposed to invite Lord Curzon to state briefly exactly what the present situation at Batum was.

LORD CURZON stated that the question arose as follows. For a long time it had been the intention of the British Government to withdraw their troops from the Caucasus.<sup>4</sup> For the last two months the only place in the Caucasus where there had been British troops was Batum. Our troops had been detained there, as it was almost certain that, if they were withdrawn, Batum would become the prey of one of the neighbouring States and would continue to be a source of discord and trouble. Denikin had been ambitious to get control of the port; the Georgians were anxious also to possess it; and the Turks in Asia Minor had cast covetous eyes in its direction. Batum had been made a free port by the Treaty of Berlin, but had been seized by Russia in defiance of that treaty. As the terminus of the Baku-Batum Railway and as the place where the pipeline emerged upon the Black Sea, it was eminently desirable that the port should be in trustworthy hands. The British War Office were still receiving telegrams from Constantinople to the effect that the attitude of the Turks was becoming more menacing every day. For this

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Volume III, Chap. II *passim*.

reason the British Government had intended to withdraw their troops from outlying districts and concentrate them in Constantinople, and the British Cabinet had decided that, in accordance with this intention, Batum should be evacuated by British troops. When the council had discussed the question of Armenia, they had had under consideration the desirability or otherwise of conceding to Armenia a port on the Black Sea, and in the course of this discussion, the council had generally inclined to the view that Batum should be a free and open port under the protection of the League of Nations.<sup>5</sup> He had then brought the matter before the British Cabinet again, and the Cabinet had decided to postpone complete evacuation of Batum until the Supreme Council had had an opportunity of again discussing the question. The British Cabinet had further been of opinion that, if the Supreme Council accepted their view that Batum should be a free port under the League of Nations, it should be provisionally occupied and held by an Allied force in pursuance of an Allied policy. The situation to-day was that the withdrawal of the British brigade which had been in Batum had been suspended, and two British battalions still remained there. During the withdrawal our Commander-in-chief had made anxious representations to the British Government to the effect that if we withdrew the whole of our troops, the Georgians would come in and the already unstable conditions in that area would become greatly accentuated. What he wished to submit to the Supreme Council was this: If the council agreed that Batum should be a free port under the League of Nations, would the Allies each consent to supply contingents which should form a joint force designed to ensure the security of the port and of its immediate environs in the intervening period, since Great Britain could hardly be expected to undertake this responsibility single-handed?

M. BERTHELOT said that the question of Batum had twice been examined by the council. The French Government were substantially in agreement with the British view that it was most undesirable to evacuate Batum and leave it a prey to the Georgians or the Turks or to some combination of nations. The freedom of the port was a matter of common interest to all the Allies. As Lord Curzon had said, as the terminus of the railway and of the pipeline, special importance must be attached to its security, and Europe was deeply interested in that security. The best solution, therefore, in the view of his Government was that the port should be free and open to the commerce of all nations, including Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. In order to ensure this, the port must be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations and a military force must be located there. There remained the question of the composition of this force; and, in regard to this, their military experts were the best judges. He had consulted Colonel Chardigny who had informed him that, in the view of all competent military advisers, a composite force of three battalions would be sufficient. France was quite prepared to participate and to contribute one battalion on the understanding that Great Britain and Italy would each make a similar contribution.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 10.

SIGNOR NITTI said that unfortunately he was compelled for the present to maintain a much larger army than his Government wished. The Jugoslavs still had 150 battalions in being, and it was necessary for the Italians in consequence to retain under arms a very considerable force. He was unwilling, therefore, to undertake any further military responsibilities; but when he considered the enormous importance of the port of Batum, he was prepared to make sacrifices, and he would therefore undertake to supply one battalion as the Italian contribution to the joint garrison.

It was agreed—

- (a) That Batum should be a free port under the guarantee of the League of Nations.
- (b) That for the present an Allied composite garrison should be maintained at Batum, consisting of one British, one French and one Italian battalion.

3. SIGNOR NITTI said that he would be glad if Lord Curzon would kindly inform the council what exactly was the present position in regard to the mountain races of Daghestan.

LORD CURZON said that Daghestan was a mountainous region whose inhabitants were the most turbulent people in the world—perhaps, in deference to those members of the council who might have mountain blood in their veins, he should rather say, it was inhabited by a very martial race, who acknowledged no Government. Whatever Government there was, changed every two months. It was, therefore, impossible to recognise any Government in Daghestan, as there was no responsible Government which they could recognise.

4. MR. LLOYD GEORGE reminded the council that it had been decided at an earlier meeting that they should discuss on the following morning (Thursday) the question of food prices and foreign exchanges. As the relevant documents had not yet been circulated to members of the council, he thought that it would be more profitable if the discussion of this question was postponed until the following Friday. The British documents were ready for distribution, and he hoped that the French and Italian papers would be circulated with as little delay as possible.

It was agreed that the question of food prices and foreign exchanges should be discussed on Friday, the 27th instant.

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 25, 1920.



## No. 28

I.C.P. 47A.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conversation held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Thursday, February 26, 1920, at 11.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Leeper, Mr. Philip Kerr; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Captain Abraham.

*France*: M. Cambon, M. Berthelot.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

A French draft reply was considered in detail, and after a prolonged discussion the question was adjourned for the preparation of a revised draft based on the morning's discussions.

*The Adriatic. Draft  
Reply to President  
Wilson's Letter  
dated February  
25, 1920*

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 26, 1920.

## No. 29

I.C.P. 47B.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conversation held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Thursday, February 26, 1920, at 4 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Forbes Adam, Mr. Leeper; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Major Caccia.

*France*: M. Cambon, M. Berthelot.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti, Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Galli; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

(In the unavoidable absence of Mr. Lloyd George,<sup>1</sup> Lord Curzon took the chair.)

LORD CURZON said that the council had before them what was an attempt to put in the form of a draft agreement<sup>2</sup> the arrangements it was desirable to make in respect of the economic spheres to be allotted to the Allies in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. These arrangements had been put in a form which would not seem to make the Allies participants in the spoils of a conquered country, or monopolists in any particular sphere. It partook of the nature of what he had previously called a 'self-denying ordinance': that is to say, that in regard to Adalia the French and British entered into an agreement not to interfere with Italian economic priority. The British and Italians entered into a similar agreement in respect of Cilicia. Equally, in Kurdistan, east of the Tigris and outside the blue area of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the French and Italians would

<sup>1</sup> Cf. below.

<sup>2</sup> Not appended to the filed copy: cf. No. 19, note 1.

agree not to apply for special concessions against the British. In effect, what had been aimed at was complete equality as between the three Allies. Further, it was necessary to make it quite clear that there was no intention of preventing other nations from benefiting by the opening up of these regions. All that they wanted to do was to have a common understanding among themselves. If the Allies could agree as to the special economic priorities to be granted to each of them in particular regions, they would eliminate competition among themselves in the specified areas, but there would be no reason why Japan, or Belgium or any other country should not seek concessions in those areas. All they proposed to do was to say that two of the Powers would not compete with the third in a particularised area, and that these two Powers would give their diplomatic support to that third party. He desired to make this brief preliminary explanation before the council proceeded to examine the draft clause by clause.

M. BERTHELOT said that he had two small remarks to make in regard to Cilicia and the limits imposed by the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

*Cilicia* Political influence, from the economic point of view, gave really little beyond what was conceded by the present arrangement. From that point of view, the benefit accruing to the French from the area allotted under existing arrangements would be extremely limited. M. Berthelot then described on a map certain modifications of the suggested borders of Cilicia which his Government desired to put forward.

LORD CURZON said that M. Berthelot raised the question whether the blue area should not be extended eastwards to Lake Van, in order to expand the French sphere of economic priority in that region. Upon this question he had two comments to offer: first, that to adopt this proposal would be to tread on dangerous ground, since it would be a new departure, the Powers having hitherto proceeded on the basis of the Sykes-Picot Agreement: second, the area of the economic priority already granted to France was very large, while that given to Great Britain was very small and would be perceptibly curtailed if M. Berthelot's suggestion, as indicated by him on the map, were adopted. Lord Curzon then explained what he had just said by means of a map which showed the distribution of the mineral resources in the areas under discussion. He pointed out that practically the whole of the mineral resources in Asia Minor were contained in areas allocated to the French or Italians, or Greeks, or in the areas which would remain under the Turks. In the circumstances, he thought it was not reasonable to suggest a further contraction of the British area.

M. CAMBON asked whether it was not a question of the independence of Kurdistan, and whether this question had been settled by the conference.

LORD CURZON replied that the question of Kurdistan had not been settled in the Council Chamber. The council had decided that M. Berthelot and he should discuss the matter together, and on the previous day Mr. Lloyd

George, in the council, had given the outlines of a speech which he proposed to make in the House of Commons this afternoon on the whole Turkish question.<sup>3</sup> Mr. Lloyd George had stated that he proposed to say that one of the principles upon which the council had proceeded was to cut off from the Turkish Empire all regions inhabited by non-Turkish races: e.g., the Arabs, the Armenians, the Syrians, and the Kurds, as these latter were certainly not Turks.

M. BERTHELOT said that on the subject of Kurdistan, if the conference was to compare the respective situations of France and Great Britain as laid down in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, they must start from the point of departure. The French zone was that marked in blue on the Sykes-Picot map, and this had been much diminished in the direction of Mosul. The British zone, on the contrary, had remained intact, and had been increased in the direction of Mosul. Kurdistan, however, was a new feature, and it[s] future had not been outlined in the Sykes-Picot instrument. There were, he believed, valuable mines of various minerals there. Although there were certain copper and other mines in Cilicia, there were mineral resources of much greater value, he contended, in the British zone.

LORD CURZON thought it was difficult for the conference to discuss those details. M. Berthelot had spoken as if the French had been given special economic rights in the blue area under the Sykes-Picot Agreement. This was not the case, he thought. The French had rights of appointing advisers in that area, but rights of economic priority were only conceded in areas 'A' and 'B'. In the draft, therefore, the French were really being granted more than had been conceded by the said agreement, while they proposed to relieve themselves of all military responsibilities in Cilicia. Moreover, the possession of these rights in respect of Palestine gave no real advantage to the British: in fact, they would gladly hand them over to anyone else. Further, the British had nothing to get out of Kurdistan, and were only interested in it from its contiguity to the country which they would have to administer. He hoped that, on further consideration, M. Berthelot would be content with the blue area as provided by the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

M. BERTHELOT thought that there was no advantage to be gained by prolonging, in the absence of M. Millerand, a discussion which was somewhat controversial in character. He would, however, at once refer to M. Millerand the view put forward by Lord Curzon. Kurdistan, he thought, had a certain special significance and importance, on account of its contiguity to Armenia and Syro-Chaldea. He suggested that the council should await the views of M. Millerand on this subject. M. Millerand's concern was due to the importance attached to the question by the Armenians in Cilicia.

SIGNOR NITTI said that the area which was proposed to be included in the Adalia Adalia region had not been clearly defined. He thought the conference were in agreement that the Italian zone was to include both the green and the 'C' areas. He reminded his colleagues that the Italians had lost

<sup>3</sup> See No. 26, minute 3.

Smyrna and the Smyrna district, which was equivalent to 20 per cent. of the revenue of the old Ottoman Power, and the area which was now allocated to them was partly arable, but partly also salt and desert. He would like the line to be made absolutely definite, and he would prefer that it should run from Afioun-Kara-Hissar to the sea.

LORD CURZON stated, with reference to what Signor Nitti had just said, that it was quite true that the green area under the Sykes-Picot arrangement had been somewhat modified by the cession of Smyrna to Greece. Signor Nitti's proposal, however, that this area should be extended to run in a line due north to the Black Sea caused him considerable apprehension. It involved a departure from the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the terms of which had been seen by and were well known to everybody. If they went outside that agreement the world generally would say that the Allies meant now to profit further by the weakness of the Turks. The present disposal of Smyrna had been agreed to by the Allies for political reasons. He trusted that Signor Nitti would not persist in his proposal, as it would raise great difficulties with the Turks. He understood that Signor Nitti suggested extending the Italian area right up to the demilitarised zone, and he would like to ask whether the extension would include Brussa.

SIGNOR NITTI said that it was not proposed to include Brussa.

LORD CURZON thought that they were in a very difficult position as it was. He had just been refreshing his memory by looking at the terms under which areas 'B' and 'C' came. These terms had been arranged at Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne: 'sous réserve de l'assentiment russe.' Mr. Balfour had later written to the Italian Government to say that, in consequence of altered conditions, what had been arranged at Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne no longer held good.<sup>4</sup> He (Lord Curzon) did not wish to contest the question of 'C'

<sup>4</sup> On November 26, 1918, Mr. Balfour had addressed a letter to the Marquis Imperiali, Italian Ambassador in London, in reply to the latter's letter of November 16, to Mr. Balfour. This correspondence (which has now been traced and should be read in conjunction with the Introductory Note to Chap. III in Vol. IV) read as follows (reference 191856/747/44):

(a) *The Marquis Imperiali to Mr. Balfour (Received November 20)*

(Translation.)

No. 4511

ITALIAN EMBASSY, LONDON, November 16, 1918

'Sir,

'In a Note dated October 30th last [not printed] Your Excellency informed me that the British Government considered it advisable to initiate conversations between the Governments of Italy, the United States, France, and Great Britain regarding the territories mentioned in the Franco-British Agreement of 1916.

'In accordance with instructions received, I hasten to inform Your Excellency that the Italian Government is disposed to participate in these discussions as proposed, with which, as you inform me, the French Government will be associated.

'The Italian Government takes act of Your Excellency's declaration to the effect that, in opening these discussions, there is no intention of questioning the validity of the Treaty of London of 1915, which will remain in full force and effect.

'The Italian Government adds, however, that until a subsequent agreement is reached, it must consider as valid the agreement concluded at London in August 1917 between the British, French, and Italian Governments, when the Italian Government gave its

area, but he felt that area was the limit beyond which it would be impossible to go. In consideration, therefore, of the fact that he did not propose to contest 'C,' he trusted that Signor Nitti would not press him further.

Lord Curzon proposed that the conference should now proceed to discuss the draft clause by clause. He pointed out that the first two clauses involved a matter of principle, and he felt that their discussion had better be deferred until Mr. Lloyd George could be present.

M. BERTHELOT said that he had two reservations to make with regard to the concluding paragraph of the tripartite agreement which related to Kurdistan, namely: firstly, that the zone therein referred to should be defined as the blue area of the Sykes-Picot Agreement; and, secondly, that

adherence to the Franco-British Agreement of 1916 and obtained the recognition of its interests in Anatolia, Arabia, and the Red Sea. Advantage is taken of this opportunity to state that in the view of the Italian Government and in conformity with a reasonable interpretation of justice, the reservation in regard to Russian consent, made in the Agreement of 1917, cannot in any way invalidate it inasmuch as Russia has ceased to exist as a contracting Government and is not therefore in a position to express herself on the question.

'I am, further, instructed to point out to Your Excellency that, in giving its adherence to Your Excellency's request regarding a *modus vivendi* between Great Britain and France for the conduct of relations with the Arabs in certain districts, the Italian Government must assume that not only the Franco-British Agreement of 1916 but also the Agreement of August 1917 remain valid.

'On its part, the Italian Government wishes to declare that it pursues no objects in the Anatolian districts covered by the Agreement of 1917 other than to promote the establishment of a Government and national Administration supported by the free will of the people, with the view of assuring, with its support and effective assistance, the normal operation of justice, security and civil progress, and to promote the development of the country's economic resources.

'I have, &c.,  
IMPERIALI'

(b) *Mr. Balfour to the Marquis Imperiali*

'FOREIGN OFFICE, November 26, 1918

'Your Excellency,

'I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note (No. 4511), which your Excellency was so good as to address to me on the 16th instant, on the subject of the agreement concluded in London in August 1917, between the British, French, and Italian Governments.

'His Majesty's Government are quite unable to admit the contention advanced in your Excellency's note under reply. The condition providing that the consent of Russia should be secured, on which the validity of the whole agreement was expressly made dependent, has not been fulfilled. The reasons for such non-fulfilment are, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, immaterial. It will be within your Excellency's recollection that His Majesty's Government went out of their way to meet Italian interests by suggesting a fresh arrangement, to be based on discussions with France and the United States. They sincerely regret that their friendly offer should be met by a formal claim that an agreement is binding although one of its fundamental provisions remains unfulfilled.

'In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government regret that they are compelled, in answer to the formal claim put forward by the Italian Government, to state quite categorically that they consider it altogether inadmissible.

'I have, &c.,  
ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR'

the French area of priority should be extended up to the Armenian frontier, south of Van. Later on he would submit a draft giving effect to his proposal.

LORD CURZON said that he felt compelled to make certain reservations with regard to the provision concerning administrative assistance. He was under the impression that the British Foreign Office had been instructed to draw up an arrangement, on the basis of certain proposals framed by the Italian representatives, dealing exclusively with the spheres of economic priority to be created for France and Italy. He had only seen the draft now under consideration a short time ago, and he now found that the agreement went a great deal beyond the creation of economic spheres of influence. He found in the second provision that the same preference which had been provided for in respect of industrial and financial priorities had also been extended in respect of the granting of such assistance as the Ottoman Government might desire to obtain in the local administration and police. The question had undoubtedly been discussed by the council at a previous meeting, but, as far as he could recollect, no decision had been taken. Indeed, he felt doubtful whether the clause in question would be accepted by Mr. Lloyd George. Consequently, any decision come to on those clauses would only be accepted by himself subject to Mr. Lloyd George's assent.

M. BERTHELOT said that both the Italian and French Governments considered the clause relating to assistance should form an essential part of the agreement. If his recollection served him aright, he thought that Mr. Lloyd George had expressed the view that the Ottoman Government could not be obliged to accept assistance in the local administration or police, but that the Allies could, amongst themselves, agree not to dispute the preferential claims of the Power whose special interest in such areas had been recognised to supply such assistance.

LORD CURZON thought, on further recollection, that M. Berthelot had correctly interpreted Mr. Lloyd George's intentions. At the same time, he would ask that the clause should be accepted, subject to the concurrence of Mr. Lloyd George.

M. BERTHELOT said he took exception to the following words at the end of the first paragraph of the third provision: 'or is unable to take advantage of its special position.' He thought that phrase should be altered to read as follows: 'or is unwilling to exercise its rights.' This was agreed to.

LORD CURZON proposed to add a clause between clauses 5 and 6 to the effect that, while the three contracting Powers had entered into certain binding agreements among themselves, nothing in that arrangement would prevent outside Powers from coming in, subject only to anything to the contrary that might exist in the Treaty of Peace itself. He himself felt so apprehensive of the criticism that a partition of Turkey amongst the three contracting Powers had been made that he thought something should be inserted to show that the free claims of other nations were not denied. He proposed, therefore, the addition of the following clause:—

'There is nothing in this agreement to impede the free entry for commercial and economic purposes of the nationals of other States into any of

the areas herein referred to, subject to the reservations which are contained in the treaty, or which have been voluntarily accepted for themselves by the signatories of this agreement.'

(This was agreed to.)

M. BERTHELOT then invited attention to the concluding portion of clause 6 wherein it was stated that, on the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, France and Italy 'will thereupon withdraw their troops from the areas in which their special interests are respectively recognised.' He thought that the signature of the treaty by Turkey would not, in the interests of the safety of the minorities, by itself justify the immediate withdrawal of the troops. He thought a more general formula would have to be found, and he would submit a draft on the following day. This was agreed to.

SIGNOR NITTI asked permission to refer again to the question of the area in which the special interests of Italy would be recognised. It had been decided that Italy should only receive concessions in regard to coal in the area of Heraclea. He wished to urge that the concessions granted to Italy in the green zone on the map attached to the Sykes-Picot Agreement should be extended to the whole area of Heraclea, in order to enable her to develop that port and the railways leading thereto.

M. CAMBON pointed out that the French already possessed certain concessions at Heraclea. Consequently, if Heraclea were included in the Italian sphere of influence, the French concessions would fall under Italian control. He agreed that the condition of the port of Heraclea was extremely bad, but he thought the French must retain full possession of their concessions in that area.

(This question was then dropped.)

SIGNOR NITTI pointed out that one more question called for settlement, namely, the distribution of enemy property in the respective spheres of economic influence. He thought the council had agreed that the three Powers should retain all German property within their respective spheres of influence.

LORD CURZON reminded the conference that, when the question had been brought forward before, Mr. Lloyd George had not been able to accept that proposal, and had taken very grave objection to the suggestion that the railways should be transferred either to France or to Italy in their respective zones. In that connection, he would read the following extract from the statement made by Mr. Lloyd George to the conference on the 20th February, 1920<sup>5</sup> (for Mr. Lloyd George's statement, see I.C.P. 39A).

<sup>5</sup> See No. 19 (I.C.P. 39A). In the typescript text of the present minute there followed, in place of the phrase in parenthesis, a quotation from the first statement by Mr. Lloyd George recorded in minute 2 of No. 19, beginning 'Were, for instance, German shares' and ending 'into a general pool'. In the typescript text this quotation was immediately followed by the words: 'The draft proposals regarding administrative assistance to Turkey and her economic development were generally approved, subject to a second reading after amendment in accordance with the reservations made at that meeting. It was further agreed—That a second reading of the amended draft should take place on the following day.'

I.C.P. 48.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Thursday, February 26, 1920, at 5.45 p.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Forbes Adam, Mr. Leeper; **SECRETARIES,** Sir M. Hankey, Major Caccia.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Berthelot.

*Italy:* Signor Nitti, Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Galli; **SECRETARY,** Signor Trombetti.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda.

*Roumania:* M. Vaida Voevod, Prime Minister, and Minister for Foreign Affairs; M. Boeresco, Chargé d'Affaires in London.

**INTERPRETER:** Professor P. J. Mantoux.

**LORD CURZON**, addressing M. Vaida Voevod, said that he wished to express his regrets that Mr. Lloyd George was unavoidably absent, being detained at the House of Commons. Mr. Lloyd George would have wished to have been present to extend<sup>1</sup> a welcome to the Roumanian Prime Minister. In his absence he (Lord Curzon) wished to ask the conference to allow him to extend a warm welcome to M. Vaida Voevod. The conference desired to hear the Roumanian Prime Minister on two points. One of those points would be discussed that day, but the second would have to be postponed to a later date, since it referred to the reply which the Allied Powers proposed to give to the Hungarian counter-proposals. With regard to the question immediately to be discussed, a month ago the Roumanian Prime Minister had attended a meeting in Paris, when the question of the withdrawal of the Roumanian army from Hungary had been discussed.<sup>2</sup> He had then accepted a decision reached by the conference, and had undertaken to issue immediate instructions to give effect to that decision.<sup>3</sup> Since then, the Roumanian Government had done its best, but great difficulties had arisen to prevent the withdrawal of the Roumanian troops from Hungary—difficulties due to lack of transport, the rigours of the climate, and want of accommodation for the troops. The Roumanian Prime Minister's anxiety to carry out his undertaking was such that he wished now to make certain proposals, and it was in order to give him an opportunity of putting forward his proposals that he had been invited to attend the council that afternoon.

**M. VAIDA VOEVOVOD** said that the question of the withdrawal of the Roumanian army from Hungary had caused a partial Government crisis in Roumania, because he had insisted too much, with the result that certain

<sup>1</sup> In the typescript text this word was amended by Lord Curzon to 'offer'. This and other corrections by Lord Curzon and M. Vaida Voevod (see notes 3-8 below) to the typescript were not circulated or incorporated in the filed copy of the text, which remained unrevised.

<sup>2</sup> See Volume II, No. 78, minute 5.

<sup>3</sup> This sentence was corrected by Lord Curzon (cf. note 1 above) to read: 'He had then accepted the decision as to immediate evacuation which had been reached by the conference, and had undertaken to issue instructions to give effect thereto.'



members of the Government had attacked the General Staff<sup>4</sup> of the army. As a consequence, the Minister of War had resigned, and latterly his colleague, who had made the attack on the army,<sup>5</sup> had also sent in his resignation. He himself, too, had for a time been under the impression that the Roumanian General Staff<sup>4</sup> were not doing their best, but after enquiries he had become convinced that they had done all that had been possible to carry out the evacuation. The difficulty, however, did not lie merely in evacuating the troops. A greater difficulty existed in clearing the depots which had been formed in the territory in question, and it was thought that the Roumanian Government could not incur the loss of abandoning the stocks of food and clothing there collected. The Roumanian Army Headquarters<sup>6</sup> had reported that the troops could be withdrawn at once if the Government took the responsibility of abandoning the depots. At the same time, the clearance of the depots had begun, though that was necessarily a very slow operation on account of transport and climatic difficulties. Army Headquarters<sup>6</sup> had latterly sent officers to Bucharest<sup>7</sup> to discuss that matter with the Allied representatives. Furthermore, he had that day read in a newspaper, though he had received no official confirmation of it, that an agreement had been reached between the Hungarian and Roumanian Governments with the object of fixing a time within which the desired evacuation would take place. He now wished to invite the Supreme Council to agree to send a commission of military experts to the area in question, with the object of fixing on the spot the time within which the troops and the depots should be evacuated. He promised that, on their part, the Roumanian Government would do their best to comply to [*with*] the decision thus reached. In conclusion, he would merely say that the Roumanian Government had done their best to comply with the engagements undertaken in Paris. Evacuation had commenced, and the only thing that now remained was to fix a date by which it should be completed.

LORD CURZON explained that the proposal put forward by M. Vaida Voevod would necessitate the appointment of experts, who would fix the various stages of withdrawal. In that connection the British Government would issue the necessary instructions to that effect to General Ironside, who was about to proceed to Roumania. He enquired whether the French and Italian Governments would also appoint representatives of their own to assist.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he agreed very willingly to the suggestion made by the Roumanian Prime Minister. An Italian representative would be appointed without delay.

M. BERTHELOT said that the French Government would also appoint an expert at once.

M. VAIDA VOEVOV thanked the conference, and wished to be permitted, in

<sup>4</sup> Corrected by M. Vaida Voevod (cf. note 1 above) to 'General H.Q.'.

<sup>5</sup> Corrected by M. Vaida Voevod to '... on the G.H.Q.'.

<sup>6</sup> Corrected by M. Vaida Voevod to '... General Headquarters'.

<sup>7</sup> Corrected by M. Vaida Voevod to 'Budapest'.

conclusion, to invite their attention to the great difficulties under which the Roumanian Government laboured, owing to the boundaries of Bessarabia not having so far been fixed.<sup>8</sup>

LORD CURZON said that the council could not discuss that question on that day.

The council agreed—

To appoint British, French and Italian military experts to fix, on the spot, the dates for the completion of the various stages in the withdrawal of the Roumanian troops from Hungary.

General Ironside was appointed the British expert, and the names of the French and Italian experts will be communicated at the earliest possible date.

*(The conference adjourned at 6.15 p.m.)*

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 26, 1920.

<sup>8</sup> This passage was corrected by M. Vaida Voevod to read '... owing to the boundaries of Bessarabia concerning which the Supreme Council has so far not expressed itself.'

## No. 31

I.C.P. 48A.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conversation held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Thursday, February 26, 1920, at 6.15 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire:* The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Leeper; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Major Caccia.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Berthelot.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. LORD CURZON said that at the morning's meeting the conference had agreed to a French draft of a reply, on behalf of France and Great Britain, to President Wilson's communication, received on the 25th February, 1920.<sup>1</sup> While the draft gave perfect expression to the council's views in the French idiom, it was found that it was less satisfactory when translated into the English language. Consequently, it had been found necessary slightly to alter the form of the document, which would have to be transmitted to President Wilson in English. The redraft, however, contained all that was in the French draft, and laid emphasis on certain questions which had not been sufficiently stressed that morning.

*The Adriatic.  
Reply to  
President  
Wilson's Letter,  
dated February  
25, 1920*

(Professor Mantoux then read the English redraft, which was unanimously accepted without amendment (for full text see Appendix).<sup>2</sup>)

<sup>1</sup> See No. 28.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. The text in this appendix was the same as that printed as document 15 in Cmd. 586 except for minor variation in punctuation, and for the text in the appendix reproducing the signatures: 'Millerand. D. Lloyd George'.

It was agreed—

That the English redraft, duly signed by Mr. Lloyd George and M. Millerand, should be transmitted to the American Ambassador in London that evening.

2. M. BERTHELOT enquired whether the whole of the documents, including the reply to be despatched that evening, could now be published.
- Publication of the Correspondence*      LORD CURZON said that he had requested the American Ambassador to ensure that the American Government would not publish the correspondence in question until the Allies' last reply had been received by them. A few minutes ago, however, he had heard from a pressman representing one of the London news agencies that the American Government had already taken steps to publish the correspondence that night. Lord Curzon thought it most improper that they should do so before the receipt of the final reply. He did not think, however, that it mattered much who published the correspondence first, since the Allied Governments would give sound reasons why they had not been able to publish earlier.

It was agreed—

That the whole of the correspondence relating to the Adriatic question, in accordance with a list prepared by Lord Curzon, should be published by the Allied Governments at the earliest possible date: the correspondent [*correspondence*] to include the reply of the Governments to the note of the 9th December.

It was thought that the correspondence could be published on the following Saturday.

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 26, 1920.

I.C.P. 49.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference, held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Friday, February 27, 1920, at 11.30 a.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer; The Right Hon. Sir A. C. Geddes, President of the Board of Trade; The Right Hon. Sir Robert Horne, Minister of Labour; Mr. C. A. McCurdy, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food; Sir S. J. Chapman, Joint Permanent Secretary to the Board of Trade; Mr. B. P. Blackett, Controller of Finance, Treasury; Mr. Wise; **SECRETARIES,** Sir M. Hankey, Captain Abraham, Mr. Leith Ross.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. François Marsal, M. Avenol, M. de Béarn.

*Italy:* Signor Nitti, Signor Scialoja, Signor Beneduce, Signor Giannini; **SECRETARY,** Signor Trombetti.

**INTERPRETER:** Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. LORD CURZON said that he would like, before the conference began the business on the agenda, to make a statement regarding news he had just received. He had learned that the American Government had placed in possession of the Central News Agency its selection from the correspondence which had passed concerning the Adriatic problem. The council would remember that some time ago it had been made aware that the American Government proposed to publish this correspondence.<sup>1</sup> The council had agreed that there was no real objection to publication, provided it was simultaneous in all the countries concerned, and identical<sup>2</sup> in content. This had been communicated to the American Ambassador in London, who had expressed his concurrence. Subsequently, a few days ago, the American Ambassador had shown Lord Curzon the list of letters<sup>3</sup> which the American Government proposed to publish. Signor Nitti, on seeing the list, had objected that it omitted the Italian replies, which was undesirable. The American Ambassador had been told this, and had been promised that the British Foreign Office would supply him with a full list of all the letters it was proposed to publish. It had also been pointed out to Mr. Davis that the last reply to President Wilson should be among the letters published. The American Ambassador had agreed, and telegraphed accordingly to his Government. The complete list had been given to him on the previous day, and it had been agreed that the full correspondence should appear on Monday next, both in America and in Europe. On hearing the surprising news that publication had taken place in America

*The Adriatic.  
Publication of  
Correspondence*

<sup>1</sup> See No. 17, minute 2.

<sup>2</sup> In the typescript text this phrase was corrected by Lord Curzon to read '... and as far as possible identical in contents'. This and other corrections by Lord Curzon (see notes 3 and 4 below) to the typescript were not circulated or incorporated in the filed copy here printed.

<sup>3</sup> This word was corrected by Lord Curzon (cf. note 2 above) to 'papers'.

last night, he (Lord Curzon) had told the American Ambassador that he found it hard to believe the news to be true. It must be assumed that the President had been induced to take this action for some political reason. He did not think the incident was disastrous,<sup>4</sup> though it was undoubtedly unfortunate. The list which the British Government proposed to publish contained sixteen letters,<sup>5</sup> whereas the American list only contained six. He assumed that the French and Italian Governments would make corresponding arrangements for publication in their countries on Monday next. He had desired to make this statement to the council in order to show that there had been no neglect on his part in the matter.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that it would be preferable to arrange for publication on the following day rather than on Monday, in order that the abbreviated American version should not appear in the European press before the full version.

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that it would be difficult to secure publication in Paris on the following day, as the French delegation had been awaiting the British compilation, and only expected to receive it at mid-day.

SIGNOR NITTI said that this argument applied even more strongly to Italy. It might be possible to publish on Monday, but he was not quite sure of this. The Paris-Lyons-Mediterranean Railway being disorganised,<sup>6</sup> it would be necessary to telegraph the correspondence, which might get garbled in the process. However, he was prepared to announce in the Italian press that the American compilation was incomplete, and that the supplementary correspondence, including the Italian replies, would be published. He therefore raised no objection to publication on the following day.

It was agreed—

That publication of the entire correspondence should be made as early as possible.

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, as the council was about to engage on the important subject of high prices and exchanges, and as the greatest interest would be taken by the public in the results of the discussions, he thought the council should devote the whole of its time to the subject. It was certain that the examination of the matter could not be concluded in one day, it was unlikely to be concluded in two, and might take three or four. It would probably be desirable, at the close of the examination, to issue a report, or a list of recommendations, which, coming from so authoritative a body, would have a great effect. In the meanwhile it would be very unfortunate if the business connected with the Turkish treaty should halt. The reports of the commissions dealing with various parts of this treaty were coming in, and should be dealt with. He therefore sug-

*Division of the Conference*  
<sup>4</sup> This phrase was corrected by Lord Curzon to read: 'He did not think that the incident was serious'.

<sup>5</sup> The publication in question, Cmd. 586 of 1920, comprised fifteen numbered documents

<sup>6</sup> A strike on the Paris-Lyon-Méditerranée railway had begun on February 25, 1920. In this connection M. Millerand had returned to Paris. The strike ended on March 1.

gested that the conference should divide its forces, and that those members concerned in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey should meet at the Foreign Office. Should any of them think it necessary to obtain a decision of the full conference on any point, a morning or afternoon could be set apart for the purpose. He therefore proposed, if his colleagues agreed, that meetings regarding the Turkish treaty should take place at the Foreign Office, at the same time as meetings regarding high prices and exchanges should take place in Downing Street.

This proposal was agreed to by the French and Italian representatives, and it was decided—

That the first meeting in the Foreign Office, on the subject of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, should be held at 4 p.m. the same day.

3. SIR AUCKLAND GEDDES was then invited to open the discussion on prices by a statement of the British view.<sup>7</sup> He said that the subject was one on which no one would wish to speak dogmatically. It was difficult to analyse all the causes involved in the rise of prices as they included many elements, especially:—

*High Prices and  
Foreign Ex-  
changes*

- (1) Depreciation of currency.
- (2) Scarcity resulting from the war; and
- (3) The effects of combinations, trusts and 'profiteering'.

There were also important elements such as reduction of output, difficulty of transport, the reflection of high taxation, and the need to set aside sums for depreciation of machinery and plant. But in his view by far the most important element was the disturbance of currency, which might be divided into two aspects:—

- (a) The change in the commodity value of gold; and
- (b) The excessive issue of paper and the consequent change in the relation between currency and gold.

To take the first point, America still remained on a gold basis, but owing to the immense accumulation of gold in her banks the commodity value of gold had fallen, with a result that wholesale prices had risen 100 to 120 per cent. above the pre-war level. In other gold-using countries there was a

<sup>7</sup> In a corrigendum, which was circulated but not incorporated in the present text, this minute began as follows: 'The Conference had before it the following papers [not appended to filed copy] on High Prices and Foreign Exchanges:—

'Note by the French Delegation (C.P. 744)

'Note by the Italian Delegation (C.P. 743)

'Notes by Sir Auckland Geddes (C.P. 726 and 727)

'Note by the British Chancellor of the Exchequer (C.P. 728)

'Note by Mr. McCurdy (C.P. 730)

'and also the Minutes of a Conference of Finance Ministers which took place at the Treasury on the 13th February (I.C.P. 27A [No. 5]).

'Sir Auckland Geddes was invited to open the discussion by a statement of the British view.'

similar, and, indeed, a more intensified, increase in gold prices, e.g., in Japan the increase was 160 per cent., so that it might be said that throughout the world gold had not more than half the commodity value it had before the war, and as gold was the standard measure of prices, that measure had itself changed.

Returning to Europe, however, the fall in the value of gold was greatly intensified. Whereas in America wholesale prices had risen say from 100 before the war to 220, in Great Britain the rise was from 100 to 270, and in France and Italy, so far as he could judge, the rise had been from 100 to 400. The additional fall in the value of money in Europe as compared with America was a measure of the paper inflation which had taken place in Europe.

The different price levels ruling in the different countries as a result of inflation had lead [*sic*] to violent oscillations of the exchanges, with the result that business men had lost confidence in the stability of currency in other countries, and before activity of commerce could be resumed each country must provide guarantees that no further inflation of currency would be allowed. Until this was done the rise in prices will be accentuated by the fact that world's [*sic*] stocks are not being moved freely from one country to another.

It appeared to him that the difficulty of moving goods and raw materials was doing more to hamper production in Europe at this moment than any other cause. With the present exchange position it was impossible to supply Poland, Czechoslovakia, Roumania, &c., with raw materials, and though the British Government was making arrangements to send a certain amount for them to work up into goods under a system by which the goods are returned to this country, such arrangements were a mere drop in the bucket. Until business men regained confidence in currency, full scale interchange of products could not be restarted, and it appeared to him, therefore, of first importance that each country should take steps to limit the issue of paper money, or in future to issue a special kind of paper only for internal circulation, proceeding to reduce the amount in circulation at the earliest possible date.

Before there could be any reduction of gold prices it was absolutely necessary that the countries with inflated currency should close the gap between their paper and gold prices. This could be achieved in either of three ways:—

- (a) Gold prices might rise;
- (b) Paper prices might fall; or
- (c) Paper prices might come down and gold prices go up till they met.

A rise in gold prices would, of course, present the easiest solution, and he expected some further increase in the United States. But it was essential that paper prices should be brought down, and this was a matter which each country must deal with for itself by getting its expenditure met from taxation, and by beginning to pay off its debt. When that was done they would get back to a gold level, though he thought the future level of gold would be at least 50 or 75 per cent. above the pre-war level.

Summarising his views, he felt it should be recognised that while steps can be taken to palliate the results of scarcity, nothing effective can be done till the free movement of goods from country to country for manufacture and production is resumed; that to secure this a definite stop must be put to paper inflation, and, if possible, a reduction effected so that paper and gold prices may again correspond. The balance would not, however, be restored unless production was maintained and export encouraged to the fullest possible extent. There was no short road to pull down prices, but it was a matter of importance that the people in every country should realise that the situation could only be cured by harder work and that the Governments should realise the need for stricter economy in expenditure and for meeting that expenditure out of taxation.

M. MARSAL said he agreed with most of Sir A. C. Geddes's statements, but he was inclined to think that the movement of gold prices was rather a result than a cause. To his mind the basis of the whole problem was the wholesale destruction of means of production and the using up of all stocks, visible and invisible. Further, millions of men had been diverted for years to the work of destruction and to preparing means of destruction, and this necessarily disturbed the whole relation of consumption and production. Assuming, then, that the essential cause of the present crisis was to be found in the results of the war, the aims which he thought should be kept in view were:—

- (1) To re-establish means of production;
- (2) To avoid excessive consumption;
- (3) To reconstitute stocks;
- (4) To intensify output

everywhere as soon as possible.

The measures to be taken to secure these aims were partly international and partly national. As regards international measures, the main object must be to restore the productive capacity of the countries which had been devastated by the war or the countries which were sterilised by other causes, as, for example, Russia.

Steps must be taken to provide the countries which cannot produce what they produced in 1914 with the food<sup>8</sup> manufactures, raw materials, means of transport, &c., which they lacked and which were now accumulated in the hands of other groups. It would be essential that they should receive them at reasonable prices and under some system of credit, in order that they could reconstruct themselves effectively. For example, before the war France was self-supporting in wheat and sugar, but she was now compelled to buy these commodities abroad, thereby creating a scarcity in the world markets, and driving up the world prices. This situation was detrimental to all other countries which had to import these essential goods, and it was to their interest to assist in restoring France's normal production. A further measure

<sup>8</sup> There should perhaps be a comma after 'food'.



which would assist the exchanges and also improve the internal situation was to secure the transfer into negotiable values of the German reparations.

The question of increased output of labour was also an international matter. In view of the importance of public opinion, any action taken by the Governments must be taken simultaneously and in common. It was essential to improve the standard of output not only by developing the use of machinery, but also be [by] securing greater efficiency on the part of the mechanic. Such questions as the encouragement of piece-work, profit-sharing, &c., would have to be considered in this connection; and also the question of compelling owners of means of production to secure that they are used to the maximum possible extent. Finally, steps would have to be taken also to reduce consumption.

As regards national measures, he entirely agreed that the first thing to be done was to reduce paper circulation, whatever form that paper took, e.g., bank-notes, bills, bonds, &c. So far as internal debt was concerned, the question could to a large extent be settled by the issue of internal funding loans, and France was taking energetic measures in this direction. He also agreed that each country must balance its budget and secure a revenue sufficient to cover all its indispensable expenditure. In this he included its obligations to foreign creditors, though the period when the foreign debt could be redeemed must be as remote as possible so as not to crush the present generation.

(It was agreed that the Italian view should be stated at the afternoon meeting.)

*(The conference adjourned at 1.15 p.m. until 4 p.m.)*

*2, Whitehall Gardens, February 27, 1920.*

I.C.P. 50.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference, held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Friday, February 27, 1920, at 4 p.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer; The Right Hon. Sir A. C. Geddes, President of the Board of Trade; The Right Hon. Sir Robert Horne, Minister of Labour; Mr. McCurdy, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food; Sir S. J. Chapman, Joint Permanent Secretary to the Board of Trade; Mr. Blackett, Controller of Finance, Treasury; Mr. Wise; **SECRETARIES,** Sir M. Hankey, Captain Abraham, Mr. Leith Ross.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. François Marsal, M. Avenol, M. de Béarn.

*Italy:* Signor Nitti, Signor Scialoja, Signor Beneduce, Signor Giannini; **SECRETARY,** Signor Trombetti.

**INTERPRETER:** Professor P. J. Mantoux.

**SIGNOR BENEDUCE** said that, in his opinion, the source of the present financial troubles of Europe was the want of balance between production and consumption. This had been at its worst during the war. The various States had become involved in great enterprises, the benefits of which could be estimated in moral advantages, but not, as yet, in economic advantages. These States had been immense consumers of goods. The relatively slender resources at their command had been quite inadequate to pay for the value of the goods they had consumed; hence the issue of a great mass of fiduciary currency. The remedy for the whole situation, therefore, was increased production. Men in all countries, victorious or vanquished, must be induced back to work. This should be the first result to aim at. The moral solidarity of the world had been shaken; its economic solidarity was now reasserting itself. Nothing would re-establish normal life save the bringing of all peoples back to productive labour.

It was not only necessary to consider those countries in which production had been totally disorganised. There were also countries in a position to produce, and produce well. These also required support and encouragement, in order that they should be enabled to work at their full capacity. Some such countries needed raw material; some needed means of transport. All obstacles to their obtaining these necessary things should be removed. It was clear that any country which only obtained raw material at a prohibitive price must have its power of production crippled. In the matter of raw material there was a natural economic solidarity throughout the world. The isolation of a market in an anti-economic way could only produce an evil effect not only locally, but in the aggregate.

He had noted what had been said that morning by the President of the

Board of Trade<sup>1</sup> regarding the plan for supplying raw material to countries with a very depreciated currency. He suggested that there should be an extension of some such system to countries which were in a better position than those he had taken into consideration. Among the countries in a position to work and produce, there were some with a surplus of raw material, and others with organised skill and labour, capable of transferring such raw material into manufactured goods. Countries thus situated should be in a position to exchange services. Exchanges in kind had been suggested as between countries still organised and countries in a state of disorganisation. No doubt this could be effected by means of a clearing-house for raw materials and manufactured goods. Something of the same kind could be done for the other countries he had in mind. This raised the question of long-term credit. In the arrangements described by Sir Auckland Geddes, the length of the credit was measured by the time elapsing between sending the raw material and its return in the form of manufactured goods. Countries less impoverished, but with an adverse exchange forbidding the purchase of raw material, needed some working capital placed at their disposal. The restoration of Europe, therefore, depended upon the supply of working capital, and this could only be found in America. If the system of credit which existed before the war was to be restored, he thought it would largely be brought about by understandings between private organisations, Governments only stepping in to guarantee the proper use of the money advanced. The conference on exchanges, therefore, should be one between private persons, with representatives of Governments merely holding a watching brief.

All Governments must now do what they urged their citizens to do, namely, economise. They must balance revenue and expenditure, and they must diminish their paper circulation. These things were indispensable to the renewal of ordinary life.

Another necessity was centralised purchase, to avoid intermediate agencies and increased burden on exchanges.

He had not made any concrete proposals, but only made an exposition of general views on which such proposals could be based.

In conclusion, he would say that the causes of the economic crisis were not themselves purely economic; they were connected with moral and political factors, which conditioned the restoration of peace in Europe.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that the course of the discussion had shown that there was general agreement. The main difference between the British point of view and that of their French and Italian colleagues, was that in Great Britain greater importance was attached to inflation and depreciation of currency, which appeared to him to account more largely for the rise in prices than would be admitted by the French and Italian Ministers. But this was a difference not of principle, but of the degree of importance to be attached to one element of the problem.

Basing himself on this general agreement, he desired to draw attention to two statements made by Signor Beneduce. In the first place, he had pointed

<sup>1</sup> See No. 32.

out that the economic solidarity of Europe made it as much in the interest of the Allies as of their late enemies to restart industry in the vanquished countries. So far as Great Britain was concerned, he hoped that the Reparation Commission would use the powers given to them by article 235 of the Treaty of Peace, so as to enable Germany to secure raw material for her industries, and thus take the first step towards meeting her reparation obligations. This was equally necessary for M. Marsal's project of converting those obligations into some negotiable asset which could be used to assist the financial situation.

In the second place, Signor Beneduce had said that, to help Europe through her difficulties, we needed reasonable assistance from the wealth of America. For the moment it must be admitted that the conditions appeared very unfavourable. The United States Government did not propose to allow any further credits to the Allied Governments, and market conditions made it very difficult for these Governments to raise a loan in America. The main hope of assistance, therefore, lay in securing commercial credits, and in granting these America would be largely influenced by the impression we gave as to the extent to which we were making serious efforts to restore the normal financial position.

The position of Europe to England was analogous in this matter to the position of England to America. We had to buy food and raw materials from America, and our powers of lending to Europe were limited by the extent of our credit in America. It was essential for each country to stop further inflation of credit and currency, and to begin a steady reduction of both at the earliest moment. That was the definite policy adopted by the British Government, and any new loans not raised out of the savings of the people must defeat this aim. The same result would follow if bankers were asked to create additional bank credits on guarantees from the Government. The problem was, how to maintain and increase production to the highest level, while limiting and, if necessary, rationing credit so that the demand should not exceed the supply. The British Government could not, without defeating its policy of deflation, which was recognised on all sides as being sound, agree to force the market to make loans. So far, however, as the market could lend without requiring Government guarantees or assistance, the Government would offer no objection to borrowing by the Allies. It was not altogether convenient to us, as we needed capital in this country, but he had given up control of capital issues, and he had already expressed to M. Marsal and Signor Beneduce his willingness that they should obtain such loans as they could get from the London market without Government guarantee.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether the representatives of France and Italy could give figures of the rise in prices in their respective countries since the war.

M. MARSAL said that, apart from some differences in detail, the figures were very closely similar to those given by Sir Auckland Geddes.

SIGNOR BENEDEUCE said that the figures of inflation were correct, but the figure given for the increase of prices in Italy should be somewhat higher, as it was now in excess of 300 per cent.

SIGNOR NITTI said the question of prices and exchange, involving, as it did, the whole economic life, was so complex that it was difficult to know where to begin; but, in his view, the main point was the need to set Europe to work again. There were 180 million people in Russia either not working at all or not working in communication with us, and there were a further 120 million in Central Europe doing little work because they could not get food, and not getting food because they were not doing work. The whole European situation, even in the richest countries, was very grave, and it was getting worse.

It appeared to him that the first thing was to make the world realise that the war was over. Peace was not yet established in the minds of the people, and without peace there could be no confidence; and without confidence there could be no credit.

Before the war, Germany had the biggest share of Italian trade. At present she could neither buy nor sell, and her situation was creating great embarrassments for the whole of Europe. M. Marsal had suggested that assistance could be got by liquidating the German indemnity. For his part, he frankly stated that he was willing to sell his share in that indemnity at a heavy loss if he could find a purchaser in the United States. Whoever bought it would find himself faced with Germany, and only be able to realise by keeping Germany under something like a system of slavery. In the financial arrangements of Italy he had reckoned the indemnity at zero, so that anything that came in would be surplus. The only sure asset, to his mind, lay in the resumption of work, and that was what he wanted to see. He thought the situation in Europe to-day was not unlike that of a district which had been devastated by an earthquake. After an earthquake the survivors wanted to eat and drink and do no work, and it often took three or four years to restore their normal *moral*. The war had taken years to do what an earthquake could do in a few minutes, but we must adopt the same measures to give the people confidence in peace and restore their *moral* in work. Thus it seemed to him that the difficulty was chiefly a political and moral one, rather than purely economic.

The economic questions were for each Government to settle, and were full of difficulty. Everybody readily spoke of economies, but they were all led to more and more expenditure. What was needed was increased production, and this could not be secured without raw materials and credits. There were three steps—

- (i) The restarting of work and production.
- (ii) Economy in expenditure and consumption.
- (iii) The reduction of inflation.

As regards the latter, Italy was setting aside 3 milliard lire to be devoted solely to the reduction of the note circulation, while she was also instituting strict and complete taxation.

The community of interest of all countries should be recognised. Great Britain was a debtor country to the United States, but was a creditor to

France and Italy. If, for example, Italy should fail, the situation for England also would be endangered. It seemed to him that the following questions deserved examination:—

- (a) How far can we organise a common supply of raw materials?
- (b) How far can we establish credits with America and neutrals?
- (c) Should we continue to purchase in common, or compete against one another?

As regards the question of credits, he thought that such credits should be guaranteed not on the German indemnity, but out of the pockets of the borrowing country. But he again repeated that it appeared to him that the moral and political factors were at least as important as the purely economic questions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the conference would now adjourn, as Signor Nitti could not stay. He suggested that it should be resumed on the following morning, in order to consider some of the suggestions in detail. He proposed that on the following morning they should begin with the discussion of paper issues and deflation.

*(The conference adjourned at 5.45 p.m.)*

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 27, 1920.

#### No. 34

I.C.P. 51.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference of Foreign Secretaries and Ambassadors held in the Secretary of State's Room, British Foreign Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1, on Friday, February 27, 1920, at 6 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Malkin (for Minute 1), Colonel Gribbon; SECRETARIES, Colonel Storr, Major Caccia, Major Young.

*France*: M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, Colonel Chardigny, M. Kammerer.

*Italy*: Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Duke Ascanio Colonna, Signor Galli, Colonel Castoldi.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda, Mr. Magaoka [Nagaoka].

1. LORD CURZON said that the first point on the agenda paper related to the question of the Powers who should sign the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. On that question the Drafting Committee had submitted a memorandum which he would read to the conference.

*Turkish Peace  
Treaty: Powers  
to Sign*

(Lord Curzon then read a note by the Drafting Committee with reference to the Powers who should sign the Turkish Treaty (Appendix 1<sup>1</sup> A.J. 45).)

<sup>1</sup> Not appended to filed copy.

(a) Lord Curzon, continuing, said that the first question the conference had been asked to decide was whether the United States should be invited to sign the treaty. They had not declared war on Turkey, but had severed diplomatic relations. During the last few months the United States Government had dissociated itself from the proceedings of the Peace Conference. The American Ambassador had attended the Ambassadors' Conference in Paris with the object of reporting to the President what took place; but he had taken no official part in the proceedings. With regard to the present session of the Peace Conference, the American Government had gone further. When the conference had met in London he (Lord Curzon) had invited the American Ambassador to attend. The Ambassador, however, replied that he had no authority to do so. Consequently, the United States Government would have no responsibility for the decisions taken by the conference. Many of those present regretted that decision, but he (Lord Curzon) could not help thinking that before the Allied Governments had finished the treaty with Turkey, the United States would desire in some way or other to be included. He need only refer to what had occurred in the case of the Adriatic. The present conference must, however, accept existing facts. America had openly dissociated herself from their proceedings. Consequently, she could not be a party to the treaty at present, and she could not be asked to sign and to accept the decisions taken, as long as she openly refused to be represented, especially in the case of a country with whom she had not been actually at war.

M. CAMBON thought that there would be no necessity to take a formal decision on that day. But, when the treaty would be completed, it should be communicated to the United States of America in case she might have some criticisms to make or objections to raise. Should the United States of America then express the wish to sign, even though she had not been at war with Turkey, he thought she should be permitted to do so, however irregular the proceedings might be.

MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that he agreed to the procedure proposed by M. Cambon, provided it were clearly understood that the conference would not be asked to redraft the whole of the treaty, should America object thereto, since she (America) had been invited to attend and had refused to do so.

It was agreed that a copy of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey should, when completed, be communicated to the United States of America. The American Government would thus have an opportunity of deciding whether it would sign the treaty or not.

(b) LORD CURZON said that the second enquiry related to Montenegro. Montenegro had not been invited to sign either the treaty with Germany, Austria or Hungary. She should not therefore be invited to sign the treaty with Turkey.

It was agreed that Montenegro should not sign the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

(c) LORD CURZON said that the third question related to Armenia. Armenia had been recognised as an independent State. It was true that so far the only Armenian State whose autonomy had been recognised by the Principal Allied Powers was the old Russian Armenia, but in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey it was intended to cut out of the Turkish Empire an independent Armenian State. Armenia, as a part of the former Turkish Empire, would, as a result, have to undertake certain obligations which she would inherit from Turkey, such as her share of the Turkish debt. Consequently, it was desirable that she should be one of the signatories of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that the same principle had been followed in regard to the States carved out of the former Austrian Empire.

It was agreed that Armenia should be included in the signing of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

(d) LORD CURZON said that the next question to decide was whether Poland and Czechoslovakia should sign the Turkish Treaty. It appeared that these Powers wished to sign the treaty in order to obtain capitulatory rights and any other advantages that would be recognised by the treaty in favour of the Allied Powers.

M. KAMMERER explained that the Sublime Porte had during the war suppressed the Capitulations. In accordance with the Treaty of Peace it was proposed to re-establish those rights until a new judiciary system could be introduced. He thought, therefore, that it would be sufficient to introduce some clause in the treaty dealing with that question as far as Poland and Czechoslovakia were concerned.

LORD CURZON thought that the conference would agree that Poland and Czechoslovakia should enjoy capitulatory rights. But no decision need be taken until the clauses of the treaty relating to that question had been drafted and approved.

It was agreed that Poland and Czechoslovakia should eventually be granted the benefits of capitulatory rights, but whether that should be done by allowing them to sign the treaty, or by the inclusion of a special clause in the treaty, would be decided when the clauses of the treaty had been drafted and approved.

(e) LORD CURZON said that with regard to Russia his own inclination lead [sic] him to think that the conference should provide for the reappearance of Russia at a further date. It would be agreed that there would obviously be a Russia some day, and she would be interested in the question of Turkey. Consequently, the Turkish Treaty should be so drawn up that a door would be left open for the eventual adherence of Russia. He proposed, therefore, that a clause should be inserted providing for the accession of Russia to the treaty, after she had become a member of the League of Nations and thereby given satisfactory guarantees.



It was agreed that a clause should be inserted in the Turkish Treaty providing for the accession by Russia to the treaty on her becoming a member of the League of Nations.

- (f) LORD CURZON said that there remained the question whether the other Powers who took part in the Peace Conference, or any of them, should be invited to sign. He thought a negative reply should be given to that question.
- Other Powers to sign Treaty*

It was agreed that only those Powers mentioned in the first paragraph of the note by the Drafting Committee should be invited to sign the Turkish Treaty, subject to the decisions taken above.

- (g) LORD CURZON said that the last question put by the Drafting Committee, was whether the expression 'Allied and Associated Powers,' or 'Allied Powers,' or 'Principal Allied Powers,' should be employed. He thought the answer to that question should be that the expression 'Allied and Associated Powers' could only be employed if the United States agreed to sign. Otherwise, the expression 'Allied Powers' must be used to designate the whole body of signatories other than Turkey. Furthermore, in certain clauses the expression 'Principal Allied Powers' would be used as before, to designate the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan.
- Expression to designate Signatories of the Treaty*

It was agreed that the expression 'Allied Powers' should be employed in the Turkish Treaty to designate the whole body of signatories other than Turkey, and 'Principal Allied Powers' to designate the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan.

2. LORD CURZON read the report<sup>2</sup> and proposals of the Commission for the Delimitation of the Boundaries of Armenia.
- Boundaries of Armenia*

- (a) The first question, Lord Curzon said, related to Erzinjan and Trebizond. The commission had reported that both these places should not be included in the boundaries of Armenia.
- Erzinjan and Trebizond*

COLONEL CHARDIGNY explained that the proposed boundary ran along the edge of the high plateau of Armenia. A strategic and practical frontier had thus been established, a line which had been selected by the Caucasian army as the best defensive position in that region. On the other hand, the country round Erzinjan was quite different and contained only a small number of Armenians.

It was agreed that Erzinjan and Trebizond should not be included in the boundaries of Armenia.

<sup>2</sup> Not appended to filed copy. For a later report of March 24, 1920, relating to this question see No. 71, appendix 1.

(b) LORD CURZON said that the next question related to the boundary between Armenia and the Free State of Batoum. The commission had proposed that the boundaries of Batoum should be determined on the spot by an inter-Allied commission. It would be within the recollection of the conference that the Supreme Council had agreed in principle to the creation of a small Free State of Batoum, the town of Batoum itself to be a free port. Furthermore, it had been agreed that a small Allied force consisting of three battalions should provisionally garrison Batoum.<sup>3</sup> The choice lay between a smaller and a larger State of Batoum, as drawn up on the map.<sup>1</sup> He favoured the smaller area.

It was agreed that the boundary between Armenia and the Free State of Batoum should be determined on the spot by an inter-Allied commission, the smaller zone being preferred.

(c) LORD CURZON explained that, with regard to the boundaries between Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, the commission recommended that the conference should for the present await the results of the agreement provided for in the existing treaties between the three republics<sup>4</sup> in regard to the delimitation of their respective frontiers by the States themselves. He explained that the regions of Karabagh, Kangeoar [? Zangezur] and Nakhitchewan were in dispute. The population there was chiefly Armenian, except for a part which was almost wholly Tartar. He thought that the question could not at present be settled by the conference, and the proposal of the commission should be accepted.

It was decided that a decision with regard to the boundaries between the States of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan should be postponed until the results of the agreement between the three republics were known, and that an inter-Allied commission should subsequently be appointed to demarcate the line.

(d) LORD CURZON said that Lazistan consisted of a small strip of the coast in the eastern corner of the Black Sea. It was inhabited by people who were Mussulman by religion and Turkish in sympathy. Those people were mountaineers and would brook no interference. The commission had therefore proposed the creation of an autonomous State of Lazistan under the nominal suzerainty of Armenia. He (Lord Curzon) felt some doubt in arriving at a correct decision as to what was meant by an autonomous State under the suzerainty of Armenia.

COLONEL CHARDIGNY explained that the intention of the commission had been that Lazistan should for all practical purposes be an independent State, and that Armenia should be given the right to convert into carriage roads the bad roads from Baiburt to Surmeneh, thus obtaining an outlet to the Black Sea through Lazistan. The commission felt that the proposal would be open

<sup>3</sup> See No. 27, minute 2.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Volume II, No. 42, appendix C, and Volume III, Nos. 483, 564, 656.

to criticism, but considered it to be the best that could be devised in the circumstances. He fully realised that it might be possible to discover some other means of giving Armenia the use of the roads through Lazistan. For instance, an international servitude might be created. The point should not, however, be forgotten that the people of Lazistan would prefer to be under Turkish suzerainty rather than Armenian suzerainty.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI and M. CAMBON suggested that Lazistan should remain under Turkish suzerainty with a servitude for the roads, since the population was Turkish in sentiment and anti-Armenian.

LORD CURZON said that he felt considerable difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory solution. M. Cambon had suggested that Lazistan should remain under Turkish suzerainty. He thought that would be a very dangerous solution, because it would constitute a danger to the independence of Armenia and would encourage Turkish ambitions for the recovery of Batoum. On the other hand, the commission had suggested that Lazistan should be created an autonomous State, and he agreed that, whether so created or not, it would make itself into an autonomous State, since Armenia would not be strong enough to occupy it. In these circumstances, he thought a solution might be found by including Lazistan in the Armenian State and allowing Armenia and Lazistan to come to some mutually satisfactory arrangements with regard to the government of the region in question. Armenia would no doubt agree to leave Lazistan severely alone as long as she obtained the use of the roads.

M. BERTHELOT expressed the view that 'nominal' sovereignty merely implied the use of the flag. Consequently, he thought the arrangement proposed by the commission to create an autonomous State under the nominal suzerainty of Armenia would be preferable to the inclusion of Lazistan in Armenia. Furthermore, as M. Kammerer had explained to him, the same objection which applied to the inclusion of Trebizond in Georgia applied to the inclusion of Lazistan in Turkey.

LORD CURZON agreed that the problem before the conference was to find a formula that would satisfy Lazistan whilst placing it directly under Armenia

After some further discussion, it was decided to propose the creation of an autonomous State of Lazistan under the nominal suzerainty of Armenia, as suggested by the Commission for the Delimitation of the Boundaries of Armenia.

(e) M. BERTHELOT said that the commission had proposed that in the hinterland of Trebizond between Tereboli, Ardasa and Surmaneh [*sic*] the Turks should not be entitled to maintain troops or to keep stores of munitions. He thought that the recommendations of the commission did not go far enough. He was advised that the whole of the territory round Erzinjan up to Kurdistan should also be demilitarised.

LORD CURZON agreed that a further zone in addition to that proposed by the commission should also be demilitarised. He suggested that the area in question should stretch from Tereboli to Kemakh.

It was agreed that in the hinterland of Trebizond between Tereboli and Kemakh the Turks would not be entitled either to maintain troops or to keep stores of munitions.

(f) LORD CURZON said that the conference would unanimously agree that the Turkish troops would have to be withdrawn from the zone allotted to Armenia within a period to be determined by the Allies. But, on the withdrawal of the Turkish troops, as suggested, the question would at once arise whether Armenia would be in a position to protect herself. That is to say, would she require a military force? Would she want volunteers recruited from among the Allied and Associated Powers? Would she require arms and munitions? Would she require money for the payment of the army and the purchase of the material necessary for the creation of the same? At the moment he had no definite opinion to offer to the conference; but, when the Turkish treaty came to be made, the Allied Governments would be compelled to answer those questions. In other words, as soon as the Armenian State came to be created, the Allied Governments would be called upon to say how its safety could be secured. In his opinion, the money required for the creation of an army would easily be forthcoming owing to the sympathy felt throughout the world for Armenia. For similar reasons, he thought volunteers, including officers, recruited from among the Allied and Associated Powers would also be forthcoming.

MARQUIS IMPERIALI thought that Lord Curzon had raised a question of such great importance, involving the assumption of heavy responsibilities, that he thought it should be referred to the Supreme Council.

LORD CURZON agreed that the present conference would be unable to settle the question, but it could advise the Council of [Prime] Ministers. He was told by the British General Staff, who had been in communication with the Armenians, that Armenia would be able herself to raise an army of 40,000 men with which to protect her territory. She merely asked for the assistance of Allied Staff officers to train the army. He understood, at any rate, that the Armenians did not require volunteers, as suggested in the report of the commission.

COLONEL CHARDIGNY said that to reconstitute Armenia, it would be necessary, for the first two or three years, to have European troops in the country, because he felt certain that the Mahometan population would not accept the decision of the conference, especially as that decision entailed the removal of Mahometans from certain areas, and their substitution by Armenians. Consequently, a force of some 15,000 to 20,000 Allied troops would undoubtedly have to be maintained in Armenia for the first two or three years in order to overawe the Mahometan population in and around that country. That force could be employed as a cadre for the creation of an Armenian army, thus justifying its withdrawal in two or three years' time. He fully realised the fact that it would be difficult to decide who would supply those Allied forces. But, unless that were done, the country would undoubtedly be open to attack by the Mahometans.

MARQUIS IMPERIALI thought that Colonel Chardigny had raised a very big question, which could only be settled by the Prime Ministers.

LORD CURZON doubted if the Allied Powers would undertake to furnish 15,000 to 20,000 men for garrisoning Armenia. The proposal entailed two great difficulties: firstly, the difficulty of supplying so large a force; secondly, by sending the men the Allied Powers would thereby become responsible for the safety of Armenia, and withdrawal would become impossible. In these circumstances, he would ask the conference to answer the following two questions, viz., could Armenia be trusted to create a national army if she were supplied with arms, money and munitions? Should arms, money and munitions not be sufficient, could volunteers be supplied, and whence?

MARQUIS IMPERIALI thought that the question of the supply of money to Armenia involved large commitments, which none of the Allied Governments could undertake.

M. BERTHELOT suggested that a solution of the difficulty might be found in the League of Nations, to whom could be left the responsibility of deciding all questions connected with the raising of volunteers and the supply of munitions, money and other necessary materials. The League of Nations had only recently begun to function, but it would eventually be required to solve problems of that kind. It possessed great authority and it could appeal to the civilised Governments for money, volunteers and such other assistance as might be required for the organisation of an independent Armenian State. He felt sure that such an appeal by the League of Nations would at once be responded to by the United States of America, who had at one time contemplated accepting a mandate for Armenia. In addition, a number of wealthy Armenians at present residing in each of the Allied and Associated countries would, no doubt, be willing to assist in the establishment of an Armenian State.

LORD CURZON agreed that M. Berthelot had made a very valuable contribution to the discussion, and he thought the conference should proceed on the lines suggested by him. It had been agreed that the independent State of Armenia should be placed under the League of Nations. Consequently, he thought that the conference should address a letter, at a later stage, to the Council of the League of Nations informing them that an independent State of Armenia would be formed and setting forth her difficulties with regard to the creation of a solid national army, necessary for her defence. The Council of the League of Nations would be asked to take up the question of the supply of arms, money and munitions, on the ground that the State would exist under the guarantee of the League. This appeal would be made not because they desired to escape responsibility, but because the Governments could not appeal for funds, arms and munitions themselves.

M. BERTHELOT said he entirely agreed with the remarks made by Lord Curzon. The League of Nations would have to decide with regard to the Constitution of Armenia. Considerable resources would be available in the new State. He thought, therefore, that no great difficulty would be found in raising the necessary funds, especially if an arrangement were made in con-

junction with the League of Nations. He thought that just as the League of Nations had been asked to send a Commission of Enquiry to Russia, so could it be asked to undertake the duties now contemplated.

It was agreed that the Council of the League of Nations should be invited at a later date to consider the supply to Armenia of the material and funds necessary for the creation of a national army, and, if necessary, the raising of volunteers among the Allied and Associated Powers for the service of the new State.

(g) LORD CURZON said that, before concluding the consideration of the report of the Armenian Commission, he wished to invite the attention of the conference to the very difficult question connected with the protection of the Armenians who would remain in Cilicia.

Armenians  
in Cilicia

(A discussion took place upon this question, in the course of which it was pointed out that the Armenians in Cilicia, being largely an urban population, engaged in trade, would be very reluctant to be moved to another part of Asia Minor. It was further agreed that the obligation of protecting the Armenians in Cilicia from persecution and massacre was one that devolved naturally upon the Allied Power at the present time in military occupation of that area, namely France.)

(*The meeting then adjourned.*)

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 27, 1920.

### No. 35

I.C.P. 52.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Saturday, February 28, 1920, at 11 a.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer; The Right Hon. Sir A. C. Geddes, President of the Board of Trade; The Right Hon. Sir Robert Horne, Minister of Labour; Mr. McCurdy, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food; Sir S. J. Chapman, Joint Permanent Secretary to the Board of Trade; Mr. Blackett, Controller of Finance, Treasury; Mr. Wise, Mr. Philip Kerr; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Mr. Leith Ross, Captain Abraham.

*France*: M. François Marsal, M. Avenol, M. de Béarn.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti, Signor Scialoja, Signor Beneduce, Signor Giannini; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

*Belgium*: Baron Moncheur.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. MR. LLOYD GEORGE referred to the very striking speech delivered by Signor Nitti on the previous day,<sup>1</sup> and invited M. Marsal, in the first place, to give his observations upon it.

High Prices and  
Foreign Ex-  
changes

M. MARSAL said he was in agreement with Signor Nitti as to the importance of the psychological factor in the present situation, and he concurred in the view that one of the first duties of the various

<sup>1</sup> See No. 33.

Governments was to put strong moral pressure on their peoples to resume the normal standard of industry. But he suggested that, taking the analogy suggested by Signor Nitti, after an earthquake there was no one to look to for reparations, and he did not agree that this was the case in regard to the results of the war. Signor Nitti appeared to be very sceptical of the possibility of securing the German indemnity, and, indeed, to be willing to write it down to zero. If that was the case, he felt bound to make certain reservations. Germany still remained a great country, with an industrious population of 60,000,000. She had not been cut into pieces like Austria. She had still the material means of working—labour, machinery, manures, &c. Her ship-yards and factories were undamaged and could be started at work again as soon as the psychological difficulties were overcome. When this took place, the financial situation would rapidly improve. The Allies had long ago determined the principle that the ravages of the war should be made good by Germany, and it was in the common interest not only to secure the fulfilment of this obligation, but also to make arrangements for discounting it as soon as possible. The first thing was to settle the amount of the debt. Until this was done, despite the fact that her industrial capacity was unimpaired, Germany could not secure the credits required to restart her industrial life. And the creditors of Germany were equally interested. At present they were not certain of anything, so far as the indemnity was concerned, and this uncertainty was a great obstacle to reconstruction, which at present had to be carried out by the Allies at their own expense. He had explained how important it was, in the world interest, to restore the productive powers of France and to take her out of the world markets for wheat, sugar, coal, &c. As soon as the world knew the amount of the indemnity and the period over which payment would be spread, it would be easier all round to raise credit. The neutrals and the financial interests in the United States would then be able to determine their position and decide how far they would discount the German indemnity.

He was prepared to welcome any proposals which would have the effect of converting the indemnity into liquid assets, but, for his part, he was in favour of the issue simultaneously on all markets of an international loan, secured on the indemnity, and he thought that if the Allies all acted together, such a loan could be easily and successfully floated. His idea was that this loan should be supported, first, by the guarantee of the annual payment to be made in respect of the German indemnity; secondly, by such concrete securities as the Reparation Commission might determine (e.g., the German railways, or customs); and, thirdly, by guarantees from each of the nations which participated in the scheme in respect of such portion of the loan as was issued by them individually.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN asked whether this proposal did not mean, in fact, the issue of a series of loans, secured on the German indemnity, but guaranteed by each of the Allies. He suggested that if this was the case, the quotation of each series would depend on the credit of the Allied Government concerned, rather than on the credit of Germany, and each series would accordingly be quoted in the market at different rates.

M. MARSAL explained that he had in mind the issue not of separate series of bonds, but of one type of bond only, based on the yearly indemnity, and guaranteed also by the several Allies—England, France and Italy—in respect of such-and-such a proportion of the full issue. There would, therefore, be no specialisation of different parts of the loan, and there would be only one type of paper, which would have such security that its sale and circulation would be a simple matter.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether each Power was to underwrite the share of the loan which was subscribed by its own nationals, or a fixed proportion of the total loan equivalent to the amount of its share in the German indemnity.

M. MARSAL agreed that if one country were to subscribe more than what she would receive from Germany, to that extent the flotation of the loan would adversely affect her exchange. But it would be easy to provide a remedy, and he proposed that each of the issuing countries should limit the issue to the amount of its share of the German indemnity.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that one of the difficulties which he felt about this proposal was that the moment the Allies guaranteed bonds secured on the German indemnity, it would create doubt as to the value of the latter security. What would happen if Germany were to default? Its failure would be purely a political question between Germany and the Allies—not a question between Germany and the bondholders, as they were covered by the Allied guarantee. Germany could, therefore, default without injuring her credit. He desired to make an alternative suggestion, viz., firstly, that we should get the total indemnity fixed; secondly, that the Reparation Commission should take bonds for that amount, secured on such German assets as they thought proper; and, thirdly, that an inter-Allied body, either the Reparation Commission or some other body, should gradually sell these bonds on the market, at first, no doubt, at a great discount, but gradually, if payment was duly made, at a higher price, possibly rising to par. His object was to get the bonds taken by individuals, particularly in neutral countries, and in America, as in that way the German commercial credit would be involved in their security, and that credit would at once be destroyed by any default.

M. MARSAL replied that doubt as to the payment by Germany of the indemnity did not depend on any Allied guarantee. It was very prevalent already, and had been freely expressed. His feeling was that if we issued bonds, secured solely on the German indemnity, no one would be willing to take them up. He did not think that this guarantee would, in effect, discharge Germany from her obligations, as any business man knew that when a guarantee had to be resorted to his credit fell; and the Germans would know that if recourse was had to the guarantee of this loan, their economic interests would certainly be affected. On the other hand, they might calculate that they would divide the signatories of the Treaty of Versailles. But if those signatories were jointly concerned in the proposed issue, whatever Government was at the head of the German people would know that all the Powers



would act together to secure execution from Germany. Turning to the point which largely preoccupied Mr. Lloyd George, he felt that the working capital required for the re-establishment of production could only be secured by paper which bore the signature not only of Germany, but also of Great Britain, France, Belgium, &c., which would afford a great attraction to capitalists, who at present were hesitating and lacking in confidence.

SIGNOR NITTI expressed considerable doubt as to whether any result would be achieved by the issue of a loan primarily guaranteed on the German indemnity. M. Marsal had said that Germany was still strong; it had its population of 60,000,000 and its undamaged factories. He thought the situation in Germany was worse than his colleagues allowed. Germany had her 60,000,000 people, but they were not producing. She had her factories, but they were not working. Before the war Germany was the strongest commercial country in Europe, but to-day she had neither raw materials, nor credit wherewith to buy them. Her population was very dense—130 people to each square kilometre, as against 72 in France—and the country was not self-supporting in food. If France, with a lower density of population and a richer territory, could not live without exchange with the outside world, how much worse was the situation in Germany? If Germany was to pay us anything, she must live. The Allies had waged war against the immoral political aims of the German Government, but they did not want to annihilate the people of Germany, who were an indispensable element in the economic life of Europe. He felt, then, that a financial operation, based on the German indemnity was wellnigh impracticable, and that the first thing was to fix the German indemnity as soon as possible, at a reasonable figure. Labour would then start, provided the raw materials were supplied, and unless labour restarted we should get nothing but the renewal of war and revolution throughout Europe. He had great doubts whether any credits could be raised on the security of a German indemnity in the United States or in neutral countries, as any such loan would be regarded by them as a political rather than a financial scheme. What was most needed was the provision of raw materials, and no internal loan would help to secure this. Any loan must be raised in the countries where the purchases were required, and he suggested the possibility of issuing a joint international loan, partly to supply Germany with raw material and partly to supply our own needs. It appeared to him that we must extend to Germany the principle of relief already adopted for Austria, and if we were to raise a loan for this purpose it would give a real impression that the war was over, and Germany would be encouraged to work and to pay. He thought it far better that the Allies should form an international syndicate to raise this loan for the purpose of improving exchanges, rather than try to raise it on the Germany [*sic*] indemnity, which would give a contrary impression.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he did not propose to discuss the general question of high prices, but he would like to make some comments on the discussion which had taken place in regard to reparations. He was in agreement with much of what Signor Nitti had said that morning with regard to

the German indemnity; more so, in fact, than he had been on the previous day. At yesterday's meeting Signor Nitti appeared ready to sell his share of the indemnity at the present value of the mark, and if that was so, he, for his part, was rather disposed to be a buyer. He certainly would not accept the view that the indemnity should be written down to zero. The present conditions in Germany were no indication of what she could eventually pay, and he thought that the position of the Allied countries would be very serious indeed if no reparations were received. For example, France, with a far smaller population than Germany, had, he believed, as big a debt, and she would have, in addition, to pay £3,000,000,000 or £4,000,000,000 for repairing damage. So that, unless the cost was recovered from Germany, she would be burdened with twice as much debt per head as Germany had, with her factories and shipyards intact. He could not contemplate such a position, in which the victor had to pay double as much as the vanquished, and he could not agree, therefore, to write off the indemnity and say: 'Let bygones be bygones.'

The question in his mind was, what steps should be taken to improve the present position in Germany? It was directly in our interests to see to the industrial health of our debtor, and we should set Germany on her feet, in his opinion, before we thought of the issue of any loans. His experience in the sale of surplus war stores bore on this point. If you sold a motor-lorry damaged and battered, with a wheel off and all the paint gone, you would get next to nothing for it; so we were sending them to the repair shops, where it did not cost much to put them right, and they would then fetch three or four times as much as they would in their battered condition. It was the same with Germany, which was at present battered and had more than one wheel off, and all the paint gone. But there was no evidence that she could not be put on the road again. We must set Germany up before we could borrow on her credit, and it was in our interests to do so not only as her creditors, but as one of the nations of Europe.

The first thing, therefore, in his mind, was to fix the liability of Germany. That, according to the treaty, depended on the valuation of the damage done, which was to be investigated by the Germans, who had also a right to make an offer for the supply of raw materials, labour, &c. Further, there was also to be an estimate of the German capacity to pay. He thought that we should bring to the attention of the Reparation Commission at once our view as to the urgency of getting this settled. So long as the liability remained indeterminate, it was quite impossible for Germany to raise anything in the market.

The next thing was to help her to get her factories working. This was impossible so long as her people were not able to secure adequate food, and it appeared from the reports which he received from the British representatives that the daily ration in the occupied territories was at present about one-third of what the International Scientific Food Commission had thought necessary. So long as such conditions continued, how was it possible to expect the Germans to work, to supply coal, or to build ships? Their potato crop

and food production had gone down by one-half; the cattle stocks were barely one-half; so far from having surplus manures, they needed to import them. Instead of paying indemnities, it appeared to him difficult to see how they could go on living, as at present, and it looked to him as if before long we might have to feed the German children as we were already feeding the Austrian children. The immediate step was to find credits to enable them to live, and until that had been done, it was neither businesslike nor humane to talk of borrowing on a starving and bankrupt people.

He was rather doubtful about the expediency of trying to issue any joint loan. Any such loan was not likely to be issued on as favourable terms as could be secured by the credit of the individual countries concerned. For example, it would be better for this country to borrow on its own credit than to give its guarantee to a German bond. The proposal was like attempting to mix champagne and laager [*sic*] beer; some people might like that sort of mixture, but he felt sure that there was no market for it. If we tried to float any guaranteed loan of this kind, we should have to pay more for it than for a purely English loan, and, incidentally, we should be depressing the value of all existing British securities.

The practical measures, therefore, that he had to suggest were:—

- (a) That the council should approach the Reparation Commission and the Germans, so as to get the amount of the indemnity settled as soon as possible.
- (b) That measures should be thought out for restarting industry in Germany, which would then serve as guarantees for the security of the indemnity.

He proposed that the conference should now adjourn until the following Monday morning, and he suggested that each delegation should, in the meantime, prepare and submit definite proposals on the various points covered by the discussion: e.g., reparations, production, consumption, deflation, &c.

*(The conference adjourned at 1.20 p.m.)*

*2, Whitehall Gardens, February 28, 1920.*

I.C.P. 53.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference of Foreign Secretaries and Ambassadors, held in the Secretary of State's Room, British Foreign Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1, on Saturday, February 28, 1920, at 11.30 a.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart; SECRETARIES, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Major Caccia, Major Young.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer, Colonel Chardigny.

*Italy:* Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Nogara, Signor Galli, Duke Ascanio Colonna.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

1. LORD CURZON said that before taking the business of the day, he desired to raise the question of what was happening in Armenia. In the *Massacre of Armenians* 'Times' newspaper of that morning a telegram had been published which indicated the existence of a very serious state of affairs in Cilicia. The telegram, which had been received by Boghos Nubar Pasha, president of the Armenian delegation to the Peace Conference, from the Armenian Patriarchate at Constantinople, read as follows: 'I regret to inform you that the French troops evacuated Marash (Cilicia) on the 9th. On the following day, 3,000 Armenians made their first exit, and were massacred. 1,500 others succeeded in reaching Ishahia (between Marash and Alexandretta), but a great number were frozen. Out of the 29,000 Armenians remaining in Marash, 16,000 were massacred.'

Yesterday, after receiving a copy of that telegram, he had spoken about it to M. Berthelot. They had then come to the conclusion that the information, therein contained, must be greatly exaggerated, since it could not be confirmed by any reports previously received. Since then he had looked up all the despatches available in the British Foreign Office, and he would communicate a résumé of the same to the conference in chronological order.

On the 17th February last the British representative at Beirut had reported that General Gouraud<sup>1</sup> had told him in conversation, that heavy fighting had taken place around Marash, with the result that the town had suffered considerably. General Gouraud could not say with certainty whether the Nationalists were helping the revolutionary troops, but, in any case, he regarded the situation in Cilicia with grave apprehension. On the 19th February last the British representative at Beirut had reported that the French troops had been extricated from Marash with great difficulty. On the following day he telegraphed that the French authorities had told him that Armenian massacres had occurred in Cilicia outside their sphere of action; but no details as to numbers could be given.

On the same date, the 20th February, 1920, the British military authorities had reported that French reliefs, consisting of three infantry battalions and

<sup>1</sup> French High Commissioner in Syria and Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Levant.

half a squadron of cavalry, had reached Marash and relieved the garrison after severe fighting. The French had suffered 250 casualties, the enemy having been armed with machine guns. Further, a French detachment east of the Euphrates still remained cut off.

On the 21st [27th] February a telegram had been received from the British representative at Beirut, which had appeared to confirm the telegram sent by the Armenian Patriarchate at Constantinople. It stated that the Americans, who had left Marash with the French, estimated that 5,000 Armenians had been massacred around Marash, and that the balance remaining there were doomed to a similar fate. A few had succeeded in escaping with the French, but the remainder had been cut off.

Finally, worst of all, the Commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean Fleet at Constantinople had telegraphed on Thursday<sup>2</sup> that, in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, where only 3,000 French troops were quartered, a state of war existed, and that in Cilicia the French had evacuated the Sanjak of Marash after heavy fighting and, he continued: 'During and after the fighting many Armenians were massacred, possibly between 15,000 and 20,000. The French troops in Cilicia were not more than 12,000; the enemy forces 25,000 to 30,000.' The Commander-in-chief of the British Mediterranean Fleet had further reported that General Gouraud considered that he had sufficient troops to deal with the situation, but that the French Administrator of Cilicia considered that considerable reinforcements would be required to retake Marash.

The information which he (Lord Curzon) had just communicated to the conference unfolded a very serious situation, and, should that information be confirmed, public opinion in Great Britain and France would be very gravely excited. They would undoubtedly ask where the responsibility lay, and what steps would be taken to protect the Armenians and to punish those responsible for the massacres. The Prime Minister considered the matter to be of such grave importance that a meeting of the Supreme Council would be held that morning to consider it; and he invited this conference to proceed to Downing Street in order to discuss the case. In conclusion, he would enquire whether his Excellency the French Ambassador or M. Berthelot had any information to give the conference.

M. CAMBON said that he had no recent information with regard to what had occurred at Marash. The last despatch he had received from General Gouraud merely reported the fact that the situation was extremely grave; and that Marash had been relieved. He had seen his Excellency Boghos Nubar Pasha two days ago, but he then made no mention of the incidents now reported.

He would merely add that General Gouraud was a very capable and energetic leader, and if he stated that his forces would be sufficient to deal with the situation, he could well be trusted. On the other hand, for some time past the situation in those regions had been getting more and more serious, owing to the intervention of the Nationalists: the enemy forces now

<sup>2</sup> February 26, 1920.

being composed both of Turkish regular troops, not under Government control, and Nationalists.

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that the information received came from various sources, and required, therefore, before acceptance, to be carefully sifted. The French troops had to contend against elemental difficulties due to heavy snowstorms, and, in addition, the country was extremely hilly and broken. Furthermore, the French troops at present employed in that region were young and untrained. Nevertheless, he would at once admit that the situation at Marash was undoubtedly serious; but outside Marash only small disturbances had occurred. Therefore, in considering the situation, he insisted that Marash must be isolated from the rest of Cilicia and Syria. Marash was far off; the town itself had been partly ruined, and it was surrounded by enemy regular troops and armed bands. Undoubtedly, the responsibility of Mustafa Kemal for all that occurred in that region was extremely great.

Next, with regard to the number of Armenians massacred, he estimated 5,000 as the outside figure. But, whatever the number, he did not wish to minimise the fact that such massacres could not be tolerated. At the present moment, no single Great Power was in a position to take action on the spot. Consequently, pressure must be brought to bear on Constantinople, and the Sublime Porte must be held responsible. It was well known that Mustafa Kemal was in constant touch with Constantinople. He proposed, therefore, that the Great Powers should, through their respective High Commissioners, make united representation to the Turkish Government at Constantinople.

LORD CURZON said that he entirely concurred in the proposal made by M. Berthelot; but he would carry it a step further. In his opinion, two plans of action appeared to be indicated.

Firstly, political action at Constantinople. The Turkish Government must be held responsible for the massacres. Mustafa Kemal undoubtedly maintained close relations with the Government at Constantinople, and acted with their approval and support. Consequently, the strongest action should be taken at Constantinople, and the Allies should either threaten to remove the Turk from Constantinople, or take such other action as might be decided by the Prime Ministers.

Secondly, local action must also be taken. At the present moment, he understood that the bulk of the French troops in Cilicia were not white troops; they were partly Armenians raised locally, and partly coloured troops. In his opinion, it would be very desirable to consider the question whether those troops should be replaced by white troops, and he invited the opinion of the French representatives on that point. Further, it would be agreed that a very powerful and deterrent influence was produced by the presence of war-ships. He understood that the French might not be able to supply any ships for that purpose, but by a fortunate accident, the British fleet had just been removed to Constantinople, and was now lying off the Golden Horn. He thought, therefore, that it would be very desirable to send some of those ships to Mersina. The question had now become an Allied one,

and the responsibility for its solution fell on all the Powers equally. He thought that they should go to the Prime Ministers with certain concrete proposals. He would, therefore, put three questions to the conference, namely:—

- (1) Have the French any white troops in the neighbourhood which could be used to deal with the situation?
- (2) Could the French representatives make any proposal with regard to the despatch of French ships to Mersina?
- (3) What form should be given to the Allied combined representation to be made to the Sublime Porte?

M. BERTHELOT accepted Lord Curzon's proposition that the question had become an Allied one. In reply to the three questions put by Lord Curzon, he would reply as follows:—

Firstly, he thought that sufficient French white troops could be made available to deal with the situation in Cilicia. He could not speak with certainty, but General Gourard [*sic*] had some time back asked for reinforcements. At any rate, the question would now be referred to Paris for immediate action. In that connection he would point out that General Gourard had had to meet the combined attacks of a number of armed bands, acting in different theatres, a fact which had obliged him to disperse his forces; and it also explained why he found himself unable to retake Marash.

Secondly, with regard to the despatch of ships to the Cilicia regions, a suggestion to that effect had already been sent to Paris. For various reasons, however, the French at the present moment only had one ship available, the cruiser 'Jurien de la Gravière', which lay at Constantinople.

Thirdly, the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople should make combined representation to the Sublime Porte, in accordance with precise instructions to be sent by the Supreme Council. He did not think the Turk could forthwith be threatened with removal from Constantinople, if the massacres did not cease; but some more general statement might be made, for instance, that the Powers would cease to show the Sultan that consideration which they had decided to afford to him in drawing up the Peace Treaty.

LORD CURZON said that he did not contemplate forthwith threatening the Turk with removal from Constantinople. But, he thought, the terms of the statement, which the High Commissioners should make to the Sublime Porte, should be settled. The Sultan would undoubtedly state that he could not be held responsible for the massacres, which he deeply deplored. In that case, what threat could be used at the present moment that would put a check to the massacres in Armenia?

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI maintained that the essential thing would be to make a threat that could be at once enforced. He could not himself suggest the nature of the threat; but nothing could be more dangerous than to make a threat which the Allies would not afterwards be prepared to carry out.

M. CAMBON agreed that to make a threat which could not be enforced would do more harm than good. He thought, however, that the Allied Governments

could inform the Porte that they had shown great consideration to the Turkish Government in drawing up the terms of the Treaty of Peace; they had, for instance, decided to leave the Turk in Constantinople. They had found great difficulty in taking that decision, but if the Turkish Government could not put an end to the massacres, they would feel compelled to reconsider their decision.

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that the Turkish Government had petitioned to Peace Conference to summon their delegates as soon as possible. He thought that a reply could, therefore, now be sent to the Sublime Porte, to the effect that the conference had been doing their best to meet the wishes of the Turkish Government; but in view of the massacres which were going on, the conference must decline to receive the delegates, and further, should the massacres continue, the Allies would be obliged to reconsider the question of keeping the Turks at Constantinople.

LORD CURZON considered that the proposal made by M. Berthelot raised the question of the particular moment at which a repetition of these horrors would justify the Allies in tearing up the draft Peace Treaty in order to remove the Turks from Constantinople. Further, should a representation of the kind suggested by M. Berthelot be made to the Sultan, he might very well reply that the Allies had themselves chosen to go to Cilicia. He had not invited them to do so. Consequently, it appeared to him to be incumbent upon the Allies to keep sufficient troops to protect the people in that region. It was not his business. The Sultan would say that he greatly regretted the occurrence of such incidents and he would do his best to prevent their recurrence; but that he could hardly be held responsible. He (Lord Curzon) fully recognised the difficulty of answering the question which he had put; but, he thought, an answer must be found.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA thought it would be better at the present moment not to make any definite threat to the Sultan. On the other hand, the treaty now being drawn up could be used as a weapon. The Sultan knew that the Allies were engaged in drawing up the treaty and that they were well disposed towards Turkey. But, should the Turks now continue to employ the same *ante bellum*<sup>3</sup> barbaric methods, the Allies would be compelled to alter their attitude, and the terms of the treaty would have to be made harsher. It would be agreed that a threat of that nature could be given effect to in a variety of different ways. For instance, greater concessions could be given to Greece at the expense of Turkey. In addition to that threat, however, he thought it would also be necessary to make a naval and military demonstration.

LORD CURZON thought that it would be difficult in practice to give effect to Signor Scialoja's proposal. That is to say, at what particular moment would the Allies begin to give effect to their threat? The general scheme of the treaty had been approved. Should it therefore be held up for the present; and, as soon as fresh massacres occurred, should it be torn up and a new one made?

In his opinion it would be necessary to find some threat that could be carried out at once if any repetition of massacres occurred. Some definite, real effective threat, which the Allied Powers would agree to carry out,

<sup>3</sup> Prewar.



however great the difficulty. For instance, the Allies might depose the Sultan or deport the Government.

M. CAMBON thought that Lord Curzon's statements were quite well founded, but he doubted whether any threats made at Constantinople would stop the massacres. In his opinion, the massacres were due to local disturbances, raised by Mustafa Kemal. And, though undoubtedly direct relations existed between Mustafa Kemal and Constantinople, he did not think the Sultan had any control over him. Mustafa Kemal had created a Nationalist army and acted independently of Constantinople.

M. BERTHELOT agreed with what M. Cambon had just said. On the other hand, he maintained that Mustafa Kemal undoubtedly had direct relations with the Nationalist leaders in Constantinople. But, would the Great Powers ever agree to declare war on the Nationalists? So far, the Allies had said that troops for the purpose could not be spared, and for that reason the Turks had been left in possession of Constantinople. In his opinion the policy accepted by the Allies would compel them to continue to capitulate to the Turks. The various Mahometan races appeared to combine to raise trouble and commit atrocities, and the Turks continually advanced beyond the frontiers laid down for them. Consequently, something real must be done.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI maintained that, whatever decision might be taken, that decision should be carried out to the letter. In that connection, he would mention to the conference that some years ago massacres of the Armenians took place for three days running, whilst the Ambassadors of the Great Powers in Constantinople considered the situation. Eventually, on the third day, a decision having been reached and communicated to the Sublime Porte, the massacres forthwith ceased.

LORD CURZON said that at that time massacres had unquestionably been ordered from Constantinople, whereas at the present time they were got up locally. Consequently, though he was perfectly willing to make a threat, he wished to make certain that the threat would be effective. In conclusion, he thought that the question of the form of the combined representations to be made by the High Commissioners at Constantinople to the Sublime Porte would have to be settled by the Supreme Council. The Allied representatives would no doubt call on the High Commissioners to advise them as to the kind of message to deliver to the Grand Vizier. He thought it was a little difficult for the conference here to decide the terms of the message.

(Further consideration of the subject was then adjourned, to be resumed at a conference with the Prime Ministers.)

2. LORD CURZON said that the first question on the agenda paper had reference to a letter (Appendix, A.J. 43)<sup>4</sup> received from the chairman of the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways, asking for certain information in connection with the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. The commission asked the following six questions, which he would now put to the conference:—

*Commission on  
Ports, Water-  
ways and Rail-  
ways*

<sup>4</sup> Not appended to the filed copy.

- (1) With regard to the frontier between Syria and Palestine, it had been decided that the question should be discussed by the British and French representatives.<sup>5</sup> As soon as a decision had been reached, the same would be communicated to the commission.
- (2) The question of Constantinople and the Straits was being dealt with by a special commission, whose final report was expected in a few days' time.
- (3) With regard to Smyrna, the council had decided that the Smyrna Commission and the Financial Commission should hold a joint session to discuss the question of administration,<sup>6</sup> and their report was still awaited.
- (4) With regard to Batoum, the recommendation made by the commission would be communicated to the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways.
- (5) The conference would agree that questions solely affecting future mandatory territory, where Turkey was not affected, would be dealt with in separate documents relating to the mandates, and not in the Turkish Treaty, though in the Turkish Treaty, Turkey would be required to recognise what might be done in regard to mandatory territories.
- (6) The conference would agree that the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways could not make progress on certain questions until the articles relating to concessions, now being prepared by the Economic Commission, had been completed.

It was agreed to reply to the chairman of the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways as above indicated.

(*The conference then adjourned until 11.30 a.m. on Monday next, the 1st March.*)  
2, Whitehall Gardens, February 28, 1920.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 13, minute 3.

<sup>6</sup> See No. 26, minute 3.

## No. 37

I.C.P. 54.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Meeting, held at 10, Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Saturday, February 28, 1920, at 1.15 p.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Philip Kerr; **SECRETARIES,** Sir M. Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, Colonel Chardigny.

*Italy:* Signor Nitti, Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Galli; **SECRETARY,** Signor Trombetti.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda.

**MR. LLOYD GEORGE** stated that the Supreme Council had remitted to the Conference of Foreign Secretaries and Ambassadors, in the first instance, the consideration of the situation arising out of the recent massacres of Armenians in Cilicia. He proposed to invite Lord Curzon, who was presiding over the conference, to make a statement.

*Treaty of Peace  
with Turkey.  
Armenian  
Massacres*

LORD CURZON stated that the Conference of Foreign Ambassadors, over which he had the honour of presiding, had spent nearly an hour that morning in discussing the question of the Armenian massacres.<sup>1</sup> The conference had considered, to begin with, the telegram which had appeared in the newspapers, and to which a reference had been made in Parliament,<sup>2</sup> to the effect that 20,000 Armenians had been massacred near Marash. He had informed the conference that he had consulted M. Berthelot the previous evening, and that the latter had said that the French had so far received no confirmation of this startling news. He had then read to the conference the latest telegrams which had been received by the British Government, and in the course of their meeting a copy had been handed to him of a telegram from our Commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean which had confirmed the news, which had hitherto been received with caution, that possibly between 15,000 to 20,000 Armenians had been massacred. The contents of this telegram he had at once communicated to the conference. The conference then discussed—

(a) The local situation.

(b) The steps it might be advisable to take at Constantinople.

As regards the first question, unfortunately the Nationalist Turks outnumbered the French under General Gouraud. The French troops did not number more than 26,000 men, of whom about one-third were white troops and the remainder Algerians and Armenians locally recruited. General Gouraud had been attempting to obtain reinforcements from French troops in Thrace and Bulgaria. His desire was to bring the force under his command up to a total of 48,000 men, which was the force maintained by the British when they occupied Syria and Cilicia, but at present the French were in a numerical inferiority, and all they could do was to wait the reinforcement which General Gouraud had summoned. Lord Curzon said that he had raised the question of sending ships to that district, as experience showed that the appearance of warships invariably had an excellent moral effect. The French had only one war vessel at Constantinople, and she was not of the first class. Fortunately, however, the Malta battle squadron had recently sailed for Constantinople, and had reached that capital a few days before. The conference submitted, for the consideration of the Supreme Council, the desirability of detaching two or more battleships from the British squadron at Constantinople and despatching them to Mersina, which was only two days' sail away. His colleagues at the conference had agreed with him that this was not a purely French, but an Allied, question. It was impossible for the Allies to tolerate this insulting defiance of them by the Turks, and it was felt that all three must join in exacting the appropriate penalties. Next, as regards the situation in Constantinople. This, Lord Curzon said, raised the very issue which Mr. Lloyd George and he had exposed in the British Parliament.<sup>3</sup> Why had the Supreme Council decided to retain the Sultan in

<sup>1</sup> See No. 36, minute 1.

<sup>2</sup> See *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 125, cols. 2060–2.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 125, cols. 1958–71.

Constantinople? It was in order that he should be at their mercy in the event of any trouble arising in Turkey in the future. The case had now arisen. The conference had further considered the question of the responsibility attaching to the Grand Vizier and the present Turkish Government for the massacres. It was quite clear that, if our High Commissioners tackled the Grand Vizier on the subject, he would merely shrug his shoulders and wash his hands of the whole business, saying that he had absolutely no hold over Mustafa Kemal and the Nationalist Turks in Cilicia. That plea, however, could not be sustained for a moment, as the Vizier had been put in power by Mustafa Kemal himself.

The conference had then considered the question how they should advise the Supreme Council to proceed. They had discussed many suggestions, and they had agreed that they could not proceed without consulting their respective High Commissioners at Constantinople. What could these High Commissioners do? They could go in a body to the Grand Vizier and say: 'If you permit these massacres to continue the Powers will have no alternative but drastically to revise the present treaty, the terms of which are anything but harsh, and turn your Government out of Constantinople.' But what point was to be reached in the present series of massacres before the Powers decided to tear up the treaty and start drafting it all over again? A *démarche* of this kind on the part of the High Commissioners might, therefore, merely be a *brutum fulmen*.<sup>4</sup> He had suggested, therefore, to the conference, and the latter had agreed to refer his solution to the Supreme Council, that the only effective way of dealing with the situation was to do something which would be at once striking, dramatic and of serious intent. The High Commissioners should be instructed to say to the Grand Vizier: 'You must stop these massacres at once. If they are repeated, the Sultan will be deported and he will be detained on the other side of the Straits.' Lord Curzon urged that now was the moment to show to the world, and to the Turk in particular, what our policy was worth. By what the Powers decided to do now their Turkish policy would be judged. He concluded by saying that the conference had generally agreed—

- (a) That the Allies in this matter must act together.
- (b) That it was desirable to refer to the High Commissioners the question of the nature of the representation that should be made to the Turkish Government.
- (c) That this representation, after approval or amendment by the Supreme Council, should be presented by the three High Commissioners in concert.

(On the motion of Mr. Lloyd George, the discussion was adjourned till 4 p.m. the same afternoon at the same place.)

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 28, 1920.

<sup>4</sup> An aimless thunderbolt.

I.C.P. 55.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference, held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Saturday, February 28, 1920, at 4 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; The Right Hon. W. S. Churchill, M.P., Secretary of State for War and Air; Major-General Sir P. P. de B. Radcliffe, Director of Military Operations; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Philip Kerr, Colonel Gribbon; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr.

*France*: M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, Colonel Chardigny.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti, Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, General Cavallero, Signor Galli; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the French had any later news from General Gouraud or other French authorities in Cilicia.

*Treaty of Peace  
with Turkey.  
Armenian  
Massacres*

M. CAMBON said that nothing fresh had been received.

LORD CURZON<sup>1</sup> said that when, at the meeting of the Supreme Council that morning, he had spoken of the complicity of Mustafa Kemal with the Turkish Government, he was not aware that the connection between the two was as close as now appeared. He had just been informed that Mustafa Kemal had recently been appointed Governor of Erzerum, a fact which was more significant because Erzerum was to be included in the new Armenia. The immunity [? nomination] of such a man would entirely preclude any chance of success which the new State might otherwise have had.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Supreme Council were faced with a very difficult situation. The information of which he was in possession was necessarily incomplete, and it came from Constantinople. A telegram had been received that morning from the British Commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, and its contents had been communicated by Lord Curzon to the Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers held that morning,<sup>2</sup> to the effect that, after heavy fighting in Marash, the Sanjak of Marago, in Cilicia, had been evacuated by the French. Many Armenians had been massacred both during and after this fighting. It was difficult to estimate the actual numbers, but they might amount to possibly between 15,000 and 20,000. There were not more than about 12,000 French troops in Cilicia, whereas the enemy's forces were variously estimated at between 25,000 and 30,000. The principal administrator of Cilicia had stated that immediate action would be taken to recover Marash, and General Gouraud seemed to be confident that he had sufficient troops to deal with the situation. Mr. Lloyd George

<sup>1</sup> The major part of the following statements by Lord Curzon and Mr. Lloyd George is printed with minor variation by D. Lloyd George, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 1286-9.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 36, minute 1.

said that he had also received a letter from Bogos Nubar Pasha, dated 27th February, 1920, enclosing a copy of the following telegram from the Bishop Narayon:—

‘Constantinople, February 25, 1920.—I have regret to inform you that French troops evacuated Marash in the night. Unfortunately, they did not inform anyone. On the following day, surprised by this sudden retreat, 3,000 Armenians made their first exit and they were massacred, 1,500 others succeeded in reaching Islahie. A great number of them were frozen. Out of 20,000 remaining in the town 16,000 were massacred.’

Apparently there was no fresh news from General Gouraud, who was in charge of this district. He suggested the first thing to do was to ask the French Government to ascertain from General Gouraud exactly what the situation was, so far as the latter’s information went. In the meantime, he thought that they must proceed on the assumption that the news which the British Government had received was accurate. It appeared that a considerable organised force of Turks, possibly supported by some Arabs, amounting to 30,000 men, had driven the French out of Marash. They had cut off one French battalion, and they had massacred anything up to 20,000 Armenians, whom the Powers had promised to protect. He himself could not conceive of anything more fatal to the prestige of all the Allies than this event. Unless strong action were taken at once their prestige would suffer irretrievably. It would mean that our treaty was worthless except where there were overwhelming Allied forces on the spot. It was all very well to insert in the treaty provisions about ‘powers of patrolling,’ ‘spheres of influence,’ and so on, but not the slightest attention would be paid to these by the Turks, and the stipulations that would be made mutually in regard to the protection of minorities—well, he doubted whether these had the slightest value. The fact was that, on the eve of making peace with Turkey, the Powers found themselves practically impotent to deal with a situation of extreme gravity. Taking this as a typical case of the application of the rights of economic priority, he would remind the council that when they had discussed the previous week the question of economic preference, he had stated that in his opinion no Power should undertake this obligation unless that Power at the same time accepted certain responsibilities.<sup>3</sup> The British were not asking for preferential rights in regard to Mosul merely in order to have the use of the oil; they were quite prepared to accept a concurrent obligation to defend the inhabitants from outside aggression. Similar obligations must be accepted by other Powers who undertook the responsibility of a sphere of influence. Up to last September the British had been in military occupation of Marash, and throughout that occupation perfect order had existed; British officers had even been accustomed to shoot 20 or 30 miles outside Marash in complete security. Since that time, and after the territory had been taken over by the French, the Turkish nationalist movement had spread and had grown more and more menacing in character. He understood

<sup>3</sup> See No. 19, minute 2.

that the French troops of occupation included many Algerians, and also Armenians who had been enlisted on the spot, and it was possible that these latter had annoyed the mixed population of Marash by a somewhat arrogant attitude as they strolled about the streets in French uniform; but the fact remained that the present French garrison had, unfortunately, been unable to protect the Armenians against the recent massacre. It was no use the Allies proceeding with the terms of a Peace Treaty until they could once more restore order. For this, the primary responsibility rested with the French. Great Britain had discharged this duty up to last September. Although, as he had said, the French were primarily responsible, the other Powers were all interested in the question. The British Government had withdrawn its troops after pressure which had been exerted for many months by the French statesmen, on the understanding that France would undertake to protect the Armenians. The Powers now wanted to know what steps the French Government proposed to take to restore the situation, to protect the Armenians who remained, and generally to uphold the prestige of the Allies. So much for the local situation. As regards Constantinople, as Lord Curzon had stated that morning, the reason why the Supreme Council had decided to maintain the Turk there was that the Allies felt that so long as the Sultan and his Government remained at Constantinople under the Allied guns they had a certain hold over them in certain eventualities. Such an eventuality had now arisen. The council had been informed that Mustafa Kemal, who was responsible, presumably, for the recent horrors in Cilicia, was a high official of the Government of Constantinople, and had recently been appointed Governor of Erzerum. Were the Allies to do nothing? It was not enough to warn the Turks. We had done that again and again. The time had now arrived to take strong action and to do something dramatic. He suggested that they should endeavour to have the information at present in their hands confirmed by General Gouraud, and if it were found to be approximately correct they should take charge of the Turkish Government; that is to say, they should arrest the Grand Vizier and his War Ministers [*Minister*], along with other Ministers, if necessary, and either imprison them on the other side of the Straits or place them in custody on one of the Allied ships until steps had been taken by the Government to remedy the situation.

M. BERTHELOT said that he would ask permission to reply to certain points which had been raised by Mr. Lloyd George in his statement. As regards the suggestion that they should endeavour to obtain further information from General Gouraud, he thought that this would be unnecessary. The French Government had already received at least a hundred telegrams from the General, the last of which had arrived a day or so ago. Substantially, the information which General Gouraud had sent to the French Government corroborated that which had been received in London. When the French troops had taken over the occupation of the territory from the British, the first difficulty that General Gouraud had experienced was in the south, with the Arab extremists. Then these latter ran up against the Nationalist Turk extremists, and considerable trouble and disorder had resulted. He wished

to point out that Mustafa Kemal had never thought that the British would remain in Cilicia, and when the French came into occupation the situation was absolutely different. The Supreme Council were well aware that France had never desired to occupy this territory, but it had been found to be necessary. Perhaps it would have been better if the Turks had been informed that there would be a French occupation. One of the reasons why the English troops experienced no difficulty when they were in Cilicia was that the Turks imagined that their occupation would be for a limited period only. From the fact that both during the British military occupation and at the commencement of the French occupation the inhabitants had been quite orderly, caused [*sic*] the French military commander to anticipate no disturbances. He had, however, suddenly been confronted with a violent, armed, energetic opposition of an organised military character. Was his mistake due to an error in psychology? As he had said, the trouble originated in the Arab movement from the south. General Gouraud had had experience of Arabs in North Africa, and he was not afraid of anything that they could do. He had, however, certainly insufficient troops to deal with the present difficult situation. The Turks who opposed him were well-disciplined and experienced forces, and he had never calculated upon opposition of this kind. When the trouble first started there had been spasmodic disturbances in different localities, which had been easily suppressed. The situation, however, at Marash was of an entirely different character. Marash was right away up in the mountains, and that region to-day was many feet under snow. The few troops there were attacked, and it had been found necessary to send up a force of about 2,000 to 2,500 French troops in order to extricate the garrison. The despatch of more considerable forces might have had much graver results. As regards the Armenians, the state of Turkish mentality so far as these unfortunate people were concerned was well known. The Turks loathed them, and this loathing was accentuated when they saw them serving in the ranks of French units. They found in Marash these hated Armenians stalking about the streets in French uniforms, and this was quite sufficient incentive. M. Berthelot thought, however, that the figure of 20,000 Armenians supposed to have been massacred at Marash was a wild exaggeration. The figure was probably about 5,000. It must be remembered that Marash was now half in ruins, as a considerable portion of the town had been burnt down. As to what action the Powers should now take, he was afraid that in present circumstances it was not possible for General Gouraud himself to do much. He had his hands already full in dealing with the local squabbles. Only one-third of the forces at his disposal were white troops, and, as he had said, Marash was in a mountainous region which was now covered with snow. He thought that the Supreme Council should suggest that it was the duty of the French Government to act as effectively as possible without delay. If the council agreed, he proposed to cable this decision to Paris the same evening, and he would hope to get a reply very shortly, to the effect that the French Government proposed to act promptly. He did not think that Mustafa Kemal would be much impressed by the despatch of



warships. After all, Marash was a long way from the sea. At the same time, the presence of some Allied men-of-war at Mersina might have a certain moral effect, and would at least show that the Allies were acting in co-operation. Next, as to the responsibility incurred by the French in regard to Cilicia, he agreed that equal responsibility rested upon them as with the British in Mosul and elsewhere. He wished to remind the council, however, that the present period was one of transition, and that the French had not yet actually accepted any obligations in respect of Cilicia. Mr. Lloyd George had compared the tranquil state of Cilicia under British occupation with the present unsettled state of that country when the French were in possession.

He (M. Berthelot) desired to point out that if the French troops found themselves, after the departure of the British, in considerable difficulties, it was simply because the situation had completely changed. Moreover, they had only 26,000 troops, whereas the British had had 48,000, and the latter, moreover, had more white troops, and a greater proportion of cavalry. Further, when the French took over the country, all the Allies were faced with the difficult problem of demobilisation, which, in the case of the French, was more advanced than it was in the case of the British. Coming once more to what action should be taken, he had already said that, in his opinion, immediate action on the spot would be difficult. General Gouraud was not at present in a position to send an expedition of suitable strength and with a proper complement of white troops to Marash, though he might be able to do this later, when reinforcements arrived. In the meantime, he must show as strong a front as possible, even if this necessitated some accommodation with the Emir Feisal. There remained the general situation at Constantinople. In regard to this, he was in full agreement with Mr. Lloyd George, that something must be done, and he favoured generally the propositions put forward by the British Prime Minister.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that M. Berthelot's statement was very satisfactory and encouraging.

SIGNOR NITTI said that as regards the proposed *démarche*, he was in complete accord with what Mr. Lloyd George had proposed and he had no reservations to make. There was one point, however, which he wished to make, and that was that he thought the Powers ought to ascertain to what extent Constantinople had any real hold over Mustafa Kemal. It was believed that Mustafa had under him a force, the strength of which was estimated to be anything up to 150,000 men, men who were recruited in Asia. That being the case, was it not rather the truth that Mustafa dictated to Constantinople, than that Constantinople controlled Mustafa? Again, in reaching a decision in regard to the present problem, he felt that the Supreme Council should bear in mind what the general effect of that decision would be. The whole question was, of course, linked up with the general solution of the future of Asia Minor.

M. CAMBON said that Colonel Chardigny might be able to give the Supreme Council some details as to the constitution of Mustafa Kemal's forces.

COLONEL CHARDIGNY said<sup>4</sup> that the Turkish army still survived, but the strength of the various divisions had been considerably reduced. There were at present about fifteen divisions of regular troops, each consisting of about 3,000 men, perhaps totalling altogether some 50,000 men. These 50,000 men were well trained and disciplined, but, beyond them, there were probably a large number of small bands, ranging from 100 to 150 men, each under one or two officers. The first *corps d'armée*, consisting of four divisions, and numbering about 7,000 men, was at Erzerum. Mustafa had, however, great difficulty in feeding and supplying his troops, as he lacked transport and the commissariat was deficient. He had, in fact, to keep them separated, as he was unable to concentrate them owing to supply difficulties.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the Foreign Ministers might meet, when the council adjourned, and draft a joint despatch to be sent to their respective High Commissioners at Constantinople.

LORD CURZON said that he had jotted down a very rough draft, which he thought might serve as a basis of discussion.

(Lord Curzon then read out his draft, which was translated into French by Professor Mantoux.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed that the council should now adjourn and leave the Foreign Secretaries to work on Lord Curzon's draft.

M. BERTHELOT said that he thought that Lord Curzon's draft was excellent. He had, however, one or two suggestions to make in regard to it, which he would put to the Foreign Ministers later.

M. CAMBON referred to what Lord Curzon had said at the meeting of the council that morning, that the French naval contingent at Constantinople and the Asia Minor ports consisted of one second-class man-of-war only. This was not quite correct, as there were one or two other French vessels, both at Constantinople and at Beirut.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the Foreign Ministers might introduce into their draft something to the effect that the Supreme Council in future did not intend to continue to deal with the Turkish Government by means of diplomatic notes, but that they would substitute for those notes a new régime, which would take the form of strong action. This, he thought, should be clearly stated in emphatic but diplomatic language. He wished to enquire who paid for the maintenance of Mustafa Kemal's Turkish army. Was it paid by the Turkish Government at Constantinople?

M. BERTHELOT said that Mustafa's troops received no payment, they merely lived on the country.

MR. CHURCHILL doubted if any action the Allies might now take at Constantinople would really have any very considerable effect. The whole of Turkey was practically disorganised, and there was no strong central control.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the action that the Allies now proposed to take would test the extent of the control of the present Turkish Government.

<sup>4</sup> The following statement by Colonel Chardigny is printed op. cit., vol. ii, p. 1290.

It was agreed—

That the Supreme Council should now adjourn until the following Monday morning, and that the Foreign Ministers of the three Allied Governments should remain and prepare a joint, identic despatch, based on Lord Curzon's draft, to be sent at once to their respective High Commissioners in Constantinople.

(The despatch, as finally approved by the Foreign Ministers, is attached as an appendix to these notes.)

*(The Supreme Council adjourned at 5.30 p.m.)*

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 28, 1920.

#### APPENDIX TO No. 38

##### *Draft [sic] Despatch to Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople*

Information contained in telegram No. 9172 [917 Z] from Commander-in-chief Mediterranean afloat as to Armenian massacres in Cilicia<sup>5</sup>—whether the figures be or be not exaggerated—is so serious that the Allied Governments, who are in complete agreement on the matter, are compelled to take instantaneous action, both to secure punishment of responsible parties, and to prevent a repetition of these atrocious crimes. This action must be taken both in Cilicia and at Constantinople.

In Cilicia the French Government, being in military occupation, assume full responsibility for the restoration of order, and General Gouraud is receiving explicit instructions in this sense.

But the Allied Governments cannot acquit the Turkish Government at Constantinople of responsibility; and they are compelled at once to show that their authority cannot be derided, and that the provisional decision which has left the Turks in Constantinople does not mean that they are at liberty to practise these abominable deeds.

The Supreme Council is of opinion that some drastic measure should be taken, and that this might assume the form of occupying the War Office or some important Government building, and of securing the persons of the Grand Vizier and the Minister of War, or of such Ministers as are primarily responsible, and placing them in confinement, either on land or in an Allied man-of-war, pending a further investigation of the matter. You should consult your colleagues at once, as well as the naval and military Commanders-in-chief, and advise us without delay as to the steps, in this or in any other sense, which you would recommend.

The Turkish Government should realise once and for all that when such cases as this occur, the old procedure of diplomatic notes and representations will no longer be followed, but that immediate action will be taken by the Allied Governments, as in the present case.

Orders are being sent simultaneously to the naval Commanders-in-chief to send one or more Allied men-of-war to Mersina, if it is your joint opinion that such a demonstration will assist to save the Armenians from further attack.

Please communicate this telegram immediately to the French and Italian High Commissioners and to the naval and military Commanders-in-chief.

<sup>5</sup> See above.

I.C.P. 56.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference, held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Monday, March 1, 1920, at 11 a.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer; The Right Hon. [Sir] A. C. Geddes, President of the Board of Trade; The Right Hon. Sir Robert Horne, Minister of Labour; Mr. McCurdy, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food; Mr. Blackett, Controller of Finance, Treasury; Mr. Wise; **SECRETARIES,** Sir M. Hankey, Captain Abraham, Mr. Leith Ross.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Avenol.

*Italy:* Signor Nitti, Signor Beneduce, Signor Giannini; **SECRETARY,** Signor Trombetti.

*Belgium:* Baron Moncheur.

**INTERPRETER:** M. Camerlynck.

1. **MR. LLOYD GEORGE** said that he understood Signor Beneduce had a statement to make.

*High Prices and  
Foreign Ex-  
changes*

**SIGNOR BENEDEUCE** said that he was going to make some practical proposals arising from the discussions on the previous Saturday,<sup>1</sup> the conclusion of which had been that a loan to Germany was advisable. He thought the council had established that all Europe was bound together by economic solidarity; that in the interest of Europe, as well as in the interest of Germany, it was necessary to restart the Germans in productive effort; and, lastly, that the indemnity due from Germany should be fixed in a spirit of moderation. The sum should be one to which Germany herself would agree, and one which would leave her a sufficient margin to set her economic life going again. These were preliminary questions, and he took it as agreed that Germany must have means of living and of producing. However, if all her wealth was to be at the disposal of the victorious States, they alone would have an interest in rehabilitating her; but they were unable to the present time to furnish her with food or raw materials. It followed, therefore, that Germany must somehow obtain credit in order to get supplies of this character. There was no doubt that, by setting aside certain German resources to guarantee a loan, Germany could obtain credit in neutral countries. Not only would this credit be better in proportion to the moderation used in fixing the indemnity, but he thought it to the interest of the Allied Powers to permit Germany to mortgage some of her assets, with priority even over the indemnity itself. Such assets must be sufficient to satisfy the countries lending money to Germany that they were lending on sufficient security. Once the victorious countries agreed to this and declared what was to be the purpose of the loan they permitted Germany to raise, it would be clear to the world that peace had really begun. Germany, he believed, could be placed by the Allies in a position to raise loans in the United States, the Argentine, Holland, Spain and Scandinavia in the

<sup>1</sup> See No. 35.

currency of those countries, provided it were stipulated that the money thus raised should be spent in those countries to purchase necessary supplies. If so desired, Allied supervision could be offered.

It was manifest that the wealth of Germany entitled her to some credit. A loan of this kind could be made to furnish either enough for Germany's immediate needs, or a surplus over this. If the former of these alternatives were adopted, Germany could be made to use the proceeds in the way the Allies might prescribe. If the latter were permitted, the surplus might be utilised in anticipating on the prescribed order of reparation payment, and thereby benefit the Allied countries. In either case important results would follow. The German exchange would improve in neutral countries and in the United States, and when Germany wished to purchase in Allied countries, some of this American or neutral currency at her disposal could be expended in those countries.

The precise conditions of the issue of the loan were matters of less importance, but obviously the conditions must be attractive. He would suggest a 5 per cent. loan, redeemable in thirty or forty years at par, and issued at the initial price of 60 or 65 per cent. The details could be studied by the Reparation Commission in concert with the German Government.

To sum up, the conclusions he suggested the council should arrive at were to the following effect:—

- (a) The conference recognise[s] the urgent necessity of fixing the indemnity due by Germany in a spirit of moderation and in accordance with a provision permitting Germany to offer a lump sum in satisfaction of all claims.
- (b) The conference admits the necessity of furnishing Germany with adequate means of restoring her productive activity, not only in her interest but in the interest of Europe.
- (c) The conference is of opinion that Germany would be able to obtain credits in neutral countries and in America on condition that certain of her assets were set apart as security, with priority over the claims of the Reparation Commission. The Allied Governments are ready to consent to this, and also, if desired, to take part in a Commission of Control.
- (d) The Reparation Commission is instructed to study the details of such a proposal together with the delegates of the German Government.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had before him a proposal very much on the same lines as that so ably set forth by Signor Beneduce. The first point on which he desired to insist was the necessity of ascertaining and fixing the amount of reparation due from Germany. Both Signor Nitti and himself had been agreed on this point on the previous Saturday, and M. Marsal, he believed, had also agreed. However, he wished to make it clear that what was now being considered was no new proposal. It was not a revision of the treaty, but an execution of the treaty. There had been much criticism of the reparation clauses of the treaty, but most of this criticism

was ill-informed and rarely referred to the actual terms of the document. All that was now suggested was contained in a document signed in Paris on the 16th June, 1919:—

*Extract<sup>2</sup> from the reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the observations of the German delegation on the Conditions of Peace*

‘Germany may offer a lump sum in settlement of her whole liability, as defined in article 232, or in settlement of her liability under any of the particular categories which have been decided on and laid down.’

It had therefore been suggested on [*in*] June 1919 that Germany should herself propose payment in a lump sum within four months of the signature of the treaty. He thought it of great importance that in the draft adopted it should be made clear that this stipulation was being brought into effect. No doubt it would be necessary to extend the period allowed to Germany for making her proposal, and four months had already elapsed. He was very anxious that the proposal to be made should be shown to be a natural consequence of the treaty itself; otherwise there would be misconception in France and in Great Britain. The Council was not relaxing the rights of the Allies over Germany, but executing those rights. With this proviso he agreed with Signor Beneduce’s proposal. As to the second part, namely, that Germany should be allowed to raise a loan and set apart assets as security for it, with priority over indemnity, he also agreed, but he thought that a limit to the sum she was to be allowed to raise by a loan should be fixed. All she was entitled to receive was sufficient oil and fuel to start her machinery again. It might be dangerous to permit her to raise an unlimited loan, seeing that she might appeal with success to Germans in America and to investors everywhere who were tired of the old forms of investment. He agreed that these securities must be placed in front of reparation. He thought they should also be placed in front of Germany’s internal debt. He would ask M. Beneduce to furnish him with a copy of his document, which he thought should be examined by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. In principle, he felt himself to be in agreement with the Italian proposals.

M. AVENOL said that M. Marsal had agreed to the need of fixing the reparation sum due from Germany. He thought, however, that it might be inopportune to give the public the impression that, at the very first meeting concerned with financial and economic matters held by the Allied Governments after the treaty had come into force, mitigations of the treaty were recommended. He thought the result could be achieved by giving confidential instructions to the members of the Reparation Commission. A public document, he thought, might cause a very undesirable effect. As to the loan it was suggested Germany should contract, he thought it should take the form prescribed in article 235 of the treaty, which empowered the Reparation Commission to authorise special credits for the purchase of foodstuffs and raw materials pending the fixing of reparations. As to the

<sup>2</sup> See *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxii, p. 285.

expediency or possibility of success of such a loan he was unable to form an opinion. It all depended upon the way it was received in America and in neutral countries. He would suggest that the questions be discussed at the economic conference to be called by the League of Nations, at which neutrals would be present. Details could then be settled, and some indication would be obtained of the probable success of the operation. For instance, the question might arise whether Germany alone was to launch a loan, and so on. As to the principle itself, he had no objection to raise, and he welcomed Mr. Lloyd George's idea that what was done regarding these matters should be linked on to the treaty.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it would be well to show that even the loan was covered by article 235.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that, in view of the general agreement on principles, he would only make two remarks on matters of detail. Was it expedient to make an announcement? He thought it was. M. Avenol had said that it was hard to know in what manner the neutrals would receive the proposed loan. He submitted that it was impossible to know until the Allied Governments had made an announcement. In fact, until the mind of the Allied Governments was known to the neutrals, the latter would find it hard to decide what attitude they should take. If they knew that the Allied Governments wished Germany set up again, they would subscribe to the loan. His second remark related to the time at which an announcement of the Allied policy should be made. He would deprecate waiting for the meeting of the Economic Conference summoned by the League of Nations. He thought it would be very advantageous for the Allied Powers to show that, on their own initiative and without pressure, they had decided exactly how far they meant to go. Should they not do this, they might find in the economic conference of the League of Nations a tendency for the conquered nations and the neutrals to combine against the victorious Powers and to put pressure on them to forgo some of their treaty rights in order that economic life in Europe should be restarted. Not only were neutral representatives to be feared, but there was influential opinion even in our own countries which would incline in the same way. Financiers and traders, anxious to do business, might find their private interests outweighed their national interest in obtaining a share of reparation. He therefore urged that as the council had agreed, it should make it known to the world before meeting the other Powers in conference.

SIGNOR BENEDUCE said that the Italian delegation was in agreement with Mr. Chamberlain. It was advisable to act quickly, and to show that the Allies meant not to strangle Germany, but to leave her means of living. The Reparation Commission should be in a position to discuss the details of the proposed loan with bankers in neutral countries as soon as possible.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was inclined to agree with the French delegation that the expression 'moderation' should be avoided. It would be better to call attention to certain parts of the treaty which had been commonly overlooked. There was the provision enabling Germany to pay in a lump

sum; the provision entitling Germany to propose this sum herself; and the proviso also existed that her capacity to pay would be taken into account. All these things were in the treaty. He therefore suggested that the proposals be so drafted as to make it clear that it was the treaty itself which was being put into force. Germany would be asked to make her proposal soon. The Reparation Commission could be instructed to see that Germany made it, and her time for making it could be extended. He would therefore suggest that while adopting in principle Signor Beneduce's proposals, a redraft should be made in order to indicate that the treaty was being applied and not modified.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he agreed.

It was decided—

That a Drafting Committee, composed as follows:—

Baron Moncheur,  
Signor Beneduce,  
M. Avenol,  
Mr. Blackett,

should adapt Signor Beneduce's proposals to the considerations set forth above by Mr. Lloyd George.

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had to submit a summary of recommendations which he suggested should be issued by the conference as representing their views on the whole economic problem (A.J. 53).<sup>3</sup>

*Proposals submitted by British Delegation*

The first paragraph raised certain political issues which, at Signor Nitti's suggestion, he thought it would be inadvisable to take at the moment, and he proposed that this paragraph should be reserved for consideration during the afternoon, at a meeting when the Foreign Ministers could be present.

(This course was agreed to.)

Paragraph 2 (increase of production), and paragraph 3 (reduction of consumption and expenditure) were agreed to and adopted.

M. AVENOL expressed his general agreement with the statements in paragraph 4, which, indeed, represented sound financial principles, but he felt bound to point out that France was in a special position, and that she was necessarily forced to continue for some time to conduct her finances on a war basis.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN suggested that M. Avenol's point might be met by inserting the word 'recurrent' before the word 'expenditure' in sub-section (a).

(With this amendment the paragraph was agreed to and adopted.)

SIGNOR NITTI said he welcomed the statement in this recommendation, as it seemed to him that the Governments could not very well ask their private citizens to economise unless they were prepared to take very drastic action of this kind themselves. He wished to point out to Mr. Lloyd George what

<sup>3</sup> See appendix 1 to No. 41.



appeared to him to be the wholly excessive number of commissions now being sent to Austria, and the very high salaries and expenditure which they were incurring. For example, there was a Naval Commission now working in Austria, or at least incurring expenses, although Austria had no longer any coast. He felt that an announcement from the conference would have a moral influence in addition to its political and financial effects. He cordially agreed, therefore, that every effort must be made to secure a balance between ordinary revenue and ordinary expenditure, including the service of the debt. He had taken all possible measures to secure drastic economies in his Government. He had, however, found that this policy raised a strong opposition, but he felt sure that credits could not be obtained unless it was ruthlessly carried out. He therefore welcomed a definite pronouncement on the subject by the conference, as indicating that all the Governments concerned were in agreement on the matter.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed that the last sentence in paragraph 5 should be deleted, and that the previous sentence should be amended to read as follows:—

‘This will be possible when the countries concerned have undertaken the reforms indicated in the preceding paragraphs.’

SIGNOR BENEDUCE suggested that in connection with this paragraph some reference should be made to the need for a free interchange of commodities between all countries.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that this was referred to in paragraph 1 (c), which was reserved for consideration later.

SIGNOR BENEDUCE thought, however, that a wider pronouncement was required, as, in addition to the new tariff barriers which were being erected by the new States carved out of Austria-Hungary, the export and preference duties in force in other countries were an embarrassment to the reconstruction of Europe. He suggested that the whole question of such obstacles to trade should be referred to the Supreme Economic Council for consideration. He also thought it desirable to include in paragraph 5 some reference to the need of continuing the Inter-Allied Commission for consultation in regard to food supplies next year, and a general statement to the effect that the conference confirmed the solidarity of the Allies in their efforts to overcome the present difficulties in the reconstitution of the economic position.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that Signor Beneduce should submit an alternative draft on these points, and bring it up for consideration at the afternoon meeting.

SIGNOR BENEDUCE undertook to submit a formula in writing for consideration at the afternoon meeting.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the substance of paragraph 6 had already been discussed, and he proposed that the Drafting Committee (*see previous minute*) should meet immediately and bring up a revised paragraph for consideration at the afternoon meeting.

*(The conference adjourned at 1.5 p.m.)*

*2, Whitehall Gardens, March 1, 1920.*

I.C.P. 57.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers held in Lord Curzon's Room at the British Foreign Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1, on Monday, March 1, 1920, at 11.30 a.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Forbes Adam, General Mance, Mr. Malkin; **SECRETARIES,** Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Major Caccia, Major Young.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer.

*Italy:* Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Galli, Signor Nogara, Don Ascanio Colonna.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda.

**INTERPRETER:** M. Camerlynck.

**LORD CURZON** said that the conference would take that morning the report of the Committee on the Administration of the Waterways of the Straits and the Sea of Marmora.

*Administration of the Waterways and Straits of the Sea of Marmora. Report of Committee*

**VISCOUNT CHINDA** said that before proceeding further, he wished to place on record the fact that he had only been informed a short time previously that the conference would discuss that subject. He had been under the impression that the report of the Turkish Financial Commission would have been taken that morning. As a result he had not had time to read the proposals made with regard to the administration of the waterways of the Straits; though that was a question in which the Japanese Government was greatly interested.

When the question of the administration of the waterways of the Straits had come before the Supreme Council, that body had decided that the schemes, prepared independently by the British and French Foreign Offices, should be co-ordinated and presented to the conference.<sup>1</sup> As matters stood, he maintained that the Japanese Government should have been represented on the committee in question. The report raised important questions of principle which might call for revision. He did not wish to complain about what had occurred; but he mentioned these facts in order to explain how incompetent he felt to put forward that morning the views of the Japanese Government.

**LORD CURZON** explained that Viscount Chinda had been correct in stating that the conference should that morning have discussed the report of the Turkish Financial Commission. For this purpose, however, it had been thought that the presence of Mr. Blackett, the chairman of the commission, would be necessary. It had been found, however, that Mr. Blackett would be required to attend at Downing Street. Consequently, the consideration of the report had been postponed until the afternoon.

**M. CAMBON** thought that the report with regard to the administration of the Straits raised important questions of principle, which would necessitate

<sup>1</sup> See No. 20, minute 2.

the same being referred back to the commission for revision. For instance, many of the proposals could not be accepted without reference to the reports of other commissions, such as the Military and Naval Commission, the Ports, Railways and Waterways Commission, &c. Consequently, he thought that many opportunities would hereafter arise for the Japanese representative to put forward any amendments he might wish to make.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that he fully agreed to the report being discussed that morning, on the understanding that he would reserve to himself the right of raising definite objections at a subsequent date.

LORD CURZON said that the conference would now read the draft articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, dealing with the administration over the waterways of the Straits and the Sea of Marmora, and discuss each article in turn. (Appendix I.)

M. CAMBON pointed out that article 1 had reference to the navigation of the Straits, 'including the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus.' That is to say, the High Commission of the Straits would apparently also have the control of the Sea of Marmora, outside the Straits.

LORD CURZON thought that the jurisdiction of the commission must, of necessity, extend to the Sea of Marmora, otherwise ships would enter the Dardanelles under the jurisdiction of the commission, subsequently become free on entering the Sea of Marmora, and again come under the commission's jurisdiction further on. That is to say, the shipping in the middle would be under no authority whatever.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI agreed that the whole should form a single passage under a single control.

(It was agreed to accept article 1.)

(Article 2 was accepted without amendment.)

M. KAMMERER explained that considerable difference of opinion existed as to the extent of the territorial limits; but 3 miles would be accepted as the conventional distance.

(It was agreed to accept article 3 without amendment.)

LORD CURZON said that article 4 raised a question of great importance. Originally, when the constitution of a commission of the nature now contemplated had been discussed by M. Berthelot, the conclusion had been reached that such a commission should comprise not only representatives of the Great Powers, but also representatives of the Minor Powers, who had an interest in the navigation of these waters; that is to say, Roumania and Greece. The present clause provided for the future admission of Russia '(if and when Russia becomes a member of the League of Nations)'. But the same reasons which eventually would necessitate the admission of Russia applied to Roumania. Consequently, he would, in the first place, raise the question whether it would be possible to leave out Roumania.

Next, with regard to Greece, the question of the claims of Greece to the north side of the Straits had been provisionally decided, with the result that

the territory north and west of Chatalja would go to Greece. Under those conditions, what would Greece say should she be given no place on the commission? Then, again, at a later date, the question of Bulgaria would also arise as soon as she became a member of the League of Nations. Accordingly, M. Berthelot and himself had agreed that the claims of these various nations could best be met by giving two representatives to each of the Great Powers, and one representative to each of the smaller Powers above-mentioned. That decision had been swept aside, and it had now been proposed that only the three Great Powers and the United States of America and Russia should have the right to appoint one representative each. In his opinion, this decision would excite a good deal of criticism. He wished, therefore, to enquire from the members of the commission the reason which had led them to decide to exclude Roumania and Greece.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI pointed out that in addition to Roumania and Greece, there existed also other new States which would demand recognition, namely, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, &c. Consequently, as soon as provisions were made to include any of the smaller States, it would become invidious to omit any of them. In any case, in his opinion, it would be imperative to provide a place for Bulgaria as soon as she became a member of the League of Nations. His proposal, therefore, would be, for the present, to include on the commission a representative of Bulgaria, Greece and Roumania.

M. BERTHELOT explained that in the conversation referred to by Lord Curzon, the idea had been to set up an important commission at Constantinople; whereas, the present proposals were of a far more restricted character, dealing only with the administration of the Straits. Consequently, it had been thought sufficient to bring together on this commission merely the representatives of the Powers having capital interests in the Mediterranean, namely, France, Great Britain and Italy. In his opinion, one of the inconveniences of admitting representatives of Greece and Roumania would be that Turkey would also have to be given a place. Once any of the small Powers were included—Roumania, Greece or Bulgaria—it would be impossible to stop at that, and every small Power would have to receive similar treatment. The commission had, therefore, decided to accept the following two important principles, namely: firstly, that the commission must consist of representatives of the Great Powers; and, secondly, the Powers in question must be Mediterranean Powers only. Otherwise, all other States interested would also have to be included, viz., Greece, Roumania, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Furthermore, the powers of the commission would not be very large; those powers had been defined and restricted. Consequently, in his opinion, the Great Powers, acting under the guarantee of the League of Nations, would constitute the best instruments for ensuring the object in view. The solution thus reached appeared to him to be the most logical one. The responsibility had been placed on the Great Powers of the Mediterranean, who were chiefly interested, both commercially and politically, and who possessed the best (naval) means for carrying out the duties entrusted to them.

The possibility of adding other Great Powers, such as the United States of America, Japan and Russia, formed a principle which he would be prepared to admit, though he would have preferred the inclusion merely of representatives of the British, French and Italian Governments. In any case, he strongly opposed the admission of any representatives of the smaller Powers.

M. KAMMERER said that the arguments brought forward by M. Berthelot had guided the commission in arriving at a decision. Two solutions had been considered as possible, namely, either the representatives should be appointed by the Great Powers only, or all the smaller Powers, including Turkey and Bulgaria, should also be represented. To the inclusion of Roumania he had no great objection to offer. But it would be in the recollection of the conference that Marshal Foch had recommended that Greece, on account of its territorial possessions on either side of the Straits, should not be permitted to participate in the military occupation of the zone of the Straits.<sup>2</sup> Again, Turkey and Bulgaria were enemy countries which could not at the present moment be given representation.

LORD CURZON admitted that M. Berthelot had stated with great clearness the reasons which had influenced the commission in arriving at their decision. He felt, however, that he could not accept those arguments. For instance, M. Berthelot held that Greece was a small Power. He thought that it would be more correct to say that she had now been made into a Great Power, and, further, she would become, by the addition of Thrace, Smyrna, the northern shores of the Sea of Marmora, &c., a great Mediterranean Power. In the circumstances, it would, in his opinion, be impossible to deny her representation on the commission on the ground that she was a small Power. Again, with regard to the question of trade, he thought that the volume of Greek trade through the Straits would compare favourably with that of any other of the Great Powers, and the trade of Greece with the Black Sea would undoubtedly steadily augment. Then, again, would it be possible to exclude Roumania, an Ally, on the ground that she occupied too small a territory?

In his opinion, a solution of the problem might be found in introducing a scheme whereby each of the Great Powers, as mentioned in article 4, would be entitled to two votes, while, in addition, two places might be allotted to all the smaller States, whose representatives would be nominated in turn. He thought that it would not be wise to leave out the smaller States altogether.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI thought that Greece, for instance, would never agree to be represented one year and excluded the next. Lord Curzon's proposals would, he thought, open the door to quarrels among the smaller States. He would, however, accept a proposal that Bulgaria, Roumania and Greece should each nominate one representative, Bulgaria only being permitted to join when she became a member of the League of Nations.

LORD CURZON said that the proposal before the conference was that the United States Government (if and when that Government was willing to

<sup>2</sup> Cf. appendix 1 to No. 14.

participate), the British Government, the French Government, the Italian Government and the Russian Government (if and when Russia became a member of the League of Nations) should each appoint one representative with two votes, and that the Greek Government, the Roumanian Government and the Bulgarian Government (if and when Bulgaria became a member of the League of Nations) should each appoint one representative with one vote.

M. BERTHELOT enquired whether it was intended that Turkey should be excluded. He suggested that Turkey might be given a consultative vote.

LORD CURZON maintained that the Commission of the Straits had been imposed on Turkey because she had been defeated in war and also in order to prevent her misbehaving in the future. Consequently, Turkey could not be placed on equal terms with Greece and Roumania. In fact, a servitude was being placed on Turkey.

M. CAMBON said he would accept the proposal put forward by Lord Curzon.

It was agreed—

To amend article 4 to read:—

The commission shall be composed of representatives appointed respectively by the United States Government (if and when that Government is willing to participate), the British Government, the French Government, the Italian Government, the Russian Government (if and when Russia becomes a member of the League of Nations), the Greek Government, the Roumanian Government and the Bulgarian Government (if and when Bulgaria becomes a member of the League of Nations). Each nation shall appoint one representative. The representatives of the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Russia shall each have two votes. The representatives of Greece, Roumania, and Bulgaria shall each have one vote. Each commissioner shall only be removable with the consent of his own Government.

(Article 5 was adopted without amendment.)

M. CAMBON said that article 6 gave the commission a separate and independent existence. He recognised that a flag had been given to the Danube Commission, but that had been done at a time when the Balkan States did not exist. Moreover, the Danube Commission merely dealt with technical matters. On the other hand, the Commission of the Straits would exercise powers in the name of the Turkish Government, as stated in article 2. Consequently, it could not have its own flag. The flag would have to be Turkish.

With regard to the commission having its own budget, he did not fully understand what was meant. It would be in the recollection of the conference that the Supreme Council had adopted in principle the suggestion of creating an International Financial Commission in Constantinople,<sup>3</sup> whose duties would be to reorganise the finances of Turkey and to prevent the Turkish Government from raising loans without its consent. Consequently, it would

<sup>3</sup> Cf. No. 42, minute 3 (a).

upset the arrangements of the International Finance Commission should the Commission of the Straits also have powers to raise loans. In his opinion, the Straits Commission should in matters of finance be placed under the authority of the Inter-Allied Financial Commission.

The same remarks applied to judicial matters, since an International Judicial Commission would be appointed at Constantinople, and he felt certain that the United States of America and the neutral Powers, who would not be a party to the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, would never accept the judicial decisions of that commission. He thought the details of the organisation of the Commission of the Straits, both as regards finance and administration, should be referred back to the commission for further consideration and report.

LORD CURZON agreed that M. Cambon had raised points of great importance. He agreed that the questions relating to the budget could only be definitely settled after the powers of the International Financial Commission had been defined. On the other hand, the commission would have to collect dues and spend money on the execution of works considered necessary for the improvement of the channels and approaches to harbours, docks, quays, &c. That expenditure would render the preparation of a budget necessary.

Next, he admitted that the Commission of the Straits would exercise its control in the name of the Turkish Government, but that would not prevent its having a flag of its own, just as many other societies, organisations and the Danube Commission had flags of their own.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI thought that M. Cambon's criticism had reference to two separate and distinct points. In the first place, the commission would raise certain funds by the collection of fees paid by ships using the Straits. Those funds had been provided for in a subsequent article. In addition, however, the commission apparently would also be empowered to raise loans, and he thought M. Cambon was right in maintaining that the commission should not be empowered to raise loans without reference to the International Finance Commission.

M. CAMBON held that his objections went further. In his opinion, the commission should not have its own budget, because each State should, as a matter of principle, only possess one budget to cover all branches of its administration. He thought that, if that principle were abandoned in the case of Turkey by authorising the commission to have its own separate budget, a very dangerous situation would ensue.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI thought that no difficulties of the nature contemplated by M. Cambon would arise provided the revenues to be collected by the commission were included in a special separate budget, all borrowings being made through the agency of the International Financial Commission.

M. CAMBON maintained that the Commission of the Straits should, in regard to financial matters, be placed entirely under the International Financial Commission. The latter commission would alone be able to discuss financial questions from a political point of view as affecting the various States concerned.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA expressed the view that the Commission of the Straits should be independent of the International Financial Commission, because, should the Sultan be removed from Constantinople, the Commission of the Straits would still continue to function and its powers would remain the same.

LORD CURZON pointed out that the scheme for the creation of an International Financial Commission provided that Great Britain, France and Italy alone should be represented. But the Commission of the Straits, which would deal with the shipping of all nations, should [*would*] constitute a separate and larger body. Also, a commission<sup>4</sup> should be created with full financial powers and independent authority, except with regard to the naval and military forces stationed in that zone. The question of raising the loans was dealt with in article 9 of the document under consideration. The commission would be entrusted with the execution of certain works for which funds would be required. Were they to go, hat in hand, to the International Financial Commission? He thought such a solution would render the discharge of their duties in that connection impossible. He proposed that the conference should provisionally accept the proposals under consideration, until such time as the organisation and duties of the International Financial Commission had been settled. The conference would have an opportunity of considering how far the powers conferred on the International Financial Commission fitted in with those of the Commission of the Straits when the former came to be discussed.

(Article 6 was accepted by the British and Italian representatives on the understanding that the whole of the financial arrangements therein contained would be reopened when the proposals for the financial conditions of peace with Turkey came to be discussed.)

M. CAMBON enquired whether the Commission of the Straits could be given the control of quarantine and all matters relating to the health of shipping in the port, as proposed in article 7 (*h*). An International Sanitary Commission had already been established by international agreement at Constantinople, whose duties were to apply the rules issued by the parent body.

LORD CURZON explained that sub-clause (*h*) merely proposed that the powers of the Constantinople Sanitary Commission should devolve on the Commission of the Straits. He understood that the Constantinople Sanitary Commission formed a department of the Ottoman Government, though foreign representatives were permitted to attend and advise.

M. CAMBON said that originally the Sanitary Commission at Constantinople may have been an Ottoman institution, but since then it had developed into an International Commission. It collected taxes and had thus raised considerable funds which the Ottoman Government had always endeavoured to take over. The Ottoman Government would probably raise no objections to the control of quarantine and all matters relating to the

<sup>4</sup> The typescript text here read: 'i.e. a commission'.



health of shipping in the Straits being handed over to the Commission of the Straits. But he thought that certain of the other Powers who were at present represented on the Constantinople Commission would protest against the suppression of their functions on the plea that they would no longer have a voice in taking measures for the protection of their countries.

LORD CURZON thought that some doubt existed as to the constitution and powers of the Sanitary Commission at Constantinople. He proposed that the chairman of that body, who now happened to be in London, should be invited to attend to give information on that subject.

(It was agreed to adjourn further consideration of article 7 (*h*) until further evidence had been collected with regard to the constitution and powers of the Sanitary Commission at Constantinople.)

LORD CURZON pointed out that the duties with which the Commission of the Straits had been charged had been duly set forth in article 7 (*a*)–(*g*). He wished to enquire at what particular stage the Turkish Government or the Inter-Allied Financial Commission would exercise their respective jurisdictions over shipping, for instance, with regard to customs.

M. KAMMERER expressed the view that the question raised by Lord Curzon would have to be settled by the Ports, Railways and Waterways Commission. The Commission of the Straits had considered the question to be outside their competence. The commission, however, would not interfere with the powers of the Turkish Government to raise customs. It would be found that the settlement of a number of questions of that nature depended upon the decision reached by a number of other commissions such as the Financial Commission, the Ports, Railways and Waterways Commission, the Sanitary Commission, and others.

(It was agreed to adopt article 7 (*a*)–(*g*).)

M. CAMBON expressed the view that in practice the question of requisitioning the aid of naval and military forces invariably presented the very greatest difficulties, because the naval and military authorities either demanded to know for what reason the troops were required, or they stated their inability to supply the same owing to want of men. It was a question for decision whether the Commission of the Straits should not possess a gendarmerie of its own sufficient to enforce its decision.

M. KAMMERER explained that the commission, in considering this question, had discussed whether the powers of the commission should be restricted merely to shipping or whether it should also be given the control of military and other questions. Eventually a compromise had been reached by giving the commission the right to requisition the aid of the naval and military forces in order to ensure the free passage of the Straits. In arriving at that decision the commission had followed a precedent in that formerly French consuls in the East had been empowered to requisition the aid of naval forces. It was felt that in the event of urgent necessity the commission should have the power to take some military action pending the receipt of instructions from the Governments.

LORD CURZON explained that the right to requisition men meant the right to demand and not merely request the aid of the military and naval forces.

M. CAMBON said that for that reason he did not favour the use of the word 'requisition,' since thereby the susceptibilities of admirals and other commanders would undoubtedly be raised. He would prefer to substitute the words 'have recourse to.'

LORD CURZON proposed that the following text should be substituted for article 8:—

'In the event of the commission being of opinion that the liberty of passage is threatened by extreme action, they will inform the commander of the Allied forces, who will thereupon be responsible for taking such action as shall be best calculated to avert such threat.'

It was agreed to substitute the following clause for article 8:—

'In the event of the commission being of opinion that the liberty of passage is threatened by extreme action, they will inform the commander of the Allied forces, who will thereupon be responsible for taking such action as shall be best calculated to avert such threat.'

It was agreed—

That articles 9 and 10 fall under the reservation made above under articles 6 and 7 (*h*) respectively.

(The further consideration of the Report on the administration of the waterways of the Straits was then adjourned.)

LORD CURZON said that the naval advisers of the Powers in Paris, who had been instructed to study the naval terms of peace with Turkey, had submitted certain questions (Appendix 2)<sup>5</sup> for the decision of the conference. He thought those questions involved matters of principle which could only be settled by the Supreme Council.

*Peace Treaty  
with Turkey.  
Naval Terms*

It was agreed—

That the questions put by the naval advisers of the Powers in Paris, with reference to the terms of peace with Turkey, should be referred to the Supreme Council.

(*The meeting was then adjourned.*)

#### APPENDIX I TO No. 40

##### *Draft Articles for Insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey dealing with the Administration over the Waters of the Straits and the Sea of Marmora*

1. The navigation of the Straits, including the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus, shall in future be open both in peace and war (except as pro-

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. This appendix was a variant version of annex 1 in appendix 1 to No. 45: see also No. 42, minute 2.

vided below) to the ships of the Allied and Associated Powers, of all States members of the League of Nations, and of States non-members of the League of Nations on an application being made to the Council of the League of Nations and approved by them, provided that such States accept the provisions of the present scheme. These waters shall not be subject to blockade, nor shall any right of war be exercised nor any act of hostility be committed within them, unless in pursuance of a decision of the Council of the League of Nations.

2. The Turkish Government, deeming it necessary to take further measures to ensure the freedom of navigation provided for in article 1, delegates to a commission to be called the High Commission of the Straits (hereinafter called the commission) the control of the waters specified in article 3 in the manner hereinafter provided, the control to be exercised in the name of the Turkish Government.

3. The jurisdiction of the commission will extend to all the waters between the Mediterranean mouth of the Dardanelles and the Black Sea mouth of the Bosphorus and to the waters within 3 miles of each of these mouths.

4. The commission shall be composed of representatives appointed respectively by the United States Government (if and when that Government is willing to participate), the British Government, the French Government, the Italian Government, and the Russian Government (if and when Russia becomes a member of the League of Nations). Each Government shall appoint one representative. Each commissioner shall only be removable with the consent of his own Government.

5. Each commissioner shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.

6. The commission will exercise the powers given by this treaty in complete independence of the local authority. It will have its own flag, its own budget and its separate organisation.

7. Within the jurisdiction laid down in article 3, the commission will be charged with the following duties:—

- (a) The execution of any works, considered necessary for the improvement of the channels or the approaches to harbours, docks or quays.
- (b) The lighting and buoys of the channels.
- (c) The control of pilotage and towage.
- (d) The control of anchorages.
- (e) The control of docks, quays and harbours, and the provision of such further docks and quays as may be required.
- (f) The control of all matters relating to wrecks, and the salvage of vessels injured by collision, stranding or other reason.
- (g) The control of the loading and discharging of cargoes, whether to or from lighters or other craft, or to or from the quays or shore.
- (h) The control of quarantine and all matters relating to the health of shipping in the port.

8. For the purposes of the preservation of peace and order (not falling within the competence of the commission's police, provided for hereinafter), the commission shall have the right to requisition the aid of naval and military forces stationed in the zone of the Straits, as provided for in chapter 6, article 6, of this treaty.

9. For the purpose of the acquisition of any property, or the execution of any permanent works which may be required, the commission shall be entitled to raise

<sup>6</sup> Omission in filed copy.

such loans as they may consider necessary. These loans will be secured, as far as possible, on the dues to be levied on the shipping using the Straits, provided for hereinafter.

10. The powers and duties of the Sanitary Administration and of any other international bodies within the waters specified in article 3 shall be transferred to the commission.

11. Subject to the general control which is conferred upon the commission, the rights of any persons or companies now holding concessions as to lighthouses, docks, quays or other matters shall be preserved; but the commission shall be entitled, if they think it necessary in the general interests of the administration of the Straits, to buy out or modify the rights of the holder of any such concession upon the conditions agreed upon in article<sup>7</sup> 6 of Chapter 6 of the present treaty.

12. The commission shall have power to organise an adequate force of local police, drawn, as far as possible, from the native population of the zone of the Straits, and commanded by police officers of the nationality of the members of the commission, for the purpose of assisting them in the execution of any duties with which they are entrusted by this chapter.

13. The commission shall appoint judicial officers, who shall exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon the commission by the present treaty, for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the regulations and by-laws issued by the commission. They shall have power to determine the fines which may be imposed in the event of the infringement of the commissioner's regulations.

In particular, the judicial officers shall hear and determine all such suits relating to the ships within the waters under the control of the commission and to the officers and crews thereof, as would in general be exercised by the courts of a State over foreign shipping within its waters. They shall have power to impose fines for the breach by a ship of any regulations and for enforcing the payment of fines they may arrest and detain such ship. They shall have power to impose such penalty as may be enacted for any offence by an officer or member of the crew of a ship against the peace or good order of the waters under the commission's control, or for the breach by any person of any regulations made by the commission.

14. The officers or members of the crew of any merchant vessels within the waters under the control of the commission who may be arrested on shore, whether by the police under the territorial administration of Turkey, or by the commission's police, for any offence committed either ashore or afloat, within the waters specified in article 3, shall be handed over to the police of the commission and dealt with by the judicial officers.

15. The commission shall make such arrangements as may be required in order to carry out the sentences imposed by the judicial officers. In particular, these sentences will be executed, on the demand of the commission, by the local authorities, by the foreign consular officers, or, outside the waters under the jurisdiction of the commission, by the Governments who adhere to the provisions of this treaty.

16. The commission shall appoint such other officers or officials as shall be found indispensable to assist them in carrying out the duties with which they are charged.

17. In all matters relating to the navigation of the waters which are placed under the control of the commission, the ships of all nations adhering to the provisions of this chapter shall be treated upon a footing of absolute impartiality.

18. Subject to the provisions of article 11, the existing rights to levy dues and charges for various purposes on ships or on cargoes in the waters specified in

<sup>7</sup> *Note in original: 'i.e., in the economic section of this treaty.'*

article 3 (whether exercised direct by the Turkish Government, or through the medium of international bodies, or private companies), shall be transferred to the commission. The commission may fix these dues and charges at such amount only as may be reasonably necessary to cover the cost of the works executed and the services rendered for the benefit of shipping, including the general costs and expenses of the administration of the commission (see also article C of the annex to this chapter). For these sole purposes, and with the prior consent of the Council of the League of Nations, the commission may also establish dues and charges other than those now existing, and fix their amounts.

19. All dues and charges imposed by the commission shall be levied impartially and equitably in respect of all vessels, whatever their port of origin, destination and departure, their flag or ownership, or the nationality or ownership of their cargoes.

20. The commission shall be entitled to exercise such jurisdiction on land as may be necessary to enable them to carry out the duties with which they are charged by this treaty.

21. The Turkish Government undertake to facilitate the acquisition by the commission of such land and buildings as the commission shall consider it necessary to acquire to enable them to carry out effectively the duties with which they are entrusted.

22. Ships of war shall be allowed free passage through the waters specified in article 3, provided that they conform their movements in all respects to the regulations issued by the commission. Any vessel of war intending to pass the Straits shall notify the commission, and shall comply with such directions as they may give. In particular, they may prescribe the number of such vessels which may at one time be within the waters under their control, the time limit within which the passage shall be completed, the period for which they may be allowed to anchor, and the supplies which they may be allowed to ship.

23. In time of peace warlike material in transit through the waters specified in article 3 must be declared to the commission. In time of war munitions of war and contraband must be likewise declared to the commission, who will also have the right to visit and search vessels.

Further, in the event of a war in which Turkey is a belligerent and not an aggressor, passage of munitions of war and contraband destined for the enemies of Turkey shall be denied by the commission.

24. Without derogating from the provisions of article[s] 1 and 22, applicable to all vessels of war, those belonging to a belligerent shall not revictual nor take in any stores within the waters under the control of the commission except so far as may be strictly necessary to enable them to complete the transit of the Straits and to reach the nearest port where they can call, nor shall they add to the number of their crews, or in any way add to their fighting efficiency. No repairs shall be effected if the damage was due to hostile action, nor in any cases beyond what may be necessary to enable the vessels to keep the sea. The transit of such vessels shall be effected with the least possible delay. They shall not remain in such waters longer than twenty-four hours from the departure of a vessel of war of the other belligerent.

In the event of a war in which Turkey is a belligerent and not the aggressor, passage through such waters shall be denied by the commission to vessels of Turkey's enemies.

25. Prizes shall in all respects be subjected to the same conditions as belligerent vessels of war.

26. No belligerent shall embark or disembark troops, munitions of war, or warlike materials in the waters under the control of the commission, except in case of accidental hindrance of the transit, and, in such cases, the transit shall be resumed with all possible despatch.

27. Nothing in articles 23, 24, 25 and 26 shall be deemed as limiting the powers of a belligerent or belligerents acting in pursuance of a decision by the Council of the League of Nations.

28. If, by this treaty, the Greek Government shall secure the sovereignty over any part of the waters specified in article 3 or of the land adjoining these waters, the Greek Government shall delegate to the commission the same powers as those delegated to the commission in this chapter by the Turkish Government, and give the commission the same facilities.

### *Annex*

(a) The chairmanship of the commission shall be rotatory for the period of two years among the members of the commission in the alphabetic order of the countries concerned.

The commission shall take decisions by a majority vote and the chairman shall have a casting vote. Abstention shall be regarded as a vote against the proposal under discussion.

Each of the commissioners will have the right to designate a deputy commissioner to replace him in his absence.

(b) The salaries of the members of the commission will be paid by each Government and will be established on reasonable bases by agreements to be made from time to time between the Governments represented on the commission.

(c) The salaries of the judicial officers (article 12), of the police officers (article 11), of such other officials and officers as may be appointed under article 15, and the pay of the local police (article 11) shall be paid out of the receipts of the dues and charges levied on shipping.

The commission shall frame regulations as to the terms and conditions of employment of all officers and officials appointed by them.

(d) The commission shall have at their disposal such vessels as may be necessary to carry out their functions, as laid down in this chapter and annex.

(e) In order to carry out all the duties with which they are charged by the provisions of this chapter and annex and within the limits therein laid down, the commission will have the power to prepare, issue and enforce the necessary regulations, this power to include the right of amending so far as may be necessary, or annulling the existing regulations.

(f) The commission shall frame regulations determining the manner in which the accounts of all revenues and expenditure of the funds under their control shall be kept, for the auditing of such accounts and for publishing every year a full and accurate report thereof.

I.C.P. 58.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Monday, March 1, 1920, at 4 p.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer; The Right Hon. [Sir] A. C. Geddes, President of the Board of Trade; Sir S. J. Chapman, Joint Permanent Secretary to the Board of Trade; Sir Hugh Levick; Mr. Blackett, Controller of Finance, Treasury; Mr. Wise, Mr. Philip Kerr; **SECRETARIES,** Sir M. Hankey, Captain Abraham, Mr. Leith Ross, Major Caccia.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. Avenol.

*Italy:* Signor Nitti, Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Beneduce, Signor Giannini; **SECRETARY,** Signor Trombetti.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda.

*Belgium:* Baron Moncheur.

**INTERPRETER:** M. Camerlynck.

1. **MR. LLOYD GEORGE** said that the economic section of the council had been considering various questions, such as currency, over-consumption, under-production, and so on. All these questions eventually brought the discussion within the region of diplomacy. The difficulties arising in the economic sphere were always in the end traceable to the fact that there was no peace. The Poles had 750,000 men under arms; the Lithuanians were armed; the Czechoslovaks maintained a large army; so did the Jugoslavs. Much might be attributed, no doubt, to the threat represented by Soviet Russia. The Poles and Roumanians could allege this reason to explain the large armies they maintained. But this was not the only cause. Lithuania and Poland had frontier troubles with one another. Latvia and Esthonia were not at one. Roumania and Hungary were not agreed. The Czechs and the Poles had a dispute which was far from settled. There remained the unfortunate question of the Adriatic, to which no solution had yet been found, in spite of the sincere efforts of Signor Nitti. He therefore thought that in issuing recommendations to the world, it was desirable to place in the forefront a recommendation that peace be restored throughout Europe as the only basis for restarting its economic life. He therefore ventured to propose for discussion the first paragraph of a paper which had been circulated to all members (A.J.—53) (Appendix 1).

**SIGNOR NITTI** said that he accepted the text in question as it stood.

**M. CAMBON** said that he was not in a position to discuss making peace with Russia without consulting his Government.

**MR. LLOYD GEORGE** asked whether the suggested draft was not substantially in accordance with what had been decided the previous week.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See No. 24, minute 1 and note 1.

M. CAMBON said that his instructions from M. Millerand were to reserve all questions touching peace with Russia.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he understood this to mean peace between the Allied Powers and Russia. What was suggested was a recommendation that peace be made between Russia and her neighbours. The Baltic States, Roumania and Poland were, as was generally known, sending deputies to Warsaw to discuss terms of peace with Russia. Roumania, he was convinced, would be glad to receive a hint from the Allies advising her to make peace. Lithuania was in the same state of mind. As to Poland, he was not so sure. In any case, prices would not come down until this result had been achieved. The French prices were 300 per cent. above pre-war prices; the British prices 170 per cent., and the Italian prices, perhaps, even more inflated than the French. One of the principal reasons was the isolation of Russia, which was the natural granary of Europe. Unless the border States could be got to make peace with Russia the anomalous result would follow that we were trading with Russia while our Allies were fighting her. If M. Cambon was unable to make a statement now, he hoped he would be able to do so very soon.

LORD CURZON said that he particularly wished M. Cambon to realise that the question under discussion was that of peace between Russia and her neighbours—Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Roumania. In principle this had been accepted by the council in the previous week. What M. Millerand had reserved was the reopening of relations between the Powers and Russia—that was to say, diplomatic relations; for even he had agreed to the reopening of commercial relations. He (Lord Curzon) therefore believed that M. Cambon was really in a position to discuss the matter.

M. CAMBON said that, if his memory served him aright, the declaration made by the council, with M. Millerand's assent, did not go so far as to say that the Allies desired that there should be peace between Russia and her neighbours. All the council had said was that it would not take the responsibility of giving advice to these States, but must leave them to take their own decision in accordance with their own interests.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that, as Signor Nitti was leaving England in a few days, it would be very unfortunate that French agreement should not be obtained before his departure.

M. CAMBON said that Signor Nitti had proposed the resumption both of political and economic relations with Russia, and the discussion had started from this proposal.

LORD CURZON observed that a negative decision had been reached in the previous week, and it was now suggested that the same decision should be put in a positive form.

M. CAMBON agreed that this was so, but maintained that he was unable to make this change without consulting his Government.

SIGNOR NITTI said he quite agreed with Lord Curzon, but he thought that the step which should convert that negative into a positive was one that ought to be taken. The European position would grow worse and worse. No



credits could be obtained from America. Germany must be set up and put in a position to live, work and pay her indemnities. For this, Russia must be opened up and made to yield her raw materials. It would be said, no doubt, that Russia would be unable to furnish supplies at once. Nevertheless, the sooner she did so the better, and delay would not improve the case. The countries with an adverse exchange could not wait. German labour and Russian food were necessary to them. In Italy the Government had done all it could, but the country must live and must get raw material with which to work. During the war it had been constantly said that this was to be the last war. Something must be done to justify that. After all what could be done for the border States should they fight Russia? The Allies could not send men, and would find it very hard to send equipment. Therefore the only advice they could possibly give them was to make peace, and thereby assist in the general economic reconstruction.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that perhaps a concrete case would make the matter clear. Great Britain had been asked to collaborate with America in the relief of Poland. Great Britain had agreed to do so. Of the other Allies, Italy had regretfully replied that she was not in a position to do so. M. Marsal, on behalf of France, had said that he was not certain whether France could give any help.<sup>2</sup> In any case, in view of France's financial position, this help would be very small. Was it reasonable to ask any community in a position to help the Poles to do so if they did not set their own house in order, if they persisted in maintaining huge armies and in fighting wars far within the borders of Russia?

M. CAMBON said that he did not know whether peace between Russia and her neighbours, leading ultimately, no doubt, as it was intended it should, to peace with the Allied Powers, would furnish much food or raw material. Reports from Russia indicated that there would be a poor harvest, no mining, and a disorganised system of transportation. It was therefore reasonable to doubt whether the economic condition of Europe would be much improved by what was suggested.

M. BERTHELOT said that, seeing what was going on in Poland, it was perhaps superfluous to tender the Poles any advice. There had been a secret meeting in Warsaw of the Ministers and of the committee of the Parliament dealing with foreign affairs. As a result, five proposals had been drafted as a basis of peace with Soviet Russia. This being so, why should the council needlessly advise the Poles to do what they were doing? Poland, being the most powerful of the border States, would doubtless find her lead followed by the rest. It had already been pointed out that they were all sending delegates to Warsaw. It had been agreed during the previous week to give no advice, but to leave Poland to follow her own interests. He submitted that the council should go no further. Poland was taking counsel of her own interests, and it was best to leave her alone. These States had said to the Powers that they would not make peace if the Powers had any objection. The Powers, in reply, left the decision to them. Esthonia had already made

<sup>2</sup> See No. 5, minute 5.

peace. What M. Millerand's opinion would be he was not in a position to say, but he did not think that he would yield any further, seeing what had been the position from which he had started. M. Vaida Voevod quite realised that it would be a mistake for one of the border States to make peace in isolation from the rest. He clearly realised that if peace were made it must extend from the Baltic to the Black Sea. He submitted, therefore, that there was no need to tender any advice implying a break in the continuity of Allied policy.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he did not quite take that view. He thought it very important for the council to say that the time for peace had come. He thought the Council would incur serious responsibility should it fail to do so. Italy and Great Britain were prepared to take this responsibility. He quite understood M. Cambon's hesitation, but he would ask him to obtain instructions from his Government as early as possible. He would not like to issue a document with the signatures of Italy and Great Britain only and that of France omitted. He would therefore urge that, if possible, the reply of the French Government be obtained on the following day, seeing that Signor Nitti would be leaving for Italy the day after that.

M. BERTHELOT undertook to state the case to the French Government very fully and with the emphasis desired by Mr. Lloyd George. He hoped that he would be able to give the answer in the course of the following day.

2. With reference to I.C.P. 56,<sup>3</sup> Minute 1, MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in the morning a drafting committee had been appointed to put into final shape the proposals submitted by Signor Beneduce. He thought that the final draft had been produced (Appendix 2).

*High Prices and  
Foreign Ex-  
changes*

BARON MONCHEUR said, with reference to this document, that he had one remark to make. He had no instructions from his Government, as it had not been aware that he would be asked to attend the council, but he felt that he ought, on his own responsibility, to enter a caveat that his Government would not be likely to agree to anything affecting Belgium's right to priority of reparations from Germany. He did not know whether the scheme would have that effect, but he wished, on his own responsibility, to take the precaution of guarding against the contingency.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that he did not think that anything in the proposals would affect the rights of Belgium to priority of payment. It was true that certain German assets were proposed to be set aside as security for the proposed loan, in priority to reparations, but he believed that without this no one would ever receive any reparations at all.

M. AVENOL said that the document was of too great importance to accept without consulting the French Government. He undertook to telegraph for the consent of his Government as soon as possible, and he thought that consent would be given.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN asked whether there would be any objection to telegraphing the tenor of the document to America. He thought it highly

<sup>3</sup> No. 39.

desirable that the United States should act with the Allies in this matter. It might be telegraphed to America as a provisional agreement pending the final assent of the Allied Governments, and the United States Government might be asked whether it would ultimately associate itself with the final proposal.

M. BERTHELOT said he thought it would do no harm to wait twenty-four hours before telegraphing to America. The document would produce a greater effect in America if it had the unanimous backing of all the Allied Powers. On the other hand, it would weaken the document if twenty-four hours later a French reservation had to be communicated.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he quite agreed to wait twenty-four hours before communicating the document to the American Government.

The proposals annexed (Appendix 2) were accepted *ad referendum* to the French Government.

3. SIGNOR NITTI said that at the last Inter-Allied Conference in Paris he had asked M. Clemenceau, Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Curzon not to delay the appointing of Allied Ambassadors to Germany. All, he believed, had assented. Nevertheless, nothing had yet been done. He thought the question was really more important than it seemed, as the appointing of authoritative representatives in Berlin would contribute to give the general feeling that the war was over. Further delay was very undesirable. He had no wish to act independently of France. He would therefore ask the French delegation to decide on a date at which all the Allied Powers should appoint Ambassadors to Berlin.

LORD CURZON said that the question was not a new one. Four or five months ago the Allied Powers had agreed that it was quite undesirable to appoint Ambassadors immediately after the treaty had come into force;<sup>4</sup> consequently, all had sent Chargés d'Affaires. It had been generally agreed that all must act together. The Japanese Ambassador, for instance, had questioned him on the subject, and he had promised to inform him as soon as any change was contemplated.<sup>5</sup> When the matter was last discussed with the French Government he thought the latter had agreed to replace the Chargé d'Affaires by an Ambassador after a short period. Two periods had been suggested, one of six weeks and one of three months. Six weeks had certainly passed, and the longer term was approaching its termination, and he thought that the time had now come when the provisional assent of the French Government to the change should be rendered effective. He was in agreement with Signor Nitti, and would be glad to see a British Ambassador appointed, though he was quite satisfied with the conduct of the British Chargé d'Affaires.

M. CAMBON said that the French Government had, like its Allies, sent a Chargé d'Affaires, and had agreed ultimately to replace him by an Ambassador, but no date, so far as he could recollect, had been mentioned. The

<sup>4</sup> See Volume II, No. 6, minute 5.

<sup>5</sup> See Volume VI, No. 539.

date, he believed, depended on the manner in which Germany executed the treaty. In regard to the execution of the treaty, there had been a large number of disputes. The commissions in Berlin were having difficulties of all kinds with the German Government. He did not think the French Government, therefore, would be willing to send an Ambassador to Berlin until Germany showed a more amenable spirit regarding the execution of the treaty.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if there were difficulties with Germany in regard to the execution of the treaty, the need of an authoritative representative in Berlin appeared to be all the greater. He was not surprised that there were difficulties. There would be difficulties for the next fifteen years. Anyone who thought that these difficulties would be solved in six months could not have read the treaty. Without implying any criticism of the present representatives of the Powers in Berlin, he thought they should be represented there by persons possessing the maximum of official authority. He hoped, therefore, that the French Government would see its way to appoint an Ambassador very soon. The Allies must begin talking to the Germans instead of merely sending them notes. In any case, these notes ought to be interpreted to them by someone with authority, able to discuss with them.

LORD CURZON said that he had spoken from memory when he said that the French Government had suggested a definite term after which Ambassadors would be appointed. He would refer to the records in the Foreign Office and communicate the result to M. Cambon.

M. BERTHELOT said that he thought he had a clear recollection of what had taken place. First, there had been a period of discussion, during which it had been proposed to send Ambassadors to Berlin. Then it had been thought that this was premature and that the step might come more suitably six weeks or three months later. This, however, had no character of finality. It was then decided to send *Chargés d'Affaires*, and to make no change in this without general agreement. In this matter France was held, as the country most affected, to have a sort of prescriptive right to set the pace. This right, of course, did not amount to a title, and would not be pressed as such. The last view of the French Government had been that no change should be made for six months, and that after that it was expedient that all the Powers should act together. No term had ever been fixed in writing. No doubt difficulties with Germany would last longer than six months. Nevertheless, it was desirable that she should indicate a real intention of behaving properly before Ambassadors were appointed. He could not answer for the attitude of the French Government, which, in view of British and Italian pressure, might change; but when he left Paris the feeling was that six months at least should elapse before Ambassadors were appointed. He was sorry to have to repeat that France was the most threatened of the countries concerned, as well as the one which had suffered most. He thought that her feelings should be consulted. The question had a symbolic importance for France, more than for her Allies. He thought the appointment of a French Ambassador at this

stage would not be well received by public opinion in France. In this connection he would like to allude to a telegram he had just received from Berlin. General Nollet, who presided over the Military Commission in Berlin, after struggling with endless delays and evasions of the German Government in carrying out the military terms of the Peace Treaty, had had an interview with Herr Noske and Herr Bauer,<sup>6</sup> and had spoken to them very firmly. As a result, they had agreed to certain proposals that afternoon. Later in the day, however, Herr Noske had informed General Nollet that he was not ready to be given an ultimatum of this character. He asked General Nollet to come back and discuss the matter afresh, and he added that he felt sure of British support in this matter. M. Berthelot said he was not going to suggest that Herr Noske had any right to say this, but the council must reflect that what had taken place regarding the handing over of war criminals and other matters might have given the impression that France was the most uncompromising of the Allies, that they had hitherto followed her lead, but that the tendency among the rest now was to go in a different direction. The question of the Ambassadors was not in itself of great importance, but it was symbolic, and it was most undesirable to allow Germany to form the impression that she could depend on Italy and Great Britain to oppose France. This would not conduce to the execution of the treaty, and might lead to serious trouble.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he had no intention of arguing against the position taken up by M. Berthelot. He would merely address to him an appeal couched in the most friendly terms. In the first place he would say to him that the existing facts connected with the existing situation must be taken into account. The council could not discuss the question under consideration in general terms. Rates of exchange, the economic conditions prevailing at the present moment throughout Europe, made it imperative that the impression should be given that war was over. Consequently, the policy of the Allied Governments must of necessity be directed towards that end.

Following that train of thought, he would then ask M. Berthelot: What purpose could be served by sending a Chargé d'Affaires to Berlin instead of an Ambassador? The only object in view could be the desire to give the impression that the Germans were a conquered people; that war was not yet over. He could hardly believe that the council intended deliberately to adopt that policy after the treaty had been signed, and after the Allied plenipotentiaries had shaken hands with the German representatives. At the present moment in Germany, three currents of political activity existed. Firstly, the imperialistic current, which aimed at the return of the former autocratic régime. Secondly, the moderate current, which was represented by the present Government. Lastly, the revolutionary stream. He would ask: Was it in the interests of the Allies that they should place themselves against the present Government, or endeavour to reduce its prestige? Was not the present Government the only one which could give the Allies suitable guarantees? What objects could be gained by placing themselves in antagon-

<sup>6</sup> Herr Bauer was German Chancellor and Herr Noske German Minister of Defence.

ism with the Government, and so endeavouring to diminish its authority? In a word, did the Allies wish to break off all relations with the present moderate Government? If so, what advantage could thereby be gained? On the contrary he thought the Allies should do everything to help the existing Government, to place it in a condition to live. The German people should be encouraged to reorganise the industries of the country and to work, if only for the Allies, and for that purpose a supply of raw materials would be essential. A Government [*sic*] would be necessary in order to restore confidence to the people, who would only then realise that war was indeed over.

In conclusion, he would beg M. Berthelot, in the most friendly manner, to co-operate in bringing these conditions to pass by sending an Ambassador to Berlin. Indeed, he would go so far as to hope that the French Ambassador would be the first to reach Berlin. The council would agree that peace must be restored, and that everything must be done to bring about the desired result.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would in the first place say a word about what fell from M. Berthelot. He (Mr. Lloyd George) was not afraid of disagreement among the Allies on fundamental issues; he was far more afraid of suspicions dividing them. He referred to the sort of suggestion contained in the telegram that had been read by M. Berthelot to the effect that Great Britain was inimical to France. He fully realised that there were people in the country who wished to keep the war spirit going by harrying and trampling the Germans. No doubt those people existed in France also; but there were not many either there or here. He could not claim correctly to interpret French public opinion; but the vast majority of people in Great Britain were prepared to say: 'War is over, we have defeated our enemy, let us make peace.' He was informed that the same sentiment existed in France and in Italy among the vast majority of the population.

He agreed entirely with the views expressed by Signor Nitti, but everything depended on the attitude taken by the Government. In one country the Government would follow the reasonable aspirations of the population towards peace. In another country the Government would allow itself to be bullied and heckled by the militant party into following an aggressive policy. In his opinion therein lay the real danger of the situation; that is to say, that the blatant aggressive people might direct the policy of Government.

With regard to the telegram read by M. Berthelot, he would recollect that the council had agreed about the extension to be given to the Germans for disarmament.<sup>7</sup> And as far as the British Government was concerned no different instructions had been given to anyone. He fully realised the importance of moving together; but in any case that incident had nothing to do with the question under consideration, namely, whether an Ambassador or a Chargé d'Affaires should be kept at Berlin. Should the Allies wish to trap each other, that could just as easily be done through the agency of a Chargé d'Affaires as through the agency of an Ambassador. On the contrary, an Ambassador would have greater authority as compared with a Chargé d'Affaires.

<sup>7</sup> See No. 13, minute 4.

In his opinion the great danger lay in the military members of the various missions each expressing their own views, whilst the Chargé d'Affaires did not possess sufficient authority to keep them in order. In his opinion each of the Allies must be represented in Berlin by a personality who would represent the political conscience of the people and express the views of his Government.

He (Mr. Lloyd George) had been greatly alarmed by the statement made by M. Berthelot that he offered no hope that the existing state of things would be brought to an early end.

M. Berthelot had said that an Ambassador might perhaps be sent in six months' time. In reply he would ask, Why six months? Furthermore, M. Berthelot had said that the French must decide the opportune moment for sending an Ambassador.

He (Mr. Lloyd George) wished to make matters perfectly clear with regard to that question. He fully agreed that the French had undoubtedly suffered most in the war. But he could never agree to the suggestion that Great Britain should never be on peace terms with Germany until the Government of France agreed to send an Ambassador there. The British Government would be anxious to act with the French and would be prepared to stretch a point to do so. But he could never, on behalf of the British Government, accept the proposition that Great Britain should not send an Ambassador to Berlin until the French Government had agreed to do so. He thought that matter should be made clear at once.

In conclusion, he would join in the appeal to France that she should do exactly what Germany did in 1870 and send an Ambassador.

M. BERTHELOT intervening said that Germany only sent a Chargé d'Affaires to Paris. She did not send an Ambassador until two years after the conclusion of peace.<sup>8</sup>

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, continuing, enquired: What would be gained by refusing to send an Ambassador to Berlin, thereby leaving Allied affairs in the hands of inexperienced military officers? In his opinion that policy would merely end in the overthrow of the only Government that stood between militarism and spartacism. He must apologise for the terms of his statement; but he considered the question to be so important that he felt compelled to speak quite plainly. He agreed with all that Signor Nitti had said.

M. BERTHELOT felt compelled to say at once that he was not qualified to express any decided or official opinion. With regard to the Ambassadors, he had merely referred to the various conversations that had taken place on that subject, and he had promised to refer the whole matter to M. Millerand for his immediate favourable consideration. He himself could express no views.

Next, with regard to Signor Nitti's statement, whose kindly sentiments appealed deeply to him, he fully realised the necessity for agreement amongst the Allies, but in order to obtain agreement the same party could not always be expected to give in. It was quite true that the war had ended. Neverthe-

<sup>8</sup> Count von Arnim was accredited as German Ambassador to France in January 1872.

less the treaty must be enforced. So far Germany had invariably attempted to evade her commitments, and in the end, if the treaty were not duly executed by her, the Allies could not be expected to renounce all the benefits of victory, and war would break out again.

Next, Signor Nitti had said that nothing should be done against the German Government. But it would not, in his opinion, be acting against the Government to leave a *Chargé d'Affaires* at Berlin. Again, ought the Allies to support the Government? To that question he would reply in the affirmative, provided Germany carried out the terms of the treaty. Next, should the Allies give the Government their confidence? To that he would reply, certainly if it deserved it.

Mr. Lloyd George had said that he did not dread a disagreement between the Allies on main issues, but that he dreaded suspicion. He (M. Berthelot) fully agreed with that view, but he did not think any idea of suspicion had arisen. The fact that he had read the telegram from Berlin alone showed that no suspicion existed. The French general had merely reported without comment something that had actually occurred. No suspicion existed between thinking people in either country: the only sentiment existing in France was that the Peace Treaty should be enforced.

He (M. Berthelot) had never said that France alone should decide the question of the collective sending of Ambassadors to Berlin. He had merely wished to imply that the French were, on account of their special situation, entitled to express an opinion in the matter, which should receive careful consideration. But he had never intended that to mean that Great Britain or Italy should not send an Ambassador until France agreed to do so.

In conclusion, he fully admitted that the question under consideration was not a very important one. A far more important question was involved, the execution of the Peace Treaty. He agreed that France should support the present German Government, but she could not say that war had ended and that Germany could now do anything she pleased. Germany must be made to carry out the terms of the treaty in full.

SIGNOR NITTI said he was inclined to admit by hypothesis that the French and British missions in Germany perhaps agreed better with one another than with the similar representatives of Italy. Nevertheless, he felt deeply concerned with regard to the numbers of the military missions in Germany, and Italy greatly desired that some chief who could talk on behalf of his Government, with prestige, dignity and authority, should be placed at the head of the missions in that country. As a rule military men talked little. In war time the military were indispensable and must take the lead, but in peace military men could no longer lead. Consequently, in his opinion, it was imperative that an Ambassador with moral authority should be placed above all the existing commissioners in Germany. He thought that would alone constitute a great step forwards towards the re-establishment of trade, which was now so necessary.

Italy, like France, had every interest in seeing to the execution of the treaty; but it would also be necessary to place the German Government in a position



to execute the treaty. Therefore, from a purely political point of view it would be important to appoint Ambassadors, that alone would be accepted as an indication that war was over, and that the Allies wished to support the Government and to give it a real start. Should the present Government fall, a worse situation would undoubtedly ensue, and the Allies could not possibly desire that the present Government should be replaced either by a revolutionary, or by an imperialistic Government. Consequently, he hoped the French Government would be the first to send an Ambassador to Berlin.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the discussion would now, owing to the late hour, have to be adjourned. He understood that M. Berthelot would communicate with M. Millerand, and that his reply would be received in a day or two. As Signor Nitti would be compelled to leave England in a day or two, he desired that a discussion on the Treaty of Peace with Turkey should take place on the following day. He understood that certain principles having reference to the military and naval clauses, the financial clauses, and the control of the Straits would require to be considered.

*(The meeting then adjourned until to-morrow.)*

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 1, 1920.

#### APPENDIX I TO No. 41

1. It is of paramount importance that peace conditions should be fully and completely restored at the earliest possible moment throughout the world. In order to achieve this object, it is desirable—

- (a) That peace should be re-established in Eastern Europe, and that the state of war that now exists between Russia and her neighbours should be terminated.
- (b) That armies should everywhere be reduced to a peace footing, that armaments should be limited to the lowest possible figure compatible with national security, and that the League of Nations should accordingly be invited to consider, as soon as possible, proposals for the reduction of armaments.
- (c) That the States which have been created or enlarged as the result of the war should at once re-establish full and friendly co-operation, and arrange for the free interchange of commodities, in order that the essential unity of European economic life may not be impaired by the erection of artificial economic barriers.

2. Not only the Government of each country, but all those engaged in the task of production in every land, should give immediate attention to the execution of all measures which will contribute to the full resumption of peaceful industry, to the encouragement of better output on the part of the workers in every country, to the improvement of machinery and means of transportation, and the removal of such disturbing factors as profiteering.

3. Each Government should at once consider means for urging upon its nationals in every rank of life the vital necessity of suppressing extravagance and reducing

expenditure, so as to bridge the gap which must for some years exist between the demand for and supply of essential commodities.

4. It is essential that early steps be taken to secure the deflation of credit and currency, (a) by the reduction of Government expenditure within the limits of revenue, (b) by the imposition of such additional taxation as is necessary to secure this result, (c) by the funding of short-time obligations by means of loans subscribed out of the savings of the people, and (d) by the immediate limitation and gradual curtailment of the note circulation.

5. The provision of raw materials being essential to the restoration of industry, means should be found by which the countries which are, in present conditions of international exchange, unable to purchase in the world markets, and so are unable to restart their economic life, can obtain commercial credits. It will be impossible to achieve this unless the countries are prepared to undertake at once to initiate the currency reforms indicated above. It is hoped that the Financial Conference, which is being summoned by the League of Nations, will be able to make practical suggestions to this end.

6. In order to make clear their whole-hearted adhesion to the policy here enunciated, viz., the complete restoration of peace and the reconstruction of the economic life of Europe, the Powers represented at the conference have agreed to instruct their representatives on the Reparation Commission to recommend that commission to take steps to obtain at the earliest possible date a statement from Germany of her liabilities under the Peace Treaty, and to fix a final total for the amount to be paid by way of reparation, based on her capacity to pay, and to authorise Germany to raise a loan abroad, to rank before her liabilities for reparation, of such amount as the commission may deem to be requisite; and they propose to adopt a similar course in the case of Austria.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, March 1, 1920.*

## APPENDIX 2 TO No. 41

5.<sup>9</sup> The provision of raw materials being essential to the restoration of industry, means should be found by which the countries which are, in present conditions of international exchange, unable to purchase in the world markets, and so are unable to restart their economic life, can obtain commercial credits. It will be possible to achieve this when the countries have made the reforms indicated in the foregoing paragraphs. The Powers represented at the conference recognise the necessity for continued co-operation between the Allies and for removing obstacles to the easy interchange of essential commodities. They will continue to consult together regarding the provision and distribution of necessary raw materials and foodstuffs with a view to the early restoration of normal conditions.

6. The Powers represented at the conference have taken under consideration article 235 and cognate articles of the Treaty of Versailles, and the passages in the letter addressed on the [16th]<sup>10</sup> June, 1919, by the Supreme Council to the German Peace delegates, which contemplate that Germany, within four months of the signature of the treaty, shall make proposals for fixing the total of the payments to be made by her by way of reparation and that facilities may be given her to obtain

<sup>9</sup> This notation corresponded to that of appendix 1 above: cf. No. 39, minute 2.

<sup>10</sup> Omission from filed copy.

necessary foodstuffs and raw materials in advance of payments being made by way of reparation. The Powers are agreed that it is desirable in the interest alike of Germany and of her creditors that the total to be paid by her for reparation should be fixed at an early date. They observe that under the treaty a period of four months was provided during which Germany should have the right to make proposals of the kind referred to, and they are agreed that, in the circumstances as they exist to-day, such period should be extended.

The Powers represented at the conference accordingly have agreed to instruct their representatives on the Reparation Commission to recommend that commission to take steps to obtain at the earliest possible date a statement from Germany of her liabilities under the Peace Treaty, and to fix a final total for the amount to be paid by way of reparation, based on her capacity to pay, and in accordance with the provisions of article 235 of the treaty to take steps to enable Germany to obtain essential foodstuffs and raw materials, and, if necessary, to authorise her to raise a loan abroad to rank in front of any other liability of Germany. (Query, add: including her liability for reparation.)

They propose to adopt a similar course in the case of Austria.

## No. 42

I.C.P. 59.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, March 2, 1920, at 11 a.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; The Right Hon. W. Long, First Lord of the Admiralty; Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff; Mr. Blackett, Controller of Finance, Treasury; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Philip Kerr; **SECRETARIES,** Sir M. Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Major Caccia, Captain Abraham.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer, M. Avenol (for Minute 3).

*Italy:* Signor Nitti, Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Commander Ruspoli (for Minute 2), Signor Galli, Duke Ascalio [*sic*] Colonna, Signor Nogara (for Minute 3); **SECRETARY,** Signor Trombetti.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda, Mr. Kengo Mori.

**INTERPRETER:** M. Camerlynck.

1. **MR. LLOYD GEORGE** said that he was quite sure that his colleagues on the Supreme Council shared the satisfaction which he felt at *M. Millerand* M. Millerand's triumph over his difficulties in connection with the recent railway strike in France. He suggested that they should request the French Ambassador to convey to M. Millerand their very sincere congratulations at the happy issue which had been reached. Now that the strike was finished, he hoped that it might be possible for M. Millerand to return to London at once, if possible before Signor Nitti left, as the President of the Italian Chamber had informed him that he ought to be returning to Italy immediately. There were, however, three or four really important questions

which required the presence of all three Prime Ministers. He hoped, therefore, that M. Cambon, in conveying their congratulations to M. Millerand, would inform the latter that it was most desirable that he should rejoin the council without delay, and he trusted that Signor Nitti might see his way to defer his departure until the following Thursday, so that they might have the opportunity of at least one day with the full council sitting.

M. CAMBON said that he would be delighted to transmit to M. Millerand the congratulations of the members of the council. He was sure that these would be deeply appreciated by the President of the French Council. As regards what Mr. Lloyd George had said about the possibility of M. Millerand's speedy return, he was afraid that this was out of the question. There were certain urgent matters arising out of the strike which required M. Millerand's presence, and M. Millerand, therefore, would hardly be able to return to London for some days.

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the council should now turn to the business of the day. The first question was one which had been raised by the Allied Military Committee, sitting at Versailles under the presidency of Marshal Foch, who had reported that the naval representatives had unanimously expressed their opinion that it was necessary for them, in order to frame the naval clauses, to receive from the Supreme Council instructions on certain points detailed in the attached<sup>1</sup> note:—

- (i) Will Turkey be allowed to keep an organised navy, only limited to that necessary for the defence of her coasts?
- (ii) Is the Turkish navy to be reduced to a size sufficient only for a police service and protection of fisheries?
- (iii) In both the above cases it is essential to know what would be the extent of her coasts, and the authority under which they would be placed.

The advice of the British Admiralty was that the reply to the first question should be in the negative; that the reply to the second question should be in the affirmative; and they suggested that a naval force of seven sloops and two gunboats would be just adequate for police duties along the coast.

M. CAMBON said that he agreed with the view taken by the British Admiralty, that Turkey should not be allowed to maintain an organised navy. She ought, however, he thought, to be permitted to maintain a sufficient number of suitable ships for carrying out police duties and protecting her coasts. As regards the third point raised by Marshal Foch's Committee, he thought this turned upon another matter which had not yet been settled, and that was, what were to be the actual boundaries of Greece?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether the French representatives, who apparently did not include a French naval adviser, had any alternative suggestion to make as to the size of the force which the British Admiralty

<sup>1</sup> Not attached to filed copy: see No. 40, note 5.

suggested Turkey might be allowed to retain, viz., seven sloops and two gunboats.

M. CAMBON thought the exact size was of no great importance, although she should have enough ships to police her coasts. This was a matter that could be settled later. What was important was that Turkey should cease to be a naval Power.

LORD CURZON said that the question of the amount of coast left to Turkey had been practically already settled by the council. They had agreed provisionally that the northern boundary of Turkey should extend to the Chatalja lines, which meant that all the north coast of pre-war Turkey would now belong to Greece. The coasts of the Turkey of the future would, on the Black Sea, begin on the western side of Lazistan, near Trebizond, and would run westwards to the Bosphorus. As the Allies were to assume complete naval control of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora and the Dardanelles, the Turks would require no defensive naval force in those waters. From the Dardanelles the Turkish coast would run down to Smyrna, where he assumed that the necessary protective duties would fall to Greece. From Smyrna the Turkish coast would continue past Adalia to some point in Cilicia not yet determined. He thought, therefore, that the council were quite competent to decide that morning the probable size of the Turkish naval force required to look after her coasts.

SIGNOR NITTI said that there were two questions. One was the northern frontier of Turkey, whether it should stretch to the Enos-Midia line or to the Chatalja line. The second was the amount of naval force to be maintained by Turkey in the future. There was a third question, which he thought was more important than either, and that was the question of the Turkish customs. A very active contraband had always been carried out on the Turkish coasts of Asia Minor, and he thought that whatever ships were to be maintained by Turkey for protective work should be manned by a naval personnel if they were effectively to deal with smuggling. Again, he doubted whether the sloops and gunboats suggested by the British Admiralty would afford sufficient protection. They would probably prove to be much too slow for the task. He thought that vessels of high speed would almost certainly be necessary.

M. CAMBON said that he agreed with Lord Curzon about the coasts of the new Turkey, and thought that this could be pointed out in the council's reply to Versailles. In regard to what Signor Nitti had said about the Turkish customs, his own view was that the whole of the question of the future customs administration in Turkey would be settled by the Financial Commission which was to be set up. The council could not decide that morning exactly what form that administration would take. The size and number of the ships was also a question of detail which could well be allowed to stand over.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether M. Cambon suggested that the council should not fix the size of the naval force, but should leave it to the Financial Commission.

LORD CURZON said that he understood M. Cambon to be referring rather to the commission which had been appointed to make recommendations as to the nature of the Financial Commission, and that the former commission should be asked to decide the question of customs raised by Signor Nitti.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the council should take the same line that they had adopted in regard to the German treaty. By that treaty Germany had been permitted to maintain an army of a certain size to enable her to keep internal order. A proviso had been made, however, to the effect that, if this force was found to be inadequate for the purpose, Germany had the right to appeal to the council. As a matter of fact, she had quite lately made such an appeal, and the council, after referring the matter in the first instance to Marshal Foch's Military Committee, had allowed Germany to double that force for the next two or three months.<sup>2</sup> He suggested that the council should accept the British Admiralty's proposal, and provide in the treaty that, if the body to be responsible for customs administration in Turkey in the future found this naval force inadequate, it could appeal to the Allies for permission to increase it.

The council agreed to accept the suggestion of Mr. Lloyd George.

3. MR. LLOYD GEORGE called on Mr. Blackett, the chairman of the Turkish Financial Commission, to state whether any big questions of principle required to be settled by the council in connection with the financial clauses of the treaty with Turkey.

*Financial  
Clauses: (a)  
Powers of  
Financial Com-  
missions [sic]*

MR. BLACKETT said that the first big question which the council would be invited to consider had reference to the powers to be conferred on the Financial Commission. In accordance with the draft proposals for the financial conditions of peace with Turkey, the Financial Commission which it was proposed to set up had been given somewhat extended powers, including the control of the customs, the control of the Inspectorate of the Finance, which constituted the operative part of the Ministry of Finance, and which would, through the administration of the debt, exercise considerable control over all the special revenues at present hypothecated to the holders of the bonds of the pre-war external debt of Turkey. The commission had decided that a control of this nature would be desirable on financial grounds, but it had been left to the Supreme Council to decide whether the control would also be desirable on political grounds.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired what was exactly meant by 'the control of customs.'

MR. BLACKETT replied that article 14 laid down that 'the administration of the customs shall be under a Director-General, appointed by and invoked by the Financial Commission and answerable to it. No change shall be made in the schedule of the customs charges except by the Financial Commission.'

M. CAMBON expressed the view that the control of the customs by the

<sup>2</sup> See No. 13, minute 4.

Financial Commission would not prevent the Department itself being independent and Turkish. In his opinion, it was essential that the work of the Customs Department should be controlled, as suggested, by the Financial Commission, which must be responsible for the maintenance of the Ottoman finances in good order. Consequently, it had been decided that the Director-General of Customs should be appointed by and answerable to the Financial Commission. That proposal would undoubtedly involve a certain degree of interference with the Turkish administration. In his opinion, however, that would be absolutely necessary. Nothing would be done by the Turkish Government unless the Great Powers took some part in the administration.

M. KAMMERER explained that the article in question had been accepted by the Turkish Financial Commission as a compromise, with the idea of reconciling, on the one hand, the necessity of exercising a certain amount of supervision over the Turkish administration, which has been unanimously considered to be essential; whilst, on the other hand, avoiding the danger of any interference with the internal administration of the country, a measure which it was thought might eventually lead to disorders and even to military intervention. The commission had thought that a distinction could be made between action taken at Constantinople and similar action in the interior of the country. It had been realised that customs would be collected at the frontiers. Consequently, such control as might have to be exercised would be little evident. The commission had endeavoured to give effect, as far as possible, to the views on this subject originally set forth by the British Prime Minister.<sup>3</sup>

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI invited attention to article 2, which read as follows:—

‘The budget to be presented annually by the Turkish Minister of the Finance to Parliament shall be submitted, in the first instance, to the Financial Commission, and shall be presented to Parliament in the form approved by that commission. No modification introduced by Parliament shall be operative without the approval of the Financial Commission.’

It would be seen that the Financial Commission would have the control of the budget.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE interpreted the article to mean that the Financial Commission would decide what articles sold by different countries to Turkey should be taxed and in what proportion. Thus, suppose the Turkish Finance Minister proposed a tariff in his budget (that is to say, to tax goods coming from outside), that budget would be submitted in the first instance to the representatives of the countries who would eventually supply the goods in question. Consequently, those countries would decide what taxes should be placed on the goods they would be selling to Turkey.

M. KAMMERER explained that the situation in Turkey was somewhat different. In accordance with existing treaties, Turkey possessed before the war no power to fix her own tariffs. Under the economic clauses of the peace

<sup>3</sup> Cf. No. 7, minute 3.

with Turkey it had been proposed that the tariff of 1907 should forthwith be reintroduced; but, in addition, under the scheme proposed by the Turkish Financial Commission, Turkey would now be given the right to suggest alterations in the sanctioned tariff. He thought the new powers thus conferred on Turkey would greatly ease the situation. He would point out, however, that the question of tariffs had been dealt with under another article.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI agreed with M. Kammerer that the Turkish Government had under the Capitulations no right to impose a tariff of her own. She was thereby compelled to impose a duty of 11 per cent. *ad valorem* on all imports, and she had no authority to augment the same. But under the provisions now proposed by the Turkish Financial Commission, Turkey would, with the sanction of the Financial Commission, have the power to alter her tariffs. He thought that implied a distinct improvement.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that Turkey had always possessed the right to alter the tariffs with the consent of the Great Powers. Now it was proposed that a commission, representing three Great Powers only, should decide whether the goods should be taxed and to what extent. He thought that other Powers not represented on the Financial Commission might object to the procedure proposed.

VISCOUNT CHINDA maintained that the interests of Japan were deeply concerned in the question under discussion. In accordance with article 14: 'No change in the schedule of the custom charges may be ordered except by the Financial Commission.' That is to say, the three Great Powers—Great Britain, France and Italy—would be empowered without reference to any other of the Great Powers to sanction changes in the tariff, and the Financial Commission would thereby undoubtedly obtain the power to interfere with the commerce of other countries.

SIGNOR NITTI thought that the situation in Turkey had not been fully realised. The council had talked about Turkey as if she were an industrial country trying to protect her industries by means of protective duties. As a matter of fact, Turkey would have no such problem to solve; her customs would be imposed for fiscal and not for economic reasons. Consequently, there would be no idea of treating one country differently from another in the matter of customs. The duties of the Financial Commission would be merely to co-ordinate financial matters, and the revenue collected by that commission would be expended for definite purposes. All countries would be treated in exactly the same manner; the only difference being that the three Powers—Great Britain, France and Italy—would be responsible for exercising a control which, as a matter of fact, already existed. The question of the possible imposition of preferential tariffs did not therefore arise. He thought the matter could be made quite clear by slightly redrafting certain articles.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that so far he had been in the position of one asking for information. He, like the Japanese representative, had been opposed to the creation of a commission that could set up a preferential tariff, but he now understood that no such thing could happen.



VISCOUNT CHINDA, intervening, said that he had never intended to refer to preferential tariffs. It had been said that the Financial Commission could only propose changes in the tariffs which would be of general application and that therefore no country could thereby suffer. He maintained, however, that a change applicable to particular commodities might, as a matter of fact, affect one country more than another. Therein lay his objection.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed with Viscount Chinda as to the danger referred to by him. He found great difficulty, however, in suggesting any alternative. The council would agree that it would be impossible to leave the control of the finances entirely in the hands of Turkey, partly on account of the Ottoman debt which already had to be controlled, and partly because some sort of indirect control would be essential in order to prevent massacres. Consequently, had any other way out of the difficulty been suggested, he would have felt disinclined to accept the present proposals. In the circumstances, however, he would suggest that the council should accept in principle the proposals contained in articles 2 and 14, leaving to the Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers to consider how the proposals would work out in practice.

It was agreed to accept in principle articles 2 and 14; it being left to the Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers in London to consider how the proposals would work out in practice.

MR. BLACKETT said that the second point to which the commission wished to invite the attention of the conference had reference to the priority in which it had been proposed to deal with claims against Turkey. Under article 1 the Allied and Associated Powers recognised that the resources of Turkey would not be sufficient to enable her to make complete reparation. But under article 5, it was proposed that all the resources of the Turkish Government, save revenues conceded or hypothecated to the services of the Ottoman External Debt, should be placed at the disposal of the Financial Commission, which would employ them in the following order:—

(b) *Claims  
against Turkey.  
Article 5*

1. To defray salaries and current expenses of the Finance Commission.
2. To defray the cost of the Allied military and naval forces of occupation from the date of the armistice to the date of the ratification of the treaty.

The clauses as drafted represented the views of the British and Japanese members. The French and Italian members, however, had desired to exclude any charges incurred on account of the occupation of Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia, or any other territory which, under the treaty, might be detached from Turkey. That is to say, payments by Turkey should be confined to the cost of the occupation of territory remaining Turkish.

The Turkish Financial Commission had not discussed that question at any great length, since a fundamental difference of opinion existed which could only be settled by the Supreme Council.

M. CAMBON observed that if priority were given to the refund by Turkey of the cost of the occupation of territories which were not to remain Turkish, nothing would remain for distribution. This would render the restoration of Turkey quite impossible, and no one would receive indemnification of any kind. The cost involved in Mesopotamia, for instance, represented a vast sum. If Smyrna was to remain in the hands of the Greeks, were the Greeks to be able to charge Turkey with the cost of occupying this territory? This would mean the complete suppression of Turkish finances. The French Government, therefore, wished to follow the precedent of the Bulgarian treaty. Nothing had been charged to Bulgaria for the occupation of Thrace, because it was not to remain Bulgarian. Similar provisions had been made in the case of the Austrian treaty. In the interest of Turkish finances he thought such a charge should not be made.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he was going to join M. Cambon in begging Mr. Lloyd George not to press a claim of this nature. First of all, practical possibilities had been taken into account. It was not possible for Turkey to pay the cost of occupying territories which were to be taken out of her control. The demand could be made, but Turkey certainly would never be able to pay. In addition, there was the question of what it was fair to ask. The occupation of these territories had not been made in the interests of Turkey. Turkey, for instance, had a natural right to be in Smyrna; yet we were to say to Turkey: 'You must lose Smyrna, and pay for the loss of it.' Smyrna and the country round it represented about 25 per cent. of the revenues of Turkey. This was surely asking too much. It might be argued that the occupation of areas which were to remain Turkish had been a general service which it was fair to charge to Turkey; but the same could not be said for territories to which she was to renounce all claim. He hoped, therefore, that Mr. Lloyd George would realise that it was impossible for Turkey to meet such a demand, and that he would forgo it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he agreed with Signor Nitti and M. Cambon that the cost of occupying territories to be taken away from Turkey could not well be charged to her. This applied in the case of Palestine, Mesopotamia and Smyrna. There still remained, however, a difficulty. Cilicia, for instance, was Turkish, and was to remain Turkish. British troops, however, had garrisoned Cilicia for over a year. Syria, though not to remain Turkish, was not to become British, and British troops had garrisoned Syria for over a year. Was no allowance to be made for the occupation of Syria and Cilicia? He wished to ask in what manner it was proposed to treat the occupation of parts of the Turkish Empire, conquered and occupied by British troops, when they were not to pass under British control. Great Britain, he would point out, had even renounced any economic advantage in these territories. Cilicia, he assumed, would be treated as part of Turkey. But what would be done regarding Syria?

M. CAMBON said that he would submit the special question of the cost of occupying Syria to his Government.

SIGNOR NITTI said that the Italian delegation felt some concern about the provisions of article 21. Certain sums in gold were involved, which, (d) *Article 21* according to the terms of this article, would be utilised to satisfy the claims of the Allied Powers. His delegation thought this sum ought to be employed for the restoration of Turkish currency. It could either be placed on deposit or put into circulation. In either case, Turkish paper money would improve in value. If the gold were absorbed immediately by the Allies, the value of Turkish paper currency would diminish. It was to the interest of all to set Turkey at work again, and there appeared to be no other means of bringing that about. If Turkish paper money were to cease to have any value at all, the Allies as a whole would suffer. The amount of gold involved was not sufficient to affect the wealth of the Allied Powers appreciably. It could, however, improve the currency situation of Turkey. The Allies would suffer as much as the Turks if their claims had to be paid to them in useless paper. If, on the other hand, a gold basis could be found for the Turkish currency, all sides would benefit.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it was not so easy for the British delegation to take so exalted a view. The proposal really meant that Great Britain principally, France secondly, were to subscribe the gold that was to serve as a basis for the Turkish currency. In other words, the cost of British troops of occupation, and of French troops, would not be paid. He did not think that Turkish paper money would be less valuable than German paper, nor did he think that Turkey would make any good use of this gold if placed in her coffers. The Turks had no expectation of receiving this money, and he hoped that Signor Nitti, seeing the great expenses incurred by Great Britain and also by France, in Turkey, would not press the point.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he had not suggested handing the gold to Turkey. What he suggested was that it should be kept by the Financial Commission, and utilised in such a way as to improve the currency. He would propose to draft the article as follows:—

‘The sums in gold and German Treasury bills to be transferred to the Allied and Associated Powers by Germany and Austria under the provisions of article 259 (1) and (2) and of article 210 of the treaty with Austria, representing the gold reserve of Turkish currency, shall be placed at the disposal of the Financial Commission and employed by them for the improvement and rehabilitation of the said currency.’

Thus the gold would not be given to Turkey, but to the Financial Commission. It must be admitted that if there were no deposited gold, Great Britain and France, in proportion to their interests, which were greater than Italy's, would suffer. The more worthless paper they received the worse off they would be. Further, prices would rise in Turkey, and before long the Allies would have to relieve Constantinople as they had to relieve Vienna. In other words, in order to pocket a little gold the Allies would be shouldering heavy burdens. What he suggested was, he thought, not sentiment, but good business.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the matter was certainly a question of business for Great Britain. The real question was whether Turkish finance should be rehabilitated entirely at the expense of Great Britain. If the Allies shared the expense, the position would be different. If £6,000,000 of gold were required to restore Turkish currency, let each of the three principal Allied Powers contribute £2,000,000. The proposal, as it now stood, placed nearly all the burden on Great Britain, and the remainder on France. He did not think this was fair.

SIGNOR NITTI said that Mr. Lloyd George put the question in a very embarrassing form. He charged Italy with attempting to be generous with money which was not her own. In view of this he could not press the matter any further. He hoped, however, that something would be done to restore Turkish currency.

M. CAMBON said that if Signor Nitti withdrew his proposal he would take it up on behalf of the French delegation. He thought it of great importance to restore Turkish currency. He would suggest the addition to the draft suggested by Signor Nitti of the following:—

‘Any sum not used by the Financial Commission for the purpose indicated above shall be devoted to the repayment of the cost of occupation by Allied forces.’

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that M. Cambon appeared to be putting forward an amendment to a motion which had been withdrawn. If he insisted upon fathering the motion, it could be discussed. He would like to point out that the French delegate in commission had withdrawn the same proposal that was now being made. He had already shown that the proposal involved the restoration of Turkey at the expense of Great Britain almost alone. In view of this he asked whether M. Cambon insisted.

M. CAMBON said he felt he was bound to insist.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in that case he was bound to disagree. He was willing to agree to any proposal which would distribute the burden equally among the Allies. He could not accept anything which placed the whole burden on the British taxpayer, who had already spent £750,000,000 in conquering territory, a portion of which was going to France.

M. CAMBON said he thought it was so important to restore Turkish currency that he was ready to have all avenues explored to find a solution which would meet the objections raised by Mr. Lloyd George. At present he admitted that he could see no other. It might, perhaps, be possible for the Allied Powers to lend this gold to the Financial Commission, subject to return at a later date. This might improve the situation.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he thought there was general agreement that the restoration of Turkish paper currency was desirable. Since the question had been discussed in the council he thought the best way would be to send it back to the commission. Great Britain herself had a great interest in the Ottoman Debt, and could not wish to be paid in worthless paper.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would agree to the study of means for restoring Turkish currency so long as the study were not hitched on to article 21.

M. CAMBON deprecated the definite exclusion of article 21 from the study of the question. He thought the commission should be left free to seek for a way out, with due consideration of the objections raised by Mr. Lloyd George.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it was useless to disguise the essentials under any form of words. Article 21 referred to article 5; article 5 laid down the order of priority of charges on Turkey. M. Cambon suggested going back on this at British expense. He could only agree that, whatever was done, the burden must be shared equally between the three Powers. On these lines the British delegation was prepared to discuss the matter, but not otherwise. The commission, therefore, must have definite instructions. If the instructions he had outlined were given to them, he was willing. He would propose to leave article 21 as it stood, and to ask the commission to study means of restoring Turkish currency by a common and equal effort of the Allied Powers. Nothing short of this could he defend in the British Parliament.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he realised there was a substantial difference of opinion. Mr. Lloyd George held that articles 5 and 21 could not be altered. Great Britain had borne most of the expenses, and must not be exposed to further loss. He was defending British interests—which was quite understandable. What the Italian delegation desired was merely a means of improving Turkish currency, but they did not wish to make sacrifices in order to do so. He would remind the council of the decision taken regarding the loan to Germany. He thought, perhaps, something could be done on the same lines, and suggested that the commission should enquire into this.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he quite understood that each Power said: 'Why should we pay?' Nevertheless, M. Cambon's proposal, in its nudity, was that Great Britain should disburse four or five millions in gold. The expense ought properly to fall on Turkey; in any case not on one alone of the Allies.

M. KAMMERER pointed out that the problem, in the shape in which it now presented itself, was dealt with in article 5. Since it was not possible to alter the scheme of priorities or to mortgage the gold mentioned in article 21, he could not see that anything further could be done except what was provided for in article 3.

SIGNOR NITTI thought that, nevertheless, the question should be referred to the commission.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he could only agree to an equal sharing of the burden. He did not think Great Britain's Allies ought to ask her to contribute four or five millions from her exchequer. It would be impossible to explain to the British taxpayer why he was expected to bear the whole burden of restoring Turkish currency for the benefit of all. He hoped, therefore, that the matter would not be pressed. The British delegation, in any case, stood by articles 3, 5 and 21 as drafted.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he must draw attention to the second paragraph of Annex 2:—  
(e) *Annex 2*

‘In consideration of the importance of the financial interests of France and Great Britain, the annual chairman shall be alternately the French and British delegate.’

He would beg his colleagues not to insist on this. He would prefer Italy to withdraw from the commission altogether rather than take the position created for her in this clause. If the commission had been composed of more than three, such a position might have been tolerable; but in a commission of three, loss of prestige to Italy would be very damaging.

M. CAMBON said he thought a distinction should be made between financial and political interests. The French and British financial interests were indisputably greater than those of Italy. There was no intention to offend Italy. This provision was merely the restatement of what had been established in the council of the Ottoman Debt. He could not believe that Italy would be damaged in any way.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he could not help thinking that the new situation was in some ways different from the previous one. The Financial Commission would, after all, really exert a sort of political control over Turkey. In these circumstances it was certainly very difficult to make a distinction among the three Allies composing it. M. Kammerer had pointed out that the Financial Commission would be in a position to grasp Turkey by the throat and thereby to force her to behave properly towards minorities in the country. He thought it was fair that Italy should have her full share in taking Turkey by the throat.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he thanked Mr. Lloyd George for his support. He hoped that M. Cambon would also yield. He would never be able to sign a treaty in which Italy received differential treatment of this kind.

M. CAMBON said that, in view of what Signor Nitti said, he felt it would be ungracious to resist. He had no desire to be disagreeable to Italy. But he would like to point out that a difficulty might arise. In accordance with article 14, the Council of the Debt was, after three years, to be merged in the Financial Commission. The administration of the Ottoman Debt had been founded after the bankruptcy of Turkey, and the bondholders designated the members of the council. The alternating chairmanship of the French and British member was part of the Decree of Mouharrem.<sup>4</sup> Could a new council be set up without the concurrence of the bondholders? Some litigious bondholder, for instance, might choose to bring a suit against the Governments for altering the management without his consent. He therefore suggested that some legal authority be asked to consider this aspect of the case.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he understood that the question of the fusion of

<sup>4</sup> The decree of 28 Mouharrem 1299 (December 8/20, 1881) regulating the service of the Consolidated Public Debt of the Ottoman Empire: see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. lxxiii, pp. 115 ff.

the Council of the Debt and the Financial Commission had not been considered by the part of the conference sitting in the Foreign Office. The whole question, no doubt, should be gone into, but he did not think the addition of an Italian chairman would affect it much.

M. CAMBON said that he had already agreed to Italy taking her turn in holding the chair. He would like the other question to be raised. He thought perhaps it might be possible to insert at the end of article 14, after the words 'determined by the commission,' the words 'after consulting the bondholders.'

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked M. Cambon to reserve this suggestion for the meeting in the Foreign Office.

*(The conference then adjourned.)*

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 2, 1920.

### No. 43

I.C.P. 60.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, March 2, 1920, at 4 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer; The Right Hon. Sir A. C. Geddes, President of the Board of Trade; Mr. McCurdy, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food; Sir S. J. Chapman, Joint Permanent Secretary to the Board of Trade; Mr. Blackett, Controller of Finance, Treasury; Sir Hugh Levick, Mr. Wise, Mr. Philip Kerr; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Mr. Leith Ross.

*France*: M. Avenol.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti, Signor Beneduce, Signor Giannini; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

*Belgium*: Baron Moncheur.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

The conference had before them a draft announcement on the economic conditions of the world, which was submitted by Mr. Lloyd George on behalf of the British delegation (A.J. 54).<sup>1</sup>

*High Prices and Foreign Exchanges. Allied Announcement*

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this document was an attempt to draw up an Allied statement on the whole economic position, with a view to explaining the facts, which, although obvious to experts, were still too little realised by the average person. People still imagined that prices could be reduced by some simple action on the part of Governments, and did not realise that the rise which had taken place was a fundamental result of the Great War. He thought that an announcement on the lines proposed would be useful both in the United States, as showing that Europe was seriously tackling the economic problem,

<sup>1</sup> Not appended to filed copy: cf. No. 47.

and in our own countries, where a statement of this kind, coming with the authority of the Supreme Council, would attract great attention. It would also serve as a conclusion of the discussions which had taken place. He proposed that the memorandum should be read in French, and then if any questions were raised they could be discussed.

(The memorandum was then read.)

Mr. Lloyd George said that he proposed that the general character of the document should first be discussed, and if that was approved substantially by the conference then the precise form should be referred to a Drafting Committee.

SIGNOR NITTI agreed with the general lines of the memorandum, and thought that the document would have enormous importance. But he felt it desirable to avoid giving the impression that the *bourgeois* Governments had no remedy to offer. The category of losses arising from the war would, as at present drafted, tend to arouse the criticism that these losses were the work of the *bourgeois* capitalists. It must be pointed out that the Allied Governments had not wanted war, and had only undertaken it to save their countries from the greater evil of military tyranny. It would also be desirable to give the impression that the Governments had a remedy in view, and that they were going to take it seriously in hand. He wanted not to create a foolish optimism, but to inspire confidence in the policy of economy and industry which they were all anxious to pursue.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE entirely agreed. He did not want the document to have any appearance of pacifism, and he thought that the optimistic reference to the really remarkable recovery which had, on the whole, taken place in industry might be developed. He suggested that the Drafting Committee should be instructed to bear this principle in mind.

M. AVENOL also agreed to the general lines of the document, but he felt bound to insist that fuller reference should be made to the economic difficulties of France, resulting from the devastation of her territory, and he would like to lay stress on the urgent necessity of the reconstruction of France in the interests of Europe as a whole.

It was agreed—

That a Drafting Committee should be appointed, composed as follows:—

M. Avenol, for France.

Signor Beneduce, for Italy.

Sir S. J. Chapman and Mr. Blackett, for Great Britain.

Mr. F. W. Leith Ross (*Secretary*).

The committee to meet at once in the Treasury Board Room.

(*The conference adjourned at 5.25 p.m.*)

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 2, 1920.



I.C.P. 61.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers held in Lord Curzon's Room at the British Foreign Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, March 2, 1920, at 11.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Forbes Adam, General Mance, Mr. Malkin, Dr. Clemow; SECRETARIES, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Major Caccia, Major Young.

*France*: M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer.

*Italy*: Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Galli, Signor Nogara, Duke Ascanio Colonna, Signor Castoldi.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda, Mr. Nagioka [Nagaoka].

INTERPRETER: M. Billot.

1. LORD CURZON said that the conference would continue to discuss the *The Administration of the Waterways of the Straits and the Sea of Marmora. Report of Committee. Articles 7 (h)-10* report of the Committee on the Administration of the Waterways of the Straits and the Sea of Marmora.<sup>1</sup> When the discussion had been adjourned on Monday<sup>2</sup> it had been pointed out that the transference of the control of quarantine referred to in article 7 (h), and also in article 10, of the draft articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace might be objected to by certain Powers as conflicting with the rights which they had already enjoyed in the existing administration of the quarantine of Constantinople. It had been decided to invite Dr. Clemow<sup>3</sup> to describe to the conference the exact system now prevailing, and to inform them whether there was likely to be any protests from the Powers already represented on the International Board of Constantinople. The question to be decided was whether other Powers had the right to protest, and whether they were likely to exercise that right.

DR. CLEWOW said that the existing International Sanitary and Quarantine Board of Constantinople had been set up in 1838. Its *raison d'être* had been the Capitulations, and arrangements had been formed and developed by agreement between Turkey and the capitulatory Powers, consequent on the successive conventions set up from time to time by international bodies meeting at various centres. He wished to point out that the only part of the duties of the Constantinople Board which appeared to be affected by the proposed transfer was that connected with the control of quarantine and sanitary arrangements on the waterways. He presumed that some other arrangement was in contemplation for the protection of the remaining frontiers of Turkey. Without knowing what was to be the fate of the International Board in respect of the duties which were not affected by the proposed transfer, he found it difficult to forecast possible objections that might be raised by other Powers.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 40, appendix 1.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 40.

<sup>3</sup> A British expert on questions of hygiene in Turkey and the Near East.

M. CAMBON observed that difficulties might possibly arise through Powers which were parties to the International Quarantine Conventions, but who were not parties to the treaty with Turkey, finding that they were no longer to be represented in the quarantine arrangements of the area to be handed over to the Commission of the Straits. He presumed that the International Board would remain in existence to perform its present functions with regard to other parts of Turkey.

MARQUIS IMPERIALI suggested that it might be sufficient for a member of the International Board to be invited to attend whenever the Commission of the Straits desired to consider quarantine and health questions.

LORD CURZON pointed out that there would be no question of the Commission of the Straits assembling to discuss questions of policy. All that it was proposed to hand over to them was the daily administration action [*sic*] necessary to carry out the provisions of the various international conventions. He thought it would be unreasonable that quarantine powers should be specifically excluded when all other powers relating to the Straits zone were entrusted to the commission.

M. CAMBON suggested that possible objections on the part of other Powers—for example, the United States—would be made [*? met*] if the control of quarantine were ‘delegated’ to the commission, and not ‘transferred’ to them.

DR. CLEMOW said that this suggestion implied the continuance of the International Board of Constantinople. So far as he knew, the area left to Turkey would have such a small frontier from the point of view of international health, that the continued existence of the present large International Board no longer appeared necessary.

The following clause was proposed to replace article 7 (*h*) and article 10:—

(a) ‘The functions previously exercised by the Constantinople Superior Board of Health and the Turkish Sanitary Administration, which was directed by the said board, as well as the functions exercised by the International Lifeboat Service of the Bosphorus, will, within the zone specified in article 3, be discharged under the control of the commission and in such manner as they may direct.

‘Turkey hereby agrees to accept any decisions which have been or may be taken by the Allied Powers, in agreement where necessary with third Powers, in order to dispose in an equitable manner of the funds of the Superior Board of Health and the Turkish Sanitary Administration, or of the International Lifeboat Service of the Bosphorus.

‘The commission will co-operate in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease.’

M. KAMMERER pointed out that the second paragraph of this article was already provided for in article 23 of the draft proposals for the Financial Conditions of Peace with Turkey.

It was agreed to delete article 7 (*h*) and to replace article 10 by the following:—

'The functions previously exercised by the Constantinople Superior Board of Health and the Turkish Sanitary Administration which was directed by the said Board, as well as the functions exercised by the International Lifeboat Service of the Bosphorus, will, within the zone specified in article 3, be discharged under the control of the commission and in such manner as they may direct.

'The commission will co-operate in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease.'

It was also agreed to insert the following clause in the miscellaneous articles at the end of the Peace Treaty:—

(b) 'Within her frontiers as laid down by the present treaty (with the exception of the zone defined in article 4) Turkey hereby agrees to accept, and co-operate in the execution of, any decisions taken by the Allied Powers, in agreement, where necessary, with third Powers, in relation to any matters previously dealt with by the Constantinople Superior Board of Health and the Turkish Sanitary Administration, which was directed by the said board.'

M. CAMBON repeated the objection which he had previously raised to the Commission of the Straits being given the right to raise loans without the authority of the Financial Commission.

LORD CURZON said that the Danube and Congo Commissions already possessed this right and raised loans which appeared to him essential if the commission was to be in a position to fulfil its functions. If it was decided that they were to obtain the authority of the Financial Commission, the result would be that a commission on which five, or possibly six, Powers would be represented, would be subordinated to a commission on which only three Powers were represented.

MARQUIS IMPERIALI suggested that the words 'as far as possible' should be omitted. This would make it quite clear that the commission were only authorised to raise loans on the security of the dues to be levied on the shipping used in the Straits.

VISCOUNT CHINDA supported this proposal, and suggested that the commission should also be authorised to raise loans on the security of docks and other property, whether existing or contemplated.

LORD CURZON said that if the loan-making powers of the commission were confined in the manner suggested by Marquis Imperiali, they would be tempted to increase their dues if they found the security insufficient. In answer to a question by M. Cambon, he said that control would be exercised by the Powers whose representatives sat on the commission. There appeared to him to be only two alternatives—either to put the commission directly under the orders of the Financial Commission, or to give them a reasonable measure of independence.

MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that [*the*] dominant idea was that everything

4 Omission in original.

connected with the Straits should be taken right away from Turkey. This appeared to him to rule out the alternative of putting the Straits Commission under the Financial Commission.

(It was agreed to accept article 9 without alteration.)

Article 11 It was agreed to postpone the consideration of this article until it had been decided what economic powers were to be given to the Financial Commission.

Article 12 LORD CURZON said that the local police drawn as far as possible from the native population of the zone of the Straits would be a curious body composed of Greeks, Jews, Armenians and Turks. He agreed with the provision for the recruitment of the men, but he did not see the necessity for restricting the nationality of the officers to that of members of the commission. He thought that the commission should be empowered to appoint such officers as it considered desirable from any nationality other than the native population of the zone.

It was agreed that the article should be reworded as follows:—

‘The commission shall have power to organise an adequate force of local police drawn as far as possible from the native population of the zone of the Straits and commanded by foreign police officers appointed by the commission.’

Articles 13, 14 and 15 M. CAMBON said that it was apparently proposed to give very wide powers to the judicial officers and he doubted whether the French Parliament would agree to do this.

LORD CURZON said he imagined that in a short time when the Capitulations were examined, it would be found necessary to set up a new judicial system and a new tribunal. He suggested that it might be possible to lay down that the tribunal under the control of the Straits Commission should be purely provisional until the larger tribunal was set up. It was clearly necessary that some tribunal and some system of justice should be instituted in the Straits zone during the period which must elapse before the Capitulations were revised, otherwise each offender would have to be tried by courts of his own nationality. He did not imagine that more than a year would elapse before the revision of the Capitulations and he thought it unnecessary to set up the elaborate judicial system proposed in these articles.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI suggested that it would be easier and simpler to preserve the *status quo* until the Capitulations were revised. The commission should be given the right to bring an offender before the existing Consular Courts.

VISCOUNT CHINDA pointed out that the setting up of a judicial system under the control of the Straits Commission would necessitate special provisions for the maintenance of Greek sovereignty in the areas which it was proposed to transfer to Greece.

M. CAMBON observed that a distinction must be drawn between offences against the regulations and by-laws of the Straits Commission and offences against common law which would be outside its competence.

It was agreed to substitute the following for article 13:—

‘Pending the coming into force of the reform of the Ottoman judicial system provided for in article 4, all infractions of the regulations and by-laws made by the commission shall be dealt with [by] the Consular Courts. The Allied Powers agree to make such infractions justiciable in their Consular Courts.’

*Article 14* It was agreed to substitute the words ‘competent jurisdiction’ for the words ‘judicial officers’ at the end of this article.

*Article 15* It was agreed to expunge article 15.

*Article 16* On the suggestion of Lord Curzon it was agreed to substitute the word ‘subordinate’ for the word ‘other’ in the first line of this article.

*Article 17* On the suggestion of Viscount Chinda it was decided to substitute the word ‘equality’ for the word ‘impartiality’ at the end of this article.

*Article 18* This article was adopted.

This article was adopted subject to the proviso that it should be redrafted by the Drafting Committee to meet the objection of Viscount Chinda that absolute equality as between nations should be ensured without prejudice to the discretion of the commission to regulate tonnage dues.

*Article 20* It was agreed to expunge this article.

*Article 21* This article was adopted.

*Articles 22–26* It was agreed to refer these articles to the Joint Naval and Military Commission sitting in Paris.

This article was adopted so far as the conference were concerned, subject to reference to the Joint Naval and Military Commission sitting in Paris.

*Article 28* This article was adopted.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that the first paragraph of this article had  
*Annex:* presumably been drafted before the decision had been taken  
*Paragraph (a)* to admit the Greeks and the Roumanians and possibly, eventually, the Bulgarians to participation in the Straits Commission.<sup>2</sup> He

thought that the chairmanship of the commission should be limited to the representatives of the Powers whose membership was contemplated when the draft was written.

M. CAMBON pointed out that the proposal that the chairmanship should be rotatory in the alphabetic order of the countries concerned was open to the objection that it left no opening for the commission to choose as its first chairman the member whom it considered most suitable for this office. He added that if a similar provision were inserted regarding the chairmanship of the other commissions which it was proposed to set up, it would inevitably follow that the same Power would, at any rate for the first period, hold the chairmanship of all the commissions.

LORD CURZON suggested that these two points might be met by providing for the chairmanship to be rotatory among those members of the commission enjoying two votes with no reference to the order in which they should be selected.

It was agreed to adopt article 'A' with the substitution of the words 'enjoying two votes' for the words 'in the alphabetic order of the countries concerned.'

Replying to M. Cambon, Lord Curzon explained that the objections to the payment of the salaries of members of the commission being charged to Turkey were, firstly, that we could not reasonably ask the Turkish Government to pay the salaries of three or more officials and thus expose ourselves to the argument that one would be sufficient, and secondly, that there was an element of insecurity about payments by the Turkish Government which would not be appreciated by the members of the commission.

(It was agreed to adopt this article.)

*Paragraph (c)* This was adopted subject to the deletion of the words 'of the judicial officers article 12.'

*Paragraphs (d), (e) and (f)* were adopted.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 2, 1920.

I.C.P. 62.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Wednesday, March 3, 1920, at 11 a.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; The Right Hon. W. S. Churchill, Secretary of State for War and Air; Field-Marshal Sir H. H. Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff; Major-General Sir W. Thwaites, Director of Military Intelligence; Air-Marshal Sir H. M. Trenchard, Bart., Chief of the Air Staff; Mr. Vansittart, Colonel Gribbon, Mr. Philip Kerr; **SECRETARIES,** Sir M. Hankey, Captain Abraham, Major Caccia.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, General the Viscount de la Panouse, M. Kammerer.

*Italy:* Signor Nitti, Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, General Cavallero, Signor Galli, Signor Nogara; **SECRETARY,** Signor Trombetti.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda.

**INTERPRETERS:** M. Camerlynck and M. Billot.

1. **MR. LLOYD GEORGE** said that the military and air clauses of the Terms of Peace with Turkey had been drafted at Versailles (A.J. 56) (Appendix 1). He, personally, had been much surprised at the recommendation that Turkey should maintain 50,000 or 60,000 armed men. Austria, as far as he remembered, had only been allowed 30,000 or 40,000.

**GENERAL CAVALLERO** observed that Austria had been allowed 30,000 and Hungary 35,000.

**LORD CURZON** said that the essential condition for a stable and useful force was that it should be paid. Turkey had usually been a bad paymaster. Was it likely that she would be able to pay 60,000 men? He thought not. Every unpaid soldier in the East must be accounted a brigand and a likely murderer of Armenians.

**M. CAMBON** said that he entirely agreed with Lord Curzon on this point. Probably the military advisers had recommended a larger force for Turkey than for Austria because Turkey was a harder country to supervise.

**GENERAL CAVALLERO** said that this was indeed the reason. The territory to be left to Turkey was of considerable extent; its communications were bad; it was subject to risings, and the displacement of troops inevitably subjected to great delay. The comparatively high number of men allotted to the Turkish forces was intended to compensate for their lack of mobility. Further, the military advisers had considered that Turkey must be able to defend her frontiers both against the Arabs and also along the line from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.

**LORD CURZON** said that he thought the Turks would not require to defend their frontier against the Arabs; it was far more likely that the two would combine against the Christians. The formation of a gendarmerie had been under consideration, and each country with special interests in any zone of

Turkey was, he understood, if so requested by the Turkish Government, to assist in the organisation of this gendarmerie, to furnish instructors, inspectors and office [*officers*] for it. If there was to be a constabulary of this kind, what need was there of an army of 50,000 men?

SIGNOR NITTI said that he wished to claim no competence in military matters, but he was in agreement with Lord Curzon for political reasons. Turkey must be given a chance to begin producing. She should not be saddled, therefore, with a large army. A gendarmerie merely to ensure order was what she needed. An army might even develop into antagonism against such a gendarmerie as was suggested, especially if officered by foreign officers. He was, therefore, in favour of reducing the Turkish army as much as possible. But there was, he admitted, a difficulty connected with this. It had been found elsewhere that it was relatively easy to demobilise rank and file, but that a large number of officers could not find employment in civil life. He thought some allowance should be made for Turkish regular officers during the period of reduction; otherwise they would take to brigandage.

GENERAL DE LA PANOUSE said that he had not been present when the military terms were under discussion, but he thought that article 9, on page 7<sup>1</sup> of the memorandum (A.J. 56), indicated that the army Turkey was to have was itself a gendarmerie, seeing that there was to be a fusion of the military and constabulary forces.

LORD CURZON said that when he spoke of a 'gendarmerie' he referred not to that which at present existed, which was worthless, but to the one which was to be set up at the invitation of the Turkish Government under the tutelage of the Allied Powers. A new constabulary was required. The old could be dismissed. The army, he thought, should be reduced at least to 30,000.

SIR HENRY WILSON said that, in his opinion, it would take years to organise an efficient constabulary. If, in the interval, the Sultan was expected to be responsible for order in Turkey he must have means of enforcing it. The 50,000 or 60,000 men provided really amounted to a military constabulary. It was to have no guns; its rifles and machine guns were to be limited; and it was to have practically no transport. He did not know that the Powers had decided to supply officers to the Turkish gendarmerie. Even so, it would take many years to organise one. The troops it was proposed to give the Sultan were to be distributed among the vilayets, and could in no sense be held to form an army.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether the military advisers had considered whether Turkey could pay for such an establishment in addition to paying for the cost of the Allied occupation.

SIR HENRY WILSON said that this matter had not been considered.

LORD CURZON said that he would like to reply to Sir Henry Wilson. To the statement that the Turkish army would have no guns he would reply that it was well known that Turkey was full of guns. Such a force would undoubtedly get possession of them. The force on paper might be distributed

<sup>1</sup> See p. 370.



among the vilayets, but any Nationalist movement, such as that of the present moment, would collect these scattered forces and direct them as occasion might require against Smyrna or against Armenia. What could the Allies do to prevent it? As to the time required to form a constabulary, he did not share Sir Henry Wilson's view. In Persia and on the frontiers of India the British had considerable experience of forming such bodies. The East was replete with the best material for the formation of a gendarmerie. A potential gendarme in his private capacity was a robber. If well and regularly paid he became a robber in your interest. All that was required was to supply him with an officer he could trust, and the conversion, he believed, could be operated in a year.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that at the time of the Macedonian reforms<sup>2</sup> a gendarmerie under international officers had been formed in less than two years. It had been such a success that when the revolution came the Young Turks begged the officers who had trained it to remain.

SIR HENRY WILSON said that no doubt there were guns in Turkey, and only force could get them out. This would be the case whether the troops allowed to Turkey were called an 'army' or a 'constabulary.' It was also possible that the future Turkish forces might snap their fingers at the articles restricting them to certain vilayets. Again, only force would coerce them. Whether the Powers had the force required he was not prepared to say. As to the time required for training a constabulary, much depended upon what were to be its functions. If it was to impose the Sultan's will throughout Turkey, he believed that many years would be required before it was adequately trained. He was not so sure that immediate respect for European officers would be found. The Turks were not behaving very nicely to the French at Marash, and he doubted whether a supply of French officers for a Turkish gendarmerie would be very effective at the moment. The figures suggested by the military advisers was a rough estimate. He thought Marshal Foch might agree to reduce it within limits, and he was prepared himself to suggest it. But it was felt that if the Sultan was to be responsible for order, he must have means of maintaining it.

M. CAMBON said that if Turkey, as both Lord Curzon and Sir Henry Wilson said, was full of arms, these must be the previous armament of the Turkish army; but the armistice had stipulated for the disarmament of the Turkish army. If so, why had it not been carried out? The Bulgarian army had been disarmed, according to the armistice.

LORD CURZON said that he believed the armistice had only given us the right to penetrate into certain portions of Turkey.<sup>3</sup> The arms were, no doubt, concealed in those portions into which we were not able to advance. He would add a word in reply to Sir Henry Wilson. Why was it necessary to supply the Sultan with a great force to impose his will on Turkey, seeing that, for the first time in history, the Turkish State was to be composed of Turks only, the Greeks, Syrians and Arabs being removed from Turkish domina-

<sup>2</sup> Cf. No. 6, note 5.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. article VII of the Armistice of Mudros: *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxi, p. 612.

tion? Turkey was to be a national State, and presumably it would not require a great amount of coercion.

MR. CHURCHILL said that he had understood the policy was to keep the Sultan in Constantinople in order that the Allied Powers should be able to control him, and, through his agency, to secure order and civilised government in Turkey. If this was the purpose, he fancied a force of 60,000 men at the disposal of the Turkish Government was not too much. The figure of 60,000, he understood, represented the full establishment. Only half this number would be composed of effectives. He did not think this was too much for a turbulent and warlike population.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked who, in Mr. Churchill's opinion, would pay for these troops.

MR. CHURCHILL said he assumed the Turks would not keep more troops than they could pay for.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he thought this could not be depended on.

SIGNOR NITTI observed that Germany, with a population of 60,000,000, had been allowed an army of 100,000 men. Turkey, as constituted by the treaty, would have a population of 9,000,000 or 10,000,000 men, and yet she was to be allowed a force of 60,000. This proportion, he thought, could hardly be maintained.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE then suggested that the question be referred back to the military advisers at Versailles, together with a strong expression of opinion from the council that the number of troops recommended for the Turkish forces was excessive. The military advisers should, further, be asked to consider the formation of a constabulary, and for this purpose should have added to their number British, French and Italian experts on the subject of a gendarmerie.

(This was agreed to.)

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if any delegation wished to comment on the  
*Air Clauses* air clauses.

(There was no comment.)

3. MR. LLOYD GEORGE drew attention to the last paragraph of A.J. 56.

*Clauses relating to the French Foreign Legion* GENERAL DE LA PANOUSE explained that a similar exception had been made in all the other treaties in favour of the maintenance of the French Foreign Legion.

4. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that a telegram had been received from Admiral  
*Despatch from Admiral de Robeck at Constantinople* de Robeck which he thought he ought to communicate to the council. It had been sent before the receipt of the recent message from the council,<sup>4</sup> but this circumstance only made it all the more significant.

(The telegram (see Appendix 2) was then read.)

<sup>4</sup> See appendix to No. 38.

M. CAMBON said that the telegram from the council had no doubt reached Admiral de Robeck. To some extent it gave an anticipated answer to his problems. No doubt the commissioners in Constantinople were discussing it. In his own view, means to cope with the situation should be ordered by the Sultan himself. The first step should be the arrest of the Nationalist leaders. The Turks, like all Orientals, if treated leniently grew insolent. We ought, therefore, to tell the Sultan that he must arrest these people, and that if he failed to do so we should do it ourselves.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had always felt that some exhibition of real force would be necessary before the Turks accepted the treaty, or else, even if they accepted it, they would not fulfil it. He thought it would be necessary to occupy Constantinople.

MR. CHURCHILL observed that the Allies were in control of Constantinople.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he meant the placing of guards on public buildings, and possibly on the Sultan's palace. He felt it would be quite easy to obtain any reinforcements required. General Franchet d'Esperey was not far off, or British troops could be sent from Egypt. There would be no difficulty about this. The British alone could do all that was required, but it would be preferable, no doubt, that the action taken should be inter-Allied. He would agree, however, to wait until a reply had come from Constantinople to the despatch sent on the previous Saturday from the council,<sup>4</sup> but, as Signor Nitti would then be away, he would like to know what he thought of the proposed action.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he could express his opinion at once. It was both the interest and the right of the Allied Powers to re-establish order in Turkey. He was quite ready to co-operate in sending military and naval forces to coerce if necessary. But, at the same time as coercing the Sultan, he thought the Allies should offer him some encouragement enabling him to resist the Nationalists. There was a public opinion in Turkey, and the Sultan's position must not be made one which would lose all prestige in that opinion. He was ready to threaten him and to send fleets to Constantinople, but, at the same time, some form of words should be used which would leave the Sultan some means of dealing with the Nationalists.

M. CAMBON said that he felt very doubtful of how this action would be received.

M. BERTHELOT said that the Turks knew full well in what spirit the treaty was being drafted. Every time any goodwill was shown they thought we were yielding to their violent demonstrations. In fact, we always used the same system. We tied our hands in advance by making official or semi-official statements that we would refrain from doing certain things, while we left the Turks unfettered. The Turks thought this was weakness, and to some extent it was. In Admiral de Robeck's despatch it was stated that the Nationalists meant to have Smyrna, Thrace and Cilicia. The first two they would not get. As soon as they knew this, being aware that they were to retain Constantinople and Anatolia, they would concentrate their efforts against Smyrna and Thrace. He was informed that the Greeks were landing

more troops at Smyrna, and that the officers said they expected great events. This, no doubt, was natural talk among young officers. It also appeared that the Turkish Nationalists were preparing to attack. At Marash the situation seemed to be improving, and a Turkish official had been sent there to see to the provisioning of the place. It seemed that about half the Armenians were left. In this general condition of Turkey he felt very doubtful whether any special exercise of tact in the way the council addressed itself to the Sultan was very desirable. The two forms of procedure recommended by Signor Nitti might appear to cancel one another.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he entirely agreed with M. Berthelot, whose statement gave a very powerful picture of the actual position at Constantinople. The Sultan had been officially informed that he would remain in Constantinople. As a result, what had happened? The Armenians had been massacred, and the influences making for resistance to the decisions of the Peace Conference were, as Admiral de Robeck's telegram stated, more than ever in the ascendant. These were the results of talking smooth things to the Turks. The experience of the past had abundantly proved that the Turk would resist as soon as he thought the Allies did not mean business. That same policy had invariably been followed by Abdul Hamid. There would be no object in telling the Sultan: 'We are going to leave you a little piece of Turkey. We are taking away the wings and the breast, but still you will be able to enjoy a few bones.' As a matter of fact, what would be left to Turkey? One half of the old Turkish Empire would be taken away, including many of the richest and most fertile parts. In addition, the Straits would be occupied by the Allies, and Turkey would be made to pay for that. Constantinople would not be a source of revenue to the Sultan, since the revenue would go to the maintenance of the Allied forces of occupation. Consequently, he did not think the Allies would sooth the troubled heart of the Sultan by telling him the good news that they intended to leave him Constantinople. The fact must be realised that the Allies had no glad tidings to give him, and, even if they had, the only result would be that the Sultan would say unto himself: 'You see what happens by our resistance! When we cringed, the Allies were going to take Smyrna and Constantinople; but, as a result of the troubles caused by Mustafa Kemal, we shall now get back Constantinople, and we have only got to maintain our resistance to get Smyrna also.'

In his opinion, it would only be through the exhibition of irresistible force that the Turks would be brought to see reason. The Turks were not formidable. Alone they had always been beaten, except perhaps by the Greeks. They had been beaten even by Bulgaria, a country half, or even one-third, the size of Turkey. Turkey possessed a false, sham reputation, and the Allies were still living in dread thereof. Consequently, he felt that the time had come for taking decisive action. Great Britain would be willing to make its contribution, but it would also be quite prepared to do the work required alone if necessary. He wished to make the point quite clear that Great Britain did not ask for the military support of her Allies because she

could not do the work alone, but because she thought it right that all the Allies should be represented and show a united front. In conclusion, he thought that the situation in Turkey indicated the vital importance of hurrying up with the Treaty of Peace, the terms of which should be communicated to the Turks with the least possible delay, so that Turkey might definitely know where she stood.

MR. CHURCHILL considered that the military aspect of the question must not be overlooked. He agreed that the power of the Allies, as represented by their fleet and armies, over Constantinople and the Turkish administration was unlimited. Any action could be taken under the menace of the guns of the ships, and Great Britain alone could do all that was necessary in Constantinople. But the fact must not be overlooked that the real difficulties would have to be faced in districts remote from Constantinople and from the sea. It would be in these far off districts that sullen resistance to the terms of the Peace Treaty would arise, and in those districts the Allies at present possessed no power or forces sufficient to exercise any satisfactory control. He agreed that the Turkish armies in Asia could not be compared in efficiency to the trained forces employed by Turkey during the war, but they would be quite good enough to inflict heavy losses on any small force[s] sent against them. Consequently, military operations of the first importance in those remote districts must be contemplated if the conference desired to enforce its decisions. It must be fully realised that the Turkish armies in Asia would not be controlled by any decision of violence extorted from the Turkish Government in Constantinople. Consequently, whatever action might be taken at Constantinople, the same would never result in compliance by Turkey as a whole, and, furthermore, the Allies did not possess sufficient forces to take the necessary action outside Constantinople.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that it would still be possible to enforce the decisions of the conference with regard to keeping the Turks out of Thrace and with regard to Smyrna. He proposed, however, that the question should be adjourned pending the receipt of a reply from the High Commissioners at Constantinople.

It was agreed—

To adjourn the question until the receipt of a reply from the High Commissioners at Constantinople to the despatch sent on the 28th February, 1920.

5. MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired when the draft Treaty of Peace with Turkey would be ready.

*Treaty of Peace  
with Turkey.  
Completion of  
Draft*

M. BERTHELOT thought that a complete draft could be ready by the end of next week.

LORD CURZON thought that M. Berthelot took rather a sanguine view of the situation. The Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers still had to take under consideration the question of the control of the Straits and the report of the Financial Com-

mission. So far, progress had been greatly delayed owing to the members of that conference being summoned to attend meetings of the Supreme Council. He doubted, therefore, whether the terms of the Peace Treaty could be completed by the end of next week.

M. BERTHELOT suggested that the Turkish peace delegates might be summoned to attend in Paris on Monday the 22nd March.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that a good effect would undoubtedly be produced by letting the Turks know as soon as possible when they would be required to attend in Paris to receive the terms of the Treaty of Peace.

The general feeling was in favour of aiming at the completion of the Treaty of Peace in time to hand it to the Turkish delegates on Monday the 22nd March, but that no action should be taken until after the receipt of the reply of the High Commissioners to the despatch of the 28th February.

6. M. CAMBON said that a few days ago the conference had discussed the question of appointing Ambassadors to Berlin,<sup>5</sup> and the French representatives had agreed to refer the question to M. Millerand in Paris. M. Millerand's reply had now been received. He stated that he fully appreciated the reasons which had influenced the British and Italian Governments in desiring to replace the Chargé d'Affaires by Ambassadors, and he would be prepared to do his best to meet their wishes. On the other hand, he must wait to send a French Ambassador to Berlin until the German Government had given some slight token of its goodwill in the execution of the Treaty of Peace.

LORD CURZON considered that the decision taken by M. Millerand placed Great Britain in a very difficult position. Yesterday he had shown to M. Berthelot the text of a telegram<sup>6</sup> received from Paris in September last, which contained the suggestion that an Ambassador should be accredited to Berlin at the earliest possible date. The suggestion in question came from the French Government. The despatch concluded with the following sentence: 'In the light of the above consideration the French Government share the views of the British Government as to the desirability of an agreement between the Allied and Associated Powers for the despatch of a Chargé d'Affaires immediately after the ratification of the Treaty of Peace, to be followed a few weeks later by the despatch of an Ambassador.' M. Berthelot now took the view that the situation had changed since then. But, had it? And, was that change sufficient to justify a complete reversal of an agreed policy? M. Millerand apparently held the view that before an Ambassador could be sent to Berlin, Germany should give some evidence of her sincerity to execute the terms of the Treaty of Peace. What did that mean? The Italian and British Governments wished to appoint Ambassadors, but the French Government declined to do so until she felt satisfied with regard to the good faith of the German Government. In reply, he would ask: What evidence of good faith did France require? And how long would the Allies be

<sup>5</sup> See No. 41, minute 3.

<sup>6</sup> i.e. Paris telegram No. 1026 of September 19, 1919 (received September 20): cf. below.

required to wait? A few days ago M. Berthelot had criticised the attitude taken by the British and Italian missions in Germany towards their French colleagues. The British Government did not recognise that such feelings existed, and entirely disowned them. The British Government desired to act in accord with the French Government. But if it became known that France refused to send an Ambassador to Berlin, whilst Great Britain and Italy desired to do so, would not that promote the impression of differences of opinion, which M. Berthelot deprecated? He sincerely hoped that M. Millerand would be willing to reconsider his decision.

M. BERTHELOT expressed the view that the difference between the British and French Governments existed more in appearance than in actual facts. It was true, as Lord Curzon had said, that in September last the suggestion had been put forward in conversation that an Ambassador should be despatched to Berlin a few weeks after the ratification of the Treaty of Peace, but Lord Curzon should not overlook the fact that in October a contrary decision had been reached.<sup>7</sup> He thought, however, that no useful purpose would be served by discussing questions of that nature. M. Millerand had been asked favourably to consider the wishes of the Allies, and he had replied that he would send an Ambassador as soon as the Germans gave him an opportunity of doing so; that is, as soon as they gave some sign of their desire to execute the terms of the Peace Treaty.

In September last the idea had been put forward that Ambassadors should be sent to Berlin three months after the ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. He thought that period of three months from the date of ratification would be accepted by M. Millerand as a means of reaching an agreement.

M. CAMBON asked the conference to consider the position of M. Millerand. M. Millerand felt compelled to consider French public opinion, which was opposed to the despatch of an Ambassador to Berlin. The public considered the appointment of an Ambassador to be a mark of great friendship, and to imply that good relations existed. He thought, however, that M. Millerand would accept the period of three months from the date of ratification of the Treaty of Peace.

It was agreed—

That Great Britain, France and Italy should appoint Ambassadors to Berlin three months after the ratification of the Treaty of Peace (i.e., to date from the 10th April, 1920), subject to acceptance of decision by M. Millerand as far as France was concerned.

*(The meeting then adjourned until 3.30 p.m.)*

*2, Whitehall Gardens, March 3, 1920.*

<sup>7</sup> See No. 41, note 4.

APPENDIX I TO No. 45

*Marshal Foch to Mr. Lloyd George*

(A.J. 56.)

*Allied Military Committee of Versailles, February 28, 1920*

M. le Président,

In your letters of the 18th, 19th and 21st February<sup>8</sup> you have been good enough to transmit to me the resolution[s] of the Supreme Council, inviting me to call a meeting of the military, naval and air representatives of the British, French, Italian and Japanese Governments, in order to decide on—

The military, naval and air clauses for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

The stipulations necessary in this treaty to deal with the questions of the personal bodyguard of the Sultan, prisoners of war, and graves.

I have the honour to submit herewith the text of the articles adopted by the Assembly of these military, naval and air representatives at their sitting on the 27th February, 1920, and to invite your attention to the following reservations:—

1. The naval representatives unanimously expressed the opinion that it was necessary for them, in order to frame the naval clauses, to receive from the Supreme Council instructions on certain points detailed in the attached note.<sup>9</sup>

2. In the matter of the draft of the military and air clauses—<sup>10</sup>

(a) The total effectives of the Turkish armed forces is [*sic*] left as two alternatives; 50,000 or 60,000 men, according to the extent of territory which may be left to Turkey by the Peace Treaty.

(b) The British military delegation has entered a reservation with regard to the effectives laid down in Table I of the attached text, and with regard to the effectives of the personal bodyguard of the Sultan.

(c) The proposals agreed on in London on the 16th February by the military and naval representatives on the subject of the freedom of the Straits,<sup>11</sup> are reproduced in Chapter VIII of the attached text. Nevertheless, the dispositions laid down in paragraph 6 of article 24 of this chapter are made subject to reservations at the request of the British naval representative.

(d) Finally, the clauses to be inserted in the Peace Treaty relative to—  
Prisoners of war,  
Graves,

Those provisions of the armistice of the 30th October, the maintenance of which may have to be demanded,  
have been made the subject of a reservation by the British delegation pending the receipt of instructions from the War Office.

Believe me,

F. FOCH

<sup>8</sup> Not appended to filed copy. These letters evidently transmitted decisions of the Supreme Council recorded in No. 13, minute 1, No. 16, minute 3, and No. 20, minute 2.

<sup>9</sup> Note in original: 'Annex 1.'

<sup>10</sup> Note in original: 'Annex 2.'

<sup>11</sup> See appendix 1 to No. 14.



## *Annex 1*

### *Opinion of the Naval Advisers*

The naval advisers assembled on the 27th February came to the unanimous opinion that it would be impossible for them to present the naval clauses for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey until they received instructions on the following points:—

1. Will Turkey be allowed to keep an organised navy only limited to that necessary for the defence of her coasts?<sup>12</sup>
2. Is the Turkish navy to be reduced to a size sufficient only for a police service and protection of fisheries? .
3. In both the above cases, it is essential to know what will be the extent of her coasts and the authority under which they will be placed.

## *Annex 2*

### *Part 13*

### *Military, Naval and Air Clauses*

In order to render possible the preparation of a general limitation of armaments of all nations, Turkey undertakes to respect strictly the military, naval and air clauses stipulated below.

#### *Section I.—Military Clauses*

##### *Chapter I.—General Clauses*

###### *Article 1*

Within three months after the present treaty comes into force, all military forces, including the existing gendarmerie, except the armed force hereinafter provided for, must be demobilised and dismissed.

###### *Article 2*

The armed Ottoman force allowed under the treaty will have the following duties:—

1. To ensure the personal safety of the Sultan in his residence and during his movements.
2. To maintain internal order and security and to guarantee the protection of minorities.
3. The policing of the frontiers.

##### *Chapter II.—Effectives, Organisation, Enlistment of the Armed Force*

###### *Article 3*

The total effectives of the armed forces of Turkey must not exceed (50,000)/(60,000),<sup>14</sup> including staffs, officers, services, personnel of schools, and depot troops.

<sup>12</sup> *Note in original:* 'It should be remembered that by the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors on the 26th January, 1920, the greater part of the Turkish warships surrendered on the declaration of the armistice on the 30th October, 1918, must be demolished.'

<sup>13</sup> Omission in original.

<sup>14</sup> *Note in original:* 'According to the extent of territory secured to Turkey by the Peace Treaty.'

#### Article 4

The personal bodyguard of the Sultan may consist of a staff and units of infantry and cavalry, the total effectives of which must not exceed 1,500 officers and men, to be included in the total effectives of the armed forces provided for in article 3 above.<sup>15</sup>

#### Article 5

The troops intended for the maintenance of internal order are to be distributed over the territories of the Ottoman Empire, which, for this purpose, is divided into six military territorial districts, each including a certain number of vilayets. The delimitation of these districts will be fixed in accordance with the stipulations of article 6 (Section IV).

A legion, composed of mounted and dismounted men, equipped with machine guns and provided with administrative and sanitary services, is to be organised in each territorial district; this legion will furnish in the vilayets, sanjaks, kazas, &c., any detachments necessary for the organisation of a fixed service of security, and will arrange for mobile reserves at one or more points in the district.

On account of their special functions, the legions will not comprise either artillery or technical arms.

In round numbers the effectives of the legions must not exceed 33,500 men (43,500),<sup>14</sup> to be included in the total effectives of the armed force laid down in article 3; the proportion of mounted to dismounted troops is not to exceed 1 to 9.

The maximum effectives of any one legion must not exceed one-quarter of the total effectives of all the legions. It is a principal [*sic*] that the units of any legion must not be employed outside the limits of their own district without special authority from the Allied Powers.

#### Article 6

The legions of the territorial districts bordering on the frontiers may be reinforced by special units to allow of their watching the frontiers and eventually to ensure their defence.

This special formation may include details of infantry, cavalry, mountain artillery, pioneers and corresponding technical and general services; their effectives in round numbers must not exceed 15,000 men; to be included in the total of effectives of the armed force laid down in article 3.

The proportions of the different arms and services in the composition of these special units is laid down in Table No. II.

The location and employment of this formation outside the frontier districts is forbidden without special authority from the Allied Powers.

#### Article 7

In the formations considered in articles 5 and 6 the proportion of officers, including the personnel of staffs and services, must not exceed one-twentieth of the total effectives, nor the proportion of *sous-officiers* one-twelfth of that total.

#### Article 8

All measures for mobilisation or connected with mobilisation, or tending to the reinforcement of the effectives or of the means of transport of forces of any kind mentioned above are forbidden.

<sup>15</sup> *Note in original*: 'Reserved by the British delegation for further consideration.'

The different formations, staffs and services must in no case include complementary cadres.

#### *Article 9*

Within the period fixed in article 1, all the present gendarmerie forces must be transformed into troops of the legions detailed in article 5.

#### *Article 10*

All formations of troops not laid down in this section of the treaty are forbidden.

The reduction of formations in excess of the authorised strength of (50,000)/(60,000) men will be effected progressively, commencing from the signing of the Treaty of Peace, in such a way that it will be completely carried out within three months at latest after the treaty has come into effect, in conformity with the stipulations of article 1.

The personnel of officers and others included in the Ministry of War and Turkish General Staff, as also in the administrative offices attached to them, will be reduced within the same period to the effectives strictly necessary to the efficient carrying on of the general services of the Turkish armed forces; these effectives are to be included in the maximum figures laid down in article 7.

### *Chapter III.—Recruiting*

#### *Article 11*

The Turkish armed forces will in future only be constituted and recruited by voluntary engagements. Recruiting will be open equally to all subjects of the Ottoman Empire without distinction of race or religion. As far as it concerns the legions mentioned in article 5, recruiting will be principally regional and regulated in such a manner that the Mussulman and non-Mussulman elements of the population of each region will be represented as far as possible in the total strength of the corresponding legion and distributed through the territory of the region in accordance with the ethnical and religious character of the population.

#### *Article 12*

The terms of service for non-commissioned officers and soldiers must be twelve consecutive years. The annual replacement of men freed from service before the expiration of the term of their engagement for any cause whatsoever must not exceed five per cent. of the total number of effectives fixed by article 3 of the present treaty.

#### *Article 13*

All officers must be regulars. Officers actually serving in the army and in the gendarmerie and who are retained on the strength of the new army must engage to serve at least up to the age of 45 years. Officers actually serving in the army and in the gendarmerie and who are not kept on the strength must be freed definitely from all military obligations, and must not take part in any military exercise, either theoretical or practical.

Officers newly appointed must undertake actually to serve for twenty-five consecutive years.

The annual replacement of officers leaving the service before expiration of the term of their engagement for any cause whatsoever must not exceed five per cent. of the effective total of officers provided for in article 7.

#### *Chapter IV.—Schools, Training Establishments, Military Societies and Associations*

##### *Article 14*

Within a period of three months of the coming into force of the treaty, there shall only exist in Turkey the number of military schools which are absolutely necessary for the enlistment of officers and non-commissioned officers for authorised units, namely:—

One school per arm of the service for officers.

One school per territorial region for non-commissioned officers.

The number of pupils admitted to undergo courses in these schools will be strictly proportionate to the vacancies available in the cadres of officers and non-commissioned officers.

##### *Article 15*

Training establishments, other than those mentioned in the preceding article, as well as all societies, sporting or otherwise, must not engage themselves in any military question.

#### *Chapter V.—Customs Officers. Local Police*

##### *Article 16*

The number of customs officers, agents of provincial or municipal police or similar officials must not exceed the number of similarly employed men in 1913 and who actually served within the territorial limits of Turkey as fixed by the present treaty.

The number of these officials can be increased in future only in a proportion corresponding to the increase in the population in the localities or municipalities which employ them.

The workmen and officials employed in the railway service must not assemble for the purpose of taking part in any military exercise whatsoever.

#### *Chapter VI.—Armament, Munitions, Material*

##### *Article 17*

At the expiration of the three months which follow the putting into force of the present treaty, the armament which may be in service or maintained in reserve for replacement in the different formations of the Ottoman territory must not exceed the total amount fixed for 1,000 men in Table III attached.

##### *Article 18*

The supply of munitions which Turkey may prepare must not exceed that fixed in Table III attached.

##### *Article 19*

Within three months after the putting into force of the treaty, the arms, munitions of different kinds and material of war in excess of the quantities authorised must be handed over to the Inter-Allied Commission of Control provided for in article 13 at the points fixed by this commission.

The Allied Powers will decide on the destination to be given to this material.

#### *Article 20*

The manufacture of arms, munitions and material of war will only take place in the factories or establishments authorised by the Allies.

Within three months of the putting into force of the present treaty, all other establishments having for their object the manufacture, preparation, storage or study of arms, munitions or any material of war whatsoever will be abolished or turned over to a purely commercial use.

All arsenals, other than those used as depots for authorised stocks of munitions, will be treated in a similar manner.

The tools of the establishments or arsenals in excess of those needed for authorised manufacture must be rendered useless or turned over to a purely commercial use in conformity with the decisions of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control provided for in article <sup>13</sup>.

#### *Article 21*

The importation into Turkey of arms, munitions and material of war of any kind is absolutely forbidden. The same will apply to the manufacture of arms, munitions and material of war of every kind for foreign countries and to their exportation.

#### *Article 22*

The use of flame projectors and of asphyxiating gas of a poisonous nature as well as all liquids, shells or devices of a similar nature being forbidden, their manufacture and importation into Turkey is strictly forbidden.

The same applies to material specially intended for the manufacture, storage, and use of the said products or devices. The manufacture and importation into Turkey of all armoured cars, tanks or any other similar engine suitable for use in war is equally prohibited.

### *Chapter VII.—Fortifications*

#### *Article 23*

The system of fortified works, except inside the zone of the Straits and of the islands defined in article 24 below, may be maintained in its present state, but will be disarmed.

### *Chapter VIII.—Maintenance of the Freedom of the Straits*

#### *Article 24*

In view of guaranteeing the maintenance of the freedom of the Straits, the following dispositions are stipulated:—

1. Within three months of the coming into force of the present treaty, the disarmament and demolition of all works, fortifications or batteries in a strip of territory fixed on the shores of the Sea of Marmora and the Straits in conformity with the accompanying map<sup>16</sup> will be proceeded with as well as in the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace, Tenedos, Mitylene and in the islands of the Sea of Marmora.

<sup>16</sup> Not appended to filed copy.

The reconstruction of such works as well as the establishment of roads or railways which would permit them to have mobile batteries there quickly is prohibited in these areas and islands.

The Allied Powers reserve the right to make the existing roads and railways unfit for use which might be utilised to this end.

2. The measures provided for in paragraph 1 above will be carried out under the control of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control (article 8 of Section IV).

3. The territories of the Straits and the islands mentioned in paragraph 1 above cannot be utilised militarily except by the principal Allied Powers acting conjointly.

4. These Powers will have the power of maintaining land forces in these territories with the particular object of assuring that no disposition prejudicial to the liberty of the Straits is carried out and prepared.

5. This occupation will be completed from a naval point of view by supervision which will be exercised under the direction of a guardship from each of the guaranteeing Powers.

6. (Reserved at the request of the British Naval Adviser.) The transit of war material through the Straits is forbidden without the authority of the principal Allied Powers. These Powers will have the right of control over all the ships of commerce traversing the Straits.

Vessels of war should demand the preliminary authority for passage from the principal Powers, following the rules approved for the entry into port of a warship.

*Table I.—Composition of the Sultan's Guard*

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Strength</i>	<i>Comment</i>
Headquarters . . .	200*	* Included in this strength are:— (a) The headquarters of the Sultan's Guard. (b) The general officers, officers of all grades and arms, as well as the military functionaries attached to the military establishment of the Sultan.
Infantry . . .	820 all ranks	
Cavalry . . .	350 „	
Services . . .	130 „	
Total . . .	1,500	

Reserved at the request of the British delegation.

*Table II.—Strengths of Different Arms and Services entering into the Composition of Special Elements of Reinforcements.*

<i>Units</i>	<i>Maximum strength. All ranks</i>
Headquarters . . . . .	100
Infantry . . . . .	8,200
Artillery . . . . .	2,500
Cavalry . . . . .	700
Pioneers and technical troops . . . . .	2,000
Technical and general services . . . . .	1,500
Total . . . . .	<u>15,000</u>

*Table III.—Maximum Armament and Supply of Munitions.*

<i>Material</i>	<i>Quantity for 1,000 men<sup>17</sup></i>			<i>Quantity of munition per rifle or gun</i>		
	<i>Sultan's Guard</i>	<i>Legions</i>	<i>Special element of reinforcement</i>	<i>Sultan's Guard</i>	<i>Legions</i>	<i>Special elements of reinforcement</i>
Rifle or carbine <sup>18</sup>	1,150	1,150	1,150	1,000	1,000	1,000
Revolvers.	1 revolver per	mounted	officer and n.c.o.	100	rounds per	revolver.
Heavy or light machine guns	15	10	15	50,000	100,000	100,000
Mountain guns <sup>19</sup>	..	..	5 <sup>20</sup>	..	..	1,500

*Section II[I].—Naval and Military Air Clauses*

*Article 1*

The military forces of Turkey will not carry out any aviation, military or naval. No dirigible balloon will be kept.

*Article 2*

Within two months from the date of carrying into force of the present treaty, the air personnel at present shown on the rolls of the Turkish sea and land forces will be demobilised.

*Article 3*

Until the complete evacuation of Turkish territory by the Allied troops, the aircraft of the Allied Powers will have the freedom of the air throughout Turkish territory, freedom of passage and landing.

*Article 4*

During the six months which follow the carrying into force of the present treaty, the manufacture, importation and exportation of all aeroplanes of every kind, of all spare parts, as well as aeroplane engines and parts of aeroplane engines, will be prohibited throughout the territory of Turkey.

*Article 5*

As soon as the present treaty comes into force, all aerial, military and naval material is to be handed over by Turkey, and at her expense, to the principal Allied Powers. The handing over is to be carried out at such places as may be appointed by the Governments of the said Powers, who shall decide alike on the destination to be given for the material.

The delivery of the material is to be completed within three months. Among the material will be included, in particular, material which is or has been employed or destined for purposes of war, especially:—

<sup>17</sup> *Note in original:* 'Includes over-estimate for replacement.'

<sup>18</sup> *Note in original:* 'Automatic carbines and rifles are counted as light machine guns.'

<sup>19</sup> *Note in original:* 'No field gun or heavy gun is allowed.'

<sup>20</sup> *Note in original:* 'One battery of 4 guns plus 1 gun for replacement to a total of 15 batteries.'

Aeroplanes and hydroplanes complete, as well as those under construction, repair or erection. Dirigible balloons in flying condition, under construction, repair or erection.

Apparatus for the manufacture of hydrogen, hangars for dirigible balloons and shelters of all sorts for aircraft.

Until they are handed over, dirigible balloons will be kept, at the expense of Turkey, inflated with hydrogen. Apparatus for making hydrogen, as well as shelters for dirigible balloons may, at the discretion of the said Powers, be left to Turkey until the handing over of the dirigible balloons.

The aerial motors.

Cells [Cells].

Armament (guns, machine guns, automatic rifles, bombs, torpedoes, apparatus for synchronisation, aiming apparatus).

Munitions (cartridges, shells, filled bombs, bomb cases, stocks of explosives or material intended for their manufacture).

Binding (?) instruments.

Wireless telegraphic apparatus and photographic and cinematographic apparatus used by aircraft, spare parts relating to the above categories.

All aerial material of any nature which may exist in Turkey will be considered *a priori* as material of war, and, as such, is not to be exported, transferred, lent, used or destroyed, but it is to be kept unaltered until such time as the Inter-Allied Aerial Commission of Control, provided for by article <sup>13</sup> of the present treaty, has given a decision on its nature. This commission will alone be qualified to declare whether an aircraft, or the various aeronautic materials, are of a military type.

#### *Section IV.—Inter-Allied Commissions of Control*

##### *Article 1*

All military, naval and aerial clauses which are contained in the present treaty, and for the carrying out of which a time limit has been fixed, will be carried out by Turkey under the control of inter-Allied commissions nominated for this purpose by the Principal Allied Powers.

The above-mentioned commissions will represent the Principal Allied Powers at the Court of the Ottoman Government in all that relates to the carrying out of the military, naval and aerial clauses. They will communicate to the Turkish authorities decisions which the Principal Allied Powers reserve the right to take or which the carrying out of the said clauses may necessitate.

##### *Article 2*

Inter-Allied Commissions of Control may set up their departments at Constantinople, and will have the right, as often as they may deem advisable, to visit any part of Ottoman territory, or to send sub-commissions there, or to instruct one or more of their members to go there.

##### *Article 3*

The Ottoman Government is to give to the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control all information and documents which the latter may deem necessary for the carrying out of their mission, and all facilities, whether in the matter of personnel or of material, of which the above-mentioned commissions may have need to ensure the complete fulfilment of the military, naval or air clauses.



The Ottoman Government is to appoint a qualified representative to each Inter-Allied Commission of Control, with authority to receive from the commission communications which the commission may have to address to the Ottoman Government and to furnish or procure for the commission all information or documents asked for.

#### *Article 4*

The maintenance and cost of the commission[s] of control and the expenses caused by their working will be borne by Turkey.

#### *Article 5*

The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control will have in particular—

1. To fix the number of custom-house officers, local and municipal police, and other analogous officials, whom Turkey will be authorised to maintain in accordance with article 16 (Section I).
2. To receive from the Ottoman Government notifications relating to the situation of stocks and depots of munitions, the armament of fortified works, fortresses and strong points, the situation of arms manufactories, munitions [*sic*]<sup>21</sup> and war material and their working.
3. To take delivery of arms, munitions, war material, stocks of tools intended for war manufacture, to fix the places where this delivery is to be carried out and to supervise the putting out of use or changes provided for by the present treaty.
4. The commission will have besides the task of fixing in collaboration with the Ottoman Government and in accordance with the clauses provided for in Section I, the limits of the six territorial regions set forth in article 5 of this section, the organisation and repartition in the area of the new Ottoman armed forces.

With this end in view the commission will receive from the Ottoman Government the necessary executive powers respecting the means of command and administration of the new Ottoman armed forces.

#### *Article 6*

Clauses relative to the Inter-Allied Naval Commission of Control.

#### *Article 7*

The Inter-Allied Aerial Commission of Control will specially occupy itself with taking stock of aerial material which is actually in the hands of the Ottoman Government, inspecting aeroplane factories, aerial balloons and motors, arms factories, munitions and explosives which could be used from the air; visiting all aerodromes, hangars, landing grounds, parks and depots in Turkish territories and making arrangements if necessary to remove and take over such material.

The Ottoman Government should furnish the Inter-Allied Aerial Commission of Control with all information and legal documents, administrative or otherwise, which the commission consider necessary for the complete execution of the aerial clauses, especially a numerical state of the personnel belonging to all Turkish aerial services, as well as a state of all material in preparation or on order, and a complete list of all factories doing aeronautical work, of their location and of the location of all hangars and landing grounds.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. article 200 of the Treaty of Sèvres.

#### *Article 8*

A mixed commission, with personnel formed for [? from] the Military, Naval and Aerial Commissions of Control, will be responsible for the execution of the clauses enumerated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 24 of the present treaty [*sic*].<sup>22</sup>

#### *Section V.—General Clauses*

#### *Article 9*

After a delay of three months from the date of the present treaty coming into force, the Ottoman legislation must have been modified, and must be carried out by the Ottoman Government in conformity with these clauses of the present treaty. Within the same period, all steps, administrative or otherwise, relative to the circulation [?execution] of the terms of the clauses of the present treaty must have been taken by the Ottoman Government.

#### *Article 10*

Clauses relative to the eventual maintenance of certain stipulations of the armistice of the 30th October, 1918.

#### *Article 11*

Turkey undertakes, dating from the putting into force of the present treaty, not to accredit to any foreign country any military, naval or aerial mission, nor to despatch or allow to be despatched any such mission; she further undertakes to take the necessary steps to prevent Turkish subjects from leaving Turkish territory to enlist in the army, fleet, or aerial service of any foreign Power, or to be attached to such services for the purpose of training or to take any part in military, naval or aerial instruction in a foreign country.

The Allied Powers agree in so far as it concerns them that from the date of the coming into force of the present treaty they should not enlist in or attach to their armies, fleets, or aerial forces any Turkish subject, with the view to his military training, or generally employ any Turkish subject as a military, naval or aerial instructor. With the proviso that this arrangement will in no way prejudice the right of France to recruit her foreign legion in accordance with French military laws and regulations.

#### APPENDIX 2 TO No. 45

#### *Paraphrase of Telegram from Admiral de Robeck, dated Constantinople, February 29, 1920*

In continuance of my telegrams Nos. 109<sup>23</sup> and 152,<sup>24</sup> I have to report that the

<sup>22</sup> i.e. article 24 of section I above.

<sup>23</sup> See Volume IV, No. 681.

<sup>24</sup> This telegram of February 21, 1920 (received in Foreign Office, February 23), read as follows:

'I communicated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs verbally on the 19th February contents of your telegram No. 123 [see No. 26, note 3] of the 16th February.

'Commenting on reservation as to possible modification of decision of Conference in the event of continued Turkish misbehaviour, I took an opportunity to enumerate various

situation between the Allies and the Turks is daily becoming more strained owing to the occurrence of incidents, which clearly indicate that influences making for resistance to the decisions of the Peace Conference are more than ever in the ascendency.

Instructions given by General Milne under article 20 of the armistice are constantly disregarded by the Turkish military authorities, and in consequence I am asked to formulate the demands arising out of such instances. Whether I act alone, or conjointly with my colleagues, I find that while fully in agreement with Milne as to the propriety of his demands, the only result is evasion or procrastination, with of late a tendency to open defiance. No single instance is in itself of sufficient importance to justify military action, but the aggregate result is that the Allied High Commissioners are flouted, not by the responsible Government, but by the Nationalist organisation which the Government cannot control. Thereby the High Commissioners are placed in a false position. Furthermore, the Nationalist leaders are thereby emboldened to believe that resistance to the peace terms can be continued indefinitely with the same impunity with which they now disregard the wishes of the Allies in all matters, even in those arising out of the armistice. In my opinion, it is useless for the High Commissioners to continue to address demands to the Porte, which are invariably rejected or evaded.

I consider that preparations should at once be made for effective action to be taken when developments in the situation may make it desirable, or whenever Nationalist defiance passes the limits of endurance. By effective action is meant the occupation of Constantinople, together with such other measures as the military authorities may consider possible. The drawback to this course lies in the danger for Allied subjects and Christians in the interior.

Consequently, the Allies should carefully consider what announcement should accompany such action in order to prevent the Turks from massacres. The question of possible safeguards for Christians, the question of the advisability of such action and the question of the moment for taking it, all turn on the intentions of the Peace Conference. Except as regards Constantinople, my French colleague, with whom I have discussed the situation, is equally ignorant with myself on this point. My French colleague and myself have both got the impression that under the Peace Treaty, Smyrna and Thrace, including Adrianople would be given to the Greeks. If this impression be correct, peace would have to be imposed by force of arms, and the High Commissioners and the military authorities should be informed in good time, but very secretly, so that steps may be taken to consolidate the military

instances of such misbehaviour on the part of military authorities and of organisers of national movement, insisting very strongly that Government could not disclaim responsibility for activities of latter . . . [text uncertain] of my observations follows by bag.

'Later on same day I informed my French colleague and my Italian colleague of what had passed. Neither of them had been formally instructed in the sense of your telegram under reference, though both accept decision to keep Turks here as *fait accompli*, and French High Commissioner had used language based on that assumption in conversation with Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 18th February.

'I desire to draw your attention to fact that there has latterly been noticeable military liveliness in provinces, especially among Nationalists, and situation shows signs of tension. There has been, of course, no time as yet for my communication to Ministry of Foreign Affairs to become generally known in provinces and, though I anticipate it will produce sedative effect, I feel that we should have sufficient military strength locally to render impossible any action against us by Nationalists similar to attack on French in Cilicia. To this end I consider reinforcements of A.B.'s [*sic.* i.e. Army of the Black Sea] desirable.'

situation in Constantinople. On the other hand, if our impression is incorrect and peace is to be comparatively lenient, the military authorities and High Commissioners should be informed less secretly, with permission to divulge peace prospects to the Sultan if considered advisable. The Sultan and other possible elements in the counter-Nationalist movements can only be enlisted in support of the acceptance of peace terms if they are comparatively lenient; that is to say, if they include suzerainty at least over a substantial portion of the Eastern Province of Asia Minor and the maintenance of Turkish sovereignty over Smyrna and Eastern Thrace, including Adrianople.

## No. 46

I.C.P. 62A.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference, held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Wednesday, March 3, 1920, at 3.30 p.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Leeper, Mr. Vansittart (for latter part), Mr. Forbes Adam (for latter part), Mr. Philip Kerr; **SECRETARIES,** Sir M. Hankey, Captain Abraham, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Major Caccia, Brigadier-General S. H. Wilson, Mr. Leith Ross.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer.

*Italy:* Signor Nitti, Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Galli, Signor Nogara, Duke Ascanio Colonna; **SECRETARY,** Signor Trombetti.

**INTERPRETERS:** M. Camerlynck and M. Billot.

1. **MR. LLOYD GEORGE** said that M. Vaida Voevod had just shown him telegrams containing a wireless message from the Bolsheviks. They *Roumania* said that military operations had brought Soviet troops face to face with the troops of Roumania. Avoidance of any conflict was much desired. It was suggested that the Roumanians should name a place of meeting to negotiate an understanding. M. Vaida Voevod, with whom he had just had an interview, had asked him whether the council objected. Seeing that M. Millerand had not yet agreed to the form of words suggested on the previous Monday,<sup>1</sup> he was unable to say more than was contained in the formula adopted the previous week, namely, that the council could not assume the responsibility of giving advice, and that Roumania must act on her own responsibility; she could not expect help from the Allies unless the Bolsheviks were to invade Roumania proper. As far as Great Britain was concerned, he would have no hesitation in saying that it was better to make peace, but he could not yet say this in the name of the conference until M. Millerand had given his assent.

M. CAMBON said he had just received M. Millerand's answer to the question he had put to him on behalf of the council. M. Millerand preferred to adhere to the formula of the previous week; he thought nothing had occurred in the meanwhile to alter the situation in such a way as to make any

<sup>1</sup> See No. 41, minute 1.

change of policy desirable, and there were objections to altering the attitude of the Allies so rapidly.

M. BERTHELOT said he thought there was nothing in this that need complicate the question raised by M. Vaida Voevod, who had previously declared that he would make peace with the Bolsheviks if they agreed that Bessarabia should be Roumanian; failing this, he would not. If, therefore, M. Vaida Voevod was told to follow his own interests, he would fulfil this programme. He could only be diverted from this plan if the Allies had said that they did not desire him to make peace; and this they had refrained from doing. M. Voevod also quite realised that if any of the border States made peace with Russia all must do so. Esthonia had begun the process, and it would certainly spread.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that one of the conditions of peace set out by the Poles affected the internal situation in Russia, because he believed the fifth point insisted on the summoning of a National Assembly in Russia. If the Poles meant to insist on this, they meant to have no peace with Soviet Russia. He agreed that the formula of the previous week was quite sufficient to indicate to Roumania what the Allies meant, but if this condition were insisted on there would be no peace.

M. BERTHELOT said he thought these conditions were merely the starting-point, and that the Poles did not really attach any great importance to the regime prevailing in Russia. What mattered to them was material advantages.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that M. Vaida Voevod had further declared that he would be much assisted in his negotiations with Russia if the conference recognised Roumania's right to Bessarabia.

LORD CURZON said that the Allied Powers had always been favourable to an ultimate union between Bessarabia and Roumania. Ethnological, geographical and political arguments all tended in the same direction. Moreover, the Roumanians were in occupation of the country. The reason why no final decision had been taken was that, so long as the Roumanian army remained in Hungary, the council was unwilling to acknowledge Roumania's title to Bessarabia. M. Vaida Voevod's Government was doing all it could to evacuate Hungary. He had agreed to the fixing of the stages of the withdrawal by Allied officers. This being so, it seemed that the council might now agree to the incorporation of Bessarabia in Roumania. If this were done, the Roumanian Government would be able to negotiate with the Russians on fair terms, and the latter would not be able to use Bessarabia to bargain with.

M. CAMBON said that he had information that the evacuation of Hungary had already begun, and though the country was under snow the troops were withdrawing on foot.

LORD CURZON said that a form of words had been drawn up in the Foreign Office which he would submit to the council.

(The attached statement (Appendix 1)<sup>2</sup> was then read and adopted.)

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This statement is printed by A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923* (London, 1925), pp. 501-2. It declared, in particular, that 'the Principal Allied

2. LORD CURZON said that, in the draft agreement arrived at, a point had been omitted which he thought had been accepted by implication in the discussions in the council. When Cilicia had been under discussion, considerable concern had been shown in the fate of the Armenians in that province. It was recognised that the Allied Powers incurred a responsibility for their protection, and the French Government, on behalf of the Alliance, had taken over the obligation. If France did this, he assumed that Italy would do the same in the green and 'C' zones attributed to her. Great Britain would, of course, do the same in her zones. He was very much afraid that, when it was known publicly that zones of economic preference had been allotted to the several Powers in Turkey, there would be much adverse criticism. He thought that some of this criticism might be averted if each Power receiving economic priorities undertook within the zone allotted to it the protection of minorities.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he quite agreed. The Power receiving economic advantages should justify these advantages by fulfilling duties. But he would make it quite clear, however, that each Power was only responsible for what occurred within its own zone. For instance, Italy could not be responsible for trouble in the Greek zone. He thought the undertaking of protection of Christian minorities in Turkey would have considerable propaganda value in America.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that Italy was anxious to make it clear that, if trouble arose by reason of friction between Greeks and Turks in Smyrna, Italy must not be held answerable.

LORD CURZON said that this was understood. For instance, if Greeks were massacred at Konia, which was in the green zone, Italy would be responsible.

SIGNOR NITTI said that Italy would be, in that case; not if the massacre occurred in Smyrna.

The following form of words was then accepted:—

'Any one of the Great Powers who enjoys special economic interests in any part of the Turkish Empire shall accept therewith the responsibility for supervising the provisions of the treaty with regard to the protection of minorities in that area.'

3. M. BERTHELOT said that he thought the French and Italian troops should not be withdrawn from Cilicia and Adalia until there was an adequate guarantee that the local minorities ran no further risks. He therefore had an alternative form of words to suggest in place of article 6 of the Tripartite Agreement as at present drafted. His draft did not leave it to the judgment of France or Italy to decide when the troops should be removed, but left the decision to a joint agreement of the Powers. He proposed the following:—

Powers pronounce themselves . . . in favour of the reunion of Bessarabia with Roumania, which has now been formally declared by the Bessarabian representatives, and are desirous to conclude a treaty in recognition of this as soon as the conditions stated have been carried out'.

'The present agreement will be communicated to the Turkish Government and will enter into force at the same time as the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

'The French and Italian Governments will withdraw their troops from the respective zones where their special interests are recognised, when the contracting parties shall have declared themselves satisfied by a joint agreement that the treaty is being executed and the measures accepted by Turkey for the protection of Christian minorities have been put into force and effectively guaranteed.'

(This draft was adopted to take the place of article 6.)

4. LORD CURZON said that one important question had been omitted from the draft agreement, namely, the question of railways. He thought it was important to say something in the agreement regarding at least the Bagdad Railway; otherwise it might be inferred that the portion of it passing through the green area became an Italian interest, and the portion of it going through Cilicia would be a French interest, and that all development of those portions were [*sic*] reserved for the country with priority of economic interest. He did not think this was a possible method of dealing with the Bagdad Railway. There was, for instance, the Smyrna-Aidin Railway. Certain extensions had been contemplated before the war, but had not been carried out. It must not be assumed that concessions for these works could only be granted to the Greeks. He wished to make this quite clear lest it be thought that priority of economic interest covered the development of existing railways.

M. CAMBON said that undoubtedly the question of railways deserved separate treatment. A single line could not be cut up into segments. There ought to be an agreement regarding the whole line.

It was agreed—

That the question of the existing railways should be considered by the Conference of Foreign Ministers, in consultation with experts.

5. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would like to put a question. It had been agreed that, in certain portions of Turkey, certain Powers should have economic priorities. In addition to these zones, France and Great Britain were going to administer large areas formerly Turkish. Were they respectively in these areas to have economic priorities or not? Seeing that in these cases, they would be bearing the whole burden of the administration, it would appear strange that they should have no economic advantage, though holding such advantage in territories they did not administer.

M. BERTHELOT said that he presumed a provision of this kind would be made. It would have to be provided for in the form of mandate adopted. He also assumed that certain property rights now existing would be reserved: for instance, the French rights in the Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway, which would now be in British Palestine.

LORD CURZON said that the case of this railway was being dealt with by the Economic Commission. He thought the answer to Mr. Lloyd George's question was that the problem could only be solved by the framing of the form of Mandate 'A' that was to apply to Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine. He thought perhaps the same form of mandate could apply to Mesopotamia and Syria, but that Palestine would probably require a different form. According to the treaty, the mandate must be drawn up either by the conference or by the League of Nations. He suggested that the League of Nations be asked to depute someone to assist him and his colleagues to draw up mandates for the countries in question. These mandates, when drawn up in collaboration with the emissary of the League of Nations, could be submitted to the council.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that so far as mandates were concerned, he thought that Lord Curzon was right and he saw no reason why the council should not be able to come to some agreement. No form of mandate, however, could really ensure the same preference and right of priority among the Allies in respect of Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine, as it was proposed the respective Powers should enjoy in Cilicia and Adalia. His own view was that the council should arrange to respect priorities in Syria, Mesopotamia and Palestine, just as priorities in Adalia and Cilicia were to be respected. He was all in favour of mandates, but he was afraid that the present proposals would not cover the whole ground satisfactorily.

M. CAMBON stated that he understood that the various forms of preference had already been decided by the Peace Conference for the benefit of the Powers concerned and in possession, and that it had been laid down that if any Power did not choose to exercise its rights of priority within a certain period, other Powers would be permitted to come in.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this was all right so far as spheres of influence were concerned, but did not cover mandatory territories.

It was agreed—

To accept Lord Curzon's suggestion that Lord Curzon should draw up, in consultation with M. Berthelot and a representative of the Council of the League of Nations, proposals in regard to economic priority in spheres of influence and mandatory territories, for the consideration of the Supreme Council.

6. SIGNOR NITTI asked permission to introduce for the council's consideration, certain proposals in regard to present article 4 of the British draft of the Tripartite Agreement, which the Italian representatives desired to lay before the council (Appendix [2]).

*Article 4 of  
Tripartite Agree-  
ment. Finance*

The intention of these modifications was to establish, if possible, financial co-operation in each zone, as there were already in the said zones certain vested interests.

M. BERTHELOT interposed to state that any such modifications must exclude the railways.



MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the consideration of the Italian proposals should be suspended until the council had considered the question of the railways generally.

It was agreed—

To adopt Mr. Lloyd George's suggestion.

7. SIGNOR NITTI said that he further desired to place before the council an Italian proposal for an alternative to the second paragraph of article 5 of the British draft of the Tripartite Agreement (Appendix [2]).

*Article 5 of  
Tripartite Agree-  
ment. Heraclea*

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that as this proposal mainly concerned the Italian and French Governments, he thought it would be better if the representatives of those two countries could discuss the Italian proposals in the first instance.

M. BERTHELOT said that he agreed that the Italian alternative might be reserved for the present as there was no immediate hurry to decide the question.

It was agreed—

That the Italian alternative proposal for insertion in article 5 of the British draft should be reserved until it had been first discussed by the French and Italian representatives.

8. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he wished to ask the council now to consider the question of Hungary. He had before him an ethnological map which showed that there were some 850,000 Magyars in Czechoslovakia, 1,500,000 in Transylvania, and 400,000 in Jugoslavia; making a total of 2,750,000 Magyars, or one-third of the total Magyar population which it was proposed to transfer from their own country into territory which was so dear to Signor Nitti and his colleagues. He himself was of opinion that it would not be easy to defend this proposal.

M. BERTHELOT thought that statistics were notoriously untrustworthy. After all, what were the Magyars? Hungary had been built up of denationalised peoples. The original inhabitants of the country were natives and not Magyar. In regard to the future of Hungary, what was the position? The whole problem had been exhaustively examined and thrashed out by the Peace Conference, and had been closely investigated by numberless experts, including many famous American professors. Certain decisions had been reached, and he strongly deprecated any reopening of the question. He wished to remind the council that they had always refused, since those decisions had been reached, to meet any further deputations of the peoples concerned. Supposing the council, in their desire to placate the Magyars, who had always proved themselves to be a most treacherous people, did decide to reopen the question, what would be the feeling of our allies, and what would President Wilson say? He urged that the council should state

that it was too late to remodel their proposed plan and that they intended to stick by what they had decided. The French representatives had always urged that they should stand by the principle which the Peace Conference had adopted and absolutely exclude any modification of the frontiers laid down. On behalf of the French Government, he felt bound to protest against any suggestion to the contrary. The French President felt very strongly on the question and would assuredly object strenuously to any re-opening of the question. The French were prepared to give way only in respect of small points of detail, but to any departure in principle the French Government would be fundamentally opposed.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he would ask permission of M. Berthelot and the council to express an opinion contrary to that which had been eloquently put forward by M. Berthelot. M. Berthelot had presented the point of view of France *vis-à-vis* her principal enemy, Germany; similarly, Signor Nitti felt bound to present the Italian point of view, *vis-à-vis* her<sup>3</sup> principal enemy, Austria. As regards the Adriatic, there were, in that region only about 35,000 [*sic*] inhabitants, and the future of these was setting all Europe by the ears. Could, he asked, the council accept, without discussion, that millions of Magyars should be handed over to the sovereignty of other nations? When he had been in Paris, he had been profoundly disturbed by what he had heard from Count Apponyi, who had spoken very frankly and with great force to him, and he had been deeply impressed by what he had heard. Every member of the council would admit that Hungary and Austria presented exceedingly difficult problems. They would also admit that Austria must be allowed to exist and that Hungary must have justice. At present there were vast numbers of Hungarians outside their own national territory, and he urged that the council should not forget that even conquered nations had a right to expect justice. M. Berthelot had said that it was difficult to determine where a particular race began and ended. He himself fully appreciated this difficulty of defining nationalities, and, in this connection he would venture to direct the attention of the council to a work on the subject which had lately been published by a well-known authority. Hungary was entitled to a full measure of justice, and he begged the council not to lose sight of this fact.

M. BERTHELOT stated that he fully agreed with Signor Nitti that Hungary was entitled to justice and that the council ought to examine most carefully all proposals as to the future of that country which might be submitted to them. He did not, however, think that the council should start with a premiss that Hungary had specially suffered. Signor Nitti had cited the work of a well-known expert on Hungarian nationality; he himself would ask Signor Nitti to study a recent book by an expert of equal authority, the contents of which would, he thought, cause Signor Nitti profound astonishment. In Hungary there had been about 15,000 Austrian families, mainly big land-owners. These, however, had been denationalised and their neighbours had been denationalised; and Hungary proper could no longer be said to exist.

<sup>3</sup> In the typescript copy this word was underlined.

A well-known Hungarian had said to him: 'As a matter of fact we Hungarians now have neither nationality, nor dynasty, nor King; we have only the Crown of Saint Stephens [*sic*].' The council might not be disposed to take this saying seriously, but in his view it was profoundly true. He would, however, prefer to stand on another ground. What, he asked, would be the situation of countries like Bohemia, Jugoslavia, &c., if the council adhered to the decisions reached in Paris? Would not their adherence to those decisions, without any modifications, mean a condition of hopeless unrest in Central Europe? The people of these countries were even more concerned in the return to a state of peace than were the great nations of Europe. To refuse any modifications would inevitably raise endless difficulties, and peace would be indefinitely postponed. It was not that the French representatives were not prepared to examine any proposals that might be put forward in matters of detail, or that they were not ready to render justice in full measure; but he was convinced that it would be contrary to the feeling of France and to that of her Allies to permit any extensive modifications, in the frontiers already fixed, or any departure from principle.<sup>4</sup>

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that there was a certain amount of inconsistency in the last two sentences of M. Berthelot's statement. He had understood M. Berthelot to say that he would be willing to examine the Hungarian case, and to redress it if any injustice had been committed. But, he continued to say, that if in order to redress an injustice the frontiers of Hungary, as previously decided by the Supreme Council, would have to be altered he would never consent. In his opinion (Mr. Lloyd George's) if the conference found, after due examination, that the objections raised by the Hungarians were sound, they should be given satisfaction. Exactly the same thing had been done in the case of Germany. Germany had put forward certain claims with regard to her eastern frontier, which, on examination, were found to be just, and, in spite of violent Polish protestations, the Supreme Council had eventually decided in favour of Germany, and to redress the injustice which it had been done. It was imperative, in his opinion, that the Allies should inspire confidence, that they acted justly. Did M. Berthelot really believe that it would lead to peace in Central Europe if it were discovered afterwards that the claims of Hungary were sound, and that a whole community of Magyars had been handed over like cattle to Czechoslovakia and to Transylvania, simply because the conference had refused to examine the Hungarian case? He (Mr. Lloyd George) thought that such action would most certainly lead to war, and it would merely be a question of groupment, whether the Magyars joined the Germans or the Russians. In any case, he personally would never consent deliberately to sign, seal and deliver an injustice because he could not take the trouble to rectify it. He had frequently heard similar observations made with regard to nationalities. In reply he would say that there were only two pure nationalities in Europe, namely, one in Brittany and the other in Wales. Every other European nation consisted

<sup>4</sup> It would appear that the preceding paragraph may not accurately record the arguments advanced by M. Berthelot.

of a mixture of peoples. That, however, did not prevent the existence of a national feeling. For instance, no more intense national feeling existed than in France, and yet France was inhabited by a mixed race—French, Gauls, Normans and Italians—and no doubt the Magyars were just as mixed. But the thing that mattered was consciousness of nationality, and the people under consideration had Magyar consciousness. Consequently, if those people were put inside Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovakia would (as it were) suffer from violent appendicitis, and sooner or later an operation would become necessary, under which Czechoslovakia might very well collapse. He thought that the same thing ought to be done with Hungary as with Poland. The Poles had contended that the one thing that mattered was the possession of the railway which ran from Poland to the sea. On the other hand, the Supreme Council had decided that the character and spirit of the people should be the deciding factor in fixing the frontiers of States. In his opinion, the acceptance of any other policy would be wrong and lead to fatal consequences.

SIGNOR NITTI expressed the view that the conference were in complete agreement since M. Berthelot had not declined to examine the Hungarian case. He would point out, however, that the conference had lasted a considerable time; it would therefore be necessary to carry on further negotiations with tact and judgment. The forces of the Allies had all been demobilised; consequently, if the Hungarians refused to accept the terms of the treaty imposed by the Allies, what means would the Allies possess to enforce their decisions? At the present moment Hungary afforded the only real resistance to Bolshevism. She had caught the disease and recovered. But, if the Hungarians were now crushed, that would mean the fall of the last fortifications against Bolshevism. Hungary constituted a national entity which had been established in Europe over 1,000 years, and her right to recognition could not be wholly ignored. In his opinion, therefore, the prayers of the Magyars should be listened to, even though considerable antipathy was felt for the Hungarians on account of what they had done in the war.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed that the Hungarian document<sup>5</sup> should be referred to the Foreign Ministers to be carefully examined by them in a spirit of complete impartiality with a desire to do justice. By that he meant that the Foreign Ministers in examining the Hungarian counter-proposals should not say that the frontiers had already been definitely fixed and that the question could not be reopened.

M. BERTHELOT explained that what he had said was that all questions dealing with the frontiers of Hungary had received full and careful consideration by experts and that complete agreement had been reached by them. Furthermore, the Allied Minor Powers who surrounded Hungary had been told that those frontiers had been definitely fixed and that no change would ever be contemplated. He thought, therefore, that if any serious alterations were now made in the frontiers of Hungary, as fixed by the Treaty of Peace, the Minor Powers concerned would be justified in refusing to accept the

<sup>5</sup> See No. 26, note 6.

same; and, in the circumstances, he failed to see how the decisions of the Supreme Council could then be enforced. On the other hand, he did not wish to imply that he would oppose any change that might be suggested. He did, however, ask that the conference should not start the examination of the Hungarian case with the preconceived idea that 2½ million Magyars had been left outside the frontiers of Hungary and that they must positively be included; otherwise serious difficulties would be bound to arise. The conference must neither start with the impression that an injustice had been committed which must be rectified, nor must it refuse to consider the possibility of making any changes. In other words, he agreed that the conference should examine the question with a perfectly free mind, always remembering, however, that the decisions, contained in the Treaty of Peace, had been unanimously reached by all the Allied and Associated Powers. He agreed, however, that an honest and conscientious examination of the arguments brought forward by the Hungarians now should now be made. On the other hand, he could not accept the suggestion made by Mr. Lloyd George that for a long time past the Allied representatives had been under the impression that an injustice had been done and that the Supreme Council had made a mistake with regard to the frontiers of Hungary. He could not bring himself to believe that the British Prime Minister could ever have acquiesced in a mistake of that kind.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that as a matter of fact he had not had anything to do with the final examination of the Hungarian Treaty. He could, therefore, express no opinion whether it was right or wrong. But in any case it would be necessary now to have an *ex parte* examination of the Hungarian case. He expressed considerable astonishment and surprise at M. Berthelot's statement that the Allied Governments had made a definite promise to the Czechoslovaks and to the Jugoslavs, that they would under no circumstances in any way alter or revise the Hungarian Treaty. He (Mr. Lloyd George) had never given such an undertaking. He would never have been a party to anything of the kind. Did M. Berthelot suggest that the Allied Governments had told the Czechoslovak and Jugoslav Governments that they would make no change in the Hungarian terms, whatever injustice may have been committed? He thought that would constitute and form a most shameful promise. Such a promise would be tantamount to treating a very gallant enemy most disgracefully. He could not believe that the Allied Governments would have ever invited Hungary to come to Paris to state her case, when all the time they had agreed to give judgment against her. People who sat in judgment were bound to hear what was said, and no judge would be fit to sit in judgment if he decided beforehand that whatever might be said he would give judgment against one of the parties. He (Mr. Lloyd George) would agree to a fair, honest, and conscientious examination of the Hungarian case, without any prejudice, but not on the assumption that whatever justice might be found on the Hungarian side, judgment would be given in favour of Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, and Transylvania. He would never accept such a decision.

It was agreed—

To refer the document received from the Hungarian Government to the Foreign Ministers, who would subject the same to fair and conscientious examination in order to arrive at a just settlement.

9. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it was a matter of very great regret to him that Signor Nitti was leaving on the following day. The next time they would meet would be in Paris, about the 22nd March, when the Turkish delegation had been summoned, and it would then be necessary to consider what was to be done.

*Future Meetings  
of the Supreme  
Council*

The Supreme Council had now met in Paris and in London, and he thought it was time that the convenience of the Italian members should be considered. He would like to hear Signor Nitti's views as regards holding a meeting in Italy.

SIGNOR NITTI said he thanked Mr. Lloyd George very much for the great honour he had done Italy in suggesting that the next meeting of the Supreme Council should be held there. The meeting might take place in Rome, but perhaps it would be preferable to hold it at San Remo, which would probably be quieter than Rome. He felt that it was a great honour to him to accept the suggestion.

10. MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if he was correct in thinking that M. Cambon wished to raise a question.

*High Prices and  
Foreign Ex-  
changes. Allied  
Announcement*

M. CAMBON said it was proposed to include in the conclusions of the announcement some reference to the restoration of the devastated areas and to the raising of a loan in order to hasten this process.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE then read the French proposal, which ran as follows:—

‘The Powers represented at the conference declare that the immediate restoration of the areas devastated by the war is of primary importance for the re-establishment of economic equilibrium in Europe, and the resumption of normal trade conditions. They agree that it is desirable that the necessary means for hastening this process should be obtained by loans, in anticipation of the War Indemnity stipulated by the Treaty of Peace.’

SIGNOR NITTI said he was rather in favour of not including any reference to the restoration of the devastated areas. Italy was also very much interested, in so far as there were Italian areas which had also been devastated. The object of publishing the announcement was not to insist on what was right or to discuss the post-war state of the world, but to show what might be done to improve the economic state of Europe and to reduce the cost of living. What was most necessary was increased production, and he did not think it was desirable to mix up the question of restoration with economic matters. Italy was just as much interested as any one else in the question of reparation and the restoration of devastated areas.

M. CAMBON asked if it was not a fact that, in order to increase production, it would be necessary at the same time to restore the devastated areas. Signor Nitti had said that production came before restoration, but in his opinion it should be the other way about. It was not possible to produce if one had not the materials available. To take, for example, the devastated areas of France; before one could start work again it would be necessary to restore these areas and to get back more or less to the normal state. In Northern France everything had been destroyed—machinery, mines and spinning factories. The Germans had taken away most of the machinery, and some measure of reconstruction was necessary before anything could be done to increase production.

SIGNOR NITTI saw no objection to the inclusion of the first part of the proposed addition, which stated that the restoration of the areas devastated by the war was of primary importance for the re-establishment of economic equilibrium in Europe. He was doubtful, however, of the second part, which referred to the desirability of raising a loan, and he hoped that the inclusion of this part would not be pressed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed to the inclusion of the first part. As he had said, he thought it was very essential that the council should take cognisance of the great importance of restoring the devastated areas. He agreed with every word which M. Cambon had said about reconstruction being essential before production could be increased, and he thought that the importance of restoring the devastated areas should be stated in the strongest possible terms. He was very doubtful, however, about the desirability of suggesting the raising of a loan. It was very difficult in England at that time to raise a loan, and he thought that if any phrase such as that suggested were to be included in the announcement it might have an effect on the stock markets, which were very sensitive, and would say at once that the raising of a big loan was contemplated. It was a suggestion which would have to be considered very carefully, and he hoped that M. Cambon would not press for the inclusion of that part of the proposed addition.

M. AVENOL said he felt there was great weight in what had been said by Mr. Lloyd George. The question, however, was for France one of great public interest, and French public opinion was very sensitive. Measures for assisting Germany had already been agreed to, and he did not know what view public opinion in France would take if assistance to Germany were to be put before the restoration of the devastated areas of France.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he quite realised the difficulties pointed out by M. Cambon and M. Avenol. Every country had its debt. In England there were houses to build, and many other commitments, but he agreed that these were not comparable with the difficulties with which France had to contend. He quite saw the strength of the French plea, and that they could not say to the French people that priority was being given to Germany to restore her industries before the restoration of those in France. He thought, however, it would be very dangerous to put anything in a public announcement referring to the raising of a loan, but if anything could be done to overcome this

difficulty he would be very glad. It was not that he disagreed with the proposal in principle, but it was a question of not frightening the money market. He would like to have an opportunity of talking the matter over with the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, as for the moment he could not see his way to sailing between the reefs. If, therefore, the council would agree, he would like to adjourn the discussion on this point until the following day, in order that he might have time to consider it.

M. CAMBON said that he would like to refer the proposed announcement to M. Millerand before it was published.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, as he understood M. Millerand did not favour the conclusion about Soviet Russia, he would suggest the alteration of Conclusion 1 (a)<sup>6</sup> to read as follows:—

‘That peace and normal economic relations should be established as soon as possible throughout Eastern Europe’,  
and that the rest of the paragraph should be deleted.

(This was agreed to.)

(*The conference then adjourned until 12 noon on the following day.*)

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 3, 1920.

#### APPENDIX 2 TO No. 46

##### *Italian Proposal for Addition to present Article 4 of British Draft of Tripartite Agreement*

In all cases where interests of nationals of the Contracting Powers are maintained or eventually established under this agreement in the areas defined in article . . .<sup>7</sup> the Contracting Powers will facilitate negotiations which financial groups of the interested Power may desire eventually to undertake with financial groups of other Contracting Powers.

##### *Italian Proposal for insertion in Article 5 of British Draft of Tripartite Agreement in place of Second Paragraph of present Article*

The interests of Italy are also recognised in respect of the Basin of Heraclea, but only so far as concerns the coal-mines and the means of transporting the coal from the mines (such as railways and port facilities), with the exception of those which are owned by neutral nationals, or were owned before August 1914 by Allied nationals.

The Contracting Powers shall render mutual diplomatic support in order to obtain the enactment by the Turkish Government, in respect of the Heraclea coal-mines, of such new decrees as may be required in order to bring the regulations regarding employment and similar matters in connection with the mining industry into accord with the technical and industrial conditions of the present time, and particularly such modifications of the existing regulations issued in 1867 as are necessary with this object.

London, March 3, 1920.

<sup>6</sup> See No. 41, appendix 1.

<sup>7</sup> Omission in original.



I.C.P. 63.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Thursday, March 4, 1920, at 12 noon.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer; The Right Hon. Sir A. C. Geddes, President of the Board of Trade; Mr. McCurdy, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food; Sir S. J. Chapman, Joint Parliamentary [sic] Secretary to the Board of Trade; Sir Hugh Levick; Mr. Blackett, Controller of Finance, Treasury; Mr. Wise, Mr. Philip Kerr; **SECRETARIES,** Brigadier-General S. H. Wilson, Captain Abraham, Mr. Leith Ross.

*France:* M. Avenol.

*Italy:* Signor Giannini.

*Belgium:* Baron Moncheur, M. Jaspar, M. Theunis.

**INTERPRETER:** M. Billot.

The Supreme Council discussed the draft declaration to be made regarding the economic position (A.J. 54, Revise).

*High Prices and  
Foreign Ex-  
changes. Allied  
Announcement*

After a lengthy discussion, the final text was adopted as given in Appendix.<sup>1</sup>

**MR. LLOYD GEORGE** said that it was very desirable now to arrange for the publication of the complete text at the earliest possible moment. He observed that extracts were already appearing piecemeal in the newspapers, and he hoped that it would be possible to issue it on the following Saturday. It depended, however, on the time which would be required before a reply from M. Millerand could be received.

**M. AVENOL** said that he hoped to be in a position to give M. Millerand's answer on the following day (Friday).

*(The conference adjourned at 1.25 p.m.)*

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 4, 1920.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. The text in this appendix, dated at 2 Whitehall Gardens, March 3, 1920, was the same as that printed in Cmd. 646 of 1920, *Declaration by the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference on the economic conditions of the World*, except that (i) in the appendix, in section 3, the annual average figure for prewar Rumanian wheat-sowing was correctly given as 1,900,000 hectares; (ii) Cmd. 646 did not include the last two paragraphs of the draft text: cf. No. 52, minute 1. The two paragraphs of the draft text which were subsequently omitted read as follows:

'The Powers represented at the conference have accordingly agreed to instruct their representatives on the Reparation Commission to recommend that commission to inform Germany of the extension of time accorded by the Allied Governments for the operation of the provision in the letter of the 16th June, 1919; to enquire of Germany whether she is prepared to make such a proposal for the settlement of her liabilities under the treaty as was contemplated in that letter; to fix at the earliest possible date a final total for the amount to be paid by way of reparation, based on Germany's capacity to pay; and to take steps, in accordance with the provisions of article 235 of the treaty, to enable Germany to obtain essential foodstuffs and raw materials and, if necessary, to authorise her to raise a loan abroad for this purpose with such priority as the commission may think necessary.

'They propose to adopt a similar course in the case of Austria.'

I.C.P. 64.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers held in Lord Curzon's Room at the British Foreign Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1, on Thursday, March 4, 1920, at 11 a.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, General Mance, Sir A. Block; SECRETARIES, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Major Caccia, Major Young.

*France*: M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer.

*Italy*: Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Colonel Castoldi, Signor Nogara, Duke Ascanio Colonna.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

[1.] At the invitation of Lord Curzon, VISCOUNT CHINDA read the following statement:—

*Report of Committee on the Administration of the Waterways of the Straits and the Sea of Marmora.*

*Point raised by Viscount Chinda*

'According to article 4 of the draft articles on the Straits administration, the High Commission of the Straits is to be composed of the representatives of Great Britain, France and Italy, with whom will be associated those of Roumania and Greece with the contingent participation of the United States, Russia and Bulgaria. Of the four principal Allied Powers now being engaged in the formulation of peace terms with Turkey, Japan alone is excluded from partici-

pation in the commission.

'The decision has apparently been made upon the ground that Japan has no special interests in Turkey. I admit candidly that our three Allied Powers have their special interests and rights, both commercial and political, based upon their past relations with Turkey. No one will be more willing than I to recognise and respect them. But I venture to observe that the exclusive application of the claims of special interests to the special case is hardly compatible with the well-known policy of the Allied and Associated Powers for the control of the Straits. According to this policy as generally understood and accepted, the status of the Straits is to be placed upon a broad and international basis, and an entirely new regime is to be inaugurated. Instead of being, as they have been for centuries, an international bone of contention, the Straits are to be a free and open highway of the world's commerce. When the Allied and Associated Powers asked the United States to take mandate for the regions<sup>1</sup> it was evidently not in recognition of her preponderating special interests, but for holding them in trusteeship on behalf of the League of Nations. The American refusal to assume the mandate has naturally and necessarily produced certain changes in the plan, but there is no reason why the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. v, pp. 614 and 622.

original policy should be abandoned so far as the control of these Straits is concerned.

'Moreover, the proposed exclusion of Japan is entirely at variance with the general principle adopted and followed throughout the peace negotiations at Paris. As you are well aware, it was an invariable principle in cases like the present that all the principal Allied and Associated Powers should assume a joint responsibility by acting as a body for giving effect to the object of peace treaties. The guarantee for the free passage of the highway of the world like the case before us should be effected in conformity with these precedents by the collective assumption of responsibilities by the Allied Powers as a body. There is no reason why a new departure should be made in this case by excluding Japan from the concert. While I have no objection whatever to the participation in the commission of the small Powers geographically interested, I deem it essential that the general principle alluded to above should be maintained first.

'In conclusion I wish to submit to your special and sympathetic consideration the peculiarly difficult situation in which the Japanese Government would be placed if we were to sign those draft articles without being represented on the commission. Some of the powers conferred upon the commission may operate prejudicially against the interests and rights of our people. If we stood outside of this conference and did not participate in the elaboration of these articles, our position would not be so embarrassing, for then we might simply tell our people to submit to all the regulations and by-laws as they are founded upon the powers delegated by Turkey. But being a party ourselves to the arrangements for calling upon Turkey to delegate those powers, the Government would be held accountable to our people for having agreed to the arrangement without securing the adequate means to safeguard their interests and rights.

'I beg now to submit the case of Japan to your sense of fairness and equity.'

Viscount Chinda said that the question of Japanese representation on the Straits Commission was raised at the meeting of the Supreme Council (I.C.P. 40)<sup>2</sup> held at No. 10, Downing Street, on Saturday, the 21st February, 1920. The decision recorded was that in drafting the scheme for the control of the navigation of the Straits the request of the Japanese Government to be represented should be given effect to.

LORD CURZON said that he was not quite sure that this decision was correctly recorded. So far as his recollection went, the decision arrived at was that the Council of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers was to consider the request of the Japanese Government, when it came to consider the draft articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace. He remembered the incident well, and was quite certain in his own mind that the question was only referred for the consideration of the Council of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, and that no actual decision was taken. He had listened with great

<sup>2</sup> No. 20.

respect to the powerful statement of the Japanese Ambassador, and would ask his French and Italian colleagues to express their opinions before he replied to it.

M. CAMBON said that he did not know the French Government's views on the point raised, but would content himself with asking a few questions. The conference had established as a principle that the Straits Commission should be composed of representatives of the Mediterranean Powers who were directly interested in the Straits. He wished to point out that for these Powers freedom of the Straits was not merely an economical or commercial question, but that it had a political aspect. The whole history of the war had gone to emphasise the political importance of the passage from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea. If this point could be taken as established, the addition to the three Powers originally entrusted with the formation of the commission of representatives from Roumania, Greece and possibly Bulgaria, was inspired by the same principle. The Japanese Ambassador had himself stated that Japan had no political interest in the question. It followed that a line might fairly be drawn on this ground between Japan and the Mediterranean Powers. If the principle were to be abandoned and Japan to be admitted, it would be difficult to refute the claims to representation of all other Powers who had economical interests in that region.

Leaving America out of consideration for the moment it appeared possible that Holland and Spain might claim representation on economical grounds. Nothing was further from his intention than to give the appearance of raising disagreeable objections to the request of the Japanese Government.

M. BERTHELOT said that while he entirely concurred in the views expressed by M. Cambon, he would ask leave to mention four or five additional points:—

(1) Viscount Chinda had stated that the United States had been asked by the Allied and Associated Powers to accept a mandate for the Straits zone. He wished to say that the French Government had never been associated with any such official request. There had been a talk about the possibility of the United States being willing to accept these responsibilities, but no official proposition had ever been made to that effect. The French Government had never contemplated the United States being asked to accept a mandate, either for Constantinople, the Straits zone or Asia Minor. The only area in which an American mandate had been contemplated by the French Government was Armenia, and even in this case all that had been done was to ask the American Government whether they would be ready to accept any form of responsibility for Armenia. If they had replied in the affirmative, the desirability of extending an official invitation would have been considered.

(2) He desired to point out that Japan and America were on a similar footing in view of the fact that neither of the two Governments had declared war against Turkey. Nothing more had been suggested to either of the two Governments than that they should participate in a friendly manner in the discussions on the peace settlement with a Power with which they had not been at war.

(3) There had been three bases for the constitution of the Straits Commission, viz., the first, which was the accepted base, was that the three Mediterranean Powers, Great Britain, France and Italy, alone be represented on it; the second, which was that the five Great Powers should be represented, had been discarded in view of the fact that only three of the five had declared war against Turkey; the third, which was discussed at the last meeting, was that representation should be extended to certain smaller Powers with secondary interests in the freedom of the Straits from a local point of view. He wished to add that so far as admission of Bulgaria was concerned, he remained doubtful whether this would be expedient. The admission of an enemy Power to representation on the commission would form a precedent for a demand by Germany to be similarly represented.

(4) The Japanese Government appeared to base their argument for representation on the Straits Commission, not on political or Mediterranean interests, but on their interest in the preservation of general order. He did not see that this was in any way endangered by the present composition of the commission. Not only had the Powers who would be represented under the present arrangements no intention of interfering with the rights and privileges of other Powers, but they were actually paying money and providing troops for the protection of those rights, which, of course, included those of the Japanese Government.

(5) The composition of the Mediterranean Powers in the Straits zone appeared to him to correspond to that of Japan in Far Eastern waters. The Japanese Government was already following in those waters the policy which the Straits Commission proposed to follow in the Straits zone. By their control of the channels opposite Formosa and Saghalien they were in a position to 'cork up' the outlets of Chinese maritime trade. The European Powers had never interested themselves in this control, and did not intend to do so.

While the statement of the Japanese Ambassador was, to a certain extent, convincing, and was worthy of careful consideration, he did not himself think that he had established a case for Japanese participation in the Straits Commission.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA pointed out that the Straits Commission would have no political functions. Its duties would be confined to the policing of the Straits and the maintenance of the open door in the common interest. The commission was just charging itself with duties which, in his opinion, should be undertaken by the States immediately concerned, and by Powers who had the means of enforcing regulations made in the common interest. So far as he was aware, there was no considerable volume of Japanese trade through the Straits zone, and he thought that perhaps the Japanese Ambassador might agree to withdraw his suggestion. There was, however, he thought, one consideration in favour of the plan put forward by the Japanese Government. In article 4 of the draft articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace, the eventual participation of the United States Government had been provided for. In answer to this, it could be urged that the United States possessed

a far larger mercantile marine than Japan. It was also possible that they might not agree to participate. Japanese ships did not usually go further than the Suez Canal, and there did not appear to be any immediate prospect of Japanese trade with the Black Sea increasing in volume. It appeared more likely that the trade of Norway and Sweden with Black Sea ports would increase to an extent which would justify them in claiming representation if a Japanese representative were appointed on commercial grounds. He saw no strong reason for the Japanese Government to press their arguments, but if they decided to do so, he would not care to offer any objection.

LORD CURZON said that he would first deal with one or two minor points. M. Berthelot's statement with regard to the offer to the American Government of a mandate for any part of Turkey was correct. No official offer had been made and no official refusal, therefore, had been received. The President of the United States was known to be keenly interested in Armenia, and there was a general impression that a large section of American public opinion was behind him. There was another section of American opinion which appeared to desire an American mandate both for Constantinople and Asia Minor. All that had been done was to enquire unofficially to what extent the United States would be ready to accept responsibilities in Turkish spheres. In the second place, M. Berthelot had deprecated the eventual participation of Bulgaria in the Straits Commission. This point had really been decided at the last [*sic*] meeting,<sup>3</sup> but he would point out that the difference between Bulgaria and other enemy States was that Bulgaria possessed ports on the Black Sea.

Participation by the Russian Government, if and when Russia became a member of the League of Nations, had been provided for on the ground of Russia's position on the Black Sea. It was only logical to include Bulgaria for the same reason.

In reply to the point made by Signor Scialoja to the effect that there was some force in the Japanese argument on the ground that America had been hypothetically invited to participate in the Straits Commission, he pointed out that, in addition to the disparity between American and Japanese mercantile marines, there was the possibility, which he had never quite abandoned, that the United States would, at some future date, reverse their attitude, and become willing to accept some responsibility for Armenia. It was not a bad thing to provide for this contingency, and, in the present temper of the President and the American people, he was anxious to show that there was no intention of shutting the door on future participation by America. On the general merits of the question, he said that, when it had been decided to entrust the control of the Straits to a commission of interested Powers, the basis of that interest had been determined on two main grounds. The first of these had been geographical, and the second, commercial. The evidence of commercial interest was the volume of trade with Constantinople and the Black Sea, and the amount of shipping engaged. Japan fell within

<sup>3</sup> See No. 40.

neither of these two categories. He had before him the figures of Black Sea trade before the war. The Japanese share in this trade was so insignificant that it was not even mentioned. Supposing that the conference were to depart from the principle of the double basis of interest which he had described, where were they to stop? They would have to admit not only the neutral Powers mentioned by M. Cambon, but also certain Allies. Brazil, to mention only one example, was no further from the Straits than Japan was.

Another point made by the Japanese Ambassador had been that since Japan had been admitted to the discussions in Paris, her exclusion from participation in the Straits Commission would be a new departure. He did not think this was quite a fair statement of the position. What had happened hitherto was that the Allies had been only too glad to profit by the presence of distinguished Japanese representatives during the discussions on the various questions which had been raised in connection with the peace settlement, and to place them on the temporary committees or commissions. The Japanese Government now requested that Japan should take a permanent share in the future control of an area in which European Powers were primarily concerned. This would, in his opinion, be the new departure. The Japanese Ambassador had presented his arguments with great persuasiveness and considerable force, and the conference had listened to them with sympathy and respect. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that, when [*while*] the Japanese Government had given invaluable assistance to the Allied cause by sea, they had not participated in land operations in Europe. They had never declared war against Turkey. It was not now contemplated that they should share in the garrisoning of the Straits. They could not ask for privileges without assuming corresponding responsibilities. He wished to make it quite clear that if the general opinion appeared unfavourable to the proposals of the Japanese Ambassador, the attitude of the conference was not in the least due either to suspicion of the Japanese Government, or to a desire to place them in an inferior position. On the contrary, everyone present had a grateful recollection of Japanese assistance, of which they were profoundly conscious and deeply appreciative.

There was one more point. Assuming that the double basis of geographical and commercial interest was correctly stated, it was, of course, impossible for Japan to change her geographical position, but there were no reasons why she should not develop her economic interests. If she were to do this in the future, she would establish a claim that every one of the Allies would be only too glad to consider.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that after hearing the expression of the views of the conference the only course open to him was to reserve the whole question, and to ask for further instructions from his Government. Judging from certain of the arguments brought forward, he feared that the motives of the Japanese Government had perhaps been misunderstood. Nothing was further from their wish than to intrude themselves in European politics. The only basis on which they claimed an interest in the Straits was purely commercial. The Straits were one of the highways of the commerce of the world,

in which all maritime Powers must necessarily be interested. He did not think that this could be said to the same extent of the channels opposite Formosa and Saghalien, referred to by M. Berthelot.

(The conference took note of Viscount Chinda's reservation.)

2. LORD CURZON said that the conference would proceed to consider the draft proposals for the Financial Conditions of Peace with Turkey (A.J. 27).<sup>4</sup>

*Peace with  
Turkey. Draft  
Proposals for the  
Financial Con-  
ditions*

A request had been received from M. Veniselos that he should be given an opportunity of stating his views on this point before the conference. He had no idea on what specific points M. Veniselos wished to be heard, but he suggested that the conference should discuss the proposals in the first place and invite M. Veniselos to express his views at a later meeting. They were fortunate in the presence of Sir Adam Block, president of the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt, whom he had invited to assist the conference with his expert local knowledge.

*Article 1* Paragraphs 1 and 2 were accepted.

LORD CURZON said that he would ask for the assent of the conference to the principle laid down in this paragraph, namely, the general re-  
*Paragraph 3* serving [<sup>?</sup> waiving]<sup>5</sup> of reparation clauses.

M. KAMMERER said that the French delegation, before recording their final and formal acceptance of this principle, wished to point out that they had accepted it under reserve of the other finance and economic clauses, which were now under examination. In so far as it meant that no gold indemnity was to be demanded from the Ottoman Government, they accepted the principle.

(Adopted, subject to this reservation.)

LORD CURZON said that he understood that the Greek Government might express the view that a Greek commissioner should also be  
*Paragraph 4* associated with the Finance Commission. He suggested that the conference should await the views of M. Veniselos before discussing this point.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that he thought the question should be decided now in principle. The admission of the Greeks would, in his opinion, imply the destruction of all the work of the conference.

LORD CURZON pointed out that by the wording of the draft, the exclusion of the Greeks was already decided upon in principle, as no Greek Commissioner appeared in the draft. On the other hand, the association with the commission of a Turkish Commissioner had been proposed, because it was

<sup>4</sup> Not appended to filed copy: cf. No. 70, note 8 and No. 77, appendix.

<sup>5</sup> The typescript text is here uncertain: cf., however, No. 49, minute 1 and article 1 in the appendix to No. 77.



only reasonable that the Turkish Government should be represented in some form on a commission which was to deal with the finances of Turkey.

(Paragraph 4 was adopted.)

*Article 2* Paragraph 1 was adopted.

LORD CURZON said that these paragraphs were of great importance, as they *Paragraphs 2 and 3* provided for the complete control by the Finance Commission of the future Turkish budget. The scheme, as he understood it, might be compared to a ladder with three rungs. The first and least important rung was the Turkish Government. The second rung was the Turkish Inspectorate of Finance, and the third and most important was the Finance Commission. The Turkish Inspectorate of Finance was to be developed and would assume a new form, in so far as it was to be a servant of the Finance Commission.

M. CAMBON said that to those who had lived in Turkey and had seen Turkish administration at work, it was clearly necessary that the entire finance control should be out of Turkish hands. He did not mean by this that Turkish officials should [*not*] be employed. The administration of the debt was a good example of the results which could be attained by non-Turkish control over Turkish officials. Another example was the Finance Commission and the gendarmerie that had been set up for a short time in Macedonia, and had worked excellently.

MARQUIS IMPERIALI agreed with M. Cambon, and mentioned that the Inspector-General of the gendarmerie in Macedonia had been under the orders of the Finance Commission.

SIR ADAM BLOCK said that the Turkish Inspectorate of Finance, which was composed of from fifteen to twenty inspectors, both Turkish and Armenian, was now completely disorganised. Replying to a question of Lord Curzon he said that it was absolutely necessary that the inspectors should be under the orders of the Finance Commission. He could not express an opinion on the practicability of the system outlined in the draft proposals, as he had only just seen them.

It was generally agreed that the appointment of the inspectors, though made by the Turkish Government, should be subject to the approval of the commission.

VISCOUNT CHINDA pointed out that the powers of action against unsuitable officials of the Government, which were proposed at the end of this paragraph, appeared to go beyond what the Financial Commission should logically exercise, inasmuch as all Government officials were included.

LORD CURZON agreed, and after some discussion—

It was decided that paragraph 3 should be redrafted as follows:—

The Financial Commission shall supervise the execution of the budget and financial laws and regulations of the Ottoman Empire. This supervision shall be exercised through the medium of the Turkish Inspectorate

of Finance, whose appointment shall be subject to the approval and who shall be placed under the direct orders of the Financial Commission. The Ottoman Government undertakes to furnish to this Inspectorate all facilities necessary for the fulfilment of their task and to take such action against unsuitable officials in the Financial Departments of the Government as the Financial Commission may suggest.

*Article 3* Adopted.

*Article 4* Adopted.

LORD CURZON pointed out that the whole of this article was based on the principle that all the resources of the Turkish Government, with the sole exception of revenues conceded or hypothecated to the service of the Ottoman External Debt, should be placed at the disposal of the Financial Commission. This was a very important point in which he invited the concurrence of the conference.

*Article 5:  
Preamble*

(Agreed.)

LORD CURZON deprecated the payment of the salaries and current expenses of the Financial Commission being given such a prominent position as the first charge on the resources of the Turkish Government.

On the suggestion of COLONEL STORR, it was decided that paragraphs (i) and (ii) should be combined in one paragraph, which should commence as follows:—

(i) 'The first charge after the salaries and current expenses of the Financial Commission have been paid shall be the cost of the Allied naval and military forces,' &c.

LORD CURZON drew attention to a speech of Mr. Lloyd George at the meeting of the Supreme Council, held at 10, Downing Street, on the 2nd March.<sup>6</sup> On that occasion M. Cambon had undertaken to submit the special question of the cost of occupying Syria to the French Government.

M. CAMBON said that he had telegraphed in this sense but that no reply had yet been received. It did not seem to him to be a question for the treaty at all, but one for settlement between the British and French Governments.

LORD CURZON said that any willingness on his part to accept the principle that the Turkish Government should not be charged with the cost of occupying territories must be subject to satisfaction being obtained by the British Government on the question of the cost of occupying Syria.

M. CAMBON observed that there were two distinct points at issue. The first point, which had been decided by the Supreme Council on the 2nd March,

<sup>6</sup> See No. 42, minute 3 (c).

was that the cost of occupying territories to be taken away from Turkey should not be charged to the Turkish Government. The subsidiary question of the cost of occupying Syria was one for discussion between the British and French Governments.

LORD CURZON did not agree with this contention. He pointed out that the draft was now being discussed clause by clause, and that each representative had a right to reserve his concurrence to any particular clause. As the representative of the British Government he reserved acceptance to this particular clause pending a decision on the cost of occupying Syria. He did not agree that a definite decision had been taken on the 2nd March. The conference was endeavouring to act on the general principle laid down by Signor Nitti, that the whole matter had been referred back to them by the Supreme Council, and he could not accordingly accept M. Cambon's view.

M. CAMBON said that his own recollection was quite clear. After Signor Nitti's speech, Mr. Lloyd George had agreed that the cost of occupying territories to be taken away from Turkey should not be charged to the Turkish Government. The question of Syria was left as a separate question.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said he did not think that the payment for the occupation of Syria could be regarded merely as a question between the French and British Governments. Important precedents were involved, and he thought the matter should be settled by the conference.

LORD CURZON said that he read the minutes of the meeting of the Supreme Council on the 2nd March to mean that Mr. Lloyd George, while he concurred in the general principle, was not prepared to accept it formally until the special question of the cost of occupying Syria had been referred to the French Government by M. Cambon.

(The conference decided to postpone discussion of paragraph (ii) pending a reply from the French Government to M. Cambon's telegram.)

*(The meeting then adjourned.)*

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 4, 1920.

I.C.P. 65.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, held in Lord Curzon's Room at the British Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1, on Thursday, March 4, 1920, at 4 p.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Blackett, General Mance, Sir A. Block; **SECRETARIES,** Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Major Caccia, Captain Abraham, Major Young.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer.

*Italy:* Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Colonel Castoldi, Signor Nogara, Duke Ascanio Colonna.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda.

**INTERPRETER:** M. Camerlynck.

1. **LORD CURZON** said that the conference would remember that they had separated that morning after having had a discussion with regard to Clause 5 (i).<sup>1</sup> After the meeting, he had seen the Prime Minister, who had told him that he had quite correctly expressed his views, namely, that he had intended to reserve the question of the cost of the Allied military occupation of Syria. The Prime Minister had therefore suggested that the conference should postpone all further discussion of the question, pending a reply from the French Government to M. Cambon's telegram. That merely confirmed the decision taken by the conference that morning.

Furthermore, he wished to clear up another point in regard to reparations. It should be clearly understood that the Allied and Associated Powers waived their rights to reparation only in so far as concerned the cost of the military and naval occupation of territories to be severed from the Turkish Empire. But the cost of the occupation of Cilicia, whether borne by the British or by the French, would be included in the reparations to be recovered from the Turkish Empire.

**LORD CURZON** pointed out that paragraph 5 (iii) would now become paragraph 5 (ii). Further, the word 'third,' at the end of the paragraph, would become 'second.'

(This was agreed to.)

**LORD CURZON**, continuing, said that he wished next to raise an independent point, namely, whether any claims for the indemnification for losses suffered by Turkish Christian subjects should be included. A great many of the native population had suffered the destruction of their property and villages, and were now returning to ruined homes. The question was one which M. Veniselos had asked permission to raise. It had also been raised by the British High Commissioner in Constantinople, who pressed very

<sup>1</sup> See No. 48, minute 2.

strongly that the Allied Governments should not merely demand reparation for the losses incurred by their own populations, but also for those people who would be compelled to return to devastated regions. The British representative on the Finance [? Minorities] Commission, Mr. Vansittart, also held strong views on this point; but he did not know what had happened in committee; or whether any decision had been taken. In his opinion, the question could be considered from two aspects. First, the moral right of the Allies, which was indisputable, to demand this reparation; secondly, the expediency of demanding the same; a question which would be largely affected by the financial resources of the Turkish Empire in the future.

M. CAMBON said that he had placed himself with those who considered that some account should be taken of the sufferings of minorities. Therefore, even without having any great hope that sufficient sums of money would be available for the purpose, he thought it would have a good moral effect on the population to know that their sufferings had received due consideration.

M. KAMMERER said that in drafting clause 5 (iii) the commission had never considered the question of making reparation to subjects of the Turkish Empire. The reason for this was that in article 1 the commission had recognised that the resources of Turkey would not be sufficient to enable her to make complete reparation. The question involved was a very large one, entailing the consideration of difficult technical details. He thought, therefore, that in the first place, it should be examined by the commission, who would prepare and submit definite proposals.

MR. VANSITTART said that the British representatives had already prepared a series of draft clauses for the consideration of the conference. He would now propose, however, that the whole question should be referred back to the Financial Commission, to report on the possibility of the various proposals which he would submit to them.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that in principle he found himself in complete agreement with the views expressed by Lord Curzon and M. Cambon with regard to the desirability of doing something to recoup the people in question, provided this could be done without detriment to their own nationals.

LORD CURZON pointed out that the indemnification of Turkish nationals would constitute a third charge upon the revenues of the Turkish State at the disposal of the Financial Commission and would therefore only be considered after the claims of the Allied Powers had been met. He proposed, therefore, that the Financial Commission should be instructed to draft a clause which would form article 5 (iii).

M. KAMMERER expressed the view that the Financial Commission should be charged with the duty of examining the whole question of reparations. So far nothing had been settled with regard to what would constitute the right to indemnification. In making reparations the case of two sets of people would have to be considered, viz., the claims of nationals of the Allied Powers, and, secondly, the claims of those nationals who may have become Allies since the outbreak of war.

LORD CURZON said that he understood the question of reparations had not been exhaustively discussed by the Financial Commission. He agreed, therefore, that they should now be asked to do so. Further, when the commission met again they should also hear M. Veniselos, particularly as he (M. Veniselos) had drawn up a definite scheme to deal with this question.

It was agreed—

- (i) That the Financial Commission should examine the whole question of reparations in detail, and submit definite draft proposals to be included in the financial conditions of the peace with Turkey, including a clause to be numbered article 5 (iii) to deal with the claims of the Turkish nationals for indemnification for loss or damage through the action of the Turkish Government during the war; and
- (ii) That the Financial Commission should hear M. Veniselos on this question.

SIR ADAM BLOCK invited attention to the fact that the annex referred to in the first paragraph of article 5 appeared to be incomplete, no mention being made of the debt as defined by the Decree of Mouharrem.

M. KAMMERER explained that the Financial Commission had decided to leave the final preparation of the annex in question to experts. They fully realised that in its present form it was incomplete.

(The conference took note of the fact that Annex 1 would have to be redrafted by experts.)

MR. BLACKETT invited attention to the following clause in Article 5 (iii).

‘The Financial Commission shall adjudicate on all claims of this nature.’

He understood that the Economic Commission had proposed that a special tribunal should be set up under the ægis of the League of Nations. The conference would therefore agree that the League of Nations tribunal would probably be charged with the duty of dealing with such questions.

SIR ADAM BLOCK expressed the view that the Financial Commission would be the most suitable body to adjudicate on all claims for indemnification. In his opinion it would be impossible to set up a more just tribunal than the Financial Commission.

MR. BLACKETT pointed out that the claims for indemnification would be submitted by subjects of all the Allied Powers, whereas the Financial Commission only represented three of the Great Powers.

LORD CURZON proposed that the conference should accept the proposal made by the Financial Commission, and if the Economic Commission wished to make any representation they would be at liberty to do so.

It was agreed to retain the sentence in article 5 (iii):—

‘The Financial Commission shall adjudicate on all claims of this nature.’

LORD CURZON invited attention to the second note of article 5, wherein it was stated that part of the cost of maintaining the freedom of the Straits might be defrayed from other sources. It was now admitted that no other funds would be available and therefore the note in question should be deleted.

(It was agreed to delete the second note of article 5 (iii).)

*Article 6* Was adopted without objection.

*Article 7* Was adopted without objection.

LORD CURZON observed that very wide powers were being conferred by this article on the Financial Commission. He had asked whether there was any precedent for a servitude of this character, which appeared to him to be very drastic.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that the clause was perhaps not so drastic if considered in relation to that which curtailed the Turkish Parliament in dealing freely with its own budget.

SIR ADAM BLOCK questioned whether it was necessary to have such an article. Any concessions involving financial liabilities to the Turkish State would, of necessity, come into the budget.

LORD CURZON thought that a clause might perhaps be required to deal with certain cases. For instance, some person might offer to manage the forests on behalf of Turkey, or ask for a concession to produce attar of roses. Such concessions might not involve any expenditure by the Turkish State. Should such concessions be granted to a German, or to any other ex-enemy subject, ought we to be without power to interfere?

M. CAMBON agreed that proposals might be made to the Turk for concessions which might involve no financial burdens on Turkey, but which might remove certain of her assets from Allied control.

(After some further discussion it was decided to leave the article, as drafted, without alteration.)

LORD CURZON said he understood that there had been some idea of excepting the Hedjaz from the operation of this article, partly because it contained the Holy Places, and partly because it would not be in possession of any funds.

M. KAMMERER said he thought it would be creating a very dangerous precedent to specify any exception. Armenia, for instance, was to inherit devastated territory which would clearly be unable to bear any financial obligations for a time. Similar reasons might be alleged by Macedonia, Montenegro, &c. He thought the principle should be affirmed quite absolutely; in practice mitigations might be introduced. The distribution of burdens would be made in proportion to resources.

LORD CURZON said that he agreed that this appeared to be the right course.

*Question of  
Turkish State  
Property in Ceded  
Territories* LORD CURZON said that a new point had been brought to his notice, namely, that the draft financial clauses made no provision for the transfer of Turkish State property in territory transferred to other States. In all other Peace Treaties this question had been dealt with in the financial clauses. Seeing that the question whether such property should be transferred free of charge, or whether its value should be added to the amount of the liability undertaken by such States in respect of the pre-war Ottoman Debt, the [*sic*] proper place for dealing with the matter seemed to him to be the financial clauses.

M. KAMMERER said that in the other Peace Treaties property of this character had been ceded at a price creditable to the Reparation Commission. In Turkey, however, such property was to pass to the new owner of the territory for nothing. The reason for this was that great leniency was being shown to Turkey in the matter of reparations, and this gratuitous transfer of property might be regarded as an equivalent. He pointed out that in another part of the treaty the question had been dealt with. The text to which he referred was section 34, as follows:—

‘The Powers to which Ottoman territory is ceded shall acquire all property and possessions situated therein belonging to the Ottoman Empire or to the Civil List.’

He was quite ready to have this clause inserted among the financial clauses if the conference desired this to be done.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA observed that Turkish State property was less determinate than State property in Europe. The Turkish State had peculiar rights over private property and over pious foundations. It followed that far greater values were involved in dealing with Turkish State property than in dealing with the property of European States. The explanation given by M. Kammerer would be excellent if it were true that all States with claims against Turkey received territory in satisfaction of their claims. But this was not so. This method, therefore, did not represent a complete indemnification of all claimants. Some might get nothing. Great Britain and France, especially the former, in view of what they had spent, rightly would receive a great deal. But Greece, which had spent very little, was going to receive the most prosperous portion of Turkey, and, with it, very large Governmental property rights. Thus, there would be a most inequitable distribution, and he thought the matter should be reconsidered.

LORD CURZON said that the Greek case might be looked at from another point of view. The conference had been considering earlier what compensation could be obtained for Armenian and Greek victims of the Turks. This had been done on moral grounds, and it had been generally agreed that the victims would not be likely to obtain much compensation. Greece would undoubtedly be put to great expense in getting the territories assigned to her in working order. He thought what she would receive might be regarded as



a sort of compensation under these heads. He would ask Signor Scialoja if he had any definite proposals to make in the alternative.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he had no definite proposals to make. His remarks had been intended as criticism of what had been suggested. He thought the question should be re-examined. As to the sufferings of Greeks in Turkey, he did not think they would be much alleviated by the enrichment of the Turkish [? Greek] State, seeing that the victimised Greeks would mostly remain with Turkey. For them to receive any benefit from the transfer of Turkish State property to the Greek Government, it would be necessary to establish a credit in their favour on Greek resources.

M. KAMMERER observed that it was wellnigh impossible to obtain exact reparation for every claim. The best that could be done was to mete out substantial justice by rough equivalents. He argued, therefore, that it would be better to leave the clause as it stood, inequitable as its workings might appear if considered in detail.

SIR ADAM BLOCK said that it seemed advisable to define very carefully what was meant by Turkish State property. He pointed out that many complications of Wakf property<sup>2</sup> and religious bequests were involved. He understood from the Italian delegation that the question of Wakfs had been discussed by the Commission on Minorities in Paris.

M. KAMMERER said that the Minorities Commission had taken certain definite decisions on Wakf properties, and that a clause was to be inserted in the treaty on this subject. This clause did not apply to Asia Minor, but it would have to be extended. He agreed that certain Wakf property would be covered by the expression 'Turkish State property,' and it was clearly necessary that this phrase should be defined. He thought that article 9 should be studied in relation to the question of the Wakfs. He suggested that the article might be headed with some formula, which made it clear that its provisions were subject to reservation in the light of any contrary provisions of the present treaty.

It was agreed that the following words should be inserted at the beginning of article 9:—

'Subject to reservation in the light of any contrary provisions which might be introduced in this treaty.'

*Article 10* Was adopted.

*Articles 11, 12 and 13* Were adopted.

*Article 14* Paragraphs 1 and 2 were adopted.  
Paragraph 3.

VISCOUNT CHINDA objected to the last sentence of this paragraph, which provided that no change in the schedule of customs charges might be ordered except by the Financial Commission. He had raised the same objection at the Supreme Council, and, if he remembered rightly, had been supported in his objection by the Prime Minister.<sup>3</sup> He considered that even within the

<sup>2</sup> Property held in trust for religious or charitable uses.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 42, minute 3 (a).

limit of 11 per cent. beyond which the customs dues could not be raised, any alteration would be of great importance to the interests of foreign trade. He suggested that the sentence should be expunged.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that this sentence embodied one of the main points and was of great importance.

M. KAMMERER said the position was that Turkey was not free to modify her customs dues, which were a part of the regime of the Capitulations. It was generally agreed that this regime was antiquated and must be superseded by something more efficient. The Economic Commission would bring forward proposals for the raising of the customs dues, and if any Power were to protest, it should, in his opinion, be Great Britain, France or Italy, whose combined interest in the Turkish customs dues exceeded 90 per cent. of the total. He hoped that in view of the comparative insignificance of Japanese trade interests in Turkey the Japanese Ambassador would withdraw his objection.

VISCOUNT CHINDA observed that he was speaking not only for Japan, but for all Powers which would not be represented on the Financial Commission. He quite realised that the three Great Powers most closely concerned would raise no objection to control by the Financial Commission, on which they were represented, but he thought that other Powers besides Japan might raise objections.

LORD CURZON was inclined to agree with the contention of the Japanese Ambassador. He pointed out that this contingency appeared to be provided for in clause 3 of the Economic Clauses. At the same time he noticed that this clause was confined to the Allied and Associated Powers.

M. KAMMERER pointed out that the regime of the Capitulations was based mainly on the old Capitulations of Francis I.<sup>4</sup> The smaller Powers for the most part did not enjoy capitulatory rights, but only the most favoured nation clause. If the Capitulations were altered, this clause would no longer have effect, and the claim of the smaller nations would fall to the ground. If the economic safeguards which were in contemplation materialised, he did not think that the other Powers would have any ground for protest.

LORD CURZON said that he could understand M. Kammerer's point, but the fact remained that the economic clause referred to left the small minority of neutral Powers untouched. He did not see why it should be necessary to restrict the proposed notification to the Allied and Associated Powers. If it were the case that the small States would lose their rights by the revision of the Capitulations, it appeared all the more necessary that they should be kept informed of projected changes.

M. KAMMERER said that he saw no insuperable objection to the extension of the notification to the neutral States. He suggested that the Economic Commission, when they met to discuss the economic clauses, should consider

<sup>4</sup> For these so-called capitulations of 1535 in favour of France see Hertslet's *Treaties, &c. between Turkey and Foreign Powers 1535-1855* (London, 1855), pp. 169-74; see also, however, Gaston Zeller, 'Une légende qui a la vie dure: les capitulations de 1535' in *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, April-June 1955, vol. ii, pp. 127 f.

the desirability of extending clause 3 to provide for the inclusion of the neutral States.

VISCOUNT CHINDA pointed out that the treaty was being made with an eye to the future, and he adhered to the view that the last sentence of this paragraph should be expunged.

LORD CURZON observed that while it might be reasonable to concede to the smaller Powers the right to protest and make themselves heard.<sup>5</sup> It was not contemplated to put them in a position to obstruct.

M. KAMMERER thought the Japanese Ambassador had possibly failed to realise that the whole object of this sentence was to provide for some control over the administration of the customs.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that the Financial Commission was being given already so much power in other ways, that he did not see the necessity for them also to control the customs.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI observed that the raising of the customs dues was the best way to increase the revenues of Turkey. If the council<sup>6</sup> were left uncontrolled, what was to prevent their raising the dues to an extent which would cause unnecessary loss to the three Powers most directly concerned?

LORD CURZON said that if the sentence referred to were expunged the existing system would stand and dues could not be raised at all. He asked whether Viscount Chinda proposed that the Turkish Government should be left free to raise the customs dues uncontrolled. He said that the Supreme Council had already accepted the principle, and that it was perhaps unnecessary to meet possible objections in advance.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI pointed out that the British, French and Italian Governments, who had a 90 per cent. interest in the trade with Turkey, were not likely to allow the Turkish Government to raise its dues to an inordinate extent.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that he was not only considering the question of a possible rise in the dues; there might be alterations in the tariff on certain articles, in which other Powers would necessarily be interested.

LORD CURZON suggested that the sentence should be reworded as follows:—

‘No change in the schedule of the customs charges shall be made, except with the approval of the Financial Commission.’

(This alternative wording was adopted, the Japanese Ambassador accepting it under reserve.)

M. CAMBON raised again a point which he had raised on the previous [*sic*] day at the Supreme Council and on which no final decision had been taken.<sup>7</sup> He asked whether alterations to the charter of the Ottoman Public Debt could be made without consulting the bondholders. He raised this merely as a point of law and not as an objection.

<sup>5</sup> This full stop should be a comma.

<sup>6</sup> i.e. the Council of the Ottoman Debt: cf. draft article 16 in the appendix to No. 77.

<sup>7</sup> See No. 42, minute 3 (e).

SIR ADAM BLOCK said that in his opinion the correct answer to any objection raised by bondholders would be that as a result of the war the Decree of Mouharrem was already null and void in view of Turkish loss of territory, and that there was, therefore, no legal ground for protest.

M. CAMBON said that this answer would not be sufficient. The constitution of the debt had not been altered and the bondholders would, in his opinion, have a legal right to protest.

LORD CURZON pointed out that the paragraph only provided that the Allied Governments should use their best endeavours in 1923 to arrange that the Financial Commission should take the place of the Council of Debt. Would it not be sufficient to leave the point for discussion on the expiry of the present term of office?

On the suggestion of M. Kammerer it was decided to add the words:—

‘After consultation with the bondholders’ to the penultimate sentence of the paragraph.

*Articles 15 to 26* Were adopted.

The annexes were adopted subject to the decision of the Supreme Council<sup>7</sup> with regard to the chairmanship of the commission referred to in Annex 2, article 1.

*(The meeting then adjourned.)*

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 4, 1920.

## No. 50

I.C.P. 66.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Friday, March 5, 1920, at 11 a.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; The Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, Lord President of the Council; The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, Lord Privy Seal; The Right Hon. W. H. Long, First Lord of the Admiralty;<sup>1</sup> Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff; Field-Marshal Sir H. H. Wilson, Bart., Chief of the Imperial General Staff; SECRETARIES, Brigadier-General S. H. Wilson, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Major Caccia.

*France*: M. Paul Cambon, M. Berthelot, General the Viscount de la Panouse, Commander Blanpré.

*Italy*: Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Colonel Castoldi, Commander Ruspoli, Duke Ascalio [*sic*] Colonna.

*Greece*: M. Veniselos (for part only).

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

1. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the conference had assembled that morning to consider what action they should take at Constantinople. He understood that the High Commissioners of the three Allied Powers had been consulted, and the British High Commissioner had sent one

<sup>1</sup> The Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill, Secretary of State for War and Air, was evidently also present for a part, at least, of the meeting: see below.

or two telegrams, but he (Mr. Lloyd George) was not quite certain exactly what advice the British High Commissioner intended to tender. Admiral de Robeck's first telegram had crossed one which had been sent in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council,<sup>2</sup> and seemed to recommend that we should take and occupy Constantinople. The second telegram from the admiral enquired as to the nature of the terms of peace that we were offering the Turks: were they likely to mollify them? In that case no action, in the view of our High Commissioner, would be necessary. As the conference knew, our terms were, on the contrary, very severe, and certainly not of a character to placate the enemy. Those terms included cutting off Armenia, Mesopotamia, Thrace, Smyrna, Syria and Palestine, and they placed the rest of the Turkish Empire in Asia Minor under control and practically in fetters. The conference, therefore, must make up their minds as to the action to be taken, and should issue instructions accordingly at once. There was no doubt that the recent massacre of Armenians had created an uneasy feeling in the civilised world, and unless drastic action were taken now the Turks, who were defying us, would continue to defy us successfully. Inaction on our part would disappoint the whole world. Moreover, it would also increase our difficulties, as it would render the Turks less likely to accept our terms and the control which we intended to exercise. It would also increase the difficulties of the French in Cilicia, where there was a powerful, regular, organised and well-led Turkish army, under Mustafa Kemal, so far as our information went. Mustafa Kemal was not an ordinary bandit or robber chieftain, but was actually the Governor of Erzerum, appointed by the Turkish Government, which was obviously in sympathy with him. This Turkish Governor attacks our Ally, and we take no action! His own view was that we should take the most energetic action possible at once. We should first demand Mustafa Kemal's dismissal, and then we should occupy Constantinople with an Allied force.

M. CAMBON said that the French Government had received a despatch from their High Commissioner at Constantinople, which was practically identical in character with that which had been received by the British Government from Admiral de Robeck. The French High Commissioner thought that if the Supreme Council intended to exact stringent peace terms they would have to take effective action at once: that is to say, the occupation of Constantinople and such other measures as the military authorities might consider necessary, as, if the Turks learned that we meant to cut off Smyrna and Thrace down to the Chatalja lines from their former empire, they would almost certainly begin massacring the Christians; and it was essential that the Allied Powers should carefully consider what announcement should accompany their action, in order to ensure all possible safeguards for the Christian populations of Turkey. In view of this, it was desirable that the High Commissioners and the military authorities at the Turkish capital should be informed in good time, so that suitable steps could be taken to consolidate the military situation. If, on the other hand, the terms were

<sup>2</sup> See No. 38, appendix and No. 45, minute 4 and appendix 2.

comparatively lenient, the High Commissioners thought that equal secrecy would not be necessary, but that they should be given discretion to divulge the character of those terms to the Sultan and other moderate elements. That was the opinion of the French High Commissioner. He himself felt that the Allies must now envisage a situation which was practically the resumption of war. As regards the question of French reinforcements, two battalions had already landed at Beirut, and seven more battalions were about to leave Marseilles. All these units were fully equipped, and accompanied by adequate supplies of war material, transport, and so on. As regards naval action, the French Government did not propose to send any more ships to Constantinople, but the French naval forces already there were prepared at any time, if considered necessary, to appear before the Syrian [*sic*] coasts and make a demonstration at Mersina. In conclusion, he would ask: Were the Allies to occupy Constantinople? He himself thought that it would be prudent for them to do this, for if there were any massacres there the Allies would stand disgraced before the whole world. The occupation of certain points in the Turkish capital would probably have to be accompanied by a more extended occupation of its environments. He agreed with Mr. Lloyd George that strong pressure should be brought to bear upon the Turkish Government to make them dismiss Mustafa Kemal. In the meantime, the French Government was taking the necessary military precautions, and, as he had stated, would make a naval demonstration off Cilic[i]a, if necessary. In reply to a question, M. Cambon said that he understood there were about fourteen French battalions now in and about Constantinople, and there were a certain number of French troops in Bulgaria.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the British Government were quite prepared to undertake the occupation of Constantinople unsupported, but, for obvious reasons, they considered it most desirable that their Allies, the French and Italians, should co-operate. As M. Cambon had said, the first thing to do was to demand the dismissal of Mustafa Kemal. There was no doubt that had he been a German we should have insisted upon this at once.

LORD CURZON said that he would venture to make a few observations as to the way in which he thought the Allies should proceed. There were really two policies put forward by the High Commissioners. The first was what had been called the *bloc* policy: that is to say, that we should treat the Sultan as a reasonable person and take him under our protection, rally the moderate elements around him, and stiffen them in their resistance to the Nationalists. For this the Commissioners urged a lenient peace; that is, that we should leave the Turk at Constantinople—which we had agreed to do: that we should expel the Greeks from Smyrna—which was quite impossible: that we should allow the Turks to remain in Thrace—which was contrary to our policy. Lenient terms would destroy all hopes of a reconstituted Armenia, and it would mean a Turkish Kurdistan. In other words, it would involve an absolute reversal of the policy the Allies had decided to adopt. The alternative policy was a strong policy, as indicated by Mr. Lloyd George and M. Cambon. This was the policy to which he thought the council

rallied. What steps, then, should be taken to carry out this policy? The first difficulty that presented itself was that our High Commissioners did not know exactly what was in our minds and what were our intentions. Therefore, the first step was for us to inform our High Commissioners confidentially of the broad lines of the policy we intended provisionally to follow: that is to say, we should tell them that we proposed that the Sultan should remain at Constantinople so long as he behaves; that Thrace is to be handed to the Greeks as far as the Chatalja lines; that Smyrna is to be administered by the Greeks, subject to the nominal suzerainty of the Sultan; that an Armenia of a certain size is to be constituted. We should then say that these terms were so drastic as to exclude the *bloc* policy, and that it was evident that they must be imposed by the force of arms. That being the case, what would be the exact moment when we should impose them; at what places should they be imposed; and what forces would be required for the purpose? The last point was, in his view, of the greatest importance. He felt that they would be wrong to assume that the Allies would only meet with opposition in Constantinople and Cilicia. It was more than probable that Turkey and Greece would come to blows in Smyrna and in Thrace. Further, although Mustafa Kemal was at present up in the north, with a strong organised force under his command, that force was very mobile, and if they wished to murder Armenians they could carry out their wishes at many points. It would be dangerous for the Allies to imagine that the whole thing could be settled by the fourteen or more battalions in and about Constantinople, and by the appearance of a few ships off Mersina, or by such action as the French could take in Cilicia. He suggested, therefore, that the character of the terms should be communicated confidentially to the High Commissioners; that the Commissioners should be asked to estimate the forces required to impose those terms, and that they should then be authorised to proceed. There was one other point. In one way it would be perfectly easy to get Mustafa Kemal deposed or dismissed merely by writing a few words on a piece of paper. That would all depend upon what Turkish Government was in power; but he would remind the conference that the Turkish Government had fallen the previous day, and the man who had been asked by the Sultan to form a new Government was Izzat Pasha, who was a man profoundly distrusted by all the Allies. Though a capable soldier, he was politically disreputable and discredited as a Minister. He, again, might fall from power to-morrow. Again, if we demanded the dismissal of Mustafa Kemal, the Turkish Government might agree nominally to dismiss him, but Kemal himself was a most elusive creature, and he might be at Sivas or at Erzerum, and it would be practically impossible to lay hands upon him. In conclusion, Lord Curzon said that the Allies must take a series of precautionary measures, and the above suggestions of his own were merely indications of the steps which he thought should be taken to carry out the policy which he understood the conference was disposed to adopt.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he had no direct information himself from the Italian representative at Constantinople, so he would have to accept the

information which had been communicated by Mr. Lloyd George and M. Cambon. The Allies were evidently faced with a problem of very great difficulty. They could not disguise from themselves the fact that actually they were at war with Turkey, although this war manifested itself at present only in a series of attacks of a local character. Everything depended on the attitude which would be taken up by the Turkish Nationalist party. He thought that Lord Curzon had accurately described the nature of the measures which the Allies should take. He agreed with Mr. Lloyd George that immediate and energetic action was required, and that the conference must come to some decision that day. They must be under no misapprehension as to the situation and what would be involved by drastic action. As regards the policy which the Allies had adopted hitherto, it certainly had not had the effect of supporting or assisting the Sultan; indeed, it might almost be described as a pro-Nationalist policy. The Nationalist party were the only people at present who counted in Turkey, and they would certainly never accept our terms. It was very desirable to strengthen the hands of the Sultan and his party, if this were possible, but he was afraid that we could not do much to this end. No doubt we might get the Turkish Government formally to dismiss Mustafa Kemal from the Governorship of Erzerum, but this would mean practically nothing. Mustafa would continue to lead the Nationalist party, which would be strengthened by the adherence of a large number of the Moderates, who would feel it their duty to oppose the terms of peace.

(At this point M. Veniselos joined the conference.)

Signor Scialoja, continuing, said he did not know what exactly were the force[s] at present at the disposal of the Allies in those regions. So far as the Italians were concerned, he was unable to offer any accurate estimate, as the Italian military representative, General Cavallero, was not in London, but he expected to be back on the following Sunday. There might possibly be about 11,000 Italian troops all told, though the actual number probably was rather below 10,000. Signor Nitti's last instructions were rather in a direction contrary to offensive action, and orders had been sent to the Italian troops to withdraw from the interior towards the coast. So far as naval forces were concerned, the Italians had a certain number of ships at Taranto which could be sent to Turkey, if necessary. He himself suggested that we should inform our High Commissioners of what we had done, the policy we proposed to pursue, and the terms we intended to exact, and we should then instruct them to take the necessary action. The Marquis Imperiali, who had very considerable experience of Turkey, had, at a meeting on the previous day, stated that the Governments were liable to take an incorrect view of the situation as they were too far off; and obviously they were not as well equipped to form a judgment as the men on the spot. He had been told that a certain distinguished Minister had been in the habit of keeping all telegrams and despatches and referring to them in future years in order to see what grave mistakes had been made by those not on the spot.



MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked M. Veniselos what Greek troops they had on the spot.

M. VENISELOS replied that there were six Greek divisions on a war footing in and about Smyrna, and they also had one division in Western Thrace on a war footing; and in Eastern Thrace there was one Greek battalion. Altogether, the Greek forces might amount to about 100,000 men.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that it would be useful if the conference would endeavour to ascertain what Allied troops were actually available, supposing the Turk proved absolutely recalcitrant. They had been told that the Greeks at Smyrna numbered about 90,000; the British troops in Turkey, excluding Palestine, about 12,000; France had in Cicilia [*sic*] something between 18,000 and 20,000; two battalions had just been landed, and another seven battalions would shortly be on their way. The French had in Thrace fourteen battalions, and round Constantinople about 8,000 men. The Italians had approximately 10,000. This meant that the Allies had got practically 160,000 troops, as compared with a total Turkish force of 80,000 men.

He could not help thinking that the Allied Powers had so far been inclined greatly to exaggerate the power of the Turk. In his opinion, it would be more correct to say that the Turk had been a great military power, but had now ceased to hold that position. Turkey had been beaten by Bulgaria, and again, in the Turkish theatre during the recent war, the British Government had employed Indian troops—newly raised, raw levies, with only a small stiffening of white troops—and yet they had easily beaten the Turks. He could not help thinking that if two soldiers—French, British, Italian or Greek—could not defeat one Turk, the Allies ought to start their conference anew and ask the Turk upon what terms he would condescend to make peace. In a word, the Allies must make up their minds once and for all either to show the Turk that they could enforce the terms of the Treaty of Peace or decide not to send them in at all. Further, he thought it would be better that the Turk should know before he came to Paris that he would there find himself face to face with Powers that meant to impose their will on him; otherwise, it would be no use to talk about such things as spheres of influence, occupation of the Straits and the protection of minorities. He hoped the council would agree to send very definite instructions to Constantinople to the effect that the High Commissioners should forthwith meet to consider, in consultation with the military and naval advisers, how the action proposed could best be put in operation at Constantinople. He sincerely trusted that the Italian Government would be able to take her share in the work contemplated, especially in view of the heavy responsibilities which she had assumed in Anatolia.

M. CAMBON invited attention to a remark made by Lord Curzon which he considered to be very just. In a recent despatch the High Commissioners had asked that the proposed terms of the Turkish Peace Treaty should be communicated to them very secretly. He, M. Cambon, thought that this should now be done, and that the High Commissioners should, at the same time,

be requested to give their views thereon. In addition, the conference should also obtain the opinions of the Allied military and naval commanders at Constantinople in regard to the military and naval operations contemplated. The military and naval attachés here in London would not be able to give their views with a full knowledge of existing facts.

MR. BONAR LAW, intervening, expressed the view that the Prime Minister had been correct in asking that action should at once be taken at Constantinople without again consulting the authorities on the spot.

M. CAMBON, continuing, said that Mr. Lloyd George's original suggestion to occupy Constantinople constituted a small operation, to which he (M. Cambon) raised no objection. But, he now understood that the Prime Minister contemplated waging a big war against Turkey, and, in his opinion, that threw quite a different light on the subject, for in that case the sanction of Parliament would have to be obtained.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that some misunderstanding had evidently occurred. He had so far been under the impression that M. Cambon had accepted the general lines which he suggested. What was the situation in Turkey which the conference were asked to consider? An attack on an Ally by Turkish regular troops had occurred a month ago. As a result the Allied troops had been forced to retire, and a number of Armenians had been slaughtered within sight of these forces. Had the same thing happened in Germany, the conference would have decided without delay to take the necessary measures, but to-day M. Cambon suggested that a note should be sent to the High Commissioners in Constantinople to seek for advice. He thought the proposal, if agreed to, would merely tend to lower the prestige of the Allies throughout the Turkish Empire; such procedure would not be compatible with the dignity of Great Powers. The council must arrive at an immediate decision as to whether immediate, collective action should be taken or not. He must point out, however, that if a negative decision were taken, Great Britain would be compelled to act independently. The British Government had given definite guarantees in the House of Commons that Constantinople would be held as a pledge to prevent the recurrence of further Armenian massacres.<sup>3</sup> It would be impossible, therefore, for the British Government to go back on their word. He hoped, however, that the Allies would agree to act together.

M. CAMBON explained that he had referred to two distinct questions. The first question related to the reparation which the Sublime Porte must render for the massacre of the Armenians in Cilicia. This matter was one which chiefly concerned the French, since that [? they] had assumed the responsibility for their protection. The French had been taken by surprise as frequently happened in far off regions; but reinforcements had already been sent to General Gouraud, who would now be able effectively to police Cilicia, and to retake Marash. So much with regard to obtaining reparation for the offences which the Turks had committed against the Allies. Further, the Allies could not admit that an official who had deliberately committed

<sup>3</sup> Cf. No. 37, note 3.

the offences of which Mustafa Kemal had been guilty, could be permitted to remain in a position of authority. The Porte must, therefore, also be ordered at once to recall Mustafa Kemal. He agreed that the decision reached last Saturday<sup>4</sup> to which the Prime Minister had referred involved the occupation of Constantinople and, he would add, the recall of Mustafa Kemal.

To-day, however, a second quite different question had been raised by Mr. Lloyd George, which involved waging a general war against Turkey. For this purpose it had been estimated that by scraping together all the available forces in these regions, some 160,000 men could be made available. Now 160,000 men, in view of the great distances to be traversed, difficulties of transport, and provisions, constituted a very small force. It must be realised that Turkey still possessed a regular army, which would not be altogether lacking in resources as had been suggested. Turkish troops, properly fed and led, had always been worth a great deal. Therefore, he begged the council carefully to take into consideration the available elements before blindly agreeing to war with Turkey. For these reasons, he had favoured the proposal made by Lord Curzon, that the High Commissioners in Constantinople, and their naval and military advisers, should be consulted with regard to the additional measures which might be considered necessary in order to impose on Turkey the terms of the treaty of peace.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would not disagree with the views expressed by M. Cambon. It appeared, however, that he must have expressed himself very badly if he had given the impression that he was meditating a great war to invade Turkey. He had merely reckoned the number of Allied forces in those regions, not with the idea of starting a big campaign, but in order to do away with the suggestion that the Allies could not, or would not, be able to defend themselves, if they roused the wrath of Turkey. The fact that the Allied Powers could on the spot muster without great difficulty a force of 160,000 men as compared with the 80,000 Turkish troops available, constituted, in his opinion, sufficient answer to the suggestion which had been made that if the Turks were angered they would drive the Greeks out of Smyrna, the French out of Cilicia and Syria, and the Greeks out of Thrace. It would be agreed that the Allies possessed sufficient forces there to stand up against the Turk, if should he [*sic*] venture to attack. The Allies, however, were now agreed with regard to the immediate measures to be taken at Constantinople. The next step would be to ask the naval and military advisers here to get together, and submit further proposals to the council.

M. BERTHELOT said that it would be advisable at this stage clearly to define what action the council intended to take. In the first place, the council had agreed forthwith to occupy Constantinople. He understood a telegram conveying the necessary instructions would forthwith be drafted and despatched to the High Commissioners at Constantinople. In the second place, the naval and military experts here would be instructed to study and report with regard to the further measures which might become necessary in order to enforce acceptance, and the subsequent execution of the terms of the Treaty of Peace

<sup>4</sup> See No. 38.

with Turkey. For that purpose, he thought that the best qualified people available should be summoned; and as far as the French were concerned either the Chief of the General Staff or Marshal Foch's Chief of Staff should be entrusted with the duty.

In the third place, he understood that the terms of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey would forthwith be communicated to the High Commissioners and to the military and naval advisers in Constantinople. At the same time they would be informed that no lenient peace would be imposed on the Turk, that the policy of creating a *bloc* around the Sultan could not be accepted, and that the views of the local military and naval commanders were required with regard to additional measures to enforce compliance with the treaty terms.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, in reply, agreed that instructions should forthwith be given for the occupation of Constantinople and the dismissal of Mustafa Kemal. In the second place a telegram would be despatched to the High Commissioners communicating to them the terms of the proposed Turkish treaty and requesting their advice, after consultation with the military and naval commanders, with regard to the measures to be taken in order to enforce the treaty, other than the seizure of Constantinople, which would already have become an accomplished fact.

MR. CHURCHILL enquired what actual meaning should be placed on the words: 'Occupation of Constantinople,' as the War Office would ask for definite instructions. Did it merely mean that a few sentries would be placed at the entrances to the various Government offices, besides maintaining a small force in Constantinople in order to secure those sentries?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the idea would be to do something which would enable the Allies to announce the occupation of Constantinople.

MR. CHURCHILL replied that the military authorities considered that they were already in occupation of Constantinople.

LORD CURZON expressed the view that the answer to Mr. Churchill's question would be found in a despatch of the British High Commissioner, in which he defined the occupation to mean taking charge of the administration of Constantinople.

MR. CHURCHILL enquired whether that meant taking over the Municipal Government and the detailed control of the population of Constantinople. He expressed regret at having to press his point, but British troops already occupied the best barracks in Constantinople. They were there. And, if it were intended merely to send more troops to Constantinople, more could be sent; but that action would in no way improve our military position.

M. CAMBON maintained that something should be done to produce a moral effect. Some method of manifestation should be discovered without the necessity of taking over the administration of the town and the Government.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE concurred with the views expressed by M. Cambon. He enquired whether it would not be possible to seize the War Office, which he understood constituted the most conspicuous building in the town. Furthermore, the War Office was properly [*probably*] responsible for issuing the orders which had brought about the disasters in Cilicia.

M. CAMBON agreed that the Ministry of War dominated the whole of the town of Constantinople. The seizure of the War Office would, moreover, create an excellent moral impression, since it was in that building that the Sultan was invested as Sultan and Caliph.

M. VENISELOS suggested that, in addition to occupying the War Office, the Allied Powers should also take over the control of the army administration, that is to say, that no orders should issue from the War Office unless counter-signed and approved by the Allies.

MR. CHURCHILL pointed out that if the Turkish War Office were deprived of the possibility of issuing any orders, the people at Constantinople must also be relieved of all responsibility for what might happen outside that town. In his opinion, when the news of the violent action taken at Constantinople by the Allies reached Mustafa Kemal, he would retaliate by massacres, and since no orders could go out from Constantinople, the latter Turkish Government [*sic*] could not be held answerable.

M. VENISELOS explained that he had not contemplated stopping the issue of all orders from the War Office. He had merely suggested that the Allies should see the orders issued, sanction the issue of all reasonable orders, and merely hold back those which could not be approved.

In addition, he would like to make a second suggestion. At the present moment a kind of Chamber of Deputies existed in Constantinople. Members of that Chamber had not been properly elected. Many of the Deputies had been merely nominated by Mustafa Kemal. The Chamber had recently met and decided to bring Ferid Pasha<sup>5</sup> before a special court as a retaliatory measure for similar action taken by him during his Premiership against the Young Turks responsible for massacres. This action had been taken in defiance of the wishes of the Allies. He suggested, therefore, that the Chamber should either be closed or dissolved.

MARQUIS IMPERIALI thought that if the Chamber were closed, as suggested by M. Veniselos, the Deputies would merely meet somewhere else, as they had done after the revolution.

LORD CURZON said that during the last few minutes he had been able to prepare a draft telegram to be sent to the High Commissioners at Constantinople, giving effect to the suggestions put forward during the course of that meeting. The despatch began by communicating the draft terms of the Turkish Treaty of Peace. It then proceeded to explain why the *bloc* policy could not be accepted, and why instant and energetic action must be taken. Finally, the High Commissioners were invited to express their views as to any further steps to secure the submission of the Turks and to obtain the protection of minorities.

(Lord Curzon then read the text of the proposed draft telegram.)

M. BERTHELOT said that he would like to raise one small point with regard to the draft telegram just read by Lord Curzon. It was therein stated that further resistance by the Turks would lead to the conditions of the peace

<sup>5</sup> Turkish Grand Vizier prior to October 1919: see Volume IV, Chap. III *passim*.

being made more severe and even to the dissolution of Turkey. He thought a statement of that kind might raise an objection from Paris, in view of the decisions already taken. He proposed, therefore, that the words relating to the dissolution of the Turkish Empire should be deleted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE accepted M. Berthelot's proposal. He suggested, however, that the wording of the telegram should be settled between Lord Curzon, Signor Scialoja and M. Berthelot that afternoon (see Appendix 1 for proposed telegram). He enquired what action would be taken in regard to the telegram to the Commander-in-chief?

LORD CURZON explained that the War Office would take the necessary action. The Commander-in-chief would be instructed to carry out, in conjunction with the naval commander, the policy laid down in the telegram to the High Commissioners, whose orders he would take.

M. CAMBON said that he would, with the least possible delay, communicate the draft of the telegram to the High Commissioners to M. Millerand, and he would ask for an immediate reply. He took it for granted, however, that the telegram to the High Commissioners would not be despatched until the receipt of M. Millerand's reply. The same condition applied to the orders which it was proposed to send to the Commander-in-chief with regard to the immediate occupation of Constantinople. In that connection, it would also be necessary to send orders to General Franchet d'Esperey. In conclusion, he enquired if it would not be better to refer to Versailles the question which it had been decided to submit to the military and naval advisers here.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the British had no naval representative at Versailles. He was inclined to think that it might perhaps be better to refer the question to the military and naval advisers in Constantinople. He would prefer that no decision should be taken at that meeting in order to enable him to consult his naval and military advisers.

*(The meeting then adjourned.)*

*2, Whitehall Gardens, March 5, 1920.*

#### APPENDIX 1 TO No. 50

##### *Draft Telegram to the British High Commissioner (Constantinople), March 5, 1920*

The Supreme Council have carefully considered the possible policies which the Allies could pursue at this juncture at Constantinople.

The first of these is the suggestion contained in your telegram No. 176<sup>6</sup> that the Allied Powers should form a *bloc* with the Sultan and the moderate and well-disposed Turks to resist the irreconcilable attitude of the extreme Nationalist party. But the condition of this policy is what you have described as a comparatively lenient peace. It would appear from your definition of such a peace that it is far removed from the terms of the treaty which we are discussing and must sooner or later impose.

<sup>6</sup> This was the telegram printed in paraphrase in appendix 2 to No. 45.

For your confidential information, in no circumstances to be divulged except to the Allied High Commissioners and naval and military Commanders-in-chief, these terms involve provisionally the cession of Thrace up to the lines of Chatalja, to Greece, complete international control of the Straits, the presence of an international force in that zone, close financial supervision of the Turkish Government to be exercised from the capital, the cession of Smyrna to Greece subject only to Turkish suzerainty, the creation of an independent Armenia including E[r]zerum, the probable recognition of an independent Kurdistan.

These terms are sufficiently drastic to preclude the successful execution of the *bloc* policy. If this be so, they will clearly require, sooner or later, to be imposed by force. The questions to be answered accordingly are these: What are the steps to be taken? At what time and where should they be taken? And with what military or naval forces should they be imposed?

The opinion of the Supreme Council is:—

1. That, in any case, the capital ought to be occupied at once by the Allied forces under conditions to be indicated presently;
2. That the Turkish Government should be required to dismiss Mustafa Kemal, Governor of Ezerum, whose responsibility for the recent occurrences in Cilicia is not open to doubt;
3. That the Turkish Government should be informed that the military occupation of Constantinople will continue until the terms of the Peace Treaty have been accepted and put into execution; and
4. That, if there is any recurrence of these or similar outrages, the proposed terms will be rendered even more severe, and the concessions already made withdrawn.

Instructions are being issued at once to the naval and military commanders to take steps for the military occupation of Constantinople. This should include the occupation of the Turkish War Office, and the control and censorship of all military orders or despatches issuing therefrom. But it should not, in our opinion, involve the general assumption of civil administration in Constantinople, as contemplated in the concluding words of your telegram No. 183.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> This Constantinople telegram of March 2, 1920 (received March 4), read as follows: 'Your telegram No. 176 of 28th February crossed my telegram No. 176 of 29th February [see note 2 above]. Latter was sent after full discussion of whole situation with my French colleague, who saw translation of my telegram and who has telegraphed to Paris in the same general sense. We decided not to take our Italian colleague into our confidence. I have fullest confidence in personal character and loyalty of Italian High Commissioner, but there are, unfortunately, too many evidences that official Italian policy here is strongly pro-Turkish. Although, therefore, I immediately communicated your telegram No. 176 of 28th February to persons indicated in last sentence, I decided to see French High Commissioner separately before discussing it with my French and Italian colleagues jointly. We met this afternoon and decided to hold meeting with Italian High Commissioner tomorrow. When it has taken place I will telegraph full expression of views. Meanwhile general conclusion arrived at by French High Commissioner and myself is that no recommendation can usefully be made to Supreme Council until latter have considered my telegram No. 176 of 29th February and corresponding telegram from French High Commissioner. I desire to reiterate with emphasis that nature of any action to be taken in the near future must depend very largely on nature of peace which Conference proposes to offer Turkey. I feel most strongly that course to be followed by Allies should not depend for its direction or jurisdiction on what has happened in Cilicia; what has happened there is

Please consult at once with your colleagues on these points and as to any steps other than those already indicated which ought to be taken either to secure the submission of the Turk or to protect the Christian minorities in Turkish territory from further attacks.

deplorable, but it would be hard to say whether Turks or French are more responsible for letting situation drift into massacre. Leaders of national movement have doubtless grave responsibility for creation of situation which did so drift. Turkish Government is theoretically responsible for acts of leaders of national movement. This is mere theory, however. No action that can now be taken here will retrieve situation in Cilicia. What we have to face and what we have to adjust our action to is the wider issue raised by Nationalists to resist drastic peace and apparent intention of Peace Conference to impose one. I think my French colleague would agree with previous paragraph [*sic*] also, though for obvious reasons I have not been able to put it to him as I have put it to your Lordship. We both agree that naval Allied demonstration on Cilician coast would be useless. If any naval action at all in those waters should be considered desirable it had better be left to French to take it alone. French admiral states that he is prepared to take necessary action and has adequate forces. I have seen General Milne; he agrees generally with my views. Arising out of my telegram No. 176 of 29th February, he considers that, if and when time comes for Allied occupation, of Constantinople, administration should be in hands of High Commissioners, who should directly control working of all Government Departments here.'

## No. 51

I.C.P. 67.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, held in Lord Curzon's Room at the British Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1, on Friday, March 5, 1920, at 3 p.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Philip Kerr; **SECRETARIES,** Brigadier-General S. H. Wilson, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Berthelot.

*Italy:* Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Duke Ascanio Colonna.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda.

**INTERPRETER:** M. Camerlynck (for the latter part).

1. **LORD CURZON** (who took the chair for the first part of the meeting in

*Extradition of  
the Kaiser*

Mr. Lloyd George's absence) said that he had been requested by Mr. Lloyd George to express the latter's sincere regrets to his colleagues that he was unable to be present at their deliberations until 4 p.m., and that he hoped they would excuse his absence and permit Lord Curzon to preside over their discussions in the meantime. The meeting had been summoned because the Dutch Minister accredited to the Court of Saint James had had an interview with Mr. Lloyd George that morning and had handed to him a letter from the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 2nd March, 1920, replying to the joint communication of



the Supreme Council on the subject of the extradition of the Kaiser.<sup>1</sup> He would ask M. Berthelot to read out the letter to the conference.

(M. BERTHELOT then read the letter in the original French. An English translation appears as Appendix 1.)<sup>2</sup>

LORD CURZON said that the letter really amounted to this. It contained a résumé of the Supreme Council's letter; it formulated certain replies to our arguments; it submitted a defence of the Dutch attitude; it implied a refusal on the part of the Netherlands Government to alter their decision; it made no mention of the exact place in Holland where the Kaiser was to be interned, but it was apparently the intention of the Netherlands Government that the place should be in Holland; and it promised to take every precaution for the custody of the person and movements of the ex-Emperor that the Allies might suggest. Since the above letter had been handed to Mr. Lloyd George, a telegram from the British Minister at The Hague (No. 56, dated the 4th March, 1920) had been received, and he would ask Mr. Vansittart to render it into French.

(MR. VANSITTART read a French rendering of Sir Ronald Graham's telegram No. 56. A paraphrase of this telegram appears as Appendix 2.)

LORD CURZON, continuing, said that, lastly, he had received a private letter from Sir Ronald Graham which cleared up certain obscurities in his official telegram.

(MR. VANSITTART then rendered into French the contents of Sir Ronald Graham's private letter<sup>3</sup> to Lord Curzon.)

M. BERTHELOT said that the letter from the Netherlands Government had given him very much the same impression that it had made upon Lord Curzon, and Lord Curzon's summary embodied practically all that he himself had intended to say. He strongly demurred, however, to that part of the letter which referred to the arrangements to be made for the custody of the Kaiser in the future; it was inconceivable that this could be accepted. The Dutch proposals would render any sort of supervision impossible. He thought also that Sir Ronald Graham's private letter gave a very accurate idea of what was really in the minds of the Netherlands Government. In his own opinion, it was clear that the Dutch had made not inconsiderable concessions, and would be prepared to make more. Apparently they did not wish to shut the door on further negotiations, and they left it for us, in the first place, to indicate some other spot in the interior of Holland to which the Kaiser could be transferred and which would meet with our approval. As regards the question of removing the ex-Kaiser to the colonies——

(At this point Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Philip Kerr entered the Council Chamber, and Mr. Lloyd George took the chair.)

<sup>1</sup> See No. 4, note 7.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. The original French text of this letter is printed in the *Netherland Orange Book*, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

<sup>3</sup> Untraced in Foreign Office archives.

LORD CURZON explained that the despatch from the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs had been read to the conference, as had also Sir Ronald Graham's telegram of the 4th instant, and the latter's private letter to Lord Curzon, examining in close detail the contents of the Dutch Government's despatch, and suggesting the form of reply which might be sent.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that the Dutch Minister had come to see him that morning and had stated that he desired to hand a letter to him as he (Mr. Lloyd George) had signed the communication from the Supreme Council to the Netherlands Government. Mr. Lloyd George said that he had informed the Dutch Minister in London that he would present the letter to the Supreme Council. He did not, however, read it. The Dutch Minister then sat down, and it was evident to Mr. Lloyd George that he was anxious to discuss the document which he had just presented. Jonkheer van Swinderen had pointed out that, apart from any possible inclination of his Government to defer to the wishes of the Allies in regard to the extradition of the ex-Kaiser, such an act was contrary to the Dutch Constitution. Mr. Lloyd George said that he then explained that what the Allies really wanted and must insist upon was adequate security for the custody of the Kaiser's person. He said that, although the ex-Kaiser was not a Napoleon, he was a great figurehead to the German nation, and if he escaped they would rally round him as the French had rallied round Napoleon I. Jonkheer van Swinderen had then said that William II was not the only King to whom Holland had had to give shelter. Mr. Lloyd George acknowledged this, and he was aware that the Dutch Ambassador was referring to Charles II, who, with his brother (who was afterwards James II) had proved an infernal nuisance to England and had instigated one rebellion after another. During the reign of both Charles II and James II England had got into a very bad state, and eventually she had had to ask Holland to send her a King—this is, William of Orange. He reminded Jonkheer van Swinderen of the fact that the great prestige which Germany had enjoyed up to the last few years was largely due to the ex-Kaiser. The Dutch Ambassador had then remarked that the ex-Kaiser was much too old to do any harm. Mr. Lloyd George had replied that, although the ex-Kaiser might be old, he had many very able lieutenants who were still in their prime, such as Ludendorff and others, who would at once rally round him. Jonkheer van Swinderen had then said that it looked as if the Allies were not disposed to trust the honour of the Dutch Government. Mr. Lloyd George said he had replied that there was no question of this: it was really a question of their not being able to afford to take any risks. He had pointed out that de Valera had been interned by the British Government in a remote part of England,<sup>4</sup> but as he and his friends had plenty of funds at their disposal they had managed to effect their escape. Similarly, the ex-Kaiser had plenty of friends and plenty of money. Of course we trusted the Dutch Government, but could we run any risk of a possible accident? If the Dutch Government refused to extradite the ex-Kaiser, and the latter managed to escape, the whole civilised world would hold Holland

<sup>4</sup> Mr. De Valera, President of the Sinn Fein, had been interned in 1918 in Lincoln gaol.

responsible if trouble arose, and the consequences could not but be most unpleasant for the Dutch Government. Jonkheer van Swinderen, had, however, given the impression that the door was still open for further negotiation. Mr. Lloyd George said he concluded the interview by saying that all he could do was to submit the letter from The Hague to the Supreme Council, whom he would also inform of what had passed between them that morning.

M. BERTHELOT said that in the reply from Holland he noticed that the Netherlands Government perceived no difference at all in the crimes committed by Germany and the actions of the Allies; they made absolutely no reference to the German responsibility both for the war and for their atrocities. A more practical observation, however, he wished to make was that there was no doubt that the Netherlands Government had advanced a step. They were certainly disposed to take more effectual measures to ensure the security of the ex-Kaiser's person, and a proper supervision of his movements. This was a very formal but a very important undertaking on their part. In the second place, they were prepared to discuss, and possibly to accept, any alternative place of internment that the Allies might indicate in Dutch territory.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE interposed to ask whether there was any actual reference in the letter to 'Dutch territory.'

M. BERTHELOT said that this was his impression when the letter had been read out. As regards Sir Ronald Graham's private letter to Lord Curzon, he had two observations to make. First, they might yield on the point of extraditing the ex-Kaiser to some place in the Dutch Colonies. Here, however, owing to internal trouble, it was doubtful whether they would really be able to exercise proper supervision. Again, the climate in some of the Dutch Colonies might affect the ex-Kaiser's health, and he might even conceivably die there. The Dutch therefore felt that they could not guarantee the same supervision over the ex-Kaiser's person in their Colonies as they could if he were interned in Holland itself. He thought it was only right that the council should not lose sight of this point. In the second place, he would offer a practical conclusion. If the Allies desired another place of internment than Doorn, and would indicate it, and were unanimous in pressing the point, the Dutch would probably give way and would agree to the strictest supervision.

(At this point M. Cambon entered the Council Chamber.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the conference might accept Sir Ronald Graham's suggestion, and ask the Dutch Government, in their reply, certain definite questions:—

- (i) Where is it proposed that the ex-Kaiser should be interned?
- (ii) What exactly are the precise measures of surveillance which it was proposed to take?
- (iii) Will his correspondence be subject to a strict censorship?

He agreed with M. Berthelot that our reply should also protest against the fact that the Dutch Government apparently saw no difference in the way in which Germany, on the one hand, and the Allies, on the other, had conducted the war.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that Sir Ronald Graham in his telegram had referred to Wiering as an alternative spot for internment. This, he understood, was one of the islands in the Zuyder Zee.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, continuing, said that the Allied reply ought also to emphasise the danger to Germany that the ex-Kaiser constituted if he were interned in anything like close proximity to the German frontier. He was quite certain that the present Government at Berlin would be only too glad to see the ex-Kaiser well out of the way.

M. BERTHELOT said that the British Minister at The Hague had put forward a fairly full programme in his letter and telegram, and it was desirable that he should have an early reply. In that reply we must be careful not to place ourselves in a false position. We might ask the Dutch to name an alternative place of internment, and if they suggested Doorn we must tell them frankly that we could not accept this. Especially was it necessary for the Allies in this matter to act in concert and complete harmony, and also to give instructions to their representatives at The Hague to act in a similar manner. It was essential to avoid giving any impression that there was any lack of vigour or of harmony on the part of the Allies. We should lay emphasis upon the fact that the Allies are thoroughly in earnest about the question; that their purpose is serious and their *accord* complete. He fully agreed with Mr. Lloyd George that our reply should show how strongly we felt about the inability of the Dutch to perceive any difference in the way in which the Allies and the Germans respectively had conducted the war. He agreed also that it would be wise to point out to the Dutch that the presence of the ex-Kaiser so close to his own country constituted a danger not only to us, but to the German people. He thought that perhaps delay might be obviated and more effective action secured if the council worked through the British Minister at The Hague, and, in the first instance, indicated to Sir Ronald Graham the line that the Allies proposed to take.

LORD CURZON said that he would venture to offer one or two observations as to the line we should adopt. M. Berthelot had suggested that the Allies should stop writing formal notes and publishing them, as these would only arouse public criticism, and he proposed that the correspondence should be continued through the medium of the British Minister at The Hague. He himself felt that it was necessary that the Allies should work in common, in order to remove any possible suspicion of lack of unity and accord. He suggested, therefore, that Sir Ronald Graham and his colleagues respectively should be instructed by their several Governments to go to the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs and say, first, our Governments are profoundly surprised that as regards crimes committed during the war those Governments apparently are placed in the same category with Germany, and they are astonished that the Dutch Government have never said a word to show

that they appreciate the fact that Germany has committed atrocities which every civilised nation should condemn. Second, they should emphasise the danger the ex-Kaiser constituted to Europe and his own old country if, by an unfortunate accident, he managed to effect his escape. Third, they should say that the Supreme Council has received and studied the reply of the Dutch Government, which they perceived had been written in a conciliatory spirit; they were, however, left in some doubt as to what was actually meant. The Dutch Government named no place at all for the ex-Kaiser's internment. If that Government proposed Doorn, they should say that Doorn was no better than Amerongen. It had been bought by the ex-Kaiser recently, with the consent of the Queen of Holland, but it was absolutely unacceptable to the Allies and quite out of the question. Fourth, they should ask the Dutch Government to state in more precise terms exactly what their promises were as to additional measures of security and surveillance; what guards would be maintained; would there be a censorship over his correspondence; would measures be taken to exclude from access to him undesirable people? They should further state that the only place which really gave security would be the Dutch Colonies; but, before the Allies pressed further for his extradition to those colonies, they would like to know what alternative place in Holland the Netherlands Government would suggest. This, Lord Curzon concluded, was, he thought, in accordance with what had been suggested by Sir Ronald Graham, and had been in the minds also of M. Berthelot and Mr. Lloyd George.

It was agreed—

That Lord Curzon, in concert with M. Berthelot and Signor Scialoja, should draft a reply in the above sense for the Supreme Council to send to the Dutch Government after approval by M. Millerand and Signor Nitti.

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that before the conference rose he wished to refer to the question which had been discussed at their meeting *Constantinople* that morning when they had decided to take action in regard to Constantinople.<sup>5</sup> He wished to ask whether it was not advisable that the intentions of the Allies in this connection should be communicated to the United States, and that the Washington Government should be invited to assist and to support that action if they liked. We had received endless telegrams from the United States asking why nothing was done to help Armenia, and the American press had strongly criticised our alleged impotence to stop the massacres. An American school had been attacked in Cilicia, and several American citizens had been murdered. Moreover, the Armenians were the special protégés of the Americans. He thought we might tell the United States Government that the Allies intended now to take strong action, and to ask if the Americans were prepared to join. The Americans had always taken a very exalted position and had lectured us severely on our inaction. They appeared to assume responsibility for the sole

<sup>5</sup> See No. 50, minute 1.

guardianship of the Ten Commandments and for the Sermon on the Mount; yet, when it came to a practical question of assistance and responsibility, they absolutely refused to accept these. He suggested, therefore, that a telegram should be sent to Washington pointing out that massacres of Armenians had taken place; that the Armenians were the special protégés of the Americans; and that American citizens had also been murdered, and asking whether the United States were prepared to join the Allies in the strong action they proposed to take. Mr. Lloyd George said he was quite certain the Americans would do nothing, but their refusal to assist would make it far easier for us in the future to deal with them.

LORD CURZON said that he agreed with Mr. Lloyd George that it would be desirable to approach the Americans and ascertain their views. He ventured, however, to suggest an alternative method of procedure. When the Supreme Council, some three weeks previously, had first begun its sittings in London, he had written to the American Ambassador in London notifying him of the fact that the Supreme Council was opening a session, and asking him whether he would wish to attend the meetings of the council, and, in that event, if his Government would depute to him any responsibility. Mr. Davis had replied that he had no authority to attend the meetings, and he must therefore decline the invitation, but that he would be grateful if, from time to time, he could be informed of what was happening and not be left entirely in the dark. It was evident, therefore, that the United States and Mr. Davis both wished to be kept *au courant* with the council's deliberations. Since that time he had not seen Mr. Davis, because the council had decided not to make piecemeal announcements as to their action, e.g., in regard to Thrace or Smyrna, and so on, owing to the fear of premature and unfortunate disclosures. If, therefore, the council decided to adopt Mr. Lloyd George's suggestion, he thought it was better that they should not telegraph to the Washington Government, as it was very doubtful what kind of reply such a communication would elicit, but that he himself should invite Mr. Davis to come to the Foreign Office, where he would remind him of Mr. Davis's request and say: 'The Supreme Council are at present faced with a very difficult situation; your own people have been murdered; the children in American schools have, we believe, been left behind and are still in danger, and the Armenians, in whom you take a very particular interest, have been massacred in great numbers; the Allied Powers have decided that they cannot tolerate this any longer, and, subject to M. Millerand's approval, they have determined to act, to occupy Constantinople and to take other measures upon which the council had decided earlier in the day. If the Americans will join us we shall be only too pleased to have your co-operation and assistance.' Lord Curzon said that that, at any rate, would clear our consciences and make it more difficult in the future for the United States to adopt a critical and a hostile attitude.

M. BERTHELOT, in agreeing generally with Lord Curzon, said that there was one small point he wished to make. It was undoubtedly very annoying to read day after day attacks in the American press upon the inaction of the

Allies. It would, however, perhaps be advisable if we were careful not to embark upon newspaper polemics. It was really a question of balancing the respective inconveniences and advantages of receiving support from the Americans. We had once asked the United States lately to co-operate with us and our request had been refused. Was it really desirable, therefore, to ask again and risk another rebuff? Certain details had been received from the French Ambassador at Washington, M. Jusserand, who had interviewed Mr. Polk<sup>6</sup> in this connection, and Mr. Polk had said that he could make no promises as to any co-operation on the part of his nation, and that the Supreme Council would therefore proceed to the examination of the terms of the Turkish treaty without waiting for America's possible participation. Perhaps, however, on the whole, the advantages outweighed the disadvantages, and it might be as well to invite America to intervene and come to our assistance. That was a material question, and we could ask the United States to let her troops co-operate with our own in the action we proposed to take.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was fairly convinced that we could not expect any help from the United States. As a matter of fact, she had no troops to send. To invite her participation, however, would place us in a very strong position.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that, as regards the action proposed by Lord Curzon, he would prefer that Lord Curzon's suggestion should be adopted, as it was quite uncertain what sort of reply we should receive to any note we might address to the Government at Washington. He hoped, however, that we should not give America the impression that the Allies were unable themselves to defend civilisation and that we had not the means at our disposal to avenge and protect the Armenians. We should invite them to intervene, and say that we should welcome their co-operation, but they must not think that we were not fully capable of defending both ourselves and our own interests, and the interests of civilisation.

It was agreed—

That Lord Curzon should interview the American Ambassador in London on the following day, and approach him in the sense indicated by the above discussion.

3. MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether any reply had yet been received from M. Millerand or M. Marsal in regard to the proposed identic announcement by the Supreme Council in respect of high prices and foreign exchanges, because the Allies had undertaken to make this announcement on the following Sunday.

*High Prices and  
Foreign Ex-  
changes. Allied  
Announcement*

M. CAMBON said that the complete text had been telegraphed to M. Millerand and M. Marsal, but that so far no reply had been received.

*(The conference adjourned at 5 p.m.)*

*2, Whitehall Gardens, March 5, 1920.*

<sup>6</sup> American Acting Secretary of State.

*Paraphrase of Sir Ronald Graham's telegram No. 56 of March 4, 1920*

The Dutch reply, which is to be delivered to the Supreme Council to-morrow in London, formed the subject of a conversation I had with the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon, who said that the reply went a long way towards meeting the wishes of the Allies. The ex-Emperor would be subjected to an extremely strict control, and round his residence there would be drawn a narrow circles [*circle*] beyond which he would not be allowed to pass. The ex-Emperor had been told of these contemplated restrictions and he was prepared to submit to them with a good grace. Knowing how embarrassing, he said, his presence must be to the Dutch Government, any regulations that Government felt it necessary to impose he could not but accept. I remarked that the spot chosen for this internment was the really important question. If the Dutch were going to suggest Doorn, which had been chosen and prepared for his own future residence by the ex-Kaiser, I failed to see how this solution could be accepted, and I again pressed that he should be sent to some distant place. M. Karnebeek replied that both the Powers and the public and I, myself, were wrong in thinking that Doorn had been selected by the ex-Kaiser himself. He had indeed tried to purchase seven or eight other places, all more attractive and larger than Doorn, the names of which M. Karnebeek said he could give me, but the Dutch Government had, in each case, stopped the sale. That Government had, however, not intervened when the ex-Emperor had negotiated for the purchase of Doorn, as they were of opinion that if he must live in Holland, he could not be interned in a more ideal spot. It was sufficiently central to be easy to control and watch, and it was sufficiently isolated, as the only large centre near it was Utrecht, which would be placed out of bounds for him. The emissaries of the Netherlands Government had scoured the country, and, in particular, the Northern Islands and Zeeland, in their search for some alternative spot, but without success, and it was his Excellency's conviction that Doorn was the most satisfactory and suitable locality from every point of view. Hitherto, his Government had kept all this to themselves, but he now requested that I should explain matters to my Government. I made a reference to Wiering, and was told by M. Karnebeek that it was an absolutely impossible place, and the conditions under which the ex-Crown Prince was living there were so wretched that most of his time was spent in bed. His Excellency then told me privately that the ex-Kaiser was now in serious need of funds, and, indeed, he was practically destitute for the moment, as he had exhausted the 200,000 florins which he had originally brought with him. Each time that Count Bentinck presented his monthly bill, disagreeable discussions followed which led to complaints of expense. The ex-Crown Prince was now not getting any allowance of any kind. M. Karnebeek then, in reply to a question of mine, informed me that the ex-Emperor had been able to buy Doorn with the money he had made by the sale to Mme. Knowbert of one of the ex-Kaiser's private residences in the German capital.



I.C.P. 68.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Monday, March 8, 1920, at 12 noon.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. Austen Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer; Mr. McCurdy, Ministry of Food; Mr. Blackett, Treasury; Sir S. Chapman, Board of Trade; Mr. Wise, Ministry of Food; **SECRETARIES,** Brigadier-General S. H. Wilson, Mr. Leith Ross.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Avenol.

*Italy:* Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Giannini.

*Belgium:* Baron Moncheur.

**INTERPRETER:** M. Billot.

1. **THE PRIME MINISTER** said he understood that a reply had now been received from the French Government and he invited the French representatives to make a statement upon it.

*Draft Declaration on Economic Conditions*

**M. AVENOL** said that the nature of the reply had been fully set out in the letter which he understood had been circulated (A.J. 66).<sup>1</sup> The only point to which M. Millerand took exception was to the second paragraph of the eighth conclusion on p. 15 (of A.J. 54, Second Revise).<sup>2</sup> The French Government proposed, after the words—

‘to inform Germany of the extension of time accorded by the Allied Governments for the operation of the provision in the letter of the 16th June, 1919’

to omit the remainder of the paragraph, as in the present draft, viz.:—

‘To enquire of Germany whether she is prepared to make such a proposal for the settlement of her liabilities under the treaty as was contemplated in that letter; to fix, at the earliest possible date, a final total for the amount to be paid by way of reparation, based on Germany’s capacity to pay; and to take steps in accordance with the provisions of article 235 of the treaty, to enable Germany to obtain essential foodstuffs and raw materials, and, if necessary, to authorise her to raise a loan abroad for this purpose, with such priority as the commission may think necessary’

and to insert the words—

‘And they take note of the invitation addressed to Germany by the commission on the 4th March,<sup>3</sup> to take the necessary measures to enable

<sup>1</sup> Not appended to filed copy: cf. below.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 47, note 1.

<sup>3</sup> In letter No. C.R. 751 of March 4, 1920, from the Reparation Commission to the German War Burdens Commission. This letter read as follows:

‘The Reparation Commission reminds Germany, that under the terms of Article 235 of the Treaty, she shall pay during 1919, 1920 and the first four months of 1921, in such instalments, and in such a manner as shall be fixed (whether in gold, commodities, securities,

all securities representing interests in undertakings situated in neutral countries which are in the possession of the German Government, the German States or German nationals, to be applied to the purchase of foodstuffs and raw materials, in the spirit of the provisions of article 235 of the Treaty of Versailles.'

THE PRIME MINISTER invited the Italian representatives to give their observations on this proposal, as the paragraph in question had originally (ships, or otherwise) the equivalent of 20 milliards of gold marks to be reckoned in the total of her debt.

'Out of this sum, the expenses of the armies of occupation shall first be met, and such supplies of food and raw material, as may be judged to be essential to enable Germany to meet her obligations for reparation, may also be paid for out of the above sum.

'In order to allow of the execution of the provisions of this Article, including the last named payment, the Commission is of opinion that it is essential that use be made of all securities, (except those covered by Articles of the Treaty other than Article 235), which are in the possession of the German Government, of German States and of German nationals, and which represent interests in undertakings situated in neutral countries.

'These securities form indeed those resources which will best enable Germany to procure such food and raw materials as are essential to permit her to meet her obligations.

'The Reparation Commission, therefore, notifies Germany that it will not consent to any payment, out of the 20 milliards of gold marks, of the supplies of food and raw materials as provided in Article 235, except on condition that the German Government immediately takes effective measures to acquire all securities of the kind described above and in the possession of its nationals, and applies them to the purchase of such indispensable supplies of food and raw materials.

'The Reparation Commission would not consent to consider the question of whether it is possible to apply other German resources to the purchase of such supplies of food and raw materials as are indispensable to enable Germany to meet her obligations for reparation, unless it has been proved to the Reparation Commission that such measures have been effectively taken and that this method of providing for the purchase of indispensable supplies of food and raw materials, together with the measures provided for by the Armistice conventions, have proved to be insufficient.

'The Reparation Commission, therefore, calls upon the German Government immediately to take all measures necessary to acquire all securities of the kind described above and in [the] possession of its nationals, and especially to enact such legislation as may be necessary to prevent any alienation of these securities by their owners. It makes no objection to the German Government using these securities for the purchase of essential supplies of food and raw materials.

'The Commission also calls upon the German Government:

'1. To inform it as soon as possible (a) of the enactments of the above laws; (b) of the measures taken to render such laws effective and to ensure their strict application.

'2. To transmit from time to time the lists of securities thus acquired by the German Government. The detailed lists containing a complete description of all securities which the German Government proposes to avail [?] itself of, for the purpose of obtaining essential food and raw materials, must be filed with the Reparation Commission and the securities therein set forth must be held intact until the German Government is notified by the Reparation Commission that no claim is made in respect of such securities under Article 238 or other clauses of the Treaty of Peace.

'3. To inform it from time to time of the proceeds resulting from the sale of such securities.

'4. To keep it informed of the particulars of the purchase of such supplies of food and raw materials acquired through the use of such resources.

'II. The Reparation Commission makes no objection to the disposition by the German

been moved by Signor Nitti. He pointed out that the proposal of the French Government made a complete change.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA replied that the document had only come into his hands during the last quarter of an hour, and he had not had time to examine it with any care, but at first sight he thought that the Italian Government would suggest keeping in the original wording down to the reference to a loan for which it might be possible to substitute:—

‘To provide facilities to Germany to enable her to use for this purpose all securities representing interests in undertakings situated in neutral countries, &c.’

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he could understand the objection of the French Government in regard to the question of raising a loan, but the first point which they proposed to omit was the proposal to fix a definite sum for the German liabilities, and he could not understand on what grounds France could object to this proposal, which appeared to him to be in everybody’s interest.

M. AVENOL replied that he had not received any detailed instructions from the French Government which would enable him to explain their view in detail, but he thought it was that the principal point agreed to was the extension of the time limit allowed to Germany for making proposals as regards the amount of the indemnity. He also understood that objection was felt to the issue of any instructions to the Reparation Commission. The increase in the time limit would enable the Reparation Commission to negotiate with Germany and it was felt that the commission should have the fullest opportunity of making any conversations they liked with Germany on the subject, and that they should not have their hands tied in any way.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he still felt that Germany should be pressed to make some offer. Everybody would much rather have a lump sum fixed for the indemnity than that it should be left indefinite as at present.

M. CAMBON said that he was not fully acquainted with what was going on in Paris, but he understood the question of a lump sum had been considered

Government of the above described securities, and which are now owned by it or by the German States and which are therefore covered by Art. 248 for the purchase of food and raw materials essential to enable Germany to meet her obligations for reparation.

‘Further, there is no objection to the German Government continuing to apply to such purchases, the foreign securities previously requisitioned by it under the terms of the Armistice conventions.

‘III. In general, the conditions imposed by the Committee of Organisation of the Reparation Commission upon the sale of the securities previously possessed or requisitioned by the German Government for the same object, remain in force.

‘The Commission confirms the request already made to the German Government to transmit to it at regular intervals the information called for above under sub-paragraphs Nos. 2, 3 and 4 of para. 1 in regard to securities treated in paragraph II.

‘It is self evident that this letter leaves intact all obligations undertaken by Germany under other Articles of the Treaty including articles 260 and 297.

BEMELMANS  
D’AMELIO’

and was discarded because the French Government thought the Reparation Commission should first negotiate with Germany and ascertain what her capacity was, and then, with full data at their disposal, they could come back and fix the lump sum in due course.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA suggested that it was difficult to understand the precise point to which the French Government objected. He understood from M. Cambon that they were not adverse to the idea of fixing a lump sum, but thought it the duty of the Reparation Commission to fix that sum. But this was the precise suggestion which they wanted to delete from the declaration.

M. CAMBON replied that the Reparation Commission had absolute power in the matter and it was not fair to bind them beforehand, as that might weaken their hands in dealing with Germany.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN pointed out that everything that was contained in the summary was contained in the body of the document. The only words which were not included in page 11<sup>4</sup> was the reference to the total sum to be paid being based on Germany's capacity to pay, and he understood that these words were not objected to. In consequence, he found it difficult to attach any reason to the proposal to omit the paragraph in the conclusions.

M. CAMBON said it was not a question of principle, but simply a question of procedure. The Governments must leave the Reparation Commission full liberty of action.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he appreciated the difficulty in which the French delegates were placed owing to the instructions they had received from M. Millerand. French public opinion was, of course, sensitive in the matter of reparations, and people might say, when they read this document, that the only recommendation in regard to the devastated territories was that a loan should be raised for Germany. On the other hand, he thought it would be undesirable to suggest detailed amendments to meet the French view. Any such amendments would have to be telegraphed backwards and forwards, and that would involve further delay. He proposed, therefore, to meet M. Millerand's views by leaving out in its entirety the second paragraph of the eighth conclusion to which the French Government had objected. That would leave the Reparation Commission entirely free.

M. CAMBON and SIGNOR SCIALOJA accepted this proposal.

THE PRIME MINISTER then asked when the document could be published in Paris, and it was agreed that it should be published on Wednesday.

*(The financial representatives then withdrew.)*

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 8, 1920.

<sup>4</sup> i.e. paragraph 10, 'Difficulties of Credit', in Cmd. 646 of 1920.

I.C.P. 68A.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference, held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Monday, March 8, 1920, at 12.15 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; M[r]. Philip Kerr; SECRETARIES, Brigadier-General S. H. Wilson, Major Caccia, Captain Abraham.

*France*: M. Cambon.

*Italy*: Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali.

INTERPRETER: M. Billot.

1. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the first question which the council ought to consider was the reply which should be sent to President Wilson's note dated the 6th March, 1920.<sup>1</sup> Copies of that note were in the hands of all the delegates present, and he would enquire what view was held by the French and Italian Governments in regard to the answer which should be given.

*President  
Wilson's Reply,  
dated March 6,  
1920*

M. CAMBON said he could only express his own personal view, namely, that no answer should be given at present. In his note, President Wilson complained bitterly of the silence maintained by the Allies in regard to the negotiations which had led to the Treaty of London. For President Wilson the question had become a personal one; he considered that his feelings had been deeply wounded, and he could not forget that fact. He had, therefore, merely reiterated the complaints which he had previously made. In these circumstances M. Cambon could not see what reply could be given. In their last note<sup>2</sup> the Allies had fully explained the reasons why it had been necessary to maintain secrecy with regard to the treaty with Italy. That secrecy had been maintained for military reasons, and at the request of Italy, in order to enable her to make necessary preparations. President Wilson, in his present reply, expressed his inability to accept that explanation, and he considered that silence could not be justified by military exigencies. Consequently, what reply could now be given to that document? The council could only repeat what had already been stated.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would like to reply that the Allies had done their best to settle the difficulty, which was disturbing the whole of Europe; their endeavours had not met with President Wilson's approval; they would therefore suggest that he would not<sup>3</sup>, perhaps, like to try his hand. In his opinion, President Wilson had in no way altered his position; he had in no way given in. Had Serbia accepted our terms in Paris the whole question would now have been settled, but, owing to President Wilson's interference, especially with regard to Northern Albania, the Serbians themselves now felt that they had been deprived of any possible access to the sea.

<sup>1</sup> This note was printed in *The Times* of March 9, 1920, page 17.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 31, note 2.

<sup>3</sup> In the typescript text this word read 'now'.

M. CAMBON maintained that in any case he could not see what useful purpose could be served by forwarding an immediate reply to President Wilson's last note.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI, on behalf of Signor Scialoja, explained that President Wilson, in his notes, invariably insisted on treating the note of the 9th December as final and definite. Signor Scialoja wished to remind the conference that when the note in question had been accepted, Sir Eyre Crowe<sup>4</sup> had, under instructions received from Lord Curzon, clearly explained to Mr. Polk that the note was intended to form the basis for future discussion, and the latter had accepted the note on those conditions.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, President Wilson invariably appeared to forget that fact.

LORD CURZON pointed out that President Wilson's attention had frequently been invited to that matter.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that it would be necessary to bring the controversy to a point. He did not think it could be left where it was. He therefore proposed to say to President Wilson that the Allies had done their best to settle the question, and, indeed, had hoped that an agreement had been reached on the lines set forth in the memorandum of the 24th [? 14th] January,<sup>6</sup> which had been rejected, with the result that a settlement was now further off than ever; consequently, the French and British Governments proposed to intimate to the Italian Government and to the Serbian Government that they had no option but to abide by the Treaty of London.

LORD CURZON pointed out that the enforcement of the Treaty of London meant that Fiume would be ceded to the Yugoslavs.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI expressed the view that President Wilson's attitude precluded the possibility of any discussion by Italy with the Yugoslavs. The latter had been informed that Signor Scialoja would be willing to treat with them, that Signor Nitti's departure from London did not alter the circumstances, and that Signor Scialoja possessed full powers to deal directly with the Yugoslavs. In reply, the Yugoslav representatives had left London on the following day.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the Yugoslavs were just as upset as the Italians with President Wilson, and that they did not desire his backing. In his opinion, the whole question ought now to be brought to a head. It was desirable that copies of the whole correspondence should be sent officially to the Italian and Yugoslav Governments, with a note to the effect that the British and French Governments had done their best to promote an understanding and had failed to succeed; consequently, they could do nothing but abide by the terms of the Treaty of London.

LORD CURZON pointed out that, in the last note to President Wilson, the Prime Ministers of France and Great Britain had said two things: Firstly, that there should be a settlement, 'mutually agreeable to Italy and Jugoslavia, regarding their common frontier in the Fiume region'; and, secondly, that

<sup>4</sup> Sir E. Crowe, Assistant Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, had at that time been Head of the British Peace Delegation.

<sup>5</sup> See Volume IV, Nos. 165 and 169.

<sup>6</sup> See No. 25, note 4.

'if this attempt should prove unsuccessful, the French and British Prime Ministers agree that the United States, Great Britain and France should once more consider the question in common, with a view to arriving at concrete proposals.' In the circumstances, he thought that a letter should now be sent to President Wilson, informing him that a common agreement had been found to be impossible, and asking him whether he would be prepared to take action as contemplated in the second alternative.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI enquired what would happen should the United States of America send a representative, as suggested, and should an agreement be reached which Italy could not accept. The conference would realise that Italy had reached the extreme limits of concession and could go no further in that direction.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA agreed with what the Marquis Imperiali had said. He pointed out that the United States representatives had always shown that they had no authority to act in the matter, and that they merely expressed the views of the President. Should President Wilson, therefore, send someone who would only be empowered to repeat the decisions already reached by the President, no progress could be made in the negotiations.

LORD CURZON said that, when he acted as Under-Secretary to Lord Salisbury,<sup>7</sup> the latter had frequently expressed the maxim: 'When in doubt, do nothing.' He was not certain that it would not be wiser to follow those directions in this instance.

M. CAMBON agreed that that maxim expressed his own personal view.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in any case it would be wise to obtain Signor Nitti's views upon that decision, as his opinion would carry great weight.

It was agreed—

That the Italian delegates should obtain the views of Signor Nitti as to whether, in his opinion, any reply should be sent to President Wilson's note of the 6th March, 1920.

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he wished to ask Signor Scialoja whether he had sent any instructions to the Italian High Commissioner at Constantinople. Information had been received by the British Government that the Italian High Commissioner was not working with his French and British colleagues. The latter were entirely in favour of the occupation of Constantinople, while the Italian High Commissioner appeared to oppose this measure. He would like to know whether Signor Scialoja would be willing to instruct the Italian High Commissioner to join with his French and British colleagues in any action that might be taken.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he did not quite know what had given rise to this impression. He had just received a much-delayed telegram from the Italian High Commissioner, the last part of which seemed to show that he was quite of the same opinion as that which had prevailed in the council a few days ago. He expressed the view that the occupation of Constantinople

<sup>7</sup> 1895-8.

would be useful as a pawn when the treaty should be presented to the Ottoman Government. The treaty was not likely to be well-received, and a hold over Constantinople would be useful. All this appeared to be entirely in accordance with the policy of the council. In regard to the forwarding of the note prepared in the council, there had been slight misunderstanding. It had been understood that the English draft was approved subject to consultation with M. Millerand. The Italian delegation, therefore, were waiting to be told that M. Millerand had agreed to the document. Information to this effect had only been received that very morning, and a telegram had been immediately sent to the Italian High Commissioner in Constantinople.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI explained that he had sent a secretary to the Foreign Office that very morning to discover whether M. Millerand's reply had been received. He had already written out a telegram to the Italian High Commissioner, and as soon as he had been aware that M. Millerand agreed, Signor Scialoja had signed the telegram, which had already been despatched. This telegram instructed the Italian Commissioner to obtain from his colleagues the note sent on behalf of the council, and to conform in every respect to the action taken by them.

LORD CURZON said that at Constantinople there had been two meetings of the High Commissioners regarding the next step to be taken by the Powers. At the first, the Italian High Commissioner had listened to the views expressed by his French and British colleagues without giving any expression of opinion himself. At the second, he had absolutely refused to collaborate in a military occupation of Constantinople. As to M. Millerand's reply, it had been received on Saturday<sup>8</sup> at midday. The Foreign Office had been instructed to send a copy of the note to the French Embassy and to Signor Scialoja, with a statement attached that, as M. Millerand had agreed, it had been telegraphed to the British High Commissioner. It would seem that this statement had not been attached to the copy sent to Signor Scialoja.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he understood that Signor Scialoja had instructed the Italian Commissioner to act in concert with his colleagues.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said this was so.

*(The conference adjourned at 1.20 p.m.)*

*2, Whitehall Gardens, March 8, 1920.*

<sup>8</sup> March 6, 1920.



I.C.P. 69.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, held in Lord Curzon's Room at the British Foreign Office, Whitehall, London, S.W. 1, on Monday, March 8, 1920, at 4.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Leeper, Mr. Malkin; SECRETARIES, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Major Caccia, Major Young.

*France*: M. Cambon, M. Berthelot.

*Italy*: Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, General Cavallero, Count Vannutelli Rey, Don Ascanio Colonna.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: M. Billot.

1. LORD CURZON said that the question of the Hungarian protest against the terms of the Hungarian Peace Treaty had been brought up at a meeting of the Supreme Council, held at 10, Downing Street,<sup>1</sup> and had then been referred to the Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, on the understanding that general principles—whether territorial or economic—should alone be discussed, the details being left to the experts in Paris. They had been requested to consider the documents which had been placed before them, and to advise the Supreme Council as to what decisions ought to be arrived at. The papers put before them included the following:—

*Treaty of Peace  
with Hungary*

- (i) A covering note to the series of printed documents presented by the Hungarian delegation,<sup>2</sup> signed by Count Apponyi, and on the lines of the speech made by him to the Supreme Council in Paris.<sup>3</sup>
- (ii) The reply,<sup>4</sup> which the three States—Roumania, Czechoslovakia and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State—had made to the Hungarian declaration.
- (iii) A further reply<sup>5</sup> from the same three States.

In addition, a number of papers had been circulated to members of the conference, giving a résumé of the various arguments (which had been extremely lengthy), and giving also certain figures which it was important should be borne in mind. Lastly, the British delegates had circulated at the last moment a note by the British expert, Mr. Leeper,<sup>6</sup> who was thoroughly

<sup>1</sup> See No. 46, minute 8.

<sup>2</sup> Not appended to filed copy: see No. 26, note 6.

<sup>3</sup> See Volume II, No. 75.

<sup>4</sup> Not appended to filed copy. For this joint note of February 24, 1920, enclosing a joint memorandum of February 20, cf. note 6 below, also D. Lloyd George, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 967–9.

<sup>5</sup> Not appended to filed copy. For this joint memorandum of February 26, in confirmation of that of February 20 (see note 4 above), cf. note 6 below.

<sup>6</sup> This memorandum of March 8, 1920, with appendices, read as follows:  
'A.7. 69

'*Supreme Council*

'*Memorandum by the Foreign Office on the Hungarian Peace Treaty*

'Summaries of the Hungarian observations on the Peace Treaty [not printed: see below,

cognisant of all the details of the question. Lord Curzon said he would next summarise the case as it came before the conference that day.

First, to take the Hungarian case: the Hungarian Government had proposed [see above] and of the reply of the Rumanian, Serb-Croat-Slovene and Czecho-Slovak Governments have already been submitted and are attached to this Memorandum [see below]. The first and crucial point raised is the question as to how far the principal Allied Powers can consider that the frontiers of Hungary drawn in the Draft Peace Treaty are still open for modification. In their Joint Memorandum the three Allied Danubian States concerned remind the Supreme Council that on various occasions, beginning with June 13, 1919, the Council publicly informed them that they were to accept these frontiers as those 'permanently dividing' Hungary from her neighbours. This assurance has been repeated on various occasions to these Governments, and on the basis of it the Governments concerned have agreed to withdraw their troops of occupation from Hungary and to accept various other decisions of the Peace Conference. If the Supreme Council were now to go back on the decisions they publicly announced to these Governments:

'(1) they would be considered everywhere in these countries to have been guilty of a serious breach of faith.

'(2) they would find that in return these Governments consider themselves as no longer bound by all the various Treaties concerning minorities and other matters which have been concluded on the basis of the frontiers given in the Peace Treaty.

'(3) they would further have no means of enforcing the withdrawal of the Czecho-Slovak, Rumanian and Jugo-Slav troops who have at the present moment finally agreed to conform themselves to the wishes of the Supreme Council in this respect, but would, if the tables were turned, be likely to go to the other extreme and again advance into Hungary and possible [*sic*] occupy Buda-Pest as the one means of enforcing their demands.

'(4) they would certainly cause violent internal crises in all the countries concerned which would overthrow the present administrations and bring to power fanatical nationalists.

'(5) they would be presenting President Wilson with yet another grievance in that these frontiers, after eight or nine months of detailed and scrupulous examination were unanimously agreed on first by the technical experts and then by the plenipotentiaries of all the Great Powers, including the United States who, in fact, played a large part in these negotiations and who would certainly not admit that the frontiers had been drawn in an unjust or partial way. Nor can it be maintained in this connection that the frontiers were drawn without hearing the Hungarian case. It was, in fact, Hungarian statistics, maps and documents on which the Commission had largely to rely, much as these Hungarian statistics are open to dispute. As far as statistics went, there is no doubt that marked favour was shown to the Hungarian point of view. The new Hungarian documents to hand add no new facts of importance in regard to racial distribution to those which have always been in the possession of the Territorial Committees of the Peace Conference.

#### *'First Hungarian Demand*

'Attention may once again be called to the fact that what the Hungarian Delegation demand are not minor rectifications of the frontiers, but a complete reversal of the whole principle of the Peace Treaty. The case they put forward is that the Old Kingdom of Hungary was an economic, geographic, historic and cultural unit which it would be a crime and misfortune for humanity to break up. They therefore ask first and foremost that the territorial integrity of Hungary shall be left in being.

'To this there would appear to be an easy reply for the Allied Powers to make. Such a reply might take the following lines:

'(1) Hungary is, in fact, not a racial unit and the large Slovak, Rumanian and Jugo-Slav portions of the Old Kingdom of Hungary are in fact to be found in close and intimate connection with the neighbouring countries of Bohemia, Rumania and Serbia. The recognition of the unity and right to independence of the Czecho-Slovak people was granted by the Allied Powers in August 1918, three months before the end of the war, at the desire of

tested against the treaty *in toto*. They alleged that every ethnic principle had been violated in the arrangement of the frontiers. The Magyar people had been put under a foreign yoke as though they were a flock of sheep. Over

the Czecho-Slovak people, considerably more than 50,000 of whom were actually in arms against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy on the side of the Entent[e]. Even before the November Armistice the representatives of the other peoples, Rumanians and Jugo-Slavs of Hungary, had declared in their National Assemblies that they had broken with Hungary and demanded union with their Rumanian and Jugo-Slav brethren in the neighbouring kingdoms.

‘(2) Hungary cannot be considered a *cultural* unit since the language, national churches and historic tradition of the non-Magyar peoples have been maintained intact, and not even the most assiduous and unscrupulous efforts of the Magyar Government have ever succeeded in Magyarising these races although they have attempted to do so by every means in their power.

‘(3) That Hungary was a *geographic* and *economic* unit may be maintained with some force, but geographic convenience can hardly be considered an equivalent for national self-determination and the economic unity of the country was based primarily not on its geographical features but on an artificial system by which all the railways of Hungary were made to converge on Buda-Pest with the result that within 50 years Buda-Pest became the industrial centre to an almost preposterous degree of all the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen.

#### *‘Second Hungarian Demand*

‘The Hungarians ask that if their first demand be not admitted, at least a plebiscite shall be carried out “under the occupation of a neutral military or police force” in all the countries (except Croatia) of which it is proposed to deprive Hungary. The practical impossibility of carrying out such a plebiscite on an enormous scale in territories involving something like 12,000,000 people, is so clear that it is hardly necessary to dwell upon it. In certain cases the Peace Conference have admitted the right of plebiscite, such cases being in places where it was not clear what were the exact wishes of the inhabitants and where it was possible to provide the means for an impartial and satisfactory vote. Such is certainly not the case in the area which the Hungarians claim. Enormous military and police forces would be required for this purpose and the only result of encouraging such a demand would be to increase the bitterness of propagandist and party feelings on both sides without attaining any satisfactory result. The Italian Government has found it impossible to consent to plebiscite either in the case of Tirol or Istria so that precedent is against recourse to this procedure [*sic*]. The obvious reply to the Hungarian demand for a plebiscite is that such a plebiscite has in fact already been carried out by the inhabitants themselves as is pointed out in the Joint Memorandum of the three Danubian Allied States. In November and December 1918 the National Assemblies comprehending representatives of all the populations concerned, declared for their independence and union with their free brothers, and it is difficult to see why such a decision should be annulled simply because it does not please the Hungarian Government.

#### *‘Third Hungarian Demand*

‘The Hungarian Delegation declare that there are 1,800,000 Magyars who “though living in unbroken geographic continuity with the great Magyar mainland are to be submitted to an abhorred foreign yoke”. They are especially indignant that certain towns lying just on the ethnic frontier between Hungary and her neighbours while containing Magyar or German majorities (according to the Hungarian statistics) have not been left to Hungary. There are several fair replies which may be made to this claim. In the first place the population of these towns, though according to the statistics it is in a majority Magyar, includes enormous numbers of public officials (who are practically always Magyars) and other persons connected with the public service and with the industries of Buda-Pest who have been introduced within comparatively recent times with the deliberate support of the

3 million Magyars had been placed under alien rule in Czechoslovakia, Roumania and Jugoslavia. On the other hand, Hungary claimed to form in itself a political, historical and cultural unit, which ought not to be divided.

Hungarian Government in order to strengthen the Magyar's national position. Large numbers of the population have also declared themselves Magyars in order to qualify for office or to enjoy economic advantages. Secondly, while the majority of the population of these towns is therefore now considered to be Magyar, the surrounding districts are overwhelming[ly] non-Magyar and it is impossible to separate these towns from the districts on which they depend and which depend on them.

'A special case to which the Hungarian Delegation call attention is that of the Szeklers of Eastern Transilvania who live in a compact mass, (500,000) separated by a large bloc of Rumanians from the other Hungarians. The Hungarian Delegation actually propose that these people should be left to Hungary to which they might be joined by a long corridor running through the town of Kolozvar and thus cutting the rest of Transilvania into two halves with no connection with each other. It is difficult to take such a proposal seriously and in fact all the evidence goes to show that the Szekler population, who have already sent their representatives to the Bucarest Parliament and begun separate negotiations with the Rumanian Government, will, owing to their separate situation and distinct character, enjoy full autonomy and administer their own internal affairs completely under the Rumanian Government. They are in fact of a very different character and disposition to the rest of the Magyar people.

'This memorandum has been prepared as a comment on the Hungarian demands. If a more detailed defence of the exact frontiers drawn by the Peace Conference is desired, it can be found in the Reports of the Territorial Committees on Roumanian, Jugo-Slav and Czecho-Slovak affairs which sat in Paris throughout 1919 and examined all these matters in great detail. A last question connected with the Hungarian frontiers requires mention. Under the Treaty of St. Germain the German parts of West Hungary were assigned to Austria and that Treaty has not only been signed by the Allied Powers as well as by Austria, but has been ratified by the latter. The Hungarian Government are refusing to evacuate their troops from this province in spite of the protests of the Austrian Government, and demand that a plebiscite should be held there. The Austrian Government are perfectly willing to grant a plebiscite eventually, but insist that the Hungarians should first of all carry out the Treaty which the Allied Powers on their part as well as Austria have promised to fulfil. For all practical purposes it is not merely a question of co-operation between the Roumanian, Serb-Croat-Slovene and Czecho-Slovak Governments, but also with the Austrian which is in agreement with the other three neighbouring States in suspecting the designs of Hungarian chauvinism and taking measures to guard against it.

'This Memorandum has only attempted to deal with territorial questions since the economic, military and other clauses of the Treaty in which the Hungarian Government have asked far reaching changes, have been referred to the competent Commissions in Paris. Lastly, it may be suggested that if, in spite of these considerations, the Supreme Council consider themselves desirous of making changes, these could only be with the consent and co-operation of the Czecho-Slovak, Austrian, Rumanian and Serb-Croat-Slovene Governments who will therefore have to be consulted. To carry out these changes with their co-operation would take an exceedingly long time. In the meantime the hopes of the Magyars that all their demands would eventually be granted would be raised very high and it would probably be found that if the question of frontiers is really re-opened the Peace Treaty with Hungary, instead of being signed within a month or so, will be quite indefinitely delayed. The effect on the peace of South-Eastern Europe would be fatal. The real remedy for any minor injustices there may be in the Hungarian Peace Treaty can only be applied when once the Treaty has been signed and peace restored. It may be suggested that the Demarcation Commissions sent out to survey the new frontiers might furnish reports on these matters to the League of Nations which might later on, at the request of

In a word, the Hungarian Government asked that the treaty should be torn up and the frontiers of Hungary retained as before the war. Further, the Hungarian Government asked if any dispute about facts arose, a plebiscite should be taken in any or all of the areas to be handed over, and they would

either the parties interested, use its good offices to negotiate frontier rectifications in the interests of both sides. This assurance might, if desired, be given to the Hungarian Government.

'A. W. A. LEEFER

8th March 1920'

[Appendix 1]

*'Reply of the Roumanian, Serb-Croat-Slovene and Czecho-Slovak Governments to the Hungarian observations*

'The Roumanian, Serb-Croat-Slovene and Czecho-Slovak Peace Delegations have presented a joint memorandum of twenty-four pages to the Peace Conference criticising the Hungarian proposals. They point out that they have repeatedly been informed by the Supreme Council "that the frontiers of the future Hungarian State had already been *finally* established by the Peace Conference". This was notified to them and to Hungary by the Supreme Council on June 13th, 1919. Again on October 12th 1919 the Supreme Council informed the Roumanian Government that the frontiers fixed were final. Similar additional communications were made by the Supreme Council to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government on June 30th, August 2nd, 5th, and 19th, 1919; and on November 7th, 1919, the President of the Peace Conference despatched a telegram to the Czecho-Slovak and Serb-Croat-Slovene Governments informing them that these frontiers were to be "considered as final". This decision has been accepted by the three Governments concerned and they therefore "regard the question of the frontiers of Hungary as finally settled".

'With regard to the Hungarian demand for a plebiscite under neutral military occupation, the three Delegations declare that the populations of all the areas in question have already in their National Assemblies declared for union with Czecho-Slovakia, Yugo-Slavia and Roumania respectively and they point out that they could not possibly accept the interference of neutral armies in regions which have for over a year past been reunited with their mother countries.

'The three Delegations declare that they are perfectly willing to enter into economic relations with Hungary but that such economic relations must spring "from free-will without constraint" and must not be based on the attempt to keep in being the artificially fostered industries of Central Hungary.'

[Appendix 2]

*'Note on the Racial Statistics of the Areas to be Ceded*

'Within the Hungarian territories now ceded to Roumania there are 2,826,000 Roumanians, as against 1,675,000 Magyars. The German population, who number 560,000, have already agreed to union with Roumania.

'In the regions of Hungary united with Czecho-Slovakia there are 1,692,000 Slovaks, as against 855,000 Magyars and 201,000 Germans.

'The number of Magyars ceded to Yugo-Slavia is not possible to determine exactly, since the figures are much disputed. They may number possibly 440,000, but the Yugo-Slavs claim to have proved that a large number of these so-called Magyars are really Yugo-Slavs, who have been wrongly entered in Hungarian statistics.

'The grand total, therefore, of Magyars ceded to other States would be just under 3,000,000. On the other hand large Slovak and German and smaller Roumanian and Yugo-Slav minorities are left in Hungary.

'The detailed defence of the decisions taken by the Supreme Council on the advice of the Territorial Committees of the Peace Conference on Czecho-Slovak, Roumanian and Yugo-Slav affairs is to be found in the reports of those committees.'

be quite willing to abide by the result of such a plebiscite. In addition, the Hungarian Government also raised a special issue with regard to a territory situated in East Transylvania, namely, the Szekler Counties, exclusively inhabited by 500,000 Magyars. In order to get over the difficulty connected with access to this region, they proposed the creation of a corridor across the intervening territory. Finally, in their note the Hungarian Government raised a number of economic questions into which he (Lord Curzon) would not enter at present.

As regards the case of the three Governments: Roumania, Czechoslovakia and the Yugoslavs denied that the treaty violated any racial or ethnographical principles. On the contrary, all those questions had been most carefully considered in Paris. They stated that the frontiers were a result arrived at after careful investigation; that after having been agreed to by the technical commissions they went to the Supreme Council, by whom they were accepted, receiving the assent of President Wilson. They could not, therefore be said to violate President Wilson's principles. The three States went further, and said that the decision with regard to frontiers had been definitely communicated to them as final by the Supreme Council on several occasions, and they pleaded that no alterations in those boundaries could in any circumstances be considered. They claimed that they might definitely proceed on that assumption. Further, the three States said that, having received those assurances, they had been in occupation during the past year. Were they now to evacuate those areas? If so, instead of making peace there would be a revival of controversies and war. Furthermore, the settlement of the fate of the Magyars outside Central Hungary had been accepted by the populations themselves. The three States pointed to the fact that in the latter part of 1918 the Assemblies of the countries in question had voted in favour of incorporation into the three States. Then, with regard to the plebiscite, the three States asked: How is it possible now to hold a plebiscite? In those territories there existed a population of 12 million people; was the whole country to be turned upside down in order to get the votes of the people? The holding of a plebiscite would create great bitterness and conflict, and who would keep order? Would Allied or neutral forces be sent there? And they had added that they would never admit neutral forces into those areas for such a purpose.

He (Lord Curzon) had given the substance of the case of the Hungarians and of the three States on the territorial aspect of the subject. He thought he could sum up the whole case in the form of three questions, which he would put to the conference:—

- (i) Was the Hungarian case one which ought to be considered by the conference?
- (ii) Should the conference yield in any way to the claims now put forward by the Hungarians?
- (iii) Were the arguments put forward by the three States sufficiently strong to justify the conference in refusing the [*to*] reopen the case?

M. BERTHELOT said that he had already clearly put forward the view of the French Government in statements which he had previously made to the Supreme Council.<sup>1</sup> The French Government, like the three States, considered that the frontiers had been carefully studied by experts, and especially by American experts; that all the details had been discussed by three separate commissions—the Commission on Czechoslovakia, the Commission on Roumania, and the Commission on Yugoslavia—and all had reached unanimous decisions. Further, the Supreme Council, to whom the whole case had been submitted, had, after careful scrutiny and after making slight alterations, also reached complete agreement. It was only then that the decision had been communicated to the Hungarian Government. The fact should not be overlooked that on several occasions the three States had protested with regard to certain parts of the frontiers, where Czechs or Yugoslavs or Roumanians had been included in Hungary. On all of those occasions each State which had put forward a claim had been informed by the Supreme Council that the question of the frontiers could not be reopened. Finally, he would ask the conference to consider the case of the frontier between Austria and Hungary, since Hungary put forward claims on that side. The treaty with Austria had been signed. How, then, could that treaty now be revised? Obviously that could not be done without reopening the whole terms of the Austrian Treaty of Peace. In his opinion, the three Allied States had put forward very convincing arguments, and the French Government could not admit that any real injustice had been done to Hungary. The decision reached had been the result of a careful, judicial enquiry. On the other hand, he admitted that the decision reached by the French Government did not preclude the reconsideration of small questions of detail.

It had been stated that there would never be peace in those regions unless the Hungarian claims were acknowledged. In reply to that he would say that, in his opinion, far greater bitterness would be created in the other countries concerned by altering the boundaries after the decision of the Supreme Council had been given effect to. It had also been said that Hungary would not accept the terms of the treaty, but that contingency had all along been recognised. Had peace been settled earlier he did not doubt that the Hungarians would have accepted the terms without protest; but now, seeing the difficulties of the situation in Eastern Europe, they were prepared to raise all manner of objections. At any rate, he thought it would be better to keep our Allies and friends on our side rather than to try and please our enemies.

In conclusion, he wished positively to affirm that the French Government had no doubts with regard to the justice of the existing frontiers.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that, at a previous meeting of the Supreme Council,<sup>1</sup> Signor Nitti had stated that he did not think it would be impossible to reconsider certain details connected with the frontiers of Hungary, and in the end the Supreme Council had decided that the matter should be examined with a perfectly open mind. For that purpose, he thought the Hungarian counter-proposals should be discussed point by point. In the first place, the whole question should be considered from a general point of view, and

subsequently the whole should be forwarded to the experts in Paris, in order that they might consider smaller matters of detail that might have escaped the notice of the conference. He now agreed that it would be extremely difficult for the conference to reopen the general question of the frontiers. Some of those frontiers had, for instance, already been fixed by the Austrian treaty, which had been ratified by Italy. Consequently, no alterations on that side could be contemplated. As a result, no great alterations would become necessary in the frontiers. On the other hand, there might be some truth in certain of the minor objections raised by Hungary. He proposed, therefore, that, without changing any of the essential decisions which had been taken, the conference ought to refer the whole of the frontiers to the experts in Paris in order to enable them to report whether any minor alterations in detail appeared to be necessary.

LORD CURZON considered that by referring the whole question to Paris they would be shirking their duty. He thought it would not be right to send the documents to Paris and to say: 'We are unable to come to a decision, but if you can find any little thing to do we will let you do it.' He did not think that would be fair to the experts. He agreed that if a case could be established in regard to any one part of the boundaries on the frontiers the conference itself should assume the responsibility of recommending an alteration. He thought it would be well for the conference to hear the views of the experts with regard to two special territories, namely, the Szekler Counties and the Grosse Schütt. It would be interesting to know on what principle it had been agreed that the Magyar territories in question should be given to Czechoslovakia.

MR. LEEPER said that the Grosse Schütt consisted of an island formed by two branches of the Danube. The reason for the inclusion of that island in Czechoslovakia had been given by the commission in the following words:<sup>7</sup>—

'The committee propose to attach the island of Grosse Schütt to Czechoslovakia, although the population is mainly Magyar. In making the proposal, the committee were influenced by the consideration that the natural and economic relations of the island are with the region in the north and not with that to the south of the main Danube.'

M. Benes<sup>8</sup> had produced excellent maps showing the economic relations of the island, whereby it appeared that the two towns of Pressburg and Komern [*Komorn*] were absolutely dependent on the intervening territory, and that it would be impossible to exclude that territory without starving them, and especially Pressburg, which was the only great river port of Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, M. Benes had said that the Hungarian statement to the effect that the population of the Grosse Schütt was mainly Magyar was not wholly correct. The population had originally been Slovak and German, and had only recently been Magyarised.

<sup>7</sup> See the report of March 26, 1919, of the Commission of Czechoslovak Affairs, printed under the wrong date of March 12 by F. Deák, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York, 1942), p. 413.

<sup>8</sup> Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs.



With regard to the frontiers of Czechoslovakia further to the east, the commission had endeavoured to follow as far as possible a purely ethnic line. But it was found that an entirely ethnic line would have cut across valleys which ran from north to south, and would have resulted in a situation which would have made it quite impossible for portions in the southern part of Czechoslovakia to have any communication one with the other. Only one line of railway ran through this territory. The commission, however, had not hesitated to cut the railway line where it was thought the Czechoslovaks would be able to build loop lines; but they had not felt justified in depriving Czechoslovakia of the railway at points where, owing to the mountainous character of the country, it would have been impossible to replace the existing railway by any other.

M. BERTHELOT agreed with the latter part of Mr. Leeper's statement. He wished further to emphasise the fact that full satisfaction had not been given to the claims of Bohemia, and M. Benes had abandoned his claims whenever possible in order not to include Magyars in Czechoslovakia, with the result that the frontier, as now drawn, did not constitute a strategic frontier.

COUNT VANNUTELLI REY said that the matter was not one which could be settled by considering particular portions of the frontier. The Hungarians had, in fact, raised an important question of principle which it behoved the conference to consider. They had maintained that all the mountainous country to the north of Budapest was intimately bound up with Budapest. He thought, therefore, that the economic aspect of the case should receive careful consideration.

M. BERTHELOT said that Count Vannutelli Rey had raised a very broad question which would imply a modification of the whole treaty from a point of view diametrically opposed to that adopted in Paris. The decision to exclude Pressburg from Hungary had been arrived at unanimously after long discussion. Any modification which implied the handing over of the mountain districts north of Pressburg to Hungary would be very serious for Czechoslovakia, as Hungary would thus be in a position to deny her access to the Danube outlets.

LORD CURZON pointed out that the Czechoslovak frontier as laid down in the treaty would bring it very near Budapest. The conference had recently been discussing the objections to Doorn as a place of internment for the ex-Kaiser on the grounds of its proximity to the German frontier. Doorn was no further from the German frontier than Budapest would be from the proposed frontier of Czechoslovakia, and he feared that the Hungarians would not welcome a frontier within 50 or 60 miles of their capital.

M. BERTHELOT called attention to the similar position of Belgrade and remarked that the Banat offered an example of the impossibility of reconciling geographical with ethnographical considerations in determining a frontier.

LORD CURZON said that if no member of the conference desired to raise any further questions in connection with the frontier, he wished to make a suggestion. All were agreed that it was not only difficult but almost impossible at this stage for the conference to discuss modifications to the treaty. At the

same time, there appeared to be a general feeling that in certain areas of the frontier districts injustice might have been committed. The question was, what steps, if any, could be taken to provide for a re-examination of the frontier in this light? It was provided under the treaty that a commission or commissions should be appointed for the final delimitation of the frontiers. Would it not be possible to provide that if these commissions found after due enquiry on the spot, that in certain areas injustice had been done and modifications were required, they should be at liberty to report their conclusions to the League of Nations? It might further be provided that if the League of Nations was then asked by either party to do so, it could undertake to use its good offices to rectify the frontier amicably at the places where modification was considered desirable. This appeared to him to be a practicable suggestion, and he did not see that the conference could go further than this at this stage.

M. BERTHELOT thought that this was an ingenious suggestion, but before concurring in it he would like to be quite clear to what extent the Delimitation Commission would be authorised to make recommendations. The broad lines of the frontier as fixed in the treaty had been worked out by experts and must stand. He thought that the Delimitation Commission should only be given authority to indicate specific points on their [*this*] frontier where they considered that modification was desirable. The League of Nations should only be invited to adjudicate on these specific points.

M. CAMBON saw no objection to the suggestion, subject to the considerations outlined by M. Berthelot.

(The conference approved Lord Curzon's suggestion.)

[2] LORD CURZON said that a few days ago when M. Vaida Voevod had been before the conference the evacuation of Hungary by Roumanian troops had been discussed, and it had been decided that this evacuation should be supervised by an Inter-Allied Commission under the presidency of Major-General Ironside.<sup>9</sup> It had also been decided that after the evacuation was completed, the question of Bessarabia was to be settled in a manner favourable to Roumania. Draft instructions to Major-General Ironside had been prepared by the British delegation for the approval of the conference. He did not know whether the conference were prepared to approve them at once. Major-General Ironside was to leave London on 10th March.

*Suggested Instructions to the Inter-Allied Commission under the Presidency of Major-General Ironside*

It was decided to await any observations which the Italian delegation might have to offer on the draft instructions.

(*The meeting then adjourned.*)

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 8, 1920.

<sup>9</sup> Sec No. 30.

I.C.P. 70.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Wednesday, March 10, 1920, at 12 noon.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, Lord Privy Seal; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; The Right Hon. W. Long, First Lord of the Admiralty; The Right Hon. W. S. Churchill, Secretary of State for War and Air; Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff; Major-General Sir W. Thwaites, Director of Military Intelligence; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Philip Kerr; **SECRETARIES,** Brigadier-General S. H. Wilson, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Major Caccia.

*France:* M. Paul Cambon, M. Berthelot, General Viscount de la Panouse, Commander Blanpré.

*Italy:* Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, General Cavallero, Signor Galli, Duke Ascanio Colonna, Commander Ruspoli.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda.

*Greece:* M. Veniselos.

**INTERPRETERS:** M. Camerlynck and M. T. d'Honincthun.

1. **MR. LLOYD GEORGE** said that he considered it necessary that the conference should have another meeting upon the subject of *Constantinople* Constantinople. The French and Italian delegates, he thought, must have already received telegrams from their High Commissioners giving the advice asked for as to the further measures to be taken at Constantinople. He understood that identic telegrams had been sent by all the High Commissioners. At all events, Admiral de Robeck informed the British Government that his telegram had been drawn up in agreement with the French High Commissioner. Apparently, at first, some difference of opinion had occurred on the part of the Italian High Commissioner, but no doubt that matter had now been put right. The French and British High Commissioners recommended that much more drastic action should be taken than that recommended by the conference, including not only the occupation of Constantinople, but the taking over of the civil administration of the town, the arrest of the nationalist leaders, and the suppression of the Turkish Parliament. At the same time they recommended that a proclamation should be issued indicating the grounds for taking that course. He (Mr. Lloyd George) thought that the recommendations made by the High Commissioners required careful consideration. The British Government felt that it would be sufficient to proceed with the milder instructions issued on the previous Saturday<sup>1</sup> which would include the seizure of the War Office at Constantinople in order to prevent orders being issued to the Turkish army contrary to Allied interests. Should the conference decide, however, that further action should be taken, the British delegates would be prepared to discuss the same. Meanwhile, the British Government had telegraphed on

<sup>1</sup> See No. 50, appendix 1 and No. 53, minute 2.

the previous day to their High Commissioner that the recommendations made by the High Commissioners would be taken into consideration by the conference, but that steps should be taken forthwith to carry out the orders already issued by the Supreme Council, without at present taking any of those extreme measures indicated in the last telegram of the High Commissioners.

M. CAMBON invited attention to the fact that at the last meeting of the Supreme Council, Mr. Churchill had pointed out that Constantinople was already occupied by the Allies.<sup>2</sup> Troops did not occupy the centre of the town merely because it had been found more convenient to keep them in the outskirts. The conference had decided that it would be necessary to make a demonstration in order to produce a moral effect and to show the Turkish Government that the Allies were prepared to enforce their decisions. With this object in view, it had been decided to take over the Turkish War Office. The question of the internal administration of the town had been discussed, with the result that the conference had decided that they would not undertake the civil administration of the town, since that might lead to very great difficulties. Now, the British and French High Commissioners had suggested not only the taking over [of] the civil administration, which he (M. Cambon) considered to be a very difficult matter, but also the dissolution of the Turkish Parliament. He fully admitted that that Parliament had never been elected in a regular way, and the value of its mandate was undoubtedly doubtful; but the fact remained that the Parliament did exist, and its suppression would inevitably create difficulties. In his opinion it would be sufficient, in view of the Allied occupation of Constantinople, to threaten the Turkish Parliament with dissolution in the event of their causing trouble. Taking all the above facts into consideration, he would propose that for the moment the conference should adhere to the decisions taken at the last meeting, and decide to go no further.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he had so far received no reply from the Italian High Commissioner in Constantinople. He (Signor Scialoja) was, therefore, dependent on the information which he had received at the conference. Nevertheless, he felt convinced that the conference should carry out the decisions reached at the last meeting. He would point out that many of the recommendations now made by the High Commissioners had already been discussed by the council at their last meeting. They had examined the question of the dissolution of the Turkish Parliament, and had agreed that no useful purpose would thereby be served,<sup>2</sup> especially as that Parliament, if driven from Constantinople, might meet in some place in Asia Minor and there form the nucleus of an official organisation for Mustafa Kemal, thus creating a far more dangerous situation.

The council had decided to occupy Constantinople with two objects in view, namely—

- (i) To threaten Turkey, in order to prevent the recurrence of massacres and the ill-treatment of minorities.

<sup>2</sup> See No 50, minute 1.

- (ii) In order that the Allied Governments might hold a pledge in their hands at the time when the peace terms would be communicated to the Turks, and be able to exert pressure in order to obtain their acceptance.

In order to attain these two objects the council had decided, firstly, to occupy Constantinople, and, secondly, to take over control of the War Office. In his opinion the adoption of the further recommendations made by the High Commissioners would only compel the Allies eventually to undertake serious operations of war. Consequently, before accepting them, he thought the delegates should ask themselves whether they would be ready to carry out extensive operations of that nature. He would say at once that for Italy it would be extremely difficult for her to do anything that might even be interpreted as a renewal of warfare. Italy would unquestionably be prepared to help in the occupation of Constantinople; she would also take her share of the responsibility for the protection of minorities; but she could never agree to enter on a line of policy which would undoubtedly lead to war. He could never bind his Government to accept that policy.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that he had no observations to make.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, as any trouble which arose in Turkey would necessarily affect Greece—and affect her seriously—and also since Greece had more troops in occupation of the old Turkish Empire than any other of the Powers, he had taken it upon himself to invite M. Veniselos to attend that morning. He did not know what views M. Veniselos held, but he felt confident that the conference would be glad to hear him.

M. VENISELOS said that the contemplated measures aimed at the achievement of two purposes, namely:—

- (i) To prevent future massacres.
- (ii) To ensure the acceptance of the terms of peace and their eventual execution.

With those objects in view it appeared quite obvious, especially in dealing with an Eastern Power, that the Allies should bear in mind the fact that as regards Oriental peoples and especially the Turks, it was not enough that these peoples should be conscious of the strength of the Allies, but that they should know that they were prepared to use that power in order to enforce their wishes. Following that train of thought, the suggestions made by the High Commissioners, he thought, deserved very careful consideration. He, personally, would be prepared to accept their recommendations, as a whole, but in deference to the objections raised by M. Cambon and Signor Scialoja, he thought it advisable that the civil administration of the town should be left at present to the Turks, while the control of the police should be taken over by the Allies. The council had already decided to occupy and control the Ministry of War at Constantinople; consequently, the same should logically be extended also to the police, since in his opinion it would be impossible effectively to control the army without also taking over the police.

Next, with regard to the dissolution of the Turkish Parliament, since that proposal appeared to be received with considerable doubt, he thought it would be sufficient for the moment merely to threaten, as suggested by M. Cambon, that any hostile action taken by that Parliament would at once lead to its dissolution. On the other hand, he thought that it would be absolutely necessary forthwith to seize and keep under arrest a certain number of the Nationalist leaders, and were<sup>3</sup> undoubtedly merely representatives of Mustafa Kemal. He admitted that the measures to be taken at Constantinople would, no doubt, have a certain moral effect throughout the Ottoman Empire, and it might have an influence on Mustafa Kemal, but he was far from certain of this; and as long as the latter remained in Anatolia at the head of his forces, troubles and difficulties would be bound to arise. It would be found that the most important of Mustafa Kemal's forces were now concentrated in the Villayet of Aidin, in front of the Greek troops. He understood that two-thirds of Mustafa Kemal's forces were to be found in that locality. He thought, therefore, that the Turkish Government should forthwith be directed to disband those forces. A period of twenty-four hours could be given to the Turkish Government for the issue of the necessary orders, and one week for the execution of the same; failing which, the Allies should make it clear that the Greek army would undertake to do this work. In addition, M. Veniselos wished to make the following proposal. The Allied troops in occupation of Asia Minor were under the orders of General Milne, who, he thought, should be instructed to visit the Greek front, and if he came to the conclusion that Mustafa Kemal's forces facing the Greeks should be dispersed, he should be authorised to permit the Greek forces to do this work. The work in question could easily be carried out by the Greek troops on the spot. In this connection he would at once give the necessary guarantees that any advance by the Greek troops would in no way affect the territorial decisions already agreed upon by the conference. The Greek troops would at once retire to their frontiers on the completion of the contemplated operations.

MR. CHURCHILL explained that the information in possession of the British War Office with regard to the grouping of the Turkish forces differed somewhat from that given by M. Veniselos. The British figures showed that the number of Turkish troops on the Greek front did not exceed 2,500 regulars and 16,000 irregulars. The main mass of Mustafa Kemal's forces were to be found in Armenia, totalling 12,000 regulars and 16,000 irregulars. The next largest forces were concentrated in four other zones, but there were only a very small number of regulars on the Greek front. In the second place, from the War Office point of view, the Great Powers ought to consider at this juncture whether they should not address themselves to Mustafa Kemal, because he constituted the only power in the Turkish Empire that could at the present moment resist their orders and obstruct any decisions reached by the council. Consequently, if it were decided to give to Turkey a chance of complying with the will of the council, the Great Powers ought to address

<sup>3</sup> In the typescript text this passage read '... leaders, who were' &c.

themselves to the real master of the Turkish forces, namely, Mustafa Kemal, at the same time as pressure was being brought to bear in Constantinople. In his opinion, to attack the Turkish Government at Constantinople while ignoring Mustafa Kemal constituted a one-sided way of treating the problem.

LORD CURZON wished, in the first place, to invite attention to one point which had not yet been made in the discussion. In the instructions to the High Commissioners on the previous Saturday the seizure of the Turkish War Office had been suggested, with the object of censoring all despatches received or issued. He wished, however, to make another suggestion, namely, the seizure of the post and telegraph department, because otherwise all communications between the military authorities and the districts would in future merely be transferred from the War Office to the post and telegraph department. In his opinion, therefore, the taking over of the post and telegraph offices would really constitute the logical sequence of the seizure of the War Office.

With regard to the proposal to dissolve the Turkish Parliament, he would point out that that Parliament counted for nothing, since it was not a properly elected body; it merely consisted of a collection of Nationalists irregularly appointed. He could, therefore, see no objection to the acceptance of the proposal.

Next, with regard to the question of the police. When the Allied Governments had taken over Constantinople, it had been decided also to exercise a certain measure of control over the police. By reference to Foreign Office papers, he had found that an inter-Allied police control existed which extended half-way up the Bosphorus and as far as Scutari. A number of Allied officers and non-commissioned officers had been appointed to work in with the Turkish administration. In addition, certain military patrols were also supplied by the General Officer Commanding. Consequently, to take over complete control would only mean an extension of the existing system. He therefore fully accepted the proposal made by M. Veniselos.

Lastly, the arrest of the Nationalist leaders would involve no new policy. This had already been done, and a number of Nationalists were now under arrest at Malta. Therefore, if anyone dangerous appeared at Constantinople, the Allied representatives already possessed full powers to deal with him. It would be seen, therefore, that the minor proposals which had that day been made, in addition to the decisions taken on Saturday last, were really a continuation of the policy that had already been adopted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would ask the interpreter to read out to the council a French rendering of a draft telegram which Lord Curzon had prepared for despatch to the British High Commissioner in Constantinople.

M. CAMERLYNCK then read out the following telegram:—

‘The Supreme Council have carefully considered the proposals made by French High Commissioner in four telegrams, Nos. ,<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Omission in filed copy, wherein the text of this draft telegram was incorrectly cited. The text as sent in Foreign Office telegram No. 207 of March 10, 1920, to Constantinople

with which it is understood that you agree. The council are opposed at present either to assuming charge of the civil administration or to dissolving the Turkish Parliament or to issuing a general proclamation. They adhere to the instructions contained in our telegram,<sup>1</sup> which should be, if they have not already been, carried out at once.

'It may be necessary, however, that you should seize the posts and telegraphs as well as the War Office, in order to prevent the issue of secret communications, and should also assume complete charge of the police.

'The arrest of dangerous Nationalist leaders would only be in accord with policy previously pursued.

'You will doubtless advise, in consultation with your naval and military commanders, whether any steps require to be taken for protection of Christian minorities in other parts of Turkey.'

M. CAMBON said he was entirely in agreement with Lord Curzon. It went without saying that the police must be subordinated to military commanders. Further, the posts and telegraphs must be seized and controlled. As regards Mustafa Kemal, he understood that the Italians had some troops at Aidin, Konia and elsewhere.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said there were no Italian troops at Aidin, but only in that region.

M. CAMBON thought that the Italian commanders must have been more or less in contact with Mustafa Kemal.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA stated that this was not the case. The Italian forces and those of Mustafa Kemal were opposing each other, but so far there had been no conflict of any kind, and the Italians had not yet been attacked.

M. VENISELOS said that the Greek forces had been attacked, and, as a matter of fact, were being attacked every day.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that the part allotted to the Italian troops had been limited to keeping the line, to prevent the Turk penetrating beyond it.

M. BERTHELOT thought that the Italians ought to know approximately what troops Mustafa Kemal had. He would ask whether they had any information as to whether he was at Konia or Erzerum.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that the only information they had was contained in a telegram which had just been received of a premonitory character, warning the Italian Government that the Turks were believed to be about to attack near Konia.

M. CAMBON said that, as Mr. Churchill had pointed out, Mustafa Kemal employed guerilla tactics, which, in the circumstances, were much more formidable than regular warfare.

GENERAL CAVALLERI [*sic*] said that, according to M. Berthelot, Mustafa Kemal was believed to be probably at Konia. His information, however, was to the effect that he was not there. The Italian commander on the spot here read '... by the French High Commissioner in your telegram No. 201, with which' &c. The proposals under reference, transmitted in Constantinople telegram No. 201 of March 7 (received March 8), were those referred to by Mr. Lloyd George in his opening statement above.



used to be apprehensive of the Turks attacking Konia, but these threats had never materialised. Such attacks as had been made had always been from the east, and not from the south, where the Italian troops were.

M. VENISELOS agreed that this was a fact.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the council were unanimous in thinking that any extensive operations in Anatolia by the Allies were out of the question, and that they should confine themselves to the policy they had decided to adopt, in regard to which instructions had already been issued; and, further, that they agreed with Lord Curzon's suggestion that the posts and telegraphs must be seized. If the council approved of the draft telegram which had been read to them, he would have it despatched to the British High Commissioner, and copies issued at once to his colleagues.

M. CAMBON thought it would be better to refer the draft to M. Millerand in the first instance for his approval.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that this would involve considerable delay. He explained that the draft telegram did not involve any alteration in the instructions already issued, and it was intended merely to give effect to a policy which had already been approved by the council. Had there been any suggestion of any alteration, he would have quite understood the desirability of referring to M. Millerand, but no such proposal was contemplated. In brief, the telegram merely stated that the Allies were declining to accept further commitments, and intended to adhere to the policy which had already been agreed upon by the three Governments.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he agreed to the telegram being sent and with what Mr. Lloyd George had said.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, continuing, said that his own view was that the Allies exaggerated the prowess of the Turks, who, he did not think, would prove a very formidable enemy in the face of trained Western troops. They were formidable only as guerillas, and he had no intention of attempting to occupy Anatolia. There was one question he would like to put to M. Veniselos, and it was this: Some time ago M. Veniselos had stated that he had experienced great difficulty owing to the rigid line of demarcation which had been laid down beyond which the Greek troops were not allowed to pass, even to pursue the enemy.<sup>5</sup>

M. VENISELOS said that from the very start the power of the Greek troops to attack and pursue the Turks had been absolutely curtailed by this edict, and had constantly been severely handicapped. The result indeed had been to place them in a position of considerable military inferiority, as they were not even allowed on being attacked to take the counter-offensive and pursue the enemy beyond the line of occupation. Naturally the Turks took advantage of this. Two months ago representations had been made to General Milne, who had so far modified his original instructions as to permit the Greeks to move forward to the extent of 3 kilom. The effect of this was that the Turks withdrew to a distance of 4 kilom. and there sat down and merely laughed at the Greek troops. He admitted that there were probably, as estimated by

<sup>5</sup> See Volume II, No. 25, appendix B.

Mr. Churchill, some 20,000 Turks opposing the Greeks. If the Allied Council would permit his troops to move forward and disperse these 20,000 Turks, the prestige of Mustafa Kemal would suffer a severe blow. After all, the Turk did not really want to fight. He was a reluctantly conscripted man and not a volunteer, in the late war he had been thoroughly beaten and consequently demoralised. He hoped that the Allies would give the Greeks this opportunity of dispersing them and making prisoners and destroying Mustafa Kemal's prestige. Failing this, he earnestly hoped that the Allies would agree to remove the disability attaching to the 3-kilom. limit, and he begged that permission be given to the Greeks to take the counter-offensive up to a limit of 10 to 12 kilom. on the strict understanding that when the action was over the Greek troops would withdraw again within their own lines.

MR. CHURCHILL explained that only last week General Milne had given a full discretion to the Greek commanders to attack the Turks beyond their line and to pursue them up to a full 12 kilom. If the present proposal was that the discretionary power should be transferred from General Milne to the Greek commander, this was a new departure which would require consideration.

M. VENISELOS said that he was quite satisfied with what Mr. Churchill had said. He himself had not heard of this discretionary power which had been given to General Milne, but it was possible that General Milne's orders had not yet been communicated to the Greek commander.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that M. Veniselos should instruct the Greek commander to get into touch at once with General Milne on the subject, and that M. Veniselos should again raise the question before the Supreme Council, in the event of any further difficulties arising.

(This suggestion was accepted by the council.)

(*The council adjourned at 1.25 p.m.*)

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 10, 1920.

I.C.P. 70A.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conversation between British and French Delegates, held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Wednesday, March 10, 1920, at 1.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; The Right Hon. W. S. Churchill, Secretary of State for War and Air; Major-General Sir W. Thwaites, Director of Military Intelligence; Mr. Philip Kerr; SECRETARIES, Brigadier-General S. H. Wilson, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Major Caccia.

*France*: M. Cambon, M. Berthelot.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had a rather important question to raise, and that was, what general was to assume command of the Allied troops at Constantinople? This was a matter which more particularly concerned our French Allies and ourselves, and it was for this reason that he had deemed it advisable to confine the conversation to the representatives of those two Powers. The question had already been raised on more than one occasion in Paris,<sup>1</sup> and had sometimes aroused rather stormy scenes, which no one would desire to see repeated. The reason why he had brought up the matter was that he understood that General Franchet d'Esperey had left for Constantinople.<sup>2</sup> If this meant that General Franchet d'Esperey had left with instructions to take over the supreme command there, this, he must say at once, raised an issue between the two Governments which he thought they were both very anxious to avoid. Great Britain had never accepted that General Franchet d'Esperey should be in supreme command at Constantinople. It had been understood that General Milne should command the troops in the Turkish capital and near the Straits. If General Franchet d'Esperey went to Constantinople and assumed command, a very difficult situation would be created. As a matter of fact, he thought that the present system was working very well, and he hoped that it would continue.

M. CAMBON said that the present system was that General Franchet d'Esperey commanded the Allied troops on the European side of the Straits and on the strip along the coast, while General Milne had supreme command in Turkey in Asia from the Asiatic shore. This had been agreed upon by Lord Curzon and himself.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in practice it had always been recognised that General Milne should command at the Turkish capital. As his French colleagues knew, he had never fully believed in the tact of General Franchet d'Esperey, and his views on this question had been freely communicated to M. Clemenceau. He was a distinguished French officer, but deplorably

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Volume IV, Nos. 514, 518, and 525.

<sup>2</sup> General Franchet d'Esperey had recently been in Paris.

deficient in tact. Mr. Lloyd George felt that he could speak quite freely and frankly on this subject, because he was more responsible than any other man for placing British troops in France, to the extent of over 2,000,000 men, under the French Commander-in-chief. It was not that he took a narrow view of the present question, or that he was reluctant to place British troops under a French commander. This was obvious from the line he had taken in France. He hoped his French colleagues would permit him to say that General Franchet d'Esperey was lacking in tact, and that he was constantly exercising command in a manner which was humiliating to the British soldiers. He himself had always wished that it had been possible for the French to have sent General Gourand to command instead. Attempts had been made, he thought, in France to persuade M. Clemenceau to send General Henry. M. Clemenceau had promised to do this, but unfortunately it had not been found feasible. In any case, M. Clemenceau had been disposed to recall General Franchet d'Esperey, but M. Clemenceau was no longer the President of the Chamber [*sic*], and General Franchet d'Esperey remained where he was and was asserting his authority in a manner which was not in any way compatible with friendly co-operation. Mr. Lloyd George said that he would have much preferred to discuss this matter when M. Millerand had been in London, and he would certainly have brought it up before the council when M. Millerand was present if he had imagined that the French contemplated sending General Franchet d'Esperey to take over the command. Directly General Franchet d'Esperey assumed the command, General Milne, as he had repeatedly informed M. Clemenceau, would at once refer to his own Government, which would raise a very unpleasant and delicate question. He sincerely hoped that the French would not persist in sending the general out to Constantinople, as his assumption of the supreme command there could not be accepted by the British Government.

M. BERTHELOT said that he would endeavour to sum up the situation in a few words as he understood it. At the start, General Franchet d'Esperey had found himself in command of the Allied troops in those regions. It was quite true, as Mr. Lloyd George had said, that the general had not succeeded in ingratiating himself with the British soldiers, as he had found it necessary to break them up into several detachments, which naturally was not acceptable to them. It was also the fact that when the Turks surrendered it was after a British victory, and General Milne, the British commander, had been the first to reach their capital. General Milne had then taken over command at Constantinople, and had been in control of the town. When, however, General Franchet d'Esperey went to Constantinople, he also had taken up his headquarters there. In other words, there were two Allied generals both exercising command in one place. Such a situation obviously could not last. Actually, General Franchet d'Esperey was Commander-in-chief of the Allied troops. It had been thought impossible to settle this question of the command on the spot, and it had been referred to London and Paris. Then, as the French Ambassador had stated, the matter had been fixed up between Lord Curzon and M. Cambon, that General Milne was to command in Turkey-

in-Asia and General Franchet d'Esperey in Turkey-in-Europe. The British Government, however, were apparently not prepared to follow up this agreement. The French delegates were quite ready to reconsider the question and to refer it to M. Millerand, though they could not forecast in any way what line M. Millerand was likely to take.

LORD CURZON said that he hoped M. Cambon would allow him to recall the exact position. It was true that M. Cambon had come to see him about the question of the supreme command, and had proposed a division of the spheres. No actual agreement had, however, been concluded. M. Cambon's suggestion had been passed on by him (Lord Curzon) to the British War Office, and he understood that neither the French War Office nor the British War Office had found it acceptable.<sup>3</sup> It was certain that no formal agreement had ever been made.

M. CAMBON said that his recollection was quite precise on the subject. He fully understood that it was an agreement which included the claim of the British War Office to the absolute control of Haidar Pasha, the station from which started the whole railway system of Anatolia, which claim had been admitted.

M. BERTHELOT said that it was the fact General Franchet d'Esperey was appointed Commander-in-chief of the Allied troops in that part of the world. There had never been any modification of this when General Milne went to Constantinople. In theory, General Franchet d'Esperey was, and remained, Commander-in-chief of the Allied troops. The French had no desire to be grasping; what they wanted was a happy solution of the difficulty. At the same time they must state facts. The position at Constantinople, with two Allied Commanders, would become ridiculous. The French had certainly believed that the agreement reached between M. Cambon and Lord Curzon was to be carried out. The reason this had not been possible was that it had been opposed by the War Office. The question of personality was one of primary importance, and it was certainly unfortunate that General Gouraud was ill and consequently unable to take over the command. Were they to telegraph to M. Millerand that it was proposed to suppress the Commander-in-chiefship of the Eastern Allied army? The last thing he wanted to do was to raise unnecessary difficulties. At the same time he was bound to point out that right was undoubtedly on the side of the French.

MR. CHURCHILL said that the important and urgent thing was to prevent this difficult question becoming more difficult by friction and quarrel on the spot. The Governments must settle the matter at once if they were to avoid an unfortunate *contretemps* at Constantinople. At any moment, possibly within a few hours, General Franchet d'Esperey might arrive at Constantinople and give orders to General Milne, who would at once refer to the British Government before carrying them out. What the British Government desired was that General Franchet d'Esperey should be instructed not to raise this question on the spot, and that he should be informed that the matter would be settled by the highest authorities of the two States concerned:

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Volume IV, Nos. 476 and 483.

that is to say, by the heads of the Governments or by their respective Foreign and War Offices, and that it would not be settled by the military authorities at Constantinople.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he wished to appeal to the French not to permit this question to be fought out on the spot. The difficulty would never have arisen had the French Commander been a man possessed of more tact. No such difficulties had arisen in France, where the most amicable relations had existed between Marshal Foch and Field-Marshal Haig, whose respective spheres had been clearly defined. The British High Commissioner, Admiral de Robeck, was a man with whom it was most easy to work, and yet we had received from him constant complaints about General Franchet d'Esperey's conduct. Again, General Milne was a very quiet and unassuming commander, who had even managed to work in quite a friendly fashion with General Sarrail.<sup>4</sup> But that these two British authorities should both have constant reason to complain of General Franchet d'Esperey's attitude and demeanour clearly showed that something must be wrong. The French had suggested that the British general should command in Anatolia, and that General Franchet d'Esperey should command in European Turkey. He himself and his colleagues would much prefer that it should be the other way about, as they thought that it might be as well that General Franchet d'Esperey should be given an opportunity of exercising his special qualifications on the other side of the Straits. An alternative solution was that there should be a joint command, the details of which should be arranged between the two generals on the spot: that is to say, that each general should command his own troops—the French general the French troops, the Italian general the Italian troops, and the British general the British troops. He did not think this would lead to very happy results. He understood that the majority of the troops in Constantinople to-day were British.

M. BERTHELOT disputed this.

Then followed a discussion as to the exact numbers of troops of the respective Allied armies in and about Constantinople, in the course of which MR. CHURCHILL pointed out that, although the French might have a battalion, or less, more than the British, the French battalions were very much under strength, and the actual numbers were approximately 3,000 British and Indian troops, as against 1,200 French.

M. BERTHELOT said that, in any case, this question could hardly be settled on the narrow margin of a battalion or so of a few hundred men.

MR. CHURCHILL agreed.

M. BERTHELOT said that in theory and in law General Milne was subordinate to General Franchet d'Esperey. In point of fact, General Milne had gone to Constantinople and had established himself there. The French were now asked to accept General Milne as the Commander-in-chief of the Allied troops in Turkey. They had accepted him as the Allied Commander on the east of the Straits, but General Milne had gone further and had proceeded to exercise command in the Turkish capital. The last thing

<sup>4</sup> French Commander-in-Chief of Allied forces at Salonika, 1915-17.

M. Berthelot said he wanted to do was to infuse any heat into the discussion. The French delegates earnestly desired to settle the matter harmoniously and in a spirit of unanimity, and also in such a way as would be best for all concerned, particularly for those on the spot. But a question of right and principle was involved. General Franchet d'Esperey was *de facto* Commander-in-chief of the Allied armies in the East, and yet General Milne had exercised command in Constantinople. That was leading to an obviously absurd situation. What, however, was he to telegraph to Paris? Should he cable in the sense that the British objected to General Franchet d'Esperey, but would accept another French commander? In claiming to have a French Commander-in-chief of the Allies there, the French were strictly within their rights. He proposed to telegraph to M. Millerand in the sense of the above discussion, but he could not possibly say what view Paris would take of the matter. In conclusion, he would ask why Mr. Lloyd George thought that General Franchet d'Esperey was on his way to Constantinople?

MR. CHURCHILL said that the fact had been announced and was in all the papers, notably in the 'Echo de Paris'.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the British suggested complete equality for the British and French commanders in the Turkish capital. General Franchet d'Esperey must, in no circumstances, however, assert that he was Commander-in-chief of the Allied forces: the moment he did so he would at once *ipso facto* cease to be the Allied Commander-in-chief. As he had said, the British suggestion was complete equality. He claimed complete equality between the Allied commanders, and he would leave it to the generals to agree among themselves as to such details as which places were to be occupied by which troops. Nothing, however, was more to be deprecated than disputes between the Allied commanders on the spot. Great Britain did not claim to have sole control any more than she claimed any suzerainty over Turkey.

M. BERTHELOT, subject to M. Millerand's approval, accepted the proposal that there should be complete equality between the Allied generals at Constantinople, who should meet together and decide on the steps to be taken by the commanders of each of the Allied forces to give effect to this decision.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that perhaps it might be better if the Governments themselves arranged this.

(*The conversation terminated at 2.20 p.m.*)

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 10, 1920.

## CHAPTER II

# Concluding proceedings of the First Conference of London

March 11–April 10, 1920

No. 57

I.C.P. 71.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, held in Lord Curzon's Room at the British Foreign Office, Whitehall, London, S.W. 1, on Thursday, March 11, 1920, at 11.30 a.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Malkin; **SECRETARIES,** Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Captain Abraham, Major Caccia.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer.

*Italy:* Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Nogara, Colonel Castoldi, Signor Galli, Don Ascanio Colonna.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda.

**INTERPRETER:** M. Camerlynck.

1. **LORD CURZON** said that he wished to draw attention to a matter which greatly concerned the progress of the conference. The conference had spent several hours on two occasions in the past week discussing the report of the Financial Commission.<sup>1</sup> He had thought that the matter was thereby concluded. He was now informed that new proposals had been put forward, that the commission had met again to consider them, and that consequently the work already done by the conference might turn out to have been wasted. He would be glad if any member of the commission present would explain how this had come about, and by what authority the commission had again brought under discussion questions which had been settled. If this was to go on there would be no finality at all.

*Financial Commission. Powers of Delegates to take Decisions*

**M. KAMMERER** said that the results obtained after the various discussions alluded to by Lord Curzon had been sent to Paris. The French technical delegates had no authority to accept any proposal finally. The text had been sent to the Minister of Finance, who had communicated it to those principally interested. As a result, some of the proposals appear to have been unacceptable from the French point of view. It was inevitable, therefore, that they should be discussed again. As to the meeting of the commission, he would like to observe that it had been called at the instance of the chairman,

<sup>1</sup> See No. 48, minute 2, and No. 49, minute 1.



who was British, for the purpose of introducing certain modifications which he had to propose. Two out of the three hours during which the commission met had been spent in making changes proposed by the chairman. Presumably, if this was legitimate, no discrimination could be made to the detriment of the French suggestions for an alteration in the text.

M. BERTHELOT said that he thought it had been well understood that the French delegates could only accept proposals *ad referendum*. In this instance observations had been received from Paris which had been communicated to M. Kammerer, who placed them before the meeting of the commission.

LORD CURZON observed that this method of procedure would go far to stultify the work of the conference. There had been a Supreme Council in London, at which M. Millerand and Signor Nitti had been present; general principles had been laid down by it, and their application had been entrusted to the Conference of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors. This conference was not a subordinate committee, and he had always understood that the French Ambassador and M. Berthelot had full powers; that Signor Scialoja and the Marquis Imperiali represented their Governments as he himself represented the British Government, and as the Japanese Ambassador represented his. No doubt the decisions of the conference might be subject to the acceptance of the Supreme Council, but if every point was subject to reference to M. Millerand and Signor Nitti, no possible progress could be made. As to the Financial Commission, he assumed that all the representatives were endowed with sufficient authority. Had he known that their work and the work of the conference was subject to piecemeal alteration after reference to the Governments abroad, he would have declined to sit at the table. He knew nothing of the modifications as suggested by the British chairman; he had given him no instructions to propose any. He wished to ask whether the consideration by the conference of the report of the Minorities Committee was to be treated in a like manner? If so, it was scarcely worth while to begin the work. Before commencing he would like to be quite clear as to the basis of the labours of the conference.

M. BERTHELOT said that none of the delegates present had completely full power. Signor Scialoja was bound to refer certain matters to Italy, and the Japanese Ambassador to Japan. Only the heads of Governments could take final decisions. When they were present the conference was fully a conference of plenipotentiaries. The present delegates could settle matters of detail, but whenever a big question arose it was necessary to refer it to the Governments. He did not think that under these conditions the work was useless, and he thought that even with these limitations the procedure had given good results hitherto. In certain cases the delegates had taken it upon themselves to give a final acceptance, and they had occasionally received somewhat severe observations for having done so. As to the financial clauses, the matters they dealt with were of first-rate importance to France. The French interests were the biggest interests involved, and such questions must, therefore, inevitably be referred to the head of the French Government. He did not think the same applied to the report on minorities. In any case, he

thought this did not constitute any divergence from the situation that had existed in Paris.

M. KAMMERER said that the instructions received by the French member of the Financial Commission might lead to changes in about half a page out of a text consisting of some ten pages. The changes would certainly not be greater in extent than those accepted at the suggestion of Sir Adam Block; nor were the changes as fundamental as Lord Curzon had been led to believe. This would be evident when the amended text was brought forward. The French delegates could not but take into consideration public opinion, by which France, like other countries, was ultimately ruled.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he did not know to what extent the general principles of the financial articles had been altered; and added that he had received a similar objection from Signor Nitti to the conclusions of the conference about the Hungarian boundaries.

LORD CURZON said that he was prepared to agree with M. Berthelot that the conference was not endowed with final authority to deal with all matters. Certain questions of principle might require the assent of the Governments. Whenever such a question arose in the discussion he thought it was only fair that the conference should be informed that its acceptance was subject to reference. He, for one, would not have spent several hours discussing a draft if he had known that its main points were subject to reference to one of the Governments concerned. He would have preferred to wait until that Government had declared its views. He would ask M. Berthelot in future to give due warning each time he felt impelled to reserve his decision for consultation with his Government. He did not agree that the procedure was quite that adopted in Paris. In the first place, there had not been a Conference of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors there. In the second place, reference to the heads of Governments was a quick process, seeing that they were on the spot. As to the proposals of the Financial Commission, was it suggested that the conference should go through them line by line a second time? A few days ago the boundaries of Hungary had been under discussion, and he had suggested the reference of certain questions to the League of Nations.<sup>2</sup> Signor Scialoja had said that he must consult Signor Nitti. Signor Nitti now objected to the proposal, and this put a stop to the whole discussion. Even a meeting at 10, Downing Street could not make any headway. Consequently, unless full powers were delegated it would be useless to proceed with the conference in its present form.

M. BERTHELOT said that he recognised that he ought to have given warning that he was unable to accept the financial clauses finally. He had assumed that this was understood. As to what should now be done he thought that, when the Financial Commission put up its next draft after taking into consideration the views of the French Government, the final decision could be arrived at quite rapidly by the conference. He must also observe that all parts of the treaty were interdependent. An isolated provision could not be accepted by itself, and new subjects were constantly being brought into the

<sup>2</sup> See No. 54, minute 1.

discussion. Before the fate of Smyrna was settled, for instance, it was hardly possible to lay down final financial terms, for the fate of Smyrna obviously reacted upon the whole problem. He thought, therefore, it was necessary for the Financial Commission to meet again, and he begged that leniency might be shown to those delegates who had come from abroad and were sometimes insufficiently equipped for a conference which had already lasted longer than was expected.

LORD CURZON said that he accepted M. Berthelot's assurance that in future he would give due warning when he was unable to accept a proposal finally. He was delighted, but also surprised, to hear that the conference would not find it necessary to spend more than a few minutes upon the next draft of the financial terms.

Before proceeding with the business on the agenda he would ask the conference to hear Mr. Malkin regarding the movements of the Drafting Committee.

2. MR. MALKIN said that the Drafting Committee had to deal with two treaties. The Hungarian Treaty was subject to certain alterations, and the elements of the Turkish Treaty required to be put into shape. Part of the Drafting Committee was in Paris and part in London. It was not possible, therefore, under these conditions, to work at either of these treaties. He suggested that all material for the Hungarian Treaty should be got ready early in the following week, and that the Drafting Committee should meet in Paris to deal with it, and that in the next week it should meet in London to deal with the Turkish Treaty.

M. BERTHELOT observed that M. Fromageot had returned to London.

LORD CURZON said that this altered the situation, and he asked whether the Japanese Ambassador could get the Japanese member to return to London.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that he was ready to return.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that Signor Ricci Buzatti [Busatti]<sup>3</sup> was in Paris and might be proceeding to Rome. He would, however, ask him to remain at the disposal of the conference in Paris or London.

It was agreed—

That Mr. Malkin, after discussing the question with M. Fromageot, should make a report on the following day containing proposals for the work of the Drafting Committee.

3. The conference had before them the report of the Minorities Commission (Paper A.J. 78).<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Italian representative on the Drafting Committee.

<sup>4</sup> Not appended to filed copy. This report read as follows in the English text:

*'Committee on protection of minorities in Turkey*

*'Composition*

*'British Empire:* R. Vansittart, M.V.O.,; E. G. Forbes Adam.

*'France:* M. Kammerer.

*'Italy:* Colonel Castoldi.

*'Japan:* I. Yoshida, C.B.

*Report of the  
Minorities  
Commission* LORD CURZON observed that the report was long, and that the most important remarks were perhaps contained in the preface. The preface pointed out that there were unfortunate precedents for provisions of this character. Turkey had signed articles of this kind before, but had invariably treated them as a dead letter. The commission therefore

'The Committee unanimously recommend the attached draft articles for insertion in the treaty of peace with Turkey. The articles take account of certain proposals on this matter put forward by M. Venizelos. At the same time the Committee wish to make the following observations:

'The Turkish Government have more than once in history solemnly pledged themselves to carry out just the reforms which these articles embody. The Imperial Hatti Sherif of Gulhane, November 3rd 1839, the Imperial Hatti Humayoun of February 18th 1856, and the Treaty of Berlin 1878 may be cited.

'All of these promises have remained dead letters and it seems too optimistic to expect that the present pledges will be carried out unless the Allies can obtain by the Treaty real guarantees. The presence of Allied ships and troops near the capital may be an adequate guarantee so far as the Government and the country near the capital are concerned but the experiences of the armistice and especially the recent Armenian massacres clearly show that some further guarantee is required for the effective performance in the interim of paper pledges signed by the Government at Constantinople.

'The Committee feel it their duty to say that in their opinion the following further guarantees are required.

'(1) Foreign officers to be named by the Allied and Associated Powers or by the Council of the League of Nations should be present in the Turkish gendarmerie and police to the extent of not more than 25% of the total officers of the force. Such officers to have the same executive powers as Turkish officers and to be entitled to report direct to the representative of the League of Nations (Article 12).

'(2) In every district the police, gendarmerie and rural and forest guards should be recruited on the basis of the population, according to the percentage of the races represented and should also be officered in the same proportion. For non-Moslems a percentage of the highest posts should be reserved.

'The Committee have also been tempted to suggest that Article 13 of the Draft submitted might be strengthened by stating that the League may consider the removal of the Turkish Government from Constantinople as a possible penalty for a breach by the Turkish Government of their pledges under this chapter.

'The Committee felt, however, precluded by the general tenour of recent discussions at the Supreme Council from actually embodying the above guarantees in the chapter but they cannot refrain from pointing out that the Allies will lay themselves open to the reproach of being contented once again in spite of long experience with paper guarantees for the protection of minorities in Turkey unless something like the above practical guarantees are inserted in the minorities chapter or elsewhere in the treaty.

'In conclusion the Committee desire to add that other minority treaties have usually contained stipulations regarding changes of nationality rendered necessary by the creation of new states or the transfer of territory to existing states. In the case of Turkey the situation is so complex and the conditions so abnormal that the Committee desire to recommend in due course a chapter regarding nationality, for insertion in the treaty of peace with Turkey, in which the necessary provisions will be separately elaborated.

*London, March 9th.'*

#### *'Article 1*

'Turkey undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 2, 6 and 7 of this chapter shall be recognised as fundamental laws, and that no civil or military laws or regulations, no Imperial Iradeh nor official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.

suggested special guarantees, contingents of foreign officers representing the Allied and Associated Powers in the Turkish gendarmerie, and the recruitment of the police force in each district in proportion to the percentage of the

*'Article 2*

'Turkey undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

'All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion or belief.

*'Article 3*

'Whereas from the 1st November, 1914, until the date of the signature of the Armistice there was a terrorist regime in the Ottoman Empire and whereas no conversions to Islam could therefore take place under normal conditions, no conversions between these dates are recognised and all who were non-Moslems before November 1st, 1914, are to be considered as such to-day unless, after regaining their liberty, they voluntarily perform the necessary formalities for embracing the Islamic faith.

'The Turkish Government will lend every assistance for the recovery of men, women and children of wholly or partly non-Moslem parentage who have adopted the Islamic faith since November 1st, 1914, and who are officially claimed by their community or family. It will also concede the fullest right of search for lost persons in private houses and institutions, the search to be carried out by a representative of the community affected and an official of the Turkish Government, together with a delegate of the representative of the League of Nations (see article 12 below).

*'Article 4*

'Turkey undertakes to recognize such provisions as the Allied Powers may consider opportune with respect to the reciprocal and voluntary emigration of persons belonging to racial minorities.

'In particular Turkey undertakes to adhere to the Treaty between Greece and Bulgaria relating to reciprocal emigration, signed at Neuilly-sur-Seine on November 27th, 1919, in accordance with the provisions of Article 16 of the said Treaty.

*'Article 5*

'The Turkish Government recognises the inequitable character of the Law on Abandoned Properties (*Emval-i-Metroukeh*) 1915 and of the supplementary provisions thereof and declares them to be null and void, in the past as in the future.

'It solemnly undertakes to facilitate to the greatest possible extent the return to their homes and re-establishment in their businesses of the Turkish subjects of non-Turkish race who have been forcibly driven from their homes by fear of massacre or any other form of pressure, since 1st August 1914. It recognises that any real or movable property of the said Turkish subjects of non-Turkish race or of the communities to which such subjects belong, which can be recovered, must be restored to them as soon as possible, in whatever hands it may be found, free of all charges and servitude, with which they may have been burdened and without any compensation of any sort to the present holders of such property, subject to any action such holders may bring against the person from whom they acquired the property in question.

'The Turkish Government further agrees that the funds which may be applied by the Financial Commission for the benefit of such Turkish subjects of non-Turkish race or of their communities (in virtue of Article 5 of the Financial Clauses) shall be allocated in accordance with the provisions of the present article.

'The Turkish Government agrees that arbitral commissions shall be appointed by the Council of the League of Nations or by their representative (mentioned in Article 12) wherever found necessary. These commissions shall each be composed of one representative of the Turkish Government, one representative of the injured community or whose member

racés represented in it. Further, they suggested that a threat should be made that the Turkish Government might, under certain conditions, be removed from Constantinople. These suggestions had not been incorporated in the articles as the commission considered it was not within its power to do so. may have been injured, and a chairman appointed by the representative of the League of Nations. The arbitral Commissions shall hear all claims falling within the scope of this article and decide them by summary procedure.

'The arbitral Commissions will have the power to decide:

'(a) The provision by the Turkish Government of labour for any work of reconstruction or restoration deemed necessary and possible. This labour shall be recruited, in equal proportions from the races inhabiting the territory where the representative of the League of Nations considers the execution of the said works to be necessary;

'(b) the removal of any person, who, after enquiry, shall be recognised as having taken an active part in the massacres or deportations or who may have provoked them, the measures to be taken with regard to his possessions being indicated by the Commission;

'(c) the disposal of property belonging to members of a community who have died or disappeared since August 1st, 1914, without leaving heirs, with the power to hand over their goods and property to the community instead of to the State;

'(d) The cancellation of all acts of sale or any acts creating rights over real property concluded after the 1st August 1914. The indemnification of the possessors in virtue of the present article will be a charge upon the Turkish Government, but must nevertheless not serve as a pretext for delaying restitution. The Commission will however have the power to impose equitable arrangements among the interested parties, *if any which may have been paid by the present owner of such property.* [The passage here editorially italicized was not present in the French text.]

'The Turkish Government undertakes to facilitate in the fullest possible measure the work of the Commissions and to ensure the execution of their decisions, which will be final. No decision of the Turkish judicial or administrative authorities will be permitted to override the said decisions.

#### 'Article 6

'All Turkish nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion.

'Difference of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as for instance admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries.

'No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings. Adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, before the courts.

#### 'Article 7

'Turkish nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense and independently of—and without interference—by the Turkish authorities, charitable, religious and social institutions, schools of primary, secondary and higher instruction and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein.

#### 'Article 8

'In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Turkish nationals belonging to racial, linguistic or religious minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out

These were large questions of policy. The draft might be considered article by article, and the preface studied afterwards, or the contrary method might be adopted. In any case, a reference to the Supreme Council would doubt-

of public funds under the State, municipal or other budget, for educational or charitable purposes.

'The sums in question shall be paid to the qualified representatives of the interested communities.

*'Article 9*

'The Turkish Government agrees to recognise in favour of all racial minorities in Turkey their ecclesiastical and scholastic autonomy. For this purpose the Turkish Government confirms and will fully uphold in future the prerogatives and immunities of an ecclesiastical, scholastic and juridical nature, granted by the Sultans to non-Moslem races in virtue of special orders or imperial decrees (firmans, hattis, berats etc.) as well as by ministerial orders or orders of the Grand Vizier.

'All laws, decrees, regulations and circulars issued by the Turkish Government and containing abrogations, restrictions or amendments of such prerogatives and immunities are considered null and void so far as their dispositions affecting the said privileges and immunities are concerned.

'Any modification of the Turkish judicial system which may be introduced by or as a direct result of the provisions of the present Treaty, shall be held to override this article in the case of conflict, in so far as such modification may affect individuals belonging to racial minorities.

*'Article 10*

'In towns and districts where there is resident a considerable proportion of Turkish subjects of the Christian or Jewish religions, the Turkish Government agrees that these Christians or Jews shall not be compelled to perform any act which constitutes a violation of their faith or religious observances, and they shall not be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal to attend courts of law or to perform any legal business on their weekly day of rest. This provision, however, shall not exempt Christians or Jews from such obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Turkish citizens for the preservation of public order.

'The Turkish Government agrees to refrain from ordering or permitting, except in the case of local usage, elections, whether general or local, to be held on the Christian or Jewish weekly day of rest nor will registration for electoral or other purposes be compulsory on these days.

*'Article 11*

'Turkey agrees that the stipulations in the foregoing articles, so far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations. (The United States), the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent from any modification in these Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

*'Article 12*

'A representative appointed by the Council of the League of Nations shall be resident at Constantinople with a view to watch the application of the Articles of this chapter, with the mission of making periodical reports to the Council. He will have the right to make enquiries on the spot, or to send his delegates to the spot with a view to investigate every infringement of the provisions of the present chapter. The Turkish Government and the Turkish local authorities shall give them every facility in the performance of their functions.

less be necessary. He asked the conference which method it would prefer to follow.

M. KAMMERER said that he begged to suggest that it would be better to study the draft article by article, and to reserve the preface, which had a political character not really within the competence of the commission. The commission had felt, however, that no paper conditions by themselves would suffice to obtain the desired results.

After some further interchange of views, it was decided to study the draft articles one by one.

*Article 1* Was adopted without amendment.

*Article 2* Was adopted without amendment.

LORD CURZON asked the members of the Financial [*sic*] Commission to explain the reason for which article 3 had been inserted.

MR. VANSITTART explained that during the war an enormous number of false conversions had taken place. Article 3 was intended to rectify one of the greatest injustices that had been committed by the Turks during the war.

M. KAMMERER pointed out that very great care had been exercised in drafting the clause, in order that guarantees should be given that no illegal action should be committed. For that reason it had been decided that the search for lost persons in private houses and institutions should be carried out by a representative of the community affected and an official of the Turkish Government, together with a delegate of the representative of the League of Nations.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI enquired whether the commission had fully realised what the proposal in question would mean when applied in practice. In his opinion, the suggestion that a representative of a non-Mahometan community should be permitted to enter a Turkish village and search every house would positively lead to serious riots and massacres. He (Marquis Imperiali) could not imagine what right the Allied Powers could possess to claim anything of the kind. He agreed that the proposal would have

*'Article 13*

'Turkey agrees that any member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction, or any danger of infraction, of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances. The Turkish Government shall carry out such direction immediately and in its entirety.

*'Article 14*

'The Turkish Government further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or of fact arising out of these articles between the Turkish Government and any one of the Principal Allied (and Associated Powers) or any other Power, a Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Turkish Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant. Nothing, however, in this article shall stay the immediate execution by Turkey of any direction given her under Articles 12 and 13 of this chapter.'



presented a different complexion had an inter-Allied gendarmerie already been created, which could be used for the purpose. But the moment normal conditions would again be restored with the administration in the hands of the Turks, he failed to see how in practice effect could be given to the proposals contained in article 3.

M. CAMBON expressed his complete agreement with the view taken by Marquis Imperiali. He had in mind a similar instance which had occurred during his residence in Constantinople. In that case a French consul had forcibly entered a Mahometan house in order to reclaim a French woman, there interned, with the result that serious riots and massacres had ensued.

LORD CURZON invited attention to the fact that the search would be carried out by a representative of the community affected and an official of the Turkish Government, 'together with a delegate of the representative of the League of Nations (see article 12 below).' Now, article 12 laid down that 'a representative appointed by the Council of the League of Nations shall be resident at Constantinople.' Was it really supposed that a representative of the League of Nations sitting at Constantinople would be able to send, or to appoint, delegates to go over all the Turkish territories, where Christians were supposed to have been interned in Mahometan houses, in order to make enquiries on the spot? How could the League of Nations do anything of that kind? Where would the League find the delegates required?

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI enquired: 'Why should there be a representative of the Council of the League of Nations at Constantinople?' He would, moreover, invite attention to the fact that in almost every one of the draft articles on the Protection of the Minorities in Turkey reference had been made to a representative of the League of Nations. He considered this to constitute quite a new departure. The proposal in question might eventually be found to be effective; but, in his opinion, the existence of a representative of the League of Nations at Constantinople would only complicate and render useless the work of the representatives of the Great Powers, and confusion would be bound to arise. In his opinion, no necessity existed to set up a special body to safeguard the provisions of the Treaty of Peace relating to the Protection of the Minorities.

LORD CURZON thought that before continuing the examination of article 3 the council must discuss the general proposal contained in article 12, namely, that there should be a representative of the League of Nations at Constantinople. The proposal in question involved a matter of principle. On the assumption that the Turk would be left at Constantinople, there would exist there:—

Firstly, the whole administration appertaining to the Turkish Government itself;

Secondly, the Financial Commission;

Thirdly, the Commission for the Control of the Straits;

Fourthly, the commanders of the Allied forces. And in addition it was now proposed to have—

Fifthly, a representative of the Council of the League of Nations.

He thought the latter proposal required very careful examination, particularly as to whether it would ever work. He, personally, felt considerable doubt whether the administration of the Turkish Empire by commissions consisting of representatives of the Powers would ever be able to function satisfactorily. The conference, however, had not now been asked to say whether the Allied Governments had been right in creating the commissions 2 and 4<sup>s</sup> above, but would the conference now be justified in creating a fifth body? Would the League of Nations agree to appoint a person of high authority with a view to watching the application of certain articles of the Treaty of Peace? If so, what forces would be placed at his disposal? With what authority should he be invested? In his opinion, it was an easy matter to put on paper a proposal to the effect that the League of Nations should go to Constantinople, but the question must be considered as a practical proposition; and, before accepting the references to the representative of the League of Nations, which occurred in many of the draft articles, he would ask the conference to decide whether they were agreed to set up a separate, outside, independent authority at Constantinople in addition to those already created, and, if so, with what powers should it be invested, and how was it to carry out its duties?

(At this stage M. Fromageot entered the Conference Room.)

SIGNOR SCIALOJA enquired whether the commission had contemplated what use the Turkish Government would make of the representative of the League of Nations should the necessity arise. In his opinion, the representative in question would either be a cypher, or he would become a dictator, and, in the latter case, he thought it would be best forthwith to abolish the other inter-Allied authorities.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI expressed the view that it would have been logical to place a representative of the League of Nations at Constantinople to represent the Great Powers; but the co-existence of the representatives of the Great Powers and the representative of the League of Nations would, in his opinion, only lead to confusion and paralyse the work of the various commissions. The mere existence of a representative of the League of Nations implied a right of appeal from the decisions of the various commissions to the Council of the League of Nations. The council, however, lived far away from Constantinople and only met at infrequent intervals; consequently, should an appeal be made, all the machinery of the Allied administration in Turkey would be stopped for a considerable period of time.

M. CAMBON said that he quite agreed with the Marquis Imperiali. He could not see how the machinery proposed in article 12 would work.

MR. VANSITTART pointed out that the representative of the League of Nations would only be appointed to exercise certain definite duties; that is to say, to assist in the recovery of men, women and children who had been compelled to adopt the Islamic faith since the 1st November, 1914.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI maintained that the representative of the League

<sup>s</sup> The typescript text here read 'commissions 2 to 4'.

of Nations had been vested with many other duties, including interference with the gendarmerie. Furthermore, the appointment in question would undoubtedly give the Turkish Government an opportunity of appealing to the League of Nations, which they would certainly take advantage of. No useful purpose could be served by setting up another King at Constantinople.

VISCOUNT CHINDA expressed the view that the question under consideration should be considered in conjunction with article 11, since the latter article explained the necessity for the existence of a representative of the League of Nations at Constantinople.

LORD CURZON enquired whether the articles, which contained a reference to the League of Nations, had not been drafted on the assumption that the Council of the League of Nations would unhesitatingly approve the terms of the treaty. But what would be the position of the Great Powers should the Council of the League of Nations refuse to guarantee the same when asked to do so? He personally could understand bringing in the League of Nations on the assumption that, the problem being so complex and so difficult, some outside body must be found to take over the entire administration of Constantinople; but to set up an Allied Commission of Control and then to bring in the League of Nations as an outsider, and to put all sorts of responsibilities on it, appeared to him to be very illogical. He must confess that, without having been present at the meeting of the Financial [*sic*] Commission, he shared the views expressed by the French and Italian Ambassadors. He would ask the conference to observe that, under article 12, the League of Nations would not be confined to a particular thing, but it would be required 'to watch the application of the articles of the chapter' of the Treaty of Peace.

M. CAMBON expressed the view that the proposal contained in article 12 had not been drawn up in the spirit which had led to the creation of the League of Nations, whose duty it would be merely to settle difficulties which might arise between Powers. In his opinion, the council could not agree to set up a League of Nations as a supreme power, as if it were a Pope in the middle ages, otherwise it would have to be provided with fleets and arms.

VISCOUNT CHINDA pointed out that an article in identic terms to article 11 had been inserted in every other Treaty of Peace. The article in question did not, however, invest the League of Nations with any administrative powers. It merely gave the League of Nations the power to supervise the execution of certain of the terms of the Treaty of Peace with regard to the protection of minorities. It did not give the League of Nations any right to propose changes in the treaty itself.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA invited attention to the fact that a proposal similar to that contained in article 12 had been inserted in the case of Macedonia. That proposal had not, however, been accepted by the Supreme Council.<sup>6</sup> He thought, therefore, the conference should not now attempt to reverse a previous decision of the Supreme Council.

M. KAMMERER thought that the conference should not insist on retaining article 12 after what had been said at that meeting. The proposals therein

<sup>6</sup> See Volume I, No. 48, minute 1.

contained had been put forward by the British representatives without having received much support from the other members of the commission.

MR. VANSITTART said that, in his opinion, the various draft articles on the protection of minorities in Turkey would have little value without article 12.

LORD CURZON said that, when the draft articles came to be placed before the Supreme Council, the latter would be informed that the conference had discussed the question of the appointment of a representative of the Council of the League of Nations at Constantinople. The Supreme Council would thus have an opportunity of reopening the whole question.

He must confess that he personally did not like the proposal that the League of Nations should be made responsible for one part of the treaty only, namely, the articles dealing with the protection of minorities. He thought it would be impossible to treat the League of Nations in that way. He could understand taking the whole treaty to the League of Nations and asking them to guarantee its execution, but he thought it would be illogical merely to ask them to superintend one or two bits of the treaty. At any rate, the majority of opinion appeared to be against the acceptance of the proposals contained in article 12. He thought, therefore, that it would be best not to pursue the question further.

Lord Curzon said that the question raised by Viscount Chinda, would be discussed when article 11 came under consideration. He suggested that the conference should now confine their attention to article 3.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA invited attention to the first sentence of article 3, wherein it was stated that 'from the 1st November, 1914, until the date of the signature of the armistice there was a terrorist régime in the Ottoman Empire.' He would point out that many serious incidents had also occurred after the signature of the armistice. In the circumstances, he proposed that the words in question should be made to read: 'From the 1st November, 1914, until the date of the coming into force of the present treaty.'

(It was agreed to amend the first sentence accordingly.)

Signor Scialoja, continuing, said that he wished to draw attention to a second point. In the second paragraph the right to claim women and children was given, not only to the families of the persons concerned, but to religious communities also. He thought the proposal would be somewhat dangerous, since it apparently empowered religious communities to claim women and children, in spite of the wishes of their families. In his opinion, great care should be taken to prevent religious communities in the Turkish Empire from exercising undue authority. Experience had shown that Christian communities were just as prone to commit crimes and atrocities as the Mahometans. Consequently, no weapon should be placed in the hands of the Christians which might be used against Mahometans.

LORD CURZON suggested that the first sentence of the second paragraph of article 12 [3] should be amended to read: 'The Turkish Government will lend every assistance for the recovery of men, women and children of wholly or partly non-Moslem parentage who have adopted the Islamic faith since the

1st November, 1914, and who are officially claimed either by their families or, in default of families, by their community.'

(It was agreed to amend the sentence accordingly.)

M. KAMMERER invited attention to the reference to article 12 at the end of article 3. He thought that the whole of the last sentence should be deleted. It would be better not to say who would be invested with the power to search.

MR. VANSITTART enquired whether the Turkish Government could be asked to concede the right of search without saying by whom that right would be exercised.

LORD CURZON proposed that the last sentence of article 3 should be amended to read: 'The search to be carried out by a representative of the community affected and an official of the Turkish Government, together with such other foreign representative as may hereafter be determined.'

Article 3, amended as follows, was duly approved:—

'Whereas from the 1st November, 1914, until the date of the coming into force of the present treaty there was a terrorist regime in the Ottoman Empire, and whereas no conversions to Islam could therefore take place under normal conditions, no conversions between these dates are recognised, and all who were non-Moslems before the 1st November, 1914, are to be considered as such to-day unless, after regaining their liberty, they voluntarily perform the necessary formalities for embracing the Islamic faith.

'The Turkish Government will lend every assistance for the recovery of men, women and children of wholly or partly non-Moslem parentage who have adopted the Islamic faith since the 1st November, 1914, and who are officially claimed either by their families or, in default of families, by their communities. It will also concede the fullest right of search for lost persons in private houses and institutions, the search to be carried out by a representative of the community affected and an official of the Turkish Government, together with such other foreign representative as may thereafter be determined.'

*(The meeting then adjourned.)*

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 11, 1920.

I.C.P. 72.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, held in Lord Curzon's Room at the British Foreign Office, Whitehall, London, S.W. 1, on Friday, March 12, 1920, at 11.30 a.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart; Mr. Forbes Adam; **SECRETARIES,** Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Major Caccia, Captain Abraham.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Kammerer.

*Italy:* Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Colonel Castoldi, Signor Nogara, Signor Galli, Don Ascanio Colonna.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda.

**INTERPRETER:** M. Camerlynck.

1. **LORD CURZON** informed the conference that M. Fromageot and Mr. Malkin, members of the Drafting Committee, had proceeded to Paris yesterday in order to carry out their duties there, where other members of the committee were already installed. It would, therefore, be impossible for M. Fromageot and Mr. Malkin to make their report on the future arrangements for the drafting of the Turkish Peace Treaty<sup>1</sup> until their return from Paris at the end of next week.

*Drafting Committee of the Turkish Peace Treaty. Report by M. Fromageot and Mr. Malkin*

**THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI** enquired how long it was thought that the Turkish Peace Treaty would take to draft. It was necessary that Signor Scialoja should know as soon as possible how long he might be required to remain in London.

**M. KAMMERER** explained that the length of the Turkish Peace Treaty would be the same as the others. Many of the articles were identic with those of other treaties: but there would, in addition, be a great number of entirely new clauses to cover the exceptional conditions existing in Turkey. Taking these facts into consideration, he thought that the work of drafting the Turkish Peace Treaty should be completed in ten days, provided the text of the articles had been approved. With regard to the latter question, he would point out that the financial clauses, the economic articles, and those relating to concessions, still remained to be examined. In addition, there remained the question of the railways and certain clauses relating to ports, railways and waterways. He thought, however, that the draft articles should all be ready by the end of the following week.

**LORD CURZON** expressed the hope that the conference would be able to complete the examination of the draft articles of the Turkish Peace Treaty by the 24th March next.

2. **LORD CURZON** said that before proceeding to discuss the next question on the agenda paper, he would like to mention a matter which arose out of a speech that he had made yesterday afternoon in the House of Lords on the subject of the Turkish Empire.<sup>2</sup> There were two points that

<sup>1</sup> See No. 57, minute 2.

<sup>2</sup> See *Parl. Debts.*, 5th ser., *H. of L.*, vol. xxxix, cols. 409-23.

still remained to be decided in regard to Armenia, namely, firstly, the determination of the frontiers, which had already provisionally been done; secondly, the provision for the future existence of the State, which meant that certain armed forces would have to be provided for its protection, as well as money and arms to set those forces going. He understood that the Armenians would be capable of supplying the larger part, if not the whole, of the manhood to constitute a force sufficient to defend the State, provided a certain number of Allied officers were found, as well as arms and munitions. In the absence of foreign States to accept a mandate—he referred more particularly to the United States of America—the Supreme Council had decided that the new State should be placed under the protection or guarantee of the League of Nations,<sup>3</sup> which, it was thought, would be willing to accept that responsibility. But, meanwhile, the League of Nations had not been approached with the view to ascertaining what steps they would be prepared to take to initiate the work of setting up the new Administration.

At the present moment a certain quantity of arms and munitions were being sent spasmodically by France and Great Britain. The former, for instance, had sent aeroplanes. Further, a great deal of money subscribed to the British and American relief funds had been supplied to Armenia, but he (Lord Curzon) had learnt yesterday that the money in possession of the relief funds was coming to an end. It was evident, therefore, that someone ought to be responsible for the future organisation of Armenia, and if this duty was to be taken by the League of Nations, he thought they should be approached at once, and that a letter should be sent to the Council of the League, informing them of the wishes of the Great Powers, and enquiring what steps they would be prepared to take to organise the forces, and to grant the material assistance required.

M. CAMBON agreed that the duty of supervising the future organisation of Armenia could not be placed on the League of Nations without their first having been consulted. On the other hand, what could the League of Nations do in its present embryonic condition?

SIGNOR SCIALOJA pointed out that the Council of the League of Nations were to-day holding a private meeting in Paris, and that there would be a public meeting to-morrow. He suggested that a telegram should forthwith be sent to Paris.

LORD CURZON said that, if the conference would authorise him to send the telegram in question, he would despatch the same that morning the moment the meeting broke up.

It was agreed—

That the British Foreign Minister should draft and despatch that day a telegram to the Council of the League of Nations, informing them of the decision taken by the Supreme Council in regard to the future organisation of Armenia by the League of Nations, and inviting their acceptance of the

<sup>3</sup> Cf. No. 34, minute 2 (*f*).

proposals therein contained (for copy of telegram as despatched see Appendix 2).<sup>4</sup>

3. LORD CURZON said that, before continuing the examination in regular order of the draft clauses on the protection of minorities in Turkey, he desired to invite attention to a point which arose out of the sitting of the League of Nations, and also out of the draft under consideration. Yesterday, the conference had spent some time in considering whether it would be desirable to include a clause, namely, clause 12, to the effect that a representative appointed by the Council of the League of Nations should be resident at Constantinople, with a view to watching the application of certain articles of the Treaty of Peace.<sup>5</sup>

Report of Minorities Commission  
Considerable objection had been expressed, both by the French and the Italian Ambassadors to the appointment of a representative of the League of Nations at Constantinople, an objection which he had also shared. He now found that he had been somewhat mistaken, because when dealing with article 11 he had not realised that the power therein conferred on the League of Nations was similar to corresponding provisions included in all other treaties. In accepting article 11, the conference, therefore, were really doing what had already been done elsewhere. Article 12, however, did make a new suggestion in that it prescribed that a representative of the League of Nations should be placed at Constantinople. Furthermore, he observed that the existence of a representative of the League of Nations at Constantinople had been assumed in several other clauses. It occurred to him, therefore, that, as the League of Nations was now sitting in Paris, and since the conference had just decided to refer to them the question of Armenia, it would only be prudent to refer to them this point also. He would suggest, therefore, that a telegram should forthwith be sent to the Council of the League of Nations, informing them that a proposal had been put forward to insert a clause

<sup>4</sup> Not here printed. This telegram of March 12, 1920 from Lord Curzon to Lord Derby in Paris is printed by the League of Nations as annex 29 to *Procès-Verbal of the Third Session of the Council of the League of Nations* (Geneva, 1921), p. 33. The text printed by the League of Nations was the same as that in appendix 2 subject to: (i) minor variation in wording and in arrangement of paragraphs; (ii) the second and third sentences of the second paragraph of the appendix read as follows: 'It had been hoped for long that the mandate for this State under the League of Nations might be accepted either by America or by some European Power. In the absence, however, for the time being of any Power willing to undertake the task, the Supreme Council have expressed the desire, which it is proposed to incorporate in the text of the Turkish Treaty, to place the future Armenian State under the protection of the League of Nations.'; (iii) the fifth paragraph of the appendix read as follows: 'In connection therewith arises the question of the provision of adequate armed forces to enable Armenia to maintain her independence, and of the material resources required to promote her future economic development. The first of these subjects has been carefully examined by a special commission, whose report has been accepted by the Conference.'; (iv) the second sentence of the sixth paragraph of the appendix read 'measures of self-defence', whereas the equivalent passage of the League of Nations text read 'measures of selected defence'; (v) the second sentence of the seventh paragraph of the appendix began 'The Armenian representatives here, who are imploring . . .', whereas the equivalent passage of the League of Nations text read 'The Armenian representatives here, who are employing . . .'.  
<sup>5</sup> See No. 57, minute 3 and note 4.



dealing with the protection of minorities similar to that placed in other treaties, and that it had also been proposed that the League of Nations should appoint a representative at Constantinople to watch the application of the articles in question with the mission of making periodical reports to the council. The Council of the League of Nations would be informed that considerable difference of opinion existed in regard to this proposal, which had not been viewed favourably either by the French or Italian delegates, but, before taking a final decision, the conference would like to have the views of the League of Nations.

In conclusion, should this proposal be accepted, it would not be necessary to go through each clause containing that proposal. That is to say, each clause could be examined, leaving out of account the part dealing with the existence of a representative of the League of Nations at Constantinople.

M. CAMBON expressed the view that it would be best, when telegraphing to the Council of the League of Nations, not to mention that objections had been raised by the French and Italian Ambassadors. In his opinion, it would be sufficient to indicate that some objections had been raised, without saying by whom.

LORD CURZON entirely agreed with what M. Cambon had just said. The difference was not between the French and Italians on the one side, and the British on the other side, since he was inclined to agree. The difference of opinion was really one between the commission and the conference.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA maintained that a reference to the League of Nations at this stage would presuppose that the conference were agreed on the principle involved. In his opinion, the conference should, in the first place, decide whether they would in reality eventually be prepared to accept the proposal in question, since, should the conference decide that they did not wish to have a representative of the League of Nations at Constantinople, what would be the good of referring the matter to the League of Nations.

M. CAMBON said that the proposal before the conference was that they should obtain the views of the League of Nations, that is to say an appreciation, without binding themselves in any way. Both the Marquis Imperiali and himself had expressed grave doubts as to the practicability of the proposal under consideration, and therefore they would like to have the views of the League of Nations.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA maintained that to invite the views of the League of Nations necessarily implied that the conference were agreed as to the desirability, if possible, of having a representative of the League of Nations at Constantinople, whereas the Italian delegates considered that the intervention of a representative of the League of Nations at Constantinople would be harmful and would practically tend to render null and void all the clauses of the treaty dealing with the protection of minorities.

LORD CURZON pointed out that the conference had decided under article 11 to place certain responsibilities for the protection of minorities on the League of Nations, and a further proposal had been made under article 12 to appoint a representative of the League of Nations at Constantinople. Now, supposing

the conference should decide to cut out article 12 containing the latter proposal and to leave article 11, the League of Nations would undoubtedly get to know what had been done, with the result that they might say that certain responsibilities had been placed on them under article 11, whilst the means of fulfilling the same had been withdrawn by the deletion of article 12. He thought that such a protest would place the conference in a ridiculous position. Therefore, before deciding what action to take in the matter, common prudence demanded that the conference should acquaint the Council of the League of Nations with the proposals made. He could not conceive that any doubt should exist in regard to the procedure to be followed.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA pointed out that all other treaties contained article 11, whereas article 12 did not appear in any other treaty. He did not think therefore, that the League of Nations would feel injured if they were not consulted in regard to the inclusion or exclusion of the two articles in question. Furthermore, he had yesterday invited attention to the fact that in the case of Macedonia the Supreme Council had refused to accept the proposals contained in article 12, in spite of very precise recommendations made by a Commission of Experts.<sup>6</sup>

LORD CURZON expressed the view that the situation had somewhat altered since the decision had been taken by the Supreme Council with regard to Macedonia. When the other treaties were drafted the League of Nations was not in existence as it was now. He found considerable difficulty in arriving at a correct understanding of Signor Scialoja's objections to the proposal before the conference, since whatever the League of Nations might propose the conference would in no way be bound to follow that advice.

M. KAMMERER explained that the corresponding article relating to Macedonia had been drafted by Colonel Castoldi, who had at that time pointed out that serious massacres had occurred in Macedonia, similar to those in Armenia. Owing to the rejection by the Supreme Council of the proposals relating to Macedonia, the commission had only accepted the present proposals with great hesitation. As far as he personally was concerned, he considered the proposal to be desirable, but not practicable.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that he found himself in substantial agreement with Lord Curzon. Yesterday he had expressed the view that article 12 merely gave expression to the proposals contained in article 11. He favoured the suggestion to consult the Council of the League of Nations in order to avoid all protests by the latter to the effect that the provisions of article 11 could not be applied without the powers conferred by article 12.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI maintained that article 11 conferred no right on the League of Nations to intervene, or even to ask to be represented at Constantinople. In view of the fact that the provisions of article 11 had been included in every other treaty, it would now be impossible for the League of Nations to say that they could not apply article 11, unless vested with the powers conferred by article 12.

<sup>6</sup> See No. 57, note 6.

LORD CURZON invited attention to the first sentence of article 11, which stated:—

‘Turkey agrees that the stipulations in the foregoing articles, so far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, constitute obligations of international concern, and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations.’

SIGNOR SCIALOJA thought that a solution could be found in article 13 which read as follows:—

‘Turkey agrees that any member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the council any infraction [...] of any of these obligations, and that the council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.’

He suggested that a clause should be added thereto empowering the council to appoint a representative of the League to proceed to Constantinople should an appeal be lodged by any member of the council.

MR. VANSITTART explained that the object in view in drafting article 12 had been to avoid delay, but Signor Scialoja’s proposal would have the contrary effect.

LORD CURZON appealed to Signor Scialoja to withdraw his objection. In referring the matter to the League of Nations both the French and British delegates would be prepared to say that the proposal in question had met with considerable opposition. He would assure Signor Scialoja that the telegram to the League of Nations would not prejudge the case in any way.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA agreed in the circumstances to withdraw his objection.

It was agreed—

That the proposals contained in articles 12 and 13 of the draft articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey on the subject of ‘Protection of Minorities’ should be forwarded to the Council of the League of Nations for an expression of their views thereon. The council at the same time to be informed that the proposals therein contained had met with considerable opposition. For copy and [*of the*] telegram as despatched, see Appendix 3.<sup>7</sup>

Article 4 was adopted without amendment.

Article 5: Paragraph 1 was adopted.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA invited attention to the concluding part of paragraph 2 with particular reference to the French text which did not appear to agree with the British version of the same. The French text appeared to confine

<sup>7</sup> Not here printed. This telegram of March 12, 1920, from Lord Curzon to Lord Derby in Paris is printed as Annex 28 to *Procès-Verbal of the Third Session of the Council of the League of Nations*, p. 31. The text printed by the League of Nations was the same as that in the appendix subject to: (i) minor variation in wording; (ii) the third paragraph of the appendix began ‘The commission have recommended unanimously (1) that the provisions . . .’ &c. (The two words queried in the League of Nations text were correct.)

such action as might be taken to the rights of property only. He suggested that the words in question should be altered to read as follows:—

‘...<sup>8</sup> pour les possesseurs ou détenteurs actuels des dites propriétés sous réserve de l’action des possesseurs ou détenteurs contre leurs auteurs.’

It was agreed to alter the French text as proposed by Signor Scialoja, and to alter the British text to read as follows:—

‘...<sup>8</sup> to the present holders of such property subject to any action such holders may bring against the person from whom they acquired the *rights* in question.’

LORD CURZON enquired why the date the 1st August, 1914, had been fixed in paragraph 2 instead of the date of the entry of Turkey into the war.

M. KAMMERER explained that the commission had considered that many illegalities had been committed before the actual date of Turkey’s entry into the war.

(It was agreed to leave the date the 1st August, 1914.)

Paragraph 3 was adopted. It was understood that it depended upon article 5 of the financial clauses, not yet drafted in its final form.

Paragraph 4 was adopted, with the substitution of ‘Council of the League of Nations’ for ‘representative of the League of Nations’, at the end of the penultimate sentence.

M. KAMMERER observed that a new principle was contained in paragraph 5 (a). The qualification ‘possible,’ however, would limit its application.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that, in his view, the expression ‘in equal proportions,’ in the second sentence, involved something that was clearly not possible.

It was agreed that these words should be suppressed.

It was further agreed that the words ‘the representative of the League of Nations’ should be replaced by the words ‘the Arbitral Commission.’

With these modifications paragraph 5 (a) was adopted.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI observed that paragraph 5 (b) might furnish the Turks with a pretext for banishing Greek authors of atrocities. This might be awkward for Greece.

LORD CURZON said that it was the Arbitral Commission, and not the Turks, who would have the decision.

Paragraph 5 (b) was then adopted without alteration.

Paragraph 5 (c) was adopted without alteration.

Paragraph 5 (d) was adopted, with the suppression of the words ‘in virtue of the present article.’

Paragraph 5 (e) [*sic*] was adopted without alteration.

Articles 6, 7 and 8 were adopted without alteration.

<sup>8</sup> Punctuation as in original quotation.

Article 9 was adopted, with the insertion, in qualification of the second sentence, of the words 'saving any provision to the contrary in the present treaty.'

Article 10 was adopted, with the suppression of the last paragraph.

Articles 11 and 12 were reserved.

Articles 13 and 14 were adopted without modification.

LORD CURZON asked whether, in view of what had taken place regarding the financial clauses, any of the delegates wished to qualify his assent by stipulating reference to his Government.

M. KAMMERER said that as long as article 12 was reserved he did not wish to make any further reservation. He would ask, however, that these clauses be communicated for information to the Financial and Economic Commission[s], seeing that the question of restitution of property had a close connection with the subjects dealt with in the financial clauses.

(This was agreed to.)

LORD CURZON suggested that the council should now consider the preface of the document (A.J. 78).<sup>5</sup> The committee had felt that, without special guarantees, there was little chance that the treaty would be executed by Turkey. Regarding the first recommendation, it should be noted that the Turkish gendarmerie was a body regarding the constitution of which no decision had yet been taken. The question had been raised at a meeting at 10, Downing Street, and had been referred to the Military Commission.<sup>9</sup> It seemed possible, however, to stipulate that there should be a proportion of foreign officers whatever the size of the force might ultimately be.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI demurred to the suggestion that such officers should report direct to the League of Nations. He thought this was one instance exhibiting the danger of having a representative of the League in Turkey.

LORD CURZON thought that a similar objection might be taken to the initial words of the first sentence. He thought the officers could more easily be appointed by the Allied and Associated Powers than by the League of Nations, which, as such, had no knowledge of officers and would have to ask the various Powers to recommend them suitable ones.

M. CAMBON thought that each Power should name its own officers, as had been done in Macedonia.

M. KAMMERER said that the paragraph under discussion was merely a suggestion made by members of the commission. He thought it should not be discussed as if it were a draft article, but merely remitted to the commission dealing with the gendarmerie, in order that any practical suggestion it contained should be examined. The rest of the preface could be dealt with only by the Supreme Council.

LORD CURZON observed that if the preface were forwarded from the present conference it would appear to be forwarded with the approval of the

<sup>9</sup> See No. 45, minute 1.

conference. He thought, therefore, that it ought to be examined in some detail.

After some further discussion, it was decided—

That the first recommendation, after the excision of the words in the first sentence 'or by the Council of the League of Nations,' and in the second sentence, of all the words after 'Turkish officers,' should be referred for examination to the commission studying the question of a Turkish gendarmerie.

LORD CURZON observed that the second recommendation appeared to him to be expressed too precisely. He suggested that it should read as follows:—

'In every district the police, gendarmerie and rural and forest guards should be recruited and officered with due regard to the racial factors in the local population. Especially should non-Moslem elements be represented in the highest posts.'

This reading was adopted, and referred, as above, to the commission dealing with the question of a Turkish gendarmerie.

The rest of the preface was not discussed.

LORD CURZON suggested that the council should consider the proposals contained in A.J. 63 (see Appendix [1]).

It was decided—

To refer this document to the Naval and Military Commission.

*(The conference adjourned at 1.30 p.m. until 4 p.m.)*

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 12, 1920.

#### APPENDIX I TO No. 58

##### Position of Turkish Islands under Treaty of Peace with Turkey

*Mr. Vansittart to Sir M. Hankey*

(A.J. 63.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 4, 1920*

Dear Hankey,

In Section 3 (a) of the Appendix<sup>10</sup> to the synopsis of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, approved by the Supreme Council on the 21st February, 1920,<sup>11</sup> it was recommended that the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace, Tenedos and Mitylene and the islands of the Sea of Marmora should be demilitarised.

2. It has, however, been pointed out, firstly, that north-east of Mitylene there is also the island of Moskonisi, which is almost as big as Tenedos, and, secondly, that in the vicinity of these different islands there are many nameless islets which it seems desirable to cover by the phrasing of the treaty.

<sup>10</sup> Appendix I to No. 14.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. No. 20, minute 2.

3. I therefore think it well to bring these two points to your attention, in order that they may be raised at the Supreme Council, and, if the council agree, referred to the Naval and Military Commission for redrafting.

Yours sincerely,

ROBERT VANSITTART

### No. 59

I.C.P. 73.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Ambassadors' Conference held at the Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1, on Friday, March 12, 1920, at 4.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Forbes Adam; SECRETARIES, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Major Caccia, Major Young.

*France*: M. Cambon.

*Italy*: Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Nogara, Signor Galli, Don Ascanio Colonna.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

1. LORD CURZON explained that the conference had on a previous occasion<sup>1</sup> decided to transfer to the new administration of the Straits and Sea of Marmora the control and direction of sanitary matters within those waters. The memorandum (A.J. 70—see appendix) which the conference were called upon to examine that afternoon contained certain draft clauses for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey to provide for the future exercise of the functions of the Constantinople Superior Council of Health and the Turkish Sanitary Administration in the ports and waters remaining to Turkey outside the Straits zone and in the ports and waters of that part of the former Turkish Empire which was to be ceded by the Turkish Government.

(The memorandum (appendix) was then read in English and French.)

LORD CURZON said that he had put to himself two questions with regard to Suggested clause 1.

Clause 1 Firstly, what did the clause mean? It was clear on the face of it that the clause was intended to compel Turkey to accept any decisions taken or to be taken by the Allied Powers in agreement where necessary with third Powers in relation to any matters previously dealt with by the Constantinople Superior Council of Health and the Turkish Sanitary Administration.

Secondly, what obligation did the clause in question impose on enemy Powers? It would be in the recollection of the conference that in every one of the treaties already concluded with other enemy Powers the latter had undertaken the obligation of accepting the provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA enquired what about neutrals.

MR. VANSITTART pointed out that the words 'in agreement where necessary with third Powers' was [*sic*] intended to cover the case of neutrals.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 44, minute 1.

M. CAMBON enquired whether an International Sanitary Bureau had not already been established in Paris, whose duty it was to supervise and harmonise the work carried out by all other sanitary bodies. He was under the impression that each of the Great Powers appointed representatives to form part of the bureau and paid a share of the total expenses. He was unable, however, to say exactly what the powers and constitution was [*sic*] of the bureau in question. He suggested that enquiries should be made.

LORD CURZON said he would cause enquiries to be made forthwith and communicate the result of same as soon as received.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA expressed the opinion that the Constantinople Superior Council of Health should be consulted before taking the suggested clause under examination.

MR. FORBES ADAM explained that the whole question had already been carefully discussed in connection with the control of sanitary matters within the Straits and Sea of Marmora. Exactly the same principle had been introduced in the clause under consideration.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA maintained that the present regulations dealt with a very much larger zone and that a larger number of Powers were intimately concerned. He thought that the difficulty might be overcome by placing the responsibility for the execution of the necessary measures on certain of the Great Powers, whilst at the same time allowing a larger number of representatives to sit on the council.

LORD CURZON thought that Signor Scialoja's criticism was already covered by the provision in the clause whereby all decisions would have to be taken by the Allied Powers 'in agreement with third Powers.' That is to say, agreements would have to be entered into with different Powers.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA maintained that before a proposal of that nature was entered in the treaty it would be advisable to consult the Powers concerned. In his opinion, it would not be wise to enter a provision in the Treaty of Peace whose application would depend on subsequent agreement with third Powers.

LORD CURZON thought that the treaty would be held up indefinitely if discussions with neutrals had to be undertaken.

M. CAMBON thought that the Paris International Bureau, if it existed, should be charged with the duties in question.

It was agreed—

To adjourn the discussion pending receipt of information with regard to the Paris International Sanitary Bureau.

LORD CURZON invited attention to the clause quoted in paragraph 3 of the memorandum under consideration (appendix), which had been approved by the council on the 2nd March for insertion in the miscellaneous provisions of the treaty.<sup>1</sup> He desired to enquire what would happen in the case of Cilicia. Apparently, Cilicia would remain part of the Turkish Empire. At the same time, France had undertaken certain obligations in connection with the protection of minorities. Would France in the same way undertake the

*Clause to be  
inserted in  
Miscellaneous  
Provisions of  
Treaty*



obligation to control and direct sanitary matters within that territory? France had laid down the proposition that she would be responsible for assisting the Turkish Government in carrying out certain duties in Cilicia; for instance, she would control the work of the gendarmerie and supply advisers and officials for the purpose. Would she in the same way supply inspectors and become responsible for the control and direction of sanitary matters there?

M. CAMBON replied that in theory the administration would be Turkish, and Turkey would nominally be responsible for carrying out the duties prescribed so long as Cilicia remained an integral part of the Turkish Empire.

LORD CURZON said that he agreed with M. Cambon so far as Cilicia was concerned, but pointed out that in the territories which were to be ceded by Turkey the mandatory Power concerned would have to make itself responsible for maintaining and running its own quarantine establishments.

M. CAMBON drew the attention of the conference to article 6, paragraph 2 (c), of the memorandum under consideration, and pointed out that the sanitary control of the Hedjaz pilgrimage was at present carried out under orders from Constantinople. He presumed that the phrase 'Allied Powers' was intended to include the Hedjaz.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI agreed, and said that the Hedjaz must be treated as an independent kingdom subject to no control of any kind.

LORD CURZON pointed out that the memorandum provided only for those parts of the former Turkish Empire which were to be ceded by the Turkish Government under the Treaty of Peace. The Hedjaz being an independent kingdom, separate arrangements would have to be made later for the control of those measures of pilgrimage quarantine which would be carried out in the Hedjaz itself.

(At this point Dr. Buchanan<sup>2</sup> entered.)

Lord Curzon invited Dr. Buchanan to acquaint the conference with the position as regards the Paris International Bureau, which had been mentioned by M. Cambon.

DR. BUCHANAN said that M. Cambon doubtless referred to the Office international d'Hygiène publique, which was established by International Convention in 1907, with its seat in Paris. One of the principal functions of that International Office was to study and consider all questions relating to the dissemination of cholera and plague. It was a purely advisory body making recommendations to the Governments concerned, but having no executive authority. Its work in relation to epidemic diseases had, however, proved so important and valuable that it was hoped that it would shortly extend itself and become amalgamated with the League of Nations. If this amalgamation took place, the Office International would form the nucleus of the proposed new health organisation of the League of Nations, under the orders of which

<sup>2</sup> A Senior Medical Officer of the British Ministry of Health.

would function any committees or bodies that might be set up under the League in the future.

M. CAMBON invited reference to article 24 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which reads as follows:—

‘There shall be placed under the direction of the League all international bureaux already established by general treaties if the parties to such treaties consent. All such international bureaux and all commissions for the regulation of matters of international interest hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the League.

‘In all matters of international interest which are regulated by general conventions, but which are not placed under the control of international bureaux or commissions, the secretariat of the League shall, subject to the consent of the council and if desired by the parties, collect and distribute all relevant information and shall render any other assistance which may be necessary or desirable.

‘The council may include as part of the expenses of the secretariat the expenses of any bureau or commission which is placed under the direction of the League.’

He pointed out that the duties of international bureaux as provided for by this article were apparently confined to the collection and distribution of all relevant information and to rather a vague rendering of any other assistance which might be necessary or desirable. While he quite agreed that the Office International should participate in the proposed new health organisation, he thought special steps would be necessary to enable it to exercise executive functions.

DR. BUCHANAN admitted that there would be difficulty if the new health organisation of the League of Nations were to be formed solely by the absorption of the Office International, and were to have only advisory functions under article 24.

The new health office of the League of Nations which was projected would, however, undertake larger functions than the Office International.

The Council of the League of Nations had already invited the British Ministry of Health to summon a conference of public health experts from the principal countries to frame a constitution of the new health office which should absorb and extend the work of the Office International. Active progress was being made in this matter and the conference had been summoned to meet in London in April. The British and French Governments were acting in close consultation on this point and the Office International had already expressed its wish to be placed under the direction of the League of Nations in future in order to form part of the new organisation.

If matters proceeded as proposed (and apparently all concerned were in accord with the project) the new health office would be so constituted as to be able to exercise or depute executive authority in connection with the points under discussion.

LORD CURZON said that the conference were obliged to Dr. Buchanan for

his statement of what was being done. He was of opinion that the establishment of the proposed organisation would satisfactorily meet the points raised by the Marquis Imperiali and M. Cambon.

(The conference adopted the clause suggested in paragraph 6 of the memorandum under consideration.)

(*The meeting then adjourned.*)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, March 12, 1920.*

#### APPENDIX TO No. 59

##### *Memorandum by British Delegation for Council of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors*

(A.J. 70.)

The Council have already decided to transfer to the new administration of the Straits and Sea of Marmora the control and direction of sanitary matters within these waters, formerly exercised by the Constantinople Superior Council of Health and the Turkish Sanitary Administration.

2. It is also necessary to provide in the treaty for the future exercise of the functions of the above council and administration, (a) in the ports and waters remaining to Turkey outside the Straits zone, (b) in the ports and waters of that part of the former Turkish Empire which is to be ceded by the Turkish Government under the Treaty of Peace.

3. The council have already taken the necessary action regarding (a) by approving on the 2nd March<sup>1</sup> the insertion in the miscellaneous provisions of the treaty of the following clause:—

‘Within her frontiers as laid down by the present treaty (with the exception of the zone defined in article <sup>3</sup>), Turkey hereby agrees to accept, and co-operate in the execution of, any decisions taken by the Allied Powers, in agreement where necessary with third Powers, in relation to any matters previously dealt with by the Constantinople Superior Board of Health and the Turkish Sanitary Administration which was directed by the said Board.’

4. It remains to provide in the treaty for (b). A clause in general terms on the lines of the above quoted clause would meet the case as regards Turkey, but it is doubtful whether it would equally meet the case as regards the other enemy Powers. The latter are bound by the Allied treaties with them, to accept the provisions of the Turkish treaty, and would therefore be tied by the provision of such a general clause. They would, however, not be bound to accept the provisions of a subsequent inter-Allied agreement (arising out of such a general clause) for the treatment of quarantine matters outside the future Turkey, but inside the old Turkish Empire, unless the general lines, on which such an inter-Allied agreement was to be based, were inserted in the Turkish treaty.

5. It is therefore proposed that clauses, drafts for which are suggested below, should be inserted in the treaty. In drafting these clauses the British delegation

<sup>1</sup> Omission in original.

has been guided by the following general principles which, they assume, will be acceptable to the French, Italian and Japanese delegations:—

- (1) Each Allied Power will be responsible for maintaining and running its own quarantine establishments in any territory ceded by Turkey which is placed under the control of that Allied Power, whether the Allied Power be in sovereign possession of, or act as a mandatory or protector of, or be responsible for the administration of, the territory in question.
- (2) All such Allied quarantine services will accept and follow the principles of action settled by International Sanitary Conventions.
- (3) Such measures for the sanitary control of the Hedjaz pilgrimage, as have hitherto been carried out by—or under the direction of—the Constantinople Superior Council of Health and the Turkish Sanitary Administration or by the Alexandria Sanitary Maritime and Quarantine Board, will henceforth be undertaken by the Allied Powers under whose control (as defined under (1)) will pass those territories in which the various quarantine stations and sanitary establishments necessary for the execution of such measures are situated.

These measures will be in conformity with the provisions of International Sanitary Conventions, and in order to secure complete uniformity each Allied quarantine service concerned in the sanitary control of the pilgrimage will be represented on a co-ordinated Pilgrimage Quarantine Committee placed under the supervision of the Council of the League of Nations.

6. Accordingly the following clause is suggested for insertion in the miscellaneous section of the Turkish treaty:—

‘(1) In those portions of the former Ottoman Empire ceded by Turkey under the present treaty, and in any territories which cease under the present treaty to be under the suzerainty of Turkey, Turkey hereby agrees to accept any decisions, based on the principles enunciated in the immediately following article, taken or to be taken by the Allied Powers, in agreement where necessary with third Powers, in relation to any matters previously dealt with by the Constantinople Superior Council of Health and the Turkish Sanitary Administration, which was directed by the said council, or by the Alexandria Sanitary Maritime and Quarantine Board.

‘(2) The decisions, referred to in the immediately preceding article, will be based on the following principles:— . . .’<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> In conclusion, the remainder of paragraph 6 was identical with the last four subparagraphs of paragraph 5 above (beginning ‘(1) Each Allied Power’ and ending ‘. . . of the League of Nations’) except that (i) the three enumerated subparagraphs carried the notation (a)–(c) instead of (1)–(3); (ii) subparagraph (b) ended as follows ‘. . . action settled internationally by international Sanitary Conventions.’

I.C.P. 74.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Monday, March 15, 1920, at 12 noon.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, Lord Privy Seal; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; The Right Hon. W. Long, First Lord of the Admiralty; The Right Hon. W. S. Churchill, Secretary of State for War and Air; Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff; Major-General Sir P. P. de B. Radcliffe, Director of Military Operations; Colonel Gribbon, Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Philip Kerr; **SECRETARIES,** Sir M. Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Brigadier-General S. H. Wilson.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer, General Viscount de la Panouse, Commander de Blanpré.

*Italy:* Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Galli, Colonel Castoldi, Don Ascanio Colonna, Commander Ruspoli, Major Marzillini.

*Greece:* M. Veniselos.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda.

**INTERPRETER:** M. Camerlynck.

1. **MR. LLOYD GEORGE** said that, before they proceeded to the business on the agenda, he thought the council would be glad to hear what information Lord Curzon had received in regard to the situation in Berlin.

*Situation in  
Germany. Coup  
d'État at  
Berlin<sup>1</sup>*

**LORD CURZON** said that the bulk of his information had already appeared in the newspapers, which apparently were better informed than our own diplomatic representatives. He had received that morning two telegrams from the British Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, which might be of interest.

(Lord Curzon then read out the telegrams, paraphrases of which appear in Appendix 1.)

Then there was another rather interesting telegram, which corroborated what had been received from Berlin, from Sir Harold Stuart, the British representative on the Rhineland High Commission.

(Lord Curzon read an extract from Sir Harold Stuart's telegram, a paraphrase of which appears in Appendix 2.)

Then, Sir Charles Marling, the British representative at Flensburg,<sup>2</sup> had telegraphed at midday on the 14th March, a telephone message from the British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, who had sought this supplementary

<sup>1</sup> i.e. the Kapp Putsch, March 13-17, 1920.

<sup>2</sup> Sir C. Marling was President of the Schleswig plebiscite commission constituted under article 111 of the Treaty of Versailles. The commission at that time had its seat at Flensburg.

channel of communication in case his telegram had been stopped. The telephone message was, in substance, what we had already received from Lord Kilmarnock.

Proceeding, Lord Curzon said that, as soon as he had heard of the revolution in Germany, which was said to be monarchical in character, *The Kaiser* he had felt it desirable to communicate at once with the British Minister to the Netherlands, pointing out how greatly this military *coup d'État* strengthened our case for the removal of the ex-Kaiser from Europe; his presence in Holland was bound to be a constant focus of intrigue, and it might even have some connection with the present rising; the Dutch Government themselves could, therefore, no longer be insensible to this danger; it was incumbent upon them, therefore, to take special measures to guard against any possibility of the ex-Kaiser's escape. Sir R. Graham was also informed that there had not been time to ask the other Governments to send similar instructions to their representatives at The Hague, but it was hoped that they would find it possible to associate themselves with him in any representations he made to the Netherlands Government. Lord Curzon concluded by saying that Mr. Lloyd George had just reminded him that the British Government had been given to understand that the ex-Kaiser was in reality financing the revolution.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the French, Italian and Japanese Governments had any information to confirm or supplement that which Lord Curzon had communicated.

M. CAMBON said that there was no additional information of any particular importance in the possession of the French Government. M. Millerand had telephoned to him that morning to say that the German Chargé d'Affaires had visited the Quai d'Orsay the day before and had told M. Millerand that he was in constant communication with his own Government, which was at Dresden, and that he had received from the Under-Secretary of State, von Haniel, who was at Berlin, a circular letter, addressed to the German representatives abroad, which had been drawn up in agreement with M. Miller [Müller], the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was also at Dresden. He had added that his Government would proceed the following day, or on Tuesday, to Stuttgart, where it proposed to convene a meeting of the Assembly as soon as possible. According to the German Chargé d'Affaires, the present movement was really only a scramble. In communicating this information, M. Millerand had indicated to M. Cambon the attitude which, in his opinion, should be assumed by the Allied Powers in the circumstances. Their predominant thought must be the complete and loyal execution of the Peace Treaty. It was, therefore, unnecessary to state that they had no intention of recognising a Government whose avowed intention was to restore the Hohenzollerns. The events, however, which had taken place in Germany were still too complex and too obscure for it to be possible to estimate their trend. The Allied Powers ought, therefore, to adopt an attitude of reserve. Any public manifestation of their intentions would, consequently, be pre-

mature. Until they were more fully informed, they must wait on the turn of events. While continuing official relations with the Government at Dresden, they should maintain with the Government at Berlin only such relations as were indispensable for the protection of their interests. M. Cambon said that he had also received a telegram from M. Millerand to say that he had ordered the French consular agent at Mayence to go to Stuttgart, so as to get into touch and obtain information. He had also sent the French Chargé d'Affaires to Dresden to follow the old Government. He would not have done this without consulting his colleagues on the Supreme Council had he not deemed it imperative to lose no time.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he thought it was highly desirable that there should be somebody in contact with the old Government.

M. CAMBON said that he would sum up in the words of M. Millerand, that we should maintain official relations with the old Government, but only *de facto* relations with the new Military Government.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he did not see that it was possible for the Allies to do anything until they had further information. With reference to one of the telegrams which Lord Curzon had read out, he thought it might be desirable to find out if the Allied military representatives had said anything about Germany being allowed an army of 250,000 men. He suggested that the British Director of Military Operations, who was present that morning, should communicate with the Military Commission at once, saying that this rumour had reached London, and that, at a meeting of the council, it had been decided that the military representatives should be asked if they knew anything about it.

(This was agreed to.)

M. CAMBON enquired whether His Majesty's Government had any intention of sending representatives to Stuttgart or Dresden.

LORD CURZON said that Mr. Lloyd George had just said to him that he thought this was desirable, and had asked him to find out if there were any men available who were suitable for the purpose.

M. BERTHELOT said there was no question of leaving Berlin to go to Dresden.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he had nothing to add to the information which had been communicated by Lord Curzon and M. Cambon. His information was merely corroborative. The Italian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin had stated that, at a meeting of the Allied Chargés d'Affaires at Berlin, he had recommended to his colleagues that they should maintain an expectant attitude and await events.

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the council should now address themselves to the first item on the agenda, which was the situation at Constantinople, and he invited Lord Curzon to make a statement.

LORD CURZON said that the situation in regard to Constantinople was

briefly as follows: The council in London had twice sent instructions to their respective High Commissioners to take certain action.<sup>3</sup> On the second of these occasions, the telegram which had been sent had been approved the previous Wednesday, and it had been understood that the High Commissioners would take the necessary steps to put the council's decision in force. There should, he thought, not be much difficulty about this. Everybody in Constantinople knew fairly well what the decision had been, but our military and naval power there was quite overwhelming. Some difficulty might possibly arise, as it appeared that the French High Commissioner had not yet received instructions from his Government similar to those which had been despatched to his colleagues. In view of this, Lord Curzon said that he had written a letter, on the previous day, to M. Cambon, to say that he was quite sure that the French would have no hesitation in carrying out what had been decided by the Allied Council. M. Cambon had at once telegraphed to M. Millerand, who had promptly cabled to the French High Commissioner to act in collaboration with his colleagues at Constantinople. It was possible, therefore, that the commissioners might be taking action that very day. The council could do nothing further for the present, but must await the results of that action. There was, however, a further question, which had been raised, he thought, by the French High Commissioner, and that was, the possible consequences in Turkey, both in Asia and in Europe, of the enforcement of the terms of the drastic peace which the Allies proposed. The council would remember that the High Commissioners had communicated to them the kind of peace which the Turks were expecting, and the council had then been compelled to reply indicating a peace of a very different character. This question was a different issue from the military occupation, and it was—should we be wise to enforce the particular treaty we have in view? This must be considered on its own merits, and it was this which M. Cambon, he understood, desired to raise before the council that day on behalf of M. Millerand.

M. CAMBON stated that Lord Curzon had just said that this question had been raised by the French High Commissioner; this, however, was not quite correct. A telegram had been received from the French High Commissioner to the effect that he and his colleagues were working in the closest collaboration, as was shown by the fact that the question which Lord Curzon had put to the council had been raised in an identic telegram which had been received by the three Allied Governments from their respective commissioners.

(M. Cambon then read the telegram, a paraphrase of the English rendering of which appears in Appendix 3.)

Since this telegram had been received by M. Millerand, the latter had called a Cabinet Council in Paris and had communicated its contents to the council. The Cabinet had been distinctly impressed by the representations made by the High Commissioners, and they had requested M. Millerand to ask that the Supreme Council should examine the various suggestions put forward by the commissioners. M. Millerand had asked him to raise this

<sup>3</sup> See No. 50, minute 1 and appendix 1, and No. 55, minute 1.



question in London, and this he was now doing, in accordance with his instructions. There was a further point, M. Cambon said, which arose from another telegram. Some days back Lord Curzon had suggested that he should see the American Ambassador in London, Mr. Davis, about Constantinople.<sup>4</sup> M. Millerand had similarly asked M. Jusserand, in Washington, to see the President, if possible, to approach him in like manner, in order to let him know exactly what the Allies had done and proposed to do. Unfortunately, M. Jusserand had been unable to gain access to the President. He had accordingly visited Mr. Polk, who was Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Washington, who had told M. Jusserand that he himself was unable to obtain access to President Wilson. M. Jusserand had pointed out to Mr. Polk that it was most important that the substance of his communication should reach President Wilson with the least possible delay, as the Allies were most anxious that the President should have no cause to feel aggrieved because he thought that he had been kept in the dark in regard to what the Allies were doing; they had no intention of presenting the President with a *fait accompli*, and they did not wish to be thought guilty of acting secretly and behind his back.

LORD CURZON said that, as requested by the council, he had seen Mr. Davis on the morning of Saturday, the 6th March, and had given him a full account of the proceedings of the council in regard to Constantinople up to that date, and he had also given him exact information of the measures the Allied Powers intended to take. After the interview he had written a full account of it, and had sent a copy to Mr. Davis for correction, if necessary. Mr. Davis had returned it, saying that it correctly represented what had taken place. The same afternoon Mr. Davis had cabled to Washington, so that the President and the United States Government had received full information from two sources—Mr. Davis and M. Jusserand. It appeared that Mr. Davis had not yet received any reply from his Government. Mr. Davis had just left for the Riviera.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in this connection there was a rather important telegram of which he had just been reminded, which he would ask Lord Curzon to read.

LORD CURZON said that Mr. Lloyd George was referring to a telegram which had been sent off by the British representative at Washington on the 11th March, and had been received in London last Saturday.

(Lord Curzon then read the telegram, a paraphrase of which is given in Appendix 4).

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the question before the council was: Were they to refer the question of the enforcement of the proposed Terms of Peace with Turkey to their military and naval advisers at Versailles for their immediate consideration? He himself was in favour of this course.

M. BERTHELOT said that he agreed, on the understanding that their expert advisers would only be consulted as to the *means* of enforcing the terms. It

<sup>4</sup> See No. 51, minute 2.

was desirable that the question should not be pre-judged in any way, and he thought, therefore, that the experts should be confined to studying the actual means of carrying out the terms.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed, and said that he thought it ought to be a special council; that is to say, that special representatives should be sent by the three Powers to Versailles.

M. CAMBON and M. BERTHELOT both agreed to submit the question to the Versailles Council, subject to the reservation made by M. Berthelot, and also that special experts should attend the council.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he was in agreement with his colleagues, subject to the same reservation that M. Berthelot had made; that is to say, that the military and naval advisers should study the question from the military and naval point of view only, and that they should be empowered to come to no decision. Decisions were the business of the Supreme Council itself.

It was agreed—

That the Military and Naval Commission at Versailles should be requested to consider and advise as to the military means for enforcing the terms of the proposed Treaty of Peace with Turkey, and that for the purposes of their enquiry the Military Council at Versailles should be strengthened by the addition of such naval, military and air experts as the various Governments might desire.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that he understood that the council was to meet that day.

MR. BONAR LAW said that he had seen in the newspapers that Marshal Foch was at Mayence.

M. CAMBON said that this was so, but that Marshal Foch could be back at Versailles in a night.

M. VENISELOS said that he would ask if Greece could not also be allowed to send a military representative to attend the meeting of the Versailles Council when this question was examined, as Greece was particularly interested.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he saw no objection. Greece was certainly much interested in the matter, and had, moreover, 100,000 troops in Turkey. He recalled that a Belgian representative generally attended meetings of the Council of Versailles in the old days whenever operations on the Western Front were considered. A great deal depended on the military support of Greece in enforcing the terms. His own view, therefore, was that a Greek military expert should attend the meeting.

M. CAMBON said that perhaps the best course would be to refer the question to Versailles and to instruct the council there to call in a military representative of Greece, or any other Power that might be interested, as necessary. It was only a question of discussing how the terms of the treaty should be enforced on Turkey if she declined to carry out these terms, and a decision on the action to be taken in such an eventuality would have to be arrived at later.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE was a little doubtful as to how the Versailles Council

could consider the question without having present a representative of the Power which had the greatest number of troops in the area in question. He thought it was very likely that Marshal Foch himself would prefer to have a Greek general present when the discussion took place.

M. CAMBON suggested that the simplest plan might be to allow the representatives of Great Britain, Italy and France to proceed with the discussion and to call in a Greek representative if necessary. He fully realised that Greece had some 100,000 men in the area in question. What had to be determined was the total numbers that it would be necessary to have and what the other Powers would have to supply. In making the observations he had he did not for a moment wish to give the impression that a Greek representative should not be consulted, but the council at Versailles had been appointed by the Peace Conference and he saw some little difficulty in modifying its composition at this stage. He did not see why the difficulty should not be got over by asking a Greek representative to be present when necessary.

M. VENISELOS said he was quite ready to accept M. Cambon's proposal which was that a Greek representative should be called in a consultative capacity when the council at Versailles thought it necessary to have one. He certainly thought that a Greek representative should be consulted, since there were more Greek troops than almost any others in the area in question. Although he himself was not a military man, he had often been asked to be present at the Versailles Council.

M. CAMBON said that this was so, and that the Versailles Council had heard M. Veniselos's views with great pleasure. It would be with equal pleasure that they would hear the views of a Greek general on the question which it was proposed to discuss.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he thought everyone was agreed that the council at Versailles should consider the question, and that a Greek military representative should be called in as required.

(This was agreed to.)

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 15, 1920.

#### APPENDIX I TO No. 60

##### Document I

*Paraphrase of a Telegram from the British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, dated March 14, 1920*

So far as my information goes the situation seems to be as follows:—

In a military sense the Kapp-Luttwitz Government<sup>5</sup> are masters of Berlin. They protest that they are not a Monarchist Government, and all they desire to do is to

<sup>5</sup> Herr Kapp was German Chancellor and Prime Minister of Prussia, and General von Luttwitz was Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defence in the administration formed as a result of the Kapp Putsch.

get rid of the old corrupt Government, and immediately the latter demobilises (*sic*) to hold fresh elections; that in so far as is possible and consistent with the honour of the German people, and with its power to work and to exist without annihilation, they accept the Treaty of Peace. So far as my present information goes, East Prussia and Pomerania have declared in favour of the new Government, but the whole of the South and West of Germany are against it. It seems that the general strike has not taken full effect. The electric light and water, which were cut off this morning, are again functioning, but I believe this is due to the Nothilfstruppe.<sup>6</sup> According to a declaration by the Railways Unions all traffic will be suspended by them to-morrow. It is anticipated that similar action will be taken by the hotels, business houses and shops. It is stated that the Under-Secretaries of State of all Ministries have declared that they will not accept the new Government's orders. Statements are being issued, on the other hand, by Kapp that troops in Bavaria and Saxony have joined in his movement. It is also reported that General Marc-dew [? Märcker] has arrested Bauer and Noske.

## Document 2

### *Paraphrase of a Telegram from the British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, dated March 14, 1920*

With reference to my telegram immediately preceding this, I have to state that although reports are contradictory and the situation is obscure, our best information seems to point to the fact that unless the general strike entirely fails to become effective the Kapp Government cannot last. Berlin will be practically isolated by the military garrison if the rest of Germany, with the exception of East Prussia, supports the Bauer-Noske Government. This Government seems to be counting on support from the Allies, and they are announcing that they have reason to believe that they can count on receiving that support. It has been stated that a high British officer has announced that England is ready to allow them to maintain an army of a quarter of a million men. I am not in a position directly to correct this misapprehension, as I have refrained from getting into communication with the Kapp Government, but I have told everybody whom I have seen that this is an obvious fabrication. It is impossible to issue a public refutation as no newspapers have appeared to-day. A considerable number of people believe that if the Allies definitely declare themselves as supporters of the late Government, the new Administration would quickly collapse. I venture therefore to suggest for your consideration whether a good effect might not be produced if the Allied representatives at once left Berlin and went to Dresden or Stuttgart to join the Government to which they are accredited. This would not commit us to taking any definite steps in an international [? internal] struggle, but I assume that our policy must be to refrain from giving any semblance of support to a Government which a purely militarist *coup d'État* has brought into power.

<sup>6</sup> i.e. detachments of the Technische Nothilfe, a German technical emergency organization for the maintenance of public services, in this case during the general strike proclaimed against the Kapp administration by the recognized German government.

## APPENDIX 2 TO No. 60

### *Paraphrase of a Telegram from Sir Harold Stuart, dated Coblenz, March 14*

The situation generally is rather obscure and the reports I receive are somewhat conflicting. It seems, however, that outside Berlin the counter-revolution is not having much success. A big demonstration against the revolution is to be held to-morrow at Cologne, and will be attended by some 150,000 to 200,000 people, the majority of whom will be workmen. The Reichswehr outside Berlin is loyal to the former Government, which is now at Berlin [Dresden], and South German States appear to be against the revolution. It is stated that the National Assembly has been summoned to meet on Tuesday at Stuttgart. So far as my information at present goes, it appears to me that no important personages have come out to support the present Monarchist movement, and that that movement is premature. The High Commission met both yesterday and to-day, and decided unanimously against any intervention, and also to give instructions to the local delegates to confine themselves to preventing strikes affecting the public services and to maintaining public order. In the event of the new Government maintaining themselves some development of the Rhineland Separatist movement is probable. I am keeping a close watch upon this, and will inform you of any developments.

## APPENDIX 3 TO No. 60

### *Paraphrase of a Telegram from the British High Commissioner, Constantinople, dated March 10, 1920*

(Translation into English of an identic Telegram from the High Commissioners of the Three Powers.)

The Italian, British and French High Commissioners have now received by telegraph from London, dated the 6th March,<sup>7</sup> the Supreme Council's instructions respecting the occupation of Constantinople, and the terms of the future Turkish Peace Treaty, also the information that Erzerum is to go to Armenia and Smyrna, and all Thrace, including the Shores of the Sea of Marmora and Adrianople, is to go to Greece. Naturally the High Commissioners will do their utmost to carry out any instructions they may receive and to enforce whatever the Supreme Council may decide, but they regard it as incumbent upon them once more to express their unanimous opinion on the consequences of presenting a treaty as severe as that now proposed. In their view the said consequences may be: First, a refusal by Turkey to sign the treaty or to ratify it if it is signed or to execute it if it is ratified. Second, the abdication or deposition of the Sultan, the accession of a new Sultan, and the creation of a new Government in Asia, the flight of Parliament to Anatolia, the rising of the whole of the Turkish elements and widespread massacre of Christians in Asia Minor and Thrace. As soon as the stipulations of the treaty become known there is a danger that these consequences, and in particular the massacres, will at once ensue. Third, attempts in Europe which may be continued indefinitely to secure any action against the Greeks between the Bulgarians and the Turks. Fourth, the possibility of combined action in the future in Asia between the Bolsheviks, the Arabs and the Turks.

<sup>7</sup> See No. 50, appendix 1.

## APPENDIX 4 TO No. 60

### *Paraphrase of Extract from Telegram from the British Representative at Washington, dated March 11, 1920*

The meaning of the note<sup>8</sup> was not quite clear, but it expressed the hope that the United States Government would not disinterest themselves from the negotiations in regard to the Turkish Peace Treaty, while it did not actually invite them to participate in these negotiations. The Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs here admitted that his country had really no *locus standi* for expressing their views, still in order to avoid future difficulties if possible, he proposed to send a reply which should indicate certain principle [*principal*] points which, in the view of the Washington Government, it was essential to safeguard. He mentioned the following points: First, the internationalisation of the Straits. Second, that provisions should be made to permit Russia to express her views, as soon as she is able to do so, on the question of Constantinople whenever decision may be reached by the Allies; Mr. Polk, however, demurred to any suggestion that this would involve an indefinite postponement of any decision. Third, the question of a larger Armenia; he was very vague as to the extent of this, but thought it must exclude Cilicia, and include the region round Lake Van and also Trebizond and some of the coast to west (*sic*) of that port. Mr. Polk stated that as soon as it was ready he would telegraph his memorandum to the United States Ambassador in London for communication to the British Foreign Office.

<sup>8</sup> The reference was to the note addressed by M. Jusserand to the American Acting Secretary of State under date of March 12: see *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1920*, vol. iii, pp. 748-50.

## No. 61

1.C.P. 75.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference, held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Monday, March 15, 1920, at 12.45 p.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Philip Kerr, Sir S. Chapman (for latter part); SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Brigadier-General S. H. Wilson.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer.

*Italy:* Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Don Ascanio Colonna.

**INTERPRETER:** M. Camerlynck.

1. MR. LLOYD GEORGE referred to the fact that at a previous meeting of the *Adriatic* Supreme Council it had been agreed that Signor Scialoja should find out Signor Nitti's views as regards the type of reply, if any, which should be sent to President Wilson's recent communication in connection with the question of the Adriatic.<sup>1</sup> He would like to ask if Signor Scialoja had heard from Signor Nitti.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 53, minute 1.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said he had received a reply from Signor Nitti and the latter was of opinion that it would be more prudent not to send any reply to President Wilson for the time being. This would be generally in accordance with the views already expressed at the Supreme Council.

(It was agreed that for the time being no reply should be sent to President Wilson's communication in connection with the Adriatic.)

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had received a communication from the United States Ambassador in connection with the question of the resumption of trade with Russia through the Russian co-operative societies,<sup>2</sup> and he would ask Lord Curzon to explain to the council the terms of the communication which he had received, and his views as to the reply which might be sent.

LORD CURZON said that he had received from Mr. Davis, the United States Ambassador at London, a communication in connection with this question, and under cover of this communication Mr. Davis had sent him a memorandum which gave the substance of the instructions which he had received from Mr. Polk, the Acting Secretary of State at Washington. It would be seen that the memorandum in question concluded with a suggestion that common action should be taken on certain points.

(At this stage M. Camerlynck translated into French the document which had been received from the United States Ambassador.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought it ought to be decided what answer should be sent, as the American Government appeared to want to know definitely if all the Powers would agree to remove the present restrictions on the same date, and the 20th March was suggested.

LORD CURZON said he would like to give the views held by the British Foreign Office, and he would do this in the form of the reply which he suggested might be sent.

Paragraph 1 of the memorandum in question showed that the United States Government were in general agreement with the policy decided on by the Supreme Council, and in reply to this paragraph it would be easy to say that the council welcomed the prospect of the United States joining in common action in this respect.

Paragraph 2 referred to the fact that the United States Government had not procured substantial proof that the character of the Soviet regime had so altered, or its good faith been sufficiently established, to warrant any resumption of the informal relations which obtained prior to August 1918.

The reply to this might be that the Supreme Council were not contemplating any such resumption of relations with the Soviet Government for the reasons already clearly laid down.

Paragraph 3 pointed out that the Government of the United States did not consider that it was warranted any longer in continuing the existing restric-

<sup>2</sup> See *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1920*, vol. iii, p. 703, note 86.

tions on trade with Russia, which had been originally adopted purely as a war measure, nor in continuing to prevent such trade by means of private enterprise.

The reply to this paragraph might be that the Governments represented on the Supreme Council did not propose to encourage individual traders to trade in Russia until some machinery was devised for their protection. On the other hand, it might be pointed out that the blockade of Russian ports in the Baltic had already been withdrawn.<sup>3</sup>

Paragraph 4 pointed out that the United States Government desired to ascertain the views of the Allied Governments as regards taking common action on a date to be fixed by mutual agreement and suggested that this date should be the 20th March.

The reply to this paragraph might be that the Governments represented on the council would gladly communicate all decisions arrived at in order that common action might be taken, but that the 20th March appeared too soon a date to fix for such action, since by that date the delegation which was being sent by the co-operative societies<sup>4</sup> would not have arrived in this country.

Paragraph 5 suggested that it would be well for the Allied and Associated Governments to inform their respective diplomatic services at the time when trade restrictions were removed of the uncertain situation in Russia and the limited protection which could be extended to those persons who wished to trade there.

The reply to this paragraph might be that it had been the policy of the different Governments concerned to keep their representatives abroad informed of all decisions of this nature. He thought, however, that the phrase 'limited protection' was one which was too strong, since at the present moment no protection could be afforded at all, and could only be given if some arrangements could be made through the co-operative societies.

Paragraph 6 referred to the measures to be taken to prevent the dispersal abroad by the Bolsheviks after trade had been resumed of [?] such securities and other valuables as might have been illegally procured by them, and asked for information as to whether the Allied Governments had considered this question.

He (Lord Curzon) was not aware that the question had been considered by the Allied Governments, and if this was so, a reply might be sent accordingly. As regards the securities or other valuables which were alleged to be illegally in the possession of the Bolsheviks, he was not clear as to what valuables were referred to, but it might be considered desirable to discuss this matter before the representatives of the co-operative societies arrived on the scene. He thought that the memorandum received from the United States Ambassador was on the whole somewhat obscure and did not carry the question very much further. If the council considered that it was

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Volume II, No. 74, minute 2.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Volume II, No. 74, minute 2. See also *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. x, pp. 681-3 and 775-85.



necessary to send a reply, he would suggest that this might be done somewhat on the lines which he had put forward.

M. BERTHELOT said he was entirely in agreement with the replies which Lord Curzon suggested should be sent to paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4. As regards paragraph 5 and the expression 'limited protection', he agreed that this expression was, under existing conditions, too strong. He would like to know what was the actual proposal.

LORD CURZON said that the word 'limited' could not be correctly used because at the present time no protection at all could be provided unless it was the case that the Soviet Government wished to trade and would be willing on their part to give some undertaking in this connection through the co-operative societies.

M. BERTHELOT said the implication was that if the Soviet Government did not give such an undertaking, it would be necessary to allow no trading at all, and he would like to ask whether the answer would be drafted in that sense.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that before discussing paragraph 5, he would like to raise the point referred to in paragraph 4, in which the United States Government referred to the removal at an early date of the present restrictions and suggested the 20th March as a suitable date. If this were done, it would mean allowing every individual trader who wished to go to Russia on his own risk to do so, and he did not personally see why this should not be done. It would be impossible to keep private traders out, as, if they were prepared to take the risk, nothing could be done to prevent American and German traders from going there. He was of opinion that the best plan would be to agree to allow private traders to carry on trade at their own risk, provided an exception was made as regards ammunition, and he would like to reply in the sense that no restrictions would be placed on private enterprise, but that no guarantee of protection would be given.

M. BERTHELOT and SIGNOR SCIALOJA concurred in Mr. Lloyd George's proposal.

M. BERTHELOT referred to the last paragraph of the United States memorandum and asked if he was correct in thinking that it was the proposal that the matter should be raised with the representatives of the co-operative societies and made one of the conditions for allowing trade.

LORD CURZON pointed out that the last paragraph asked for information, and it would appear that the only reply that could be given was that we were not clear in regard to what valuables were referred to.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if foreign securities were referred to, he did not think that there were any in Russia, and if, on the other hand, Russian national securities were referred to, all these had been confiscated. Perhaps gold or jewellery was meant, and in this connection, he understood that there was a very large quantity of jewellery in Russia and that people were going there in order to try and buy it. He would suggest that the best plan would be to find out what the American Government meant exactly by securities and other valuables.

M. BERTHELOT agreed in this course, and pointed out that it was in the common interest to have a general discussion on the question.

LORD CURZON asked if he was to draft a memorandum on the lines of the discussion which had taken place.

(It was agreed that this should be done by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the draft should be submitted for the concurrence of the French and Italian representatives.)

SIGNOR SCIALOJA suggested that something should be put in the reply pointing out that the League of Nations had passed a resolution in favour of sending two missions to Russia.<sup>5</sup>

LORD CURZON explained that one of the missions was being sent by the League of Nations and another by the International Labour Congress.

[3.] M. CAMBON said that he had received a communication from Marshal Foch saying that the Council of Ambassadors was meeting on the following day at Paris to consider Marshal Foch's reports as regards the reparations to be demanded from Germany in connection with the assaults on Allied officers.<sup>6</sup> The substance of the report had been communicated to the British Ambassador at Paris on the 13th instant, and the meeting of Ambassadors which was to take place on the following day was being held with a view to deciding on the note to be sent to Germany. M. Millerand suggested that this note should be handed at once to the German representative in Paris.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he must ask that no action be taken affecting the Allies without the respective Governments being consulted. This was the first occasion on which he had heard of the matter raised by M. Cambon, and he trusted that Marshal Foch would not take any action which might commit the Allies without reference to the other Governments concerned.

LORD CURZON pointed out that Marshal Foch's report was apparently going to be considered by the Conference of Ambassadors on the following day. The Ambassadors could clearly not approve of any action being taken without referring to their respective Governments. He personally had heard nothing in the matter from Lord Derby, but it would be necessary to consider it as soon as such a communication was received. He would like to ask if that was not a very unsuitable time to publish anything as regards reparations in the Berlin papers and for the Allies to address themselves to the representatives of a Government which were at the moment fleeing for their lives.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. No. 24, minute 1 and note 1. See also *League of Nations Official Journal*, March 1920, p. 65.

<sup>6</sup> The reference was to a report of March 12, 1920, wherein Marshal Foch drew the attention of the Conference of Ambassadors to seven cases of German assaults on Allied officers in Germany during the period March 2-9. Marshal Foch proposed that 'an energetic protest [be] addressed to the German Government, and, secondly, that the German Government be compelled to make all reparation due, and to furnish immediately positive guarantees thereto, otherwise the operations of the Commission of Control, and in consequence, the execution of the Treaty, would soon become impossible.'

M. CAMBON said that there was no question that Marshal Foch's report had been sent to the Council of Ambassadors at Paris with a view to these Ambassadors consulting their respective Governments, and it was quite clear that no decision could be taken until these Governments had been referred to. He thought that it would be best to inform the Council of Ambassadors that in view of the existing situation in Germany, it might be better to wait before taking any action in the matter.

(This was agreed to.)

(*The meeting then adjourned.*)

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W. 1, March 15, 1920.

## No. 62

I.C.P. 76.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, held in Lord Curzon's Room at the British Foreign Office, Whitehall, London, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, March 16, 1920, at 4 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Forbes Adam; SECRETARIES, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Captain Abraham.

*France*: M. Cambon, M. Berthelot.

*Italy*: Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Nogara, Colonel Castoldi, Signor Galli, Don Ascanio Colonna.

INTERPRETERS: M. Camerlynck and M. Billot.

1. LORD CURZON said that before beginning the business on the agenda he would like to call the attention of his colleagues to the necessity of treating the proceedings of the conference as strictly confidential. They should be regarded as no less confidential than the proceedings in 10, Downing Street. Many of the powers of the Supreme Council had been delegated to the conference, and, in his view, all taking part in its deliberations were bound to secrecy. Perhaps he himself had been at fault in not drawing the attention of the conference to this, but he had always held himself and the Foreign Office as under an obligation to disclose nothing. Day after day, however, he had seen in the newspapers, both English and foreign, accounts of what had taken place the day before in the conference. Not only were details given of the results obtained, but even the arguments used were quoted. He could give examples of this, if necessary. He had spoken to the proprietor of the newspaper which had made the bulk of these revelations, and he had been told that the details were obtained from one or other of the members of the conference. He felt sure there had been some misunderstanding as to the situation, and that a mere mention of the matter would be a sufficient remedy. It must be obvious to all that reticence was very desirable. He had recently received a telegram from Constantinople

saying that the policy of the Allied Powers had been gravely prejudiced by premature disclosure of the proceedings of the conference. He therefore begged his colleagues in future to practise a scrupulous reticence.

2. LORD CURZON said that the military occupation of Constantinople, which had been decided on, was to be carried out that day at 11 a.m. *Occupation of Constantinople* He trusted that this matter would not be revealed outside that room. The War Office and the Ministry of Marine were to be seized; all communications and traffic in the Bosphorus would be placed under control, martial law proclaimed, landing parties from the ships sent on shore, both sides of the Straits would be commanded by the fleets, and Allied vessels would be stationed at various ports in Northern Turkey. No doubt the news would be in the papers very shortly, but it was not desirable to mention the subject for the time being.

3. LORD CURZON observed that, as the conference would remember, he had been authorised at the previous meeting to send a telegram to the Council of the League of Nations regarding the protection of minorities and the establishment of a representative at Constantinople; and another regarding the protection of Armenia.<sup>1</sup> *Role of the League of Nations in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey* The idea of the conference had been to make Armenia a free State under the League of Nations, which, it was hoped, would supply the new State with means of self-defence and the necessary funds to begin its life, which funds the League of Nations might be able to obtain by voluntary subscription. The telegrams to this effect had been sent on the previous Friday afternoon, and the Council of the League had devoted a special and confidential meeting on Saturday afternoon to these two questions. The reply of the council was that they had been taken a little by surprise, and felt that they had insufficient material on which to come to a decision. They therefore asked for all the information available to be communicated to them. He submitted that this was a very reasonable request, and for his part he would be disposed to accede to it. The council had further observed that it was quite true that in previous treaties the League of Nations had been called upon to guarantee the minorities; for instance, in the case of Poland; but there was surely a difference between the case of Poland, a State with a certain amount of organisation, and what Turkey was likely to be in the future. In the latter case the danger would arise from the action of bands not altogether under the control of the central authority. To guarantee minorities in Turkey against sporadic outbreaks all over the territory would be a difficult responsibility for the League of Nations to undertake. He did not think the League of Nations would ultimately refuse, as the protection of minorities was certainly one of the purposes for which it had been created. As to the placing of a representative of the League at Constantinople, the council were at present doubtful, and would like to be supplied with further information. In the conference itself doubts

<sup>1</sup> See No. 58, minutes 2 and 3.

had been expressed by Signor Scialoja, M. Cambon and himself. The next meeting of the Council of the League of Nations was to take place in Rome on the 25th April. It might perhaps be possible to induce the council to hold an earlier meeting to discuss Armenia. The council wished to know exactly what kind of responsibility it was desired to place upon the League of Nations in respect to Armenia. For instance, were the funds of the League to supply any deficit in the budget of Armenia? Further, as to its protection, the League of Nations at present had no forces at command. The council was willing to discuss the question in Rome, or possibly at Easter in Paris or London, when these points had been made clear to it. He himself attached such importance to the question of Armenia that he would like to accept the suggestion that an earlier meeting should be held by the council at Easter-time. He would therefore suggest that all the information at the disposal of the conference should be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations, and that the suggestion of an early meeting to discuss Armenia should be gratefully accepted.

(General agreement was expressed with these proposals.)

LORD CURZON observed that the question of guarantees for minorities in Turkey would not come before the Council of the League of Nations before its meeting in Rome on the 25th April. It was undesirable, however, to postpone the framing of the treaty for that reason. He would therefore suggest the insertion of a suspensory clause regarding guarantees, which the Drafting Committee might be instructed to insert.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that it appeared to him difficult to leave this question in a vague state in the treaty to be presented to the Turks, as it was a very important matter for Turkey. Would it not be possible, he asked, to persuade the Council of the League of Nations to deal with this question first?

M. BERTHELOT observed that a general guarantee of the League of Nations for minorities had been inserted as a kind of platonic clause in other treaties, and the League had never been consulted on the subject. In the case of Turkey, however, the League of Nations had been asked to appoint a representative at Constantinople. This was going beyond the previous treaties, and represented a much heavier responsibility for the League, since direct appeals would come to such a representative. Still more did this apply to the suggestion that the League should be responsible for the finance and defence of Armenia. Such questions no doubt deserved very close study, but as far as the general guarantee was concerned he did not think it necessary to consult the League.

LORD CURZON stated that he did not quite take this view. In the first place, the League of Nations had not been constituted when the previous treaties had been framed, and, therefore, could not be consulted. Secondly, the situation of the League of Nations in regard to Turkey would not be the same as in regard to Poland or Roumania. Poland and Roumania were members of the League of Nations, and if any dispute arose regarding minorities the Polish and Roumanian member respectively would be summoned to the

meeting. Turkey was not a member, and no Turkish delegate could be invited. These considerations had been put forward by the Council of the League of Nations itself, though not as a motive for refusing the proposal of the conference. Nevertheless, he thought the conference should not put too much on the League of Nations without giving them full opportunity of considering what they could undertake.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA observed that the guarantee of the League of Nations for minorities in Bulgaria had been given, though Bulgaria was not a member.

M. BERTHELOT said that very big problems were involved. Hitherto the League of Nations had not been organised to meet responsibilities of the character suggested for Turkey. The League of Nations had no considerable financial endowment and no army. At present it was only endowed with moral force. Material force, if required, was, he understood, to be supplied by the Great Powers. If, for instance, the minority clauses in Poland were not carried out, there would be an appeal to the League of Nations; and if, after due investigation, the Polish State were found to be at fault, reference would then be made to the Great Powers, which would have to consider what action they could take. But in Turkey it was suggested that the League of Nations should undertake the direct protection of the minorities, including the use of force; also that it should finance Armenia. He doubted whether the League of Nations, as at present constituted, would undertake tasks of this kind. If this was not the intention, then all that was needed was a similar provision as had been made in the case of the treaty with Poland. This, he suggested, was the proper course, unless it was intended to convert the League of Nations into a super State.

LORD CURZON said that in either case, seeing that the Council and Assembly of the League of Nations were now in existence and holding meetings, it was hardly possible to propose a clause involving obligations to them without giving them an opportunity of discussing it.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said the point was that it was not desired that the League of Nations should undertake what was suggested. The Italian delegation objected.

LORD CURZON said he understood the Italian delegation objected to a representative at Constantinople, but not to a general guarantee.

MR. VANSITTART then suggested that articles 11 to 14 of the minority clauses should be suppressed, and a formula to the following effect substituted in their place:—

‘The principal Allied Powers, in consultation with the Council of the League of Nations, will decide what measures are necessary to guarantee the execution of the clauses in this chapter. The Turkish Government accepts all decisions that may be taken on the subject.’

(This was agreed to.)

As a corollary, all reference in these clauses to a ‘representative of the League of Nations’ should be deleted, and ‘the Council of the League of Nations’ substituted.

4. The conference considered a memorandum by the British delegation, on the subject of Antiquities in Turkey (Appendix 1).

*Clauses regarding Antiquities in Turkey* LORD CURZON observed that these clauses had been drafted in Paris by archæological experts, Commander Hogarth representing Great Britain, Professor Cagnat representing France, Signor Parabeni representing Italy, and Mr. Butler the United States of America.

M. BERTHELOT asked whether these clauses modified the previous regime.

MR. VANSITTART said that the old regime was defective and that it was modified by the present proposals.

Clause 1 was read and adopted, with the insertion after the words 'the present treaty' of the words 'abrogate the existing law of antiquities and.'

Annex, paragraph 1, was then considered.

M. BERTHELOT took exception to the year '1700'. He regarded 18th Century art in Turkey as particularly deserving of protection.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA questioned whether anything made in the 18th Century merited the appellation 'antiquity'. He thought it would be better to use some formula such as 'works of historical or artistic value.'

LORD CURZON said that, as the clauses dealt with antiquities, he would prefer '1600' rather than '1800.' The clauses did not deal with artistic merits, but he suggested that as the clause was the work of experts it might be better to accept it as it stood.

(Paragraph 1 was accepted.)

Paragraph 2 was then read.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA then suggested that the draft clauses relating to antiquities, which were the work of expert archæologists, should be accepted in principle without further discussion, and sent to the drafting committee with a request that they be examined with a view to the detection of any legal flaws.

(This was agreed to.)

Signor Scialoja said with reference to article 2 he would like to read a telegram which he had received from the Under-Secretary of State in Rome giving a list of objects of artistic interest which he wished to claim for Italy, notably certain Roman marble statues, which had been carried off to the Imperial Museum before the war.

MR. VANSITTART pointed out that the Turks could also claim certain *objets d'art* which had been carried off by Italy.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA remarked that these latter were quite insignificant.

LORD CURZON thought it would be undesirable to make any exceptions.

M. BERTHELOT agreed that it would be a dangerous precedent as everybody would start claiming objects which he desired to possess.

LORD CURZON suggested that the conference should take note of what Signor Scialoja had said. No doubt a very good case might be made out in

this instance and in many others. The conference, however, could not examine individual cases.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he proposed to send a copy of the telegram on to the treaty experts in Paris.

Article 2 was accepted without amendment.

Article 3 was accepted without amendment.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that from the religious point of view it was a very serious matter to ignore the authority of the Sheikh-ul-Islamat.<sup>2</sup> Did the article, however, provide adequate safeguards?

LORD CURZON thought that the draft as it stood sufficiently met the case, viz., 'no authority shall be exercised by any functionary of the Sultan or the Turkish Government,' &c.

Article 4 was accepted without amendment.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI thought that some arrangement should be made by which Moslems of every country should be represented, as it was a question in which all Moslems were deeply interested.

Article 5 was accepted without amendment.

Article 6 was accepted without amendment.

Article 7 was accepted without amendment.

5. The conference had under consideration the report of the Smyrna Committee (A.J. 90) (Appendix 2) on articles to be inserted in the Turkish Treaty, dealing with the regime in the region round Smyrna.

*Regime in  
Region round  
Smyrna*

LORD CURZON pointed out that on page 1 one of the bases of the report was 'the Turkish flag as sole evidence of Turkish suzerainty to fly on the principal forts outside Smyrna,' and that in a footnote on the same page it was stated that the 'Supreme Council subsequently decided that it should fly on one particular fort'; and that in article 4 it was laid down that the 'Turkish flag should remain permanently hoisted over an outer fort of the town of Smyrna.' He wished to know which particular fort would be selected.

M. CAMBON said that M. Veniselos, when this question had been discussed by the Supreme Council, had spoken of a fort immediately outside the town.

LORD CURZON said that M. Veniselos's real reason for suggesting this had been that he did not wish the flag to fly in Smyrna itself. He himself agreed that it should not be flown within the limits of the town, but he thought that some particular fort should be definitely designated.

M. CAMBON said that in the case of Crete the Turkish flag had been flown on a little islet off the principal island.

The conference then discussed the draft articles *seriatim*.

Article 1 was accepted without amendment.

Article 2 was accepted without amendment.

Article 3 was accepted without amendment.

<sup>2</sup> Ecclesiastical office exercising superior legal authority in the Ottoman Empire.



It was decided to add the following words to article 4:—

‘The fort to be designated by the Allied Powers.’

Article 5 was accepted without amendment.

Article 6 was accepted without amendment.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA expressed the view that article 7 was a most important one as it introduced the League of Nations. Supposing the Council of the League of Nations did not wish to accept the responsibility laid upon it by this article, the Greek Government could then do exactly what it liked.

LORD CURZON said that what the article did was to give the League of Nations an opportunity of expressing its opinion on the electoral scheme submitted by the Greek Government. In his view there was no alternative to this course, but he would be glad to know if any member of the conference had a suitable alternative in mind.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said it was not only a question of protecting minorities. The Smyrna Assembly would eventually decide on the future of the Smyrna Government by recourse to a plebiscite. Supposing no reply was received from the Council of the League of Nations, the final decision would rest with the Smyrna Assembly. He thought that some provision should be made for this eventuality.

LORD CURZON explained that the Council of the League of Nations was introduced here because that council would eventually have to take the place of the present Supreme Council. In his view there were two alternatives. They could either adopt the suggestion made in the article under consideration or else they could select some other body, equivalent in authority to the Supreme Council and resembling it in composition. The Supreme Council, however, met sometimes in London, sometimes in Paris and sometimes elsewhere, and the result was considerable delay. In the case of Smyrna it was desirable to get the matter started as soon as possible. Smyrna was to have the option in two years' time of voting itself a part of Greece. If any of the Allied Governments desired to submit any question, as, for instance, a question of the laws of Smyrna, to some supreme body, the representatives of that Government could always do this at a meeting of the Council of the League.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA enquired what would happen supposing the Council of the League declined to take up the question. Could it then be referred to the International Commission at Constantinople?

LORD CURZON asked which commission Signor Scialoja had in mind, as there were to be several.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said he was referring to the Financial Commission.

M. CAMBON thought that the financial experts were hardly qualified to examine an electoral question. To set up a juridical body at Constantinople would mean one more commission.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that all that need be done by the council would be to send a letter in reply to the Smyrna Government acknowledging their communication and stating that the matter was being considered. If, how-

ever, the representative of any one nation on the council declined to discuss the question, that would be quite enough to have it dropped.

LORD CURZON thought that this eventuality was sufficiently covered by the words 'which shall not come into force until approved' in the article.

After some further discussion, in the course of which M. SCIALOJA pointed out that the Greeks possessed the means of influencing a decision of the Council of the League of Nations as they were represented on it—

LORD CURZON said that two hypotheses had been put forward. First, that M. Veniselos would go to the council, of which he was a member, and propose a system so unreasonable that the council would not touch it; second, the council will be so angry at this responsibility thrust upon them that they would do nothing. He himself thought that the League of Nations, on the contrary, would feel the necessity of justifying its existence. He deprecated the conference adopting an attitude of suspicion of every proposal that was brought forward which introduced the League of Nations.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA thought then that at least the League of Nations should be invited to assume this charge before it was thrust upon them. They had been invited to accept responsibility in regard to much less important questions—minorities, for instance. He felt it was the duty of the Allies to consult the Council of the League before any clause was inserted in the treaty which in any way committed the League.

M. CAMBON suggested that the League of Nations might decline to accept the charge, and say it was not their business to draft resolutions, but merely to offer opinions.

LORD CURZON said that the members of the conference seemed to be disposed to think that too much responsibility was being laid upon the Council of the League. He did not agree. The representation of the Smyrna Government would merely be taken by the council as a part of their regular business. Why was this article inserted? It was because the Allies desired to protect minorities, and in this case the minority was very far from being negligible. He himself did not entirely accept M. Veniselos's figures and believed that if the whole sanjak were canvassed, it would be found to contain an almost equal number of Turks and Greeks. What they desired was to ensure a fair representation in Smyrna. They desired that some impartial body should discuss the question and come to a decision one way or the other; and what better body could be selected than the Council of the League? He himself could not conceive of any alternative. All Signor Scialoja suggested was to refer the matter from Foreign Office to Foreign Office and from capital to capital, involving endless delay.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA thought that in any case the last part of the first paragraph of article 7 should be amended so as to ensure that the Council of the League sent some form of reply. Either something must be done to prevent the council declining to answer or, as he had already suggested, the council should be consulted as to their readiness to accept responsibility.

LORD CURZON asked whether the French Ambassador had any remark or suggestion to make.

M. CAMBON thought that the part referring to a period of three months might be eliminated.

LORD CURZON suggested that the last three lines of the first paragraph might then be erased.

VISCOUNT CHINDA thought that some sort of period ought to be fixed.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA doubted if this was necessary. He pointed out that there were nine States represented on the council and each representative could put questions to the council. Both Japan and Greece were represented. There must, however, be some guarantee, and silence offered no guarantee at all.

MR. VANSITTART said that, if these three lines were suppressed, any single Power could block the whole question.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA thought they might say that the council should decide by a majority of votes.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said he did not read the sentence in this light. The article as drafted placed the council under no obligation to reply, and he wished that some provision should be made to compel an answer of some kind within a certain period.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA did not agree that such provision was necessary. Japan was represented on the council and could raise the question whenever it liked. In his view there was really nothing to fear.

It was agreed (a) in the 16th line of the English rendering of article 7 to insert the words 'a majority of' before the words 'such council'; (b) to strike out the words 'or until three months shall have elapsed without a reply from the Council of the League of Nations.'

Articles 8 to 14 were accepted without amendment.

It was agreed in the third line from the end<sup>4</sup> of the English rendering of article 15 to substitute the word 'subject' for the words 'without prejudice.'

Article 16 was accepted without amendment.

M. CAMBON pointed out that all decisions taken by the conference were, of course, subject to revision by the Supreme Council, after military and other experts had been consulted.

LORD CURZON said that the French Ambassador was perfectly correct. Every decision taken by the conference was subject to the approval or otherwise of the Supreme Council.

## 6. The conference had before them—

*Delimitation of  
the Free State of  
Batumi*

- (a) A letter from Sir M. Hankey to Mr. Malkin, dated the 1st March [28th February], 1920 (C.P. 759) (Appendix 3).<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> See the sixth line of article 7 in appendix 2 below.

<sup>4</sup> i.e. the penultimate line of article 15 in appendix 2 below.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. This appendix comprised a letter of February 28, 1920, from Sir M. Hankey to Marshal Foch, enclosing a letter of even date from Sir M. Hankey to Mr. Malkin. Sir M. Hankey informed Mr. Malkin, for the information of the Drafting Committee, that the Conference had, on February 27, taken as 'provisional decisions' those recorded in

- (b) A note by the Acting British Secretary (A.J. 79) (Appendix 4).
- (c) A letter from the President, Georgian delegation, to the President, Peace Conference, dated the 28th February, 1920 (A.J. 88) (Appendix 5).

MR. VANSITTART briefly summarised a telegram dated the 28th February, which had been received from General Milne at Constantinople<sup>6</sup> regarding the Batum Province, and said that they were all agreed, he thought, upon the line suggested by General Milne.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that if they were all agreed the matter was settled.

MR. VANSITTART explained that General Milne's proposals had been examined and the line he suggested had been adopted as a basis of discussion by the Inter-Allied Commission.

It was agreed to recommend that in sub-heading 2 of Sir M. Hankey's letter to Mr. Malkin of the 28th February the words 'the smaller zone being preferred' should be excised.

*(The conference adjourned at 6.40 p.m.)*

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 16, 1920.

#### APPENDIX I TO No. 62

##### *Memorandum by British Delegation for Submission to the Council of Dominion? Ministers and Ambassadors*

The British delegation propose the following draft articles for insertion either in the political or miscellaneous chapters of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey:—

Articles 1 and 2 deal with archæology in Turkey.

Article 3 deals with the disposal and return of archives.

Article 4 deals with the cessation, *inter alia*, of the authority of the Sheikh-ul-Islamat over ceded or transferred territories.

Article 5 deals with Turkey's connection with the Hedjaz Railway.

Article 6 deals with access to the Turkish Department of Wakfs.

Article 7 deals with amnesty.

##### *'Article 1*

'The Turkish Government will, within twelve months from the coming into force of the present treaty, take steps to enact, and will thereafter execute, a new Law of Antiquities, on the basis of the instructions contained in the annex hereto. The terms of the said law shall be submitted to the Financial Commission for approval before being submitted to the Turkish Parliament. In executing this law the Turkish Government shall observe complete equality towards all nations.

No. 34, minute 2 (a-f), respectively numbered under subheading 1-6 in Sir M. Hankey's letter. In his covering letter to Marshal Foch, Sir M. Hankey stated: 'It is thought that this information may be useful to the commission under your presidency which is studying the military, naval and air clauses for the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.'

<sup>6</sup> See document 2 in appendix 4 below.

<sup>7</sup> This word was a mistake for 'Foreign'.

*'Annex*

'(1) "Antiquity" means any construction or any conduct [? product] of human activity earlier than the year 1700.

'(2) Any person who, having discovered an antiquity without being furnished with the authorisation contemplated in article 5 below, reports the same to an officer of the Ministry of Public Instruction,<sup>8</sup> shall be recompensed according to the value of the object. The principle to be adopted should be to proceed by encouragement rather than by threat.

'(3) No antiquity may be sold except to the above Ministry; but if this Department renounces the acquisition of any antiquity that antiquity may then be freely sold. No antiquity may leave the country without an export licence from the said Ministry.

'(4) Any person who maliciously or negligently destroys or damages an ancient object or structure shall become liable to a penalty to be fixed.

'(5) No clearing of ground or digging with the object of finding antiquities shall be permitted, under penalty of fine, except to persons authorised by the above Ministry.

'(6) Equitable terms for expropriation, temporary or permanent, of lands which might be of historical or archæological interest shall be fixed.

'(7) Authorisation to excavate shall only be granted to persons who show sufficient guarantees of archæological experience. The Turkish Government shall not, in granting these authorisations, act in such a way as to eliminate scholars of any nation without good grounds.

'(8) The proceeds of excavations may be divided between the excavator and the Ministry of Public Instruction, in a proportion fixed by the Ministry. If division seems impossible, for scientific reasons, the excavator shall receive a fair indemnity in lieu of part of the find.

*'Article 2*

'All objects of religious, archæological or artistic interest, which have been removed since (the 1st August, 1914) from any of the territories which now cease to form part of the Turkish dominions, will, within (twelve) months from the coming into force of the present treaty, be restored by the Turkish Government to the Government of the territory from which such objects were removed. If any such objects have passed into private ownership, the Turkish Government will take the necessary steps, by expropriation or otherwise, to enable them to fulfil their obligations under this article.

'Lists of the objects to be restored under this article will be furnished to the Turkish Government by the Governments concerned within (six) months from the coming into force of the present treaty.

*'Article 3*

'Turkey will hand over, without delay, to the Governments concerned, archives, registers, plans, title-deeds and documents of every kind belonging to the civil, military, financial, judicial or other forms of administration in the transferred territories. If any one of these documents, archives, registers, title-deeds or plans is missing, it shall be restored by Turkey upon the demand of the Government concerned.

<sup>8</sup> *Note in original:* 'This is the qualified Turkish Department.'

'In case the archives, registers, plans, title-deeds or documents referred to in the preceding paragraph, exclusive of those of a military character, concern equally the administrations in Turkey, and cannot, therefore, be handed over without inconvenience to such administrations, Turkey undertakes, subject to reciprocity, to give access thereto to the Governments concerned.

*'Article 4*

'No authority shall be exercised by any functionary of the Sultan or the Turkish Government in any territory which, in accordance with the terms of the present treaty, ceases to form part of Turkey, or of which the existing status is recognised by Turkey under the present treaty.

*'Article 5*

'The Turkish Government abandons whatever rights it possesses over the Hedjaz Railway, and accepts such arrangements as shall be made for its working, and for the distribution of the property belonging to or used in connection with the railway, by the Governments concerned. In any such arrangements, the special position of the railway from the religious point of view shall be fully recognised and safeguarded.

*'Article 6*

'The Turkish Government undertakes, subject to reciprocity, to afford to the Governments exercising authority over territory severed from Turkey under the present treaty, access to all archives and documents relating to the administration of Wakfs in such territory, or to particular Wakfs, wherever situated, in which persons or institutions established in such territory are interested.

*'Article 7*

'Without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter <sup>9</sup> (Penalties), no inhabitant of Turkey shall be disturbed or molested, under any pretext whatever, on account of any political or military action taken by him, or any assistance of any kind given by him to the Allied Powers or their nationals, between the 1st August, 1914, and the coming into force of the present treaty; all sentences passed against any inhabitant of Turkey for the above reasons shall be completely annulled and any proceeding already instituted shall be stopped.'

APPENDIX 2 TO No. 62

*Report of Smyrna Committee on Articles to be inserted in Turkish Treaty dealing with Regime in region round Smyrna*

(A.J. 90.)

The Smyrna Committee were instructed—

'To report on the regime to be established at Smyrna on the following provisional bases:—

- '1. Turkish flag, as sole evidence of Turkish suzerainty, to fly on the principal forts outside Smyrna.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Omission in original.

<sup>10</sup> *Note in original:* 'The Supreme Council subsequently decided that it should fly on one particular fort.' (See No. 26, minute 1.)

- '2. Greek administration.
- '3. Greek garrison.
- '4. Local Parliament (Greeks and Turks).
- '5. After two years the local Parliament to have the right to apply to the League of Nations for incorporation in Greece. The League of Nations, if they think necessary, to have the right to insist on a plebiscite.'

The Committee were also informed that the Supreme Council had 'decided that a customs service should be established between the Smyrna area and the remainder of the Turkish territory.'

The committee unanimously recommend the attached draft articles Nos. 1-10, 12, 13, and 16, which take account of the views of M. Veniselos. Articles (Nos. 11, 14 and 15) dealing respectively with treatment of the currency question, the Ottoman Debt, and the salt-mines in the Smyrna area, have been drafted by the Financial Commission and inserted at their request.

*London, March 12, 1920.*

*Article for insertion in Chapter 9 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey with regard to the Turkish Frontiers*

The western frontier of Turkey shall be the Ægean, subject to the provisions of Chapter 9 dealing with the district of Smyrna.

*Chapter dealing with the District of Smyrna*

*Article 1*

Pending the decision referred to [in] article 16 of the present chapter, referring to the definitive statute of Smyrna and of the adjacent territory as defined in article 2 hereof, such territory shall be placed under the regime set forth in the following articles, viz.:—

*Article 2*

(Delimitation of territory, see annex to report of the Smyrna Committee of February 1920,<sup>11</sup> dealing with the boundaries of the district of Smyrna.)

*Article 3*

As regards the application of the remaining sections of the present Treaty of Peace, the territory referred to in article 2 hereof shall be held to be transferred or ceded territory.

*Article 4*

Turkey hereby transfers to the Greek Government the exercise of all rights of sovereignty over the territory defined in article 2 hereof, but such territory shall, nevertheless, remain under Turkish suzerainty, in witness whereof, the Turkish flag shall remain permanently hoisted over an outer fort in the town of Smyrna.

*Article 5*

The Greek Government will assume responsibility for the administration of the said territory, and will effect this by means of a body of officials which it will appoint specially for the purpose.

<sup>11</sup> See No. 26, note 5.

#### *Article 6*

The Greek Government shall be entitled to maintain in the said territory the military forces required for the maintenance of order and public security.

#### *Article 7*

A local Parliament and electoral system shall be set up in such a manner as to ensure proportional representation for all sections of the population, including racial, linguistic and religious minorities. Within six months after the coming into force of the present treaty, the Greek Government shall submit to the Council of the League of Nations an electoral scheme complying with the above suggestions, and which shall not come into force until approved by such council, or until three months shall have elapsed without a reply from the Council of the League of Nations.

The Greek Government shall be entitled to postpone elections until the return to the territory referred to in article 2 of the inhabitants banished or deported therefrom by the Turkish authorities, but such postponement shall not exceed the period of one year after the coming into force of the present treaty.

#### *Article 8*

Relations between the Greek Administration and the local Parliament shall be determined by the former in accordance with the principles of the Greek Constitution.

#### *Article 9*

The provisions contained in the special treaty of 1913<sup>9</sup> between Greece and the Allied Powers, with respect to the protection of racial, linguistic and religious minorities, shall be applicable to the territory referred to in article 2.

#### *Article 10*

The Greek Government may establish a Customs Union in the territory referred to in article 2 and may incorporate the said territory in the Greek customs system.

#### *Article 11*

The Greek Government engages to take no measure which would have for effect the depreciation of existing Turkish currency, which should retain its character as legal tender pending a final decision, in accordance with the provisions of article 16 as to the final status of Smyrna and the adjacent territory.

#### *Article 12*

The provisions of the present treaty with respect to the regime of international ports, free ports and transit shall be applicable to the territory referred to in article 2.

#### *Article 13*

As regards nationality, such inhabitants of the territory referred to in article 2 hereof as cannot claim any other nationality under the terms of the present treaty shall be treated on exactly the same footing as Greek nationals. Greece shall provide for their diplomatic and consular protection abroad.



#### *Article 14*

Questions concerning the distribution of the Ottoman Public Debt between the territory of Smyrna and the rest of Turkey will be regulated in conformity with the provisions of article 11 of the financial clauses of the present treaty relating to ceded territory.

#### *Article 15*

Pending a final decision in accordance with the provisions of article 16 as to the final status of Smyrna and the adjacent territory, no alteration or interference shall be made in the rights to exploit the salt marshes of Phoea belonging to the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt, including all plant and machinery and materials for transport by land or sea. No tax or charge shall be imposed during this period on the manufacture, exportation or transport of salt produced from these salt marshes. The Greek Administration will have the right to regulate and tax the consumption of salt within the territory. If after the specified period Greece considers it opportune to effect changes in the provisions above set forth, the salt marshes of Phoea will be treated as a concession and will enjoy the guarantee granted in respect of concessions by section 9, article 9, of the present treaty without prejudice to the provisions of article 16 of the financial clauses of the present treaty.

#### *Article 16*

When a period of two years shall have elapsed since the first meeting of the local Parliament referred to in article 7, that Parliament may, by a majority of votes, ask the Council of the League of Nations for the definite incorporation in the Kingdom of Greece of the territory referred to in article 2 hereof. The council may demand, as a preliminary, a plebiscite in the said territory on conditions to be laid down by the council.

In the event of the incorporation of the said territory into Greece as a result of the application of the foregoing paragraph, the right of suzerainty recognised by article 4 hereof as belonging to Turkey shall cease. Turkey agrees, in that event, to renounce in favour of Greece all her rights and titles to the territory referred to in article 2 hereof.

### APPENDIX 4 TO NO. 62

#### *Batum*

#### Document 1

#### *Note by the Acting British Secretary*

(Circulated for the information of the Supreme Council.)

(A.J. 79).

My attention has been drawn to sub-paragraph 2 of the provisional decisions conveyed in a letter by Sir Maurice Hankey to Mr. Malkin, circulated on the 1st March, Paper No. C.P. 759,<sup>12</sup> viz., that in delimiting the Free State of Batum the 'smaller zone' should be preferred. The British War Office have pointed out to me that they understand that the commission appointed to consider the boundary

<sup>12</sup> See note 5 above.

of Armenia were careful to make it clear that there should be no attempt in London to define the exact boundary of the Batum free port, but that this matter should be left to a commission on the spot, and that the lines shown on the map<sup>13</sup> are merely intended to indicate the possible manner in which the boundary of the Armenian State might well be extended, astride the Chorokh Valley, to meet the frontier of Batum. It appears, therefore, that there should be some rewording of the sub-paragraph of the letter in question.

In this connection, I attach herewith, for the information of the Supreme Council, a paraphrase of a telegram which has been received from General Milne giving his views regarding the best boundaries for Batum, together with a map<sup>13</sup> showing a third alternative illustrating General Milne's proposal.

S. H. WILSON  
*Acting British Secretary,  
Supreme Council.*

## Document 2

### *Paraphrase of a Telegram, re Batum Province, received from General Milne, Constantinople, dated February 28, 1920*

In continuation of my G.C. 136<sup>13</sup> dated the 20th February, following are my proposals for hinterland of Batum when occupied by Allied garrison. Reference to map 1:1,000,000 Asia North K 37 Batum.<sup>13</sup> Present northern boundary the province along Chorokh River (unnamed, but 4 miles north of Krebult) to the point where it meets the former eastern boundary as marked along watershed 83 A in Babakva a (?). Tiflis to a point ring contour 1500, which is 14 miles east of Batum. Thence to the point where stream from west joins Chorokh River 7 miles above road junction at Chertvis rise, along crest south of the stream to point 1440 on Turkish frontier. Radius (?) rather less than 16 miles. This gives best hinterland for economic and defensive purposes. It includes Kobuleti station and pump station essential to control the oil supply of Batum, and hence must include (?) Kobuleti village (?) and this (?) completes British . . .<sup>14</sup> at Tsandsal and another . . .<sup>14</sup> south of Artvin. Remainder provinces chiefly inhabited by Adjarians and Turks, who are determined to resist (?) Georgian occupation, and hostilities will undoubtedly occur, as both are Moslems. At Artvin 6,000 Armenians. Very few Georgians outside towns. Objections to holding town without hinterland are obvious. Essential: (a) Georgian boycott of and propaganda against Batum must cease and import supplies be facilitated; (b) provision arrangements with Georgia *re* railway to be revised, as owing to fall of rouble the rent is now insufficient; (c) currency question must be settled; (d) food supplies must be guaranteed. The two latter are interdependent. It is better for us from a military point of view to hold the whole province (?) boundary on grounds of race or religion (?) as the Georgian claims to the province greater than those of anyone else. Details of frontier to be determined on the . . .<sup>14</sup> grounds by the Military Governor.

<sup>13</sup> Not appended to filed copy.

<sup>14</sup> The text here is uncertain.

APPENDIX 5 TO No. 62

*Batoum*

*President, Georgian Delegation, to President, Peace Conference*

(A.J. 88.)

CURZON HOTEL, LONDRES, le 28 février 1920

M. le Président,

Il paraît que la question du régime à appliquer à la ville et au territoire de Batoum soit à l'ordre du jour du Conseil suprême actuellement réuni à Londres.

À cette occasion, la délégation de la République géorgienne tient à déclarer ce qui suit:

1. La province de Batoum (arrondissements Batoum et Artvin) est considérée par le peuple géorgien comme son patrimoine légitime et incontestable. Malgré toutes les vicissitudes subies par cette terre au cours des siècles et la domination étrangère prolongée, cette province a pleinement gardé son caractère essentiellement géorgien, et son rattachement à la mère-patrie, c'est-à-dire à la République géorgienne, conformément aux vœux unanimes des populations géorgiennes tant chrétiennes que musulmanes, doit être en toute justice sanctionné par le Conseil suprême.

2. Le port de Batoum sert de débouché principal à la Géorgie; à son sort les républiques voisines, savoir l'Azerbaïdjan et l'Arménie, sont aussi intéressées; de même, ce port est d'une importance notoire pour le commerce de transit avec la Perse. Dans ces conditions le Gouvernement géorgien, tout en revendiquant pour la Géorgie la souveraineté de la province et de la ville de Batoum, manifestait toujours le désir le plus sincère d'arriver avec ses voisins à un arrangement qui présenterait des garanties suffisantes aussi bien à l'Arménie et à l'Azerbaïdjan qu'aux nécessités du commerce international en général. Le moyen le plus pratique d'aboutir à un pareil arrangement sur la base de la souveraineté géorgienne sur Batoum serait de le faire négocier conjointement avec les autres problèmes économiques et politiques dont le règlement est nécessaire pour l'organisation du bon voisinage et des relations régulières entre les républiques transcaucasiennes.

La délégation géorgienne se tient à la disposition du Conseil suprême pour fournir toutes les explications voulues et apporter toutes les précisions nécessaires, s'il y a lieu, en ce qui concerne la province et le port de Batoum.

3. Les principes ci-dessus énoncés ont été défendus par les délégués de la Géorgie le 26 février courant devant la commission instituée par le Conseil suprême pour l'étude des frontières de l'Arménie. Dans la même séance des considérations ont été présentées sur la rectification éventuelle de la frontière méridionale de la Géorgie dite musulmane avec l'attribution à la République géorgienne du sandjak Lazistan et de certaines localités dans la vallée de Tchorech.

La délégation géorgienne croit devoir ajouter aux raisons historiques, ethnographiques et autres présentées à la commission, et militant pour l'attribution du Lazistan à la Géorgie, cette seule remarque, que le problème de la rectification de frontière ci-haut mentionnée se pose, dans la pensée du Gouvernement géorgien, en connexité avec l'établissement de l'accès de l'Arménie à la mer Noire dans les confins du vilayet de Trébizonde.

Veuillez, &c.,

Le Président de la Délégation  
de la République géorgienne,  
N. TCHEIDSE.

I.C.P. 77.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, held in Lord Curzon's Room, at the British Foreign Office, Whitehall, London, S.W. 1, on Thursday, March 18, 1920, at 11.30 a.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Forbes Adam, Mr. Leeper, Mr. Payne, Mr. Fountain; **SECRETARIES,** Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Captain E. Abraham.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer.

*Italy:* Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Nogara, Colonel Castoldi, Signor Galli, Don Ascanio Colonna.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda.

**INTERPRETERS:** M. Camerlynck and M. Billot.

1. **LORD CURZON** suggested that the observations of the Greek delegation regarding the protection of minorities (A.J. 95) (Appendix 1) might with advantage be referred to the relevant commission. To some of these observations the Greeks attached great importance. The commission might find it possible to give them satisfaction on some points, and might think it advisable to hear M. Veniselos. If there were no objection, therefore, he would propose to remit the document for examination to the Minorities Commission.

*Observations by the Greek Delegation on the Clauses for Insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey in regard to the Protection of Minorities*

(This was agreed to.)

2. **LORD CURZON** observed that M. Veniselos, in his letter to Mr. Lloyd George, of the 10th March, raised the question of the property registers relating to districts evacuated by the Turks. He proposed the insertion in the treaty of an article, of which he gave a draft (A.J. 80) (Appendix 2).

*Restoration of Property Registers by Turkish Government to Greek Government*

**MR. VANSITTART** observed that a clause had already been proposed, which might be extended to meet the desires of

M. Veniselos.

**LORD CURZON** said that he thought there would be no harm in doing so.

**M. KAMMERER** said that he thought there would be no objection, but the point raised two small questions. The first was: Should the treaty deal with matters anterior to the war? The second was: Should the article suggested deal exclusively with Greek claims? Would it not be better, he asked, to make it of general application, so that it might cover the case of Armenia as well?

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that, in his opinion, the article ought to be in general terms.

It was agreed—

That article 3 of the draft articles approved at the last meeting (I.C.P. 76,<sup>1</sup> Appendix 1) should be redrafted in such a way as to cover the demands of M. Veniselos regarding property registers for territories ceded to Greece since 1912; the article, however, should be redrafted in general terms by the Drafting Committee.

3. LORD CURZON said that the point raised by M. Veniselos in his memorandum (A.J. 83) (Appendix 3) regarding the attribution of the islands of the Sea of Marmora was a new point. They were, in any case, included in the area of Turkey to be demilitarised. Perhaps it might be well to consult the Military Commission dealing with the matter of demilitarisation as to the advantage or disadvantage of establishing Greek sovereignty in these islands.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI observed that these islands were so close to the Turkish shore of the Sea of Marmora that it appeared impossible to him to make them Greek. Friction and trouble would inevitably result.

LORD CURZON said that it was for this reason that he suggested the Military Commission should be consulted in the first instance. Ultimately the decision would have to be taken by the conference. The Military Commission might say that for certain reasons it was desirable that the sovereignty of the islands should be Turkish. It might be of opinion that the question of sovereignty was a matter of indifference from a military point of view. Its opinion on this matter would be of service to the conference in helping to frame a final decision.

M. BERTHELOT said that he had no objection to the course proposed. He thought, in referring the matter to the Military Commission, it would be desirable to state that the governing consideration must be the freedom of the Straits and of the Sea of Marmora. This was a question of capital importance, and every other consideration should be made subordinate to it. No doubt the ideal solution would be that the islands should belong neither to Turkey nor to Greece. In any case, the commission should consider whether ownership of these islands by Greece would in any way interfere with the freedom of the Straits.

It was agreed—

That the memorandum by M. Veniselos (A.J. 83) (Appendix 3) should be communicated to the Naval and Military Commission, together with the above remarks.

<sup>1</sup> No. 62.

4. The conference had before them a letter from the secretary of the Imperial Ottoman Bank to the secretary to the Supreme Council (A.J. 87) (Appendix 4).<sup>2</sup>

*Position of  
Turkish Institu-  
tions controlled  
by Allied Capital*

LORD CURZON said that this appeared to him to be a matter to be referred to the Economic Commission.

M. KAMMERER said that the letter had been discussed by the Economic Commission, which had decided against the request. As far as the Economic Commission was concerned, the matter was regarded as closed.

It was understood that the question would come before the conference in connection with the final report of the Economic Commission.

5. The conference had before them a copy of a letter from the chairman of the Economic Commission to Sir Maurice Hankey (A.J. 97) (Appendix 5).

*Economic Clauses  
of Treaty of  
Peace with  
Turkey*

MR. PAYNE explained that the bulk of the articles had been unanimously agreed on by the Economic Commission.

There were, however, a few reservations on which it was hoped that agreement would be reached within a short time.

LORD CURZON said that he thought it would be difficult for the conference to examine the whole document in detail. As far as the British Government was concerned, it was satisfied with the articles as drafted, subject to agreement regarding the reservations still undecided. He therefore left the matter in the hands of his French and Italian colleagues. If any of them should wish to raise any point at a subsequent meeting it would be discussed. If they had no such point to raise, the articles as drafted might be considered as approved.

M. KAMMERER said that the French delegation took the same view. They regarded the draft as satisfactory, and would accept it on the same conditions as the British delegation respecting the reservations. Instructions might be received to raise certain points in regard to these at a later stage.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that the Italian delegation was of the same mind.

Paper A.J. 97 was accepted in principle, subject to any points that might be raised later with reference to the reservations still undecided.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This letter of March 4, 1920, referred to article 434 of the Treaty of Versailles and suggested the insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey of an article in the following sense: 'All companies and institutions which, though legally or technically Turkish, are in fact controlled and substantially owned by Allied nationals, shall enjoy the same rights and facilities as those accorded in the treaties of peace with Germany, Austria and Bulgaria to Allied institutions and nationals as therein defined. Should any of the time limits fixed in these treaties for the exercise of such rights and facilities expire before or shortly after the Turkish Treaty comes into force, thereby excluding claims of this character, then a further extension of time for these technically Turkish institutions, equal to the original period, shall be established.'

6. The conference had before them an answer to the Hungarian delegation regarding the economic clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary (A.J. 103) (Appendix 6).<sup>3</sup>

*Allied Reply to  
Hungarian Dele-  
gation regarding  
Economic Clauses  
of the Treaty of  
Peace with  
Hungary*

LORD CURZON said that this answer had been drafted in Paris in accordance with the decision of the council that matters of detail should be dealt with by the technical commissions sitting in Paris, while questions of principle should be settled in London.<sup>4</sup> The main questions of principle

were:—

- (a) Territorial (frontiers).
- (b) Economic (trade relations).

The conference had considered in detail what answer it should make regarding frontiers, and he hoped the decision reached was final. It was now necessary for the conference to consider what reply should be made regarding the economic chapter. The meeting was therefore called upon to approve or criticise the draft reply before it. As it would take a long time to go through the whole reply, and as it was of a very technical nature, he would ask Mr. Leeper to draw the attention of the conference to salient points of principle. A great deal could be agreed to without examination.

MR. LEEPER said that the Economic Commission replied in detail to all the observations of the Hungarian delegation. On some points it gave the Hungarian delegation satisfaction—for instance, in regard to customs. The Hungarians raised the question whether it was just to make them grant most-favoured-nation treatment to all the Allies without reciprocity. The Allies replied that, as a consequence of Hungary's part in the war, this was just, but that they had agreed to include a provision that this one-sided obligation should last only for three years, after which it should be considered by the League of Nations, with a view to another arrangement if considered advisable. The most important point raised by the Hungarian delegation

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. This appendix contained the French text of a draft, which was the same as the text printed in *Les Négociations de la Paix Hongroise* (Budapest, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1920), vol. ii, pp. 565–72, subject to:

- (i) minor variation in drafting and arrangement;
- (ii) the last two paragraphs of the reply concerning article 207 (cf. *ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 566), which read as follows in the text in the appendix:

‘A l’effet de permettre que la Tchécoslovaquie, la Pologne, l’État serbe-croate-slovène, la Roumanie, la Hongrie et l’Autriche puissent s’entr’aider pour les produits que jusqu’ici ces États échangeaient et dont la fourniture serait indispensable, soit à leur production, soit à leur commerce, des négociations seront entreprises [*sic*] dans les six mois à partir de la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix, à l’effet de conclure des conventions conformes à l’esprit et aux termes du présent traité, et notamment des articles 200 à 205.

‘Si à l’expiration de cette période, ladite convention n’avait pu être conclue, l’État demandeur pourra solliciter l’entremise de la Commission des Réparations pour activer les négociations.’

- (iii) the third paragraph of the reply concerning article 217 which in the appendix gave the date of the convention as April 25, 1917 (cf. *ibid.* vol. ii, p. 567: this convention was, however, concluded on April 25, 1907, cf. *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. c, pp. 575–8).

<sup>4</sup> See No. 26, minute 4.

referred to article 205. To safeguard Hungary's economic interests, they asked that there should be free trade among all the territories of the late Dual Monarchy. The reply stated that this was impossible, as the effect would be to cut off Transylvania from Roumania and Croatia from Serbia; in fact, to create another set of economic barriers. It was impossible to put any provision with such an effect in the treaty. Nevertheless, it was suggested that an addition might be made to article 207, in the form of words given in Appendix 6. The point was that, while it was not possible to insert in the treaty what the Hungarian delegation asked for, some remedy might be sought in agreement between the States concerned after the signature of the treaty.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he saw considerable danger in this form of words. It might be interpreted as a revival of the economic Zollverein<sup>5</sup> of Austria-Hungary. On this might be based a political resurrection of the Austrian Empire. He was not opposed to facilitating the free interchange of goods, but he thought the terms used should not be wide enough to render the restoration of the old economic unit possible, still less to bring the political resurrection of the Empire within the bounds of possibility.

MR. LEEPER said he thought article 203 provided against this danger.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA pointed out that its effect was reduced to three years by what had been adopted.

MR. LEEPER said that its operation was not necessarily curtailed to three years. After consideration three years hence it might be prolonged.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said he did not think it safe to depend upon an article which might cease to be operative in three years. He thought that it was merely a matter of framing the article very carefully. He would like to have the point reserved, with a view to the consideration of a new draft.

LORD CURZON suggested that the same procedure be adopted in regard to this as in regard to the economic chapter of the Turkish treaty. The British Government was ready to accept the answer. If, in the next twenty-four hours, the French or Italian delegation had any points to raise in connection with it, he would ask them to make their observations in the course of the day. He pointed out that it was necessary to settle the matter as quickly as possible; he would prefer not to postpone it until the following week. If no comments were received, the document would be considered as accepted.

(This was agreed to.)

7. LORD CURZON observed that, in connection with the Treaty of Peace with Hungary, the Roumanian delegation asked for a slight alteration of article 181, the present drafting of which appeared to them to imply an undeserved censure on them for defending themselves against Bela Kun.<sup>6</sup> The redraft they proposed omitted from the fifth paragraph of the article in question mention of military operations conducted without the agreement of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. He

*Roumanian  
Request for Re-  
drafting of  
Article 181 of the  
Treaty of Peace  
with Hungary*

<sup>5</sup> Customs Union.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Volume I, Chap. I and Volume VI, Chap. I *passim*.



himself thought that there was no objection to redrafting the passage in accordance with the request of the Roumanian delegation.

No objection was raised, and it was agreed—

That the Drafting Committee should redraft the article as suggested by the Roumanian delegation (Appendix 7).

8. LORD CURZON said that he had received a letter from M. Veniselos, laying claim to the Island of Castellorizo (A.J. 101) (Appendix 8). At the close of a discussion at 10, Downing Street, Signor Nitti had casually observed that he hoped the island would remain Turkish and form part of the Italian sphere of interest, seeing that it was very close to the coast of the Adalia region. As all were anxious to please Signor Nitti, his suggestion had been agreed to.<sup>7</sup> Now, M. Veniselos entered the field and declared that the island contained a population of 12,000 Greeks. He further said that it was part of the Dodecanese, and had, under Turkish rule, enjoyed the same privileges as other islands of an entirely Greek population. He therefore asked the conference to ratify the express desire of the population to be placed under the Greek Government.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that, in the first place, he thought Signor Nitti would be painfully surprised if the conference went back upon the decision it had taken. Further, as M. Cambon would recollect, when the status of the Ægean Islands had been discussed in 1913, all had agreed that, as Castellorizo was so close to the Anatolian coast as almost to form part of it, it should be left to Turkey. A few months ago, in Paris, M. Veniselos had declared the island contained 1,500 Greeks; now he said it contained 12,000. Prolific as the Greeks might be, he thought this a little surprising. M. Veniselos also now declared that the island belonged to the Dodecanese. He suggested that this would make thirteen islands instead of twelve.

M. BERTHELOT observed that the Dodecanese, in spite of the derivation of the word, contained about a hundred islands.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that, in any case, he hoped the conference would not reopen the question.

LORD CURZON said it was fair to say that, when the council had decided to agree to Signor Nitti's suggestion, the opposition case had not been heard. He did not think that the claim made by M. Veniselos could be ruled out altogether without consideration.

M. BERTHELOT said that, for military reasons, the island had been occupied by French troops during the war. France, however, had no claims to the island whatever. She delivered it to the Peace Conference to determine its future fate. France had no special views on the matter; she had been quite favourable to the Italian point of view, but also thought that M. Veniselos's claim deserved consideration.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that it was clear that this island was not part of the Dodecanese, seeing that Italy had occupied the Dodecanese, but not Castellorizo.

<sup>7</sup> See No. 21, minute 13.

LORD CURZON said that as the island was in sight of the mainland and was itself surrounded by other islands, it might be more troublesome than advantageous to introduce Greek government. The conference might say that, after consideration, it was not disposed to suggest any alteration in the decision taken by the council. Of course, if M. Veniselos desired to appeal to the Supreme Council on the matter he was at liberty to do so.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that, if M. Veniselos chose to make this appeal, he trusted the council would not hear it unless Signor Nitti was present. The hearing of this appeal would, therefore, presumably be delayed until the council met in Italy.

It was agreed—

To recommend no alteration in the decision taken regarding Castellorizo, and that M. Veniselos might, if he desired, make an appeal on the subject to the Supreme Council.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that before the conference adjourned he wished to state that the Italian delegation had received information of a serious character to the effect that the Serbian army had invaded the northern part of Albania, and there was a danger of a collision there.

LORD CURZON enquired whether the Italian delegation wished the conference to discuss the question.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA replied in the negative. He expressed the view, however, that if unpleasant incidents were to be avoided the Allies must give the question their attention. As the Italian Ambassador had said, once the Albanians and the Serbs were on the march there was a risk of their colliding.

M. BERTHELOT said that they had been warned of this danger for many months past. Representations had been made to Belgrade and the replies had always been of a reassuring character. If, however, the facts were really now as stated, the Serbs would put themselves in a very serious position. He thought that the Allied Governments should instruct their representatives to make full enquiries and to see if they could obtain corroborative information. So far, there had been hypotheses and eventualities which had been adumbrated, but nothing serious had actually occurred.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI, quoting from a telegram he had received, stated that, according to his information, certain Serbian troops were on the move, and the Albanians were making preparations to resist them, and were asking for help from the Italians. A second telegram announced that insurrectionary movements on the part of the population against the Serbs were continuing.

COLONEL CASTOLDI said that there were rumours also of a violation of the frontier and there had also been instances where collision had taken place.

M. BERTHELOT said that the Serbs could equally bring accusations of a similar character against the Albanians. These events were extremely annoying for the people on the spot, but they were hardly of sufficient value to necessitate any decision on the part of the conference. The people on the spot

were subject to fits of strong excitement, which carried them away. If the Serbs went too far, the Allies would have to expostulate.

LORD CURZON said he agreed generally with M. Berthelot. He understood, however, that Signor Scialoja was not pressing for a decision to-day. He had submitted a formal statement for the information of his colleagues, who had duly taken note of it. He himself proposed that they should adopt M. Berthelot's suggestion, and that their respective representatives on the spot should be asked to make enquiries and report exactly what had happened. It would be time enough to take a decision when these reports had been received, if they went to show that the position was really serious.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that he accepted this proposal on behalf of the Italian delegation, which had discharged its responsibility in communicating to the conference the report which it had received.

It was agreed that the British and French Governments should instruct their respective representatives on the spot to make enquiries as to the alleged *démarche* of the Serbs and should report as to what extent the movement was serious.

*(The conference then adjourned.)*

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 18, 1920.

#### APPENDIX I TO No. 63

##### *Délégation hellénique*

##### *Observations sur les Clauses à insérer dans le Traité de Paix avec la Turquie au Sujet de la Protection des Minorités ethniques*

(A.J. 95.)

La délégation de Grèce à la Conférence de la Paix se rapporte, au sujet des clauses sur la protection des minorités ethniques à insérer dans le Traité de Paix avec la Turquie, à la note adressée par sa lettre du 25 février dernier à la Conférence de la Paix.<sup>8</sup> Elle maintient son point de vue en ce qui concerne la confirmation des droits et prérogatives accordés par des firmans impériaux aux nationalités non musulmanes en Turquie. Il serait, en effet, illusoire de faire prendre à ce sujet à la Turquie les mêmes engagements que ceux imposés au[x] Puissances chrétiennes et notamment aux États alliés. Ce serait substituer aux yeux du Gouvernement et du peuple turc aux prérogatives et garanties accordées aux nationalités non musulmanes par des actes solennels des Sultans, datant de la conquête de Constantinople, un régime européen identique pour tous les États même les plus favorisés, comme doivent l'être les pays alliés. C'est amoindrir la portée des garanties que l'on veut établir pour la sauvegarde de la liberté des minorités ethniques dans le futur Empire ottoman.

La délégation de Grèce insiste pour qu'on adopte un texte confirmant les prérogatives reconnues *ab antiquo* aux nationalités non musulmanes en Turquie. Ce système s'adapte mieux à la mentalité du peuple turc et s'accorde avec l'esprit de la législation de l'Empire ottoman.

<sup>8</sup> Untraced in Foreign Office archives.

En ce qui concerne les dispositions particulières sur la protection des minorités ethniques en Turquie, la délégation de Grèce a l'honneur de présenter les observations suivantes :

1. Les conditions en vue de faciliter l'application et le fonctionnement des garanties stipulées en faveur des minorités ethniques sont les suivantes :

- (a) La représentation proportionnelle des minorités ethniques au Parlement turc;
- (b) Le remaniement des divisions administratives de manière à grouper ensemble, autant que possible, les divers éléments non musulmans. Dans ce sens la loi des vilayets doit être modifiée pour permettre une plus large et plus juste représentation dans les conseils des vilayets, des sandjaks et des cazas; et
- (c) La participation des minorités ethniques, en proportion de leur nombre, à l'administration et les autres fonctions publiques et notamment à la police et la gendarmerie et ceci dans tous les grades de la hiérarchie.

Un article conçu dans les termes suivants pourrait être adopté :

'Les lois constitutionnelles, administratives et autres de l'Empire ottoman, doivent assurer :

- '(1) La représentation proportionnelle des minorités ethniques au Parlement;
- '(2) Le groupement, autant que possible, des diverses minorités ethniques dans les divisions administratives et leur juste représentation dans les conseils de ces divisions; et
- '(3) La participation des minorités ethniques, en proportion de leur nombre, à l'administration et les [*sic*] autres fonctions publiques et dans tous les grades de la hiérarchie.'

2. La sauvegarde de la vie et de la liberté des ressortissants ottomans appartenant à des minorités ethniques, devrait être complétée par les garanties suivantes :

- (a) L'interdiction des déportations ou changements forcés de résidence ou de domicile, excepté à la suite de condamnation pour des crimes de droit commun;
- (b) L'obligation du Gouvernement ottoman d'indemniser les victimes d'actes de brigandage et d'attaques en masse de la part de la population turque, toutes les fois que les autorités y sont impliquées directement ou indirectement.

Le contenu de ces deux paragraphes pourrait figurer dans la disposition y relative du traité.

3. Au sujet de la liberté de conscience il faut établir un principe général. Il ne faut pas restreindre l'obligation du Gouvernement turc à reconnaître la nullité de la conversion des non-musulmans à l'islamisme, seulement au cas de conversions qui ont eu lieu pendant la guerre et uniquement aux cas considérés comme conversion forcée; ce serait obliger les intéressés ou leurs parents à apporter des preuves difficiles à établir en ce qui concerne le temps et les mobiles de la conversion.

Il serait conforme à la justice de permettre aux non-musulmans convertis et à leurs parents de demander et obtenir par l'entremise de leur autorité ecclésiastique et ayant recours, si nécessaire, au représentant du Conseil de la Ligue des Nations à

Constantinople, l'annulation de leur conversion et la reconnaissance de leur retour à leur première croyance.

L'article y relatif pourra contenir la disposition suivante:

'Dans tous les cas des non-musulmans convertis à l'islamisme, le Gouvernement ottoman reconnaît que ces conversions sont nulles et non avenues, et s'engage à publier un décret à cet effet.'

En ce qui concerne les clauses du traité sur la liberté de conscience, nous croyons nécessaire de représenter le cas des conversions collectives à l'islamisme, qui ont fait qu'aujourd'hui il y a dans le Pont près d'Angora les Ophlides, Stavriotes, Clostes, &c., qui pratiquent en secret la religion chrétienne, mais par crainte font en public profession de la foi musulmane.

L'article y relatif pourrait être complété comme suit:

'Les habitants de la Turquie qui font involontairement profession de la foi musulmane peuvent déclarer qu'ils appartiennent à la religion qu'ils pratiquent en secret et la professer, sans encourir aucune poursuite, ni aucune pénalité.'

Pour assurer, d'autre part, le libre exercice de leur religion par les minorités en Turquie, il est indispensable d'imposer à la population musulmane le respect des religions professées par les différentes minorités. Aussi il serait nécessaire d'ajouter un paragraphe à l'article y relatif ainsi conçu:

'Le Gouvernement ottoman s'engage à assimiler dans la législation turque les outrages ou atteintes contre la religion ou l'exercice du culte des minorités, à ceux contre la religion musulmane et à édicter la même répression.'

4. Afin d'assurer un égal traitement à tous les ressortissants de l'Empire, il serait utile de stipuler 'le libre exercice pour les ressortissants ottomans appartenant à des minorités ethniques de leur profession ou métier en vertu de diplômes ou certificats émanant soit d'université[s] ou écoles turques, soit d'université[s] ou écoles étrangères reconnues.'

5. Il serait nécessaire d'établir que les ressortissants ottomans peuvent quitter la Turquie pour s'établir ailleurs sans que leurs biens, droits et intérêts puissent subir de ce chef aucune atteinte et en conservant leurs biens meubles et immeubles.

À cet effet, la disposition suivante pourra être insérée dans le traité:

'Le Gouvernement ottoman ne mettra aucun obstacle aux ressortissants ottomans de quitter la Turquie dans le but de s'établir ailleurs. Leurs biens, droits et intérêts ne subiront de ce chef aucune atteinte et ils pourront conserver leurs propriétés mobilières et immobilières en Turquie.'

'Ceux qui possèdent des immeubles ou autres propriétés en Turquie peuvent, à n'importe quel moment, vendre leurs propriétés et exporter le produit de la vente, libre de toute retenue et exempt de tout impôt.'

6. Au sujet de la restitution des biens aux ressortissants ottomans frustrés par suite des persécutions turques, depuis le 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 1914, la délégation de Grèce se rapporte à la note adressée à la conférence le 23 février dernier.<sup>9</sup> Elle insiste pour que, dans l'article qui régira la matière, une clause soit insérée relative aux contrats de cession de propriété intervenus à la suite des persécutions, des expulsions et des déportations des populations non musulmanes en Turquie. C'est en annulant ces actes, sauf restitution, bien entendu, du prix versé, qu'on peut rendre justice aux populations lésées.

<sup>9</sup> Not printed.

Cet article pourra être rédigé comme suit:

'Le Gouvernement ottoman émettra, dans le délai d'un mois à partir de la mise en vigueur de ce traité, un décret abrogeant la loi sur les propriétés abandonnées ("Inval-i-Metrouké") et mettra en vigueur les dispositions nécessaires pour assurer le rétablissement dans leurs maisons et leurs occupations des ressortissants ottomans non turcs, évincés dans leurs biens, droits et intérêts depuis le 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 1914.

'Ce rétablissement comprendra, s'il y a lieu, la réparation et la reconstruction des maisons de ces ressortissants ottomans et un entier dédommagement pour les pertes matérielles qu'ils ont subies (ou au moins l'allocation d'une somme à ceux qui en ont besoin pour la reprise de leur activité économique). Dans ce but, une commission sera constituée par le Conseil de la Société des Nations, dans le plus court délai possible, pour surveiller ce rétablissement et fixer les indemnités. "Tout contrat ou tout autre acte, attributif de propriété, conclu après le 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 1914, sera considéré comme nul et non avenue et la propriété des biens mobiliers ou immobiliers qui en a fait l'objet sera conservée au propriétaire primitif, contre restitution du prix qui lui aurait été effectivement versé."

'En cas d'absence de tout ayant droit, les biens reviendront aux communautés ecclésiastiques auxquelles les disparus et leurs familles appartenaient.'

Comme complément de cette disposition, il serait nécessaire d'ajouter l'obligation du Gouvernement ottoman à restituer aux monastères grecs les biens qu'il a indûment séquestrés ou vendus. Avant le dernier paragraphe de l'article, la phrase suivante pourrait être ajoutée:

'...<sup>10</sup>et le retour aux monastères et couvents des propriétés indûment séquestrées ou vendues.'

Enfin, afin de prévenir dans l'avenir les abus que cet article se propose de réparer, il est nécessaire 'd'interdire toute expropriation, excepté pour cause d'utilité publique et après indemnité préalable' par une disposition appropriée de l'article en question.

7. Les difficultés qui surgissent dans la possession et l'administration des biens immobiliers sis en Turquie et appartenant aux communautés, aux églises, aux couvents, aux écoles, aux établissements de bienfaisance et aux associations, du fait qu'ils ne constituaient pas des personnes morales, et que jusqu'en 1917 (et jusqu'à ce jour pour les fonds ruraux) la loi ottomane ne permettait pas l'inscription d'un bien immeuble au nom d'une personne morale, nous amènent à demander la suppression de cet état de choses. La Turquie devrait s'engager de prendre les mesures législatives nécessaires pour la reconnaissance du caractère de personne morale à ces différentes institutions et pour l'inscription en leur nom des propriétés urbaines et rurales qui leur appartiennent. La disposition suivante pourrait être insérée au traité:

'Le Gouvernement ottoman s'engage à reconnaître par une disposition légale la qualité de personne morale aux communautés, églises, couvents, écoles, établissements de bienfaisance et associations des minorités ethniques.

'Ces personnes morales auront le droit d'acquérir des propriétés et de faire inscrire en leur nom les propriétés qui sont en leur possession et sont administrées par elles ou pour leur compte.'

<sup>10</sup> Punctuation as in original quotation.

8. Il n'est pas inutile de remédier, d'autre part, aux difficultés auxquelles se heurtaient les communautés et leurs autorités ecclésiastiques, toutes les fois qu'il s'agissait de la construction ou la réparation des édifices servant comme églises, écoles ou établissements de bienfaisance. En effet, l'obtention préalable d'une autorisation, octroyée par firman impérial, était nécessaire. Il serait utile qu'une disposition de la législation ottomane établisse la liberté en cette matière, toutes les fois que la demande concernant la construction et la réparation de ces édifices est justifiée.

On satisferait à cette nécessité en ajoutant à la disposition y relative, un paragraphe ainsi conçu :

'Le Gouvernement ottoman s'engage à prendre les dispositions nécessaires en ce qui concerne la construction et la conservation des immeubles affectés au culte, à l'instruction et à la bienfaisance pour qu'aucune entrave ne soit opposée lorsqu'il s'agit d'un tel travail justifié par les besoins des communautés et l'état des édifices.'

9. Le Gouvernement turc doit s'engager à accorder des facilités appropriées pour assurer que l'instruction sera donnée dans leur propre langue aux enfants des ressortissants turcs, appartenant à des minorités ethniques. Il doit accorder aux minorités de race, de langue ou de religion, le même traitement et les mêmes sécurités en droit et en fait que celui réservé aux autres ressortissants turcs et leur assurer le droit d'établir, d'administrer et de contrôler à leurs propres frais des institutions charitables, religieuses et sociales, des écoles et autres établissements d'éducation avec le droit de se servir de leur propre langue et exercer librement leur propre religion. Des écoles d'enseignement primaire et secondaire et des écoles d'enseignement supérieur fonctionnent en Turquie, entretenues par des communautés des différentes nationalités ou des legs laissés par leurs membres. Ces écoles ont de tout temps constitué et elles continuent à constituer des foyers lumineux, ayant contribué au développement des sciences, des lettres et des arts, au milieu de l'ignorance de l'ambiance turque.

On ne saurait méconnaître l'utilité de ces institutions et on doit pourvoir à leur assurer l'existence. Dans ce but, il serait nécessaire de prévoir le fonctionnement desdites écoles et tout en dégageant de leur corrélation les droits des minorités avec ceux reconnus aux ressortissants turcs musulmans, y ajouter encore que toute immixtion des autorités turques dans l'administration et le fonctionnement en général de ces écoles est interdite.

Dans ce but, l'article suivant devrait être inséré dans le traité :

'Les ressortissants ottomans appartenant à des minorités de race, de religion ou de langue, jouiront du même traitement et de la même sécurité en droit et en fait que les autres ressortissants turcs.

'Ils auront indépendamment du traitement réservé à ce sujet aux autres ressortissants turcs, le droit d'établir, administrer et contrôler à leurs propres frais des institutions charitables, religieuses et scolaires, les écoles d'enseignement primaire, secondaire et supérieur ou autres établissements d'éducation, avec droit de se servir de leur propre langue et d'exercer librement leur propre religion. Aucune immixtion des autorités turques dans lesdits établissements n'est permise, excepté les cas d'ordre public.'

10. En ce qui concerne l'usage de leur langue par les minorités ethniques, on devrait l'autoriser devant les tribunaux, aussi bien que devant les autorités administratives et pour les requêtes adressées au Parlement turc.

Cette disposition aurait pu être ainsi conçue :

‘Nonobstant l’établissement par le Gouvernement turc d’une langue officielle, des facilités appropriées seront accordées aux ressortissants ottomans de langue autre que la langue turque pour l’usage de leur langue, oralement ou par écrit, devant les tribunaux, les autorités administratives et en ce qui concerne les requêtes adressées au Parlement.’

11. L’établissement en Turquie d’un représentant du Conseil de la Société des Nations serait une garantie pour l’application des principes concernant les droits des minorités ethniques en Turquie. Cependant, il serait indispensable que des dispositions détaillées établissent les droits de ce représentant et lui permettent d’employer des collaborateurs dont la compétence et les droits seraient de même expressément stipulés — notamment pour leur permettre de se rendre sur les lieux pour opérer des enquêtes, faire des perquisitions et être dans ce cas assurés du concours des autorités locales.

Sans ces droits d’investigation pour lui et ses subordonnés, sa résidence à Constantinople ne servirait que d’une manière très faible pour faire prévenir et réprimer les violations des dispositions du traité, pour la sauvegarde desquelles il serait proposé.

L’article suivant pourrait être adopté :

‘Un représentant, nommé par le Conseil de la Société des Nations, résidera à Constantinople dans le but de surveiller l’application des articles de ce chapitre et de faire périodiquement son rapport au conseil. Il sera assisté d’un personnel, qu’il pourra déléguer dans le but de faire constater les violations des dispositions de ce chapitre par les autorités turques à Constantinople ou dans les provinces. Il aura le droit, ainsi que ses délégués, à procéder à des enquêtes et des descentes sur les lieux. Le Gouvernement ottoman et les autorités turques devront lui accorder toutes les facilités pour l’accomplissement de sa mission.’

12. Enfin, la délégation de Grèce ne peut qu’insister sur la nécessité du maintien par une disposition expresse du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie des prérogatives accordées par des firmans impériaux au Patriarcat oecuménique et aux archevêques grecs en Turquie. Il est indispensable de sauvegarder l’organisation hiérarchique des différentes communions, et leurs rapports avec leurs chefs spirituels. Il faudrait dès lors confirmer les prérogatives du Patriarcat et maintenir la compétence des tribunaux ecclésiastiques en ce qui concerne le statut personnel des ressortissants turcs ottomans non musulmans, soit : en matière de mariage, de divorce, de séparation, de pension alimentaire, de droit de succession testamentaire et *ab intestat*[o],<sup>11</sup> &c.

La délégation de Grèce propose dès lors l’insertion dans le chapitre sur la protection des minorités de l’article suivant :

‘Les prérogatives et immunités ecclésiastiques, scolaires et juridiques accordées par les Sultans aux nationalités non musulmanes en vertu de bérats spéciaux et confirmées par les décrets impériaux tels que le *Hati Cherif* (du 25 Samban 1255/3 novembre 1839), le *Hati Houmayoun* (du 10 Djomazi-oul-Ahir 1272/18 février 1856), et en ce qui concerne notamment la nation grecque orthodoxe par les règlements élaborés en exécution du *Hati Houmayoun* et sanctionnés par décret impérial du 23 Seval 1281 ( ),<sup>12</sup> et la circulaire du Grand-Viziriat en date du 23 Djomazi-oul-Ahir 1308 ( )<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> On intestacy.

<sup>12</sup> Omission in original.



sont maintenues et confirmées dans toute leur étendue, le Gouvernement turc s'engageant à les respecter intégralement à l'avenir.

'Toutes lois, décrets, règlements et circulaires issus par le Gouvernement turc et contenant des abrogations, restrictions ou amendements des prérogatives et immunités en question sont considérés nuls et non avenues quant à leurs dispositions portant atteinte aux dits privilèges et immunités.'<sup>13</sup>

#### APPENDIX 2 TO No. 63

##### *Restoration of Property Registers by Turkish Government to Greek Government*

*M. Veniselos to Mr. Lloyd George, March 10, 1920*

(A.J. 80.)

At the time of the evacuation of Macedonia by the Turkish authorities in 1912, several Turkish officials carried off with them or destroyed the property registers which served the purposes of land registration.

The disappearance of these registers makes it impossible to check in any way the titles produced by the owners and results in complete dislocation of the public services concerned. In particular, it paralyses the efforts of the authorities to establish a land register and to fix the boundaries between neighbouring villages.

In these circumstances it is essential that the Turkish Government should be required, by a clause *ad hoc* inserted in the treaty, to restore the registers in question to the Greek Government. In the event of these registers having disappeared, the Greek Government should be authorised by the treaty to make copies in the Central Land Registry at Constantinople of the entries corresponding to the local registers of which it has been deprived through the fault of the Turkish authorities.

To this end, M. Veniselos would be grateful to the Supreme Council if it would sanction the insertion in the treaty of an article of the following tenour:—

#### *'Article'<sup>12</sup>*

'The Turkish Government undertakes to restore to the Greek Government the local land registers or any other public registers relating to landed property in the districts of the Turkish Empire ceded to Greece since 1912, which the Turkish authorities removed, or may have removed at the time of the evacuation.

'In cases where the restitution of one or more of such registers is impossible owing to their disappearance or for any other reason, and whenever necessary for purposes of verification of titles produced to the Greek authorities, the Greek Government shall be entitled to take copies of the entries in question in the Central Land Registry at Constantinople.'

E. K. VENISELOS

*London, March 10, 1920.*

#### APPENDIX 3 TO No. 63

##### *Islands of the Sea of Marmora*

*Memorandum by M. Veniselos for the Supreme Council, March 8, 1920*

(A.J. 83.)

Au sujet des clauses territoriales à insérer dans le Traité de Paix avec la Turquie, la délégation hellénique a l'honneur de prier le Conseil suprême de prendre en considération le fait suivant:

Dans la mer de Marmara, dont la liberté sera désormais effectivement assurée,

<sup>13</sup> In the typescript text this document was dated at foot: 'March 1920.'

se trouvent plusieurs îles, lesquelles, ainsi d'ailleurs que toutes les îles tombées sous la domination turque, ont totalement échappé à l'immigration musulmane pour conserver leur caractère exclusivement grec.

Quatre parmi ces îles, à savoir Halki, Antigoni, Proti et Prinkipo, désignées sous le nom d'îles des Princes, sont situées à proximité du Bosphore et de Constantinople dont elles constituent des dépendances et presque des parties intégrantes de sorte qu'elles devraient forcément, et en dépit de leur caractère ethnique purement grec, suivre le sort de cette ville.

On ne saurait, par contre, invoquer ce motif au sujet des dix [*sic*] îlots énumérés dans la liste ci-annexée, du sort desquels la délégation hellénique entend saisir le Conseil suprême par cette note. Ils comprennent une population totale de 33,566 habitants, dont 33,205 sont Grecs, 245 Turcs, des fonctionnaires ou employés de services publics, et 116 étrangers.

Dès lors, M. Vénisélos a l'honneur de prier le Conseil suprême de vouloir bien, par une juste application du principe de l'autodétermination, comprendre ces îles dans le nombre de celles qui seront attribuées à la Grèce, d'autant plus qu'aucune considération essentielle ne semblerait faire obstacle à une solution aussi équitable.

Il est bien entendu que la cession de ces îles à la Grèce pourrait être accompagnée des mesures nécessaires pour garantir la liberté de la mer de Marmara telles que la neutralisation et [?] la] démilitarisation.

*Délégation hellénique au Congrès de la Paix,  
Londres, le 8 mars 1920.*

#### Les îles de Marmara

	Grecs	Turcs	Étrangers	Total
<b>Île de Marmara—</b>				
Villages de:				
Palatia . . . .	3,750	20	16	3,786
Aftoni . . . .	2,000	..	..	2,000
Klosati . . . .	350	..	..	350
Prostio . . . .	2,700	..	..	2,700
Marmara . . . .	4,600	150	100	4,850
Galimi . . . .	2,000	..	..	2,000
	15,400	170	116	15,686
<b>Île de Pacha-Liman—</b>				
Villages de:				
Pacha-Liman . .	3,000	37	..	3,037
Vori . . . .	1,700	30	..	1,730
Skopia . . . .	3,100	..	..	3,100
Aloni . . . .	2,500	3	..	2,503
Bukhlia . . . .	1,900	5	..	1,905
	12,200	75	..	12,275
<b>Île de Jutali . . . .</b>	2,000	..	..	2,000
<b>Île d'Aphisia . . . .</b>	1,800	..	..	1,800
<b>Îles de Khairsiz Ada—</b>				
Mamala . . . .	..	..	..	..
Koyan Adasi . . .	..	..	..	..
Panagia . . . .	..	..	..	..
Kalolimnos . . . .	1,805	..	..	1,805
<b>Total . . . .</b>	<b>33,205</b>	<b>245</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>33,566</b>

APPENDIX 5 TO NO. 63

*Treaty of Peace with Turkey: Economic Clauses*

*Chairman of the Economic Commission to Sir M. Hankey*

(A.J. 97.)

BOARD OF TRADE, *March 15, 1920*

Sir,

I transmit herewith copies of clauses<sup>14</sup> proposed by the Economic Commission for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. In the main these clauses represent the unanimous decision of the commission, but certain articles, namely,

<sup>14</sup> Not printed. This enclosure, which was headed 'Economic Clauses' and dated at foot March 15, 1920, was the same as the draft, A.J. 97 Revise, dated March 25, 1920—see No. 74, note 6—except that:

Article 28 of the draft of March 15 was printed in brackets and the last sentence read: 'Compensation for any actual damage on such property, rights and interests inflicted by the occupying authorities since the armistice shall be a charge on (the State exercising authority in such detached territory) or (the Allied armies responsible).'

The second paragraph of article 32 of the draft of March 15 read: 'Any property, rights or interests or the proceeds of their liquidation not used as provided in articles 30 and 32 shall be restored to the owners.'

Article 34 of the draft of March 15 read: 'Powers to which Ottoman territory is ceded shall acquire all property and possessions situated therein belonging to the Ottoman Empire or to the Civil List.'

The third paragraph of Article 35 of the draft of March 15 read: '(The provisions of the first paragraph of this article relating to the payment of the proceeds of liquidation to the owner do not apply in the case of public utility undertakings or concessions where the owner is an Ottoman company in which the majority of the capital or the control is held by German, Austrian, Hungarian or Bulgarian nationals either directly or through their interests in a company controlled by them or was so held on the 1st August, 1914. In such case the proceeds of the liquidation may, at the option of the Government administering the territory, either be paid to the owner or be distributed among the persons directly or indirectly interested in the company, the proportion attributable to the interests of the nationals of Germany, Austria, Hungary or Bulgaria being paid to the Reparation Commission established under the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and the State in question.)'

Article 36 of the draft of March 15 was printed in brackets and its second and final sentence read: 'The amount of this price shall be received by the Financial Commission and shall be distributed by it in the same manner as is provided in article 35 in the case of the liquidation of public utility undertakings owned by Ottoman nationals in the transferred territories, except that the proportion of the price attributable to the interest of the Turkish Government shall be retained by the Financial Commission for the purposes referred to in article 5 of the Financial Clauses.)'

Article 41 of the draft of March 15 (a) was printed in brackets; (b) did not include the phrase '(with the exception of Ottoman companies controlled by the Allied and Associated groups)' present in the first paragraph of the draft of March 25; (c) the last paragraph of the earlier draft read 'The provisions of this article shall not affect debts due to or from persons resident in territories detached from the Ottoman Empire in accordance with the present treaty.)'

The annex to Section V of the draft of March 15 corresponded to that of March 25 except that (a) clause 2 did not include the final paragraph beginning 'When the execution of the contracts . . .'; (b) clause 9 included a fourth paragraph which read 'Where the contract

articles 28, 35 (last paragraph), 36, 41 and 50 are still subject to reserve and are to form the subject of further discussion by the commission.

The commission propose to continue discussion of these articles, and hope shortly to be in a position to submit their final recommendations. In doing so, they propose to draw attention to various points which in their opinion call for consideration by other competent bodies.

I am, &c.,

H. A. PAYNE

has lapsed during the war owing to non-payment of premiums, the payment of which has been prevented by the enforcement of measures of war, the assured or his representative or the persons entitled shall have the right to restore the contract on payment of the premiums, with interest at 5 per cent. per annum, within three months from the coming into force of the present treaty.'

Article 49 of the draft of March 15, which was preceded by the heading 'Special Provisions', corresponded to Article 53 of the draft of March 25.

Article 50 read:

*'(Article proposed by British Delegation.)*

Where the Government exercising authority in territory detached from Turkey under the present treaty thinks it desirable in the public interest to cancel or modify any concessions which may have been granted by the Ottoman Government or by the Ottoman local authorities affecting such transferred territory, equitable compensation shall be paid to the concessionnaires in accordance with the following provisions. As long as the concessions are not so modified or cancelled they will be maintained.

'For the purpose of determining the amount of such compensation in the absence of agreement between the parties, there shall be set up arbitral tribunals. The tribunals shall be composed of three members, one designated by the State of which the concessionnaire or the holders of the majority of the capital in the case of a company is or are nationals, one by the Government exercising authority in the territory in question and the third designated by agreement or by the Council of the League of Nations.

'The tribunal shall take into account all relevant matters, but no compensation shall be granted in respect of the issue of paper money.

'The signatory Powers shall not be bound to recognise in transferred territory the validity of the grant of any concession by the Ottoman Government or by Ottoman local authorities after the 1st August, 1914, or any transfer after that date of a concession granted by the Ottoman Government or

*'(Article proposed by the French Delegation.)*

(1) States receiving Turkish territory shall, *ipso facto*, succeed to the duties and charges of the Ottoman Empire towards concessionnaires and persons holding contracts in the territories ceded by Turkey.

'This succession shall, in the case of each State receiving territory, date from the treaty ceding the territory. The State receiving territory shall take all necessary steps to ensure that the concessions may be worked, and that the carrying out of the contract may be proceeded with without interruption.

'(2) Nevertheless, as from the signature of the present instrument, negotiations may be entered into between the States receiving territory and the holders of concessions and contracts with a view to a mutual agreement for bringing such concessions and contracts into conformity with the existing economic situation and with the legislation of such States. Except under full compensation, the holders may not be injured in any way, either by the imposition of new or more onerous charges as a result of legislative or other provisions, or by a reduction of the value of the guarantees to be substituted for the previous guarantees. Should agreement not have been reached within six months, the State or the holders may submit the dispute to an arbitral commission composed of three members, one designated by the State of which the concessionnaire or the holders of the majority of the capital in the case of a company is or are nationals, one by the Government exercising authority in the

## APPENDIX 7 TO No. 63

DÉLÉGATION ROUMAINE, PARIS, *le 4 mars 1920*

La délégation roumaine à la Conférence de la Paix a l'honneur de solliciter du Conseil suprême des Alliés une légère modification de l'alinéa 5 de l'article 181, Partie IX—Clauses financières—du Traité de Paix avec la Hongrie, modification répondant mieux à la situation actuelle.

L'article 181, alinéa 5, prévoit :

'Les dispositions qui précèdent ne s'appliqueront aux opérations militaires effectuées postérieurement au 3 novembre 1918 sans l'assentiment des principales Puissances alliées et associées et non prévues par les Conventions d'Armistice des 3 et 13 novembre 1918,<sup>15</sup> que dans la mesure où la Commission des Réparations le décidera et la Commission des Réparations aura pour ce qui concerne ces opérations pleins pouvoirs de statuer sur toutes les questions touchant notamment . . .'<sup>10</sup> &c.

Au cas où cet alinéa voudrait viser les opérations de l'armée roumaine en Hongrie, la délégation roumaine rappelle que la Hongrie a refusé d'exécuter les clauses de l'armistice de novembre 1918 se référant à la démobilisation et au désarmement de ses armées et au maintien sur le pied de paix de six divisions.

Lorsqu'en avril [*sic*] 1919, la Conférence de la Paix communiqua au Gouvernement Karolyi la nouvelle ligne de démarcation fixée le 26 février 1919 et demanda la retraite des troupes hongroises en arrière de cette ligne,<sup>16</sup> le Gouvernement Karolyi, au lieu de se soumettre à cette décision, confia le pouvoir au communiste Bela Khun, dans l'espoir qu'en troublant la paix de l'Europe il pourra[it], en liaison étroite avec les bolchevistes russes, soustraire la Hongrie aux conditions de paix qui devaient lui être imposées par la Conférence de la Paix.

Ottoman local authorities. All such grants and transfers may be declared null and void, and their cancellation shall give rise to no compensation.'

territory in question and the third designated by agreement or by the Council of the League of Nations.

The tribunal shall take into account all relevant matters, including the profit realised and likely to be realised by the concessionnaire.

'No compensation shall be granted in respect of the issue of paper money.

'The signatory Powers shall not be bound to recognise in transferred territory the validity of the grant of any concession by the Ottoman Government or by Ottoman local authorities after the 1st August, 1914, or any transfer after that date of a concession granted by the Ottoman Government or Ottoman local authorities. All such grants and transfers may be declared null and void, and their cancellation shall give rise to no compensation.'

Article 52 of the draft of March 15 corresponded to article 54 of the draft of March 25. The draft of March 15 did not include articles corresponding to articles 49 and 52 of the draft of March 25.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Volume I, No. 3, note 6.

<sup>16</sup> See Volume I, No. 26, note 3.

Les armées de Bela Khun attaquèrent immédiatement les troupes roumaines de la Transylvanie en avril 1919, pendant que les télégrammes de Budapest et de Pétrograd établissaient l'accord avec les forces bolchevistes russes qui attaquaient en même temps la Roumanie sur le Dniester et en Galicie.

Les troupes roumaines attaquées repoussent les armées hongroises jusqu'à la Theiss, et le Gouvernement roumain demande la démobilisation et le désarmement de l'armée hongroise: c'est-à-dire l'exécution des clauses de l'armistice de novembre.

Bela Khun, au lieu de se conformer à ces clauses, ordonne, au contraire, la mobilisation générale, force les représentants des grandes Puissances de Budapest à quitter la capitale, et après avoir attaqué les Tchécoslovaques, en mai 1919, refuse de nouveau d'obtempérer à l'ordre du Conseil suprême de démobiliser et de désarmer, et attaque pour la seconde fois, le 20 juillet 1919, les troupes roumaines avec un effectif supérieur à 100,000 hommes bien armés.

Après cinq jours de luttes sanglantes avec de lourdes pertes (plus que 5,000 hommes tués et blessés), les troupes roumaines réussissent à repousser les armées hongroises et, pour faire disparaître le danger permanent qui menaçait la Roumanie de la part des Hongrois, avancent jusqu'à Budapest pour désarmer l'armée hongroise.<sup>6</sup>

C'est à cela que se réduisent les opérations de l'armée roumaine en Hongrie. Elles ont été provoquées par l'inexécution par les Hongrois des clauses de l'armistice de novembre 1918 et par les attaques des armées hongroises contre la Roumanie.

La délégation roumaine estime donc qu'il ne serait pas juste que ces opérations fussent considérées comme n'ayant pas l'assentiment des grandes Puissances alliées et associées, car la rédaction actuelle de l'article 181 fournit aux Magyars, dans les mémoires présentés à la conférence, l'occasion d'exploiter en faveur de la Hongrie l'équivoque qui semble résulter de la rédaction de cet article, de sorte que les intérêts de la Roumanie basés sur le droit et la justice seraient fortement lésés.

Pour tous ces motifs, la délégation roumaine sollicite du Conseil suprême la modification de cet alinéa 5 de l'article 181 ainsi qu'il suit:

'Les dispositions qui précèdent s'appliqueront aux opérations militaires effectuées ultérieurement au 4 novembre 1918 dans la mesure où la Commission des Réparations le jugera nécessaire, et cette dernière aura, en ce qui concerne ces opérations, pleins pouvoirs de statuer sur toutes les questions touchant notamment . . .',<sup>10</sup> &c.

Cette nouvelle rédaction laisse la question des réquisitions faites par l'armée roumaine en Hongrie à l'appréciation de la Commission des Réparations, ainsi que la conférence l'a déjà décidé.

## APPENDIX 8 TO No. 63

### *The Island of Castellorizo*

#### Document 1

#### *M. Veniselos to Lord Curzon*

(A.J. 101.)

Dear Lord Curzon,

March 12, 1920

I take the liberty to enclose herewith a note addressed to the Peace Conference and dealing with the question of the Island of Castellorizo. I draw your Lordship's

kind attention to it with the prayer to submit it to the consideration of the conference.

I beg, &c.,  
E. K. VENISELOS

## Document 2

Au sujet des îles de l'Archipel sur lesquelles la souveraineté hellénique sera reconnue par le Traité de Paix avec la Turquie, la délégation hellénique a l'honneur d'attirer spécialement l'attention du Conseil suprême sur l'île de Castellorizo.

Cet îlot, qui lors de la guerre contre la Turquie (1912) avait proclamé son union à la Grèce et avait été occupé par des troupes helléniques, fut plus tard, durant la grande guerre, occupé par des forces françaises. Malgré l'étendue restreinte de sa superficie, il contient une population entièrement grecque de 12,000 âmes.

Il est, en outre, à noter que Castellorizo faisait partie du Dodécanèse et jouissait de ce même régime autonome et privilégié accordé par les Turcs aux îles dont le caractère ethnique purement grec, à leurs yeux mêmes, ne faisait aucun doute et dans lesquelles la domination ottomane ne pouvait pour ce motif s'exercer d'une façon directe et effective.

En lui faisant part de ce qui précède, M. Vénisélos a l'honneur de prier le Conseil suprême de vouloir bien, conformément aux principes adoptés, sanctionner la décision prise par les habitants de Castellorizo, en comprenant cette île parmi celles qui seront attribuées à la Grèce par le Traité de Paix.

*Londres, le 12 mars 1920.*

## No. 64

I.C.P. 78.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Thursday, March 18, 1920, at 4 p.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Major-General Sir C. H. Harington, Major-General Sir P. P. de B. Radcliffe, Mr. Philip Kerr; **SECRETARIES,** Sir M. Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, General Viscount de la Panouse.

*Italy:* Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Don Ascanio Colonna.

*Belgium:* Baron Moncheur.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda.

**INTERPRETER:** M. Camerlynck.

1. **MR. LLOYD GEORGE** said that he understood that the new German Government were proposing to occupy the Ruhr Valley. There was, however, some doubt as to whether the old Government would not take over possession. He enquired whether Paris or Rome had any special information on the subject.

*German Request to send Troops into the Ruhr Valley District*

**M. CAMBON** said that he had received a copy of a telegram from the French officer who was in command of the neutral zone at Frankfurt, who was told by the German Commandant of that zone that he would

be compelled to bring troops into the neutral zone in order to maintain order, and this he proposed to do. The matter was of such urgency that he had not been able to ask General Nollet's permission. The French officer referred to had at once submitted the matter to General Nollet, who was in charge of the French Military Commission of Control in Berlin. Following upon this, M. Millerand had put the matter before the Council of Ambassadors in Paris, and expressed it as his opinion that it was impossible to allow the Germans to occupy any part of the neutral zone. M. Millerand had further simply proposed to entrust to Marshal Foch the study of the question of military occupation of the neutral zone should there be disorders in that region, or should the Germans threaten to enter it. The last news that M. Cambon had received was to the effect that it was only the intention of the Allies to enter the zone in the last eventuality, and that they had agreed to invite Marshal Foch to go into the whole question and to make recommendations in regard to such military action as might be necessary in certain eventualities. M. Cambon concluded by saying that probably the same information was in the hands of his colleagues.

LORD CURZON said that he thought he could throw some light upon the situation. Much larger considerations were involved. The actual history of the situation was as follows: On the 16th March, General Nollet had received a demand from the new German Government (which had now fallen, it was understood) for authority to reinforce the neutral zone. General Nollet had declined, and had very properly at once referred the matter to Paris. The question had then been discussed by the Ambassadorial Conference in Paris, of which Lord Curzon said he had a full report. Incidentally the Belgian representative at that conference had said that his Government anticipated no serious trouble in that zone. The conference had decided that, in the event of the old German Government asking that action should be taken in order to stop further disorder, or should some other really responsible Government make a similar request, Allied troops should be allowed to enter the valley; but that in no circumstances should this permission be given to any German forces. The conference had further suggested that the matter should be placed in the hands of Marshal Foch. Since the 16th March, information had been received from Lord Kilmarnock, the British representative in Berlin, that there was serious trouble in Westphalia. Further, Lord Derby had telegraphed to say that he had been informed by M. Meyer [*Mayer*], the German Chargé d'Affaires in Paris, that Herren Kapp and Luttwitz had resigned, and that the old Government was reinstated.

(Lord Curzon then read out the contents of Lord Derby's telegram recording his interview with Herr Meyer, a paraphrase of which is attached as Appendix 1.)

Lord Curzon, proceeding, said that last night, at midnight, the German Chargé d'Affaires in London had rung him up on the telephone and had asked to be allowed to come and see him on a matter of urgent importance. Herr Stahmer [*Sthamer*] had then come to Lord Curzon's residence and had



handed to him a statement which was practically equivalent to what the German Chargé d'Affaires in Paris had given to Lord Derby.

(Lord Curzon then read the statement, which appears as Appendix 2.)

Continuing, Lord Curzon said that he would like to put certain considerations before the council. He imagined that the general principle on which the council was proceeding was to support the former Government; that they would welcome the disappearance of the new Government, and that they were of opinion that the only element of stability in Germany at present was the Ebert Government. This latter Government declared that their existence would be compromised if Allied troops were to enter the Ruhr Valley, where several Bolshevik demonstrations had taken place. They had, therefore, suggested that, as it was desirable that these disturbances should be suppressed, it was preferable that German soldiers, rather than Allied troops, should be utilised. The view, said Lord Curzon, had once been put forward that the only way in which to get coal out of the valley was by Allied occupation. It was quite evident now that such occupation would certainly not have this effect, as the very men who were supporting the Soviet rule in that area were the coal-miners. If our object was to obtain coal, we must be careful not to take a false step and defeat our end in view. In conclusion, he would suggest that, if fighting had to be done, it should be done by Bauer's troops, that we should accept his pledge, which was that he would undertake that if troops under the authority of the old German Government were permitted to go into the valley, they would be withdrawn in fifteen days' time; we should say that we trusted him to observe this pledge, and that if he failed us the Allies would have to send their own troops there. The information he had given, and the advice he had ventured to offer, Lord Curzon said, was merely supplementary to M. Cambon's statement.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the Belgian Minister [Ambassador] had anything to say.

BARON MONCHEUR said he had no special information. He could only say that it would be necessary for him, in the event of the council deciding that certain action should be taken, to refer to his Government, as Belgium, on account of her close proximity to the area concerned, would be particularly affected by such a decision.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that his Government had no means at present of ascertaining the exact position. The Japanese Chargé d'Affaires was now on his way to Berlin, but had not yet arrived.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA stated that he had no special news, only that which had been forwarded from Paris. He had understood that the question of the occupation of the Ruhr Valley was to be discussed at another session of the Ambassadorial Conference in Paris, and it was quite possible that they might already have exchanged views on the subject that very day.

M. CAMBON was of opinion that it would hardly be possible for another meeting of the Ambassadorial Conference in Paris to have been held so soon.

LORD CURZON said that Lord Derby had informed him that a meeting of

the Ambassadors in Paris was to have been held that day, but it was to deal merely with matters of ordinary routine.

M. CAMBON asked what was the immediate issue? He did not think that the council could contemplate taking any action beyond consulting Marshal Foch as to such measures as it might be necessary to take in certain eventualities. He himself, at any rate, had no other instructions from his Government.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked why should the council desire to consult Marshal Foch? This would only be necessary if the Allies determined to take military action and decided to march their troops into Germany. Did, however, anybody really contemplate this? It would be merely increasing indefinitely our already heavy obligations. The Ruhr Valley, as the council knew, was just opposite Belgium, and his information was to the effect that the Belgian Ambassador in Paris understood that no trouble was anticipated in that region. The people next concerned were the British; after that, the Americans: and, finally, the French. The Belgians certainly did not wish to send their troops into that area. The British Government equally had no intention of doing so. If a Soviet Government were established in the Ruhr region it was the business of Germany to deal with it. He feared that there might be a danger of the Allies repeating the mistake they had made in Russia, that is, by attempting to do something which it was much better that the country principally concerned should do. By intervening in Russian internal affairs the Allies had enlisted national sentiment on behalf of the Bolsheviks and Soviets. Moreover, both Bauer and Ebert had claimed that they were quite capable themselves of suppressing the outbreak in the Ruhr Valley. If they succeeded in doing so, it would strengthen them. If, on the other hand, the Allies should attempt to do it, it would have the effect of weakening the Bauer Government. The last thing the Allies wanted was Spartacism<sup>1</sup> or militarism. What they did want was a moderate constitutional Government, which they had possessed in the Bauer regime. What they had to do, therefore, was to support that regime. Let the Germans quarrel among themselves within their own borders as much as they liked, but do not let us interfere.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he quite agreed, and he fancied that the Italian Ambassador in Paris must have expressed very much the same views at the conference in that capital.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that he had no news from either Berlin or Paris. As an expression of his own opinion he might say that he entirely agreed with Mr. Lloyd George, Signor Scialoja and Lord Curzon. He could not say, however, what line the Japanese Ambassador in Paris had taken.

M. CAMBON said that at present there was no intention of taking any military action. All they proposed to do was to take certain preliminary precautionary measures that might be necessary, and, in order to satisfy public opinion, to consult Marshal Foch as to those measures. The Marshal

<sup>1</sup> The German communist party derived from the Spartakusbund of German left-wing socialism.

would not be asked to take any action, but merely to put forward certain proposals. There was another question, M. Cambon said, which he wished to bring before the notice of the council, and that was one of reparations for insults that had been offered to, and injury that had been sustained by, British and French officers of the Inter-Allied Control Commissions in Germany. This matter he had frequently broached at the council meetings,<sup>2</sup> but nothing had yet been settled. Whatever Government might be established at Berlin, he felt that it was incumbent upon the Allies to demand of that Government full satisfaction for the past, and pledges for good conduct in the future.

LORD CURZON said that he entirely agreed. As a matter of fact, the question had only been held over until a stable Government had been set up in the German capital. For the moment, however, the matter must be relegated to the background. To return to the larger question, he thought it could not be dismissed by merely referring to Marshal Foch the question of what military steps might be necessary in certain contingencies. He had, as he had informed the council, received a definite request from the German Chargé d'Affaires in London, who had pressed him to bring the matter before the Supreme Council with the least possible delay. He had agreed to lay it before the council that afternoon, and also to endeavour to get a reply the same day. The matter was of a pressing character. The only alternative to adopting the British suggestion—that the old German Government should be told that they could despatch troops into the Ruhr Valley for the purpose of quelling the present disturbances, on the understanding that these troops would be withdrawn within fifteen days—was to telegraph to the council in Paris to the effect that His Majesty's Government were in favour of accepting the German proposal of sending troops and settling her own troubles herself, subject to the reservation that they would be withdrawn within fifteen days. If the old German Government should not succeed in suppressing the disturbance, then the Allies would undertake the responsibility themselves and act on their own account. He thought, however, that some answer must be given at once.

M. BERTHELOT said that the French proposal had been that if it were necessary that Allied troops should go into the disturbed area, they should include both British and Italian units as well as French.

M. CAMBON said that he was bound to refer the matter to Paris. Whatever Government might be in power in Berlin, he thought it would be most dangerous to permit that Government to send German troops to occupy the neutral zone. Supposing that, at the end of the stipulated fifteen days, those troops were not withdrawn, a very difficult situation must arise. The result would either be a conflict or that the troops would remain. In any case it would be very difficult to turn them out. He would, however, telegraph immediately after the meeting of the council to Paris, communicating the views of the British and other representatives.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he saw no reason why Marshal Foch should

<sup>2</sup> Cf. No. 61, minute 3 and note 6.

not be asked to determine the nature of the pledges that should be exacted from Germany supposing she failed to carry out her undertaking to evacuate the valley at the end of fifteen years [*days*].

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the present situation was impossible. The Allies were not sending troops themselves; we were not permitting the Germans to send troops there; and yet we were allowing the Soviets apparently to establish themselves and to extend their influence. This was dangerous, as they were in far too close proximity to Belgium and to France. His Majesty's Government were very adverse from any Allied occupation, and were in favour of permitting the Germans to occupy the disturbed region for a short period, in order to scatter the Bolshevik elements, subject to such guarantees as Marshal Foch might deem it wise to propose. He enquired whether Baron Moncheur had any observations to make.

BARON MONCHEUR said that he could not give a considered opinion without consulting his Government. He thought, however, that Belgium could hardly consent to an Allied occupation of the valley except in the last resort.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked Baron Moncheur to ascertain with the least possible delay the views of the Belgian Government. Beyond that he did not think the council could profitably discuss the matter any further that afternoon.

M. CAMBON said that he would let his Government know at once that Lord Curzon was most anxious to give a reply as soon as possible to the German Chargé d'Affaires, that the various delegates at the council that afternoon had not been able to come to any agreement as to what action it was desirable to take, but that both Mr. Lloyd George and Signor Scialoja had agreed that Marshal Foch should be allowed to go into the question of guarantees, supposing it was decided to allow the Germans to go into the disturbed territory and if they did not withdraw within the stipulated period.

It was agreed—

To adjourn the discussion pending replies from the French and Belgian Governments.

2. LORD CURZON asked permission to make a statement in regard to the *The ex-Kaiser* ex-Kaiser. The Allied discussion with the Dutch Government on this subject had now reached a very critical stage. The council would remember that the question had now passed through three phases. First, the Allies had demanded, through M. Clemenceau, the surrender of the ex-Kaiser. This demand the Dutch Government had absolutely refused. The Allies then, in their reply, had maintained their position and had expressed surprise that the Dutch had made no suggestion as to some really safe place of internment, as, for instance, the Dutch Colonies. Second, the Dutch, in their reply, while refusing absolutely to send the ex-Kaiser to their colonies, had neglected to name any alternative place of internment, and merely laid stress upon the extra precautions they proposed to take for his security. Third, the council in London had decided not to send a direct

reply to the Dutch Government in respect of their latest communication, but to instruct their Ministers at The Hague to go and see the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs and to carry out certain instructions which had been conveyed in a telegram which had been sent to Sir Ronald Graham, drawing attention to the crimes committed by the Germans during the war, expressing astonishment that the Dutch appeared to be incapable of distinguishing between the methods of carrying out war adopted by the Allies and by the Germans respectively, stating that we could not accept Doorn as a place of internment, and inviting the Dutch to specify the exact nature of the extra precautions to which they referred.<sup>3</sup> Following upon this, the representatives of the three Allied Governments had seen M. Karnebeek, who had informed them that internment in the colonies was quite out of the question, and that the only place, in the view of his Government, was Doorn. Lord Curzon, proceeding, said that he had received two long letters on the subject from Sir Ronald Graham, describing his various conversations with M. Karnebeek. The Dutch Government had apparently been convinced throughout that the Allies had been bluffing, and M. [van] Swinderen, who had had one or two interviews with the British Prime Minister, had communicated the same wrong impression to The Hague that England was not really interested in the matter. In his letter of the 9th instant, Sir Ronald Graham had said that the colonies were quite out of the question, and that various very strong objections had been put forward both to the East and the West Indies. Later, in his letter of the 12th instant,<sup>4</sup> Sir Ronald wrote to the effect that M. Karnebeek had stated that the Netherlands Government intended to issue at once a Royal decree for internment of the ex-Kaiser as an alien dangerous to public tranquillity. Further, they had sent a high official to the ex-Kaiser, who had exacted a written and signed undertaking from the latter, pledging himself to take no part in politics in the future and to abstain from any political trouble in the Netherlands, and, further, promising to live quietly and to submit to censorship of his correspondence. Hitherto, the Dutch had said that Java was impossible as a place of internment, owing to the Mahometan unrest there, which made them unable to guarantee his security. As regards Curaçao, the climate was alleged by the Dutch to be bad. Lord Curzon thought that this was quite erroneous, as he had been informed by an English officer who had lived there for some time that the climate was hot but certainly not unhealthy. Proceeding, Lord Curzon said that the Dutch Government had now taken up a new line of argument, which was to the effect that they considered it cruel to banish the ex-Kaiser to a distant spot on account of the bad state of health of the ex-Empress, who was suffering from heart disease and who could not be expected to survive the long voyage. For this reason Wieringen or any other northern island must be ruled out.

<sup>3</sup> For the above-mentioned correspondence between the Allied and the Netherland Governments cf. No. 2, note 5, No. 4, note 7, No. 51, minute 1.

<sup>4</sup> Sir R. Graham's despatches No. 261 of March 9, 1920, and No. 269 of March 12 respectively had transmitted the information here indicated by Lord Curzon: see Volume IX, Chap. VII.

They further represented that the ex-Kaiser himself had not chosen Doorn, but had been shepherded into it by the Dutch Government. That Government had completely failed to find any suitable alternative to Doorn. Lastly, the ex-Kaiser was now almost entirely destitute of money; his capital had all gone; he had had to sell his pictures and his furniture; he could not afford to buy another place, and it was impossible alike to ask the Dutch Government to provide the money to buy or hire an alternative seat or for that Government to permit the Allies to provide the necessary cash. The Dutch, in short, had declined to suggest any other place than Doorn. There the matter had been left until that day. Just before the meeting he had heard that the Dutch were trying now to settle the whole question over the heads of the Allies by the following tactics:—

(Lord Curzon then read out a telegram from Sir Ronald Graham, a paraphrase of which is given in Appendix 3. He also read out the Royal decree referred to above).<sup>5</sup>

The Dutch Government, said Lord Curzon, had consequently forced the hands of the Allies. They had decided that the ex-Kaiser should be interned in Holland and nowhere else, and they had designated the Utrecht district, which, of course, meant Doorn. Were the Allies to accept this, or were they to insist upon another locality? The arguments against Doorn were very strong and well known to the council. The place was only 40 kilom. from the German frontier, and, whatever pledges the Dutch Government might give, the presence of the ex-Kaiser there must constitute a perpetual source of international danger. Secondly, to give way on this occasion would mean the third successive defeat of the Allies; that is to say, they had been defeated over the question of handing over the ex-Kaiser; they were defeated over the question of his internment in the colonies; and they would be defeated over the question of Doorn. Sir Ronald Graham had laid great stress on the very severe blow which would be struck to the prestige of the Allies if we gave way. Their arrogance was already intolerable, and would be greatly increased. On the other hand, there was no doubt that if we pressed for another place we should meet with a refusal. The council had, therefore, to consider how they could bring pressure to bear upon the Dutch, or in what manner they could exhibit their displeasure. It was no longer possible to exclude Holland from the League of Nations, as she had already become a member. No one, he thought, seriously contemplated the application of force. Could they reimpose the blockade? This, he thought, was impracticable. There remained the alternative of withdrawing their several Legations. Whatever they did, there was nothing really effective that they could do. Should they retreat from the false position in which they now found themselves, with such dignity as they might, by laying stress on the guarantees to be exacted, by the sympathy they felt for the illness of the ex-Empress, on their reliance on the word of the Dutch Government and of the ex-Kaiser, and merely say that they proposed from time to time to satisfy themselves that all precautions

<sup>5</sup> See appendix 3 below.

had been taken? He himself felt deeply humiliated by the course the negotiations had taken, and he was confident that his colleagues felt the same. He submitted to them the question of what measures they should take and what consequences might result from those measures.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that what Lord Curzon had stated was quite new to him. He thought, however, that it would be very difficult for the council to form an immediate judgment. He proposed, therefore, that they should meet on the following day after considering the question and after the various delegates had, if they so desired, communicated with their respective Governments. He thought that no immediate action could be taken, as the Royal decree had already been issued. They must consider carefully what was the next step to be taken.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA thought that the best thing would be to adjourn the meeting.

M. CAMBON said that, if he might be allowed to express his personal opinion, the Dutch would in no circumstances ever give way. That was the opinion that he himself had expressed to his own Government from the very start. He thought, therefore, that the best thing to do was for the Allies to cover their retreat in as dignified a manner as possible, and get thoroughly satisfactory guarantees from the Dutch. In any case it was no use ignoring the fact of the Royal decree.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that upon so serious a matter he did not feel competent to express an opinion at once.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that some member of the council might draft a communication to be sent to the Dutch Government, to be considered at their next meeting.

LORD CURZON enquired what lines the draft should follow.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he hoped, whatever happened, no member of the council would be in the least influenced by the illness of the ex-Empress. What would be the sentiments of a judge, supposing a murderer was before him and tried to gain the sympathy of the Bench by saying that, although he had committed the murder, yet he had a very sick wife? The Allies might either apply force to Holland or they could take another line and put the *whole* responsibility for the safeguarding of the ex-Kaiser upon the Netherlands Government. He thought that perhaps M. Berthelot might be prepared to undertake to draft a communication to the Netherlands Government as a basis for their discussion when they next met.

M. BERTHELOT, after stating that nobody could be more indignant than himself at the attitude taken up and persisted in by the Dutch Government, consented to prepare a draft as soon as he had received a copy of the *procès-verbal* of the council's meeting that afternoon.

*(The council adjourned at 5.50 p.m.)*

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 18, 1920

#### APPENDIX 1 TO No. 64

*Paraphrase of Telegram from Lord Derby, dated Paris, March 18, 1920 [12.30 a.m.]*

The German Chargé d'Affaires, Herr Meyer [Mayer], who came to interview me tonight,<sup>6</sup> informed me that revolutionary troops are leaving Berlin; Kapp and Luttwitz have both resigned; and the old Government is completely in the ascendancy. Soviet Government[s] have, however, established themselves in the Ruhr Valley, where serious disorders have broken out and Bauer exercises no authority there at all. A battery has been absolutely destroyed at Wetter, the officers and the majority of the men killed, the remainder dispersed, and the insurgents have captured guns. At Herne a battalion has been similarly treated. Herr Meyer states that Bauer is asking for 3 batteries, (? 14) squadrons and 6 battalions of German troops to be sent to the valley in order to quell disorders, and Meyer urges that his request be granted in order to prevent massacres. He guarantees that the troops will be entirely composed of men who have been consistently faithful to the Bauer Government and that they will not remain for more than fifteen days in that region. He presses very strongly that this request be granted, although he recognises that it constitutes an infraction of the treaty. He is confident that Bauer's authority would be completely destroyed if Allied troops were sent there. In that case victory would remain with the reactionary forces and Bauer would be compelled to resign.

The Ambassadors' Conference here discuss the question to-morrow morning. Until I have received some instructions from you I shall not associate myself with any movement, either of Allied or German forces. The German Chargé d'Affaires in London, Meyer tells me, is instructed to make a similar statement to you, but he fears it is possible the telegram may not get through, and he begged me, therefore, to cable to you as the matter was most urgent.

#### APPENDIX 2 TO No. 64

*Statement handed by M. Sthamer to the Marquess [sic] Curzon of Kedleston<sup>7</sup>*

The German Chargé d'Affaires has just been informed by wire from Berlin that news of the most serious character concerning the outbreak of sanguinary fighting in the Rhenish-Westphalian district has come to hand. In the eastern parts of this industrial district grave riots have taken place. It is reported that a Soviet Government has been proclaimed in the district of Herne-Bochum-Witten and Hagen, and that the authority of the Government has been done away with.

The troops stationed in those parts have been maltreated and deprived of their arms by the population, officers and men being murdered.

The Military Peace Commission asked General Nollet to permit the despatch of six battalions, two squadrons and three batteries to the said district. This was refused on the ground that the request came from a non-recognised Government.

The president of the German Peace Commission in Paris has received orders

<sup>6</sup> The night of March 17-18.

<sup>7</sup> This anachronistic heading was not in the typescript text and appears to have been added at a later date.



to ask the Allied Governments to consent to a temporary despatch of the said amount of troops to the Rhenish-Westphalian district.

I am authorised to state this request is made by the old constitutional Government of Germany.

### APPENDIX 3 TO No. 64

*Telegram en clair from Sir R. Graham, dated The Hague, March 17, 1920*

The following announcement is published this evening:—

‘Prime Minister has communicated following letter, dated 16th instant, to the presidents of the First and Second Chambers:—

‘The line of conduct pursued temporarily in respect of the residence of the former German Emperor Wilhelm II should assume a more definite form now that the Government have been unable to agree to his extradition. The ex-Emperor has given to the Government the assurance that he will abstain from all political action and will consequently cause no political difficulties to the Netherlands. The area within which the ex-Emperor resides has been indicated by Royal decree of the 16th March, 1920, No. 58, of which a copy accompanies this letter. I request that you will communicate this decree, together with the contents of this letter, to the Chamber.’

The Royal decree referred to above reads as follows:—

‘We, Wilhelmina, &c., on the proposal of our Ministers of the Interior, of Justice, and for Foreign Affairs, have determined to indicate as the area within which, with due observance of further provisions, the former German Emperor Wilhelm II will reside, that part of the Province of Utrecht to be defined by our aforesaid Ministers. Our aforesaid Ministers shall each, in so far as he is concerned, be entrusted with the execution of this decree. The Hague, March 16, 1920.—  
WILHELMINA. Signed also by the Ministers of Interior, Justice and Foreign Affairs.’

I.C.P. 79.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, held in Lord Curzon's Room at the British Foreign Office, Whitehall, London, S.W. 1, on Friday, March 19, 1920, at 4.30 p.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Rear-Admiral Sir Osmond Brock, Captain Domville, Wing-Commander Wynne, Major-General Sir W. Thwaites, Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Leeper; **SECRETARIES,** Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Captain Abraham, Major Young.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, General Vicomte de la Panouse, Commander B. de Blanpré.

*Italy:* Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Colonel Castoldi, Signor Galli, Don Ascanio Colonna, Commander Ruspoli, Major Marzillini.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda, Rear-Admiral Iida, Major-General Itamy.

**INTERPRETER:** M. Billot.

1. **LORD CURZON** reminded the meeting that the Allied answer to the Hungarian delegation regarding the economic clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary was awaited in Paris. The draft had been accepted in principle, subject to any observations by the Italian or French delegation, notice of which was to be given within twenty-four hours.<sup>1</sup> He wished to be able to telegraph to Paris that evening authorising the British Ambassador to proceed. In this connection he would like to point out that, if the authority were sent, acceptance of the territorial clauses would be implied. On this subject a unanimous agreement had been reached, but Signor Nitti had telegraphed a different opinion. Although Mr. Lloyd George was inclined to agree, on the merits, with Signor Nitti, he thought that, in view of the pledges given, it would be very difficult for the Allied Powers to reopen the question. This being so, he assumed that he could regard this question as settled in the manner agreed upon by all in the conference.

**SIGNOR SCIALOJA** said that, in regard to the reply on the economic clauses, he must insist on pressing his observation regarding article 207.<sup>1</sup> He regarded the draft clause proposed in the reply as presenting political dangers. Nothing should be said which could even appear to render possible the formation of a Zollverein among the territories which had been Austria-Hungary. Moreover, after studying the rest of the articles, he had come to the conclusion that the proposal was unnecessary. Other articles permitted the negotiating of treaties between Hungary and Czechoslovakia and Poland for the exchange of raw material. To this way of presenting the subject he raised no objection, and he would even propose to add a form of words permitting similar treaties to be made as between Hungary and Roumania and Hungary and Jugoslavia. His intention in this was to meet the spirit of

<sup>1</sup> See No. 63, minute 6.

the suggested amendment, but to maintain the form of separate individual agreements between Hungary and other States, and to avoid the risk of a common assembly of all these States to consider a universal customs union among themselves.

LORD CURZON asked whether Signor Scialoja wished his observations to be sent to Paris as an expression of his view, or whether he wished the treaty to be modified?

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that it would be better if his suggestion were adopted in the conference. It appeared to him that all Hungary could require was an addition to the list of individual States already given in the treaty, with which she might negotiate an exchange of raw material. The addition of Roumania and Jugoslavia appeared to him to supply all that was needful.

MR. LEEPER said he thought the use of the plural in the phrase '*à l'effet de conclure des conventions*' guarded against the danger alluded to by Signor Scialoja. He did not think the proposed article rendered it possible in any way that a close customs union should be formed among the ex-territories of the Austrian Empire, more especially as there was a proviso that the agreements must be in conformity with the preceding articles.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said there was some protection in article 203 as previously drafted, but now that its operation had been limited to three years<sup>1</sup> this protection in a great part disappeared. He was not opposing the principle of the suggested amendment, but merely arguing for a redraft, to avoid a possible misconstruction. He disliked the grouping of all the States under one formula, as this might give rise to the idea of a federation. To this he saw serious political objections.

LORD CURZON said that he personally did not share Signor Scialoja's alarms. He would be glad to know what his French colleagues felt.

M. CAMBON said that it appeared to him possible that the sentence as it stood should present the complexion disliked by Signor Scialoja, but he would ask whether it was not possible for Hungary, even if the treaty were silent about it altogether, to negotiate such arrangements with her neighbours?

SIGNOR SCIALOJA observed that in previous articles the liberty of Hungary in matters of customs conventions had been restricted.

LORD CURZON then suggested the use of the words '*à l'effet de conclure des conventions entre l'un ou l'autre de ces États.*'

After considerable further discussion, this form of words was accepted by Signor Scialoja. He asked, however, that the attention of the Drafting Committee be drawn to the effect of this formula on the rest of the economic chapter as it stood.

(With this alteration and proviso, the draft reply to the Hungarian delegation on the subject of the economic clauses of the treaty was accepted (see Appendix 6 to I.C.P. 77<sup>2</sup>), and the secretary was instructed to take the necessary action in communication with the Drafting Committee.)

<sup>2</sup> See No. 63, note 3.

2. LORD CURZON said that the conference was now requested to consider a letter from March [*Marshal*] Foch, covering the revised naval, military and air clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey (A.J. 102) (Appendix 1). It would be remembered that the Military Commission had previously suggested a standard [*standing*] army of 60,000 men for Turkey. At a meeting held at 10, Downing Street, the council had decided that this was an excessive force, and the suggestion had been put forward that a force of gendarmerie should suffice for the needs of Turkey.<sup>3</sup> Attention had been drawn by the Italian delegation to the notable success of a force of this character in various countries in the East. These suggestions had therefore been sent to Versailles, where they had been considered. The result was the document now before the conference. The gist of the proposals was that the Sultan at Constantinople should have a small bodyguard, that the total armed forces of Turkey should not exceed 50,000 men, inclusive of a gendarmerie force of 35,000. This left a force of 15,000 regular soldiers. If his colleagues had no general remarks to make, he thought it would be best to read the proposals article by article.

Article 1 was read and approved.

Lord Curzon asked whether any special source of recruitment was contemplated for the Sultan's bodyguard.

GENERAL DE LA PANOUSE said he knew of none.

Articles 2, 3 and 4 were read and approved.

Article 5 was read.

It was pointed out that the treaty contemplated no mandates in Turkey, and that consequently the last part of the first paragraph was unnecessary.

It was decided—

To combine paragraphs 1 and 2 in the following manner:—

'Les troupes de gendarmerie sont réparties sur le territoire de l'Empire ottoman, qui, dans ce but, est divisé en régions territoriales militaires, dont la délimitation sera fixée dans les conditions définies à l'article 8.'

The remainder of article 5 was read and accepted.

LORD CURZON observed that the question whether the commission mentioned in the last paragraph of this article was to be temporary or permanent would have to be discussed when article 8 was reached.

Article 6 was read.

Lord Curzon observed that the stipulation contained in the second paragraph appeared to be too precise. He thought it should be qualified by a proviso 'without the special authorisation of the commission provided for in article 8.'

With this alteration, article 6 was agreed to.

Article 7 was read and approved.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 45, minute 1.

Lord Curzon said that this article was to propose the creation of an inter-  
*Article 8* Allied commission, whose position was to be fixed by the Great Allied Powers and which was to be charged with the organisation of the future Turkish army on the lines that had just been under discussion, with delimiting the area into which Turkey was to be divided for military purposes and with the general supervision of the Turkish army and gendarmerie.

This was a serious question, involving as it did the setting up of yet another commission which was to assist the future Turkish Government in exercising its functions. No one would wish voluntarily to add to the number of these commissions. There were already commissions for the control of the Straits zone from the point of view of navigation, and for the control of finance, and there were also to be commanders of the Allied forces in the Straits zone, who would work in concert and might be called another commission. He assumed that it was inevitable that a commission of some kind should be entrusted with the arrangements proposed in this chapter. It was quite impossible that they could be set in motion, and still less that they should be kept in force from year to year without Allied supervision.

He invited the conference to consider of whom it was to be composed and by whom commanded. Its headquarters would be at Constantinople, and he supposed that everyone would agree that it was undesirable for an indefinite number of Allied generals to be collected in Constantinople, some of them possibly with not very much to do.

The suggestion occurred to him that it might be possible to utilise the services of the commanders of the Allied forces in the Straits zone for the purposes of this commission. He understood that the army of occupation would consist of about two divisions or 30,000 men, of whom 10,000 each would be provided by Great Britain, France and Italy. As time went on this force would be gradually reduced, and it might fall to 10,000 men, or even to one brigade. No one could say how soon this reduction would begin or how long it would be before it was completed. Meanwhile, for an army of 30,000 men each Power must have a commanding officer of at least the rank of major-general. There would presumably be a supreme commander of the rank of lieutenant-general, or a general officer of equivalent rank to a divisional general commanding an army corps.

These four officers would be at Constantinople, and it seemed to him a possible suggestion that their services should be utilised for the reorganisation and control of the Turkish army and gendarmerie as well as for the command of the Allied forces.

The French Ambassador had made the suggestion that the military attachés to the Representatives of the three Powers concerned might be available for this purpose. This was a possible alternative, but he wished to point out that military attachés came and went, and also that it would be difficult for them to supervise the army of the State to which they were accredited, since their primary duty was to further the interest of their own country.

There was another point. The last sentence of the first paragraph of

article 8 implied that this commission was to be a permanent body. The British military authorities were inclined to think that it should be temporary. If it were permanent, the result would be that the Turkish Ministry of War at Constantinople would for all practical purposes cease to exist. The Turkish Minister for War would be unable even to move a unit from one place to another without the sanction of the body of foreign generals.

The conditions which necessitated a permanent financial commission were quite different. Allied control was in this case to supersede the Turkish Ministry of Finance. Turkish revenues would be required to meet charges incurred both before and during the war, and the Turks themselves would agree that the only way to ensure this was for their finances to be organised from outside.

VICOMTE PANOUSE remarked that the second paragraph of article 6, which laid down that the reinforcement to any one area must not exceed a third of the total effectives of the 'special elements,' implied that the Turkish Minister of War would not be quite so helpless as Lord Curzon suggested.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that, in view of all the difficulties which he foresaw in the carrying out of the treaty, it was perhaps in the general interest to cut out any provision which was likely to be resented by the Turkish Government, provided it was not absolutely necessary. It was not clear to him that the permanent retention of this military commission was an absolute necessity, and he submitted that no reasonable opportunity should be lost of softening the peace terms if this could safely be done.

LORD CURZON agreed that this was an important point, that [? but] the commission would clearly be necessary to organise and set up the reconstituted Turkish forces. He suggested that provision should be made for the reconsideration of the whole question after a period of five years.

In reply to Marquis Imperiali, who had suggested the alternative of reconsideration when the organisation was completed, he said he thought it better to fix a definite time limit. The alternative proposed by the Italian Ambassador would open up the possibility of endless discussion.

The conference recommended that the commission should be composed of officers from the Allied forces of occupation<sup>4</sup> and that the following paragraph should be added to article 8:—

'At the expiration of five years the principal Allied Powers shall reconsider the question whether the Inter-Allied Military Commission is any longer required.'

GENERAL THWAITES said that it seemed desirable to limit the number of foreign officers employed in the organisation and instruction of the gendarmerie. He suggested that a total of 250 foreign officers should be fixed as the maximum. This was roughly 10 per cent. of the establishment of Turkish officers for a force of the numbers proposed.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI asked who was to command the gendarmerie.

<sup>4</sup> *Note in original:* 'This decision was modified during discussion of articles 48-51.' (See No. 66, minute 1.)

Was it to be a foreign or a Turkish general? He did not know whether this was to be decided by the Allied Military Commission at Versailles.

M. CAMBON said that in the Macedonian gendarmerie each sector was commanded by a foreign officer.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI pointed out that the Sultan had always refused to admit the position of these foreign officers or to give orders through them. While they certainly controlled the gendarmerie, they were not actually in command.

LORD CURZON said that this very important point appeared to have been overlooked by the Versailles Commission. There was no doubt that the proposed Turkish regular army of 15,000 would be commanded by a Turkish general.

With regard to the gendarmerie, it was generally understood that in those areas in which the protection of minorities had been undertaken by certain Powers the Powers concerned would, on the invitation of the Turkish Government, provide officers to command the gendarmerie, but who was to be in supreme command of this force at Constantinople? Was it to be a Turk or a foreigner? This was a question which he thought should be referred back to Versailles.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that a useful analogy might be drawn from the Macedonian gendarmerie. While it was true that the command in each sector was exercised by an officer of the Power concerned with the gendarmerie in that sector, the executive orders which were nominally given by the Sultan were not officially communicated by him to these officers, whom he refused to recognise, but to an attached Turkish officer. This Turkish officer had, of course, no real authority, but he acted as a channel between the Sultan and the foreign officer concerned. The root of the matter lay in the question of a supreme command at Constantinople, where there must be a commanding officer with a staff. What had to be decided was whether this officer should be an officer of the Turkish Government or not.

LORD CURZON referred to the suggestion made by General Thwaites, and proposed that after the words 'l'article 7 ci-dessus' the words 'et leur nombre ne dépassera pas 250' should be inserted.

COLONEL CASTOLDI thought that this was much too low a figure. In the Italian sector in Macedonia there had been ten Italian officers to each regiment of gendarmerie, and even that was not enough.

LORD CURZON said that Colonel Castoldi was naturally defending the system of which he had had practical experience, but he disagreed with his conclusions, which were founded on the assumption that the Allied Powers concerned were actually to command the units of the gendarmerie. He thought that this would be a mistake, as it would leave no scope for the Turks at all. He pointed out that the regular regiments of the Indian army had no more than an average of a dozen British officers. If Colonel Castoldi's suggestion were adopted, the result would be that the gendarmerie in Turkey would become a force closely corresponding to the regular Indian army. His own view was that it should be more on the lines of the levies and militia

in the frontier districts of India, where each regiment had only three, or, at the most, four, British officers.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that, while there might be certain areas in which it would be desirable for the strength of the European officers to be increased or to be put at the figure suggested by Colonel Castoldi, there were other areas in which this was clearly undesirable. He did not think, however, that it would be practicable for two different scales to be in force at the same time.

He concurred in a suggestion by M. Cambon that the question should be referred back to the Versailles Commission, which included the French officer who commanded the French sector at Seres.

The conference decided to suggest to the Versailles Commission the insertion of the words 'et leur nombre ne dépassera pas' after the words 'l'article 7 ci-dessus.' The secretary was instructed to take the necessary action.

It was decided to delete the last two lines of article 10, on the analogy of article 5.

Article 11 was adopted.

Article 12 was adopted.

Article 13 was adopted.

In reply to a question by Lord Curzon, MR. VANSITTART explained that the phrase 'mise en vigueur'<sup>s</sup> had been uniformly adopted in all other treaties.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA drew attention to the fact that each treaty ended with a clause providing that the deposit of ratification by three of the Allied Powers was officially regarded as the moment for the coming into force of the treaty.

(It was decided to adopt a suggestion by Lord Curzon that, after the words '50,000 hommes' should be inserted the words 'non compris la garde personnelle du Sultan.'

A suggestion by Marquis Imperiali was also adopted that between the words 'ramenées à l'effectif' and the words 'strictement nécessaire' should be inserted the words 'que la Commission sus-citée estimera.')

GENERAL THWAITES suggested that the last three lines of this [*sic*] article 15, from the words 'et répartis sur le territoire' to the end, should be deleted, on the ground that it would, in practice, be found impossible, and probably objectionable, to carry out the distribution of gendarmerie within an area in accordance with the ethnical and religious character of the population of the area.

VICOMTE PANOUSE drew attention to the words 'dans la mesure des possibilités,' and thought that this was a sufficient qualification.

LORD CURZON thought that it would be better to delete the sentence altogether. It was really too much to ask anyone to carry out a distribution of this kind, which was, on the face of it, impracticable.

The conference decided to delete the last three lines of the article, from the words 'et répartis sur le territoire' to the end.

<sup>s</sup> The reference was to article 14.



Article 16 was adopted.

Article 17 was adopted.

In reply to a suggestion by Colonel Castoldi that some provision should be made for a school for the gendarmerie, Lord Curzon observed that the words 'unités autorisées'<sup>6</sup> included gendarmerie, and that if special provision were made for a gendarmerie school, there would also have to be special provision for a school for the Sultan's bodyguard.

GENERAL THWAITES observed that the phrase 'région territoriale' could only refer to the gendarmerie.

It was decided to adopt the article as it stood.

Article 19 was adopted.

At Lord Curzon's suggestion it was decided to delete the words 'qui servent actuellement' in article 20.

Article 21 was adopted.

Article 22 was adopted.

The conference adopted a suggestion by VISCOUNT CHINDA that the words 'Puissances alliées' in paragraph 2 of the article [23] should be 'principales Puissances alliées'.

LORD CURZON pointed out that the first paragraph of article 25 [24] appeared to confuse the functions of the Allied Powers with those of the Inter-Allied Military Commission. The authorisation of arms and munitions factories in Turkey should rest with the commission and not be referred to the Allies.

This was, of course, a different question from the disposal of existing arms and munitions, dealt with in article 23, which could only be decided by the Powers themselves.

SIR OSMOND BROCK said that the authorisation of arms factories and the possible utilisation of other factories for the manufacture of munitions of war appeared to him to raise economic considerations, which could not be decided by the commission if the latter were to be composed of the officers commanding the Allied forces of occupation in the Straits zone. The supervision of such factories in Germany lay with the Supreme Military Council at Versailles and not with any local commission.

LORD CURZON pointed out that the condition[s] in Turkey differed from those in Germany, inasmuch as, where Germany was concerned, all necessary information was already available in Paris. This was not the case where Turkey was concerned. The Versailles Council would be compelled to refer questions back to the local commission, and he thought it better to leave the commission to perform these functions.

It was decided that, in place of the words 'par les Alliées,' the words 'par la Commission militaire interalliée de Contrôle prévue à l'article 8' should be adopted.

Article 25 was adopted.

Article 26 was adopted.

<sup>6</sup> The reference was to article 18.

Lord Curzon drew attention to the second paragraph of this [*sic*] article 27, which provided for the demilitarisation of a zone in the neighbourhood of Trebizond and Erzinjan. This was dictated by the necessity for protecting the new Armenian State. It had been found possible to include Erzerum in the new Armenia, but it was not contemplated that Armenia should extend so far into Asia Minor as to include Erzinjan and Trebizond, and, at the same time, it was clearly necessary that some provision should be made to obviate the possibility of fortifications being established by the Turkish Government in this area, and the proposal for the demilitarisation of this zone had been put forward as the best means to secure this end.

Article 27 was adopted.

VISCOUNT CHINDA drew attention to the memorandum of the 11th March by the naval advisers,<sup>7</sup> quoted by Marshal Foch in the penultimate paragraph of his covering letter.<sup>7</sup> In this memorandum the naval advisers had drawn attention to the fact that article 28, as at present worded, left it doubtful which Powers were referred to, and suggested that the phrase 'protecting Powers' should be substituted for 'Allied Powers' in clauses 1 and 4 [5] of the article, and that the word 'protecting' should be inserted before the word 'Powers' at the beginning of clause 4. In the course of a general discussion the view was expressed that it should be perfectly clear that the Powers referred to in this article were Great Britain, France and Italy only.

LORD CURZON agreed and thought it would be better that the Powers concerned should be actually named in the respective clauses.

This suggestion was adopted.

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 1920.

## APPENDIX 1 TO NO. 65

### Document 1

*Marshal Foch to Mr. Lloyd George*

(A.J. 102. Secret.)

PARIS, le 13 mars 1920

M. le Président,

Par lettres des 2 et 3 mars, vous m'avez transmis, en vue de la préparation du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie, les observations du Conseil suprême au sujet du projet des clauses militaires et aériennes que je vous avais adressé le 28 février, ainsi que les directives du conseil relatives à l'établissement des clauses navales.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> See appendix 1 below.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. No. 42, minute 2, and No. 45, minute 1 and appendix 1.

Le Comité militaire allié de Versailles, dans sa séance plénière du 12 mars, a, en conséquence, révisé ses premières propositions et les a complétées en ce qui concerne les clauses navales, ainsi que les clauses relatives aux prisonniers de guerre et aux sépultures, dont l'étude avait été réservée à la demande du représentant britannique.

J'ai l'honneur de soumettre à votre approbation le projet ainsi rectifié et complété.

**Clauses militaires.** Les observations du Conseil suprême signalaient l'opportunité de réduire l'effectif de la force armée ottomane, de limiter son rôle à celui d'une simple gendarmerie et de la placer sous le contrôle des Alliés.

L'effectif de la force armée ottomane a été réduit à 50,000 hommes (non compris la garde personnelle du Sultan, ramenée elle-même de 1,500 à 700 hommes).

Cet effectif de 50,000 hommes, eu égard à la population du futur Empire ottoman, correspond, proportionnellement, aux effectifs admis respectivement pour l'Autriche, la Bulgarie et la Hongrie.<sup>9</sup>

Mais, tandis que, pour ces Puissances, l'effectif autorisé ne comprend que l'armée proprement dite, à l'exclusion de la gendarmerie; en Turquie, au contraire, le chiffre de 50,000 hommes adopté s'applique à l'ensemble de la force armée ottomane, y compris la gendarmerie, pour laquelle un effectif de 35,000 hommes est prévu.

Les 15,000 hommes restants, organisés en troupes de toutes armes, constituent, pour cette gendarmerie très diluée sur un territoire étendu et dépourvu de voies de communication rapides, les éléments de renforcement strictement indispensables, si l'on veut qu'elle soit en mesure de réprimer les troubles à prévoir dans un pays travaillé par les querelles de race et de religion, et de s'opposer éventuellement au brigandage et aux incursions de bandes armées dans la zone frontière.

En conséquence, il paraît impossible de réduire l'effectif total de 50,000 hommes ainsi proposé.

Quant au contrôle des Alliés sur l'organisation et l'emploi de cette force armée, il est assuré d'une manière efficace par les dispositions de l'article 8 et de l'article 9.

**Clauses aériennes:** Le projet primitif des clauses aériennes n'a subi aucune modification.

**Clauses navales:** Les principes qui ont servi de base pour l'établissement de ces clauses sont exposés dans le préambule du projet présenté par les conseillers navals au Comité militaire allié de Versailles et dont une copie est ci-annexée.

Ce projet contient en outre deux mémoranda soumis à la décision du Conseil suprême et relatifs:

Le premier, à la rédaction du Chapitre 8 des **Clauses militaires** (substitution de l'expression: 'Puissances protectrices' à celle de 'Puissances alliées' dans cette rédaction);

Le second, à la renonciation de la Turquie aux droits qu'elle possède sur les câbles sous-marins.

**Clauses relatives aux Prisonniers de Guerre et aux Sépultures:** Ces clauses ont été établies après consultation des experts désignés par les services alliés compétents.

Veillez, &c.,

F. FOCH

<sup>9</sup> *Note in original:* 'L'effectif de la force ottomane, calculé sur la base des 2 pour cent de la population, comme pour ces Puissances, serait de 45,000 hommes.'

## Document 2

### *Projet de Traité de Paix avec la Turquie*

#### *Partie V.—Clauses militaires, navales et aériennes*

En vue de rendre possible la préparation d'une limitation générale des armements de toutes les nations, la Turquie s'engage strictement à respecter les clauses militaires, navales et aériennes ci-après stipulées.

#### Section I.—*Clauses Militaires*

##### Chapitre I.—*Clauses générales* . . .<sup>10</sup>

##### Chapitre II.—*Effectifs, Organisation, Encadrement de la Force armée*

. . . *Article 5.*<sup>11</sup> Les troupes de gendarmerie sont réparties sur le territoire de l'Empire ottoman, qui, dans ce but, est divisé en régions territoriales militaires, délimitées en tenant compte, d'une part, des subdivisions administratives ou, d'autre part, des zones soumises au mandat des Puissances alliées, de manière qu'à chacune de ces zones corresponde une ou plusieurs régions militaires distinctes.

La délimitation de ces régions territoriales sera fixée dans les conditions définies à l'article 8.

Une légion de gendarmerie composée de troupes à pied et à cheval, pourvue de mitrailleuses, et dotée de services administratifs et sanitaires, est organisée dans chaque région territoriale; elle fournit dans les vilayets, sandjaks, cazas, &c., les détachements nécessaires à l'organisation d'un service fixe de sécurité, et dispose, en un ou plusieurs points du territoire de la région, de réserves mobiles.

En raison de leur rôle spécial, les légions ne comportent ni artillerie, ni armes techniques.

L'effectif global des légions ne doit pas excéder 35,000 hommes, à comprendre dans l'effectif total de la force armée prévue à l'article 4.

L'effectif maximum d'une même légion ne doit pas excéder le quart de l'effectif global des légions.

Les éléments d'une même légion ne doivent pas, en principe, être employés en dehors du territoire de leur région, sauf autorisation spéciale de la commission prévue à l'article 8.

. . . *Article 8.*<sup>12</sup> Une commission interalliée, dont la composition est fixée par les grandes Puissances alliées, sera chargée, en collaboration avec le Gouvernement ottoman, de procéder à l'organisation de la force armée ottomane sur les bases du présent traité, de fixer la délimitation des régions territoriales prévues à l'article 5, ainsi que la répartition des troupes de gendarmerie et des éléments spéciaux de

<sup>10</sup> This chapter (not printed) comprised draft articles 1 and 2 which, subject to minor variation (this proviso applies also to the draft articles listed in notes 11-15 and 18-25 below), corresponded respectively to articles 152 and 153 of the Treaty of Sèvres, except that in draft article 2 the stipulated period was three months.

<sup>11</sup> Draft articles 3 and 4 (not printed) corresponded respectively to articles 154 and 155 of the treaty.

<sup>12</sup> Draft articles 6 and 7 (not printed) corresponded to articles 157 and 158 respectively, except that the second paragraph of draft article 6 ended ' . . . l'effectif global de ces éléments.', and the reference in the last paragraph of the same article was to draft article 8.

renforcement entre les différentes régions territoriales, et de contrôler les conditions d'emploi de ces troupes et de ces éléments.

Dans ce but, elle recevra du Gouvernement ottoman les pouvoirs d'exécution nécessaires vis-à-vis des différents organes de commandement et d'administration de la force armée ottomane.

*Article 9.* En outre, des officiers fournis par les différentes Puissances alliées ou neutres, concourront, sous la direction du Gouvernement ottoman, au commandement, à l'organisation et à l'instruction de la gendarmerie. Ces officiers ne compteront pas dans l'effectif autorisé à l'article 7 ci-dessus. Des accords spéciaux à établir par la commission interalliée visée à l'article 8 fixeront la proportion de ces officiers par nationalité, et régleront les conditions de leur participation aux différentes missions prévues pour eux par le présent article.

*Article 10.* En principe, dans une même région territoriale, tous les officiers opérant par délégation de la commission interalliée visée à l'article 8, ou mis à la disposition du Gouvernement ottoman dans les conditions prévues à l'article 9, seront de la même nationalité.

Dans chaque région soumise au mandat d'une Puissance alliée, ces divers officiers seront de la nationalité de la Puissance mandataire.

*Article 11.* Dans la zone des Détroits, les troupes de gendarmerie sont subordonnées au commandement des forces interalliées d'occupation de cette zone.

... *Article 14.*<sup>13</sup> Toute formation de troupe non prévue à la présente section du traité est interdite.

La suppression des formations qui existeraient en plus de l'effectif autorisé de 50,000 hommes, s'effectuera progressivement à partir de la signature du Traité de Paix, de telle façon qu'elle soit réalisée complètement trois mois au plus tard après la mise en vigueur du traité, conformément aux stipulations de l'article 2.

Le personnel officiers ou assimilés du Ministère de la Guerre et l'État-Major général turc, ainsi que les administrations qui leur sont rattachées, seront dans le même délai ramenées [*sic*] à l'effectif strictement nécessaire au bon fonctionnement des services généraux de la force armée ottomane, cet effectif restant compris dans le chiffre maximum prévu à l'article 7.

### Chapitre III.—*Recrutement*

*Article 15.* La force armée ottomane ne sera à l'avenir constituée et recrutée que par engagements volontaires.

Le recrutement sera ouvert également à tous les sujets de l'Empire ottoman, sans distinction de race ni de religion.

En ce qui concerne les légions visées à l'article 5, leur recrutement sera en principe régional, et réglé de telle sorte que les éléments musulmans et non musulmans de la population de chaque région soient, dans la mesure des possibilités, représentés dans l'effectif de la légion correspondante, et répartis sur le territoire de la région en concordance avec le caractère ethnique et religieux des populations de ce territoire. . . .<sup>14</sup>

### Chapitre V.—*Douaniers, Police locale*

*Article 20.* Le nombre des douaniers, agents de la police locale ou municipale ou autres fonctionnaires analogues ne devra pas excéder le nombre d'hommes qui

<sup>13</sup> Draft articles 12 and 13 (not printed) corresponded to articles 162 and 163 respectively.

<sup>14</sup> Draft articles 16 and 17 (not printed), and draft articles 18 and 19, comprising chapter IV ('Écoles, Établissements d'Enseignement, Sociétés et Associations militaires': not printed), corresponded to articles 166-169 respectively.

exerçaient une fonction semblable en 1913 et qui servent actuellement dans les limites territoriales de la Turquie, telles qu'elles sont fixées par le présent traité.

Le nombre de ces fonctionnaires ne pourra à l'avenir être augmenté que dans une proportion correspondante à celle des augmentations de la population dans les localités ou municipalités qui les emploient.

Ces employés et fonctionnaires ainsi que ceux du service des chemins de fer ne pourront pas être réunis pour participer à un exercice militaire quelconque.

#### Chapitre VI.—*Armement, Munitions, Matériel* . . .<sup>15</sup>

##### Chapitre VII.—*Fortifications*

*Article 27.* Les dispositions concernant les fortifications dans la zone des Détroits et des îles définie au Chapitre VIII ci-après sont spécifiées dans ce chapitre.

Dans la zone de Trébizonde-Erzindjan, définie à l'article ,<sup>16</sup> les fortifications de toute nature seront désarmées et démolies dans un délai de trois mois après la mise en vigueur du présent traité.

En dehors de ces zones, les ouvrages fortifiés existants pourront être conservés dans leur état actuel, mais seront désarmés dans le même délai de trois mois.

##### Chapitre VIII.—*Maintien de la Liberté des Détroits*

*Article 28.* En vue de garantir le maintien de la liberté des Détroits, les dispositions ci-après sont stipulées :

1. Dans un délai de trois mois à partir de la mise en vigueur du présent traité, il sera procédé au désarmement et à la démolition de tous ouvrages, fortifications ou batteries dans une bande de territoire déterminée sur le littoral de la mer de Marmara et des Détroits, conformément aux indications de la carte ci-jointe,<sup>17</sup> ainsi que dans les îles de Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace, Ténédos, Mytilène, et dans les îles de la mer de Marmara.

Sont interdits sur ces territoires et ces îles, la reconstruction de tels ouvrages ainsi que l'établissement de routes ou voies ferrées permettant d'y amener rapidement des batteries mobiles.

Les Puissances alliées se réservent de préparer la mise hors de service des routes et voies ferrées existantes et pouvant être utilisées dans ces buts.

2. Les mesures prévues au paragraphe 1 ci-dessus seront exécutées, sous le contrôle de la Commission interalliée de Contrôle prévue à l'article 52 de la Section IV.

3. Les territoires des Détroits et des îles mentionnés au paragraphe 1 ci-dessus ne pourront être utilisés militairement que par les principales Puissances alliées, agissant conjointement.

4. Ces Puissances auront la faculté de maintenir dans ces territoires des forces de terre, dans le but de s'assurer en particulier qu'aucune disposition nuisible à la liberté des Détroits n'y est effectuée ni préparée.

<sup>15</sup> This chapter (not printed) comprised draft articles 21–26 which corresponded to articles 171–176 respectively, except that (a) the stipulated period in draft articles 21, 23 and 24 was three months; (b) the reference in draft articles 23 and 24 was to draft article 49; (c) the last paragraph of draft article 23 began: 'Les Puissances alliées' &c.; (d) the first paragraph of draft article 24 read: 'La fabrication d'armes, de munitions et de matériel de guerre n'aura lieu que dans les usines ou établissements autorisés par les Alliés.'; (e) the first paragraph of draft article 25 read: 'L'importation en Turquie de munitions et de matériel de guerre de toute sorte est formellement interdite'.

<sup>16</sup> Omission in filed copy.

<sup>17</sup> Not appended to filed copy.

5. Cette occupation sera complétée par une surveillance au point de vue naval qui sera exercée sous la direction d'un stationnaire de chacune des Puissances alliées.

*Réservé à la demande du conseiller naval britannique*

6. Le transit du matériel de guerre par les Détroits est interdit, sauf autorisation des principales Puissances alliées. Ces Puissances auront par suite le droit de contrôle sur tous les navires de commerce franchissant les Détroits.

Les bâtiments de guerre devront demander aux principales Puissances l'autorisation préalable de passage, suivant les règles admises pour l'entrée d'un navire de guerre dans un port. . . .<sup>18</sup>

Section II.—*Clauses navales*

. . . *Article 38.*<sup>19</sup> Les postes de T.S.F. de Constantinople seront remis aux principales Puissances alliées dès l'entrée en vigueur du présent traité. La Turquie ne devra construire aucun poste de T.S.F. sur les territoires occupés par les Puissances protectrices.

*Article 39. Dardanelles et Bosphore.*—Tous les droits et devoirs appartenant jusqu'ici à la Turquie au sujet des règlements gouvernant les navires, les dispositions pour le balisage et le pilotage des ports, tous les droits de plage et territoriaux dans les eaux et ports du territoire livré par la Turquie, et les revenus qui peuvent en provenir, seront assumés par les Puissances protectrices et exercés comme elles le décideront.

Section III.—*Clauses concernant l'Aéronautique militaire et navale* . . .<sup>20</sup>

Section IV.—*Commission interalliée de Contrôle*

. . . *Article 49.*<sup>21</sup> La Commission militaire interalliée de Contrôle aura notamment:

<sup>18</sup> The three tables (not printed) following draft article 28 were the same as the three tables at the end of the military clauses of the treaty, except that in the draft in the last table the figures '50,000' and '100,000' in the third line of the fourth and fifth columns of figures were repeated, probably in error, in the fourth line of those columns, opposite the item 'Canons de montagne'.

<sup>19</sup> Draft articles 29–37 (not printed) corresponded to articles 181–189 respectively, except that: (a) the antepenultimate paragraph of draft article 29 read: '. . . la Commission navale interalliée de Contrôle parmi les navires suivants . . .'; (b) the penultimate paragraph of the same article read: '. . . aura le droit d'en appeler aux Puissances alliées protectrices des Détroits pour obtenir' &c.; (c) the last sentence of draft article 36 read: 'Aucun corps militaire ou naval ou aucune force de réserve, autre que ceux se rapportant à la marine turque, ne peuvent être organisés en Turquie s'ils ne sont pas compris dans la force ci-dessus.'; (d) the second paragraph of draft article 37 ended '. . . la Commission navale interalliée de Contrôle (article 8)'.

<sup>20</sup> This section (not printed) comprised draft articles 40–44 which corresponded to articles 191–195 respectively, except that (a) the stipulated period in the second paragraph of draft article 44 was three months; (b) the last paragraph of the same article ended '. . . prévue par l'article [omission in filed copy] du présent traité, se sera prononcée sur sa nature. Cette commission aura seule qualité pour déclarer si un aéronef ou les divers matériels aéronautiques sont de type militaire.'

<sup>21</sup> Draft articles 45–48 (not printed) corresponded to articles 196–199 respectively, except that (a) the first paragraph of draft article 45 read: 'Toutes les clauses militaires, navales et aéronautiques, qui sont contenues dans le présent traité, et pour l'exécution desquelles une limite de temps a été fixée, seront exécutées par la Turquie sous le contrôle des commissions interalliées nommées à cet effet par les principales Puissances alliées'; (b) draft articles 46–48 did not include the words 'et d'organisation'; (c) the first paragraph of draft article 47 read: '. . . l'accomplissement de leur mission et tous les moyens, tant . . .' &c.

1. À fixer le nombre des douaniers, agents de la police locale et municipale, et autres fonctionnaires analogues, que la Turquie sera autorisée à conserver conformément à l'article 16 (section I);
2. À recevoir du Gouvernement ottoman les notifications relatives à l'emplacement des stocks et dépôts de munitions, à l'armement des ouvrages fortifiés, forteresses et places fortes, à l'emplacement des usines ou fabriques d'armes, de munitions et de matériel de guerre et à leur fonctionnement;
3. À recevoir livraison des armes, munitions, matériel de guerre, outillage destiné aux fabrications de guerre, à fixer les lieux où cette livraison devra être effectuée, et à surveiller les mises hors d'usage ou transformations prévues par le présent traité.

*Article 50.* La Commission navale interalliée de Contrôle représentera les Gouvernements des principales Puissances alliées pour traiter avec le Gouvernement turc de toutes matières concernant l'exécution des clauses navales.

En particulier, ce sera son devoir que de se rendre dans les arsenaux et de diriger la destruction des navires, selon l'article 6, de prendre livraison des armes, munitions, et matériel de guerre et d'en surveiller la destruction et la démolition.

Le Gouvernement turc devra fournir à la Commission navale interalliée de Contrôle tous les renseignements et documents que la commission jugera nécessaires pour assurer l'exécution complète des clauses navales, en particulier les plans des bâtiments de guerre, la composition de leur armement, les détails et modèles de canons, munitions, torpilles, mines, explosifs, appareils de T.S.F. et en général tout ce qui se rapporte au matériel naval de guerre, ainsi que les documents ou règlements législatifs ou administratifs.

... *Article 52.*<sup>22</sup> Une commission mixte, constituée par prélèvement sur les Commissions militaire, navale et aérienne de Contrôle, sera chargée de l'exécution des clauses prévues aux paragraphes 1 et 2 de l'article 2 du présent traité.

#### *Section V.—Clauses générales*

*Article 53.* À l'expiration d'un délai de trois mois à dater de la mise en vigueur du présent traité, la législation ottomane devra avoir été modifiée et devra être maintenue par le Gouvernement ottoman en conformité de la présente partie du présent traité.

Dans le même délai, toutes les mesures administratives ou autres relatives à l'exécution des dispositions de la présente partie du présent traité devront avoir été prises par le Gouvernement ottoman.

... *Article 56.*<sup>23</sup> Aussi longtemps que le présent traité restera en vigueur, la Turquie s'engage à se prêter à toute investigation que le Conseil de la Société des Nations, votant à la majorité, jugerait nécessaire.

### *Partie VI.—Prisonniers de Guerre et Sépultures*

#### *Section I.—Prisonniers de Guerre*

... *Article 65.*<sup>24</sup> La Turquie s'engage à restituer sans délai, dès la mise en vigueur du présent traité, tous les objets, monnaie, valeurs ou documents ayant appartenu à

<sup>22</sup> Draft article 51 (not printed) corresponded to article 202.

<sup>23</sup> Draft articles 54–55 (not printed) corresponded to articles 206 and 207 respectively.

<sup>24</sup> Draft articles 57–64 (not printed) corresponded to articles 208–215 respectively, except that (a) the date in draft article 60 read '1<sup>er</sup> janvier 1920'; (b) draft article 64 comprised subparagraphs 1 and 2 only of article 215.



des ressortissants des Puissances alliées et qui auraient été retenus par des autorités turques.

*Nota.*—Le Comité militaire allié de Versailles, dans sa séance du 12 mars 1920, a laissé à la décision du Conseil suprême, pour être insérée dans les clauses financières du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie, la question du remboursement des sommes dues par le Gouvernement turc pour l'entretien des prisonniers de guerre alliés.

## Section II.—*Sépultures*

*Article 66.* Le Gouvernement de l'Empire ottoman transférera respectivement aux Gouvernements britannique, français et italien la propriété entière et exclusive des territoires situés dans les limites de la Turquie fixées par le présent traité, où se trouvent les tombes des militaires de leurs armées respectives tombés sur le champ de bataille ou morts des suites de leurs blessures, d'accidents ou de maladies, ainsi que ceux nécessaires pour établir uniquement des nécropoles ou monuments commémoratifs de ces militaires et des voies d'accès à ces cimetières ou monuments.

*Article 67.* Les territoires à transférer seront indiqués au Gouvernement de l'Empire ottoman, dans un délai de six mois à partir de la ratification du traité, respectivement par les Gouvernements britannique, français, et italien, qui auront le droit de nommer chacun une commission, seule chargée d'examiner les zones où des inhumations ont été ou ont pu être faites, ou de proposer les regroupements de sépultures et les emplacements de nécropoles à constituer éventuellement.

Le Gouvernement de l'Empire ottoman, qui pourra se faire représenter à ces commissions, devra leur assurer tout son concours pour l'exécution de leur mission. . . .<sup>25</sup>

## Document 3

(Traduction.)

*Le 11 mars 1920*

M. le Président,

Les Conseillers navals ont l'honneur de vous adresser ci-joint le projet de clauses navales pour le Traité de Paix avec la Turquie, ainsi que quelques remarques explicatives à son sujet.

2. Ils soumettent aussi des mémorandums au sujet de la rédaction de la clause 24 [28] des Conditions militaires, et au sujet des câbles sous-marins ex-turcs.

3. Ils ont l'honneur de demander que ces affaires soient discutées à la prochaine réunion du Comité interallié.

## Document 4

*Le 11 mars 1920*

Les conseillers navals en établissant le projet de clauses navales ci-joint pour le Traité de Paix avec la Turquie ont pris en considération, pour décider les dimensions et l'armement des bâtiments à conserver par la Turquie, les détails correspondants des navires attribués à l'Autriche, la Hongrie et la Bulgarie pour les services de police et de pêcheries.

<sup>25</sup> Draft articles 68–73 (not printed) corresponded to articles 220–225 respectively, except that (a) the draft included no reference to 'Gouvernement hellénique', 'autorités helléniques' or 'souveraineté hellénique'; (b) the first sentence of draft article 70 read: 'Les territoires transférés ne seront soumis à aucune espèce de taxe turque.'

2. Ils ont, en conséquence, conseillé que les deux canonnières mentionnées dans la communication du Conseil suprême au Maréchal Foch du 2 mars 1920<sup>8</sup> soient remplacées par six petits torpilleurs, car ces canonnières semblent inutilement grandes pour les services en question.

3. Les conseillers navals alliés comprennent que les clauses fixant le régime des Détroits (Dardanelles et Bosphore) sont en cours de projet établi par une commission spéciale nommée par les Puissances protectrices, et appelée la 'Commission des Détroits.' Ils ont donc omis toute clause portant sur cette question dans les conditions navales proposées.

(For naval clauses see section II (articles 29-39) of draft treaty.)

## Document 5

### *Commission navale interalliée de Contrôle*

*Le 11 mars 1920*

La Commission navale interalliée de Contrôle représentera les Gouvernements des principales Puissances alliées pour traiter avec le Gouvernement turc de toutes matières concernant l'exécution des clauses navales.

En particulier, ce sera son devoir que de se rendre dans les arsenaux et de diriger la destruction des navires, selon l'article 6, de prendre livraison des armes, munitions, et matériel de guerre et d'en surveiller la destruction et la démolition.

Le Gouvernement turc devra fournir à la Commission navale interalliée de Contrôle tous les renseignements et documents que la commission jugera nécessaires pour assurer l'exécution complète des clauses navales, en particulier les plans des bâtiments de guerre, la composition de leur armement, les détails et modèles de canons, munitions, torpilles, mines, explosifs, appareils de T.S.F., et en général tout ce qui se rapporte au matériel naval de guerre, ainsi que [que] les documents ou règlements législatifs ou administratifs.

## Document 6

### *Mémoire rédigé par les Conseillers navals*

*Le 11 mars 1920*

#### *Article 24 [28] des Clauses militaires.*

Les conseillers navals désirent attirer l'attention sur les termes 'Puissances alliées' et 'Puissances protectrices' employés dans l'article 24 [28] du projet des clauses militaires de la paix avec la Turquie. Les 'Puissances protectrices' sont présumées être la Grande-Bretagne, la France, et l'Italie, tandis que le terme 'Puissances alliées' semble s'appliquer à un plus grand nombre de nations.

On considère qu'il faudrait substituer 'protectrices' à 'alliées' dans les clauses 1 et 4 [5] de l'article 24, et l'ajouter après le premier mot de la clause 4.

## Document 7

### *Mémoire rédigé par les Conseillers navals*

*Le 11 mars 1920*

#### *Câbles sous-marins*

Les conseillers navals recommandent que, en conformité avec le traité avec l'Allemagne, on introduise dans le Traité de Paix avec la Turquie une clause dont les conditions suivent, en laissant à la commission chargée d'établir les projets le soin de décider la partie du traité où elle devra se trouver.

### Câbles

La Turquie renonce en son propre nom et au nom de ses nationaux en faveur des principales Puissances alliées aux droits, titres ou privilèges de toute nature sur les câbles sous-marins fixés ci-dessous, ou sur toute partie de ces câbles:

Jeddah-Suakkin.

Chypre-Latakia.

La valeur des câbles mentionnés ci-dessus ou des parties de ces câbles, pour autant qu'ils sont propriétés particulières, calculée sur la base du coût original, moins une diminution pour dépréciation, sera créditée à la Turquie dans le compte des réparations.

### No. 66

I.C.P. 80.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, held in Lord Curzon's Room at the British Foreign Office, Whitehall, London, S.W. 1, on Saturday, March 20, 1920, at 11.30 a.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Rear-Admiral Sir Osmond Brock, Captain Domville, Wing-Commander Wynne, Major-General Sir W. Thwaites, Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Leeper; **SECRETARIES,** Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Captain Abraham, Major Young.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Kammerer, General Viscount de la Panouse, Commander de Blanpré.

*Italy:* Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Colonel Castoldi, Signor Galli, Don Ascanio Colonna, Commander Ruspoli, Major Marzillini.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda, Rear-Admiral Iida, Major-General Itamy.

**INTERPRETER:** M. Billot.

#### 1. Article 28<sup>1</sup> was read.

*Treaty of Peace with Turkey.*  
*Military, Naval and Air Clauses*  
It was pointed out that it would be preferable to substitute for the term 'Les Puissances alliées,' 'the three Powers, France, Great Britain and Italy,' by name.

**VISCOUNT CHINDA** said he had understood the term was to be 'the protecting Powers.'

**LORD CURZON** said that it was undesirable to use the expression 'protecting'.

**THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI** agreed that this would be offensive to the Turks.

It was then agreed to use the expression 'the three Powers, France, Great Britain and Italy' in sub-clause 1, and thereafter to use the same expression, or the expression 'the three Powers above mentioned'; for instance, in sub-clauses 3 and 5 of the same article.

With this alteration, sub-clauses 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of this article were adopted.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 65, appendix 1.

LORD CURZON said he understood the British naval representative desired to omit sub-clause 6.

ADMIRAL BROCK said that the matter was dealt with in another part of the treaty concerned with the freedom of the Straits.

(It was agreed to suppress sub-clause 6.)

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he thought the relation of the Civil Commission, which was to regulate the Straits, and the Military Commission, which was to control the Turkish forces, had not been defined. Unless some definition were given, a conflict between the two might ensue.

M. CAMBON said that, although he felt it was very necessary that a conflict between these two bodies should be avoided, he was not sure that a close definition on paper was necessary. The two commissions would live in the same place, and would establish before long a working agreement.

LORD CURZON said he entirely agreed that it was important that there should be no feuds, but he did not think that the danger could be entirely set aside by anything that might be done in the conference.

The tables attached to article 28 were accepted.

Article 29 was read.

ADMIRAL BROCK observed that the Inter-Allied Control Commission mentioned in this article was set up by article 50. It was a commission similar to those set up for Austria and other maritime enemy Powers to see that the peace conditions were carried out.

It was agreed—

That it was desirable to insert after 'Naval Inter-Allied Commission in [? of] Control,' the words 'provided for in article 50,' and to alter the expression 'Puissances alliées protectrices' in a manner in accordance with the modification made in article 28.

With this alteration article 29 was adopted.

In this connection LORD CURZON asked whether the ships Turkey was to deliver were under sufficient protection to prevent their being sunk.

ADMIRAL BROCK said that the ships were in the Golden Horn under the charge of the Allied Commission.

Articles 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 and 36 were read and adopted.

The reference to article 8 in the second paragraph of article 37 was questioned.

It was decided to delete this reference.

With this alteration article 37 was adopted.

Article 38 was read.

At the request of Admiral Brock the words 'and of the demilitarised area' were inserted after the words 'of Constantinople'.

The expression 'Protecting Powers' was altered to 'the three Powers mentioned above'.

Article 39 was read and deleted, as the subject dealt with was covered by another part of the treaty.

Article 40 was adopted.

Article 41 was adopted.

Article 42 was adopted.

Article 43 was adopted.

Article 44 was adopted.

LORD CURZON asked how many inter-Allied commissions were contemplated by article 45.

COLONEL CASTOLDI explained that there were to be three. One military, one naval and one aeronautical, whose respective duties were defined in articles 49, 50 and 51. This was on the analogy of the other treaties.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI enquired why there should be a separate aeronautical commission to deal with Turkey. Germany had a large air service and he could understand why a sub-commission was necessary in the German treaty, but the Turkish air service was so small that it seemed hardly worth while to have a sub-commission to deal with it.

SIR OSMOND BROCK said that these commissions would be very small and consist of not more than three officers each.

WING-COMMANDER WYNNE remarked that they would only remain in existence for six months. So far as the air was concerned some form of supervision would be necessary for this period to ensure that the Turks should not build aircraft.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI suggested that in view of the objection to multiplying commissions and to the bad effect that this would have when the terms of the treaty were published, it might be sufficient for naval and air attachés to be included in the composition of one or other of the more important commissions which it was proposed to set up.

LORD CURZON thought there was considerable force in the Italian Ambassador's criticism. He was personally very much averse from an indefinite multiplication of commissions. He suggested that the commission provided for in article 8 should be given power to form sub-commissions to deal with the naval and air clauses.

Replying to a question by Vicomte de la Panouse he pointed out that the terms of reference of this commission empowered them to deal with the Turkish 'armed forces,' which included naval and air forces.

VISCOUNT CHINDA objected that Japan would not be represented on the commission provided for in article 8.

LORD CURZON replied that if his proposal were adopted he would suggest special provision being made for the inclusion of Japan in the proposed sub-commissions, for the period during which they would remain in existence. These would have a much shorter existence than the commission itself, which would remain in being for several years.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI suggested that articles 8, 45, 49 and 51 should be referred back to the Versailles Commission.

(The question was further discussed during the consideration of articles 48-51.)

Article 46 was adopted.

Article 47 was adopted.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI observed that this article [48] provided an additional argument in favour of reducing the number of commissions to be set up under the treaty.

LORD CURZON remarked, with reference to articles 49 to 51, that if the duties defined in these three articles were to be performed by the sub-commissions of the main commission at Constantinople it would be necessary to specify more exactly where the duties of the respective sub-commissions began and ended. The main commission itself, more especially if it were composed of the officers commanding the Allied forces in the Straits zone, could not be expected to perform the detailed duties specified in these articles. This would be the work of the sub-commissions, and the degree to which they were authorised to take decision[s] should, he thought, be clearly defined.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI thought that this delegation of authority could safely be left to the main commission, which would really be working through the sub-commission set up by itself. He saw no necessity for the wording of the preamble to these articles to be altered.

M. CAMBON agreed with the Italian Ambassador. If the principal [*principle*] were approved that the duties laid down in these articles should be performed by sub-commissions set up by and acting under the supervision of the main commission, he thought it would be a mistake for the extent to which that commission should delegate its authority to be laid down in the treaty. The insertion of these details would, he feared, clearly increase the volume of the treaty.

Reverting to article 48, MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that he thought, in any case, a clause should be inserted limiting the size of the proposed sub-commissions.

LORD CURZON drew attention to the omission to provide in the draft for the payment of the main commission to be set up under article 8.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI suggested that article 48 should be deleted and that no provision should be made for the payment either of the main commission or of the proposed sub-commissions to be set up by it. If the main commission were to be composed of the officers commanding the Allied forces in the Straits zone, to whom one or two naval and air attachés were to be added, he did not see that any provision for special payments would be necessary.

LORD CURZON pointed out that a larger question lay behind the point raised by the Italian Ambassador. On the previous day the conference had come to the conclusion that the main commission should be composed of the officers commanding the Allied forces in the Straits zone.<sup>2</sup> Now that it was contemplated to throw upon the Commissioners the additional burden

<sup>2</sup> See No. 65, minute 2.

involved in the supervision of the three sub-commissions, he was doubtful whether the commanding officers could reasonably be asked to undertake these functions in addition to their own duties. He was inclined to the view that the decision arrived at on the previous day must be reversed.

VICOMTE DE LA PANOUSE suggested that the conference should consult Marshal Foch and ask him to consider whether the main commission and the sub-commissions could, in the opinion of his committee, be formed from among the Allied officers on the spot, or whether special officers would be necessary for these purposes.

LORD CURZON thought this a very good suggestion. He proposed that the whole question of the position of the main commission and of the suggested sub-commissions should be referred to Marshal Foch in a letter somewhat on the following lines:—

‘The conference were all agreed that the number of commissions to be set up should be reduced as far as possible. They accepted the necessity for a main commission to supervise and<sup>3</sup> carrying out of the military, naval and air clauses, and they suggested that the special duties described in articles 49 and 51 should be performed by sub-commissions to be set up by this main commission. They presumed that there would not only be a general officer from each of the three Allied Powers and a fourth officer in supreme command of the forces in occupation of the Straits zone, but that there would be also a very large number of subordinate officers available on the spot. They would ask Marshal Foch to consider how these officers could be used for the purposes of the main commission and sub-commissions, and whether he thought it necessary that any additional officers should be attached to them for the purpose.’

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that he had hitherto been under the impression that the proposed sub-commissions would act independently so far as their own special duties were concerned. He pointed out that if Japan were represented on the sub-commission[s]—and the conference had agreed to this—her representatives would be in a ridiculous position if they were placed under the orders of a main commission on which Japan was not represented.

LORD CURZON replied that it was precisely to meet this point that he had suggested the desirability of a closer definition of the actual duties to be performed by the main commission and sub-commissions respectively. He saw no reason why the powers of the sub-commissions should be any less if they were appointed through the agency of the main commission than if they were appointed independently by the provisions of the treaty. There was no intention whatever of placing Japan in the subordinate position contemplated by the Japanese Ambassador. The same point had been raised in the discussion on article 45, and would be made quite clear in the proposed letter to Marshal Foch.

The conference decided that a letter should be addressed to Marshal Foch in the terms suggested by Lord Curzon.

<sup>3</sup> This word was probably a mistake for ‘the’.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI presumed that the mixed commission proposed in article 52 would now become a sub-commission under the supervision of the main commission.

The conference decided that this point should also be raised in the proposed letter to Marshal Foch.

Article 53 was adopted.

Article 54 was adopted.

LORD CURZON drew attention to the last paragraph of article 55. The article as a whole was worded in general terms which appeared to apply to all the Allied Powers.

The last paragraph, however, made specific exception in favour of France. He could not understand why this should be so.

M. KAMMERER said that the paragraph by which France retained her right to recruit for the Foreign Legion had been inserted in all the other Peace Treaties.

LORD CURZON said that this was no reason why it should necessarily be inserted in the Turkish treaty. The position with regard to Turkey was entirely different. If this paragraph were adopted, the result would be that, while the British in Mosul, Mesopotamia and Palestine were not allowed to recruit Turkish subjects, France alone would be permitted to do so in Syria merely because she already possessed a Foreign Legion.

M. KAMMERER thought that this point demanded closer consideration. The paragraph in question had clearly not been inserted from any other ulterior motive, but merely to uphold the general principle which had been accepted in all the other treaties. In [*It*] was, in his opinion, quite impossible that this provision should be excluded from the Turkish treaty without involving the sacrifice of this principle. He pointed out that the Foreign Legion at present contained only eight Turks. He suggested that the paragraph should be referred back to Versailles.

LORD CURZON said that he quite appreciated M. Kammerer's argument, but he could not for a moment accept his conclusion. In the case of Turkey, the adoption of this paragraph would amount to a special privilege for France which he considered highly undesirable. The conference had decided to limit the Turkish army to a very small force. The result of this would be that a large number of Turks of a military age would find a military career closed to them in their own country. They would naturally look about for opportunities of service elsewhere. Where would they go? All the other Allied Powers having agreed to refrain from enlisting them, they would naturally turn to the French Foreign Legion. While it might be the case that there were at present only eight Turks in the Foreign Legion, there was nothing to prevent 800 or 8,000 being enlisted if this paragraph were adopted. In the troublous times which he foresaw for Great Britain and France in the Middle East the power to enlist these men would be of great assistance to France, while Great Britain would be precluded from making use of them.

Another very important point was that there would be a continual stream



of men who had received military training in the Foreign Legion returning to Turkey. The whole object of the limitation which it was proposed to impose on the Turkish Government would be defeated if an opening were left to them to send men of a military age to be trained elsewhere. He adhered to the view that the case of Turkey was quite different from that of the other enemy Powers.

M. KAMMERER said that the French Government were looking only to the maintenance of the Foreign Legion. They would raise no objection to the formation by Great Britain of a similar organisation. Their object was not to secure an advantage for themselves which was denied to other Powers. They had experienced great difficulties with Germany in the past on the subject of the Legion, and they must insist on safeguarding the principle that they should be allowed to recruit for it all over the world.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI remarked that if an exception were to be made in regard to empowering any country to raise a Foreign Legion, he would ask that similar rights be granted to Italy.

LORD CURZON said that he failed to see why a special clause should be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey to safeguard a principle as far as Turkey was concerned. There were said to be only eight Turks in the Foreign Legion, and unless the French Government proposed a considerable increase in this number their contention amounted to a plea for special provision to enable them to retain the services of eight men. The Italian Ambassador had made the suggestion that Italy should also embark upon the formation of a Foreign Legion. He strongly deprecated this suggestion. The recruitment of large Asiatic and African armies by European Powers was highly objectionable. The present troubles which the French Government were experiencing in Cilicia were due to a large extent to the presence of Senegalese and Armenian troops in French uniforms. The peace of the world would be seriously threatened unless the European Powers agreed to limit their recruitment of Asiatic and African troops. His objection was in no way answered by M. Kammerer's reply that France would have no objection to Great Britain forming a Foreign Legion. Great Britain had no wish to do anything of the kind. He could not possibly give way on this point, and if the French representative insisted on the retention of this paragraph he must ask that the question be referred to the Supreme Council.

M. KAMMERER observed that the Foreign Legion was recruited from men who had lost all hope of advancement and were prepared to lose their nationality and cut themselves entirely adrift from their own country. A Turk presenting himself for enlistment in the Foreign Legion was not regarded as a Turk and could not even be identified as such. The French Government would never accept without qualification a provision which struck at the root principle on which the Legion of Honour [*sic*] was based. In view of the number of Turks enlisted in the Legion, Lord Curzon's objection did not appear to him insuperable.

LORD CURZON pointed out that the French Government had the whole world to choose from. A Turk was quite unmistakable and he could not

admit that the French authorities would be unable to identify him if he walked into the recruiting office at Alexandretta. This was not a small question, but a most important one. The French Government were certainly going to experience great difficulties in Syria and Cilicia. The local population would not stand the continued presence of African troops. The French authorities would inevitably find themselves compelled to enlist Turks. The result would be that an immense Turkish army would grow up under the banner of France on the actual boundaries of the future Turkey. This would be a great international danger which he would do all in his power to avert.

The conference decided that the question should be referred to the Supreme Council.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA criticised the wording of article 56 which implied either that the present treaty would not remain in force or that Turkey would never enter the League of Nations.

LORD CURZON agreed that the clause was badly worded. He understood that a similar clause had been inserted in the other treaties, but he considered that in any case a clause of this nature should find some other place in the treaty and not be included in the chapter relating to the military, naval and air clauses.

The conference decided that this article should not be inserted here.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, March 20, 1920.*

#### No. 67

I.C.P. 81.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, held in Lord Curzon's Room at the British Foreign Office, Whitehall, London, S.W. 1, on Monday, March 22, 1920, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Rear-Admiral Sir Osmond Brock, Captain Domville, Wing-Commander Wynne, Major-General Sir W. Thwaites, Mr. Vansittart, Major-General Sir F. H. Sykes, Major-General Sir Fabian Ware (Imperial [War] Graves Commission); SECRETARIES, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Major Young.

*France*: M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, General Viscount de la Panouse, Commander B. de Blanpré.

*Italy*: Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Colonel Castoldi, Signor Galli, Don Ascanio Colonna, Commander Ruspoli, Major Marzillini.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda, Rear-Admiral Iida, Major-General Itamy.

INTERPRETER: Captain Abraham.

The conference resumed their examination of military, naval and air clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.<sup>1</sup>

*Military, Naval  
and Air Clauses  
of the Treaty of  
Peace with  
Turkey*

Articles 57-64 were adopted by the conference without amendment.

It was agreed to add a fresh paragraph to article 64 similar to that inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 65, appendix 1.

‘(3) A faciliter la constatation d’actes criminels possibles [passibles] des sanctions prévues à la Partie VI (sanctions) du présent traité, commis par des Turcs sur la personne de prisonniers de guerre ou de ressortissants alliés durant leur captivité.’

Article 65 was adopted without amendment.

It was agreed to insert here a fresh clause, article 65 (b), as follows:—

‘Les hautes parties contractantes déclarent renoncer au remboursement réciproque des sommes dues pour l’entretien des prisonniers de guerre sur leurs territoires respectifs.’

*Section II.* Article 66 was adopted without amendment.

*Graves* The attention of the conference was drawn to a telegram from Marshal Foch to the President of the Supreme Peace Conference, dated the 20th March, 1920 (A.J. 112),<sup>2</sup> to the effect that the Military Allied Commission, at their meeting on the 19th March, had examined the British proposal to supplement article 67 in the draft of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey by a clause transferring to the British Government a strip of coastal territory to the south-west of Suvla Bay on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

The French and Japanese representatives were willing to adopt this proposal, but the Italian representative had signified his inability to accept it and had asked that the following addition might be made instead to the above article:—

‘At certain places where several Allied cemeteries are very close together, the Inter-Allied Commission should lay down that Turkish subjects should have no power to construct any new building of any sort in the spaces between the said cemeteries.’

LORD CURZON said that he had since been informed by Signor Scialoja that the Italian Government were prepared to withdraw their objection to the British proposal and were not disposed further to press for their own alternative clause.

It was accordingly agreed to make the following addition to article 67:—

‘Le territoire qui devra être transféré comprendra en particulier la partie de la péninsule de Gallipoli indiquée sur la carte ci-jointe. Mais les limites dudit territoire seront définitivement indiquées conformément au premier paragraphe du présent article. Il est bien entendu que cette concession perpétuelle n’implique pour le Gouvernement au profit duquel elle est consentie aucun droit présent ou futur d’utiliser ce territoire et la côte correspondante pour quelque usage que ce soit (militaire, maritime ou commercial) autre que celui pour lequel elle a été octroyée.’

Articles 68–73 were adopted without amendment.

The conference were reminded that the whole of the naval clauses had *Naval Clauses* been already discussed and accepted.

<sup>2</sup> Not appended to filed copy: this document was as indicated below.

*Aeronautical  
Clauses* The conference had before them a copy of the letter from the chairman of the Aerial Navigation Commission to the secretary of the Supreme Council, dated the 20th [2nd] March, 1920 (A.J. 57),<sup>2</sup> forwarding draft articles regarding aerial navigation for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

GENERAL SYKES said that the Aerial Navigation Commission had had under consideration a note submitted by the French delegates, a copy of which<sup>2</sup> was attached to the commission's letter to the Supreme Council. The commission were of opinion that unless the Supreme Council intended to subject Turkey to some special control of her civil administration, such as was outlined in paragraph 3 of the French note, aerial navigation clauses in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey should follow those already adopted in the other treaties of peace, and articles drawn up in this supposition were accordingly submitted to the Supreme Council. If, on the other hand, it was the policy of the Supreme Council to subject civil administration of Turkey to some such control, the commission would like to be informed as to the nature of this policy and to be allowed to reconsider their draft articles.

GENERAL DE LA PANOUSE said that the French delegation, in their note to the Aerial Navigation Commission, had drawn attention to the fact that Turkey was not, and could not, for a long time become capable of developing a civil aviation which would be really and exclusively Turk, having regard to the strictly limited nature of the means at her disposal. The technical committees had unanimously recognised that there was no practical means of preventing civil aviation from being rapidly transformed into military aviation. If, therefore, no measure of control was intended there was every reason to fear that civil aviation would be developed with the assistance of the Central Powers under shelter of the Treaty of Peace and under a Turkish façade. In [the] view of the French delegation, the dangers which might in consequence arise could not be ignored.

WING-COMMANDER WYNNE suggested that [in] article 24,<sup>1</sup> after 'matériel de guerre' the words 'd'avions et d'accessoires' should be inserted. Also [in] article 25, after the first paragraph, the following words should be inserted: 'the importation of aircraft and aircraft accessories into Turkey is forbidden, except with the permission of the contracting Powers.'

GENERAL SYKES said that the adoption of this proposal would meet the case submitted by his commission.

It was agreed that articles 24 and 25 should be amended as proposed by Wing-Commander Wynne above.

The eight articles on Aerial Navigation submitted by the Aerial Navigation Commission, appended to the chairman's letter referred to above (A.J. 57)<sup>2</sup> were adopted by the conference.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> These eight draft articles, numbered 31 to 38 were, with minor variation, the same as articles 318 to 323, 326 and 327, respectively, of the Treaty of Sèvres, except that (a) the draft read 'Allied and Associated' where the treaty read 'Allied'; (b) draft article 32 did not include the phrase 'with the assent of the Principal Allied Powers'; (c) draft article 33 corresponded to the first paragraph only of article 320; (d) draft article 34 did not include the

The conference had under consideration a letter from M. Jules Cambon, dated the 11th March, 1920,<sup>4</sup> to the President of the Supreme Council, enclosing draft clauses relating to penalties,<sup>4</sup> drawn up and adopted by the Commission on Responsibility, with a view to their insertion in the conditions of peace to be presented to Turkey.

LORD CURZON enquired if it was not a fact that the Allies had already demanded the surrender by Turkey of Enver and Talaat, and that they had also remonstrated with Germany for harbouring such men.<sup>5</sup>

M. CAMBON asked whether it was possible for the Allies to demand the extradition of persons who were not nationals of either of the countries concerned. In this case the Allies were asking Germany to hand over persons who were of neither German nor British nationality.

LORD CURZON suggested that the discussion of this particular point might be reserved for the present and that the clauses relating to penalties should now be considered *seriatim*.

M. CAMBON said that he was in considerable doubt as to the legal aspect of article 2 (a), which raised the above important point, and he asked that the discussion of the penalty clause[s] might be adjourned until the following day, in order to enable him in the meantime to consult the legal experts in Paris.

It was agreed to defer the consideration of the penalty clauses until M. Cambon had been able to refer to Paris.

The conference had under consideration the supplementary report of the Committee on the Protection of Minorities in Turkey (A.J. 110);<sup>6</sup> the members of the Minorities Committee having stated that the supplementary report had been unanimously approved by the committee,

phrase 'must be approved by the Principal Allied Powers and'; (e) draft article 38 read: 'The obligations imposed by the preceding provisions shall remain in force until the 1st January, 1923, unless before that date Turkey shall have been admitted into the League of Nations or shall have been authorised by consent of the Allied and Associated Powers to adhere to the Convention relative to Aerial Navigation concluded between those Powers.'

<sup>4</sup> See No. 69, appendix 3.

<sup>5</sup> Enver Pasha, Turkish Minister of War (1914-18), and Talaat Pasha, Grand Vizier (1917-18), had at the end of the First World War proceeded to Germany. (Thence Enver Pasha had endeavoured, with ultimate success, to fly in disguise to Russia: see Volume II, No. 4, note 1, also E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-23*, vol. iii, pp. 246-7.)

<sup>6</sup> This report, not appended to filed copy, read:

'London, March 19, 1920

*'Supplementary report. Committee on protection of Minorities in Turkey*

'The Committee, in accordance with the instructions of the Council of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors examined the memorandum (A.J. 95 [No. 63, Appendix 1]) of the Greek Delegation, suggesting certain clauses for insertion in the section of the treaty dealing with the protection of minorities in Turkey.

'As the Greek memorandum quoted the articles which the Greek Delegation desired to insert, and fully explained their purport, the Committee did not consider it necessary to hear M. Venizelos personally on the subject.

'Taking the numbered paragraphs of the Greek memorandum in turn, the Committee unanimously decided as follows:

and that there were no points in it calling for special consideration, it was agreed to adopt the supplementary report without amendment.

'1. It was desirable to insert, after the second paragraph of Article 6 of the chapter on the protection of minorities already recommended to and approved by the Council, the following paragraph:

' "Le Gouvernement ottoman présentera dans un délai de deux ans après la mise en vigueur du présent traité aux Puissances Alliées un projet d'organisation du système électoral basé sur le principe de la représentation proportion[n]elle de minorités ethniques.'

'2. These desiderata are already sufficiently covered by the general protection afforded by the draft articles, already approved and by the provisions of article 5.

'3. This paragraph suggests 3 additional articles. The Committee considered that the first two were already met by the provisions of the existing articles Nos. 2 and 3. As regards the third suggested article the Committee recommend the insertion of the following paragraph at the end of the existing article 2:

' "Les atteintes au libre exercice de cultes seront punies des mêmes peines, quel que soit le culte intéressé."

'4. The Committee considered this suggestion valuable and recommend the following article either to follow immediately upon No. 6 of the existing draft articles or to be inserted in such other place in the treaty as the drafting Committee may consider appropriate:

' "Le Gouvernement ottoman reconnaîtra la validité des diplômes émanant d'université[s] ou d'écoles étrangères reconnues et admettra les porteurs au libre exercice des professions et industries auxquelles ces diplômes qualifient. Ces dispositions s'appliqueront également aux ressortissants des puissances alliées résidant en Turquie."

'5. This suggestion is adequately covered by an article which figures in the Committee's recommendations dealing with the provisions to be inserted in the Turkish Treaty regarding changes of nationality.

'6. The Committee consider that article 5 of the existing draft articles as already approved as well as the general measure of protection afforded by Nos. 2, 6, 7 and 9 of the existing draft articles cover, as far as is possible or desirable, the suggestions made in this paragraph.

'7. The Committee did not feel able to accept this suggestion which raised too large a question of interference in Ottoman legislation and in particular the question of judicial reform.

'8. The Committee considered that the article suggested in this paragraph was sufficiently covered by the general protection afforded to minorities by article 7 of the existing draft articles.

'9. The article suggested in this paragraph is practically identic with the provisions of article 7 of the existing draft articles.

'10. The Committee considered that this suggestion was already met, as far as was desirable or practicable by the concluding paragraph of article 6 of the existing draft articles.

'11. This suggestion is identic with that embodied in No. 12 of the original draft articles which it has since been decided to suppress and replace by a general suspensary article, pending consultation with the Council of the League of Nations.

'12. Article 9 of the existing draft articles covers the proposals made by the Greek delegation in this paragraph.

'In submitting this report the Committee venture to suggest that if the Council consider it desirable to reply to the Greek Delegation's memorandum, the Greek Delegation might be informed in general terms, and with an expression of thanks, that their proposals have been examined by the competent commission and that articles have been drafted for insertion in the treaty, which cover the points raised by the Greek Delegation to the extent considered desirable or practicable by the Council.'

The conference had before them copies of a memorandum<sup>7</sup> dated the 10th March, 1920, addressed to Mr. Lloyd George and signed by the Archbishop of Trebizond, the president of the Pan-Pontic Congress, and the president of the National League of the Euxine-Pontus of Paris.

*The Claims of Pontus* LORD CURZON enquired whether the signatories to the memorandum had been received by any members of the conference or any officials of the Allied Governments. The memorandum before the conference was signed by the Archbishop of Trebizond and other members of the Greek community on the shores of the Black Sea. He himself was afraid that the conference would be unable to accept the proposals put forward in the memorandum; but, in compliment to the signatories, he suggested that a reply should be sent to them to the effect that the document had been before the Supreme Council, which had taken note of the representations made therein.

MR. VANSITTART, at the invitation of the chairman, then gave certain statistics regarding the populations in the area referred to in the memorandum. The figures for the population in the area corresponding to Pontus, that is to say, Trebizond and Djanik, were 1,830,000 Moslems and only 312,000 Greeks. The percentage in the various districts showed a very great preponderance of Moslems over Greeks.

LORD CURZON said that the figures quoted in the memorandum before the conference were very different; the Archbishop had said that the population of Pontus included 850,000 Greeks, including a quarter of a million emigrants in Southern Russia and Caucasia, who awaited the liberation of Pontus to return to their homes. He himself was of opinion that practically none of these emigrants would ever come back, though the possibility of their return was very useful for the purpose of the Archbishop's argument.

MR. VANSITTART said that the figures as given in the memorandum were pre-war and were certainly not applicable to-day.

It was agreed—

That a reply should be sent to the signatories of the memorandum, in the sense suggested by Lord Curzon, and the secretary was instructed to take the necessary action.

LORD CURZON said that he understood that the French delegates were preparing a memorandum on the financial clauses which would reveal a serious difference of opinion between them and their British colleagues. In these circumstances, he thought that the

*Financial Clauses* <sup>7</sup> In this memorandum, not appended, the Archbishop of Trebizond stated, in particular: 'The aspiration of Pontus to-day is to secure its full independence. The compact masses of its Greek population are the basis of this aspiration. If, however, more general considerations make this solution impossible we venture to submit that it is not too much to ask for an autonomous régime analogous to that which formerly worked so successfully in the Lebanon, with an European governor, local self-government and a local gendarmerie under European organizers.'

memorandum would have to come before the Supreme Council, and he suggested that it would be desirable to take the memorandum straight to the council and not to have it discussed first by the conference.

MR. VANSITTART pointed out that in any case, before either the council or the conference could discuss the French memorandum, it would be necessary to await the French Government's reply regarding Syria.<sup>8</sup>

It was agreed—

- (a) That M. Cambon should telegraph to Paris, urging that the French Government should expedite their reply in respect of Syria.
- (b) That the financial clauses should be referred direct to the Supreme Council, without any Parliamentary [? preliminary] decision by the conference.
- (c) That the economic clauses should be taken by the conference at an early date.

LORD CURZON said that, when the report of the Smyrna Committee was discussed, it had been decided that the Turkish flag should be allowed *Smyrna* to fly on one of the forts outside the town, and that the local Parliament of Greeks and Turks should, after a period of two years, vote as to whether Smyrna should become a part of Greece.<sup>9</sup> Since they had reached this decision, he had heard from the [? a] number of people who were thoroughly well acquainted with the inhabitants of and conditions at Smyrna, and they had all informed him that the Supreme Council's decision was in their opinion a great cause of injustice, and would lead to considerable conflict. He wished, therefore, to take the opinion of his colleagues as to whether they were bound by the Supreme Council's decisions, or whether they could review the question; in other words, were the conference at liberty to reopen the matter? He reminded the conference that he himself had suggested that the local Parliament should address the League of Nations after three years. M. Veniselos had, however, pressed for the period to be reduced to two years, and the council had adopted his proposal.

M. CAMBON enquired whether the question whether period should be two or five years was the question Lord Curzon desired to raise.

LORD CURZON said that all he wished to do was to know if his colleagues felt that they were free to review the question if necessary. Lord Curzon said that he himself was in favour of extending the term to five years. He reminded the conference that some time previously it had been decided to ask Marshal Foch to report on the armed strength required in his opinion to carry out the terms of the treaty.<sup>10</sup> He would ask M. Cambon to press for the early submission of Marshal Foch's report.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that in his opinion five years would not be a sop to the Turks. They would either accept the terms, whatever period might be laid down, or they would refuse to accept.

<sup>8</sup> See No. 42, minute 3 (c) and No. 48, minute 2.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. No. 25, minute 1 and No. 26, minutes 1 and 3.

<sup>10</sup> See No. 60, minute 2.



LORD CURZON asked whether the Marquis Imperiali considered it necessary to insert in the clauses any period at all.

After some discussion, it was agreed—

- (a) That M. Cambon should telegraph to Paris, asking that the submission of Marshal Foch's report on the armed strength necessary to carry out the terms of the treaty might be expedited.
- (b) That the conference were free to reopen the question of Smyrna with the Supreme Council, if they considered it desirable.

(*The conference adjourned at 6.20 p.m.*)

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 22, 1920.

## No. 68

I.C.P. 82.] *British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held in Lord Curzon's Room at the British Foreign Office, Whitehall, London, S.W. 1, on Monday, March 22, 1920, at 4.15 p.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; **SECRETARIES,** Sir M. Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Berthelot.

*Italy:* Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda.

**INTERPRETER:** Captain Abraham.

1. **MR. LLOYD GEORGE** said that he had summoned a meeting of the Supreme Council as he thought it was desirable to have a discussion on the present position in Germany, notably in respect of the demand of the German Government to be allowed to send troops to the disaffected areas. The council had had a preliminary discussion the previous week,<sup>1</sup> since which time the situation had sensibly deteriorated. The Spartacists were gaining strength every day. He had talked over the matter with Lord Curzon and Mr. Churchill that morning, and the latter had informed him that British officers, who had seen something of the fighting in the occupied zone, stated that they had seen a German battalion coming back very badly battered. It appeared that the Spartacists were well-led, well-disciplined and, since Essen had been captured, well-equipped. There was, in fact, a formidable and growing movement in favour of Communism, which the council could not contemplate without considerable misgiving. According to the information in the hands of the British Government, the Spartacists had already about 40,000 troops. He wished to ask the French delegates if they had any special news.

*The Situation  
in Germany*

<sup>1</sup> See No. 64, minute 1.

M. BERTHELOT said that the French Embassy had no exact information of very recent date.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, proceeding, said that, in his opinion, unless the German Government were allowed at once to send sufficient troops to crush the rebellion in the Ruhr Valley, the Communist movement which, as he had said, was spreading every day, would extend into Belgium and possibly into France. The Berlin Government, when they first made their request to be permitted to send troops,<sup>2</sup> had named quite a small force, which they thought would be sufficient for the purpose. In their latest telegram they had pointed out that, owing to the delay, a considerably larger number of men would now be necessary.<sup>3</sup> He understood, from what he had heard from Paris, that M. Millerand was disposed to allow German troops to move into the troubled areas if Allied troops simultaneously marched into Germany and occupied certain territory. He himself thought that this course was of doubtful wisdom. The Allies would never have any difficulty in ejecting German troops should this be necessary. If guarantees were required, Marshal Foch could put forward his suggestions, and the Allied Governments could communicate their nature to the German Government, and should have little difficulty in exacting them. He himself saw no point in occupying other German territory than the zones where the Allied troops now were. The less the Allies mixed themselves up in the internal affairs of Germany the better. There was always the danger of stimulating and welding German nationalist sentiment by outside interference, the effect of which would be to rally the moderate elements to the Spartacist side, as had been the case in Russia. His own opinion was that the Germans should be allowed to put into the disturbed areas as many troops as might be necessary to suppress the present disorders.

M. CAMBON said that no special news had been received from Paris that day. He understood, however, that, as Mr. Lloyd George had said, the Germans of Soviet sympathies in the Ruhr Valley were making considerable progress. When the question had first arisen, M. Millerand had undoubtedly been strongly opposed to allowing any German troops to move at all, because it was contrary to the terms of the treaty. Moreover, the disturbed areas were districts where there was a considerable amount of coal, and, as everybody knew, France was enormously handicapped at present by lack of coal, which meant the stagnation of industry and consequent strikes. The whole industrial life of France was largely dependent upon the provision of coal, and the treaty expressly laid down that France was to receive coal from these particular areas. Public feeling in France was very strong indeed on the subject, and could not be ignored. He had discussed the question lately with

<sup>2</sup> See No. 64, appendix 2; cf. also Cmd. 1325, p. 58.

<sup>3</sup> In a memorandum of March 20 the German Chargé d'Affaires had informed His Majesty's Government that he had received a further communication from the German Government according to which the German military authorities were of opinion that, in view of the serious development of the situation in the Ruhr, a force of eighteen battalions, four squadrons and eighteen batteries would now be necessary to restore law and order there.

Lord Curzon, who had suggested that German troops might be permitted to enter the districts under certain conditions, that is to say, that there should be an inter-Allied control exercised by the Allied Powers, and that the German forces should be under an obligation to withdraw after a certain period. This suggestion had been passed on by himself to M. Millerand. At the same time Marshal Foch had conceived the same idea, and had talked it over with Field-Marshal Wilson. If this suggestion found favour with the council he would be very glad indeed to forward it to his Government. Personally he was in entire accord with Mr. Lloyd George that the Germans should settle their own internal affairs themselves, and the less the Allies mixed themselves up in these matters the better. Allied intervention would indubitably consolidate and unite all German parties. He enquired whether any further expression of opinion as to the action to be taken had been received from the Versailles Council?

LORD CURZON said that nothing yet had reached London. He wished to point out that when Mr. Lloyd George had spoken of certain opinions attributed to M. Millerand, that is to say, that the French President of the Council refused to agree to German troops entering the disturbed areas unless they were accompanied by Allied officers, he was speaking from information received from the British Ambassador in Paris the previous evening. He suggested that this telegram should be read to the council.

THE INTERPRETER then read a French translation of the telegram, of which the following is a paraphrase:—

‘The President of the French Council tells me that he will allow German forces to go into the Ruhr Valley on one condition only, and that is that other portions of Germany, not necessarily the said valley, shall be occupied by Allied troops. This occupation, both by Allied troops and by Germans, must be for a strictly limited period, and both must evacuate simultaneously. This proposal, and the particular territories to which Allied troops should be sent, were now being studied by Marshal Foch. In the event of the Berlin Government agreeing to the principle, the troops could proceed at once.’

M. CAMBON said that he had received a telegram the previous night from M. Millerand in which the latter had said that he was disposed to agree to an Inter-Allied occupation of certain German territory simultaneously with the despatch of German troops, the forces on both sides moving and withdrawing simultaneously. This proposal had been submitted to him by M. Millerand, and as a suggestion only. As Mr. Lloyd George was so strongly opposed to any Allied intervention, he thought that there was no use in pressing this suggestion.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was glad to hear from M. Cambon that he did not think M. Millerand would insist on his proposal being accepted. Supposing, he said, in 1871 the Germans had sent their troops to suppress the Commune, even if they had marched side by side with M. Thiers’ troops,<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> The insurrection of the Paris Commune, March–May 1871, was suppressed by the troops of the Republic, M. Thiers being then Head of the Executive.

the effect would have been to have united the French and to have discredited the Thiers Government. He again urged that the Germans should fight out the matter by themselves. Allied intervention would have the further effect of lowering the prestige of the present moderate German Government.

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that in 1871 the Germans had, as a matter of fact, asked the French if they should assist them to suppress the Commune, and the French had refused their help.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this showed how wise the French were, and how equally prudent the Germans were not to press the matter.

M. CAMBON said that he understood that His Britannic Majesty's Government were of opinion that it was impossible for the Allies to send any troops to suppress the trouble. He personally agreed with this. If, however, the Allied Powers took no action at all, they would become actual accomplices of the Communists. Again, if they refused to let the Germans settle the matter themselves, the Allies would be in a very difficult position. The problem was, how to allow the Germans to get into the neutral zone and yet not depart from the terms of the treaty. He thought the problem might best be solved by referring to Paris Lord Curzon's suggestion that the Germans should be allowed to send a certain number of troops for a limited time; that this number should be confined to what was actually necessary to restore order; and that the German forces should be subjected to an inter-Allied General Staff control. If that was the opinion of the British Government, he enquired whether the council desired him to refer this suggestion to Paris.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he thought these proposals were very similar to those which had been put forward by Marshal Foch. He wished to know whether they met with the approval of the Italian delegates.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that when the matter had last been discussed he had stated that he understood that an Ambassadorial Conference in Paris was simultaneously examining the question. This raised a rather important point of procedure. He himself thought it was desirable that it should be clearly laid down on which side of the English Channel decisions could be taken. In Paris no decisions were taken without the several delegates consulting their respective Governments. In any case, whatever was to be done must be done as quickly as possible.

LORD CURZON said that Signor Scialoja was perfectly right. Promptness of action was of the first importance. The Paris Ambassadorial Conference had been set up, first, to finish off all small matters connected with the Treaty of Peace with Germany, and, secondly, to deal with points of that treaty requiring interpretation. On the other hand, that conference was precluded from discussing big questions of policy, and it had no authority to take executive action on a large scale. What was now before the council in London was a matter which would require such action. That, at any rate, was the view taken by His Majesty's Government. He thought it was a misfortune that M. Millerand could not be in London at the present juncture. On the other hand, the council was composed of the British Prime Minister and various distinguished Ministers and Ambassadors, such as M. Cambon,

Signor Scialoja, the Marquis Imperiali, Viscount Chinda and M. Berthelot. There was no doubt, in his opinion, that of the two bodies, the one in Paris and the other in London, the latter was best qualified to reach decisions, and the instructions which the British Government had sent to Lord Derby had been based on that view. He thought it was desirable that the other Allied Governments should be informed accordingly.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that, so far as his personal opinion went, he agreed with Lord Curzon's proposal. He had received a telegram recently from his colleague in Paris, just after the meeting of the conference there referred to by Signor Scialoja, and his colleague had stated that he had sent a cable to Tokyo asking for instructions. Those instructions, when received, would apply, of course, equally to himself and to his colleague in Paris. In default of their receipt he could not commit his Government, but, as immediate action was required, he was prepared to acquiesce in it *ad referendum* to Tokyo.

M. CAMBON said that he would cable at once to M. Millerand, and inform him that the council accepted the suggestion that Germany should send troops, subject to certain guarantees which would be laid down by Marshal Foch and would include limitation of time of occupation and the presence of inter-Allied staff officers; further, that the council was of opinion that in no circumstances could Allied troops be sent to restore order.

LORD CURZON enquired what was actually meant by 'control,' as earlier in the meeting M. Cambon had cited that one of the guarantees should be inter-Allied staff control.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that the word 'contrôle' merely meant 'supervision,' which was quite a different matter from the British word 'control.'

M. BERTHELOT said that he had a suggestion to make which perhaps would meet the views of both M. Millerand and of Mr. Lloyd George: the Germans should be told that they were allowed to send troops to repress the disorders, which was a matter simply for the German Government alone; this suppression the Germans could do in their own way; the Allied Powers had no intention of sending any troops themselves; if, however, they did not withdraw within a certain limited period, the Allies would be bound also to send troops, not in order to suppress the risings, but just to satisfy themselves as to whether the Germans were acting in good faith.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA thought it would be difficult to fix any exact period.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that M. Cambon, in his telegram to M. Millerand, should add 'the council thinks it important to act immediately.'

M. CAMBON said that he had received a communication containing a telegram from Marshal Foch, regarding an Inter-Allied Mission of Control, and also dealing with the question of reparations. This he had discussed with Lord Curzon, but unfortunately their conversation had been interrupted. The Ambassadorial Conference was to meet again, he understood, in Paris the following day.

LORD CURZON said that M. Cambon was right in saying that the Amba-

sadorial Conference was meeting the following day in Paris. The principal subjects of the discussion were, he was informed, first, reparation by the German Government for attacks upon and insults to Allied officers; and, second, whether or not a letter should be sent to the German Government pointing out various infringements of, or failures to keep, the Peace Treaty. He had also received a despatch from Lord Derby, communicating Marshal Foch's proposals on the subject,<sup>5</sup> which he himself was inclined to regard as not unreasonable. He would remind the council, however, of the view that he thought they had been disposed to adopt the other day, that now was hardly the moment to insist upon reparation. The German Government at this moment was fighting for its life, and the last thing he thought the Allies should do would be further to embarrass it. The British Government, therefore, while accepting Marshal Foch's principle, thought it desirable to postpone action until the German Government was once more on its legs. The second question was a much larger one. Marshal Foch had prepared a list of infringements of, and failures to keep, the Peace Treaty. He had studied this list, and he thought that in several cases the infringements were not deliberate in character, but were really almost inevitable. On the other hand, there had been serious breaches in regard to the surrender of military material and the reduction of the number of effectives. Here he again would suggest that this was not a favourable moment to approach the German Government on the subject. On the other hand, it was impossible for the Allies to shut their eyes to what was going on. He believed himself that M. Millerand was anxious to send the proposed letter enclosing the list, and threatening that unless the German Government took the desired action the Allied Powers would be compelled to adopt reprisals. He doubted whether such action was wise. He ventured to suggest, as an alternative, that a document should be drawn up stating exactly the position, and placing on record the view of the Allied Governments in regard to the reparation that was due for insults and attacks on their officers, and pointing out the various failures to keep the Peace Treaty. This, he thought, would sufficiently meet the case for the present, and he deprecated the use of threats, in view of the very unstable position of the Government at Berlin.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired what exactly was meant by 'reparation.' He had only just seen the article referred to, and he was not quite certain what it meant. He was all in favour of making the demands suggested by Marshal Foch at the right moment, but he quite agreed with Lord Curzon that to make those demands now would simply have the effect of bringing down the feeble German Government like a house of cards. Then, again, he found it difficult to speak with approval of the proposal of the French that German troops were to be brought in from various well-known German towns in order ceremonially to apologise for the insults and the attacks on Allied officers. He asked the council to reflect upon what would be the effect of this upon the German troops. At the very moment when the loyalty of those troops was essential to the stability of the reinstated Government, it

<sup>5</sup> See No. 61, minute 3 and note 6.

was suggested that this loyalty should be submitted to an excessively severe test. Moreover, the places from which it was proposed to draw the troops in order to go through the ceremony of apologising were towns where trouble was brewing, and, indeed, disorders had already broken out. Then, as to the trial of the guilty, was a demand of this nature to be put forward when it was essential that the German Government should be able to rely upon its own troops to assist it in maintaining order? If he himself were pro-Spartacist, he would strongly urge that this document should be sent out just at this particular juncture. He earnestly begged that the council would do nothing to embarrass or to raise fresh difficulties for the existing weak, but moderate, Government in Berlin. He sincerely hoped that the document would not be sent, as he could conceive of nothing so well calculated to give an impetus to Communism.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI agreed that it was highly dangerous.

LORD CURZON asked what action it was proposed to take in regard to the larger question.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had talked over the matter with Lord Curzon, and he would merely say that he would add his entreaties to those of the British Foreign Minister and beg the council not to send this document to Berlin at this moment. When things were re-established there, formal demand of the character suggested by the French would be submitted.

It was agreed—

- (a) That Lord Curzon and M. Cambon respectively should telegraph at once to the British Ambassador in Paris and the President of the French Council in the sense of the above discussion, and stating that the London Council were of opinion that anything of a nature likely to embarrass the German Government, placed, as it was, in a position of singular difficulty, was most undesirable; that they suggested that the German Government should be informed that there was no objection to their sending sufficient troops into the disturbed areas to suppress the present disorders, subject to certain guarantees (which would be drawn up by Marshal Foch) in regard to the period of time within which the said troops would have to be withdrawn, and requiring that inter-Allied staff officers should be allowed to accompany the German forces.
- (b) That, similarly, telegrams should be sent as above, stating that the London Council, while fully agreeing that it was desirable to bring to the notice of the German Government the fact that reparation would be required for the attacks upon and insults to Allied officers, were strongly opposed to immediate reparation being demanded, in view of the critical situation of the re-established German Government.
- (c) That telegrams of a similar character should be sent in respect of the various infringements of and failures to keep the Peace Treaty by the Germans.

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 22, 1920.

I.C.P. 83.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, held in Lord Curzon's Room at the British Foreign Office, Whitehall, London, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, March 23, 1920, at 4 p.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, Sir Ernest Pollock (for Minute 2), Mr. Hurst; **SECRETARIES,** Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Captain Abraham.

*Belgium:* Baron Moncheur (for Minute 1).

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Berthelot (for Minute 1), M. Kammerer.

*Italy:* Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Commander Baccari, Signor Galli, Don Ascanio Colonna.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda.

**INTERPRETER:** M. Camerlynck.

1. The conference had before them copies of a draft reply, prepared by M. Berthelot, to the Dutch note regarding the internment of the ex-Kaiser (A.J. 116) (Appendix 1).

*Draft Reply to the Dutch Note regarding the Internment of the Ex-Kaiser*

LORD CURZON said that the question of the internment of the ex-Kaiser had been fully discussed at a meeting held at 10, Downing Street, the previous week, and it had been agreed that the controversy could not be continued with satisfaction.<sup>1</sup> The Dutch had taken the matter out of our hands by their Royal decree. We had every right to resist if we felt so disposed, but the Dutch were known to be a particularly obstinate and stubborn nation. We had then examined what means of pressure or compulsion might be used in the last resort, and it had been found that such did not exist. It had therefore been decided to accept the situation with as much dignity as we could, and that a reply should be sent placing the responsibility for the future exclusively on the shoulders of the Dutch. Mr. Lloyd George had then asked M. Berthelot and himself to prepare draft replies to the last note from the Netherlands Government. The conference had before them a very excellent note by M. Berthelot. He had no criticism to make upon this, and only one comment, and that was that, with the delicacy and subtlety which one always associated with the French nation, the note perhaps erred on the side of being too gentle. He himself had felt that the situation perhaps required something rather more stern. He was quite sure that M. Berthelot would agree to the final draft being couched in rather stronger terms than he himself had employed, and he had therefore prepared an alternative draft, which he had that morning submitted to the British Cabinet, where it had been approved. He suggested that the drafts should be read, so that members could form their own opinion of their respective merits.

(Lord Curzon's draft was then read (Appendix 2)<sup>2</sup>.)

<sup>1</sup> See No. 64, minute 2.

<sup>2</sup> This appendix was not appended to the filed copy and is untraced in Foreign Office archives. (Cf. No. 70, minute 1 and appendix 1.)



M. BERTHELOT said he thought Lord Curzon's draft was much better than his own. Moreover, it had been approved by the British Cabinet. In any case, he felt that Lord Curzon was much better qualified than himself to draw up the document. There was one small point which he would venture to raise and that was in the last sentence. What was the exact meaning that the English attached to the word 'internment'? The French would, in similar circumstances, employ the word 'custody.'

LORD CURZON enquired whether the French words 'la garde' would meet the case. In this passage of his draft he was only alluding to the latest stage, and not the whole correspondence.

M. BERTHELOT, referring to the sentence, 'There is no doubt as to where the responsibility lies,' thought it would be better to say something to the effect that, 'whatever consequences there may be, they will be detrimental only to the Dutch themselves'; and something, he thought, might be added also to the effect that 'the Allies reserve to themselves the right to take such action in the future as they may think necessary.' In other words, we could say that, if the presence of the ex-Kaiser should ever constitute a genuine danger, we could go back to our first proposition and require that the Dutch should recognise not only their moral, but also their real, responsibility, for which the Allies would call them to account.

LORD CURZON said that he fully appreciated M. Berthelot's point. In the first place, he said that the responsibility lay on the Dutch, and he thought that this should be made clear in the letter, but this, said Lord Curzon, he had himself already stated. The other point, which appeared in M. Berthelot's draft, was that the Allies should reserve to themselves the right to scrutinise from time to time the precautionary measures taken by the Dutch. He himself had deliberately refrained from introducing this, as he was anxious that the whole responsibility should be laid on the shoulders of the Dutch, which would not be the case if we demanded the right to pay occasional visits in order to satisfy ourselves that the precautions were satisfactory. Indeed, such a scrutiny would really be an impossible duty to discharge; we should require a Secret Service, which was undesirable. The opinion of the British Cabinet had been that the line to take was as follows: The Dutch Government have thought fit to do this; the whole responsibility is theirs; we wash our hands of it; we have warned them again and again, and, if anything happens, on their heads be it. Lord Curzon concluded by saying he quite agreed with M. Berthelot's criticism of the last line of his draft, and he proposed, with his assistance, to amend it. He wished to know what the Italian delegation had to say.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he preferred Lord Curzon's formula. It was impossible for the Allies to undertake the control of the Dutch custody of the ex-Kaiser or to accept any sort of responsibility when we had absolutely no means of enforcing our wishes. He suggested, therefore, that the broader formula should be adopted, and that we should entirely divest ourselves of any responsibility.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that he also was in favour of adopting Lord Curzon's formula.

BARON MONCHEUR said that he, too, would accept Lord Curzon's draft.

It was agreed—

To accept the draft reply prepared by Lord Curzon, subject to certain amendments in the last line, which would be approved by Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot.

(At this point Baron Moncheur and M. Berthelot left the Conference, and Sir Ernest Pollock, the British Solicitor-General, entered the Council Chamber.)

2. The conference had before them copies of a letter from M. Jules Cambon, dated the 11th March, 1920, to the president of the Supreme Council, regarding clauses in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey relating to penalties (A.J. 104) (Appendix 3).

*Clauses in the  
Treaty of Peace  
with Turkey  
relating to  
Penalties*

LORD CURZON said that the consideration of this paper had been adjourned at their previous meeting<sup>3</sup> in order to enable M. Cambon to refer article 2A to his Government.

M. CAMBON said that he had referred the said article to Paris, and he and his Government were quite satisfied with the article as it stood.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that article 1<sup>4</sup> applied perfectly well in the case of Germany and Austria-Hungary, or Bulgaria, but in his view it was not equally applicable to Turkey. He had in mind ceded territories which did not become *ipso facto* an integral part of the States to which they were ceded. In this connection he would draw the attention of the conference to the article on Libya. In this the Allies provided that Turkey should renounce all rights over Libya and thereby *ipso facto* all the inhabitants of Libya would acquire Italian nationality. According to Italian domestic law these inhabitants should be Italian *subjects*, and not Italian citizens. It was a sort of colonial nationality, which was different from that which obtained in the kingdom. He suggested, therefore, that a formula should be introduced which should differentiate between these two cases. If the conference approved, he would presently submit a fresh draft for their consideration, based upon the local laws of the States concerned.

(Signor Scialoja's alternative draft was considered later in the meeting by the conference.)

SIR ERNEST POLLOCK pointed out that in article 1 a provision for a separate request by one of the Allies 'ou à celle d'entre elles qui lui en adressera la requête' had been omitted. It might be of service to retain this right to each of the Allies.

LORD CURZON said that was probably due to a slip in the drafting. He thought the conference would accept the Solicitor-General's words.

SIR ERNEST POLLOCK suggested that the phraseology which was employed in the German and other treaties should be adopted.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 67.

<sup>4</sup> Signor Scialoja was evidently referring to article 1 of the draft clauses relating to nationality: see minute 3 and appendix 4 below.

It was agreed—

That the phraseology used in article 1 in this connection should be the same as that adopted in the German treaty, and that the Drafting Committee should be instructed accordingly.

Sir Ernest Pollock pointed out that the English translation of article 2 omitted after the word 'nationals' the words 'of one,' which was [*sic*] in the French text.

Sir Ernest Pollock stated that the request in the last line of article 4 was made the request of all the Allies, whereas<sup>5</sup> in the Austrian treaty the request was that of the Powers concerned. He asked whether it was desired in the case of Turkey. It was necessary to make a joint request in all cases.

It was agreed—

That the last two lines of article 4 should be amended so as to read 'upon the joint request of all the Allied Powers,' and that the Drafting Committee should be instructed to take the necessary action.

Sir Ernest Pollock drew attention to the fact that the massacres contemplated were those committed during the continuance of the war only. If it was desired to hold the power in reserve after the treaty was in force, in order to safeguard the Armenians against future atrocities, and to try the authors of them, some such words as follows would effect the purpose:—

'Articles 1 to 4 shall apply to persons accused at any time subsequent to the coming into force of the treaty by the Allied Powers of having committed, whether during the continuance of the war or after the coming into force of the treaty, offences against the non-Moslem population of the Ottoman Empire.'

LORD CURZON said that he thought the British Solicitor-General was entitled to raise what was really a large question of policy. In the draft as it stood, the Allied Powers had contemplated only clearing up what had occurred up to the date the treaty was signed. He had, however, two remarks to make: first, that the additional safeguard suggested by Sir Ernest Pollock was not introduced in any other treaty, though the cases, he agreed, were in no way comparable; second, that the Allies had already provided two guarantees:—

<sup>5</sup> The present text here omitted corrections made by Sir E. Pollock and subsequently incorporated in the typescript text. According to these corrections the text here read: 'whereas in the Austrian treaty the request was also that of the Power concerned. He asked whether it was desired to provide for similar requests in the case of Turkey. Was it necessary to make a joint request in all cases? Should not the "Power concerned" also have the right to make the demand? It was agreed—That the last two lines of article 4 should be amended so as to read "upon the joint request of all the Allied Powers", or "at the request of the Power concerned" as in the other treaties, and that' &c.

- (a) Particular nations would assume responsibility in definite areas.
- (b) The responsibility would be much easier to discharge in the future, as we now had a hold over Constantinople.

He doubted, therefore, whether it was wise to introduce a new policy at this date.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said he was entirely in accord with Lord Curzon.

M. KAMMERER said that if the clause covered all massacres up to 'the coming into force,' that is to say, the 'ratification' of the treaty, then it was not desirable, he thought, to go further.

Some discussion then ensued as to the exact meaning of the words 'en vigueur.'

SIR ERNEST POLLOCK explained that 'a state of war' covered everything up to the date of ratification.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA agreed, but he wished to point out that cases had happened in past history where a country had itself declared that a state of war was ended.

SIR ERNEST POLLOCK said that he had only brought up this point for consideration as a legal point.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that he agreed with Lord Curzon that it was undesirable to make the provisions of the clause prospective.

LORD CURZON suggested, therefore, that the Drafting Committee should be instructed to employ words which had been used in other treaties.

SIR ERNEST POLLOCK said that in article 2A the Allied Powers reserved to themselves the right to bring the accused persons mentioned above before such a tribunal in the event of the League of Nations having created without undue delay a tribunal competent to deal with the said massacres. It seemed to him that there would be some difficulty in regard to this unless some clear definition were given of the tribunal to which the jurisdiction was to be entrusted. He thought that the same words might be employed as were used in the German treaty, viz.: 'The German Government . . .<sup>6</sup> recognise the jurisdiction of that court.' This was a legal point of importance which he was sure Signor Scialoja would recognise. It was most desirable to secure that Turkey should similarly recognise that tribunal or court.<sup>7</sup>

LORD CURZON asked if the point would be met by adding at the end of the

<sup>6</sup> Punctuation as in original quotation.

<sup>7</sup> The present text omitted corrections to this paragraph made by Sir E. Pollock, and incorporated in the typescript text. The corrected text read as follows: 'Sir Ernest Pollock said that in article 2A the Allied Powers reserved to themselves the right to bring the accused persons mentioned above before such a tribunal as they should appoint or in the event of the League of Nations having created without undue delay a tribunal competent to deal with the said massacres before that tribunal. It seemed to him that there would be some difficulty in regard to this unless some clear recognition were given of the tribunal to which the jurisdiction was to be entrusted. He thought that the same words might be employed as were used in the German treaty, viz.: "The German Government . . . recognise the jurisdiction of that court." This was a legal point of importance which he was sure Signor Scialoja would appreciate. It was most desirable to secure that Turkey should similarly "recognise" that tribunal or court.'

second clause of article 2A such words as follows: 'and the Turkish Government undertakes to recognise such tribunal.'

SIR ERNEST POLLOCK said that what he was doubtful about was the second clause, which differentiated between the court recognised by the Allies and some court of an independent character.

LORD CURZON suggested this formula also should be introduced at the end of the third clause, viz.:—

'and the Turkish Government undertakes equally to recognise such tribunal.'

SIR ERNEST POLLOCK, SIGNOR SCIALOJA and M. CAMBON having signified their acceptance, it was agreed—

To amend clauses 2 and 3 of article 2A accordingly, and to instruct the Drafting Committee to introduce the necessary amendments.

SIR ERNEST POLLOCK pointed out that article 2A also drew a distinction between the massacres committed on Turkish soil and those committed on former Turkish territory.

LORD CURZON enquired why this distinction had been made.

SIR ERNEST POLLOCK said that this had been done in Paris, and he assumed that the Drafting Committee had had in their minds the case of Armenia.

LORD CURZON supposed that what they had meant was the whole territory which was former Turkish territory, and not those portions which had been lopped off the Turkish Empire.

After some further discussion, it was agreed—

To substitute for 'on former Turkish territory,' in clause 1, the words 'on all territory which formed part of the Turkish Empire on the 1st August, 1914,' and to communicate this decision to the Drafting Committee.

3. The conference considered the report and draft articles prepared by the Committee on the Protection of Minorities in Turkey (A.J. 109) (Appendix 4).

*Articles Relative  
to Nationality*

The whole of the draft articles were accepted, with one small modification to article 1.

At SIGNOR SCIALOJA's request it was agreed—

That the Drafting Committee should be asked to insert at the end of article 1 some such form of words as the following:—

'... 'selon la loi locale de ces États.'

4. The conference then considered a memorandum by the British delegation, proposing articles regarding Egypt, the Soudan and Cyprus (A.J. 111) (Appendix 5).

*Articles relating  
to Egypt, the  
Soudan and  
Cyprus*

Article 1 was read.

M. CAMBON asked whether this question was not under negotiation in connection with Morocco.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> See No. 76, note 11.

LORD CURZON said that, to the best of his recollection, this was not so. France had recognised the British protectorate over Egypt, and Italy had promised to do so.

M. KAMMERER asked whether Great Britain had recognised the French protectorate over Morocco.

MR. VANSITTART said that only details remained to be settled.

Article 2 was read. No objection was raised.

Article 3 was read. No objection was raised.

Article 4 was read.

M. KAMMERER said that, without raising any objection, he wished to observe that the Economic Commission had proposed a very similar text, which had been adopted. He thought it would be desirable that the two chapters of the treaty should be harmonised.

It was agreed—

That the attention of the Drafting Committee should be drawn to this point.

Article 5 was read.

M. KAMMERER questioned whether this provision would not come better in the nationality clauses.

MR. VANSITTART thought it was better to maintain it where it was, as it was desired that the clauses regarding Egypt should be as complete as possible.

M. KAMMERER observed that a principle, once laid down in the treaty, was not usually repeated in order to make a particular section of it self-sufficing; for instance, it was not considered necessary to restate this principle in the case of Syria or Armenia.

MR. VANSITTART said that the economic chapter recognised that the case of Egypt was a special case.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI suggested that the attention of the Drafting Committee should be drawn to the matter.

(This was agreed to.)

Article 6 was read. No objection was raised.

Article 7 was read. No objection was raised.

Article 8 was read. No objection was raised.

Article 9 was read. No objection was raised.

Article 10 was read.

It was pointed out that in the second paragraph the reference left blank was to 'article 49.'

Article 11 was read.

M. KAMMERER said he thought this article should be examined by the Financial Commission. These proposals were before him for the first time, and he would like to consider them more carefully.

M. CAMBON said that the Turkish loans based on Egyptian tribute continued to exist. The tribute, however, was suppressed. The question, therefore, deserved some examination.

MR. VANSITTART observed that the responsibility for covering the loan was being taken by the British Government. In doing so the British Government relieved France of her share of responsibility.

It was agreed—

That the French delegation should take a day to consider this article, and should, if they desired, make observations on it on the following day.

Article 12 was read. No objection was raised.

Article 13 was read.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that the suppression of the Egyptian Public Debt would throw out of work a number of foreign officials, among whom were a considerable number of Italians. He suggested that something should be inserted to save them from the consequences of the complete suppression of their employment.

MR. VANSITTART said that he thought a letter to the Egyptian Government would serve the purpose better than any formula inserted in the treaty. The matter did not really concern the treaty with Turkey.

M. CAMBON said that he would like to reserve this article, too, for consideration. M. Cambon then explained that his acceptance of these articles must be understood to be *ad referendum* to Paris.

With this reservation and the proviso noted above, the draft clauses relating<sup>9</sup> to Egypt were accepted.

The two clauses relating to the Soudan were read, and no objection was raised.

The clause relating to Cyprus was read and approved.

MR. HURST suggested that a sentence should be added to it, to the effect that Ottoman subjects habitually resident in Cyprus should, *ipso facto*, lose Ottoman and acquire British nationality.

(This was agreed to, and referred to the Drafting Committee.)

5. The conference considered proposals by the Italian delegation relating to Libya and the Ægean Islands (A.J. 117) (Appendix 6).

*Articles relating to Libya and the Ægean Islands, proposed by the Italian Delegation*

LORD CURZON observed that the document demanded the cession of the Island of Castellorizo from Turkey to Italy. The conference would remember that Signor Nitti had obtained a decision regarding the Island of Castellorizo,<sup>10</sup> which, he understood, was in favour of its retention by Turkey. M. Veniselos had appealed against this, but the original decision had been maintained.<sup>11</sup> Now it would seem that the Italian delegation were claiming the island for Italy.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that he had lately read the minutes of the 21st February, and noticed that Signor Nitti had asked for the cession of the island to Italy.

<sup>9</sup> The typescript text here read 'the draft clauses including article 14 relating', &c.

<sup>10</sup> See No. 21, minute 13.

<sup>11</sup> See No. 63, minute 8.

LORD CURZON then quoted from I.C.P. 41, Minute 13:—<sup>10</sup>

‘He (Signor Nitti) had also a small request to make as regards the Island of Castellorizo, and that was that it should be handed back by the French to Italy. He would feel very grateful if the French could see their way to doing this. It was only a very small island, with a small population, and France had really no claim to it.

‘(The proposals as outlined by Signor Nitti were agreed to.)’

This passage, he thought, did not quite establish a cession by Turkey to Italy, as the Marquis Imperiali understood it.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that what was asked for, and granted, was the withdrawal of the French in favour of the Italians. This, he said, came to the same thing, seeing that France had no rights to the island, and claimed none. Signor Nitti was certainly under the impression that he had obtained the cession of the island to Italy, and this result could not take place unless Turkey ceded it to Italy. When the question had been reopened a few days ago, Signor Nitti had telegraphed to express his great surprise.

M. CAMBON said that it was quite true that France had only occupied the island for a temporary purpose during the war, and had, therefore, no objection to evacuating it now; but he noticed that the proposal of the Italian delegation was that all the Ægean Islands occupied by Italy should be ceded by Turkey to Italy. He was under the impression that Italy had ceded them to Greece.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that Italy must obtain title to these islands from Turkey before disposing of them in anyone else’s favour.

LORD CURZON asked whether the agreement between Italy and Greece regarding these islands was concluded; for he understood that their delivery to Greece was to be mentioned in the treaty.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that certain conditions still remained unrealised.

LORD CURZON said he understood that the statement of Signor Nitti, in I.C.P. 41, Minute 13,<sup>10</sup> held the field. He quoted the following sentences:

‘Signor Nitti said that, according to the terms of the Treaty of London, all the islands of the Dodecanese were assigned to Italy. According, however, to an agreement which had been made between Italy and M. Veniselos, Italy had agreed to hand over all these islands, with the exception of Rhodes, to Greece. There was also an understanding that a plebiscite should be taken, under circumstances to be determined, to ascertain the wish of the population as to which Power they should remain under.’

On this understanding, the clauses proposed by the Italian delegation were accepted.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> In the typescript text this decision read as follows:

‘On this understanding the clauses proposed by the Italian delegation (A.J. 117) (Appendix 6) were accepted.

‘In regard to the Island of Castellorizo it was agreed that the Island which does not form part of the Dodecanese should be ceded by Turkey to Italy.’



6. SIGNOR SCIALOJA observed that, at the time when the conference in London was discussing the reply to the Hungarian delegation regarding the economic clauses, a similar discussion had taken place in Paris in the Ambassadorial Conference. On the point which he himself had raised regarding a customs agreement between the territories which had once composed the Austrian Empire, the Ambassadors in Paris had reached somewhat different conclusions. He thought it was unfortunate that two bodies, in separate capitals, should be dealing with the same subject. He suggested that the minutes of the meeting in London<sup>13</sup> should be sent to the Ambassadors for their guidance, and he had told the Italian Ambassador that he was bound by the views expressed in London.

LORD CURZON said that in the distribution of work between the conference in Paris and the conference in London it might sometimes be difficult to distinguish between what were matters of detail and what were matters of principle. There was no doubt that the conference in London dealt with the latter. Presumably the Ambassadors were unaware, at the time that they discussed the subject, that decisions had been taken in London.

*(The conference adjourned at 6.45 p.m.)*

*2, Whitehall Gardens, March 23, 1920.*

#### APPENDIX I TO No. 69

##### *Draft Reply to the Dutch Note with regard to the Extradition of the ex-Emperor*

(Translation of Draft prepared by M. Berthelot)

(A.J. 116. Secret.)

The Allied Powers have taken cognisance of the reply which the Dutch Government made, at the beginning of this month, to their last note concerning the presence of William of Hohenzollern on Dutch territory, in proximity to the German frontier.<sup>14</sup>

Recent events in the German capital demonstrate once more the drawbacks and dangers offered by such a situation in regard to the maintenance in Germany of such order as will allow that country to carry out its obligations and not to jeopardise afresh the state of peace which is ardently desired by the whole world.

The Allies have noted the undertakings expressed by Holland concerning the custody of her dangerous prisoner, and it has caused them profound regret to note that the Dutch Government remains silent on the subject of Germany's very grave responsibility and does not recognise how dangerous is the continued presence of the ex-Emperor in such close proximity to the seat of royalist and reactionary intrigues.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. No. 63, minute 6, and No. 65, minute 1.

<sup>14</sup> See No. 51, notes 1 and 2.

They recognise that the decree ordering the internment of William of Hohenzollern, the explicit letter which has been demanded of him, and the solemn and repeated assurance given to their representatives at The Hague that the Dutch Government assumes full and entire responsibility for custody of the ex-Emperor, for his internment, and for the supervision of his correspondence and relations, represent a preliminary sum of guarantees which appreciably improves the situation and guards against a part of the risks represented thereby.

Nevertheless, they do not hold the Dutch Government exempt from the responsibilities that it still aspires to assume alone and to lay upon Holland. If events go to prove that the peace of Europe is in danger of being compromised, or that the formal engagements undertaken with respect to rendering any harmful action impossible to the ex-Kaiser are not being strictly observed, they reserve to themselves the right to approach The Hague once more, in order to obtain the execution of the measures demanded by the Powers for securing justice and definitive guarantees.

The Allies have come to their decision while taking account of [to] the greatest possible extent of the national susceptibility of the Dutch people and the scruples as to neutrality of a Government which considered it its strict duty to hold its country aloof from the war and the consequences thereof.

As to themselves, they are proud to have shed their blood and risked their future in order to ensure freedom, justice and peace to the whole world, belligerents, neutrals and enemies alike.

#### APPENDIX 3 TO No. 69

##### *Treaty of Peace with Turkey: Clauses relating to Penalties*

##### *M. Cambon to Mr. Lloyd George*

(A.J. 104. Secret.)

PARIS, March 11, 1920

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose herewith, in reply to the letter<sup>15</sup> which your Excellency was good enough to address to me on the 21st February, the draft clauses<sup>16</sup> relating to penalties drawn up and adopted by the Commission on Re-

<sup>15</sup> This letter, untraced in Foreign Office archives, was presumably in execution of minute 6 of No. 21.

<sup>16</sup> Not printed. These five draft clauses, under the heading 'Draft Articles with regard to Penalties', corresponded to Part VII of the Treaty of Sèvres. Articles 1-4 were, subject to the incorporation of the amendments adopted in minute 2 above and to minor variation, the same as articles 226-9 of the Treaty. Article 2A, which was inserted after article 4, read: 'The Turkish Government undertakes to hand over to the Allied Powers the persons considered to be responsible for the massacres committed on former Turkish territory during the continuance of the state of war.'

'The Allied Powers reserve to themselves the right to appoint the tribunal which shall try the persons so accused.'

'In the event of the League of Nations having created without undue delay a tribunal competent to deal with the said massacres, the Allied Powers reserve to themselves the right to bring the accused persons mentioned above before such tribunal.'

sponsibility, with a view to insertion in the conditions of peace to be presented to Turkey.

Article 2A has been drafted separately for use in case the Supreme Allied Council should intend to insert in the conditions of peace a clause dealing with the prosecution of the responsible authors of the massacres in Asia Minor.

I have, &c.,

JULES CAMBON

#### APPENDIX 4 TO No. 69

##### *Articles Relative to Nationality to be inserted in the Turkish Treaty*

(As approved by the Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers on March 23, 1920)

*(Additions in italics.)*

(A.J. 109.)

The Committee on the Protection of Minorities in Turkey unanimously recommends the following draft articles<sup>17</sup> for insertion in the Turkish treaty.

In drafting these articles the committee has assumed that the principles adopted for the nationality clauses in the treaties with Germany and Austria should be followed in the case of Turkey, and in particular the principle that as far as possible the population who are to be habitually resident in any of the transferred territories or new States should in due course become the subjects of the State receiving the transferred territory or of the new State. In particular the commission has taken the clauses in the Austrian treaty dealing with nationality as the model of the present draft articles.

Article 8 (Section I) of the Economic Clauses, as recommended by the Economic Commission, deals with the question of the naturalisation abroad of Turkish subjects and is covered by No. 6 of the attached articles.

The committee therefore recommend that article 8 of the Economic Clauses should be suppressed and the Drafting Committee informed accordingly.

*London, March 18, 1920*

<sup>17</sup> Not printed. This annex comprised the English and French texts of nine draft articles headed 'Clauses relating to Nationality', and corresponding to Part III, Section XII of the Treaty of Sèvres. Draft article 1 read: 'Ottoman subjects habitually resident in territory which, in accordance with the provisions of the present treaty, is severed from Turkey, will obtain *ipso facto* the nationality of the State to which such territory is transferred in conformity with the local law of these States.' Articles 2-8 corresponded to articles 124-130 of the treaty, subject to minor verbal variation and to the following differences: (a) article 3 began 'Persons habitually resident . . .', and included 'Kurdistan' between 'the Hedjaz' and 'Mesopotamia'; (b) the first paragraph of article 6 corresponded to the second paragraph of article 128 of the treaty; the second and final paragraph of the draft read: 'The above provisions will be applicable after the entry into force of the present treaty to the naturalisation abroad of Turkish nationals.'; (c) article 7 did not include the phrase 'on the coming into force of the present treaty', and the number of the article to be cited was left blank. Article 9 read: 'The clauses of the present chapter will apply to the territory of Smyrna as defined in article . . . [punctuation as in filed copy], as from the date of the final decision, laid down in Article . . . [punctuation as in filed copy] for the said territory.'

*Memorandum by British Delegation, proposing Articles to be inserted in the Turkish Treaty relative to Egypt, Soudan and Cyprus*

## Chapter 18

(A.J. 111.)

(a) *Egypt*

Turkey renounces all rights and title in or over Egypt. This renunciation shall take effect as from the 5th November, 1914. Turkey declares that in conformity with the action taken by the Allied Powers she recognises the protectorate proclaimed over Egypt by Great Britain on the 18th December, 1914.

2. Ottoman subjects habitually resident in Egypt on the 18th December, 1914, will acquire Egyptian nationality *ipso facto* and will lose their Ottoman nationality, except that if at that date such persons were temporarily absent from, and have not since that date returned to, Egypt, they will not acquire Egyptian nationality without a special authorisation from the Egyptian Government.

3. Ottoman subjects who became resident in Egypt after the 18th December, 1914, and are habitually resident there at the date of the coming into force of the present treaty may claim Egyptian nationality, but such claim may in individual cases be refused by the competent Egyptian authority.

4. For all purposes connected with the present treaty, Egyptian nationals will rank as Allied nationals, and Egypt will be regarded as Allied territory.

5. Within a period of one year after the coming into force of the present treaty persons over 18 years of age acquiring or entitled to claim Egyptian nationality under the provisions of articles 2 and 3 will be entitled to opt for Turkish nationality, or in case they differ in race from the majority of the population of Egypt they will within the same period be entitled to opt for the nationality of any State to which Turkish territory is transferred, if the majority of the population of that State is of the same race as the person exercising the right to opt.

Option by a husband covers a wife and option by parents covers their children under 18 years of age.

Persons who have exercised the above right to opt must, except where authorised to continue to reside in Egypt, transfer their place of residence to the State for which they have opted. They will be entitled to retain their immovable property in Egypt and may carry with them their movable property of every description. No export or import duties or charges may be imposed upon them in connection with the removal of such property.

6. The Egyptian Government shall have complete liberty of action in regulating the status of Ottoman subjects in Egypt and the conditions under which they may establish themselves in the territory.

7. Egyptian nationals shall be entitled when abroad to the diplomatic protection of Great Britain.

8. Egyptian goods entering Turkey shall enjoy the treatment accorded to British goods.

9. The Powers conferred upon His Imperial Majesty the Sultan by the convention signed at Constantinople on the 29th October, 1888,<sup>19</sup> relating to the free

<sup>18</sup> Omission in filed copy.

<sup>19</sup> Text printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. lxxix, pp. 18 f.

navigation of the Suez Canal, are transferred to the Government of His Britannic Majesty.

10. All property and possessions in Egypt belonging to the Turkish Government pass to the Egyptian Government without payment.

All movable and immovable property in Egypt belonging to Turkish nationals (who do not acquire Egyptian nationality) shall be dealt with in accordance with Part <sup>18</sup> (Economic Clauses) of the present treaty.

11. Turkey renounces all claim to the tribute formerly paid by Egypt.

Great Britain undertakes to relieve Turkey of all liability in respect of the Turkish loans secured on the Egyptian tribute. These loans are:—

The Guaranteed Loan of 1855.

The loan of 1894 representing the converted loans of 1854 and 1871.

The loan of 1891 representing the converted loan of 1877.

The sums which the Khedives of Egypt have from time to time undertaken to pay over to the houses by whom these loans were issued will be applied as heretofore to the interest and the sinking funds of the loans of 1894 and 1891 until the final extinction of those loans. The Government of Egypt will also continue to apply the sum hitherto paid towards the interest on the Guaranteed of Loan 1855. Upon the extinction of these loans of 1894, 1891 and 1855, all liability on the part of the Egyptian Government arising out of the tribute formerly paid by Egypt to Turkey will cease.

The payment of the interest upon the loan of 1855 having been guaranteed by the Governments of Great Britain and France, the high contracting parties take note that the Government of His Britannic Majesty agrees to indemnify the Government of the French Republic against the payment of any sums in respect of such interest, and thereby relieves that Government of all liability under its guarantee.

12. To safeguard the position of the holders of loans issued by the Egyptian Government, Great Britain declares that, in the event of any default by the Government of Egypt in the payment of the annuity of the guaranteed debts, or of the interest on the privileged or unified debts, she will take the measures necessary to restore financial equilibrium in Egypt, and to protect the interests of the bondholders of the Egyptian Public Debt.

13. The Commission of the Egyptian Public Debt, being no longer required for the protection of the holders of Egyptian Debt, in view of the declaration made by His Britannic Majesty's Government in the preceding article, the high contracting parties agree to the repeal, or to the modification to such extent as the Egyptian Government may think desirable, of the decree issued by His Highness the Khedive on the 28th November, 1904.<sup>20</sup>

14. The Government of His Britannic Majesty agree in view of the altered political status of Egypt to relieve the Governments of Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Russia and Turkey of any liability under the obligations which the Governments of those countries contracted in respect of the interest and sinking fund on the loan of £9,000,000 raised by the Egyptian Government in 1885 in accordance with the terms of the convention signed in London on the 18th March, 1885, as modified by the convention of the 25th July of that year.<sup>21</sup> The Government of His

<sup>20</sup> Text printed *op. cit.*, vol. xcvi, pp. 41 f.

<sup>21</sup> These two conventions are printed *op. cit.*, vol. lxxvi, pp. 348 f.

Britannic Majesty for their part reaffirm their obligations to guarantee the regular payment of the annuity of £315,000 assigned to the service of the above loan.

(b) *Soudan*

1. The high contracting parties declare that they have taken note of the convention between the Government of His Britannic Majesty and the Egyptian Government defining the status and regulating the administration of the Soudan signed on the 19th January, 1899, as amended by the supplementary convention relating to the town of Suakin, signed on the 10th July, 1899.<sup>22</sup>

2. Soudanese shall be entitled when in foreign countries to the diplomatic protection of His Britannic Majesty.

(c) *Cyprus*

1. The high contracting parties recognise the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the Government of His Britannic Majesty on the 5th November, 1914. Turkey renounces all rights and title over or relating to Cyprus, including the right to the tribute formerly paid by that island to the Sultan.

APPENDIX 6 TO No. 69

Document 1

*Signor Scialoja to Sir M. Hankey*

(A.J. 117.)

LONDON, *March 23*

Dear Sir,

I have the pleasure to forward herewith two articles regarding Libya and the islands of the Ægean Sea, that I propose should be inserted in the Peace Treaty with Turkey.

Believe me, &c.,  
SCIALOJA

Document 2

(Translation.)

The Italian delegation to the Peace Conference in London has the honour to propose the insertion of the following articles in the Peace Treaty with Turkey:—

1. Turkey definitely renounces all rights and privileges that according to the Treaty of Lausanne were left to the Sultan in Libya.

2. The islands of the Ægean Sea (Stampalia, Rhodes, Calki, Scarpanto, Casos, Piscopis, Misiros, Calimnos, Leros, Patmos, Lipsos, Sini and Cos) that are actually occupied by Italy, and also Castellorizo, are ceded to Italy by Turkey, that in virtue of the present treaty renounces all rights and privileges that the Ottoman Government enjoyed in the said island.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>22</sup> The convention of January 19, 1899, and the supplementary convention of July 10, 1899, are printed *op. cit.*, vol. xci, pp. 19–22.

<sup>23</sup> In the original there followed a French text, not here printed, of this document. The French text corresponded to the English except that in the former the concluding phrase read '... jouissait sur les mêmes îles.'

I.C.P. 84.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, held in Lord Curzon's Room, British Foreign Office, Whitehall, London, S.W. 1, on Wednesday, March 24, 1920, at 4 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Blackett (for Minute 3), Sir Adam Block (for Minute 3), General Mance (for Minute 4); SECRETARIES, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Captain Abraham.

*Belgium*: Baron Moncheur (for Minutes 1 and 2).

*France*: M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer (for Minute 3).

*Italy*: Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Don Ascanio Colonna, Signor Galli, M. Nogara (for Minute 3).

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

1. With reference to I.C.P. 83,<sup>1</sup> Minute 1, LORD CURZON said that before taking the business on the agenda he wished to raise two questions of some importance. The first was that of the revised draft reply to the Dutch Government regarding the internment of the ex-Kaiser. At the previous meeting M. Berthelot had made some very wise observations which had been taken account of in the new draft which it was proposed to send, with the agreement of the conference (Appendix 1).

*Revised Draft  
Reply to the  
Dutch Note  
regarding the  
Internment of the  
Ex-Kaiser*

M. BERTHELOT said that the new draft appeared to him to be satisfactory.

LORD CURZON said the conference should note the last sentence, which was new and contained an implied threat.

(No objection was raised to the draft, which was accepted.)

2. With reference to I.C.P. 82,<sup>2</sup> Minute 1, LORD CURZON said the next subject he wished to bring before the conference was that of the entry of German troops into the Ruhr Valley. When this matter had last been discussed in the conference it had been suggested that permission might be given to the German Government to send troops into the district on certain conditions: first, that their stay in the area should be limited, and, second, that Allied officers should be attached to the force to watch its action. M. Cambon had himself been favourable to the proposal, and had been asked to communicate it to the French Government. The suggestion had been discussed on the previous day in Paris, and M. Millerand's views had been communicated by M. Cambon that morning. The French Government were not disposed to accept the suggestion, and made a counter-proposal to the effect that the German Government might be allowed to send forces into the Ruhr Valley provided Allied forces simultaneously occupied Frankfort and Darmstadt. This occupation was represented not only as a guarantee for the timely withdrawal of German troops from the

*The Situation  
in Germany*

<sup>1</sup> No. 69.

<sup>2</sup> No. 68.

Ruhr, but also as a guarantee for the satisfaction of Allied demands in respect of the assaults on Allied commissions in Germany, and also for the claims to be made by the Allies arising from the infringements of the treaty. The French proposal, therefore, covered a far wider ground than the mere question of the occupation of the Ruhr Valley.

A telegram had also been received that morning stating that two German officers, accompanied by Herr Göppert, Head of the German peace delegation, had called on Marshal Foch. They had been interviewed by General Weygand. They demanded permission to send into the Ruhr Valley 48 battalions, 17 squadrons, and 40 batteries of the Reichswehr. From this it would appear that the German demand in the matter of numbers had increased enormously. It had started from 4 to 8 battalions, and now amounted to 48. General Weygand had asked what assurances the German Government would give that these troops would remain only a limited time in the neutral zone. The Germans had replied that they would certainly withdraw their troops as soon as order had been restored, and that the German Government's assurance to that effect could be trusted, as it had every interest in fulfilling its undertaking. General Weygand was not satisfied with these promises. The Germans then suggested what had been suggested in the conference, namely, that Allied officers should accompany the German forces. This also had been rejected by General Weygand. Marshal Foch, it seemed, attributed great importance to the danger of the presence of a large German force in the area. He considered that these troops might make common cause with the rebel miners, and thereby bring about a considerable military threat to the security of the Allied frontiers. Negotiations had therefore broken down. Not only had M. Millerand declined to accept what the conference suggested, but General Weygand had refused analogous proposals by the German Government.

After receipt of this news, Lord Curzon said that he had conversed by telephone with Mr. Lloyd George. He had also consulted the War Office. The outcome of these conversations was that the British Government was opposed to any occupation by Allied troops of Frankfort and Darmstadt. The proposal was contrary to the expressed policy of the conference. The conference had desired to allow German troops to go into the Ruhr Valley in order to avoid any interference by Allied troops in German internal affairs. Moreover, the British Government had heard from Lord Kilmarnock, and from the British representatives in the occupied area, that negotiations were taking place between the German Government in Berlin and the Socialists in the Ruhr Valley. If that was so, there appeared to be no need to send large bodies of troops, either German or Allied. A telegram from Sir Harold Stuart, at Coblenz, said that on the previous day all had been quiet in the occupied territory; there was no news of any fighting in the Ruhr; in his opinion, the Communists had only taken up arms to resist a Hohenzollern *coup d'État*. Sir Harold Stuart concluded with this advice: it appeared to him very important that the Allies should maintain an attitude of complete neutrality; any other attitude would not only prejudice the success of the



negotiations between the German Government and the Communists, but would arouse universal hostility to the Allies throughout the frontier area; he laid particular stress upon this, as the general on the spot thought the people of the Ruhr were Bolsheviks against whom all the Allies should combine.

His Majesty's Government, therefore, was not disposed to accept the plan suggested by M. Millerand; it considered that the negotiations between the Government and the Socialists in the Ruhr should be given every chance of success, and it had always objected to sending Allied troops into Germany. No doubt there was great force in the French demand for action regarding the assaults on Allied officers, and also regarding infractions of the treaty; but the conference had already concluded that the present was not a suitable moment for taking action. Supposing German troops were to enter the Ruhr and were not to leave the area in due time, the occupation of Frankfort and Darmstadt might be mooted again. He made no declaration regarding that eventuality, but he regretted that for the moment he was not able to agree to M. Millerand's proposal.

M. CAMBON said that M. Millerand had agreed with the council that it was undesirable that Allied troops should take part in any party fight in Germany. The occupation of Frankfort and Darmstadt would not put them in contact with Spartacists. Nevertheless, it was hardly possible to allow 100,000 German troops to enter the neutral zone, in spite of the treaty, without taking some guarantee. The promises of the German Government, in [?] and] the presence of Allied officers with the German Staff, would not be enough; it was probable that the German Government was not able to control the situation. The occupation of Frankfort and Darmstadt was in itself harmless, but would be a manifestation of the determination of the Allies not to be trifled with. The danger of conflict with the German population, which so alarmed the British Government, was, he thought, avoided by this proposal. As to the alleged negotiations between the German Government and the Socialists in the Ruhr, it was impossible to be certain that they would succeed; they might be merely a device to gain time while the inhabitants of the valley armed themselves. In any case, the result of these negotiations would be known in a few days, long before the occupation of the two towns could take place. He thought that the Allies should do what Marshal Foch suggested. Marshal Foch had deputed General Weygand to meet the German officers and to report to him if there was anything worth saving [*saying*]. It had appeared to General Weygand that they offered nothing that could excuse the entry of 100,000 German troops into the neutral area on the very frontiers of France and Belgium.

LORD CURZON said that, before asking his colleagues to express their opinion, he would like to say a word in reply to M. Cambon. M. Cambon argued that the occupation of Frankfort and Darmstadt, two cities well south of the Ruhr district, would not involve interference in the internal dissensions of Germany; moreover, that it would be justified as a guarantee against the risk of 100,000 German troops in the Ruhr Valley. The British Government

could not accept this view, as it had considered only a far more restricted entry of German troops than this. If this occupation were represented as a guarantee for the execution of the treaty as a whole, and for the satisfaction of certain demands which were to be made, he thought this would be going back on what had taken place in the conference a few days ago. The conference had come to the conclusion that the present time was a most unfavourable one for presenting any demands to the German Government on the subject. Yet the French Government proposed to occupy Frankfort and Darmstadt as a preliminary step, even before presenting its lists of demands, in order to show the German Government that the Allies meant business. With all respect, he thought that M. Cambon's statement did not improve the case.

M. CAMBON said that the conference had adopted no decision, but had merely made a suggestion, which he, in his personal capacity, thought was a good one.

LORD CURZON said that the suggestion made represented a unanimous recommendation.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he saw the matter very much in the same light as the British Government. He had had no reason to change his opinion since the last discussion. He had, moreover, received a telegram from Signor Nitti, who was very unfavourable to the despatch of troops into Germany. He thought it might lead to very serious trouble, and he thought Europe sufficiently disturbed as it was to avoid disturbing it further.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that he agreed that dangerous consequences might follow from such drastic action as the occupation of two German cities. He thought it would be better to await the result of the negotiations between Berlin and the disturbed district.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that Signor Nitti thought that the Allies possessed a sufficient guarantee in their capacity to deny Germany essential raw material. This power resided chiefly with Great Britain and America, and a threat from them ought to be sufficient to control the situation so far as the German Government was concerned.

LORD CURZON said that the news received from the Rhine by the British Government was to the effect that the one thing likely to stop the Spartacist movement was the importation of food. It was the policy of the Allied Governments to support the Ebert-Bauer Government, and not to threaten them.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that Signor Nitti wished to meet the views of the French Government as far as possible. Though he was opposed to any occupation, he thought that the Allies might show they were resolute by indicating that they would, if necessary, use economic pressure.

BARON MONCHEUR said that, in general, the Belgian Government was averse from the military occupation of Germany. He had received no definite instructions regarding the French proposal to send troops to Frankfort and Darmstadt. Should the Allies consider it desirable to do so, Belgium would take her share.

LORD CURZON said that he did not think the question could be carried any

further. There appeared to be a strong feeling that it would be unwise to do what M. Millerand suggested. He would, therefore, inform the British Ambassador in Paris of the feeling of the conference. He was sorry that there appeared to be a deadlock. It was unfortunate that suggestions made in Paris were regarded as unacceptable in London, and suggestions made in London were refused in Paris. It was very unfortunate that M. Millerand was prevented by the political situation in France from joining the Supreme Council and from defending his ideas in it.

BARON MONCHEUR said his remarks must be understood to be of a general character, and not to apply to the occupation of Frankfort and Darmstadt in particular.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that he had meant to say that he regarded the marching of troops into Germany as inadvisable at the present moment.

3. LORD CURZON said that the next question for consideration arose from a letter addressed to Mr. Lloyd George by M. Berthelot, dated the 24th March (A.J. 125) (Appendix 2). In this document M. Berthelot claimed that the only authorities capable of dealing with the financial clauses of the treaty were the Technical Commission and the Supreme Council; he stated that the Conference of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors was not competent. This Lord Curzon begged to dispute. When the Supreme Council had first met in 10, Downing Street, M. Millerand and Signor Nitti had been present for a while. They had then decided that the work of drawing up the treaty should be transferred to the Conference of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors. Accordingly, this conference had been sitting for some weeks, considering all the aspects of the treaty. Two sittings had been spent in consideration of the draft financial clauses.<sup>3</sup> With a few reservations they had been passed. M. Berthelot, at that time, had not taken up the position that this conference was not competent. Not only was it competent, but it was bound to deal with the question. After two meetings had been spent in considering the report of the commission, which, in the main, had been accepted, it appeared that the French Government had proposed a complete alteration in the principle of the draft as accepted. The change was regarded as so important as only to be fit for the consideration of the Supreme Council. No doubt it was true that important differences of opinion between the Governments should go to the Supreme Council, but this did not imply that the conference was disqualified from touching the matter. He had, therefore, taken the responsibility of summoning members of the commission, including its chairman, and he proposed to ask the latter to state what the differences were which must be referred to the Supreme Council; what had happened to the clauses that had been accepted; and what the conference could do in the circumstances? He could not accept the statement that the whole matter should be taken out of the hands of this conference, as he considered this quite contrary to the conditions under which it had been asked to work.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 48, minute 2, and No. 49.

M. BERTHELOT said that he had written the letter referred to under strict and precise instructions from his Government. He begged to assure Lord Curzon that there was nothing personal involved. Nevertheless, he could not withdraw anything he had said. The Financial Commission had examined certain proposals from a technical point of view; the proposals had then been considered from a political point of view, and the French Government had found it was unable to accept them. This political difference must, therefore, be settled by the Supreme Council. He thought it would be useless to repeat the process already gone through, seeing that the present conference could not solve either the technical or the political differences. He said this without any desire to diminish the attributes of the conference. He must further state that, should any discussion begin on the financial clauses, he would have to withdraw. He had precise orders on this point. He had understood that Lord Curzon wished him to give warning whenever he felt himself unable to collaborate in a final decision. He did so now orally, as he had done by writing, in the letter referred to. The position he was ordered to take up was that the proposals of the French Government involved technical points which could only be considered by the commission. They should be considered before the heads of the Governments were asked to investigate the political points. All the points raised were not of the greatest importance, and the technical part of the matter should be reported on before the heads of Governments conferred. He was sorry that his letter had given the chairman the impression that he was diminishing the status of this conference, to which the French Government attached the highest importance; but he thought that a discussion of the financial clauses in this assembly would not lead to any useful result.

LORD CURZON said that M. Berthelot appeared to forget that the financial chapter had been discussed in the Supreme Council itself. It was after this discussion that it had been handed over to the present conference for completion.<sup>4</sup> It therefore became the duty of the present conference to deal with the matter. After all, what was the Supreme Council? It was nothing but the present meeting as it was, with the addition of the British Prime Minister; M. Millerand was not present, and Signor Nitti was in Italy. In any case, it was for this conference to decide what were questions of first-rate importance, requiring a decision by the Supreme Council, and what were questions the conference itself should settle. He would, therefore, ask the chairman of the commission to explain the situation.

M. BERTHELOT said that, unfortunately, he was precluded by his orders from attending any discussion, and, to his great regret, he would have to withdraw if any discussion began.

LORD CURZON said that, as chairman of the meeting, he could not, with all respect to M. Berthelot, surrender his right of asking the chairman of any commission to state how its work was progressing. He acknowledged the contention that M. Berthelot could take no part in a decision, but he trusted that M. Berthelot did not assert that the chairman of the conference was

<sup>4</sup> Cf. No. 42, minute 3.

precluded from asking for information. He hoped M. Berthelot would give the conference the benefit of his presence, even if he were bound to remain silent.

M. BERTHELOT said that he did not dream of contesting the right of the chairman to ask questions, but, as he had already said, he could not himself discuss the question. The view of the French Government was that a technical discussion should take place first, and that then the question, in its political aspects, should go to the heads of the Governments. He thanked Lord Curzon for his invitation to remain in the meeting, but he gave notice that he could take no cognisance of what might take place.

MR. BLACKETT said that the draft financial clauses, after discussion in the Supreme Council and in the Conference of Foreign Ministers, had been referred back to the commission for consideration of certain specific points. The commission was to hear M. Veniselos; to deal with currency questions in Smyrna; and to consider reparation clauses. The commission had accordingly drafted clauses which had been sent to the Smyrna Commission; it had heard M. Veniselos; and had discussed the reparation question. Reports on these matters would shortly be available. The commission had also, perhaps, gone a little beyond its terms of reference, and had made small and mostly verbal alterations in the draft. It had then been confronted with a demand from the French delegation for a complete redraft of articles 5 and 15, which established the priority of charges on the Turkish Government, and the relations of the Financial Commission to be set up under the treaty, and of the existing Council of the Ottoman Debt. The clauses, as originally drafted, had represented a compromise between the views of the French and British Governments. The British Government had wished to abolish the Council of the Ottoman Debt and the hypothecated revenues; it wished to make the Financial Commission responsible for meeting the demands of the bondholders, and to charge the whole assets of Turkey with the responsibility for discharging the debt. The first charge, according to the British view, should be the cost of occupation. The French view had been the exact opposite. As the result of a compromise it had been agreed that the hypothecated revenues should be withdrawn from the total assets of Turkey and reserved for the bondholders. It had also been agreed that the Council of the Ottoman Debt should not be abolished outright, but should be merged in three years, with the Financial Commission. When confronted with the new proposals of the French Government, which took as a starting-point all the concessions made on the British side while withdrawing all those made on the French side, he had concluded that it was not within the competence of the commission to deal with the question any further. He had also stated that the British Government could not give up its whole position. The French proposals, moreover, involved the upsetting of a decision taken in the Supreme Council itself regarding £5,000,000 in gold. He thought the commission could not reopen this question except under orders of the body competent to do so. He thought it would be of little advantage for the commission to discuss these proposals, as the British delegation would at once begin by withdrawing all the concessions previously made, with the object of attaining

a compromise; it would insist on the abolition of the Council of the Debt and the merging of all the assets of Turkey into one. He did not think that this would be of much assistance to his French colleagues.

LORD CURZON said that, without going into the merits, he would merely take note of the fact that the French proposals tended to the reversal of two important provisions of the financial clauses as accepted in the conference, and of one accepted by the Supreme Council. It was obvious that the chairman of the commission was in a difficult position, as the French delegates, after withdrawing all the concessions they had made, expected him to maintain all his. No doubt the matter would have to go to the Supreme Council, and he trusted that the French Government would have a representative on it able to speak with authority. He understood, however, that the Finance Commission had considered certain questions referred to it, relating to reparation and minorities.

MR. BLACKETT said that a draft report, explaining the work of the commission on these matters, addressed to the conference, would be ready very shortly.

LORD CURZON said that the conference would be ready to examine these smaller points as soon as convenient.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that if there was to be a meeting of the Supreme Council, Signor Scialoja thought that Signor Nitti ought to be present. Signor Nitti would find it very difficult to leave Italy in the near future. He had twice travelled to London, and it had been agreed at the last meeting of the Supreme Council that it would meet next at San Remo.<sup>5</sup> He would, therefore, beg his colleagues to inform him as early as possible at what date they would like to fix the meeting of the Supreme Council at San Remo, where Signor Nitti would be delighted to welcome them. The question under discussion was, of course, not the only one the Supreme Council would have to deal with. There were many others—for instance, Marshal Foch's report on the military requirements to guarantee the execution of the Treaty with Turkey. This question would certainly require the presence of Signor Nitti.

LORD CURZON said the original plan had been to complete the Turkish Treaty in London. The British Government thought that the French and Italian Governments had delegated full powers to their representatives, and it had been hoped that the work would be completed by the end of the month. The drafting would then be completed, and the treaty handed to the Turks in Paris. After an interval for the Turkish delegation to make a reply, and after their reply had been dealt with, the signature would take place. Thus, the first stage after London would be in Paris, and the second stage in San Remo. This would now seem to be changed. The conference would probably continue discussing the Turkish Treaty till Easter. The question of the financial clauses mainly concerned Great Britain and France. He hoped that M. Millerand would be able to come to London to decide it, for if it were to be kept pending until the meeting at San Remo it would be difficult to complete the Turkish Treaty. Certain questions, like that of Marshal Foch's report, would undoubtedly require Signor Nitti's presence,

<sup>5</sup> See No. 46, minute 9.

and would, therefore, naturally be postponed until the meeting at San Remo.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that, unless there was business to be done, Signor Scialoja would start for Italy on the following day. It was clear that no meeting of the Supreme Council could take place in London. He himself would not have authority.

LORD CURZON said that if the Italian and French representatives were not endowed with full powers, it was not clear what work could be done. He had wished to work during the following week.

M. BERTHELOT said that on many questions a final result was in sight. He thought the work, therefore, could go on. As to the financial conditions, his instructions were quite categorical. These conditions should first be dealt with by the commission, and then by the Supreme Council. On any other conditions the French Government would withdraw from negotiation. He therefore must beg that the proposals be sent to the commission.

LORD CURZON said that, as there was an irreconcilable difference of opinion between the French and British Governments, no agreement in the commission was likely. He was quite ready to refer the matter to the Supreme Council, but for this it would be necessary for M. Millerand to come over. It was clearly undesirable to postpone the matter until the meeting at San Remo.

M. BERTHELOT said that he could not depart from his instructions. He did not think it was asking much to gather the commission together again. If, after a meeting or two, no agreement was found possible, the Supreme Council could then decide.

LORD CURZON said he did not mind asking the commission to re-examine the question, but he expected no results.

M. BERTHELOT said that if the British representatives on the commission had orders to yield nothing, there would certainly be no results. He assumed that the members would be free.

LORD CURZON said that, in regard to the £5,000,000 in gold, the British representative on the commission would certainly not have authority to reverse the decision taken in 10, Downing Street. No one would be precluded from discussing other proposals, but if the difference of opinion remained, the Supreme Council would have to deal with it.

It was agreed

That, on these terms, the commission to draft the financial clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey should meet again.

#### 4. The conference had under consideration—

*Clauses in the  
Turkish Treaty  
dealing with  
Ports, Waterways  
and Railways*

(a) Report of the Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission relative to the section of the Turkish Treaty dealing with ports, waterways and railways questions (A.J. 118) (Appendix 3).

(b) Report of the Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission relative to the ports of Constantinople and

Haidar Pasha (A.J. 115) (Appendix 4).

**GENERAL MANCE**, chairman of the Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission, said that the commission had unanimously agreed to all the clauses in the annexes to the two reports before the conference, with a few slight reservations. Some of these reservations had been withdrawn since the submission of the reports; for instance, the French delegates had withdrawn their objection to the inclusion of the word 'Persia' in article 27. The other clauses to which reservations had been made had really been agreed, subject to their being referred to Paris, and to such slight modifications which such reference might make desirable.

**M. KAMMERER** concurred in General Mance's statement.

**VISCOUNT CHINDA** said that he was willing to accept the draft clauses subject to any representation he might have to make after a closer study of the reports, which had only reached him just before the meeting.

**GENERAL MANCE** suggested that it might be advisable to refer the report relating to the ports of Constantinople and Haidar Pasha (A.J. 115) to the Commission on the Straits, who would signify their acceptance or propose modifications.

It was agreed—

- (a) That the secretary should forward the report of the Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission (A.J. 115), relative to the ports of Constantinople and Haidar Pasha, to the Commission on the Straits for any remarks that that commission might wish to make.
- (b) To adopt the two reports of the Ports, Waterways and Railways Commissions, subject to:—
  - (i) Any remarks that the Commission on the Straits might wish to make on the report relating to the ports of Constantinople and Haidar Pasha, provided that any suggested modifications proved acceptable to the conference.
  - (ii) The result of the reference of the French delegates to Paris.
  - (iii) Any representations the Japanese Ambassador might desire to make later.

The conference approved the suggestion of the Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission that the Drafting Committee be authorised to review the date (the 1st August, 1914) in article 38 from a juridical standpoint.

The conference took note that, in the opinion of the commission, it would probably be necessary to add a few articles regarding the Hedjaz Railway, and other matters when the boundaries of the mandatory areas had been determined.



5. The conference had before them a copy of a letter dated the 14th February, 1920 (A.J. 108) (Appendix 5), from the Acting Ecumenical Patriarch to Mr. Lloyd George on the question of the future of Constantinople.

*Future of Constantinople.*

*Letter from the Acting Ecumenical Patriarch to Mr. Lloyd George*

It was agreed—

That a reply should be sent to the Acting Ecumenical Patriarch acknowledging receipt of his letter and stating that the contents had been carefully considered by the Supreme Council.

The secretary was instructed to take the necessary action.

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 24, 1920.

#### APPENDIX I TO No. 70

##### *Internment of the ex-Kaiser*

*Reply to the Dutch Government, as approved by the Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers on March 24, 1920*

(This text was subsequently modified to meet the wishes of M. Millerand)<sup>6</sup>

Les Puissances alliées qui, depuis la réception de la note du Gouvernement néerlandais en date du 4 [2] mars dernier,<sup>7</sup> ont été en communication avec ce Gouvernement au sujet des mesures à prendre pour l'internement efficace de l'ex-Empereur allemand, dans l'intérêt de la tranquillité et de la sécurité de l'Europe, ne peuvent dissimuler la surprise avec laquelle elles ont appris que le Gouvernement néerlandais a cru devoir préjuger cette question par la publication d'un décret royal qui assigne à l'ex-Empereur un lieu d'internement précis dans la province d'Utrecht. Ce décret est accompagné d'un engagement par lequel le Gouvernement néerlandais prend sur lui la responsabilité entière de la garde de l'ex-Empereur, du contrôle de sa correspondance et de la surveillance de ses relations avec le monde extérieur.

Les Gouvernements alliés prennent acte de cet engagement comme représentant l'intention sincère du Gouvernement néerlandais de diminuer les dangers qui pourront naître de la présence de l'ex-Empereur sur le territoire hollandais.

Mais il est incontestable que nulle mesure de précaution, si loyalement conçue et fidèlement exécutée qu'elle soit, ne pourra éloigner le très grave danger qui subsistera tant qu'il sera permis à l'ex-Empereur de résider à moins de 40 kilom. de la frontière allemande, et de constituer ainsi un foyer de propagande réactionnaire et une menace constante pour la paix européenne.

Les Gouvernements alliés ne peuvent accepter aucune responsabilité à l'égard de cette décision, dont la responsabilité incombera uniquement au Gouvernement néerlandais, ce dernier ayant rejeté les représentations que lui a adressées à plusieurs reprises la voix sérieuse et unanime des Puissances.

<sup>6</sup> See No. 72, minute 8.

<sup>7</sup> See No. 51, minute 1 and note 2.

Si les conséquences redoutées résultent à l'avenir de la présence continue de l'ex-Empereur ou de sa famille dans le lieu de résidence qui leur est actuellement assigné dans le territoire hollandais, le Gouvernement néerlandais ne pourrait se soustraire à la responsabilité exclusive, tant de l'événement que de ses conséquences, qu'il a ainsi assumée en pleine connaissance de cause. Les Puissances alliées se réservent, le cas échéant, vis-à-vis du Gouvernement néerlandais, la liberté d'action que leur paraîtra comporter la situation.

*Le 24 mars 1920.*

## APPENDIX 2 TO NO. 70

*M. Berthelot to Mr. Lloyd George*

LONDRES, le 24 mars 1920

(A.J. 125.)

M. le Président,

Le Conseil suprême a confié à une commission interalliée le soin d'établir un projet de clauses financières du Traité de Paix, ménageant les intérêts des diverses Puissances alliées en Turquie.

Cette commission a préparé un premier texte, que la délégation française a dû, conformément à ses instructions formelles, référer au Gouvernement français. Ce dernier, en se déclarant d'accord sur la plupart des principes, a indiqué les modalités, d'ailleurs importantes, qu'il ne pouvait accepter sans abandonner la défense des intérêts français en Turquie, dont l'importance est de beaucoup plus considérable que ceux des autres Puissances.

Le 20 mars, la délégation française a eu l'honneur de vous adresser un mémorandum et une lettre<sup>8</sup> précisant les points essentiels en question et vous priant d'en

<sup>8</sup> This letter (A.J. 113) of March 20, 1920 and undated memorandum read as follows:

'Monsieur le Président,

'La délégation française a eu l'honneur, sur les instructions du Gouvernement français, de déclarer, en séance de la Commission des Ministres des Affaires Etrangères et Ambassadeurs, à Lord Curzon, que le Gouvernement français ne pouvait accepter certains principes incorporés dans le projet de clauses financières que la délégation française lui avait soumis après délibération à Londres.

'En effet, les travaux des Commissions sont conditionnés avant tout par les décisions générales d'ordre politique concernant la répartition des territoires de la Turquie, décisions qui ont de graves répercussions sur le règlement des questions financières et sur les intérêts français engagés en Turquie. Les principes mêmes qui avaient été envisagés dans les travaux préliminaires des clauses financières ont dû être reconsidérés à la lumière surtout de ce fait capital que les principales ressources gagées au profit des porteurs de la Dette extérieure turque se trouvent dans les territoires destinés à être détachés de l'Empire Ottoman et qu'ainsi ces gages tombent tandis que la répartition de la Dette est faite sans tenir compte des dits gages et proportionnellement aux ressources générales des diverses provinces ottomanes, ce qui ne laisse à la Turquie que des provinces où les ressources gagées risquent de ne pas couvrir leurs affectations.

'D'autres conséquences résultent aussi des délibérations de la Conférence concernant le mode de direction et l'organisation de la Commission Financière de Turquie: Il doit en résulter forcément une mise au point minutieuse des textes élaborés, mise au point qui a amené le Gouvernement français à envisager certaines précautions qui sont absolument essentielles et que l'opinion publique exige concernant l'avenir de l'Administration de la Dette Publique ottomane.

référer l'examen à la Commission financière, les techniciens étant mieux qualifiés que personne pour ce travail, et pour se mettre d'accord sur un texte précisant les points sur lesquels la conciliation des intérêts en présence a pu se faire et ceux sur

'Les raisons d'ordre politique sommairement développées ci-dessus ont amené la délégation française à déposer le mémorandum ci-joint, qui expose les modifications essentielles demandées par le Gouvernement français dans la rédaction des textes financiers, avant qu'il puisse y donner son adhésion. Les demandes dont il s'agit sont justifiées par les motifs développés au cours du mémorandum dont il s'agit, étant bien entendu que, en dehors des raisons techniques indiquées, la demande du Gouvernement français est basée sur des considérations politiques d'ordre général. Il est évident d'ailleurs que tant que les clauses politiques ne seront pas arrêtées définitivement et que les Gouvernements français et britannique ne seront pas tombés d'accord sur les questions qui les intéressent spécialement, les travaux des Commissions ne peuvent représenter que des décisions provisoires.

'La Délégation française a l'honneur de demander en conséquence que le mémorandum ci-joint soit discuté par la Commission financière.

'Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'assurance [*sic*] de mes sentiments et haute considération.

BERTHELOT'

*'Mémorandum sur les modifications demandées au texte des clauses financières, tel qu'il était après la séance du 4 Mars 1920. [Footnote in original: "L'annexe [not printed: see below] jointe au présent mémorandum présente d'un côté le texte des clauses financières tel qu'il était après la séance du 4 Mars 1920 et de l'autre les diverses modifications demandées actuellement par la délégation française."]*

'Les demandes formulées par la délégation française se justifient par les raisons techniques développées ci-après.

#### *'1. Part de Dette Publique Ottomane restant à la charge de la Turquie (Article V)*

'Les parts contributives assumées par les États cessionnaires de territoires ottomans sont calculées proportionnellement au rendement des revenus généraux dans les provinces cédées, c'est-à-dire à la fois des revenus donnés en gage d'emprunts et des revenus libres. Le solde demeurant à la charge de la Turquie sera par conséquent proportionnel au produit des revenus généraux dans les parties de l'Empire qui resteront soumises à sa souveraineté.

'Le Traité de Paix turc doit donner aux porteurs l'assurance du versement effectif de l'annuité totale exigible pour la dette ainsi répartie.

'De fait le texte stipule nettement que les Grandes Puissances s'engageront à acquitter la part leur incombant et que les États balkaniques et les États nouvellement créés seront tenus d'y affecter toutes garanties suffisantes. Au contraire [*sic*], pour ce qui est de la portion due par la Turquie, le paiement, à s'en tenir à la lettre des dispositions du projet, n'en serait assuré qu'à concurrence du rendement des gages demeurés en territoire ottoman, le texte en effet prévoit (article 5) que toutes les ressources de l'Empire, *exception faite des revenus donnés en gages* destinés au paiement de l'annuité restant à la charge de la Turquie seront mises à la disposition de la Commission financière qui doit les employer au paiement 1° des dépenses d'occupation, 2° des réparations et des dépenses d'Administration du Gouvernement turc.

'Or on doit tenir pour une quasi certitude que le rendement des gages sera insuffisant pour couvrir le paiement de l'annuité qu'il est destiné à garantir.

'La première raison en est que, dans la répartition maintenant envisagée des territoires turcs, les provinces où le Gouvernement ottoman avait concédé les gages les plus nombreux et les plus productifs, sont soustraites à son autorité. Il en est ainsi notamment en Thrace et surtout dans le vilayet d'Aidin (Smyrne). Bien qu'il ne soit pas possible, dans l'ignorance où l'on est des délimitations exactes de la Souveraineté ottomane, de présenter à ce sujet des calculs précis, on peut être assuré que la proportion des gages dans les territoires restant

lesquels le Conseil suprême des Chefs de Gouvernements a seul qualité pour décider en dernière analyse. La délégation française a pour instructions de ne pas se prêter à une discussion en dehors de ces deux organismes, c'est-à-dire la Com-

en Turquie sera inférieure à la proportion de leurs revenus généraux qui sert de base pour fixer sa part dans la Dette.

'Une raison encore plus forte de redouter une insuffisance des revenus accordés en gage est que le produit en est perçu en monnaie turque dont la dépréciation par rapport à l'or est actuellement de plus de 500%. Aussi longtemps donc que la Commission financière n'aura pas assaini la circulation fiduciaire, les assignations *fixes* stipulées par la plupart des contrats d'emprunts sur le produit des revenus affectés, ne couvriront qu'une faible part des sommes nécessaires au service de la Dette. En admettant même que ces assignations soient exprimées en livres turques or, l'insuffisance, bien que réduite, subsisterait, car le produit des revenus donnés en garantie, bien qu'il ait en général augmenté par suite de la hausse des prix des produits dimiers, taxes *ad valorem*, est limité par leur tarif même et ne saurait supporter des charges quintuplées.

'Ainsi la rédaction actuelle de l'article expose à voir la Turquie, débiteur principal, ne verser qu'une partie plus ou moins forte de son annuité or, tandis que les États cessionnaires acquitteraient l'intégralité de la leur. Résultat paradoxal auquel n'a certainement pas attendu aboutir le Conseil suprême décidé à rétablir l'ordre dans les finances turques.

'Ce résultat présenterait d'autant plus de gravité qu'il risquerait pratiquement d'empêcher tout paiement de la Dette turque, les porteurs des divers emprunts devant très certainement se rejeter les uns sur les autres la charge de supporter l'insuffisance constatée. Les porteurs de tel emprunt dont tous les gages se trouvent maintenant hors de Turquie, l'Emprunt Hodeidah-Sanaa 4% par exemple, prétendront se payer intégralement sur les annuités acquittées par les États cessionnaires. Les porteurs de tel autre emprunt dont tous les gages demeurent en Turquie, le Douanes de Constantinople 1911 par exemple, repousseront la thèse et mettront un embargo sur le produit des annuités contributives.

'Il est donc indispensable de spécifier expressément que toutes insuffisances des revenus donnés en gage seront comblées par le Gouvernement turc ou plus exactement, puisque les pouvoirs financiers de ce dernier sont transférés à la Commission financière, que celle-ci prélèvera ces insuffisances sur les ressources générales mises à sa disposition, de manière que le paiement intégral de la part de Dette d'avant-guerre restant à la charge de la Turquie soit assuré avant l'acquittement de toutes charges postérieures en date, c'est-à-dire en première charge. La Commission financière ne saurait prétendre à réorganiser l'avenir des finances turques sans avoir au préalable consolidé la Dette extérieure turque d'avant-guerre possédée à raison de 60% par la France, 11% par l'Angleterre et 4% par l'Italie.

'Il ne serait pas possible d'envisager que le Traité de Paix Tu[r]c ne précise pas d'une façon absolument nette et catégorique le paiement par la Turquie en *première charge* de l'annuité or restant à sa charge dans la Dette Ottomane.

'C'est en vue de sauvegarder efficacement les droits acquis que la délégation française propose pour l'article 5 une formule précisant que, au cas d'insuffisance de rendement des gages affectés restant en territoire turc, il sera prélevé sur la totalité des ressources de la Turquie, avant toutes autres affectations, par la Commission financière, les sommes nécessaires pour parfaire l'annuité incombant au Gouvernement ottoman.

'Au surplus le chiffre de ces insuffisances décroîtra rapidement d'importance au fur et à mesure que la Commission financière assainira la circulation, et en outre ces insuffisances seront d'autant plus aisément supportées que la Commission est investie de tous pouvoirs pour accroître le produit de la fiscalité en Turquie.

'La demande sur ce point de la délégation française est donc parfaitement fondée en équité; d'autre part, sa réalisation pratique doit être rendue facile par la création même de la Commission financière; d'ailleurs c'est l'application du principe posé à l'article 16 de l'attribution de gages suffisants ou d'une hypothèque sur les revenus généraux de l'Empire ottoman, attribution que [sic] ne peut raisonnablement être prévue pour assurer le paiement *partiel* de l'annuité or, mais bien pour en garantir le paiement intégral.

mission financière, qui prépare le travail, et le Conseil suprême politique, qui décidera finalement.

## *'II. Coupons arriérés (Article V, ii)*

'Les coupons échus pendant la guerre restent dûs aux porteurs alliés, tant dis [? tandis que nos ennemis turcs et austro-allemands, et les neutres les ont touchés. L'Égalité doit être] rétablie entre eux. L'article 19 du projet prévoit bien le rappel de certaines sommes qui ne sauraient être employées qu'au règlement de ces arriérés, mais ces sommes seront insuffisantes et en outre le texte ne pose nulle part d'une façon précise le principe du paiement intégral des arriérés. Il est indispensable de l'affirmer, quitte à accorder termes et délais, dont les modalités sont indiquées dans l'ajoute proposée au début du paragraphe ii de l'article 5.

## *'III. Conseil de la Dette Publique Ottomane (Article XV)*

'Le projet consacre le maintien du Conseil de la Dette dans sa forme actuelle jusqu'en 1923 et détermine à cet effet les mesures nécessaires telles que l'engagement des Gouvernements alliés de faire tous leurs efforts pour que le Conseil actuel ne soit pas renouvelé.

'Cet engagement est d'abord absolument anormal, car il impliquerait la possibilité d'une pression sur les porteurs, dont la consultation est indispensable pour consentir à la disparition du Conseil de la Dette qui tient son existence d'un contrat solennel passé avec eux et auquel les Gouvernements anglais, français et italien ont donné leur aval.

'D'autre part, il est imprudent de fixer d'avance un terme certain pour la fusion des deux organismes qui devra se faire quand les circonstances apparaîtront les plus opportunes. De cette opportunité, la Commission financière et le Conseil de la Dette seront les juges les plus qualifiés, et l'accord entre eux sera d'autant plus aisé que ces deux conseils sont appelés par l'article 15 du projet à collaborer à un programme d'extension des attributions de l'Administration actuelle de la Dette en ce qui concerne la perception de nouveaux revenus, et que la fusion de cette manière deviendra pour ainsi dire insensible. A ce moment il sera d'autant plus facile d'obtenir l'adhésion indispensable des porteurs qu'ils ne seront pas appelés à choisir entre deux organismes dont l'un a leur confiance depuis 40 ans et l'autre n'aurait pas encore eu le temps de faire ses preuves mais à constater leur pénétration et l'avantage de ne laisser subsister qu'un seul des deux.

'La demande de la délégation française ne saurait être repoussée, car elle amende le texte d'une façon rationnelle et en permet le jeu plus souple.

'Enfin elle fait prévoir une concession des plus importantes et sur laquelle on ne saurait trop insister, les porteurs en effet seraient en droit de réclamer le maintien du conseil de la Dette jusqu'à l'expiration du délai prévu par le contrat qui l'a créé et qui constitue une convention de droit privé à laquelle un traité de droit public ne saurait toucher sans le consentement des parties.

## *'IV. Dépenses d'occupation (Article V, ii)*

'Cette question ayant un caractère politique doit être laissée à la décision des chefs de Gouvernement.

## *'V. Bénéficiaires de réparations (Article 5, ii)*

'L'addition au texte anglais ("y compris les personnes etc.") est inutile étant donnée la compréhension de la défnation [sic] donnée par l'article 52 des clauses économiques au terme "de ressortissants alliés", toutes les fois qu'il est employé dans les sections économiques et financières du Traité. La précision de cette ajoute ne pourrait être que dangereuse car elle risquerait de faire interpréter ce texte en ce sens que les Sociétés contrôlées par les groupes alliés et associés devraient être écartées du nombre des bénéficiaires d'indemnités, ce qui n'a certainement pas été dans la pensée du rédacteur de ce texte et en fait serait en contradiction avec les dispositions générales de l'article 28 des clauses économiques.

## *'VI. Concessions nouvelles (Article VIII)*

'La nouvelle formule proposée semble d'une meilleure rédaction.

Dans ces conditions, la délégation française n'a pas pouvoir pour discuter cet après-midi devant la réunion des Ministres des Affaires étrangères et des Ambassadeurs présidée par Lord Curzon les questions financières en cours. Cette réunion n'a en effet ni la compétence technique indispensable au premier degré, ni les

*'VII. Gages donnés par les États cessionnaires (Article X)*

'Par suite d'une erreur matérielle sans doute, on a omis d'assimiler aux États balkaniques les nouveaux États d'Asie en ce qui concerne l'obligation de constituer des gages suffisants pour le paiement de leur part de [?] la Dette.

*'VIII. Surveillance de la gestion de la Dette (Article XV)*

'La suppression de la partie de phrase demandée par la délégation paraît correspondre plus exactement au rôle que devra remplir la commission financière vis-à-vis du Conseil de la Dette.

*'IX. Douanes (Article XV)*

'La suppression du paragraphe relatif aux Douanes est motivés [sic] par l'inutilité de prévoir dans le texte actuel une application des pouvoirs de la Commission financière.

*'X. Substitution de gages (Article XVI)*

'L'addition des mots "aux porteurs" est indispensable pour valider toutes décisions de la Commission relatives à la modification des gages constitués par les contrats.

*'XI. Versement des perceptions qui ont pu être effectuées par les corps d'occupation alliés depuis l'armistice (Article XIX)*

'La délégation estime de toute justice que les revenus affectés à la Dette perçus depuis l'Armistice soient également remis au Conseil, puisque les États annexants ne prennent leur part proportionnelle de Dette qu'à dater de la ratification du Traité.

*'XII. Affectation de l'or provenant des dépôts faits en Allemagne et en Autriche et des Bons du Trésor Allemands (Article 22)*

'Le [sic] délégation française insiste avec la plus vive énergie sur la nécessité de laisser à l'Administration de la Dette les sommes d'or déposées par elle sous son sceau à Berlin et à Vienne, en garantie des bons de monnaie (première émission), environ 6 millions de livres turques. Cet or en effet est sa pleine propriété et les puissances alliées ne sauraient l'en dépouiller. Elles doivent la remettre en possession de son bien, la seule restriction qui pourrait être raisonnablement admise serait que la Dette dût se conformer aux décisions de la Commission financière pour utiliser ces sommes à la réforme fiduciaire.

'C'est pourquoi la délégation française, si elle consent au texte proposé en tant qu'il s'applique à l'or à provenir des Bons du Trésor Allemands garantissant les billets de monnaie, demande avec insistance l'insertion d'une clause spéciale pour les dépôts d'or matérialisés au nom de la Dette publique ottomane.'

Annexed to this memorandum in the original was a 'Projet des clauses financières proposées pour le traité de paix avec la Turquie'. This draft was headed 'Texte rédigé après présentation au Conseil Suprême et au Conseil des Ambassadeurs avec, soulignées d'un trait [here italicized], les modifications suggérées depuis par la Commission financière', and was dated at foot 'Foreign Office 21 Février 1920'. This draft comprised French texts of 27 articles. In general French draft articles I-IV corresponded to articles 1-4 in the appendix to No. 77, and French draft articles V-XXVII to articles 6-28 in the appendix. The French draft articles specified in the covering memorandum above were, however, as follows:

(a) article V read 'Toutes les ressources de l'Empire ottoman, exception faite des revenus concédés ou donnés en garantie de la Dette publique ottomane (voir annexe I) et après préalablement, en cas d'insuffisance des dits revenus, des sommes nécessaires pour parfaire le paiement de l'annuité restant à la charge de la Turquie conformément aux dispositions de l'article 10, 2<sup>e</sup>, seront mises à la disposition de la Commission financière qui les emploiera dans les conditions suivantes:

pouvoirs de décision politique, qui n'appartiennent qu'aux Chefs de Gouvernements.

'(i) La première charge sera constitués [*sic*] par les traitements et les dépenses courantes de la Commission financiers [*sic*], ainsi que le coût des Forces d'occupation [*Footnote in original*: "On attirera l'attention du Conseil sur la portée exacte du terme d'occupation par rapport à la Mésopotamie, à la Syrie et à la Palestine. Les délégations française et italienne soutiennent qu'il faut en restreindre le sens aux territoires qui doivent rester turcs. Les délégations britanniques [*sic*] et japonaise sont de l'opinion contraire."'] Alliées Militaires et Navales depuis l'Armistice jusqu'à la date de ratification du présent Traité. Si l'occupation continue postérieurement à cette dernière date, les dépenses du fait des troupes qui y sont employées devront être supportées de la même manière. C'est à la Commission qu'il appartiendra de fixer le montant de de [*sic*] cette charge, l'annuité au moyen de laquelle elle sera payable et la période pendant laquelle courra ladite annuité.

'(ii) La Commission financière fixera le montant de l'annuité que devra verser le Gouvernement turc pour faire face tant au règlement des coupons de la Dette extérieure turque restant à payer à la date de la ratification du Traité qu'aux obligations encourues envers les Puissances alliées, à titre d'indemnités pour les pertes et dommages subis dans leurs personnes et leurs [b]iens par les ressortissants de ces puissances y compris les personnes protégées dont le titre de protection est antérieur au 1er août 1914, et par les fondations religieuses dans lesquelles les dits ressortissants ou protégés sont intéressés [a marginal note to this passage read "A supprimer les mots soulignés."'] par la faute du Gouvernement turc et en raison de la part qu'il a prise dans la guerre. Il sera néanmoins tenu compte de la situation financière de l'État turc et de la nécessité de pourvoir aux dépenses essentielles de son administration. La Commission arbitrale constituée conformément à l'article 28 des clauses économiques prononcera sur toutes les réclamations [*sic*] y compris celles pour dommage personnel. La Commission financière fixera l'annuité à affecter à cet objet et déterminera la monnaie dans laquelle elle devra être payée.'

(b) article VIII read 'Toute conces[s]ion nouvelle accordée soit par le Gouvernement Ottoman soit par une Administration locale turque, devra obtenir l'approbation de la Commission Financière'.

(c) X corresponded to article 11 in the appendix to No. 77, except that in the French version the second paragraph began: 'Les États de la Péninsule balkanique et les États nouvellement créés en Asie auxquels sont ou ont été cédés des territoires ottomans, devront donner . . . '.

(d) XV read 'Le Gouvernement ottoman transfère à la Commission financière tous ses droits sur (l'Administration de la Dette Publique ottomane en ce qui concerne tant la surveillance de sa question [? gestion] que) [a marginal note to the passage in brackets read "A supprimer"] l'utilisation des excédents de revenus concédés à la Dette ou administrés par elle. Le Conseil de la Dette sera composé des Délégués anglais, français et italiens et du représentant de la Banque Ottomane et continuera à fonctionner comme précédemment. Il devra gérer et percevoir tous les revenus qui lui sont concédés en vertu du Décret de Mouharrem et tous les autres revenus dont la gestion lui a été confiée par les contrats d'emprunts antérieurs au 1er Août 1914. Les Gouvernements alliés autorisent le Conseil à prêter son concours au Ministère ottoman [*sic*] des Finances, dans les conditions qui seront fixées par la Commission financière, d'accord avec le Conseil de la Dette Publique Ottomane, en vue de réaliser autant que possible le programme suivant:

'Le Système de perception directe de certains revenus par l'Administration actuelle de la Dette Publique Ottomane sera dans des conditions qui seront arrêtées par la Commission financière, d'accord avec le Conseil de la Dette Publique ottomane, étendu aussi largement que possible et appliqué dans toutes les provinces qui resteront sous la domination ottomane, la Commission financière examinera à l'occasion de la création des nouvelles ressources et notamment des taxes indirectes dont elle aura approuvé le principe, la possibilité d'en confier la gestion à la Dette, qui en portera le produit au crédit du Gouvernement ottoman.

'L'Administration des Douanes sera placée sous les ordres d'un directeur général responsable vis-à-vis de la Commission financière et que celle-ci aura le pouvoir de nommer et de révoquer. L'assiette des droits de douanes ne pourra être modifiée que par la Commission financière. [A marginal note to this paragraph read "A supprimer".]

Je vous serais reconnaissant de bien vouloir inviter la Commission financière à procéder à l'examen qui rendra possible la discussion du Conseil suprême, à laquelle le Chef du Gouvernement français prendra part.

Veuillez, &c.,

BERTHELOT

### APPENDIX 3 TO No. 70

#### Document 1

#### *Treaty with Turkey*

#### *Report of Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission*

(A.J. 118.)

The attached articles have been agreed to unanimously, with the exception (1) that articles 31 and 35 have been provisionally reserved by the French delegate pending receipt of a communication from Paris, and (2) that the inclusion of the word 'Persia' in article 27 has been reserved by the French delegate for the decision of the Ambassadors' Conference.

It will be observed that article 8 includes reference to ports which will be situated in mandatory territories and to Dedeagatch and Batum, which are not in Turkish territory, and there are, similarly, references in the first paragraph of article 24, in articles 27 and 29, as well as in articles 19 and 20, affecting the Maritza, which may possibly not be included in the treaty as presented to Turkey.

*'Le Conseil de la Dette constitué dans les conditions ci-dessus restera en fonctions. Tout projet de fusion de la Commission financière et du Conseil de la Dette qui pourra être présenté dans l'avenir d'accord entre ces deux [sic] organismes, ne pourra être mis en vigueur qu'après l'approbation des porteurs. Les services administratifs de la Dette publique ottomane et ceux de la Commission financière fusionneront dans un organisme unique dont la forme sera déterminée par la Commission. La nouvelle organisation devra respecter tous les droits des porteurs de la Dette extérieure, aussi longtemps que le Décret de Mouharrem et les décrets subséquents resteront en vigueur.'*

(e) XVI corresponded to article 17 of the appendix to No. 77, except that the first sentence of the French version began 'La Commission est autorisée à proposer aux porteurs, à une date ultérieure, . . .'; the last sentence was printed in brackets with a marginal note 'A supprimer'.

(f) XIX read 'Le Gouvernement turc devra effectuer le versement entre les mains de l'Administration de la Dette, d'une somme équivalente aux produits des revenus affectés jusqu'à présent au service de la Dette Publique Ottomane et qui n'ont pas été versés au Conseil de la Dette, sur les territoires qui resteront soumis à la souveraineté de l'État ottoman. (Cette mesure sera appliquée dès que, au jugement de la Commission financière, la situation des finances turques le permettra.) [A marginal note to the sentence in brackets read "A supprimer".] *Les revenus affectés à la dette extérieure perçus depuis l'Armistice dans les territoires occupés militairement par les Alliés seront versés de la même manière au Conseil de la Dette.'*

(g) XXII read 'Les sommes en or qui doivent être transférées aux Puissances Alliées et Associées par l'Allemagne et l'Autriche en exécution de l'article 259 (1) [a marginal note here read "A supprimer"], (2), (4) et (7) du Traité avec l'Allemagne (et en vertu de l'article 210 (1) du Traité avec l'Autriche) [a marginal note to the passage in brackets read "A supprimer"] seront mises à la disposition de la Commission financière pour être employées par elle à faire face aux créances des Puissances Alliées sur le Gouvernement turc dans les conditions de priorité stipulées par l'Art. 5 du présent chapitre du Traité. *Quant aux dépôts d'or visés à l'article 259 (1) du Traité avec l'Allemagne et à l'article 210 (1) du Traité avec l'Autriche, ils seront remis immédiatement à la disposition de l'Administration de la Dette Publique Ottomane qui les emploiera en conformité des instructions de la Commission Financière.'*



The commission, however, decided to submit their recommendations in their entirety and leave it to the Drafting Committee to embody them in the appropriate document.

It is further suggested that the Drafting Committee be authorised to review the date (the 1st August, 1914), in article 38, from a juridical standpoint.

It will probably be necessary to add a few articles regarding the Hedjaz Railway and other matters when the boundaries of the mandatory areas have been determined.

H. O. MANCE, *Chairman,*  
*Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission*

*March 23, 1920.*

## Document 2

### *Draft Clauses relating to Ports, Waterways and Railways*

#### *Section I.—General Provisions . . .<sup>9</sup>*

#### *Section II.—Navigation*

. . . Chapter III.<sup>10</sup>—*Clauses relating to the Maritza and the Danube*

. . . Article 21.<sup>11</sup> The European Commission of the Danube reassumes the powers it possessed before the war. Nevertheless, as a provisional measure, only repre-

<sup>9</sup> This section (not printed) comprised draft articles 1 to 6 which corresponded to articles 328–333 respectively of the Treaty of Sèvres, subject to: (a) minor variation in drafting; (b) where the treaty read ‘Allied’ the draft read ‘Allied and Associated’ (*these provisions a and b apply also to notes 10–11 and 13–14 below*); (c) draft article 3 did not include the words ‘subject to any special provisions in the present Treaty’ in the third line of article 330 of the treaty; (d) the last twelve words of draft article 3 read, seemingly in error, ‘or used a Turkish port or a port of any other Power’ (editorial italics); (e) draft article 5 read as follows: ‘Subject to the rights of concessionnaires, the seaports of the Allied and Associated Powers are entitled to all favours and to all reduced tariffs granted on Turkish railways for the benefit of Turkish ports or of any port of another Power.’

<sup>10</sup> Chapter I (not printed) comprised draft article 7 corresponding to article 334 of the treaty, and chapter II (not printed) comprised draft articles 8 to 18 corresponding to articles 335 to 345 respectively of the treaty except that (a) the last paragraph of draft articles 7 and 9 read ‘sanitation’ where the treaty read ‘public health’; (b) draft article 8 read as follows: ‘The following ports shall be deemed of international concern and submitted to the regime defined in the following articles, and shall be provided with free zones:—Constantinople, from St. Stephano to Dolma Bagtchi; Haidar Pasha; Smyrna; Alexandretta; Haifa; Basra; Trebizond (as provided in article 28); Dedeagatch (as provided in article 25); Batum. Except in so far as may be stipulated elsewhere in this treaty, the adoption of this regime shall not imply any limitation of territorial sovereignty.’; (c) the last paragraph of draft article 10 began ‘Subject to the provisions of article 18 of the Constantinople clauses [cf. No. 40, appendix 1], all dues’ &c.; (d) draft article 16 read as follows: ‘Subject to the provisions of article 17, the duties contemplated in article 11 above may be levied under the conditions of the said article on goods coming out of the Free Zone on their entry into the territory of the State under whose sovereignty or authority the port is placed and on goods destined for the Free Zone at their exit from the territory of the State under whose sovereignty or authority the port is placed.’; (e) draft article 18 began ‘Subject to the additional provisions contained in articles . . . [punctuation as in original] of the present treaty in the case of Constantinople and Haidar Pasha (article 29 of the Constantinople clauses [cf. appendix 4 below]), differences’ &c.

<sup>11</sup> Draft articles 19 and 20 (not printed) corresponded to articles 346 and 347 of the treaty.

representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy and Roumania shall constitute this commission.

*Article 22.* Turkey agrees to accept the regime which shall be laid down for the Danube by a Conference of the Powers nominated by the Allied and Associated Powers, which shall meet within one year after the coming into force of the present treaty.

*Article 23.* Turkey shall be obliged to make to the European Commission of the Danube, all restitutions, reparations and indemnities for damages inflicted on the commission during the war.

#### Chapter IV.—*Clauses giving to certain States the use of certain Ports*

*Article 24.* Free access to the Mediterranean and Ægean Seas is accorded to Turkey (and free access to the Ægean Sea is accorded to Bulgaria), who with this object will enjoy freedom of transit over the territories and in the ports severed from the former Turkish Empire (or from Bulgaria).

Freedom of transit is the freedom defined in article 1, until such time as a general convention on the subject shall have been concluded between the Allied and Associated Powers, whereupon the dispositions of the new convention shall be substituted therefor.

Special conventions between the States or Administrations concerned will lay down, as regards Turkey with the assent of the Financial Commission, the conditions of the exercise of the right accorded above, and will settle in particular the method of using the ports and the free zones existing in them, the establishment of international (joint) services and tariffs, including through tickets and waybills, and the maintenance of the Convention of Berne of the 14th October, 1890,<sup>12</sup> and its supplementary provisions, until its replacement by a new convention.

Freedom of transit will extend to postal, telegraphic and telephonic services.

*Article 25.* In the port of Smyrna, Turkey, and in the port of Dedeagatch, Bulgaria, will be accorded a lease in perpetuity, subject to determination by the League of Nations, of an area which shall be placed under the general regime of free zones laid down in articles 14 to 17 of this part, and shall be used for the direct transit of goods coming from or going to those States.

*Article 26.* The delimitation of these areas, their connection with existing railways, their equipment and their exploitation, and in general all conditions for their utilisation, including the amount of the rental, shall be decided by commissions consisting of one delegate of Turkey or Bulgaria, one delegate of Greece, and one delegate designated by the League of Nations. These conditions shall be susceptible of revision every ten years in the same manner.

*Article 27.* The provisions of article 24 giving to Turkey the right of access to the Mediterranean and Ægean Seas by the port of Smyrna, shall be applicable, *mutatis mutandis*, to the right of access of Georgia, Azerbaijan (Persia), and Armenia (including Lazistan) to the Black Sea by the port of Batum.

*Article 28.* The provisions of articles 24 to 26, giving to Turkey the right of access to the Mediterranean and Ægean Seas by the port of Smyrna, and special facilities at that port, shall be applicable, *mutatis mutandis*, to the right of access of Armenia, including Lazistan, to the Black Sea by the port of Trezibond.

*Article 29.* On the demand of Bulgaria to the Council of the League of Nations an international commission shall be formed consisting of one representative of each of the following Powers: Great Britain, France, Italy, Greece and Bulgaria.

<sup>12</sup> Printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. lxxxii, pp. 771–97.

This commission shall be charged with assuring, so far as Dedeagatch and access thereto is concerned, the execution of the regime prescribed in articles 8 to 18 and 24 to 26 of the present treaty [*Part*]. Any differences relating to this regime shall be dealt with in the first place by the above commission, which will take its decisions by simple majority. In the event of any interested State desiring to appeal against such decision, such appeal shall be before the competent authority of the League of Nations, pending whose decision the decision of the commission shall be carried out.

*Section III.—Railways . . .*<sup>13</sup>

*Section IV.—Miscellaneous . . .*<sup>14</sup>

*March 23, 1920.*

APPENDIX 4 TO NO. 70

*Report of Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission, relative to the Ports of Constantinople and Haida[r] Pasha*

(A.J. 115.)

In considering the question of the ports of Constantinople and Haida[r] Pasha in relation to the draft articles on the administration of the waterways of the Straits and the Sea of Marmora, the Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission have taken into consideration three separate aspects of the case:—

- (a) The commercial working and development of the docks and quays of Constantinople and Haida[r] Pasha.
- (b) The international regime of these ports necessary to assure the freedom, equality and continuity of their use by vessels, nationals, and goods of all nations.
- (c) Control by the High Commission of the Straits.

As regards (a), the Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission consider that the greatest efficiency is likely to result if the working and development of these ports is left entirely to commercial enterprise, and that the undertaking of such

<sup>13</sup> Chapters I to IV of this section (not printed) comprised draft articles 30 to 38 corresponding to articles 353 to 359 and 361 to 362 respectively of the treaty except that (a) the heading of draft chapter III and the first sentence of draft article 36 read 'Cession' or 'Cessions' where the treaty read 'Transfer' or 'Transfers'; (b) the second paragraph of draft article 37 did not include the words 'or new States'.

<sup>14</sup> Chapters I to III of this section (not printed) comprised draft articles 39 to 43 corresponding to articles 363, 364, 366, 365 and 368 respectively of the treaty, and sections V and VI (not printed) respectively comprised draft articles 44 to 46, and 47 to 48, corresponding to articles 369 to 373 of the treaty except that: (a) the second and last paragraphs of draft article 40 read 'telegraph' where the treaty read 'telegraph or telephone'; (b) the draft of section IV did not include the heading 'Chapter III. Submarine Cables'; (c) the draft of section IV read 'Chapter III. Transitory Provisions' where the treaty read 'Chapter IV. Executory Provisions'; (d) draft article 47 read ' . . . general conventions regarding the international regime of transit, waterways, ports or railways which may be concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers, with the approval of the League of Nations'.

functions by the commission should only be contemplated as a last resort. At the same time, they are informed that the lighterage of these ports is at present under an exceptional regime which is not controlled by the authorities responsible for the working of the wharves, and it is therefore proposed that lighterage should be expressly placed under the general control of the High Commission.

As regards (b), the Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission have had the advantage of a draft convention for international ports framed with reference to its possible application to the port of Constantinople; this draft convention was first considered by the Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission of the Paris Peace Conference, and has subsequently been reviewed by the Commission of Inquiry on Freedom of Communications and Transit now sitting at Paris, on which several neutral nations are represented. The commission have, therefore, found no difficulty in adopting in substance the latest available draft of this convention. These provisions are included in the ports, waterways and railways articles in view of the proposal to apply them also to ports, other than Constantinople. It may also be considered desirable to apply them later to the mandatory ports of Alexandria, Haifa and Basra.

As regards (c), and in view of the observations made under (a) above, it is proposed that the powers of the High Commission should include the control necessary to assure the execution at the ports of Constantinople and Haida[r] Pasha of the international regime referred to in (b), and that all complaints relative to this regime should be referred to the High Commission in the first instance.

Finally, it is suggested that, provided the control of the armed forces is not part of the functions of the High Commission, the latter should be recognised as acting on behalf of the League of Nations, any disputes between States affecting the regime of the whole of the Straits which cannot be adjusted by the High Commission being settled as provided by the League of Nations. The adoption of this proposal would be in conformity with the principles of the ports, waterways and railways articles in the other treaties.

The modifications and additions to the draft articles<sup>15</sup> circulated on the 2nd March (A.J. 51A) resulting from the above recommendations would be as follows:—

*Article 7.*

(a) Delete 'docks or quays.'

*Article 7.*

(e) Delete and substitute 'The control necessary to assure the execution at the ports of Constantinople and Haida[r] Pasha of the regime prescribed in articles <sup>16</sup> to <sup>16</sup> of the present treaty (articles 8 to 17 of the ports, waterways and railways clauses—international ports and free zones).'

*Article 7.*

(g) Delete and substitute 'The control of lighterage.'

*Article 11.*

Lines 5 and 6. Delete the words 'of the administration of the Straits'; and at the end of the same article add 'or itself to take up a new concession.'

<sup>15</sup> See No. 40 and appendix.

<sup>16</sup> Omission in original.

*New Article 29*

Any differences which may arise between States as to the interpretation or execution of the articles in this chapter and as regards Constantinople and Haida Pasha of articles 16 to 16 of the present treaty (articles 8 to 17 of the ports, waterways and railways clauses—international ports and free zones) shall be referred to the commission. In the event of the decision of the commission not being accepted by any State, on the demand of any State concerned, the question shall be settled as provided by the League of Nations, pending whose decision the ruling of the commission will be carried out.

Articles 7, 11 and 29 as revised under these proposals are annexed hereto.<sup>17</sup>

H. O. MANCE, *Chairman*.

*Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission.*

*March 22, 1920.*

APPENDIX 5 TO NO. 70

*Acting Œcumenical Patriarch to Mr. Lloyd George*

(A.J. 108.)

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 14, 1920*

Sir,

The Œcumenical Patriarch has already had the honour of submitting to the Peace Conference a memorandum<sup>18</sup> setting forth the claims of the Patriarchate.

At the moment when definitive decisions regarding the fate of Turkey are about to be arrived at, the Œcumenical Patriarch, whose interests are at all times closely connected with the Eastern question, ventures to submit a new memorandum<sup>19</sup> on

<sup>17</sup> Not printed. This annex comprised draft articles 7, 11, and 29. Draft articles 7 and 11 were the same as draft articles 7 and 11 in No. 40, appendix 1, subject to (a) the amendments recorded above; (b) the annex did not include article 7 (h); (c) the additional concluding phrase in draft article 11 read 'or to receive a new concession itself'. Draft article 29 was identical with draft article 29 above except that the sixth line of the text in the annex read, probably in error, 'any State concern, the question'.

<sup>18</sup> The typescript text here read '... a series of memoranda'. (Cf. Volume IV, Nos. 552 and 585.)

<sup>19</sup> Not printed. In this memorandum the Acting Œcumenical Patriarch represented that Turkish misrule continued, and argued that Constantinople was not in origin, culture or population a truly Turkish city and that it was not for Islam, as for the Greeks, a sacred city. Failure by the Entente to expel the Turks from Constantinople would be regarded by them as weakness; whereas 'the ideal of the Greek nation will not be realised so long as Constantinople is not united to Greece by a strong tie.' Turkey had moreover failed to defend the Straits, whereas Greece could, under an international regime, safeguard the interests of the Powers. The memorandum concluded:

'We therefore ask for the union of Constantinople with the mother country, and we propose this arrangement, together with the internationalisation of the Straits, as the best solution, because it guarantees the right to self-determination and the interests of the Powers concerned.

'If, for reasons which we can appreciate, this solution appears to be of too radical a

the question of Constantinople, on behalf of the two bodies constituted,<sup>20</sup> as an expression of the national will.

Being convinced that the *Entente* Powers, in their care for oppressed nations and in their anxiety to ensure peace and order in the East, will adopt a radical solution of the problem now before the conference, we beg, &c.

L. DOROTHEOS,  
*Acting Œcumenical Patriarch*

nature, we should propose that Greece should receive a mandate to govern the State of Constantinople.

'In conclusion, the Œcumenical Patriarch believe[s] he would be lacking in a sense of responsibility if he failed to acquaint the Peace Conference with the firm resolve of the unredeemed Greeks no longer to bear the intolerable yoke of the Turks, and to state that, in the view of his people, the maintenance of the Turkish Government or of the Sultan at Constantinople, in whatever circumstances, would be equivalent to their lasting subjugation.

'We are convinced that the last act of the Peace Conference will be an act of justice and reparation, inflicting deserved chastisement on the crimes committed in the east, preventing their recurrence once and for all, and thus guaranteeing the rights of civilisation and the peace of the world.'

<sup>20</sup> The reference is uncertain but may have been to the Greek and the Armenian patriarchates at Constantinople: cf. Volume IV, No. 552.

## No. 71

I.C.P. 85.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, held in Lord Curzon's Room, British Foreign Office, Whitehall, London, S.W. 1, on Thursday, March 25, 1920, at 4 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Leeper (for Minute 2); SECRETARY, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr.

*France*: M. Cambon, M. Berthelot.

*Italy*: Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Galli, Don Ascanio Colonna.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

1. LORD CURZON said that, before proceeding to the business of the day, he wished to raise a point in respect of the date of the next plenary session of the Supreme Council. He had just received a letter<sup>1</sup> which stated that Mr. Lloyd George felt that the London Conference was making such good progress with its business that he thought the Turkish delegation might now be invited to Paris about the 10th April, in order to receive the terms of the treaty. Mr. Lloyd George further suggested that the Turkish delegation should then be given a fortnight after that date for their reply.

*Treaty of Peace  
with Turkey.  
Date of next  
Plenary Session  
of the Supreme  
Council*

<sup>1</sup> Untraced in Foreign Office archives.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA enquired whether it was believed that the Drafting Committee would be ready by the 10th April.

LORD CURZON, proceeding, said that after the lapse of a fortnight the Supreme Council would consider what means should be taken to enforce the treaty if this should prove to be necessary. If the treaty was to be ready by the 10th April it was essential that speedy decisions should be reached on matters of importance, and the letter to which he referred more especially mentioned the financial clauses. As regards these clauses, they had been discussed by the conference the day before, and it had been decided to refer them back to the Financial Commission in order to see if agreement could not be reached, at any rate, regarding some points. He had seen the chairman of the Financial Commission that morning, and he had been informed that Mr. Blackett hoped that the commission might find some basis of agreement. If Mr. Blackett's hopes should not be justified, it would be necessary to hold a meeting of the Supreme Council the following day. It remained to decide whether the conference thought that, in respect of other parts of the treaty than the financial clauses, the instrument would be ready to be handed to the Turks on the 10th April.

M. CAMBON said that as regards the work of the Financial Commission, he had to report that the French experts had seen him that morning and had said that it was necessary for them to go at once to Paris to consult their Government, and that they would return as soon as possible, and directly they were authorised to reach conclusions. They were starting that night. He suggested, therefore, that it would be useless for the conference to discuss financial questions until the return of the experts.

M. BERTHELOT said that he had strong hopes that after the return of the experts from Paris the work of the Financial Commission would proceed more smoothly.

LORD CURZON enquired as to the general programme.

M. CAMBON thought that there was no reason why the Drafting Committee should not proceed at once with the other clauses of the treaty. Further, there were certain big questions of principle which must await the arrival of M. Millerand, who now hoped to come to London on the 7th April.

M. BERTHELOT doubted the wisdom of summoning the Turks at so early a date as the 10th of that month.

M. CAMBON said that it had been decided that the Turkish Treaty should be handed to the Turks in Paris, and that the treaty should be signed at that capital.

LORD CURZON said that he did not dispute this. The suggestion of Mr. Lloyd George, however, was that the Turkish delegates should be heard at San Remo, and that the Supreme Council should at the same time consider what measures might be necessary to enforce the terms if they refused to accept them. He agreed that it had been decided that the treaty should be signed at Paris. In his view, both propositions were reconcilable.

M. CAMBON said it was true that a meeting had been provisionally fixed at San Remo at the end of April, but it had always been understood that nego-

tiations in respect of the Turkish Treaty should be conducted in Paris. This ruled out any question of discussing the Turkish Treaty at San Remo. In his opinion it was desirable to adhere to the original programme.

LORD CURZON pointed out that it had been agreed that in compliment to Signor Nitti, the next plenary session of the Supreme Council should take place in Italy, and Signor Nitti, as a matter of courtesy, had suggested that that meeting should take place at San Remo. What they were pledged to was that the earlier stages of the treaty should be taken in London, that the Turks should then be summoned to Paris, that a certain interval should be granted for them to consider the terms of the treaty, and for the Allied Powers to discuss the Turkish reply either at San Remo or anywhere else; then, that the final stages, that is to say, the actual signing of the treaty, should take place in Paris. He maintained, however, that no agreement had been reached which ruled out the discussion of any point of the treaty either in London or at San Remo. He wished to be quite clear about this point. To adopt Mr. Lloyd George's proposal would not mean breaking any undertaking with the French Government, but merely carrying out an agreed programme.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that if a reference were made to the *procès-verbal* of the meeting of the Supreme Council when the programme was discussed,<sup>2</sup> it would be found that all that was then stated was that the next meeting of the Supreme Council should be at San Remo, and nothing was laid down as to what particular points in the treaty should be discussed.

M. CAMBON maintained that it was always understood that the treaty should be concluded in Paris. He thought it was essential to adhere to this, as it was only in Paris that the necessary materials were available for a complete study of the treaty and for a discussion of the coercive measures it might be necessary to adopt; that is to say, that the Versailles Council and the various experts were in Paris, and they could not be transferred to San Remo. The French delegation had understood that after the treaty had been handed to the Turkish delegates in Paris the Supreme Council would meet at San Remo to discuss other questions.

LORD CURZON disputed this, and thought he could prove his contention. At a meeting of the Supreme Council in Downing Street, Mr. Lloyd George had raised the question, and had asked how soon it was thought possible to complete the preparation of the terms of the treaty. In reply to this question it had been stated that the treaty ought to be ready by the 22nd March, and it had then been agreed that the Turkish representatives should be invited to come to Paris on that date.<sup>3</sup> It had then been decided that the next session of the Supreme Council should be held at San Remo. He himself had said to Mr. Lloyd George that it was doubtful whether the treaty would be ready by the 22nd March. It was evident, however, that the Supreme Council did contemplate discussing the Turkish Treaty in Italy. He doubted whether any useful purpose would be served by discussing this question further. A stage must, of course, arrive when it would be necessary to have

<sup>2</sup> See No. 46, minute 9.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 45, minute 5.



both M. Millerand and Signor Nitti present. Signor Nitti would certainly say that he had been already several times to London and to Paris, and that it was surely time that a session of the Supreme Council was held in Italy. He did not think the conference need take up any more time in discussing the question, and he had only stated his views as they were not quite in accord with those held by the French Ambassador.

M. CAMBON said that, according to his recollection, it was distinctly understood that Turkish affairs were not to be discussed at San Remo. The date of the meeting of the council at that place had been fixed between the 20th and 25th April, independently of what clauses of the treaty were to be discussed.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that the conference would fully understand that it was impossible for the Prime Minister of Italy to be constantly passing between Rome, London and Paris. Everybody was aware that there were urgent matters which required that he should be as little absent from Rome as possible. So far as his own recollection went, the position was exactly as had been stated by Lord Curzon. He wished to point out that if there was to be a plenary session with the three Prime Ministers present in the near future, the Italian Prime Minister would find it impossible to leave his country at this juncture. He himself had understood that it was definitely fixed that the next meeting of the council should be in Italy, without any reference to what subjects were to come up for discussion.

LORD CURZON said it was quite true what M. Cambon pointed out, that the various experts and documents were in Paris. There was no reason, however, why a meeting of the Supreme Council should not be held at San Remo. He thought that Signor Nitti had a perfect right to ask that the meeting should be held at San Remo, or anywhere else that he might select; and he himself saw no reason why the council, when it met, should not be at liberty to discuss any subject it chose. He was quite prepared, however, to submit M. Cambon's views to Mr. Lloyd George that evening. He enquired whether the Japanese Ambassador wished to make any statement.

VISCOUNT CHINDA suggested that, in order to ascertain exactly what had been decided, reference should be made to the minutes of the meeting when the matter was discussed.

LORD CURZON said that he thought a much more important question than the place of the next meeting was the date. He wished to put it to the conference: Would they be so far advanced with the completion of the treaty as to be in a position to invite the Turks to meet the Supreme Council on the 10th April, and was it agreed that the Turkish representatives should be granted a fortnight's grace for the consideration of its terms?

MR. VANSITTART thought that the finishing touches might be put to the treaty in two or three weeks' time. It had been agreed that the treaty should be signed in Paris. He thought that the work of the London Conference might be completed towards the end of the following week. He suggested that the Drafting Committee should be asked to stay on in Paris, and that our experts might be instructed to proceed to the French capital if we found

that it was likely that the labours of the conference would be finished by the end of the following week. It would then be possible to summon the Turks about the 20th April.

LORD CURZON enquired in what way the conference thought the various dates might best be fitted in. He agreed with Mr. Vansittart that the Drafting Committee should remain in Paris; that the London Conference should continue its work here until the end of the following week; and that then all the drafting experts should proceed to Paris. The completion of the work of drafting would require from fifteen to twenty days. This would admit of the Turks being summoned to Paris about the 20th April, as Mr. Vansittart had suggested. There was, however, the question of M. Millerand coming to London about the 7th of that month—would that interfere with the arrangement that he was suggesting, and necessitate the postponement of the date of summoning the Turks? If M. Millerand came at the end of the first week in April, would not the work of the Drafting Committee be held up until his departure?

M. CAMBON suggested that the French delegation should inform M. Millerand upon which clauses there was agreement, and M. Millerand could then decide whether it would be necessary for him to come or not. If M. Millerand accepted those clauses which had been adopted by the conference, it would not be necessary for him to come to London; otherwise, it would be essential that he should come and examine any disputed clauses. He pointed out that the Turks were, after all, only three days' journey from Paris, and they could always be summoned at the last moment.

LORD CURZON said that all this affected the date of the San Remo meeting. If the earliest date the Turks could be summoned was the 20th April, then it would be necessary to postpone the San Remo session.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that if M. Millerand came to London on the 7th April, it might be surmised that he would certainly want to discuss the financial clauses; but there would probably be other important clauses also, in which Signor Nitti was interested, and which could not be decided without a plenary session. Instead, therefore, of M. Millerand coming to London on the 7th April, he suggested that M. Millerand and Mr. Lloyd George should assemble on that date at San Remo. There were sure to be many points which would require examination by the heads of the three Principal Allied Powers, and, to make a practical suggestion, he proposed that, prior to handing the treaty to the Turks, the three Prime Ministers should meet and definitely settle the terms. He strongly urged that the next meeting of the Supreme Council should be in Italy, with Signor Nitti present.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he asked leave to put in one word. It was obvious that the handing of the treaty to the Turks was a matter of extreme political importance. Various treaties had been handed to the other enemy Powers, but this instrument was the only one likely to produce trouble in the Moslem world, and it was, consequently, essential that the greatest care should be taken to settle the terms in complete agreement before they took any irretrievable step such as handing the treaty to the Turks.

M. CAMBON said that in the present state of affairs, he really doubted if it would be necessary for M. Millerand to come to London. He had always been fully consulted, and it might be necessary for certain points in the treaty to be revised, while the Versailles Council could always put forward proposals which might require a modification of the treaty.

LORD CURZON thought that the French Ambassador had advanced a rather strong argument for the Marquis Imperiali's plea; that is to say, that M. Millerand's proposed visit about the 7th April would lead to an unfruitful discussion unless Signor Nitti could also be present. The French Ambassador had said that various important questions of measures to be taken to enforce the treaty, if necessary, had been referred to the Versailles Council. This was perfectly true. But when the report of that council was received, it must be discussed with the three Prime Ministers, and he suggested that the best thing to do would be to have this report considered by the heads of the three Governments, at San Remo, and that the whole discussion could thereafter be referred to Paris.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said he fully agreed with Lord Curzon.

MR. VANSITTART said there were two different things to consider in regard to this question. The first was the movements of the statesmen, and the second the movements of the technical experts. These experts must be given at least three weeks in which to complete their labours before the treaty would be ready to be handed to the Turks. The practical thing would be that the important people, that is to say, the Allied delegations, should meet at San Remo about the 7th April, leaving the experts, in the meantime, to go ahead on agreed points.

LORD CURZON said that he proposed, subject to the approval of the conference, to submit his programme to Mr. Lloyd George that evening, when he would communicate to the British Prime Minister M. Cambon's point of view. The programme he himself suggested was that the conference should continue its work in London until Thursday next, the 1st April. In the meantime, the Drafting Committee might proceed with its work in Paris. Then, if there were to be a meeting at San Remo—which was not a matter that he himself could settle—about the 9th April, the earliest date on which the treaty would be ready would be the 20th of that month, and probably another four or five days would be necessary. The Turks would then be given fourteen days in which to consider the terms and to hand in their reply. When this reply was read the Supreme Council could hold a plenary session in Paris in order to receive it and to sign the treaty.

M. BERTHELOT said that Lord Curzon's proposal would have to be submitted to M. Millerand. He himself thought that the President of the French Council intended to come to London on the 7th April, to discuss questions which no other Frenchman was authorised to settle. There were a number of questions other than the financial clauses; for instance, Syria, Palestine, Kurdistan, Mosul, &c., which remained to [be] settled, and which could only be decided when at least two Prime Ministers were present. If no agreement could be reached, it would be impossible to say when the treaty would be

ready. He hoped that M. Millerand would come either to London or to San Remo. The difficulty, as M. Cambon had explained, was that at San Remo the essential documents, which were very complicated in their nature, would not be available. He sincerely trusted that it would be possible for M. Millerand shortly to be present at meetings of the Supreme Council, as the other French delegates had definite instructions regarding reservations, and they must abide by those instructions.

LORD CURZON said that it was unquestionable that the presence of M. Millerand was necessary when certain points were decided. He therefore suggested that the various delegations should leave London on the 8th April, stay two or three days in Paris, and then proceed to San Remo.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that Signor Scialoja and himself were in the same position as the French delegates: that is to say, they were not empowered to settle certain questions—Palestine, for instance—without the presence of Signor Nitti, as these questions were of the utmost importance.

LORD CURZON said that he would see Mr. Lloyd George that evening and ascertain whether the programme he had tentatively proposed was acceptable to Mr. Lloyd George. He would at once let the French and Italian delegations know the result of his interview.

M. BERTHELOT said that the French delegation would not communicate with M. Millerand on this question until Lord Curzon communicated to them the result of the interview.

LORD CURZON enquired how his proposed programme would be affected by the special meeting of the League of Nations, which was to take place towards the end of the first week in April.<sup>4</sup>

M. BERTHELOT said that all that was necessary was to put off the departure of the various delegations from London for two or three days: that is to say, that if the council met on the 5th or 6th, the delegations could start on the 8th or 9th.

It was agreed—

That Lord Curzon should see Mr. Lloyd George the same evening, and submit his programme to him, and communicate the result at once to the French, Italian and Japanese delegates.

2. M. BERTHELOT asked permission to raise a point in regard to the Treaty of Peace with Hungary. He had received a telegram from M. Millerand informing him that the question had been discussed at a meeting of the Ambassadorial Conference at Paris. The general purport of the telegram was as follows: The report dated the 18th March, of financial experts<sup>5</sup> on the remarks of the Hungarian delegates,

*Treaty of Peace  
with Hungary*

<sup>4</sup> See minute 4 below, also No. 62, minute 3.

<sup>5</sup> This report corresponded generally to Part IX of the reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the observations of the Hungarian Delegation on the conditions of peace, remitted under date of May 6, 1920 and printed in a variant translation in *The Hungarian Peace Negotiations*, vol. ii, pp. 557–61, except that in the report of March 18: (1) the comment on draft article 181 read: 'A reply has already been made to the observations

had been sent direct to London and the London Conference had reached a decision thereon; in particular, alterations had been made in article 181 and the decision had been communicated to the Hungarian delegation. A copy of the said alterations had been forwarded direct from London to the Drafting Committee in Paris by Sir Maurice Hankey. Mr. Wallace<sup>6</sup> had then observed to M. Millerand that he could not possibly admit action of this kind, upsetting, as it did, decisions taken by a commission on which the United States was represented, which was not the case so far as the Supreme Council and Ambassadors' Conference in London were concerned. Mr. Wallace had observed that Ministers in London were perfectly well aware, after the incidents which had happened the previous week,<sup>7</sup> that the United States Government held the view that the clauses of the Hungarian Treaty could not be considered in the absence of the American representative. It had always been understood that the Hungarian Treaty was to be discussed and signed in Paris. As the United States had not been represented at conferences which had taken place outside Paris, they could not put their signature to a treaty which had been modified without consulting them. Mr. Wallace held, indeed, that no decision of the Supreme Council could be considered as final, nor could it be communicated to the parties concerned, unless and until the relating to Part VIII, which the Hungarian Delegation presented concerning the damages endured by Hungary on account of the mili[tary] occupation subsequent to the Armistice of November 3.

'The Allied and Associated Governments decided to leave to the special investigation Commission of Budapest and to the Reparations Commission the task of determining to what extent the requests presented by Hungary are founded. They consider that the provisions of Article 181 confer on the Reparations Commission full authority in this respect. They specify that, in their opinion, the period of the "operations" referred to in Par. 8 of the said Article, include[s] all the period during which the Rumanian armies have occupied Hungarian territories.'

(2) the comment on draft article 189 read: 'The stipulations contained in this Article are the same as those contained in Article 206 of the Treaty of St. Germain. Moreover, the problems raised by the liquidation of the Austro-Hungarian Bank are a matter of concern to the the [sic] Austrian Republic as well as to Hungary. Therefore, it is not possible to modify the present text in any way.

'However, the Allied and Associated Governments desire to specify that in drawing up Article 189 of the Treaty with Hungary and Article 206 of the Treaty of St. Germain, they did not intend to confer on the bearers of notes issued up to October 27, 1918, a right to the portion of the assets of the Austro-Hungarian Bank which was constituted after this date as a counterpart to the normal banking operations, such as the discounting of commercial paper and advances on securities.

'They deem it opportune to repeat here their earnest desire to avoid a collapse of Hungarian credit. They do not doubt that the Reparations Commission will apply the provisions of Article 189 in the most liberal sense and that it will give to the liquidators of the Austro-Hungarian Bank instructions to this effect.'

<sup>6</sup> American Ambassador in Paris.

<sup>7</sup> At a meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris on March 16, 1920, Mr. Wallace had made representations as a result of which the Conference 'decided to take formal note of the reservation made by the American Ambassador regarding the negotiation in London of the territorial and financial clauses of the Hungarian treaty, at which negotiation the United States was not represented, inasmuch as Mr. Wallace has received full powers to negotiate and sign this treaty in Paris.'

United States had stated their adherence to the instrument. M. Berthelot asked what reply he should make to M. Millerand. The financial clauses of the treaty had been remitted to Paris, but other questions had been reserved for discussion in London.

LORD CURZON said that the whole position had not been correctly stated in M. Millerand's telegram. The position was this: the Hungarian Treaty had come up for consideration by the Supreme Council at Downing Street, where it had been decided that large questions of principle, as well as territorial and economic questions, should be settled in England. Some of these questions had been discussed in London and decisions had been reached which had been accepted in Paris. As regards the economic side, one question only had been discussed, in which Signor Scialoja had evinced great interest and had suggested one modification, while he (Lord Curzon) had proposed another. The question had then been referred to Paris.<sup>8</sup> There the American Ambassador had taken the line that London had no authority to settle this question, as no American representative attended the conferences. This decision, Lord Curzon said, Mr. Wallace could hardly sustain, as, when the Supreme Council had first met in Downing Street, he himself had written—with the consent of Mr. Lloyd George, the chairman of the council—to Mr. Davis, the American representative in London, to the effect that the council would discuss all questions relating to the treaties which had still to be completed, and expressing the hope that he would attend the meetings. Mr. Davis consulted his Government, who refused to allow him to attend. Mr. Davis had, however, been given full opportunity of being present, and Mr. Wallace had therefore no right to maintain that decisions reached in London were invalid. So much for the question of principle. To come to details, Lord Derby had informed him that morning that the particular point at issue in Paris was the damage to the Roumanians.

MR. LEEPER explained that the point was really an exceedingly small one. It had been raised in the note handed in by the Roumanian delegation, asking that article 181 of the treaty should be modified by omitting certain words. The clause in question spoke of 'military operations since the 3rd November, 1915 [1918], by the Roumanian armies without consent of the Great Powers.' The Roumanians had asked that the final words 'without consent of the Great Powers' might be omitted and this was agreed to.<sup>9</sup> The point, of course, in no way affected the financial question; it was purely political, and the words objected to had been deliberately inserted in the first instance as a warning to Roumania when she was giving the Allied Powers a great deal of trouble. No valid objection had been raised against the modification and the only representative to whom it was not acceptable was Mr. Wallace.

M. BERTHELOT said that as regards the territorial clauses, he had asked M. Millerand on one occasion, in a brief interview of five minutes, when Mr. Wallace was present to arrange the matter. He enquired whether the conference would not now authorise him, without raising the question of

<sup>8</sup> See No. 69, minute 6 and note 13.

<sup>9</sup> See No. 63, minute 7.

principle, to telegraph to M. Millerand and ask him to arrange this question also. Probably when Mr. Wallace came to re-examine the article, he would withdraw his objection.

MARQUIS IMPERIALI thought this was a very practical proposal.

LORD CURZON said that the conference did not want to stand on its dignity, but it seemed that Mr. Wallace had wired to Washington, and it appeared that the United States were likely to support him.

M. BERTHELOT said that the telegram stated that, from the territorial point of view, no difficulty was anticipated.

LORD CURZON pointed out that if the United States refused to accept the territorial clauses, a very big question would be raised, which must be taken to the Supreme Council.

M. BERTHELOT said that he thought that it would have to be raised in Paris in that case. It was understood that the reply to the Hungarian delegation was to be drafted in Paris, and that it would take count of the recommendations and comments of the council in London.

LORD CURZON said that he understood that Paris was asking whether, as the territorial clauses had been drafted in London, the conference here would not draft a reply to the Hungarian Government. He himself did not mind whether the reply was prepared in Paris or in London. His impression was that the matter was to be settled in Paris.

After some further discussion, M. Berthelot said that so far as the minority clauses were concerned he had been asked if he could draft a reply in London, as he had been a member of the commission in Paris. He had agreed to do this and had asked that the necessary documents might be sent to him here. They had not, however, yet been received. He suggested that, to save time, the draft might be prepared in Paris.

It was agreed—

That the reply should be drafted in Paris.

3. MR. VANSITTART asked leave to bring up two small points regarding the articles to be inserted in the Turkish Treaty dealing with the regime in the region round Smyrna (A.J. 90).<sup>10</sup> The first referred to article 8, which was as follows: 'Relations between the Greek Administration and the local Parliament shall be determined by the former in accordance with the principles of the Greek Constitution.'

It was very important that the Greeks should not be given the right to enrol people, who were not Greek nationals, for military service. He suggested, therefore, that the following words should be added to the present draft: 'Pending the definite decision regarding the status of the territory referred to in article 2, compulsory military service shall not be enforced in the territory in question.'

<sup>10</sup> Appendix 2 to No. 62.

It was agreed—

That the above words should be added to article 8 and that the secretary should inform the Drafting Committee accordingly.

MR. VANSITTART said that his second point referred to article 13: 'As regards nationality, such inhabitants of the territory referred to in article 2 hereof as cannot claim any other nationality under the terms of the present treaty shall be treated on exactly the same footing as Greek nationals. Greece shall provide for their diplomatic and consular protection abroad.' He would remind the conference that there were a considerable number of British, French and Italians in Smyrna who had been born there and whose families had lived there for generations past. He suggested, therefore, that the Drafting Committee should make it quite clear that only Turkish nationals in this territory are referred to, and should take the necessary precautions to safeguard the interests of non-Turks. The Turks had never claimed these people as Turkish subjects, but it was possible that, unless provision was made, the Greeks might do so.

It was agreed—

That the Drafting Committee should introduce into article 13 the necessary safeguards, and the secretary was instructed to take the necessary action.

4. The conference had before them a report of the commission appointed to report on the formation of a future Armenian State (A.J. 120) (Appendix 1), a copy of a letter dated the 16th March, 1920, from the President of the Georgian delegation to the President of the Supreme Council, submitting the claims of Georgia to the port and province of Batum (A.J. 107) (Appendix 2).

*Report of the  
Commission on  
the Formation of  
a future Ar-  
menian State*

MR. VANSITTART, as chairman of the commission, asked leave to draw attention to the preface in which it was stated that the report had been agreed upon by the Italian and British representatives, but owing to pressure of other work and the necessity for an early meeting, it had not been possible to consult the French and Japanese representatives.

LORD CURZON said that there were only three points of importance raised. The first was the reference to the League of Nations. The Council of the League had agreed to hold a special meeting in order to discuss the Armenian question, and they had asked that certain information might be supplied to them. This information had been furnished, and the council were to discuss the question on the 6th or 7th April. It would therefore be necessary to reserve any reference to the League until after the special session of the council. The second point was the question of Batum. In regard to this the conference would remember that there had been three stages: first, the decision to constitute a free port with a hinterland; second, the decision that the boundaries of that hinterland should be drawn in a particular way; and third, a telegram from General Milne, Commander-in-chief of the British



troops at Constantinople, who was familiar with the region and the local conditions, submitting that the boundary zone should be drawn much nearer the town of Batum than the conference had contemplated. This proposal the conference had accepted provisionally.<sup>11</sup>

Further examination of it, however, showed that it would raise all sorts of difficulties with Georgia and Armenia. They then considered a proposal that the area should be still more restricted, that is to say, there should be the free port only.

M. CAMERLYNCK then read out a French rendering of a portion of the report beginning at the bottom of page 1, 'meanwhile circumstances have arisen,' and ending in the middle of page 2, 'both of which they claim.'<sup>12</sup>

MR. VANSITTART then explained the new proposals with the aid of a map. Great importance had been attached by the commission to ensuring that amicable relations should be maintained between the Georgians and the Armenians. On the whole, the commission were inclined to think that these new proposals would be less likely to raise trouble than any proposals that had hitherto been submitted. The last point referred to by Lord Curzon was the question of Lazistan. In their first report the commission had provided for an autonomous State of Lazistan under the nominal suzerainty of Armenia. The Lazistanis were in no sense a national unit, and the creation of a Lazistan autonomy might create for the first time a 'Lazistan question.' Moreover, the pressure of Moslem Turkey eastwards towards Batum would be encouraged if autonomy were granted. The commission proposed, therefore, to drop the question of autonomy, in the hope that the Armenians might thus be reconciled to losing a portion of Batum province which it had hoped to gain. There was a further point, and that was the communications between Erivan and Batum by the Kars-Ardahan road. It had been originally proposed to give this road to Armenia as far as the frontier of the Batum Free State. Under the new proposals the road would be in Georgian territory between Ardahan and Batum. Communications could be, however, assured to Armenia under the article guaranteeing her access to Batum. Moreover, if the Emir-Kheri Valley were included, there was a possibility that a road from Ardahan to the Chorok Valley might be constructed.

M. BERTHELOT said that he understood that under the new proposals Batum was given to Georgia.

MR. VANSITTART said that this was the case.

M. BERTHELOT said that one could hardly do this without considering the latter's relations with Azerbaijan. We have been obliged to yield to the threats of the Georgians, but we ought to insist that they should make certain concessions to the Armenians.

MR. VANSITTART explained that his commission proposed to cede Batum to Georgia and the Valleys of Chorok and Emir-Kheri to Armenia; but as this would mean great concessions to Georgia it would have to be impressed upon Georgia that she, on her part, must come to an amicable arrangement with Armenia. If the conference would give him the necessary authority, he

<sup>11</sup> See No. 62, minute 6.

<sup>12</sup> See pp. 642-3.

would like to ask General Milne if the frontier now proposed between Georgia and Armenia was defensible.

M. BERTHELOT suggested that Mr. Vansittart might consult Colonel Chardigny, who was now in London.

M. CAMERLYNCK said that the principal question for Armenia was the financial question. It was obvious that she would require considerable outside financial support.

LORD CURZON asked whether M. Cambon would not give the conference his views on this very important question. The League of Nations would probably be discussing Armenia in London on the 7th April, and he would have to appear before it. He proposed to suggest to the council, first, that they should consult the Armenians as to the way in which their country could be protected from outside, and to what extent the Armenians themselves would be able to undertake that protection. Also, would Armenia require foreign officers, arms, munitions, &c.? As regards the financial question, he proposed to tell the council that this question was vital for Armenia. She would not be able to balance her budget for many years to come and she would require large credits at once, it might be between one and two million pounds sterling. He would further suggest that the League of Nations might raise Armenia's plight as a great humanitarian issue and make a wide and powerful appeal to the world, which is greatly interested in the Armenian question, for funds. America's interest in Armenia has always been particularly strong, and he had been told by M[r.] Morgenthau<sup>13</sup> that he thought that the American people would readily respond to an appeal for charity of this kind. Lord Curzon asked whether his colleagues would agree to his putting this suggestion to the Council of the League?

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI reminded the conference that there were many wealthy Armenians who were not living in their own country who should be the first to subscribe.

It was agreed—

To accept the Armenian Commission's revised proposals as regards the free port of Batum and the boundaries of the Armenian and Georgian States, subject to:—

- (a) The result of Mr. Vansittart's consultation with Colonel Chardigny with regard to General Milne's proposals.
- (b) General Milne's report as to the defensibility of the new frontier.
- (c) Armenia's agreement to make adequate provision of the protection of minorities in their new State.
- (d) Georgia giving the most complete guarantees in regard to the protection of the railway and the pipe-line and absolutely free transit of oil.

It was further agreed—

That Georgia should be informed that the proposed concessions were dependent upon complete agreement being reached between her and Armenia as regards both their eastern and their western frontiers.

<sup>13</sup> American Ambassador to Turkey, 1913-16.

5. MR. VANSITTART said that the Commission on the Straits had drawn up a report which would be subject to the approval of the Military and Naval Commission and also of the Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission. The latter's approval had been communicated to him the previous evening, but he had not yet received any communication from the Military and Naval Commission. In order not to waste time, he would ask that the French and Italian delegates would kindly examine the report and give their views on it on the following day. It would then be complete except for such comments as the Military and Naval Commission might have to make. When this last had been received it would be sent at once to the Drafting Committee.

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 25, 1920.

## APPENDIX I TO No. 71

### *Report on Formation of a Future Armenian State*

(A.J. 120.)

The commission appointed to report on the formation of the future Armenian State have the honour to submit the annexed draft clauses for inclusion in the Turkish treaty.

These articles are based on the commission's first report as already submitted to the council,<sup>14</sup> but may have to be altered for the reasons and to the extent explained below.

One point of capital importance has, moreover, necessarily been omitted, i.e., the extent of the responsibility that might be assumed, or the assistance given, by the League of Nations.

On the 12th March the Supreme Council telegraphed an enquiry in this sense to the League, then meeting in Paris.<sup>15</sup> On the 16th March the secretary of the League explained that a special sitting of the League would be necessary for this purpose, and that he proposed to convoke one for the 6th April. Meanwhile, the League would, before coming to a decision, require more precise information of the Armenian desiderata.<sup>16</sup> These specifications have already been obtained from the Armenian delegation and forwarded to the secretary-general of the League. In view, therefore, of the capital importance of securing, if possible, the co-operation of the League of Nations, the Armenian chapter of the treaty cannot be completed until the League has had time to pronounce.

Meanwhile, circumstances have arisen which make it necessary for the commission to suggest the possibility of reconsidering their first report on several points.

The first point is the proposed creation of the Free State of Batum. The commission were unanimous that this area should be as restricted as possible. When, therefore, General Milne recommended a limit some 50 kilom. wide by 20 deep, the commission were prepared to accept it as the basis to be worked upon by the eventual Inter-Allied Delimitation Commission. This acceptance was due to three considerations:—

1. The necessity for a defensible frontier.
2. The desire to limit commitments, especially if Allied troops were to be retained at Batum for any length of time.
3. The feeling that a small area was essential if the League of Nations was to be induced to accept the responsibility.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. No. 34, minute 2.

<sup>15</sup> See No. 58, note 4.

<sup>16</sup> See No. 62, minute 3.

The probability has now to be faced that the League of Nations will not, in any case, assume this task. If, therefore, as is probable, it is not intended indefinitely to maintain the Allied garrison now at Batum, it would appear that the solution of the Free State must be abandoned. This entails a recasting of the recommendations of the commission.

While the impossibility of a Free State would be, in some respects, regrettable, there are also advantages in the altered plan now submitted. It had been considered necessary to give to Armenia direct contact with the Free State, and this—especially on the adoption of General Milne's line—involved throwing into Armenia more of Batum Province than would be compatible with future harmony between Armenia and Georgia, on which their respective existences must largely depend.

It is now suggested that only the Chorok Valley and that of the Imer Kheri should be allotted to Armenia as a corridor to the sea. There should be a free port (not a Free State) at Batum, but the town, and all the province, except the Chorok Valley, would go to Georgia, under express conditions that would ensure freedom of transit both to Armenia and Azerbaijan. There are signs that the local population are almost as hostile to Georgia as to Armenia, but it would be impossible to constitute a separate entity here except under the League of Nations, and Batum would more naturally fall to Georgia than to any other claimant.

This solution would render amicable relations—and eventually federation—possible between Armenia and Georgia, for it would compensate Georgia for not obtaining the Chorok Valley and Lazistan, both of which they claim.

The first report of the commission had provided for an autonomous State of Lazistan, under the nominal suzerainty of Armenia. This provision may now be dropped, and Armenia might be thus reconciled to losing the portion of the Batum Province which she had hoped to obtain. There would be ample justification for this. The Lazes are in no sense a national unit or community, and the creation of Lez autonomy may well create what has never existed hitherto, viz., a 'Lazistan question.' Moreover, the pressure of Moslem Turkey eastwards along the seaboard toward Batum would be encouraged. The Lazes have no greater claim to autonomy than the other minorities in the new Armenia, and, like those minorities, their rights and interests can be adequately safeguarded by the Minorities Treaty which Armenia will have to sign before she takes over her new territory.

One point only is left uncovered by these new proposals, viz., the communications between Erivan and Batum by the Kars-Ardahan road. This road was, under the first report of the commission, to have fallen to Armenia as far as the frontier of the Batum Free State. As shown already, this involves giving too much of Batum Province to Armenia. Under the new proposals, this road will be in Georgian territory between Ardahan and Batum. Communications can, however, be assured to Armenia under the article guaranteeing her access to Batum. Moreover, if the Imer Kheri Valley be included, the construction of a road from Ardahan to the Chorok Valley appears not impossible.

## Armenia

### *Article 1*

Turkey, in accordance with the action already taken by the Allied Powers, hereby recognises Armenia as a free and independent State, and renounces in favour of Armenia all rights and title over the territories of the Turkish Empire

situated outside the frontiers of Turkey, as described in article ,<sup>17</sup> and included within the limits defined in article 2.

#### Article 2

The frontiers of Armenia will be determined as follows:—

##### 1. *With Turkey and Kurdistan*

From a point to be selected on the southern shore of the Black Sea about 1 kilom. west of the mouth of the Yanboli Dere in a south-south-westerly direction to a point to be chosen on Chakar Geul Dagħ,  
the line of heights forming the western limit of the basin of the Yanboli Dere;  
thence in a south-easterly direction to the point of the salient of the western boundary of the Vilayet of Erzerum, about 4 kilom. north-west of Zelfeh Dagħ,  
the line of heights forming the watershed between the basins of the Kharshit Dere and the Yanboli Dere;  
thence in a south-south-westerly direction to a point to be selected on Hatab Dagħ,  
the western boundary of the Vilayet of Erzerum;  
thence in an easterly direction to the junction of the Poluk Chai with the Kara Su, about 10 kilom. north-east of Mans,  
a line following the line of heights forming the northern limit of the basin of the Poluk Chai;  
thence in a south-south-westerly direction to a point to be chosen on the Kara Su about 10 kilom. north of Baghir Pasha Dagħ,  
the course of the Kara Su down stream;  
then to a point on the Biyuk Su, about 12 kilom. north of Kighi,  
a line reaching and following as far as possible the line of heights Baghir Pasha Dagħ, Sultan Dagħ, Aktash and Chabarti Dagħ;  
thence in a general south-easterly direction to a point on the Igeunik [*Geunik*] Su, about 10 kilom. north-east of Oghnut,  
a line reaching and following as far as possible the line of heights Shaitan Dagħ and Chorish Dagħ;  
thence in a general southerly direction to the junction of the Masla Dere and Murad Su,  
a line following the watershed between the Masla Dere and Geunik Su;  
thence to a point to be chosen on the Murad Su, about 15 kilom. east of Ardu-shin,  
the course of the Murad Su up stream;  
thence in a general south-easterly direction to a point to be chosen on the Ru Su about 1 kilom. north-west of Tatvan, a line reaching and following as far as possible the line of heights Kozma Dagħ, Kurtik Dagħ, Kach Rash Dagħ and Kamran Tepe;  
thence in a south-easterly direction to a point to be chosen on the Bitlis Su about 2 kilom. west of Shetek,  
a line reaching and following as far as possible the line of heights Sheikh-Omar-Tepe and Kambus Dagħ;  
thence in an easterly direction to a point about 3 kilom. south of Clek [*Olek*] Sifla (Olek Ashaghj) where a stream joins the Guzel Dere,

<sup>17</sup> Omission in original.

a line reaching and then following as far as possible the watershed between the Bitlis Su and the Guzel Dere;  
 thence eastwards to the point where the Kara Su and Ejkis Dere meet about 7 kilom. east of the village of Kara Su Sifla,  
 a line passing through Kurdagh and following the southern limits of the basins of the Tamik Dere and Kara Su;  
 thence eastwards to the point of junction of the Darnis Dere with the stream flowing from Pashandasht Duz,  
 a line reaching and then following as far as possible the southern limit of the basin of the Ejekis Dere, then the southern limit of the basins of the rivers which flow into Van Geul, then the watershed between the Pashandasht Duz and the Darnis Dere;  
 thence eastwards to point 3050 (ref. Turkish Staff Map), a line to be fixed on the ground following as far as possible the Darnis Dere downstream:  
 thence north-eastwards to Vaviran Dagh,  
 a line following the line of heights to the west of the Shatak Su;  
 thence in a general easterly direction to Shakulans Dagh,  
 a line following the northern and north-eastern limits of the basin of the Shatak Su, and passing through Kush Dagh, Bashit Dagh, and Kuchkiran Dagh;  
 thence northwards and then eastwards to a point to be chosen on the salient made by the old frontier between Turkey and Persia about 4 kilom. south of Kara Hissar,  
 a line following the watershed between the Hap Su on the east and the Khoshab Su on the west;  
 thence northwards to Aghri Dagh (Ararat), the old frontier between Turkey and Persia.

2. *With Persia*

The existing frontier between Turkey and Persia.

3. *With Azerbaijan*

A line to be subsequently determined in accordance with the provisions of article 4.

4. *With Georgia*

To Kanni-Dagh on the old eastern boundary of the Province of Batum;  
 a line to be subsequently determined in accordance with the provisions of article 4;  
 thence in a westerly direction to a point to be chosen on the new boundary of Batum on the watershed between the River Ajaris-Tsehali and River Maghakhelis,  
 a line following the southern limits of the basin of the River Ajaris-Tsehali, and thence in accordance with a line to be subsequently determined in accordance with the provisions of article 4.

5. *With Batum*

By an inter-Allied commission as provided for in article 2 of the section relating to Batum.

6. *The Black Sea.*

### *Article 3*

A Boundary Commission, composed of (five) members, (three) nominated by the Principal Allied Powers, one by Armenia, and one by Turkey, will be set up within fifteen days from the coming into force of the present treaty to trace on the spot the frontier line defined in article 2 (1).

A Boundary Commission, composed of (five) members, (three) nominated by the Principal Allied Powers, one by Kurdistan, and one by Armenia, will be set up within fifteen days from the coming into force of the present treaty to trace on the spot the frontier line defined in article 2 (2 [*sic*]).

A Boundary Commission, composed of (three) members, nominated by the Principal Allied Powers, will be set up within fifteen days from the coming into force of the present treaty to trace on the spot the frontier line defined in article 2 (6 [*sic*]).

### *Article 4*

The frontiers between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Georgia respectively will be such as may be determined by direct agreement between the States concerned.

If in either case the States concerned have failed to determine the frontier by agreement within six months of the coming into force of the present treaty, the frontier line in question will be determined by the Principal Allied Powers, who will also provide for its being traced on the spot.

### *Article 5*

The boundary of the demilitarised area in Turkey lying to the west of the western frontier of Armenia will be as follows:—

From a point on the southern shore of the Black Sea about 3 kilom. south-west of Tireboli in a general southerly direction to Artabil Gedik,  
the western limits of the basin of the Kharshit Su;  
thence southwards to a point on the Shiran Chai about 3 kilom. south-west of Shiran,  
a line passing through Kara Tepe;  
thence to a point on the Kelkit Chai about 1 kilom. west of Pesh Kelissa;  
a straight line;  
thence southwards to Kara Dag, situated about 37 kilom. north-west of Erzingan,  
a straight line,  
thence to a point on the Frat Su 12 kilom. south-west of Kemakh,  
a line passing through the following heights: Damevli Dag, Kho Bey Tepe, and Marik Dag;  
thence in a south-easterly direction to Orta Dag situated about 18 kilom. south of Kemakh,  
a straight line;  
thence in a general easterly direction to Baghir Pasha Dag,  
the southern limit of the basin of the Frat Su;  
thence northwards to the Black Sea,  
the western frontier of Armenia as it may be determined by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

#### *Article 6*

(Armenia agrees to accord to Lazistan a local autonomy suited to its development in uniformity with the clauses of the treaty provided for in article 7.

The boundaries of Lazistan are laid down as follows:—

From a point to be selected on the southern shore of the Black Sea about 1 kilom.

west of the mouth of the Yanboli Dere in a south-south-westerly direction to

a point to be chosen on Chakar Geul Dagħ,

the line of heights forming the western limits of the basin of Yanboli Dere;

thence in a south-easterly direction to the point of the salient of the western

boundary of the Vilayet of Erzerum about 4 kilom. north-west of Zelfeh

Dagħ,

the line of heights forming the watershed between the basins of the Kharshit

Dere and the Yanboli Dere;

thence in a north-easterly direction to the point where it meets the old frontier

between Turkey and Russia at Kukurt Dagħ;

the northern boundary of the Vilayet of Erzerum;

thence in a northerly direction to the Black Sea, the old frontier between Turkey and Russia.)

#### *Article 7*

Armenia accepts and agrees to embody in a treaty with the Principal Allied Powers such provisions as may be deemed necessary by these Powers to protect the interests of inhabitants of that State who differ from the majority of the population in race, language or religion.

Armenia further accepts and agrees to embody in a treaty with the Principal Allied Powers such provisions as these Powers may deem necessary to protect freedom of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of other nations.

#### *Article 8*

The proportion and nature of the financial obligations of Turkey which Armenia will have to assume or of the rights which will pass to her on account of the Turkish territory placed under her sovereignty will be determined in accordance with section <sup>17</sup> (financial clauses) of the present treaty.

#### *Article 9*

Subsequent agreements will decide all questions which are not decided by the present treaty and which may arise in consequence of the cession of the said territory.

### **Batum**

#### *Article 1*

Batum is hereby established as a free and independent State, and placed under the protection of the League of Nations.

#### *Article 2*

The frontiers of Batum shall be delimited on the spot by a commission composed of (three) members nominated by the Principal Allied Powers, which will be set up within fifteen days from the coming into force of the present treaty. This commission shall take as the basis an approximate line running as follows:—



From a point on the south-eastern shore of the Black Sea, about  $4\frac{1}{2}$  kilom. south of Makriali to Mount Zalona,  
 the old frontier between Turkey and Russia;  
 thence eastwards to Mount Kvamtskala,  
 the watershed between the Ichkala Su and the Beglivan Chai,  
 thence in a north-easterly direction to the junction of the Beglivan Chai with the Chorokh Su,  
 a line following the watershed between the basin of the Beglivan Chai and Chorokh Su;  
 thence in an easterly direction to a point on the watershed between the basin of the River Skurdidi and Chorokh Su, about 4 kilom. north-east of Kartashi,  
 a line following generally the northern limits of the basin of the river on which Kartashi is situated;  
 thence northwards to the junction of the River Skurdidi with the River Machakhelis,  
 a line following as far as possible the western limits of the basin of the River Skurdidi;  
 thence northwards to a point on the River Ajaris-Tskhai, about 7 kilom. east of Khertvis,  
 a line to be chosen on the ground;  
 thence in a general northerly direction to Mount Terat,  
 a line reaching and following the watershed between the basins of the Koronistavi and Beklemari on the west, and the Ajaris-Tskhali on the south;  
 thence northwards to a point to be chosen on the River Kintrish, about 2 kilom. east of Chakhati,  
 a line following the watershed between the basins of the River Kintrish and River Kintish and then following the crest line immediately west of Pkhemlobani and Vardjanuli;  
 thence northwards to the southern point of the salient on the boundary between the Province of Batum and Kutais, about 3 kilom. north-east of Chakhati,  
 a line to be chosen on the ground;  
 thence to a point on the south-eastern shore of the Black Sea, about 2 kilom. south of Kordon,  
 the northern boundary of the Province of Batum.

### *Article 3*

A High Commissioner for Batum will be appointed by the Council of the League of Nations. He will be charged with the duty of dealing, in the first instance, with any differences arising in connection with the matters dealt with in article 6, between Batum and the States referred to in the said article, and will also be charged with such administrative functions as the Council of the League may consider desirable.

The High Commissioner will reside at Batum.

### *Article 4*

The High Contracting Parties agree to recognise as citizens of Batum all inhabitants of that State who become such under a nationality law enacted [? enacted] by the State of Batum and approved by the High Commissioner referred to in article 3.

### Article 5

Subject to the provisions of article 3, the foreign relations of Batum and the diplomatic protection of citizens of Batum when abroad will be entrusted to such State as may be elected by the Council of the League of Nations.

This report has been agreed upon by the Italian and British representatives on the Armenian Commission. Owing to pressure of other work and the necessity for an early meeting, it has not been possible to consult the French and Japanese representatives.

*March 24, 1920.*

### APPENDIX 2 TO NO. 71

#### *President, Georgian Delegation, to President of the Supreme Council*

(A.J. 107.)

CURZON HOTEL, LONDRES, le 16 mars 1920

M. le Président,

Considérant l'importance vitale et primordiale attachée par le peuple géorgien à la possession de la province et du port de Batoum, la délégation de la République géorgienne se voit en nécessité de faire ressortir encore une fois le point de vue unanimement soutenu par la nation géorgienne tout entière en ce qui concerne l'avenir de la province et de la ville de Batoum, et dont le résumé suit, savoir :

1. La province de Batoum, comprenant les districts de Batoum et d'Artvin, dont la population est en majorité géorgienne-musulmane, doit être incorporée au territoire de la République géorgienne conformément aux raisons historiques et autres, ainsi qu'à la volonté de la population de cette vieille terre géorgienne.

Le Gouvernement géorgien est peut-être le seul qui puisse assurer à ce pays l'ordre public efficace adapté aux besoins et à la mentalité de ses populations.

2. Le démembrement de la province de Batoum et le rattachement d'une partie quelconque de cette province à un État autre que la Géorgie ne manquera pas de provoquer le dissentiment le plus profond et d'envenimer les rapports entre les peuples voisins en Transcaucasie.

3. S'il est démontré que, pour des raisons géographiques, topographiques ou autres, l'accès à la mer dont on veut doter l'Arménie, doit nécessairement emprunter une portion du territoire considéré par le peuple géorgien comme son patrimoine national et revendiqué par lui à ce titre, les droits du peuple géorgien doivent être respectés. L'accès à la mer susmentionné, c'est-à-dire la jonction des chemins de fer de l'Arménie avec son débouché éventuel sur la mer Noire, pourrait être organisé en vertu des stipulations spéciales et sans préjudice à la souveraineté de la Géorgie sur les territoires en question.

4. La création à Batoum d'une république autonome, englobant aussi une partie de la province de Batoum, aura pour résultat inévitable de compliquer encore plus les rapports déjà assez compliqués entre les États transcauciens. Cette solution, tout en causant une amère déception au peuple géorgien, en lui ôtant la possession de son principal port, n'est nullement nécessaire ni pour les besoins commerciaux et économiques des pays voisins de la Géorgie ni pour les nécessités du transit des marchandises dans le commerce international, surtout avec la Perse, car tous ces intérêts dont la portée est pleinement appréciée par le Gouvernement géorgien

peuvent trouver satisfaction et les garanties nécessaires peuvent être assurées par des arrangements spéciaux conclus entre les parties intéressées, directement ou sous les auspices du Conseil suprême ou de la Société des Nations.

Organisé sur ces bases, le port de Batoum deviendrait, sous la souveraineté de la Géorgie, un véritable débouché commun des trois républiques transcaucasiennes, en même temps qu'entrepôt du commerce international, et cela sans la séparation artificielle de cette ville d'avec son hinterland, et sans porter atteinte au droit de la Géorgie sur Batoum.

5. Le Gouvernement géorgien maintient les revendications formulées dans son mémorandum présenté à la Conférence de la Paix,<sup>18</sup> en ce qui concerne l'attribution à la Géorgie des deux districts de la province de Kars, savoir Ardahan et Olty.

6. Il se peut que, pour des raisons de politique générale et pour assurer l'application des traités de paix, les grandes Puissances jugeront opportun de disposer dans le port de Batoum d'une base militaire et navale. A cette fin, toutes les facilités doivent être assurées aux grandes Puissances, et le moyen le plus simple et le plus sûr d'y parvenir serait la conclusion des accords et des conventions nécessaires à cet effet avec la Géorgie.

En priant votre Excellence de porter ce qui précède à la connaissance du Conseil suprême, je m'empresse, &c.

Président de la Délégation géorgienne,

N. TCHEIDZÉ

<sup>18</sup> Cf. No. 10, note 3.

## No. 72

I.C.P. 86.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, held in Lord Curzon's Room at the British Foreign Office, on Friday, March 26, 1920, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Malkin (for Minute 4); SECRETARY, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr.

*France*: M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer, Colonel Chardigny.

*Italy*: Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Galli, Don Ascanio Colonna.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

1. LORD CURZON said that the conference generally had a certain amount of business to transact before they could proceed to discuss the subjects on their agenda. He had four points to raise that afternoon. First, the conference would remember that at their meeting on the previous day they had considered a tentative programme for the Supreme Council, and he had undertaken to submit this programme to Mr. Lloyd George.<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately, owing to the fact that Mr. Lloyd George had had to prepare a succession of speeches,

*Date of the next  
Plenary Session  
of the Supreme  
Council*

<sup>1</sup> See No. 71, minute 1.

he had been unable to see the British Prime Minister, but he had explained the proposals of the conference to the secretary to the Cabinet, who said that he would seize the first opportunity of approaching Mr. Lloyd George and of ascertaining his wishes, and communicating them to the conference.

2. LORD CURZON said the second point was, he wished to know whether the French representatives had received any reply about Egypt.<sup>2</sup>

*Egypt* M. BERTHELOT said that he had sent Lord Curzon a letter on the subject of Egypt, informing him of the instructions that he had received from Paris, which had been communicated to him by the French Embassy in London. The French President of the Council had raised objections in respect of articles 9 and 13. These objections were fully explained in the letter referred to above.

LORD CURZON said that the conference could not discuss M. Millerand's objections until they were in possession of the document containing his views.

3. LORD CURZON, proceeding, said that his third point was the question of the recruitment of Turks in the French Foreign Legion, which was under reference to the French Government.<sup>3</sup> He wished to enquire how it stood.

*Recruitment of  
Turks in the  
French Foreign  
Legion*

M. BERTHELOT said that he had communicated the sense of the discussion on this subject to his Government, and the reply from Paris had been to the effect that the French could not give way. Germany had always conducted a very active and fierce campaign against the Foreign Legion, and had even wished to make use of it as a motive for declaring war. The French Foreign Legion had rendered the greatest services during the war; two-thirds of its effectives had been killed, and the French Government contended that it was not the moment, when they had emerged victorious from the war, for them to think of touching it. Moreover, the question had been raised in the presence of Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson, who had been furnished with explanations regarding the clause concerning the Legion which was to be inserted in the treaty.<sup>4</sup> Further, it was most unlikely that the Turks would ever enlist in the Legion, and the French had no intention of enrolling them. Moreover, he did not think that the Legion at present contained a single Turk. The French Government merely wished, as a matter of principle, to urge very strongly that the clause relating to the Foreign Legion should not be excised from this treaty, especially when it had appeared in all the others.

LORD CURZON said that, in the circumstances, further discussion of the question must be deferred until Mr. Lloyd George could be present. He wished, however, to say that he hoped that M. Berthelot did not think that he had intended in any way to attack the French Foreign Legion. On the contrary, no one was more sensible than himself of the way in which the

<sup>2</sup> See No. 69, minute 4.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 66, minute 1.

<sup>4</sup> See *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. v, p. 310.

Legion had covered itself with glory during the war, and of its splendid record, which was known all over the world. The only question was whether the privilege of enlisting the Turks in the Legion should be extended to France. M. Berthelot had said that there was no Turk in the Foreign Legion, but, on the other hand, a day or two ago M. Kammerer had stated that there were eight or nine Turks in it.

M. KAMMERER interposed to say that this was only a very rough guess on his part.

LORD CURZON said that M. Berthelot had also stated that the French had no intention of recruiting Turks for the Legion in the future. This was a very significant statement, and when the matter came up for discussion at the Supreme Council he intended to remind M. Berthelot of it. In any case, he trusted that M. Berthelot would fully understand that he had never intended to disparage in the slightest way the very splendid body of men who constituted the French Foreign Legion.

M. BERTHELOT said that the Legion was principally composed of Alsatians, or so-called Germans, who enlisted mainly in order to escape military service in Germany, and seize what was their only chance of serving France. For this reason the traditions of the Legion were sacred. When men presented themselves for enrolment no questions were ever asked about their nationality; the only qualification was their physical fitness.

4. LORD CURZON said that his fourth point was important. The Drafting Committee were at present carrying on their work in Paris. The previous day the conference had assumed that the work of drafting would be continued in the French capital, and it had therefore been agreed that the British representatives should remain in Paris, so that, if possible, their labours should be completed within the next three weeks, in which case, after a meeting of the Supreme Council had been held with the three Prime Ministers present, the terms could be handed to the Turks at the end of April. Mr. Malkin, who was one of the British members of the Drafting Committee, had, however, returned from Paris that morning with disquieting news, to the effect that the French Government regarded the whole treaty as in suspense until Marshal Foch and his Versailles Commission had reported on the means of taking coercive measures in the event of the Turks not signing the treaty, and that M. Millerand in consequence had stopped all action on the Drafting Committee. He submitted to the conference that this was a most unfortunate and undesirable state of affairs. The result of M. Millerand's instructions would be to delay the preparation of the treaty for weeks. Any Government, of course, had a perfect right to raise or reserve any points they liked, but at the same time the Drafting Committee had a considerable amount of material upon which they could work, and any delay would have most unfortunate results. Supposing, for instance, when Marshal Foch's Commission reported, they had no important modification to make, what a vast amount of time would have been wasted.

If, on the contrary, Marshal Foch wished to introduce substantial alterations, these could be discussed either in London or in Paris. He deprecated, however, complete suspense of work by the Drafting Committee when he thought they might be valuably employed in getting ahead with the clauses which were non-controversial. Mr. Malkin was, fortunately, present at the meeting, and he would ask him to make a statement. He would then suggest to the conference that M. Millerand might be requested to withdraw his prohibition and to allow the Drafting Committee to proceed.

MR. MALKIN said that on the previous Monday he had received instructions from London that the Drafting Committee would be in the British capital about Thursday to continue drafting the clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey there. On receiving these instructions he had informed M. Fromageot, who had gone to see M. Millerand, who had then stated that it was useless for the Drafting Committee to proceed until Marshal Foch's Commission had reported. Pending the receipt of that report, the work of the committee might be thrown away. Since then the Drafting Committee had received a great deal more material, and it was quite possible for them, if M. Millerand's prohibition were withdrawn, to get on with some very useful work.

M. BERTHELOT thought that there must be some misunderstanding. No doubt M. Millerand considered that a great deal depended upon the decision of Marshal Foch, because unless the Powers were sure that they would have enough effectives to send to Constantinople in order to enforce their terms they would have to make those terms somewhat less stringent. He agreed that there was no reason why the Drafting Committee should not continue its work upon other questions, especially those upon which there was complete agreement. He proposed, therefore, to send a telegram in this sense to Paris, and he hoped that the British Government would similarly telegraph to Lord Derby, asking him to make identical representations to M. Millerand. As he had said, he fully agreed that it was most desirable that the Drafting Committee should lose no time.

LORD CURZON said that he was much obliged to M. Berthelot for what he had said. He inclined to his view, that there must be some misunderstanding, and he proposed to telegraph to the British Ambassador in Paris to approach M. Millerand on the subject. It was desirable that Mr. Malkin should return to Paris in time to start work on the following Tuesday.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said he fully agreed with Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot; Signor Scialoja and himself would telegraph to their representatives in Paris to make similar representations to M. Millerand.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that he would also instruct the Japanese representative on the Drafting Committee to remain in Paris.

It was agreed—

- (a) That it was most undesirable that the work of the Drafting Committee should be suspended, and that there was no reason why they should

not proceed with that work in respect of such clauses upon which the Allied Powers were in accord.

- (b) That representations should be made in the above sense to M. Millerand by M. Cambon direct, and indirectly by the British and Italian Ambassadors respectively in Paris.
- (c) That the Drafting Committee should be asked to reassemble in Paris in order to resume work at the beginning of the following week.

(At this point Mr. Malkin withdrew.)

5. LORD CURZON said that on the previous day the conference had agreed that Mr. Vansittart should consult with Colonel Chardigny regarding the proposed Armenian and Georgian frontiers in connection with the new free port of Batum.<sup>5</sup>

*The New State  
of Armenia*

M. BERTHELOT asked to be permitted to make a few preliminary remarks before Colonel Chardigny made his statement. He had had a talk with Colonel Chardigny, who took the view that if we abandoned Batum (he was speaking of the town as distinguished from the State) to the Georgians, the material and moral results would be simply deplorable. No doubt the Georgians were prepared to give any pledges we asked, but it was quite certain they would never keep them. It was most important that Batum should be a free outlet for commerce of all kinds, more especially petrol. In Colonel Chardigny's opinion it was essential that a small inter-Allied garrison of all arms should be kept in the town for some years. The moral results of this would be great, and there was no risk at all that the Georgians would ever attack this force. Even if each Power would only contribute, say, 500 men, it would be quite sufficient as a theoretical manifestation of force. It was all-important that for the next few years complete freedom of trade should be maintained. As regards the upkeep of that force, this might well be made a charge upon the town of Batum. In maintaining this garrison the necessary precautions could be taken to tide over the transitional stage. There were objections to this proposal, no doubt, but it was necessary to find some system which would work, and the suggestion he had made would, he thought, cause the least dislocation and inconvenience, at the same time safeguarding the interests of the Allies.

LORD CURZON said that the previous day, at the conference, he had wondered how long it would be before the solution in respect of Batum, which had then commended itself to the conference, would be upset; he had thought that he might give it a fortnight's life. In this he had proved to be mistaken and had greatly overstated the period, for within twenty-four hours Colonel Chardigny had come with an entirely new proposal. Colonel Chardigny, of course, spoke with the authority of great local knowledge, and he himself was inclined to agree with much that he had said; but he did not agree with the colonel in thinking that it would be easy for each Power to maintain 500 men as part of an Allied garrison. In his own view it would not only not

<sup>5</sup> See No. 71, minute 4.

be easy, but it would be exceedingly difficult. He wished to remind the conference that he had found it difficult to persuade the Powers to occupy Batum, and they had only agreed to do so on condition that as soon as its affairs were settled their forces should be withdrawn. Then, again, the colonel had suggested that the upkeep of the troops should be met by local taxation of the trade of the town. This would certainly not be a popular move, and he doubted whether it was right in principle. It was all very well to say to the Turks that they must pay, as they were our enemy and reparation was the inevitable result of defeat in war; but it was a very different thing to take an independent State and to make that State pay for an occupying force which it did not want. Then as regards the League of Nations, the conference had assumed that the League would not want to undertake any responsibility for Batum because they had not an army behind them. He suggested that that question, instead of being reopened by the conference, should be taken to the Council of the League of Nations in the following week, when our difficulties could be stated very frankly and the council could be informed that in the opinion of the conference it was most desirable that the League of Nations should undertake the responsibility for the new free port and zone. Supposing, as was likely, the council would refuse to undertake this charge on behalf of the League of Nations, he expressed the opinion that it was most important that the complete freedom of trade of the port should be maintained. Then the conference could go to the Powers and ask them to supply the necessary garrison. If the Powers refused to do this, we could then go back to our original proposals, which had been accepted the previous day, and hand over the town and the small State of Batum to the Georgians. This was the third alternative, and it was the least desirable, but in the long run we might find that there was no other. He fully accepted the point made by Colonel Chardigny, that the Georgians were not in the least likely scrupulously to observe any pledges they might make. In conclusion, he would enquire from his colleagues whether, instead of reversing or revising their decision of the day before, he should be authorised to ask the opinion and advise [*advice*] of the Council of the League of Nations.

M. BERTHELOT thought that this was an excellent idea, and it met with his full approval.

MR. VANSITTART said that, speaking on behalf of the committee of which he was chairman, he would say that he fully agreed with Colonel Chardigny's plea for the retention of the garrison of Batum. This, however, was quite a different question from that of the frontier of Armenia, and he understood that the frontier as agreed by the conference stood, with the rider that it was desirable, if possible, that the inter-Allied garrison of Batum should be retained. He wished to inform the conference that Colonel Chardigny had no objection to raise to the frontier which had been suggested by his committee.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he fully agreed with Lord Curzon's suggestion.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that it had his full approval.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said he understood that the case to be submitted



to the League of Nations was not that of the frontier, but of the maintenance of an inter-Allied garrison.

COLONEL CHARDIGNY said it was important that the Kars-Ardahan-Batum road, which was the only one which led from Armenia to the sea, should remain entirely with the Armenians. Batum was a question which was closely bound up with European interests, and also with the question of the Caucasus. If Batum were ceded to the Georgians, Armenia would never be allowed to have a finger in the place at all. The town would be given up to pillage, and consequently the cession of this place was a very big responsibility for the Powers to assume.

M. BERTHELOT said that the question of the garrison in Batum was a much simpler matter to refer to the League of Nations than that of its future lot. The financial side of the question represented some three hundred million francs a year to the Armenians.

It was agreed—

- (a) That the concluding paragraph of the Preface to the report of the Armenian Committee (A.J. 120)<sup>6</sup> should be suppressed.
- (b) That Lord Curzon, as chairman of the conference, should be asked to represent to the Council of the League of Nations, at the meeting to be held towards the end of the first week in April, the desirability of maintaining a small inter-Allied force of all arms in the town of Batum for the sake of the moral effect it would have, to maintain order, and to ensure the free transit of oil and complete freedom of traffic.

The conference took note that Colonel Chardigny accepted the proposed frontiers of the new State of Armenia, as suggested by the Armenian Commission and provisionally approved by the conference at their meeting the previous day.

6. With reference to I.C.P. 83,<sup>7</sup> Minute 4, VISCOUNT CHINDA said that he had a point to raise in regard to the memorandum by the British delegates proposing articles to be inserted in the Turkish Treaty relating to Egypt, the Soudan and Cyprus, which had been discussed by the conference on the 23rd instant. He had made enquiries, and had discovered that the Japanese Government had not yet officially recognised either the British Protectorate of Egypt or the British annexation of Cyprus. He desired, therefore, to place on record that he could only agree to accept article 1 of Chapter 'A' (Egypt), and Chapter 'C' (Cyprus) *ad referendum* to his Government.

*Treaty of Peace  
with Turkey.  
Clauses relating  
to Egypt, the  
Soudan and  
Cyprus*

The conference took note of the Japanese Ambassador's reservation.

<sup>6</sup> See No. 71, appendix 1.

<sup>7</sup> No. 69.

7. With reference to Minute 1 *supra*, LORD CURZON said that he had just that moment received a reply from Mr. Lloyd George regarding the programme of the future business of the Supreme Council which the conference had agreed he should submit to him at their last meeting. Mr. Lloyd George stated that he was in general accord with the proposals, with the exception of that part which provided for the stay of British Ministers in Paris on their way to San Remo. Mr. Lloyd George said that he was quite prepared to go to San Remo in Easter week if it would be impossible for M. Millerand and Signor Nitti to come to London. He was not, however, in favour of breaking their journey in Paris. Further, Mr. Lloyd George agreed to summoning the Turks to Paris on the 20th April. Mr. Lloyd George, therefore, said Lord Curzon, accepted generally the proposals of the conference, and it remained for the French and Italian Governments to say whether M. Millerand and Signor Nitti would meet Mr. Lloyd George in London or whether the three Prime Ministers would assemble at San Remo.

*Date of the next  
Plenary Session  
of the Supreme  
Council*

It was agreed—

That M. Berthelot and Signor Scialoja should telegraph to their respective Governments the programme of business which had been proposed by the conference, stating the modification which had been introduced by Mr. Lloyd George, and enquiring whether the French and Italian Prime Ministers would meet Mr. Lloyd George in London or whether the next plenary session of the Supreme Council should be in San Remo.

(At this point Colonel Chardigny left the meeting.)

8. With reference to I.C.P. 83, Minute 1, LORD CURZON said that he wished to raise a further point. He had been shown by M. Cambon and M. Berthelot the previous day a telegram from M. Millerand indicating the latter's desire that certain alterations should be introduced in the note which the conference had agreed should be sent to the Dutch Government regarding the ex-Kaiser. He had explained to M. Cambon that, as the conference had been in full accord in respect of the note, he had signed and despatched it to the British representative at The Hague. He had now received from the French delegation a paper which set forth M. Millerand's views at length. The first thing the French President of the Council objected to was the opening paragraph, in which we had stated that we could not conceal our surprise that the Dutch Government had prejudged the question by issuing the Royal decree. M. Millerand thought that this was not quite fair, as the Allied Ministers at The Hague had themselves suggested that certain measures should be taken to ensure the safe custody of the ex-Kaiser. This was not quite the point, as what we had really objected to was the Netherlands Government forcing both our own hands and their own by issuing a decree which made it impossible for the Dutch to go back upon what they had done. The second part of the note to which M. Millerand referred was

*Reply to the  
Dutch Note re-  
garding the  
Internment of  
the ex-Kaiser*

the concluding portion, where we had stated that we would hold the Dutch Government responsible. This, M. Millerand thought, went too far, and he considered that the preceding sentence met the case. Lord Curzon reminded the conference that they had all, including M. Berthelot, agreed that the original draft submitted by M. Berthelot required a good deal of stiffening, and he had constructed the final sentence of the note accordingly. M. Millerand had telegraphed to the French Minister at The Hague, saying that there was a difference of opinion between the Allies in regard to the note, and asking him to postpone action. He also desired us to telegraph to our representative in the same sense. Lord Curzon said he wished to ask the French delegates whether they thought that M. Millerand attached really very great importance to the modifications he had suggested, as this would mean that the note would be hung up once more. Perhaps M. Berthelot would be kind enough to explain.

M. BERTHELOT said that when M. Millerand had sent his telegram the day before he had been afraid of wounding public opinion in Holland, to which he attached a certain amount of importance. The changes suggested by M. Millerand were of no great significance; all he really wanted was that the terms of the note should be moderated to some extent. In fact, it was suppression rather than modification which M. Millerand had in mind. M. Berthelot said that it was his own fault, and he had received blame from both sides. If he might put forward his personal point of view he would be glad if the conference would decide to meet M. Millerand's wishes, and he was sure that M. Millerand, if this were done, would, on his part, be greatly gratified.

It was agreed—

- (a) That instructions should be sent by the British, French, Italian and Japanese delegates to the representatives of their respective Governments at The Hague to suspend action on the note pending the receipt of certain modifications.
- (b) That Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot should amend the note in such a way as would meet M. Millerand's wishes.
- (c) That, as soon as the various Allied Ministers at The Hague had received the amendments, they should proceed in a body to the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs and present the note as a collective document.

*(The conference adjourned at 5.25 p.m.)*

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 26, 1920.

I.C.P. 87.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, held in Lord Curzon's Room at the British Foreign Office, Whitehall, London, S.W. 1, on Saturday, March 27, 1920, at 11 a.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Forbes Adam; SECRETARIES, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Captain Abraham.

*France*: M. Cambon (*in the Chair*), M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer.

*Italy*: Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Galli, Don Ascanio Colonna.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

1. M. CAMBON said that the Greek Minority Treaty (A.J. 130) (Appendix 1) had been studied in Paris by experts, a general agreement had been reached and M. Veniselos's acceptance obtained, except on a very few points. He thought the conference might, therefore, accept the text as a whole, and discuss only the points on which M. Veniselos had raised objections. The first of these was article 7, the second paragraph. If the provisions of this paragraph remained, Greece would be forced to establish a system of proportional representation even in old Greece. This was, perhaps, asking too much. Further, a system of proportional representation might be regarded as inapplicable even in the newly acquired territory, seeing that the populations there were unaccustomed to elections of any kind.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said he thought the establishment of proportional representation might be dangerous, as it might lead to the deliberate alteration of the existing proportion by violence.

After some further discussion, it was agreed—

To qualify the words 'un système électoral' by the words 'tenant compte des droits des minorités ethniques'; to suppress the words 'based on the principle,' &c., and to add the following sentence: 'Cette disposition n'est applicable qu'aux nouveaux territoires acquis par la Grèce depuis le 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.'

M. CAMBON said that the next article to which M. Veniselos took exception was article 11. M. Veniselos did not wish to be debarred from modifying the land system in the newly acquired territories. The article, however, only restrained the Greek Government from altering the land system for two years. It seemed, therefore, that M. Veniselos had no real ground for objecting to the article as it stood.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that the reform M. Veniselos had in mind almost amounted to confiscation, which might take place very rapidly.

It was agreed—

That no alteration should be made in article 11.

M. CAMBON pointed out that the drafting of article 15 was not very satisfactory.

After some discussion it was agreed—

To alter the second sentence as follows: after the words 'éléments ethniques', 'y résidant habituellement, seront représentés. Les musulmans auront droit de participer aux fonctions exécutives.'

It was accordingly decided—

- (a) To accept the clauses as drafted, subject to the above alterations.
- (b) That copies should be communicated forthwith to the Greek delegation and to the Economic Commission for their information, and to the Drafting Committee for the necessary action.

The secretary was instructed to furnish the said copies without delay.

2. M. CAMBON said that the draft treaty with Armenia (A.J. 128) (Appendix 2) had similarly been accepted by all the Powers. The only point to which he thought attention need be drawn was article 4, paragraph 3. He thought the same objection to the use of the expression 'proportional representation' existed in this treaty as in the Greek Treaty. In his view, it would be sufficient to say, 'an electoral system giving due consideration to the rights of ethnical minorities.'

*Draft of Treaty  
with Armenia*

(This was agreed to.)

It was decided—

- (a) To adopt the draft treaty, with the above alteration, subject to the result of the reference to the Armenian delegation (see (c) below).
- (b) To send copies to the Drafting Committee and the Economic Commission, for their information.
- (c) To furnish a copy to the Armenian delegation, with an enquiry as to whether they wish to offer any observations.

The secretary was instructed to take the necessary action in regard to (b) and (c).

3. MR. VANSITTART said that if the treaty were to be presented to the Turks on the 20th April it would hardly be possible to discuss the question of judicial reform in time. He therefore submitted a memorandum containing two clauses involving acceptance by Turkey in anticipation of what the Powers might decide, and binding her to accept the judicial findings of Allied courts in the interval (A.J. 129) (Appendix 3).

M. CAMBON agreed that it would be impossible to discuss the matter fully before the 20th April.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA thought it would be desirable to have a Turkish member on the commission proposed in the first article.

M. CAMBON observed that the article provided for the consultation of the Turkish Government.

VISCOUNT CHINDA observed that he had express instructions from his Government to ask for a Japanese member on any commission of this kind. He wished to explain why his Government was so sensitive on the matter. Both Japan and Turkey had been anxious to conclude commercial treaties, but the system of Capitulations had always been a stumbling block. Turkey had said that she could not recognise any Japanese rights under this system. Japan had always maintained that she ought to be on the same footing as the other Powers. Therefore the Japanese Government had given him strict instructions to ask that there should be a Japanese member on any commission dealing with the matter of Capitulations.

It was agreed—

That the commission should be composed of four members, to be named by France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan.

M. KAMMERER observed that the Capitulations covered a great deal more than merely judicial matters. He would suggest, therefore, the modification of the last words of the first sentence of article 1 as follows:—

‘le présent régime des Capitulations en matière judiciaire.’

(This was agreed to.)

No alteration was proposed to article 2.

It was agreed—

To send both articles, with the minutes of the above discussion, to the Drafting Committee.

The secretary was instructed to take the necessary action.

4. The conference took note that the recommendations made in the report of the Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission, relative to the ports of Constantinople and Haidar Pasha (A.J. 115),<sup>1</sup> had been approved by the Commission on the Straits.
- Treaty of Peace with Turkey.*  
*Ports of Constantinople and Haidar Pasha*
- The secretary was instructed to inform the Drafting Committee accordingly.

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 27, 1920.

#### APPENDIX I TO No. 73

##### *Memorandum for the Council of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors regarding Greek Minorities Treaty*

(A.J. 130.)

The British and Italian representatives on the Minorities Committee have the honour to recommend the attached draft articles<sup>2</sup> to form a treaty to be signed

<sup>1</sup> Appendix 4 to No. 70.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This enclosure comprised the English and French texts of twenty draft articles. These articles in the English text were the same as the twenty articles of the treaty

between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Greece at the same time as the signature of the Turkish peace. Owing to pressure of work and the urgent necessity of expediting the business of the conference there has been no time to take the final views of the French and Japanese representatives.

It should, however, be pointed out that the Minorities Committee in Paris drafted last year all the articles of the present treaty, except the second paragraph of article 7, and articles 11 and 15.<sup>3</sup> M. Veniselos is understood to accept all the articles drafted in Paris, and article 15 regarding Adrianople embodies his own suggestions. Article 11, regarding land reform, has been inserted at the wish of the Italian representative, but the British representatives, while approving the insertion, think it right to warn the council that M. Veniselos is understood to entertain strong objection to the article.

If the council approve the draft articles, it is suggested that a copy should be communicated forthwith to the Greek delegation and a copy sent to the Economic Commission for their information, and to the Drafting Committee.

*London, March 26, 1920*

## APPENDIX 2 TO NO. 73

### *Memorandum for the Council of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors regarding Minorities Treaty with Armenia*

(A.J. 128.)

The British and Italian representatives on the Minorities Committee have the honour to recommend the attached draft articles<sup>4</sup> to form a special treaty between

between the Principal Allied Powers and Greece signed at Sèvres on August 10, 1920, and printed in Cmd. 960 of 1920, subject to minor variation and to the following differences: (a) the first paragraph of draft article 3 ended: '... Greece since the 1st January, 1918.'; (b) the third paragraph of the same article read '... otherwise provided in the Treaties of Peace with Bulgaria and Turkey, transfer within the succeeding . . .'; (c) draft article 5 read '... persons concerned have, under the treaties concluded or to be concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers with Bulgaria or Turkey, to choose . . .'; (d) the second paragraph of draft article 7 read 'In particular, Greece undertakes to put into force within three years after the coming into force of the present treaty an electoral system based on the principle of proportional representation of the racial minorities.'; (e) draft article 11 read 'For a period of two years after the coming into force of the present treaty Greece undertakes not to introduce any new regulations modifying the land system in the territories acquired by Greece in consequence of the recent war with the Central Empires.'; (f) the first and third paragraphs of draft article 14 corresponded to article 14 of the treaty; the second paragraph of the draft read 'The Greek Government shall take measures to assure the nomination of a Reiss-ul-Ulema.'; (g) the second sentence of the first paragraph of draft article 15 read 'This scheme will include a municipal council in which the different racial elements of the inhabitants of the town, habitually resident there, will be proportionately represented as well as the participation of Moslems, on a similarly proportional basis, in the executive posts of the municipality.'

<sup>3</sup> See Volume II, No. 12, note 6.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. This enclosure comprised the English and French texts of twelve draft articles. These articles in the English text were the same as articles 1 to 8 and 10 to 13 respectively of the treaty between the Principal Allied Powers and Armenia signed at Sèvres on August 10, 1920, and printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxiii, pp. 459-63, subject to minor variation and to the following differences: (a) draft article 3 did not include the word 'Principal'; (b) the first, second, fourth and fifth paragraphs of draft

the Principal Allied Powers and Armenia. This treaty will be analogous to the other special treaties with new States such as Poland and Czechoslovakia.

In particular the treaty follows the model of the Greek Minorities Draft Treaty. The acceptance by the League of Nations of the usual formulas of guarantees is assumed.

Owing to pressure of work and the necessity of expediting the business of the conference, it is regretted that there has been no time to take the views of the French and Japanese delegations on the articles.

It is intended that this treaty should be signed by Armenia at the time of the signature of the Turkish Treaty. If the council approve its terms, it is suggested that a copy might be communicated to the Armenian delegation, with an enquiry as to whether they wish to offer any observations. Copies should also be sent to the Drafting Committee and to the Economic Commission for their information.

*London, March 26, 1920.*

### APPENDIX 3 TO No. 73

#### *Memorandum by the British Delegation for submission to Council of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors*

(A.J. 129.)

The British delegation have the honour to recommend the following draft articles for insertion in the Turkish treaty at the place considered appropriate by the Drafting Committee:—

‘1. Une commission de trois membres, nommés par la Grande-Bretagne, la France et l’Italie, sera établie dans les six mois après la mise en vigueur du présent traité, pour préparer un projet de réforme judiciaire de nature à remplacer le régime présent des Capitulations. La commission aura toute compétence pour recommander, s’il y a lieu et après consultation avec le Gouvernement ottoman, l’adoption d’un régime judiciaire, soit mixte, soit unifié.

‘Ce projet sera soumis aux Gouvernements desdites Puissances et entrera en vigueur dès qu’il a été approuvé par eux. La Turquie s’engage à l’avance à accepter le projet ainsi approuvé.

‘2. La Turquie s’engage à accepter toute décision prise par un juge ou tribunal allié siégeant en Turquie depuis le 31 octobre 1918, jusqu’à la mise en vigueur du nouveau système judiciaire.’

article 4 corresponded to the first, third, fourth and fifth paragraphs of article 4 of the treaty; the third paragraph of the draft (cf. the second paragraph of the treaty) read ‘The Armenian Government will present within two years of the entry into force of the present treaty to the Principal Allied Powers a draft organisation of the electoral system based on the proportional representation of ethnical minorities.’; (c) the first and third paragraphs of draft article 7 corresponded to article 7; the second paragraph of the draft read ‘The Armenian Government shall take measures to assure the nomination of a Reis-ul-Ulema.’; the third paragraph of the draft (cf. the second paragraph of article 7) began ‘Armenia undertakes to insure protection . . .’; (d) the third sentence of draft article 8 began ‘The United States, the British Empire . . .’; (e) draft articles 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 read ‘Allied and Associated’ where the final text read ‘Allied’; (f) the second sentence of draft article 10 read ‘As an exception from this provision the right of Armenia or of any other Allied or Associated Power to confine her maritime coasting trade to national vessels is expressly reserved.’; (g) the first paragraph of draft article 11 read ‘. . . Armenian territory, including territorial waters, and to treat them . . .’.



I.C.P. 88.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, held in Lord Curzon's Room at the British Foreign Office, Whitehall, London, S.W. 1, on Monday, March 29, 1920, at 3.30 p.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Payne, Mr. Fountain, Mr. Vansittart; SECRETARIES, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Captain Abraham.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Kammerer.

*Italy:* Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Nogara, Signor Galli, Don Ascanio Colonna.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda, Mr. Yoshida.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

1. With reference to I.C.P. 86,<sup>1</sup> minute 7, LORD CURZON said that there were one or two points in regard to the future business of the conference and the Supreme Council and in respect of other questions which he wished to bring before the conference before they proceeded to discuss the economic clauses of the Turkish Treaty. He had seen Mr. Lloyd George that morning, and had pointed out that it was urgently necessary that Marshal Foch's Commission should report to the conference with the least possible delay upon those questions which had been referred to it; in particular, the military, naval and air clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, and also the estimated size of the military force that might be required to enforce the terms of the treaty if this were necessary. Mr. Lloyd George had at once telegraphed to Marshal Foch on behalf of the Supreme Council, asking that he would arrange that his commission should furnish the required reports by the forenoon of the following Wednesday. He was sending a copy of the telegram to Lord Derby, and he would ask M. Cambon also to telegraph its contents to M. Millerand.

The second matter upon which he (Lord Curzon) would like to consult his colleagues was the actual dates of their proceeding to San Remo. The plan which had commended itself to the conference at the end of the previous week had been that they should continue their labours until the morning of Thursday, the 1st April, 1920; that they should then adjourn over the Easter holidays until the following week. On the 7th April, he himself would have to appear on behalf of the conference before the Council of the League of Nations, in order to state the views of the conference in regard to the future of Armenia and the State of Batum. He hoped that it would not be necessary to call a meeting of the conference in the interval between the 1st and 7th approximo. As regards the date of going to San Remo, as the conference was well aware, the work of Mr. Lloyd George in the past two or three months had been of an exceptionally strenuous and severe nature; he had therefore decided to seize the opportunity of obtaining a few days' rest and recupera-

<sup>1</sup> No. 72.

tion by proceeding to San Remo by sea, leaving in a P. and O. vessel sailing on Saturday, the 10th April, to Marseilles, where the ship was due to arrive on the 17th of that month. From Marseilles he would proceed by train to San Remo, arriving there the following day; he would there be joined by those experts who might be selected to accompany him, and would probably proceed by rail. It was proposed, therefore, that the meeting of the Supreme Council at San Remo should begin on Monday, the 19th April, and that the Heads of the Governments, their Foreign Ministers, and, if necessary, Marchal Foch, and other experts, should be present. The meeting might last until the 22nd or 23rd of that month. There would then be an adjournment to Paris, where, it was suggested, the Turkish delegates should be summoned any time between the 20th and 24th; that is to say, after completing the business at San Remo, the council should proceed to Paris, reaching there about the 23rd and receiving the Turkish representatives about the 24th or 26th. The council would then break up for the time being while the Turkish representatives considered the terms of the treaty. After two or three weeks' interval the council would proceed to the final stages of the treaty, which would take them up to the latter half of May. Such was the programme as now proposed by Mr. Lloyd George, who was anxious to know whether it would commend itself to Signor Nitti and M. Millerand.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said he had already telegraphed to Signor Nitti suggesting that he should meet his colleagues at San Remo at a meeting to be held on the 10th, 11th and 12th of April, and Signor Nitti had accepted this proposal. It was now suggested that the date should be altered to the 19th. He must ask to reserve his acceptance of this date until he had communicated the alteration to Signor Nitti. He wished to point out that the Italian Chamber of Deputies was prorogued for Easter, but it would be meeting after the Easter holidays, and it was rather doubtful whether the President of the Chamber [? Council] could be absent when there was so much urgent business to be got through requiring his presence in Rome.

M. CAMBON similarly pointed out that the French Chamber rose and adjourned for Easter until the 12th April. It was possible that M. Millerand also might find it difficult to be at San Remo on the date suggested. He would, of course, telegraph at once to ascertain whether he accepted the proposed modification of the original plan.

LORD CURZON said that the British Houses of Parliament also adjourned until the 12th April. He thought it should be easy for the various Parliaments to release their respective heads on the 19th for two or three days. It was very doubtful, in his opinion, whether the treaty would be ready for the Supreme Council by the 12th, and he thought it would be much better to leave a margin.

It was agreed—

To accept provisionally Mr. Lloyd George's amended programme for the dates of the next session of the Supreme Council, subject to a reference by Signor Scialoja and M. Cambon to Rome and Paris respectively.

2. M. VANSITTART asked leave to raise the question of the western boundary of the demilitarised zone round Constantinople, recommended by Marshal Foch's Commission in their report of the 16th February.<sup>2</sup> On further examining this boundary it had been discovered that Lake Derkos contained the fresh water supply of Constantinople, and the British Foreign Office had accordingly pointed out to their War Department that it was essential that this water supply should not be liable to interference. The Army Council therefore considered that the whole of the catchment area of Lake Derkos should be included within the demilitarised zone but they wished to make it quite clear at the same time that the Chatalja lines should be included within that zone and should not form the actual boundary of this area. The Army Council wished to make a communication to this effect to General Sackville-West, with a view to the point being considered by Marshal Foch's Commission in Paris.

M. CAMBON said that it had never been decided that the frontier should be the Chatalja lines. It had been agreed provisionally that it should be somewhere between Enos-Midia and the Chatalja lines, but there had been no definite decision.

LORD CURZON pointed out that all the decisions of the conference were provisional in character and subject to the approval and sanction of the Supreme Council. The instructions to the conference, however, had rested on the hypothesis that the line would be the Chatalja line, and for the time being they must proceed on this assumption. The question, however, could be raised at any time at a meeting of the Supreme Council.

It was agreed—

To accept the proposals of the British Army Council to refer the questions of Lake Derkos and the Chatalja lines to Marshal Foch's Commission, through their military representative.

The secretary was instructed to notify the British War Office.

3. LORD CURZON said he wished to remind the conference that when the Supreme Council had completed the drafting of their reply to President Wilson's last note, M. Millerand had telegraphed to M. Jusserand asking him to obtain a personal interview, if possible, with President Wilson; he himself, with the consent of his colleagues, had seen the American Ambassador in London and had communicated to him the general outline of the scheme proposed by the Allies.<sup>3</sup> The British Foreign Office had now received President Wilson's reply. He proposed to ask the conference to discuss this *seriatim* on the following day, and in the meantime he would ask the secretary to circulate to members a paraphrase of the cable. There was one point raised by President Wilson which Lord Curzon said he would at once put before the conference, and that was in connexion with the future of Thrace. The Allied Powers proposed that the area between Chatalja and the Bulgarian frontier should become Greek. The American President disputed this,

<sup>2</sup> See No. 14, appendix 1.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 60, minute 2.

and claimed that the northern part of the area should be given to Bulgaria; that is to say, Adrianople and the great part of the Adrianople Vilayet. The claim of Bulgaria to this zone had not yet been examined by the Supreme Council, and when the question had been considered at Downing Street, it had been assumed that all the territory between the Bulgarian frontier and Chatalja would go to Greece. On this assumption M. Veniselos had been asked to agree to special stipulations in respect of the town itself of Adrianople, in regard to safeguarding the Mahometan Holy Places, &c. Before any reply was sent to the American President he thought that whatever proposals M. Veniselos had to make must be carefully considered by the conference. Apart from the respective claims of the Turks and the Greeks to this zone, he felt quite sure that no case could be made out, on ethnological grounds, for handing it over to Bulgaria; but, as President Wilson had raised the question, he thought that the conference must go into it. He proposed, therefore, to collect the evidence which had been put before the commission in Paris, and he would then ask the conference to give the matter their attention and to advise the Supreme Council as to the reply to be sent to Washington. As he had said, he proposed to bring the matter up for discussion on the following day, as it was probable that the Supreme Council might be meeting before Thursday to discuss the nature of the reply to be sent.

M. CAMBON said he understood that President Wilson declared himself in favour of expelling the Turk from the whole of European Turkey, and of ascribing to Bulgaria Adrianople and the whole of that area.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that he had no objection to the conference discussing the question, as long as it was clearly understood that the decision must rest with the Supreme Council.

LORD CURZON said that naturally the Supreme Council only was empowered to come to a decision.

It was agreed—

To take up the question on the following day after the note had been circulated to members.

4. LORD CURZON said that the latest report of the Financial Commission (A.J. 27, Revise)<sup>4</sup> was, he had been informed, in the hands of the printers, and he hoped that the conference would be able to take it on the following day. The English version, he understood, would be ready for circulation that evening, and the French version the following morning. He enquired whether his colleagues had any objections to raise to this procedure.

M. KAMMERER asked that the consideration of the report might be deferred for one day longer. He did not himself anticipate that any difficulties would be raised in Paris, but the French financial experts had left for the capital, and the French delegation would like discussion postponed until they returned and until they had received definite instructions from Paris as to

<sup>4</sup> See No. 77, appendix.

whether or not any substantial objections were likely to be raised. It had been agreed that the French Government would examine the report with as little delay as possible, and telegraph their acceptance or otherwise.

It was agreed—

That the French delegation should again press the French Government to expedite the acceptance or otherwise of the report of the Financial Commission, and that, if possible, the report should be considered by the conference at their meeting on the afternoon of the 30th instant.

5. With reference to I.C.P. 86,<sup>1</sup> Minute 2, LORD CURZON stated that he had received a letter from M. Berthelot<sup>5</sup> fully explaining the French point of view in respect of the memorandum by the British delegation proposing articles to be inserted in the Turkish Treaty in regard to Egypt, the Soudan and Cyprus (A.J. 111), which had been discussed at their meeting on the afternoon of the 23rd March. M. Berthelot's letter was now being examined in the Foreign Office by Mr. Hurst, who wished to be present when the question came up for consideration by the conference. Mr. Hurst was absent from London, but would be returning on Wednesday morning, and Lord Curzon proposed that M. Berthelot's letter should be considered the same afternoon.

*Treaty of Peace  
with Turkey.  
Egypt*

It was agreed—

That M. Berthelot's letter to Lord Curzon regarding the draft articles relative to Egypt, proposed by the British delegation, should be placed on the agenda for the meeting of the conference to be held on the afternoon of the 31st March.

6. LORD CURZON said that he had before him a letter from the secretary to the British War Office, dated the 27th March, 1920, pointing out the desirability of including in the Turkish Treaty some general clause demanding the restoration of all trophies captured from the Allies since 1914, on the lines of article 245 in the special provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. It was pointed out that this clause would be particularly applicable to the equipment and personal effects of officers captured by the Turks at the surrender of Kut, in 1916.

*Treaty of Peace  
with Turkey.  
Trophies*

After a brief discussion, it was agreed—

That some general clause, as suggested by the British War Office, demanding the restoration of trophies captured from the Allies, should be included in the Turkish Treaty.

The secretary was instructed to take the necessary action, in communication with the Drafting Committee.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 76, appendix 2.

7. The conference had before them the proposed economic clauses in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey (A.J. 97, Revise)<sup>6</sup> together with a report by the chairman of the Economic Commission (A.J. 127) (Appendix 1).

*Treaty of Peace  
with Turkey.  
Economic Clauses.  
Revival of Post  
Offices*

LORD CURZON said he understood there was substantial agreement to the draft clauses of the Economic Chapter.

Subject to any observations by the chairman of the commission and any remarks his colleagues might wish to make, he thought that the question could be dealt with without any very minute examination.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. This document preceded document A.J. 127 in Appendix 1 below, was headed 'Draft Economic Clauses for Insertion in Treaty of Peace with Turkey', and was dated at foot March 25, 1920. These draft clauses comprised seven sections corresponding to those in Part IX of the Treaty of Sèvres, subject to incidental variation in drafting (e.g. 'Allied and Associated Powers' where the final text read 'Allied Powers' throughout) and to the following particulars:

Draft article 1 corresponded to article 261 of the Treaty of Sèvres, except that the first phrase of the draft article read '... re-established as regards the Powers which ...'.

Draft article 2 corresponded to the first paragraph of article 139 of the treaty.

Draft article 3 corresponded to article 263 except that (a) the first paragraph read as follows in the draft: 'The convention of the 25th April, 1907, relating to import duties in Turkey shall be re-established in force in favour of all the Allied and Associated Powers signatories of the present treaty, and of all other Powers which on the 1st August, 1914, were entitled directly or indirectly to the benefit of the capitulatory regime.'; (b) in the last paragraph the stipulated period was three months.

Draft article 4 corresponded to article 264 except that in the last paragraph the stipulated period was three months.

Draft articles 5-7 corresponded to articles 265-267 respectively.

Draft article 8 corresponded to the first paragraph of article 128.

Draft articles 9-14 corresponded to articles 268-273 respectively.

Draft article 15 corresponded to the first eight paragraphs of article 274.

Draft articles 16-22 corresponded to articles 275-81 respectively.

Draft article 23 corresponded to article 282 except that the end of the first paragraph of the draft read '... before the war or during its continuance; but nothing in this article shall give any right to reopen interference proceedings in the United States of America where a final hearing has taken place.'

Draft articles 24 and 25 corresponded to articles 283 and 284 respectively except that the following additional paragraph was included at the end of each of the draft articles: 'This article shall not apply as between the United States of America on the one hand and Turkey on the other.'

Draft articles 26-28 corresponded to articles 285-7 respectively.

Draft articles 29 and 31 corresponded to articles 288 and 290 respectively except that they read '... any further treaty, to which the Allied and Associated Powers are parties, settling the disposal ...' where the treaty read '... any further treaty regulating the disposal ...'.

Draft articles 30 and 32 corresponded to articles 289 and 291 respectively except that the date in the first paragraph of each was the 1st August, 1914.

Draft article 33 corresponded to article 292.

Draft article 34 read '(Deleted: superseded by article 9 of the Financial Clauses.)'

Draft article 35 corresponded to article 293 except that the first two paragraphs of the draft read 'The Governments exercising authority in territory detached from the Ottoman Empire in accordance with the present treaty may liquidate the property, rights and interests of Ottoman companies or companies controlled by Ottoman nationals in such

MR. PAYNE said that the British delegation wished to make one small alteration in article 1, in such a way as to maintain the post offices established by the Allied Powers in Turkey. He had circulated a note on the subject (Appendix 2).

territory. In all such cases the proceeds of the liquidation shall be paid direct to the company.

'The present article shall not apply to companies in which Allied or Associated nationals, including those of the mandatory State had, on the 1st August, 1914, a preponderant interest.'

Draft articles 36, 37, 37A, 37B, and 38 corresponded to articles 294-8 respectively.

Draft article 38A corresponded to article 299 except that the date cited in the draft was the 3rd November, 1918.

Draft articles 39 and 40 corresponded to articles 300 and 301 respectively.

Draft article 41 corresponded to article 302 except that the first paragraph of the draft read: 'Debts, other than the Public Debt of the Ottoman Government which is specially provided for in article 5 [6] and Annex I of the financial clauses of this treaty, between the Turkish Government or its nationals resident in its territory at the date of coming into force of the present treaty (with the exception of Ottoman companies controlled by Allied and Associated groups), on the one hand, and the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers or their nationals who were not on the 1st August, 1914, Ottoman nationals or resident or carrying on business in Turkish territory, on the other hand, which were payable before the war, or became payable during the war and arose out of transactions or contracts of which the total or partial execution was suspended on account of the war shall be credited in the currency of such one of the Allied and Associated Powers, their colonies or protectorates, or the British Dominions or India, as may be concerned. If the debts are payable in some other currency they shall be paid or credited in the currency of the country concerned, whether an Allied or Associated Power, colony, protectorate, British Dominion, or India, at the pre-war rate of exchange.'

Draft articles 42 and 43 corresponded to articles 303 and 304 respectively.

Draft article 44 corresponded to article 305 except that (a) the date in the first paragraph of the draft was the 1st August 1914; (b) the second paragraph of the draft read '... the present article nor article 45 nor the annex hereto ...'.

Draft article 45 corresponded to article 306.

Draft article 46 corresponded to article 307 except that the first paragraph of the draft did not contain the words 'or measures of execution ordered' and the corresponding phrases which are present in the final text.

Draft article 47 corresponded to article 308 except that the draft did not include the phrases here italicized in the following quotation from article 308; (a) '*... between persons who were or have become nationals ...*'; (b) '*... States whose territory is detached from Turkey and Turkish nationals ...*'.

Draft article 48 corresponded to article 309 subject to the omission of italicized phrase (b) above.

The draft annex to Section V corresponded to the annex in the final text except that (a) the draft contained, before the heading 'I. General Provisions', the following introductory paragraphs: 'The provisions of paragraphs 6 to 21 of this annex shall be applied only as regards insurance and reinsurance contracts between Turkish nationals on the one hand, and on the other hand nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers or newly-created States, in the case of which trading with Turkey shall have been unlawful by law or regulation.'

'The provisions in question shall similarly not be applicable to contracts between Turkish nationals on the one hand, and on the other hand companies and individuals established in territories transferred to Allied and Associated Powers or newly-created States as a result of the war.'

'The contracts of insurance and reinsurance excepted from the special provisions of paragraphs 6 to 21 shall be subject to the provisions of article 43.'; (b) clause 6 in the draft

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said he thought it was important to limit the right of reviving post offices to the Powers which had post offices in Turkey before the 1st August, 1914. If the field were left open for other Allied Powers to set up post offices, great difficulties would ensue.

M. CAMBON observed that Turkey had always resisted these post offices, and had at various times attempted to have them closed.

LORD CURZON said that he was informed that the right to establish post offices in Turkey by other Powers arose from most-favoured-nation rights.

read as follows 'Contracts of insurance entered into by any person with another person who subsequently became an enemy will be dealt with in accordance with the following paragraphs:—'.

Draft article 49 corresponded to article 310 except that the date in the first and second paragraphs was the 5th November, 1914.

Draft article 50 read: 'In territories detached from Turkey to be placed under the authority or tutelage of one of the principal Allied and Associated Powers, Allied or Associated nationals and companies controlled by Allied or Associated groups holding concessions granted before the 5th November, 1914, by the Turkish Government or by any Turkish local authority shall continue in complete enjoyment of the rights acquired, and the Power concerned shall maintain the guarantees granted or shall assign equivalent guarantees.

'Nevertheless, these Governments, if they consider that the maintenance of any of these concessions would be contrary to the public interest, shall have power, within a period of six months from the date of ratification of the present treaty, to buy them out or to propose modifications therein, and in this event shall be bound to pay to the concessionnaire, in accordance with the following provisions, equitable compensation.

'For the purpose of determining the amount of such compensation and in the absence of agreement between the parties, there shall be set up Arbitral Tribunals. The tribunals shall be composed of three members, one designated by the State of which the concessionnaire or the holders of the majority of the capital in the case of a company is or are nationals, one by the Government exercising authority in the territory in question, and the third designated by agreement or by the Council of the League of Nations.

'The tribunal shall take into account, from both the legal and equitable standpoints, all relevant matters, on the basis of the maintenance of the contract adapted as indicated in the following paragraph.

'On his part, the holder of a concession which is maintained in force shall have the right, within a period of six months after the expiration of the period specified in the second paragraph of this article, to demand the adaptation of his contract, and in the absence of agreement direct with the Government concerned the decision shall be referred to the Arbitral Commission provided for above.'

Draft article 50A corresponded to article 312 except that in the draft (a) the first paragraph began 'In all other territory detached from Turkey, either under the Treaty of Bucharest of the 10th August, 1913, or under the present treaty, the new Governments shall, *ipso facto* . . .'; (b) the third paragraph began 'Nevertheless, as from the signature of the present treaty . . .'

Draft article 50B read: 'For the application of articles 50 and 50A no compensation shall be granted in respect of the issue of paper money.'

Draft article 50C corresponded to article 314 except that the date cited was the 5th November, 1914.

Draft articles 51 and 52 corresponded to articles 315 and 316 respectively.

Draft article 53, which was preceded by the heading 'Section VII—General Provisions' corresponded to article 104 except that the draft began: 'For the purposes of this part, Egypt and Egyptian nationals . . .'

Draft article 54 corresponded to article 317 except that draft sub-paragraph 1 read: 'All persons and legal entities possessing the nationality of one of the Allied or Associated Powers'.



THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that he thought the right was based on no document whatever. It was a right asserted against continual opposition from the Porte, which on one occasion had forcibly closed the British post office. This had led to a diplomatic incident of some gravity. Moreover, he thought it was undesirable to remove from the Turkish Government all means of raising revenue by postal services.

M. KAMMERER said that he thought it was desirable to revive the post offices. The right might be limited in the article itself to the Powers which had established them before the war.

LORD CURZON thought it was perhaps inadvisable to insert a question of this kind in the very first article, which dealt with matters of great importance. He thought a separate article would be more appropriate.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that if the revival of post offices was regarded as part of the restoration of the Capitulations, all the signatories to the treaty should be beneficiaries.

MR. VANSITTART observed that the right of maintaining post offices had always been much contested, and was not really the result of the Capitulations.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that though Japan had had no post offices in Turkey before, if she was now to enjoy most-favoured-nation treatment, the denial of the right to establish post offices would appear to be somewhat of a paradox. He suggested that the expression 'Principal Allied Powers' might be used. Something similar had been done in the Treaty with Bulgaria in connection, not with post offices in particular, but with the Capitulations.

LORD CURZON said that he understood that post offices had no connection with Capitulations; that the privilege had been enjoyed by certain Powers in spite of considerable difficulties, involving, at times, forcible pressure. He thought that, if new post offices were created, the trouble would be enhanced.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that, in view of the comments made by his colleagues, he withdrew his proposal.

It was decided—

To ask the Drafting Committee to insert an article providing for the re-establishment of post offices by such Allied Powers as had post offices in Turkey before the 1st August, 1914.

MR. PAYNE said that nearly all the articles had been before the conference, with the exception of a very few concerning which reservations had been made. Of these, all but articles 35 and 36 had been settled. These two were still subject to reservations by the Italian and French delegations. He did not know whether these reservations could now be withdrawn.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that the Italian delegation felt bound to maintain its reservation regarding article 36.

M. KAMMERER said the French delegation was of like mind.

LORD CURZON asked when these articles could be considered by the conference.

M. KAMMERER said he hoped to get the answer of the French Government at the same time as the answer regarding the financial clauses.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that the question had a political character; he could not settle it without consultation of Signor Nitti. He thought it would probably have to be reserved, therefore, for the meeting at San Remo. The article had a wide bearing on the whole question of railways.

LORD CURZON said that it was very unfortunate that this matter should be postponed for the meeting at San Remo. There would not be much time at San Remo, and all the experts would not be present. He understood the meeting there would discuss the general bases of the treaty, and not its details. Moreover, he thought this conference ought to be able to settle a question of this kind without reference to the Supreme Council. He asked whether Signor Scialoja could not obtain a reply by the following Thursday.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that the question was, perhaps, the most important to Italy of all the questions involved in this chapter. He would telegraph to Italy, but could not promise that he would be able to reply on Thursday.

It was agreed—

That the question of article 36 should be postponed.

M. KAMMERER said that he had a very small point to raise regarding article 3. The third paragraph of this article, as at present drafted, named a period of three months. The French Government thought this period was too short, and would be glad to see it altered to six months.

MR. PAYNE said he saw no objection, and presumed that this would carry a similar alteration in article 4.

M. KAMMERER agreed.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said he had no objection.

It was therefore agreed—

To substitute 'six months' for 'three months' in articles 3 and 4.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he had a small observation to make regarding article 4. The second paragraph authorised the Financial Commission to prohibit imports and exports. In the third paragraph of the report (A.J. 127) the chairman of the commission expressed the opinion that it was desirable to abstain from imposing prohibitions on the export of raw material. He was entirely himself of that opinion, and thought that it might be desirable to limit the article in that sense.

MR. PAYNE said that the commission recognised that it might be necessary to exercise such a right, though it was undesirable to do so. He thought it was difficult to state in the article itself any limitation of the Financial Commission's power to take action.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA pointed out that the chairman's report might be lost sight of, and that the Financial Commission might not feel restrained by his excellent advice.

LORD CURZON said that he did not think it was very easy to insert a restriction in the treaty. There would, however, be an Italian representative on the Financial Commission, receiving instructions from his Government.

His Government would doubtless instruct him to resist any prohibition on the export of raw material from Turkey, and he would, if necessary, draw attention to the report. He thought this was a sufficient guarantee against any undue exercise of the right.

M. KAMMERER said that the French delegation sympathised with the views of Signor Scialoja, but had not thought it possible to insert any restrictive clause in the treaty.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said he thought a sentence might be attached to the article to the effect that prohibitions regarding the export of raw material from Turkey should be of a temporary and exceptional character. This would embody in the treaty itself the opinion expressed in the report.

LORD CURZON said that he had much sympathy with Signor Scialoja in this matter; but, as the Financial Commission to be set up in Turkey would be faced with great difficulties, he thought it was hardly fair to them to tie their hands. He thought the use of this power should be left to their discretion.

M. KAMMERER said that he thought Signor Scialoja might forgo this insertion. The Financial Commission would know that Europe needed raw materials; it would only resort to prohibition in very exceptional circumstances. In any case, all its members would be in close touch with their Governments.

SIGNOR NOGARA pointed out that in all the other treaties the Powers had abstained from inserting any provision regarding prohibition. The Italian Government was not objecting to the levy of dues on exports or imports, but merely wished to safeguard the free flow of raw materials.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he would not insist on his proposal, but he would like it recorded in the minutes that the conference endorsed the recommendation made in the report (section 3) regarding the desirability of abstaining from prohibitions on the export of raw materials produced in Turkey.

LORD CURZON said he had no objection to this, and agreed that it should be recorded that in the discussion the members of the conference had taken note of section 3 of the report, and had agreed with the recommendation made therein regarding prohibitions.

MR. PAYNE said that he had nothing to add regarding the remaining articles, except that some of them referred to in the report required reference to other commissions.

M. KAMMERER said that article 8, for instance, could now be suppressed, as the subject was covered by a chapter framed by the Commission on Nationalities.

MR. PAYNE observed that this probably applied also to article 29.

It was agreed—

That the Drafting Committee should be asked to examine whether articles 8 and 29 were now redundant.

Mr. Payne said that the attention of the Drafting Committee should also be drawn to articles 23, 24 and 25.

With the comments recorded above, the whole of the articles (A.J. 97), together with the report (A.J. 127), were referred, with the general approval of the conference, to the Drafting Committee.

M. CAMBON observed that the approval of the French delegation must be understood to be *ad referendum*.

(*The conference adjourned at 5.15 p.m.*)

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 29, 1920.

## APPENDIX I TO No. 74

### *Report of the Economic Commission*

(A.J. 127.)

The Economic Commission entrusted with the duty of preparing draft economic clauses for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey have already submitted the result of their deliberations in the form of draft clauses, which were approved by the Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, on the 18th March,<sup>7</sup> so far as they had been agreed in the commission. The commission have now reached agreement upon the clauses which remained for discussion, and upon certain additional clauses; and beg to submit the complete text of the economic part of the treaty as unanimously adopted by them. The clauses which have not already been approved by the conference are those numbered 28, 35, 36, 41, 49, 50, 50A, 50B, 50C, and 52 in the present text. Articles 35 and 36 are still subject to consideration by the French and Italian delegations.

In addition, a small modification has been agreed upon in paragraph 2 of the annex following article 48 (relating to contracts), and the final sentence of paragraph 11 [?9] of that annex has been deleted. Article 34 of the former text has been deleted, since it is understood to be covered by an article in the financial clauses. The second paragraph of article 32 has been modified at the instance of the Financial Commission.

The commission desire to draw the attention of the Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers to various matters raised in connection with the discussion of the economic clauses, the settlement of which goes beyond the competence of the Economic Commission.

1. They have not included in the clauses prepared by them any provision relating to the future judicial regime in Turkey, since it is understood that this matter is being considered by the legal experts. The commission venture, however, to emphasise the view that in the interests of commerce it is desirable that some article should be inserted for securing judicial sanction for the immediate extension to all the Allied and Associated Powers, signatories to the treaty, of the benefit of the capitulatory regime.

They also suggest that in some appropriate part of the treaty there should be a stipulation validating any decisions given by Consular Courts in Turkey during the war, and covering also the proceedings of any inter-Allied tribunal temporarily established to deal with mixed cases.

2. The commission have included in the clauses put forward by them an article (article 2) relative to renunciation by Turkey of rights of suzerainty over Mussul-

<sup>7</sup> See No. 63, minute 5.

mans not Turkish subjects; but they recognise that the importance of this clause extends beyond the economic sphere, and that it may be thought preferable to transfer it to another part of the treaty.

3. In respect of article 4, the commission desire to place on record their opinion that the Financial Commission to be established should, as far as possible, abstain from imposing export prohibitions or export duties on raw materials produced in Turkey.

4. The commission venture to suggest that, in view of the special circumstances existing in the case of Turkey, article 8 relating to the acquisition of new nationality should be submitted to the Committee on the Protection of Minorities in order that that committee may consider whether any addition to the article is required from their point of view. Article 29 should also be referred to the Committee on Minorities.

5. In articles 23, 24 and 25 (in the section dealing with industrial property) there are included, as in the corresponding articles in other treaties, special references to the United States. In the event of the United States not being a signatory of the treaty with Turkey, these references should presumably be deleted.

6. The commission are of opinion that, in the event of any territory being detached from the Turkish Empire in the district of Smyrna, an exception on the lines of article 267 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria should be made to the provisions of article 35 regarding the liquidation of property of Turkish companies. Such an exception should, no doubt, appear in the special clauses relating to this district.

7. An exception from article 43 (in the section dealing with contracts, prescriptions and judgments) is made as regards Japan, similar to the exception made in paragraph (c) of article 299 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. This exception will require to be extended to cover the United States of America and Brazil in the event of either or both of these Powers being signatory to the treaty with Turkey.

H. A. PAYNE,

*Chairman, Economic Commission.*

*March 26, 1920.*

## APPENDIX 2 TO NO. 74

### *Note by the British Delegation on the Revival of Post Offices in Turkey*

It appears desirable, in the interests of the efficient and expeditious handling of postal traffic between the Allied countries and Turkey, that the right enjoyed before the war, as part of the capitulatory regime, to maintain post offices in Turkey, should be re-established under the Treaty of Peace. This right was based upon the Treaty of Commerce between Turkey and Russia of 1783, and that between Turkey and Austria of 1784,<sup>8</sup> and was enjoyed by other Powers entitled to the capitulatory régime in virtue of their right to most-favoured-nation treatment. On the suppression of the capitulatory regime by unilateral act of the Porte in September 1914, all foreign post offices in Turkey were closed by the Turkish Government.

<sup>8</sup> The texts of these treaties of 1783 and 1784 are printed respectively in Hertslet's *Treaties, &c. between Turkey and Foreign Powers 1535-1855*, pp. 486-508 and 115-21.

In these circumstances, it may be desirable that specific reference should be made to the right to maintain post offices in article 1 of the economic clauses, and it is suggested that the opening words of this article should be modified to read as follows:—

‘The capitulatory regime resulting from treaties, conventions and usages, including the right to establish and maintain post offices, shall be re-established.’

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 29, 1920.

## No. 75

I.C.P. 89.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors, held in Lord Curzon's Room at the British Foreign Office, Whitehall, London, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, March 30, 1920, at 4.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart; SECRETARIES, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Captain Abraham.

*France*: M. Cambon, M. Kammerer.

*Italy*: Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Galli, Don Ascanio Colonna.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

1. LORD CURZON said that it was becoming increasingly difficult to determine exactly what were the functions of the Ambassadorial Conference in Paris as distinguished from those of the Conference of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors in London.

*The Relations of Poland and Lithuania*  
No doubt this difficulty would not cause much trouble in future, as the London Conference was about to adjourn. However, a case had just arisen to which he wished to draw attention. A serious situation had arisen as between Poland and Lithuania. The Polish Government had persisted—foolishly, he thought—in maintaining an aggressive attitude towards Lithuania. The situation had become so threatening that he had thought it necessary for the Allies to take notice of it. He had therefore telegraphed to Lord Derby suggesting that he should bring the matter before the Ambassadors' Conference. Lord Derby had replied that, in his opinion, the matter was not within the competence of that body. Lord Curzon said that he did not feel sure that the present conference was the right body to deal with the matter. He was inclined to think that the proper body to deal with such a question was the body which would be able to see the matter through; in other words, the Paris Conference, in this particular instance. The Governments, of course, could deal with the matter by correspondence, through Ambassadors, between the various capitals, but this would involve delay, which was to be deprecated in the circumstances. If his colleagues agreed with him, he would reply that, whether or not the Ambassadorial Conference in Paris was technically competent in the matter, it was highly desirable that it should take it up.

M. CAMBON said that he was of the same opinion. The Ambassadorial Conference in Paris had been set up, so he understood, to deal with everything connected with the execution of the treaty. This quarrel might be said to come under that heading.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that though it was undoubtedly the main business of the Ambassadorial Conference in Paris to deal with the execution of the treaty, nevertheless it took the place of the Supreme Council when no other inter-Allied council existed. It was in the discretion of the members of the Ambassadors' Conference to take decisions, or to refer to their Governments, but that was an internal question. In fact, it would be remembered that the present conference had had reason to complain that the Ambassadors' Conference in Paris trespassed on its ground; for instance, this conference had decided that the present was not the time to present any demands to Germany; the Ambassadors in Paris discussed the same question about the same time, and the result had been that Marshal Foch, through General Nollet, had presented a demand for reparation, in Berlin, on the subject of the insults to Allied officers.

M. CAMBON said that he had no news of this.

LORD CURZON said that he thought Signor Scialoja must be misinformed, as General Nollet could not possibly present demands on behalf of all the Allies, as such a demand was bound to be, without the knowledge of the Governments concerned. On the main question, he understood his colleagues agreed with him, and he would act accordingly and ask the conference in Paris to deal with the matter of the quarrel between Poland and Lithuania.

It was agreed—

That the chairman should inform the British Ambassador in Paris that, in the view of the London Conference, the Polish-Lithuanian quarrel was a question which should be dealt with in Paris.

2. The conference had before them a memorandum by the British delegation on the subject of the Turkish mercantile shipping (A.J. 98) (Appendix 1).

*Turkish  
Mercantile  
Shipping*

LORD CURZON asked whether this memorandum represented purely the British proposal or the findings of a commission.

MR. VANSITTART said that it represented the British proposal, but the facts alleged had been carefully ascertained.

M. CAMBON said that he had communicated the document to the French naval attaché, who had wired for instructions from Paris. He thought an answer would be available on the following day.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that the merchant shipping belonging to Turkey was small in quantity, and about the same as that possessed by Bulgaria. It had been decided to leave Bulgaria her shipping. He thought the same might be done for Turkey, seeing that she had bigger maritime interests than Bulgaria.

MR. VANSITTART said that only ten ships were taken out of a total of 160.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that these ten represented the passenger carrying vessels of the Turks. He thought these ten vessels were hardly worth dividing among the Allies. Italy had lost many ships in the Mediterranean, but was willing to forgo any share in these.

It was agreed—

To postpone this question until the following day, when M. Cambon would be able to give the views of the French Ministry of Marine.

3. LORD CURZON said that he had placed on the agenda a telegram giving President Wilson's views about the treaty with Turkey (A.J. 136) (Appendix 2).<sup>1</sup> He did not think it was the business of the council to prepare an answer to this. Presumably the matter would be dealt with by the Supreme Council, but he thought it might be of use for the members of the conference to see what the President's views were, and to collect facts and figures in anticipation of questions by the Supreme Council. Unless any of his colleagues had other comments to make, he would ask Mr. Vansittart to give statistics regarding the population of Northern Thrace and Adrianople. He would remark, however, that the first sentence in the despatch raised a doubt as to what document the President was answering; was it one presented to him by M. Jusserand in America, or one forwarded from London through the American Ambassador?

MR. VANSITTART said that there were some sentences in the document which were not understood; notably in the first and second paragraphs, which did not appear to answer anything in the document sent from London.

M. CAMBON said that M. Jusserand had been instructed to explain the views of the Allied Governments to the President. He had accordingly ask[ed] to see the President, but had been told that it was impossible to see him. He had then suggested that Mr. Polk should tell the President what the views of the Allied Governments were, but it appeared that Mr. Polk was unable to approach the President. Consequently, M. Jusserand may well have put some notes on paper.

LORD CURZON said he thought it would be desirable to have the document to which the President was giving a reply. He would ask M. Cambon whether he would obtain from the French Government any document which M. Jusserand may have transmitted.

M. CAMBON undertook to obtain this document, if it existed.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that he did not understand why President

<sup>1</sup> Not here printed. This telegram was headed in the appendix, 'Paraphrase of Dispatch from the British Representative at Washington, dated March 26, 1920, to the Foreign Office, London', and began as follows: 'The Secretary of State's note is as follows: . . .'. There followed a text of the note of March 24 addressed by Mr. Colby to M. Jusserand in reply to the latter's note of March 12 (see No. 60, note 8): this text is printed with minor variation by David Lloyd George, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 1296-1300. The American text of this note is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1920*, vol. iii, pp. 750-3.



Wilson, who refused to be represented at the conference, should attempt to take any part in the framing of the treaty.

M. CAMBON asked why President Wilson showed such a particular interest in Adrianople.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that President Wilson had always thought Eastern Thrace should be Bulgarian.

MR. VANSITTART said that the statement contained in the third paragraph of the document, to the effect that the northern part of Eastern Thrace was clearly Bulgarian in population, and that the cities of Kirk Kiliseh and Adrianople should in justice form part of Bulgaria, was based on mistaken data. There were various statistics regarding this part of the country, but all showed that both Greeks and Moslems greatly outnumbered the Bulgarians. The Turkish figures for the Caza of Adrianople were:—

53,000 Moslems.

36,000 Greeks.

15,000 Miscellaneous (including Bulgarians).

The figures of British experts were practically the same, only increasing the disproportion slightly against the Bulgarians. There was one point, however, on the frontier itself, where there was a Bulgarian majority. A rectification of frontier could therefore be recommended, and such rectification had been considered in Paris a year ago.

LORD CURZON observed that the figures given not only militated against the Bulgarians, but for the Turks against the Greeks.

MR. VANSITTART said the answer to this contention was that if the area to the south was to be Greek, it was strategically undesirable to leave the Turks on the Greek flank. If Greece was to go up to the Chatalja lines, she must have Adrianople. He quoted the following passage from a letter he had written to supply Mr. Lloyd George with data for his meeting with the Khaliphate delegation<sup>2</sup>:—

‘The figures for Thrace are, on M. Veniselos’s figures for 1912:—

‘Eastern Thrace (including half of the Sanjak of Chatalja)—

‘Greeks . . . . . 313,000

‘Turks . . . . . 225,000

‘Portion of Western Thrace ceded by Bulgaria:—

‘Greeks . . . . . 48,000

‘Turks . . . . . 118,000

‘Total—

‘Greeks . . . . . 361,000

‘Turks . . . . . 343,000

<sup>2</sup> The letter in question is untraced in Foreign Office archives. Mr. Lloyd George had been present at the hearing of the Turkish Peace Delegation by the Supreme Council in Paris on June 17, 1919 (cf. Volume IV, Chap. III, Introductory Note).

'These figures are taken straight from M. Veniselos, but differ slightly from his total (1) because he excluded Xanthi as practically already assigned to Greece, (2) because he included Ortakeui, which remains Bulgarian, (3) because he included the whole Sanjak of Chatalja, and at best it is only possible to give him half, *i.e.*, up to the Chatalja lines. I must in honesty draw your attention to the fact that these figures are partisan and they do not probably represent the entire truth. Our Geographical Section calculates for Western and Eastern Thrace up to the Chatalja lines—

'Turks	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	365,000
'Greeks	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	292,000

'These, however, are 1914 figures. Those of M. Veniselos are 1912; between these two dates come the Balkan wars, when many Greeks were expelled, and this is to some extent borne out by the figures of our Geographical Section, which makes the Turkish totals almost identical with those of M. Veniselos, while making the Greek totals considerably less.'

The inference was that there might have been a Greek majority in the whole area before 1912, as during the Balkan wars a vast number of Greeks had been expelled.

LORD CURZON said he thought these figures could be placed before the Supreme Council when it dealt with the President's reply.

4. M. CAMBON said that he had had a reply from M. Millerand regarding *Castellorizo*. M. Millerand thought it would be preferable for Italy to administer the island without asserting sovereignty over it.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that, as Signor Nitti believed the question to be settled, and settled in the manner which he regarded as a personal favour to himself, he would be very disappointed at any change. Italy was handing eleven islands to Greece, and thought that, in view of this, the retention of this tiny island was a mere trifle. She had sentimental reasons for wishing to possess it.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he would beg M. Cambon to ask M. Millerand to concede this point.

M. CAMBON said that M. Millerand also raised the question of the demilitarisation of the island.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he was not in a position to make a statement, but he believed the island was such that it could not be 'militarised.'

M. CAMBON undertook to refer the matter again to M. Millerand.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, March 30, 1920.*

APPENDIX I TO No. 75

*Turkish Mercantile Shipping*

*Memorandum by the British Delegation for Submission to the Council of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors*

(A.J. 98.)

The British Delegation desire to raise the question of the insertion of draft articles in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey providing for the disposal of the Turkish mercantile shipping. They wish to point out that conditions regarding the surrender of the German and Austrian mercantile shipping were inserted in the German and Austrian treaties and they presume that it is not the intention of the council to leave Turkey in this matter in a much more favourable position than [than] Germany or Austria.

The precise details of the constitution of the Turkish mercantile marine are believed to be approximately as follows:—

	<i>Total Tonnage</i>
10 steamers of 1,600 gross tons and over . . . . .	39,781
5 steamers between 1,000 and 1,599 gross tons . . . . .	6,770 [6,779]
81 steamers of under 1,000 gross tons . . . . .	27,320
Total . . . . .	73,880

And forty-four sailing vessels aggregating 12,806 net tons.

The British delegation propose that an article should be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey providing for the surrender in a sea-worthy condition and at such Allied port as may be determined upon by the Allied Governments, by the Turkish Government (a) of the ten steamers of 1,600 tons gross and over for disposal by the Allied Powers, and (b) of all German vessels transferred to the Turkish flag since the 1st August, 1914, for disposal by the Reparation Commission set up under the German treaty. They propose that the remaining Turkish vessels including sailing vessels given in the above list should be left to Turkey.

*March 11.*

I.C.P. 90.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors, held in Lord Curzon's Room at the British Foreign Office, Whitehall, London, on Wednesday, March 31, 1920, at 12 noon*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Hurst, Mr. Vansittart; **SECRETARY:** Lieutenant-Colonel Storr.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer.

*Italy:* Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Galli, Don Ascanio Colonna.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda.

**INTERPRETER:** M. Camerlynck.

1. M. CAMBON reminded the conference that the chairman had telegraphed to Lord Derby asking him to approach Marshal Foch and request him to submit as soon as possible the various reports of his commission.<sup>1</sup> The French military attaché in London had received that morning a telegram from Marshal Foch stating that the documents in question were being despatched by special courier on the 31st March, and that they ought to reach London that night.

LORD CURZON said that the special report of Marshal Foch's Commission on the military measure[s] it might be necessary to take in order to enforce the terms of peace with Turkey would be a very serious document which must be discussed by the heads of the Allied Powers at the Supreme Council and could not be taken by the conference. In any case there would not be time to reproduce copies and circulate them before the following day. This, however, raised a question which he had had the opportunity of discussing with the Marquis Imperiali that morning, and that was the date of the next plenary session.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI asked that the consideration of this question might be reserved until the arrival of Signor Scialoja. (See Minute 5.)

2. LORD CURZON said that the conference had on two occasions lately discussed the situation that had arisen in the Ruhr Valley.<sup>2</sup> The conference would remember that the German Government has [*had*] asked permission to send troops in order to quell the disorders in that district. The matter had been most carefully considered, and the conference had generally agreed that the said permission might be granted, subject to certain provisos. This view had been communicated to Paris, but it had not found favour with M. Millerand, who thought that the guarantees suggested by the London Conference were inadequate, and had advocated as an alternative that permission to the Germans to enter the Ruhr Valley should only be granted on condition that Allied troops were allowed to

<sup>1</sup> See No. 74, minute 1.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 68, minute 1, and No. 70, minute 2.

occupy Frankfort and Darmstadt. The conference had thought that this alternative confused the two points at issue. The occupation of German towns contemplated by M. Millerand had really no concern with the question of the Ruhr Valley, and the appearance of Allied troops in those regions would not tend to restore order but rather accentuate the existing disorder. The point to which he wished to draw the attention of the conference was that statements had appeared in the last two or three days in the French newspapers regarding certain communications which it was said had passed between the French and German Governments, to the effect that the moment German troops entered the Ruhr Valley French troops would occupy Darmstadt and Frankfort; and, further, that if her Allies did not agree to this course, France would act on her own initiative. Lord Curzon said that it was inconceivable to him that such communications should have passed between the two Governments without any reference to France's Allies, or that France, in any circumstances, contemplated isolated action. He would not, however, have raised the question that morning merely on what had appeared in the newspapers, but before the meeting he had received a telegram from Lord Derby drawing attention to the newspaper reports, and saying that what was stated in the papers appeared to be a matter of common knowledge; that it was asserted that M. Millerand, on the 28th March, had seen the German Chargé d'Affaires and had handed to him a note stating that the Germans were now at liberty to send troops to the Ruhr Valley if the Allies could simultaneously occupy Darmstadt, Frankfort, and possibly certain other German towns. According to the 'Petit Parisien,' M. Millerand himself had told their reporter that as France had special rights, as indicated in the Treaty of Peace with Germany, the French Government had declared its intention to act alone and independently of their Allies, if necessary, to defend those rights. If this were true, a very serious situation arose. For France to act in isolation was a very strong step to take. M. Millerand had apparently said nothing to Lord Derby, and the British Government had at present received no official confirmation of what had appeared in the papers. Lord Curzon said that after receiving Lord Derby's telegram he thought he ought to take the earliest opportunity of asking M. Cambon if he had any authoritative information to communicate to the conference.

M. CAMBON said that he could answer the questions which Lord Curzon had put to him. There was, no doubt, a good deal of gossip flying around in the newspapers. As a matter of fact, he had received a personal telegram from M. Millerand stating that the German Chargé d'Affaires had come to see him without any invitation on M. Millerand's part, and had spoken about increasing the German forces in Westphalia. The Chargé d'Affaires said that the German Government were quite prepared to give suitable guarantees to France if the latter country, on her part, would permit the German troops in the Ruhr Valley to be augmented. To this request M. Millerand had made no reply. The German Chargé d'Affaires then stated that he hoped the French Government would not oppose this augmentation, as it was essential that the German Government should increase their

forces in the Ruhr district in order to put down the present disorders. If this permission were given, the German Government promised that the additional troops would be withdrawn in the course of the next two or three weeks. Supposing, at the end of that short period, the Germans had not been able to withdraw their forces, they would spontaneously suggest to the French that they should occupy Frankfort and Darmstadt. Again M. Millerand had made no response to this suggestion. It was, therefore, simply an offer on the part of the German Chargé d'Affaires, making a request and suggesting certain guarantees. This information, said M. Cambon, had been communicated to him by M. Millerand as a personal message. Should M. Millerand receive any official proposal from the German Government, he would, of course, at once communicate it to the Government of Great Britain, and if ever the day should arrive when M. Millerand should receive officially such an offer as had been suggested by the German Chargé d'Affaires, he would certainly never accept it without consulting his Allies.

LORD CURZON said that he was greatly indebted to M. Cambon for the information he had given, and especially for his last sentence, in which he had said that M. Millerand would not—as Lord Curzon had always felt sure—commit the French to isolated action without consulting their Allies. From what M. Cambon had said, he gathered, in the first place, that the newspapers were absolutely wrong in their facts, and that the suggestion that Frankfort and Darmstadt should be occupied by Allied or French troops had been made by the Germans themselves. Of course he accepted M. Cambon's explanation unreservedly. At the same time, it caused him very considerable surprise, as the French Government had actually made the suggestion to the Supreme Council in London, and the council had been unable to accept it. However, what he wished to suggest was that the French Government, who exercised great influence over the newspapers of that country, should put an end to this pernicious dissemination of false information. In London the work of the conference had suffered from the premature leakage of information which was correct; in this case they were suffering from the percolation of information which was stated to be incorrect. On several successive days the members of the conference had seen in the French newspapers incorrect statements which could only have an embarrassing and unfortunate effect upon their deliberations, and for this reason he hoped that the French Government would see their way to issuing a *démenti*, and stating the correct position. In conclusion, he would say that he would be very pleased to receive any official communication the French Government might wish to make on the subject.

M. CAMBON said that it was very difficult to make any official communications in respect of what appeared in the press. Lord Derby himself had spoken of rumours, and had not particularised any facts. He suggested that Lord Derby might himself enquire as to what foundation there was for the said rumours.

LORD CURZON stated that he proposed to send the British Ambassador in Paris instructions to see M. Millerand personally about the matter.

3. LORD CURZON said that at their meeting on the previous day they had discussed a paper by the British delegation (A.J. 98, Revise)<sup>3</sup> regarding the proposed surrender of Turkish mercantile marine. It had been generally agreed to accept the British proposals, subject to the result of a reference which M. Cambon said he had made to his Government on the subject. M. Cambon had stated at the meeting that he hoped to be able to say that day what were the views of the French Government.

M. CAMBON said that he regretted that he had not yet received any reply from the French Government. The reason for the delay was that more than one Department had to be consulted. He hoped, however, to be able to furnish the necessary information to the conference on the following morning.

4. The conference had under consideration a memorandum by the British delegation proposing articles to be inserted in the Turkish Treaty relative to Egypt, the Soudan and Cyprus (A.J. 111) (Appendix 1), and a note by the French delegation, dated the 26th March, 1920, on the same subject (A.J. 137) (Appendix 2).

LORD CURZON said that the memorandum by the British delegation had already been discussed at two meetings of the conference (I.C.P. 83,<sup>4</sup> Minute 4, and I.C.P. 86,<sup>5</sup> Minute 6), when M. Cambon had asked that he might refer the whole of the articles to the French Government, and, of course, the conference had agreed to this. They were now in possession of the reply of the French delegation, which raised in particular the question of articles 9 and 13, and referred to the formal interchange of communications between the French and British Governments in regard to Egypt and Morocco; and, further, stated the reasons for questioning the articles in their present form. He thought that the British Government had a good answer to make to the arguments of the French Government, but in the first place he would ask whether the French representatives desired to explain or to amplify their note.

M. CAMBON said that the objection raised in respect of article 9 really only involved the question of drafting.

LORD CURZON said he did not understand what was the objection of the French to this article. It merely referred to the Sultan's rights over the Suez Canal.

M. BERTHELOT said that, as had been explained in the French note, articles 9 and 13 as drafted by the British delegation placed the French in a very unfavourable position in regard to the proposed agreement between these two Governments concerning Morocco and Egypt. The transfer to Great Britain of the Turkish rights over the Suez Canal, and the power given to the Egyptian Government to modify and suppress the Commission of the Egyptian Public Debt could not be accepted by the French Government except in exchange for corresponding advantages in regard to Morocco, and

<sup>3</sup> See No. 75, appendix 1.

<sup>4</sup> No. 69.

<sup>5</sup> No. 72.

as had been stipulated in accordance with the agreements of 1904.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, the French Government, besides being unable to accept articles 9 and 13 as drafted, considered that they had no proper place in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, for they regulated the mutual relations of the principal Allied Powers in Egypt among themselves, and not the relations of those Powers with Turkey. Further, as Turkey was not represented in the Commission of the Egyptian Public Debt, article 13 had even less right to appear in the Turkish Treaty. Negotiations at that moment were proceeding between the French and British Governments on the subject of Egypt. The proposals that the French delegates wished to make were really designed to enable these negotiations to continue with absolute freedom and without embarrassment. For the rest, he could only say that he had definite instructions from his Government not to accept these articles in their present form. They had, however, an alternative to suggest to article 9, which had been drafted in terms analogous to those of article 152 of the Treaty of Versailles:—

‘So far as Turkey is concerned, she consents to transfer to his Britannic Majesty’s Government the powers conferred on His Imperial Majesty the Sultan by the convention signed at Constantinople on the 29th April [October], 1888, regarding the free navigation of the Suez Canal.’

LORD CURZON said that as it was partly a matter of legal interpretation of the words used, he would ask Mr. Hurst to give his views.

M. BERTHELOT said that the question was not one only of drafting, but also one of substance.

MR. HURST explained that under the Suez Canal Convention certain special powers of intervention for the protection of the Canal against external aggression were conferred upon Turkey as the suzerain Power. Now that Egypt’s connection with Turkey ceased, there was no longer any reason for her enjoying those powers, and the natural course was for them to be transferred to Great Britain. The subject must, he said, be dealt with in the Turkish Treaty, because these rights were given to the Porte as the territorial Power concerned. The wording of the proposed French amendment to article 9 was inappropriate, as the rights and duties to be transferred were enjoyed by Turkey herself, and it was, therefore, for her to transfer them, and not to ‘consent to their transfer’, as suggested in the French note.

LORD CURZON suggested that the point made by Mr. Hurst might be met by omitting in the French alternative the words ‘consent en ce qui concerne ou.’

M. BERTHELOT thought there was no objection, on the part of the French, to omitting the words ‘consent’ and ‘ou,’ but they must insist upon the retention of the words ‘en ce qui concerne.’ He reminded the conference that Turkey was not the only Power who had rights on the Suez Canal.

(At this point Signor Scialoja entered the Council Chamber.)

<sup>6</sup> Text printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. ci, pp. 1053–9.



MR. HURST contended that the words 'en ce qui concerne' could not be included, because they would imply that some other Power was concerned as well as Turkey, which was not the case.

LORD CURZON pointed out that Turkey could only transfer her own rights, and he did not understand what other Power it was thought could possibly be concerned. It was impossible to transfer other people's rights.

M. BERTHELOT said that if it was the intention to agree to the first draft, he must state at once that he was closely bound by his instructions from Paris. He must insist on the retention of 'en ce qui concerne.' He quite saw the point of the arguments advanced by the British delegates, but, bound as he was by his Government's instructions, he must refer the matter again to Paris, as he had no authority to accept any amendment.

LORD CURZON remarked that it was unfortunate that it was so constantly necessary to refer comparatively unimportant matters to Paris, as this involved great delay in the progress of the business of the conference. He had understood at the Supreme Council that only important questions were to be referred by the conference to the heads of the Allied Governments.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA agreed that the words 'en ce qui concerne' really added nothing to the meaning of the article.

M. BERTHELOT thought that there need not necessarily be much delay, for if the French Government agreed to the omission of the said words the subject need not come up again for discussion.

M. Berthelot repeated that article 13, as at present drafted, empowered the Egyptian Government to suppress the Commission of Public Debt, and, as he had already stated, the French Government must have corresponding advantages in Morocco if they were to accept this article.

M. CAMBON was of opinion that this question was rather out of place in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

LORD CURZON pointed out that the proposal was that Great Britain, in assuming a protectorate over Egypt, should also take over responsibility for the Egyptian debt. If Great Britain made herself responsible to the holders of Egyptian bonds, where was the need for this superfluous commission?

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that Turkey was not represented in the Commission of Public Debt. It was difficult, therefore, to understand why it was necessary to introduce a special article in order to suppress the commission. M. Berthelot said that the French were not asking for the retention of article 12. They had made no proposals that it should be retained, but as regards article 13 he was bound by his instructions, and it was impossible to accept it. To do otherwise would be to abandon the *contre-partie* which was the object of their negotiations with the British Government, and would materially weaken their position.

MR. VANSITTART pointed out that in Paris complete agreement had been arrived at in respect of these articles. At the eleventh hour, however, the French Government had sprung upon them a new question, of which he was at a loss to see the relevance.

M. BERTHELOT said that the question of the *contre-partie* had not been

raised by the French at the last hour, as suggested by Mr. Vansittart; it had been the subject of negotiation for a considerable period. It had always been understood that the questions of Morocco and Egypt were closely connected, and under the present proposals of the British Government the French were giving up much more in Egypt than Great Britain was prepared to surrender in Morocco.

MR. VANSITTART said the point was that the delay in one set of negotiations was being advanced as a reason for the delay in the other. At any rate, the British could not hold themselves responsible.

M. BERTHELOT said that he held exactly the contrary view, with all respect to his friend Mr. Vansittart.

LORD CURZON said that he understood M. Berthelot to say that he had no objection to article 12.

M. BERTHELOT said this was not quite the case. What he had said was that he had never been party to the insertion of this article.

LORD CURZON said that, in other words, M. Berthelot did not ask it to be inserted, but he had no objection to its insertion. The contention of the British delegates was that if article 12 stood and was accepted, there was no longer any need for the maintenance of the Caisse. To this argument M. Berthelot had made no reply, but he had shifted his ground and now maintained that it touched the negotiations which were now proceeding about Morocco. He himself had no idea to what M. Berthelot referred. Negotiations certainly had been in progress in respect of Morocco, and when M. Millerand had been in London he had offered to meet M. Millerand and the Spanish Ambassador to go into the question. Nothing, however, had come of his offer. Even if—which he did not admit—it did touch the Moroccan question, the time was now approaching when it was necessary to complete the peace with all possible speed. How, he asked, could the conference make progress when at every step the French might say that it was impossible to discuss this point until the Moroccan problem had been satisfactorily disposed of?

M. BERTHELOT explained that, in his view, it was not necessary to insert article 13 in order to suppress the debt. France was at present deeply concerned in this question of the debt, and if she abandoned her attitude in regard to this without coming to some general arrangement she would be surrendering an important element without corresponding advantages. The fact remained, however, that he had instructions of a most precise character, which were to insist upon the elimination of article 13, which the French Government could never consent to accept. It was possible to substitute for it an article of a general character, by which Turkey would accept in advance any agreement which might be reached by the Great Powers.

M. KAMMERER thought that this question might be eliminated without necessarily arresting the progress of the treaty. This course had been adopted in respect of other problems which had not yet been settled, such as Syria, Palestine, and so on.

MR. HURST explained that the Commission of the Debt in Egypt existed

solely for the protection of the bondholders. The assurance given by His Majesty's Government in article 12 rendered the maintenance of the Caisse unnecessary, as the bondholders no longer required such protection. In all the previous negotiations it was assumed that no considerations other than the financial interests of the bondholders were concerned, and it was the French Government who had intimated that they could not accept the abolition of the Caisse unless measures were taken by the British Government to ensure the payment of the coupon. The promise of these measures was contained in article 12, and, unless article 13 were accepted, there would be no consideration for the promise in article 12. Egyptian finance was intimately connected with the Turkish treaty because of the tribute loans and the provisions as to raising loans in the firmans.<sup>7</sup> As finance must be touched upon in the Egypt section of the treaty, it was better to deal with it as a whole.

LORD CURZON said that if the French objected to article 13, would they like the British to withdraw articles 12 and 14? Article 12 had been inserted by the British under pressure from the French. If the British gave way to French pressure in respect of article 13, would the French equally agree to articles 12 and 14 being excised?

M. KAMMERER thought that there had been a misunderstanding. The point of view of the French had been that they had no intention of refusing to discuss the substance of articles 12, 13 and 14; what they desired was to free Great Britain from her obligations *vis-à-vis* Turkey. Discussions on the subject of Egypt, however, he submitted, ought not to take place at that conference. They could not admit the insertion in the treaty of matters which were envisaged by other agreements which would result from the negotiations now in progress. They did not ask for the insertion of any article except of one by which Turkey would engage to recognise any agreement which had to be reached between France and Great Britain. He suggested that the several articles proposed by the British delegation might be compressed, and some article of a general nature substituted, to the following effect:—

‘Turkey undertakes to recognise in advance all agreements that may be reached on the question of Egypt, either between the Allies and Turkey or between Great Britain and France.’

LORD CURZON said that he thought no advantage would be gained by pursuing the question further. M. Berthelot would report the substance of the discussion to his Government, and he would ask him at the same time to state that, if the French persisted in their objection to article 13, the British Government might have seriously to consider the advisability of withdrawing the latter part of article 11 and the whole of articles 12, 13 and 14.

M. BERTHELOT said that, if certain articles were withdrawn, as suggested by Lord Curzon, then the French delegates would ask that the whole of the articles should be withdrawn and a general clause submitted on the lines of that suggested by M. Kammerer.

<sup>7</sup> Edicts issued under the authority of the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire.

It was agreed—

That M. Berthelot should be asked to telegraph at once to the French Government the arguments for and against the retention or modification of articles 9 and 13, stating the possibility that, if the French Government persisted in their objection to article 13, the British Government might have to suppress the latter part of article 11 and the whole of articles 12, 13 and 14, and that the discussion should be resumed as soon as M. Berthelot was in receipt of a reply from Paris.

5. With reference to Minute 1 above, LORD CURZON said that it had been proposed at a meeting of the conference held two days previously that the next plenary session of the Supreme Council should be held at San Remo on the 19th April; that the session should last three days; that the British and French experts should then return to Paris, and that the Turkish delegates should be summoned to the French capital about the 24th or 25th April in order to receive the completed treaty; that the Turkish representatives should then be given two to three weeks in order to consider their reply or any observations they might wish to make. He had seen Mr. Lloyd George that morning and had been informed that Mr. Lloyd George had received a telegram from Signor Nitti stating that the latter was afraid that it would be practically impossible for him to be at San Remo so late as the 18th April, as his presence was urgently required in the Italian Chamber. Both he and his colleagues (Lord Curzon said) were naturally most anxious to meet Signor Nitti's convenience so far as might be practicable. He had, however, himself felt that it would be practically impossible for the Supreme Council to assemble at so early a date as the 12th April, as suggested by Signor Nitti, and the difficulties he had envisaged had been accentuated by the discussion they had held that morning. The intention of the conference had been to hold their last meeting on the following day (Thursday); they were then to have a few days' respite during the Easter holidays, and Signor Scialoja was to return to his own capital. They were all agreed that the projected meeting at San Remo must be the last meeting of the Supreme Council before the treaty was handed to the Turks. Consequently, it was essential that the discussion of all questions connected with the treaty should be concluded in London before the council met in Italy. Supposing they adopted Signor Nitti's suggestion and met in Supreme Council at San Remo on the 12th April, the only subject which would really be ready for discussion would be Marshal Foch's report upon the measures for enforcing the treaty. There were many other very important questions which still remained unsettled and outstanding. The delay, he was afraid, was greatly due to the fact that the French delegates unfortunately found it necessary so frequently to refer to their Government in Paris. The questions he had in mind were—

Financial clauses (which raised big questions of principle and were to be discussed that afternoon, but it was conceivable that an agreement might not be reached).

Armenia (a subject with regard to which he was to see the Council of the League of Nations about the middle of the following week; but the Armenian question could hardly be settled at one meeting).

Palestine (in which the Italians also were concerned).

Syria and Cilicia (which concerned all the three principal Powers).

Kurdistan and Mesopotamia (which concerned mainly Great Britain and France).

All these matters ought to be settled and agreed upon before the Supreme Council released the treaty in its final form for presentation to the Turks. Any one of those questions the conference might find it necessary to refer to the Supreme Council. How, he asked, could they be ready for reference to the council in the course of the next twelve days? If a meeting of the Supreme Council was held at San Remo on the 12th, he knew perfectly well what would happen. Marshal Foch's report would be discussed, everything else would be indefinitely postponed, and the whole machinery of the treaty would be thrown out of order. He fully understood, of course, Signor Nitti's difficulties. He had attained a great ascendancy in his own Parliament, and it was impossible for him to be absent for any length of time. He submitted, however, that he could surely ask either that his Parliament should adjourn for three or four days, or that they should give their Prime Minister leave of absence for that period in order to meet the heads of the Allied Powers with a view to settling the Turkish peace. He thought that the Italian Deputies could hardly refuse this request. Supposing Signor Nitti agreed to adopt this suggestion, how could the conference meet and assist him? He would suggest that the conference should adjourn the following (Thursday) evening. He would himself be at the disposal of those of his colleagues who might remain in London to discuss, about the middle of the following week, any questions that still required to be settled. Most of these questions mainly concerned the British and the French. The fact was that the conference had really been overburdened with work, and all of them had consequently to neglect their proper duties. He wished to thank his colleagues most gratefully for the assistance they had given him. At the same time, there was a limit to human endurance, and he confessed that he did not see how the terms of the Turkish peace could possibly be completed satisfactorily by the 12th April.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he had received a telegram from Signor Nitti asking him to inform Mr. Lloyd George that it was impossible for him to be absent from his Parliament on the date suggested. He could not prorogue Parliament, and he must, therefore, insist on the Supreme Council meeting on or about the 12th of the following month.

(Signor Scialoja then explained the pressing and important nature of the duties of the Italian Prime Minister, necessitating his presence in Rome at this particular juncture.)

LORD CURZON hoped that Signor Scialoja would communicate to Signor Nitti the suggestion that his Parliament should grant him leave of absence for a few days.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he would telegraph that evening.

M. CAMBON said that M. Millerand was quite prepared to agree to the programme of meeting at San Remo on the 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st April, so long as he could be sure of being back in Paris on the 22nd of that month.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI enquired whether, by working extra hours, the conference could not complete its work in time for the Supreme Council to meet about the 12th April. He suggested this as a compromise in order to meet Signor Nitti's wishes and convenience, and he was sure that Signor Nitti would be immeasurably grateful if this could be done.

LORD CURZON said that to accede to Signor Nitti's wishes would mean the complete breakdown of them all, and he doubted whether Signor Nitti fully appreciated the enormous amount of work they had done. It was, however, not a question of personal convenience or personal fatigue; it was a question whether or not it was humanly possible for the treaty to be so far advanced as to be ready for the final touches of the Supreme Council on the 12th April. He was sure that M. Berthelot and M. Kammerer were equally convinced with himself that it could not be ready in time.

M. BERTHELOT suggested, as an alternative and a compromise, that, instead of meeting at San Remo, the Supreme Council should hold its next session in Rome, which would enable Signor Nitti to be on the spot, if necessary.

LORD CURZON reiterated his readiness to meet his colleagues in conference from Wednesday to Saturday inclusive in the following week, if they desired it.

It was agreed—

That Signor Scialoja should communicate with his Government as to the date of the proposed meeting in Italy, in the sense above described.

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 31, 1920.

#### APPENDIX I TO No. 76

*Memorandum by British Delegation, proposing Articles to be inserted in the Turkish Treaty relative to Egypt, Soudan and Cyprus*

*Chapter* <sup>8</sup>

(a) *Egypt*

(A.J. 111.)<sup>9</sup>

Certain corrections,  
&c., made by  
London Conference.  
Df. [*sic*] 23.3.20  
(I.C.P. 83).<sup>4</sup>

Turkey renounces all rights and title in or over Egypt. This renunciation shall take effect as from the 5th November, 1914. Turkey declares that in conformity with the action taken by the Allied Powers she recognises the Protectorate proclaimed over Egypt by Great Britain on the 18th December, 1914.

<sup>8</sup> Omission in original.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. No. 69, appendix 5.

Article A [*sic*] to be harmonised with article 49<sup>10</sup> of the economic clauses.

Attention of Drafting Committee to question whether this provision should not come in the nationality clauses. On the other hand, case of Egypt is a special one, and clauses regarding Egypt should be as complete as possible.

2. Ottoman subjects habitually resident in Egypt on the 18th December, 1914, will acquire Egyptian nationality *ipso facto* and will lose their Ottoman nationality, except that if at that date such persons were temporarily absent from, and have not since that date returned to, Egypt they will not acquire Egyptian nationality without a special authorisation from the Egyptian Government.

3. Ottoman subjects who became resident in Egypt after the 18th December, 1914, and are habitually resident there at the date of the coming into force of the present treaty may claim Egyptian nationality, but such claim may in individual cases be refused by the competent Egyptian authority.

4. For all purposes connected with the present treaty, Egyptian nationals will rank as Allied nationals, and Egypt will be regarded as Allied territory.

5. Within a period of one year after the coming into force of the present treaty persons over 18 years of age acquiring or entitled to claim Egyptian nationality under the provisions of articles 2 and 3 will be entitled to opt for Turkish nationality, or in case they differ in race from the majority of the population of Egypt they will within the same period be entitled to opt for the nationality of any State to which Turkish territory is transferred, if the majority of the population of that State is of the same race as the person exercising the right to opt.

Option by a husband covers a wife, and option by parents covers their children under 18 years of age.

Persons who have exercised the above right to opt must, except where authorised to continue to reside in Egypt, transfer their place of residence to the State for which they have opted. They will be entitled to retain their immovable property in Egypt and may carry with them their movable property of every description. No export or import duties or charges may be imposed upon them in connection with the removal of such property.

6. The Egyptian Government shall have complete liberty of action in regulating the status of Ottoman subjects in Egypt and the conditions under which they may establish themselves in the territory.

7. Egyptian nationals shall be entitled when abroad to the diplomatic protection of Great Britain.

8. Egyptian goods entering Turkey shall enjoy the treatment accorded to British goods.

9. The powers conferred upon His Imperial Majesty the Sultan by the convention signed at Constantinople on the 29th October, 1888, relating to the free navigation of the Suez Canal, are transferred to the Government of His Britannic Majesty.

<sup>10</sup> See No. 63, note 14.

10. All property and possessions in Egypt belonging to the Turkish Government pass to the Egyptian Government without payment.

All movable and immovable property in Egypt belonging to Turkish nationals (who do not acquire Egyptian nationality) shall be dealt with in accordance with Part [article] 49<sup>10</sup> (economic clauses) of the present treaty.

11. Turkey renounces all claim to the tribute formerly paid by Egypt.

Great Britain undertakes to relieve Turkey of all liability in respect of the Turkish loans secured on the Egyptian tribute. These loans are—

The guaranteed loan of 1855.

The loan of 1894 representing the converted loans of 1854 and 1871.

The loan of 1891 representing the converted loan of 1877.

Reserved by French  
delegates pending  
reference to Paris.

The sums which the Khedives of Egypt have from time to time undertaken to pay over to the houses by whom these loans were issued will be applied as heretofore to the interest and the sinking funds of the loans of 1894 and 1891 until the final extinction of those loans. The Government of Egypt will also continue to apply the sum hitherto paid towards the interest on the guaranteed loan of 1855. Upon the extinction of these loans of 1894, 1891 and 1855, all liability on the part of the Egyptian Government arising out of the tribute formerly paid by Egypt to Turkey will cease.

The payment of the interest upon the loan of 1855 having been guaranteed by the Governments of Great Britain and France, the High Contracting Parties take note that the Government of His Britannic Majesty agrees to indemnify the Government of the French Republic against the payment of any sums in respect of such interest, and thereby relieves that Government of all liability under its guarantee.

12. To safeguard the position of the holders of loans issued by the Egyptian Government, Great Britain declares that, in the event of any default by the Government of Egypt in the payment of the annuity of the Guaranteed Debt, or of the interest on the Privileged or Unified Debts, she will take the measures necessary to restore financial equilibrium in Egypt, and to protect the interests of the bondholders of the Egyptian Public Debt.

13. The Commission of the Egyptian Public Debt being no longer required for the protection of the holders of Egyptian Debt, in view of the declaration made by His Britannic Majesty's Government in the preceding article, the High Contracting Parties agree to the repeal, or to the modification of [*sic*]<sup>9</sup> such extent as the Egyptian Government may think desirable, of the decree issued by his Highness the Khedive on the 28th November, 1904.

Accepted by French  
*ad referendum*  
to Paris.



14. The Government of His Britannic Majesty agree, in view of the altered political status of Egypt, to relieve the Governments of Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Russia and Turkey of any liability under the obligations which the Governments of those countries contracted in respect of the interest and sinking fund on the loan of £9,000,000 raised by the Egyptian Government in 1885 in accordance with the terms of the convention signed at London on the 18th March, 1885, as modified by the convention of the 25th July of that year. The Government of His Britannic Majesty for their part reaffirm their obligations to guarantee the regular payment of the annuity of £315,000 assigned to the service of the above loan.

(b) *Soudan*

1. The High Contracting Parties declare that they have taken note of the convention between the Government of His Britannic Majesty and the Egyptian Government defining the status and regulating the administration of the Soudan signed on the 19th January, 1899, as amended by the supplementary convention relating to the town of Suakin signed on the 10th July, 1899.

2. Soudanese shall be entitled when in foreign countries to the diplomatic protection of His Majesty's Government.

(c) *Cyprus*

A sentence to be added to the effect that Ottoman subjects habitually resident in Cyprus should *ipso facto* lose Ottoman and acquire British nationality.

1. The High Contracting Parties recognise the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the Government of His Britannic Majesty on the 5th November, 1914. Turkey renounces all rights and title over or relating to Cyprus, including the right to the tribute formerly paid by that island to the Sultan.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, March 26, 1920.*

APPENDIX 2 TO No. 76

*Note de la Délégation française, sur Instructions du Gouvernement français*

(A.J. 137.)

*Londres, le 26 mars 1920*

Le mémorandum anglais proposant des articles à insérer dans le traité avec la Turquie, en ce qui concerne l'Égypte, appelle de la part du Gouvernement français les observations suivantes :

1. Les articles 9 et 13 proposés enlèveraient toute valeur d'échange aux articles 14 et 17 du projet d'accord concernant le Maroc et l'Égypte entre les Gouvernements français et anglais.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup> The British and French governments had previously been conducting negotiations for the conclusion of an Anglo-French convention relative to the application in Morocco

Le transfert à la Grande-Bretagne de[s] droits de la Turquie sur le Canal de Suez (article 9) et la faculté donnée (article 13) au Gouvernement égyptien de modifier et même de supprimer la Commission de la Dette publique égyptienne ne peuvent être acceptés par le Gouvernement français qu'en échange d'avantages corrélatifs au Maroc comme il est stipulé (conformément aux accords de 1904)<sup>6</sup> dans le and in Egypt of the Anglo-French declaration of April 8, 1904. These negotiations had resulted in May 1919 in the following draft convention:

*'Projet de Convention relative à l'Application au Maroc et à l'Égypte de la Déclaration du 8 Avril 1904*

'Le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique

Ayant, à la suite de la reconnaissance du Protectorat de la France au Maroc et de la Grande-Bretagne en Égypte, jugé le moment venu de donner à la Déclaration du 8 avril 1904 la plénitude de ses effets, tant dans la zone française du Maroc qu'en Égypte, où désormais les deux Gouvernements assument respectivement la responsabilité de la paix, de l'ordre et de la bonne administration

Après avoir pris connaissance, le Gouvernement français, des garanties que lui assure le projet de loi égyptien d'organisation judiciaire des tribunaux unifiés, et le Gouvernement britannique, de celles que lui donnent les lois déjà promulguées dans la zone française du Maroc, ont décidé de remplacer le régime actuellement existant dans la zone française du Maroc pour les ressortissants britanniques et en Égypte pour les ressortissants français, par les dispositions suivantes.

*'Article 1<sup>er</sup>*

'Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique renonce en faveur du Gouvernement de la République française à tous les droits et privilèges qu'il tient du régime des Capitulations dans la zone française du Protectorat de la France au Maroc.

*'Article 2*

'Soixante jours après la mise en vigueur de la présente convention, les tribunaux consulaires britanniques de la zone française cesseront de siéger, si ce n'est pour terminer les affaires en cours.

*'Article 3*

'Les ressortissants britanniques jouiront, dans la zone française, en ce qui concerne les libertés publiques, l'administration de la justice, les droits privés, y compris la propriété foncière et les droits miniers, les professions libérales, industrielles et commerciales, les impôts et taxes, du même traitement que les ressortissants français.

'Les enfants nés dans la zone française d'un père ressortissant britannique y jouissant des privilèges de l'étranger auront droit à la nationalité britannique; ils ne deviendront pas sujets marocains.

'Une liste sera dressée, d'accord entre la Résidence générale de France et le Consulat [*sic*] général de Grande-Bretagne, des indigènes marocains de la zone française qui, jouissant de la protection britannique seront désormais, leur vie durant, justiciables des tribunaux français de l'Empire chérifien.

*'Article 4*

'Les Consuls généraux, Consuls, Vice-Consuls et Agents consulaires de Grande-Bretagne dans la zone française jouiront dès la fermeture des tribunaux consulaires, les [*sic*] mêmes immunités qu'en France.

'Ils continueront d'exercer, dans l'intérêt des particuliers, pour autant que les lois de [la] zone française ne s'y opposeront pas, toutes leurs fonctions non judiciaires, dans les mêmes conditions que par le passé.

projet d'accord Maroc-Égypte, dont la signature reste subordonnée aux satisfactions que nous attendons de l'Angleterre à Tanger.

*'Article 5*

'En ce qui concerne la zone française, tous traités existant entre la Grande-Bretagne et le Maroc sont et demeurent abrogés.

'Toutefois, jusqu'à la conclusion d'un nouveau traité de commerce et de navigation, la convention commerciale anglo-marocaine du 9 décembre 1856, complétée par l'article 68 de l'Acte d'Algésiras du 7 avril 1906 relatif à l'exportation des têtes de bétail de l'espèce bovine, reste en vigueur sauf en ce qui concerne toutes stipulations incompatibles avec l'article 1<sup>er</sup> de la présente convention.

'Sauf en ce qui concerne les conventions de commerce et de navigation, les traités en vigueur entre la France et la Grande-Bretagne s'étendent de plein droit à la zone française.

'Pour l'application de la Convention anglo-française du 14 août 1876, relative à l'extradition des criminels, il est convenu que la période de quatorze jours stipulée par l'article 9 s'étendra à deux mois, et, en ce qui concerne la convention du 17 octobre 1908, que la faculté qu'elle donne à chacune des hautes parties contractantes de refuser à l'autre l'extradition de ses nationaux s'étendra, lorsqu'il s'agira de personnes réfugiées dans la zone française, tant aux sujets de Sa Majesté Chérifienne qu'aux autres ressortissants français.

*'Article 6*

'En ce qui concerne le régime de la Banque d'État, le rôle de cette Banque et la part de la Grande-Bretagne tant dans son capital que dans son administration, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique renonce, dans la zone française, à tous les droits qu'il tient de l'Acte d'Algésiras, sans que le Gouvernement de la République française puisse avoir d'autre obligation que de désintéresser pécuniairement, sur leur demande, les porteurs britanniques.

*'Article 7*

'Les écoles britanniques de tout ordre continueront à jouir dans la zone française, notamment au point de vue de l'enseignement de la langue anglaise, de la même liberté que par le passé; elles se soumettront aux lois de contrôle scolaire applicables à toutes les écoles européennes de la zone française.

*'Article 8*

'Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique renonce à se prévaloir dans la zone française de la Convention de Madrid du 3 juillet 1880, de l'Acte d'Algésiras du 7 avril 1906 et de l'accord du 4 novembre 1911.

'Cette renonciation portera effet dès que les autres puissances alliées, associées ou amies signataires de ce traité, auront également renoncé à s'en prévaloir.

'Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique s'engage à prêter au Gouvernement de la République française son appui pour obtenir cette renonciation.

*'Article 9*

'Le Gouvernement de la République française renonce en faveur du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique à tous les droits et privilèges qu'il tient en Égypte du régime des Capitulations.

'Il s'engage à prêter au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique son appui pour obtenir des autres Puissances qu'elles y renoncent également.

*'Article 10*

'Soixante jours après la notification par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique à l'Ambassadeur de la République française à Londres de l'organisation judiciaire nouvelle instituée en Égypte sous l'autorité de la Puissance protectrice, les tribunaux consulaires français cesseront de siéger si ce n'est pour terminer les affaires en cours.

2. Les articles 9 et 13, que le Gouvernement français ne saurait accepter, ne semblent d'ailleurs pas à leur place dans le Traité de Paix avec la Turquie, car ils

*'Article 11*

'Les ressortissants français jouiront en Égypte en ce qui concerne les libertés publiques, l'administration de la justice, les droits privés, y compris la propriété foncière et les droits miniers, les professions libérales, industrielles et commerciales, les impôts et taxes, du même traitement que les ressortissants britanniques.

'Les enfants nés en Égypte d'un père ressortissant français y jouissant des privilèges de l'étranger, auront droit à la nationalité française; ils ne deviendront pas sujets Égyptiens.

*'Article 12*

'Les Consuls généraux, consuls, vice-consuls et agents consulaires de France en Égypte jouiront, dès la fermeture des tribunaux consulaires, des mêmes immunités qu'en Grande-Bretagne.

'Ils continueront d'exercer, dans l'intérêt des particuliers, pour autant que les lois de l'Égypte ne s'y opposeront pas, toutes leurs fonctions non judiciaires dans les mêmes conditions que par le passé.

*'Article 13*

'Tout traité existant entre la France et l'Égypte est et demeure abrogé.

'Toutefois, jusqu'à la conclusion d'un nouveau traité de commerce et de navigation entre la France et l'Égypte, les stipulations de la Convention du 26 novembre 1902 restent en vigueur sauf en ce qui concerne toutes stipulations incompatibles avec l'article 9 de la présente convention.

'Sauf en ce qui concerne les conventions de commerce et de navigation, les traités en vigueur entre la Grande-Bretagne et la France s'étendent à l'Égypte.

'Pour l'application de la convention anglo-française du 14 août 1876 relative à l'extradition des criminels, il est convenu que la période de quatorze jours stipulée à l'article 9 s'étendra à deux mois, et, en ce qui concerne la convention du 17 octobre 1908, que la faculté qu'elle donne à chacune des hautes parties contractantes de refuser à l'autre l'extradition de ses nationaux s'étendra, lorsqu'il s'agira de personnes réfugiées en Égypte, tant aux sujets de Sa Hautesse le Sultan qu'à tous ressortissants britanniques.

*'Article 14*

'Pour sauvegarder la situation des porteurs de titres des emprunts émis par le Gouvernement Égyptien, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique déclare que, faute par le Gouvernement Égyptien de payer l'annuité de la Dette garantie et l'intérêt des Dettes privilégiées ou unifiées, il prendra les mesures nécessaires pour rétablir l'équilibre financier et protéger les intérêts des porteurs de titres de la Dette publique égyptienne.

'La Caisse de la Dette publique égyptienne n'ayant dans ces conditions plus de raison d'être pour la protection des porteurs de la Dette égyptienne le Gouvernement de la République française consent au retrait ou à la modification, dans la mesure que le Gouvernement égyptien jugera convenable, du décret pris par Son Altesse le Khédive le 28 novembre 1904.

*'Article 15*

'Les Écoles françaises de tout ordre continueront à jouir en Égypte, notamment au point de vue de l'enseignement du français, de la même liberté que par le passé: elles se soumettront aux lois de contrôle scolaire applicables à toutes les écoles européennes du Protectorat.

'Au cas où les écoles supérieures du Gouvernement égyptien se grouperaient en Université, les écoles françaises auraient le droit de s'affilier à l'Université ainsi fondée aux mêmes conditions que les autres écoles de même ordre.

'Tant que les étrangers garderont au point de vue de l'administration de la justice par les

règlent les rapports des grandes Puissances alliées entre elles en Égypte et non les rapports de ces Puissances avec la Turquie.

L'article 13 s'expliquerait d'autant moins dans le traité que la Turquie n'est pas représentée dans la Commission de la Dette publique égyptienne.

La délégation française propose de rédiger l'article 9 dans des termes analogues à l'article 152 du Traité de Versailles, c'est-à-dire de la manière suivante :

'La Turquie consent, en ce qui la concerne, au transfert au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique des pouvoirs conférés à Sa Majesté impériale le Sultan par la convention signée à Constantinople le 29 octobre 1888 relative à la libre navigation du Canal de Suez.'

BERTHELOT

tribunaux unifiés des privilèges quelconques, tout Français jouissant des privilèges de l'étranger en Égypte et muni d'un diplôme donnant accès au barreau de France sera admis au barreau en Égypte dans les mêmes conditions que les Égyptiens munis du diplôme égyptien.

'Pendant le même délai, tout autre titulaire d'un diplôme français devra passer, avant d'être admis au barreau égyptien, un examen au cours duquel il devra justifier d'une bonne instruction secondaire et d'une connaissance suffisante du droit égyptien. Les titulaires du diplôme de baccalauréat français seront dispensés de la première partie de cet examen, mais ils auront à subir les épreuves de langue arabe prescrites pour le baccalauréat égyptien. Quand il s'agira d'un élève de l'École française de Droit du Caire, le jury d'examen comprendra au moins un professeur désigné par la Faculté de Droit de Paris.

*'Article 16*

'Jusqu'au 8 avril 1934, le poste de Directeur général des Antiquités en Égypte continuera à être confié à un Français.

*'Article 17*

'En raison de la substitution du Gouvernement britannique au Gouvernement impérial ottoman dans la charge de la défense territoriale et du maintien de l'ordre public de l'Égypte, le Gouvernement de la République française reconnaît que les pouvoirs conférés à Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan par la Convention de Constantinople du 29 octobre 1888 relative à la libre navigation du Canal de Suez sont, par l'effet du Protectorat transférés au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique.

*'Article 18*

'Le Gouvernement de la République française accepte que, sans autre réserve que celle du consentement unanime des Puissances intéressées tous les droits et devoirs de la Commission internationale de Quarantaine en Égypte passent aux Autorités Anglo-égyptiennes.

*'Article 19*

'La présente convention entrera en vigueur dès l'échange des ratifications.'

Further Anglo-French negotiations for the signature of this draft convention had, however, been suspended in June 1919. The question of Morocco, with its bearing upon that of Egypt, subsequently tended to be considered in conjunction with the question of Tangier: see Volume IV, No. 338, note 5 (cf. also *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. iv, pp. 127-37).

I.C.P. 91.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors, held in Lord Curzon's Room at the British Foreign Office, Whitehall, London, on Wednesday, March 31, 1920, at 4 p.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Blackett, Sir Adam Block, Mr. Fass, Mr. Vansittart; **SECRETARIES,** Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Captain Abraham.

*France:* M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer.

*Italy:* Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Nogara, Signor Galli, Don Ascanio Colonna.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda.

**INTERPRETER:** M. Camerlynck.

1. **LORD CURZON** said that the subject before the conference was the revised report of the commission to frame the financial clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey (A.J. 27, Revise) (Appendix). *Treaty of Peace with Turkey.* This draft represented a compromise reached in the commission between the French and British points of view. He *Revised Report of the Financial Commission* thought it would be unnecessary to go over all the clauses, most of which had been already approved by the conference and remained unaltered. The new matter was in italics, and he suggested that only these portions should be discussed.

Articles 1 and 2 were agreed to.

Article 3 was read.

**MR. BLACKETT** said that the additional passage in italics represented what in practice would be bound to happen. He had personally been inclined to leave it out, but his French colleague desired an explicit statement.

Article 3 was agreed to.

Articles 4 and 5 were agreed to.

Article 6 (i) was read.

**MR. BLACKETT** said that he could draw attention to the changes embodied in this draft. In the original draft the question had been raised about the cost of occupation of territory not remaining Turkish. In the clause as now drafted, Turkey took the burden of paying for the occupation both of territory remaining Turkish and of territory which, though ceasing to be Turkish, did not remain in the hands of the Power which had borne the cost of occupation.

**LORD CURZON** observed that the expression 'ceded' was not quite accurate. Turkey was not ceding Syria, for instance; Syria was being removed from Turkish jurisdiction.

**M. KAMMERER** said that the commission had not attempted to achieve accurate drafting, but merely to embody general principles.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that the provision violated the principle previously adopted, that Turkey should only pay for the occupation of territory remaining Turkish.

LORD CURZON agreed that the matter was not entirely in accordance with logic, but as Great Britain had paid for the occupation of Syria and France was to retain it, it was not reasonable that Great Britain should alone pay. As a way out of the difficulty the charge was being placed upon Turkey.

After some further discussion it was decided—

To ask the Drafting Committee to find a suitable alternative for the word 'ceded.'

With this comment article 6 (i) was agreed to.

Article 6 (ii) was read.

MR. BLACKETT said that the concluding sentences had been added at the request of the French delegation for the sake of clearness. It was clear that Turkey could not pay a big lump sum. She must be allowed to pay by annuities so calculated as to permit her to meet her other expenses, including the payment of interest on her external debt.

LORD CURZON said this appeared quite reasonable. He asked whether any figures had been put before the commission regarding the cost of the occupation of Syria and other Turkish territories.

MR. BLACKETT said that no exact figures had been given; a rough estimate would be £25,000,000.

LORD CURZON asked how long the annuities would continue.

MR. BLACKETT said that this would depend upon the financial situation of Turkey. They must last twenty to thirty years; of [or] Turkey, if the Financial Commission so decided, might meet her liabilities by raising a loan.

LORD CURZON asked whether Sir Adam Block thought that what was proposed was within the means of Turkey if properly controlled.

SIR ADAM BLOCK said that he thought it was, and that Turkey, under the new Financial Commission, would be able to pay her proportion of interest on the external debt.

MR. BLACKETT said that it would be desirable to draw the attention of the Drafting Committee to the reference in this paragraph to article 52 of the economic clauses. He was not sure whether this reference was now correct, and he thought it would be advisable to insert a qualifying clause after the word 'nationals,' such as 'who were not Ottoman nationals before the 1st August, 1914.'

It was decided—

To draw the attention of the Drafting Committee to these remarks, and to adopt article 6 (ii).

Articles 6 to 14 inclusive were agreed to, subject to any corrections that might be necessary in the use of the word 'ceded.'

Article 15 was read.

Mr. Blackett said that in this article the date had been altered; in the previous draft the date had been 'the ratification of the present treaty.' It

was felt, however, that Turkey would be saddled with a very heavy burden if this were maintained, seeing that the ratification of the treaty might be subject to still further delay. By way of compromise, 'the 1st March, 1920,' had been selected as being the time from which the territories in question had passed effectively into the hands of those who were to preserve them. It had been suggested that the troops of occupation should hand over what they had collected since the armistice, but there was some uncertainty as to whether any sums had been collected at all.

LORD CURZON observed that the same comment as recorded above must be made regarding the use of the word 'ceded' in this article.

It was decided—

To adopt article 15 and to draw the attention of the Drafting Committee to Lord Curzon's remark.

With the exception of article 16, the remainder of the draft was approved.

VISCOUNT CHINDA stated that he was authorised to withdraw the reservation he had previously made.<sup>1</sup>

MR. BLACKETT said that the new draft of article 16 contained little else save drafting alterations. The British delegation had originally proposed the immediate suppression of the Council of the Ottoman Debt. The French delegation had then pressed for its preservation, and as a compromise it had been agreed that it should disappear in three years. The present draft contained nothing quite so specific about its disappearance, but the British delegation regarded the suppression of the council on or before 1923 as the basis for all the concessions it had made. The British delegation, supported by the Italian delegation, thought Turkey should be financially controlled by a single authority responsible not to the private bondholders, but to the Powers. The British delegation would have liked to abolish the hypothecated revenues, which it regarded as an obstacle to the establishment of a sound financial system. They thought it should be within the power of the Financial Commission to abolish them.

LORD CURZON said he understood the principle to which the British and Italian delegations attached importance was that the Council of the Ottoman Debt should disappear on or before 1923. The article as at present drafted contained no date. Nevertheless, the British delegation adhered to the same principle, and thought it desirable that the Financial Commission should, without prejudicing the interests of the bondholders, have complete control over the financial situation. He asked whether the French delegation accepted this position.

M. KAMMERER said that hitherto he had not been quite sure of the attitude of the Italian delegation. In the commission the Italian delegation had not made it quite clear that it supported the British view. This appeared now, however, to be the case. As to the attitude of the French Government to this matter, it was quite ready to contemplate the ultimate fusion of the council

<sup>1</sup> See No. 49, minute 1.



and Financial Commission. Moreover, the French Government would do all it could to obtain this result. It hoped to obtain it, but could not absolutely promise success. He had received new instructions to refuse the insertion of the underlined words at the end of article 16. He would observe that the two parts of this sentence contradicted one another; the first laid down that there should be consultation of the bondholders, and the second practically took the result out of their hands. The holders of Turkish bonds were a very powerful body in France. They would make their grievances heard, and could raise opposition which might imperil the ratification of the treaty. A statement categorical as that at the end of article 16 might grievously embarrass the French Government. Its suppression, he thought, would not materially alter the case.

LORD CURZON said that he had noticed the inconsistency between the two parts of the sentence, but his conclusion was not that the latter part should be eliminated, but that it should be strengthened. Should they<sup>2</sup> be eliminated, what would remain? There would be no limitation in time, and no indication that the council would certainly disappear, save M. Kammerer's assurance that the French Government hoped to influence the bondholders and obtain their consent. This was very indefinite, and the bondholders might resist persuasion for years. He would prefer to say that the fusion 'shall in any case not be later than the expiry of the present term of the council.' He understood that the French Government anticipated trouble with its constituents if these words appeared in the treaty itself. He would ask M. Kammerer whether the French Government would prefer to give this assurance in a separate agreement between France and Great Britain.

M. KAMMERER said he thought this would be preferred.

LORD CURZON then asked whether the French Government would give an assurance that the council should expire in 1923.

M. KAMMERER said that if a formal agreement was being considered he must telegraph for instructions. He asked whether it would not be enough to record what had been said in the minutes.

LORD CURZON said he thought this would not be enough, and he could not withdraw from the clause he proposed, unless he obtained a formal agreement from the French Government.

SIR ADAM BLOCK said that he personally was amazed at the favour shown to the Turkish bondholders in the treaty. They were protected in every way, and received more guarantees than they had before. In England no interest was shown in the council, but considerable interest in safeguarding the bondholders. He thought they had no possible reason to complain. If nothing were said in the treaty about the abolition of the council the bondholders who appointed it would have a position superior to that of the Powers.

M. KAMMERER said that in his personal capacity he was not far from agreeing, but the pressure on the French Government was not a thing merely in anticipation; it existed. In order to make things easier for the

<sup>2</sup> The reference was presumably to 'the underlined words' mentioned above by M. Kammerer.

French Government he suggested that a slight mitigation of the formula might be adopted.

LORD CURZON said that the British delegation had made a great number of concessions in order to meet the French view. It could not yield on this point. It would not be statesmanlike to put into the treaty a text which was ambiguous and which might lead to conflicting interpretations when the moment to execute the treaty came. He thought there were only two ways in which he could accept; either to strengthen the second part of the last sentence, or to leave it out and obtain in its stead an explicit formal assurance from the French Government. The French Government might have parliamentary difficulties on this subject, but the British Government also had similar difficulties. Many people looked with suspicion on this treaty as being unduly influenced by financial interests. If these people could say that the treaty was a bondholders' treaty the position of the British Government would be just as difficult as that of the French Government *vis-à-vis* the French bondholders. He thought the best solution, and the right solution, was to insert something quite explicit in the treaty itself. He would ask the Italian delegation whether they thought it more desirable to insert a clause in the treaty or to obtain a separate assurance from the French Government?

SIGNOR NOGARA said that he would like to say a few words of explanation. Since last June he had been working on a scheme for a Financial Commission in Turkey, and he had concluded that it must supplant the old Council of the Ottoman Debt, seeing that the latter was an emanation of private owners and the former of Governments. The British delegation had asked for the immediate suppression of the council, and he had suggested as a compromise that it should be allowed to continue in office till the expiry of the present term. As to Lord Curzon's question, he felt it would be better to stipulate in the treaty itself, but this was a diplomatic matter.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA expressed a preference for a stipulation in the treaty itself.

M. KAMMERER said that it was not within his power to agree. He was not allowed to agree to what was in the text, still less to any strengthening of that text. As to the question of a separate agreement, he could only transmit the suggestion to Paris.

LORD CURZON said that he thought this most unfortunate. He thought the document represented a long series of British concessions. No further concessions could be made. The bondholders were protected in every way. He would ask the French delegation, in referring the matter to Paris, to state that the conference was of opinion that it would be better to make this explicit stipulation in the treaty. This was the view of the British and the Italian delegations. He would ask Viscount Chinda whether this was also his opinion?

VISCOUNT CHINDA said he preferred to abstain from giving an opinion.

M. BERTHELOT said that he recognised that in this special matter the British delegation had made concessions. He did not think, if the whole field of the treaty with Turkey was considered, it could be argued that France had not conceded more than Great Britain.

After some further discussion it was agreed—

To await the instructions to be obtained from Paris by the French delegation regarding article 16.

2. LORD CURZON said that the Belgian Ambassador had made a request that Belgium should be represented by a delegate both on the Council of the Debt and on the Financial Commission. He had taken it upon himself to discourage the request regarding Belgian representation on the Financial Commission, but now that the German and Austrian delegates had disappeared from the Council of the Debt he thought perhaps Belgium had a stronger case for a seat on that body.

*Belgian Representation on the Council of Debt and Financial Commission*

M. CAMBON said that he had no comment to make. He understood Belgian holdings in the debt represented about 7 per cent.

SIR ADAM BLOCK said it was hard to say what proportion the Belgians held, as the bonds were always changing hands and went from one country to another according to the fluctuations in the exchange.

M. KAMMERER said that the French holdings represented from 60 to 70 per cent.; the Belgian and British, together about 15 per cent.; the Italian about 4 per cent.; and the German and Austrian about 20 per cent.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that the Belgian request was not a new one. In any case, the institution on which Belgium desired representation was a moribund institution. The Belgian request might be allowed without any great harm, or it might be pointed out to the Belgian Ambassador that it was hardly worth his while to urge the question, since the council was shortly to disappear.

SIR ADAM BLOCK observed that, firstly, the syndicates would have to be consulted; they had hitherto always said 'No'; secondly, should they agree, the Turkish Government would have to be approached and asked to alter the Degree [Decree] of Mouharrem.

LORD CURZON said that he would tell the Belgian Minister [*sic*] that the sentiments of the conference had not been unfavourable to his request, but that as the council was shortly to disappear it was perhaps hardly worth while to set in motion all the procedure that would be required to obtain a very transitory satisfaction for Belgium.

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 31, 1920.

#### APPENDIX TO No. 77

##### *Revised Draft Proposals for the Financial Conditions of Peace with Turkey*

(A.J. 27.)<sup>3</sup>

(After consideration by Supreme Council and Council of Foreign Ministers, and with modifications, in *italics*, since suggested by the Financial Commission)

<sup>3</sup> In the typescript copy this heading read '(A.J. 27 Revise)': cf. No. 48, note 4, and minute 1 above.

*Note by the Chairman covering revised Financial Clauses for insertion in Treaty of Peace with Turkey*

At a meeting of the Conference of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors held on the 4th March, 1920,<sup>1</sup> the Draft Financial Clauses were referred back to the Financial Commission with a view (1) to the consideration of the question of reparations for minorities of Turkish subjects of non-Turkish race and to hear evidence on the subject from M. Veniselos; (2) to drafting a clause regarding currency in the Smyrna area to be included in the part of the treaty relating to that area; and (3) to reconsidering generally the question of reparations.

We submit a separate report regarding minorities (A.J. 105),<sup>4</sup> from which it will be seen that the Financial Commission are unanimously of opinion that no special provision for reparation for minorities should be included in the financial clauses of the treaty.

We have drafted and communicated to the Smyrna Commission a clause relating to currency in the Smyrna area.

We have reconsidered the general question of reparations, and have attempted to define more clearly (a) the meaning of the word 'nationals' and (b) the nature of the damage for which Turkey is to make reparation.

We have taken the opportunity to make various small alterations, all shown in *italics* in the reprint, which seemed to us desirable, and which do not in any way alter the intention of the draft as originally submitted.

B. P. BLACKETT, *Chairman,*  
*Turkish Financial Commission.*

*March 27, 1920.*

*Article 1*

The Ottoman Government recognises that by joining in the war of aggression which Germany and Austria-Hungary wage[d] against the Allied and Associated Powers, it has caused to the latter losses and sacrifices of all kinds for which it ought to make complete reparation.

On the other hand, the Allied and Associated Powers recognise that the resources of Turkey are not sufficient to enable her to make complete reparation.

In these circumstances, and inasmuch as the territorial rearrangements prescribed by this treaty will leave to the Turkish State only a portion of the revenues of the former Ottoman Empire, it is agreed that all claims against the Ottoman Government for reparation shall be waived by the Allied and Associated Powers, subject only to the provisions of the financial and economic clauses of this treaty.

The Allied and Associated Powers, desiring to afford some measure of relief and assistance to the Turkish State, have agreed with the Turkish Government that a Financial Commission shall be appointed, consisting of one representative of each of the following Allied Powers, which are specially interested, viz., France, the British Empire and Italy, with whom there shall be associated a Turkish Commissioner in a consultative capacity, with the powers and duties set forth in the following articles.

*Article 2*

The Financial Commission shall take such steps as in its judgment are best adapted to conserve and increase the resources of the Turkish Government.

The budget to be presented annually by the Turkish Minister of Finance to

<sup>4</sup> Untraced in Foreign Office archives.

Parliament shall be submitted, in the first instance, to the Financial Commission, and shall be presented to Parliament in the form approved by that commission. No modification introduced by Parliament shall be operative without the approval of the Financial Commission.

The Financial Commission shall supervise the execution of the budget and financial laws and regulations of the Ottoman Empire. This supervision shall be exercised through the medium of the Turkish Inspectorate of Finance, whose appointment shall be subject to the approval and who shall be placed under the direct orders of the Financial Commission. The Ottoman Government undertakes to furnish to this Inspectorate all facilities necessary for the fulfilment of their task, and to take such action against unsuitable officials in the Financial Departments of the Government as the Financial Commission may suggest.

#### Article 3

The Financial Commission shall, in addition, *in agreement with the Council of the Ottoman Debt and the Imperial Ottoman Bank*, undertake by such means as may be recognised to be opportune and equitable, the regulation and improvement of the Turkish currency.

#### Article 4

The Ottoman Government undertakes not to contract any internal or external loan without the consent of the Financial Commission.

#### Article 5

*The Ottoman Government engages to pay for all loss and damage suffered by civilian nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers, as defined below, in respect of their persons or property, through the action or negligence of the Turkish authorities during the war to the date of the ratification of this treaty, in accordance with the provisions of the treaty.*

#### Article 6

All the resources of the Turkish Government, save revenues conceded or hypothecated to the service of the Ottoman external debt (see Annex I), shall be placed at the disposal of the Financial Commission, which shall employ them, as need arises, in the following manner:—

- (i) *The first charge (after payment of the salaries and current expenses of the Financial Commission and of the ordinary expenses of such Allied naval and military forces of occupation as may be maintained after the date of the ratification of this treaty in territories remaining Turkish) shall be the expenses of the Allied naval and military forces of occupation since the date of the armistice of territory remaining Turkish, and the expenses of Allied naval and military forces of occupation of territories ceded under this treaty by Turkey to a Power other than the Power which has borne the expenses of occupation.*

*The amount of these expenses and of the annuities by which they shall be discharged will be determined by the Financial Commission, which will so arrange the annuities as to enable Turkey to meet any deficiency that may arise in the sums required to pay that part of the interest on the external debt for which Turkey remains responsible.*

- (ii) The second charge shall be the indemnity which the Turkish Government shall pay, as above, towards the claims of the Allied Powers for loss or damage in respect of their persons or property suffered by their nationals, as defined in article 52<sup>5</sup> of the economic clauses, through the action of the Turkish

<sup>5</sup> See No. 63, note 14.

Government during the war, due regard being had to the financial condition of the Turkish State, and the necessity for providing for the essential expenses of its administration. *The Financial Commission shall adjudicate on and provide for payment of all claims in respect to personal damage. The claims in respect to property shall be investigated, determined and paid in accordance with the economic clauses of the treaty (article 28).*

*The Financial Commission shall fix the annuity to be applied to the settlement of claims in respect of persons as well as in respect of property should the funds at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers (economic clauses, article 28) be insufficient to meet this charge, and shall determine the currency in which the annuity shall be paid.*

#### Article 7

Any hypothecation of Turkish revenues effected during the war in respect of obligations (including the internal debt) contracted by the Turkish Government during the war is hereby annulled.

#### Article 8

Turkey recognises the transfer to the Allied Powers of any claims to payment or repayment which Germany, Austria, Hungary or Bulgaria may have against her, in accordance with article 261 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, and the corresponding articles of the treaties with Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria.

The Allied Powers, on the other hand, agree not to require from Turkey any payment in respect of claims so transferred.

#### Article 9

No new concession shall be granted by the Turkish Government either to a subject of the Turkish State or otherwise without the consent of the Financial Commission.

#### Article 10

Powers to which Ottoman territory is ceded shall acquire *without payment* all property and possessions situated therein *registered in the name of* the Ottoman Empire and of the civil list.

#### Article 11

The high contracting parties agree that Powers to which Turkish territory is or has been ceded, by the arrangements concluded after the Balkan War or the present war, shall participate in the annual charge for the service of the Ottoman Public Debt contracted before *1st November, 1914*.

The Governments of the States of the Balkan Peninsula signatories to this treaty to whom such territory has been or is so ceded agree to give adequate guarantees for the payment of the share of the annual charges allotted to them, respectively.

#### Article 12

For the purposes of this chapter, the Ottoman Public Debt shall be deemed to consist of the debt heretofore governed by the Decree of Mouharrem, together with such other loans as are enumerated in the first Annex to this chapter.

Loans contracted before the *1st November, 1914*, will be taken into account in the distribution of the Ottoman Debt between Turkey, the States of the Balkan Peninsula, and the new States set up in Asia.

The distribution among the States receiving territory shall be effected in the following manner:—

- (a) Annuities arising from loans prior to the 17th October, 1912 (Balkan wars), shall be distributed between the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan States receiving territory (including Albania).
- (b) The residue of the annuities *for which the Ottoman Empire remains liable* after this distribution, together with those arising from loans contracted by that Empire between the 17th October, 1912, and the 1st August, 1914, shall be distributed between the Ottoman Empire and the States to which territory will be ceded by the stipulations of the present Treaty of Peace.

#### Article 13

The general principle to be followed in determining the amount of the annuity to be paid by each Power, to which Turkish territory is or has been ceded, is that the amount shall bear the same ratio to the total required for the service of the debt as the average revenue of the ceded territory bore to the average revenue of the whole Empire (including in each case the yield of the customs surtax imposed in the year 1907) over the three financial years 1909–10, 1910–11, and 1911–12.

#### Article 14

The Financial Commission shall, as soon as may be after the ratification of this treaty, determine in accordance with the principle mentioned in article 9 [? 13] the amount of the annuities referred to in that article. The decisions of the commission shall be communicated to the high contracting parties at the earliest date possible after the coming into effect of the present treaty.

The Financial Commission shall fulfil the functions provided for in article 134 of Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria.

#### Article 15

The annuities assessed in the manner above provided will be payable as from the date of the ratification of *the treaties by which the various territories were ceded and, in the case of territories ceded under the present treaty, from the 1st March, 1920*, and shall continue to be payable (except as provided below by article 22) until the final liquidation of the debt. They shall, however, be proportionately reduced as the loans constituting the debt are successively extinguished.

#### Article 16

*The Ottoman Government transfers to the Financial Commission all its rights under the provisions of the Decree of Mouharrem and subsequent decrees.* The Council of the Debt shall consist of the British, French and Italian delegates, and of the representative of the Ottoman Bank, and shall continue to operate as heretofore. It shall administer and levy all revenues conceded to it by reason of the Decree of Mouharrem and all other revenues the management of which has been entrusted to it in accordance with other loan contracts previous to the 1st August, 1914. The Allied Governments authorise the council to give administrative assistance to the Ottoman Ministry of Finance, under such conditions as may be determined by the Financial Commission with the object of realising as far as possible the following programme:—

The system of direct levy of certain revenues by the existing Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt, shall, within limits to be prescribed by the Financial Commission, be extended as widely as possible and applied throughout the

provinces remaining Turkish. On each new creation of revenue or of indirect taxes approved by the Financial Commission, the latter shall consider the possibility of entrusting the administration thereof to the council for the account of the Ottoman Government.

The<sup>6</sup> administration of the customs shall be under a Director-General appointed by and revocable by the Financial Commission and answerable to it. No change in the schedule of the customs charges shall be made except with the approval of the Financial Commission.

*The Council of the Debt as above constituted shall remain in office until such date as the bondholders have given their consent to its fusion with the Financial Commission; such consent shall be sought as soon as possible, with a view to the fusion of the two bodies taking place not later than the expiry of the present term of the Council.*<sup>7</sup>

#### Article 17

The commission has authority to propose, at a later date, the substitution for the pledges at present granted to bondholders in accordance with their contract or existing decrees, of other adequate pledges, or of a charge on the general revenues of the Ottoman Empire. The Allied Governments undertake to consider any proposals the Financial Commission might then have to make.

#### Article 18

All property, movable and immovable, belonging to the Administration of the Ottoman Debt, wherever situate, shall remain integrally at the disposal of that body.

The Council of the Debt shall have power to apply the value of any realised property, for the purpose of extraordinary amortisation either of the Unified Debt or of the Lots turcs.<sup>8</sup>

#### Article 19

The Turkish Government agrees to transfer to the Financial Commission all its rights in the reserve funds and the Tripoli Indemnity Fund.

#### Article 20

A sum equal to the arrears of any revenues heretofore affected to the service of the Ottoman Public Debt within the territories that remain subject to the Dominion of the Turkish State, which should have been but have not been paid to the Council of the Debt, shall (except where such territories have been in the military occupation of Allied forces, and for the time of such occupation), be accounted for and paid to the Council of the Debt by the Turkish Government as soon as in the opinion of the Financial Commission the financial condition of the country shall permit.

#### Article 21

The Council of the Debt shall review all the transactions of the council which have taken place during the war, and any disbursements made by the council which are not in accordance with its powers and duties, as defined by the Decree of Mouharrem or otherwise before the war, shall be reimbursed to the Council of the Debt by the Turkish Government so soon as in the opinion of the Financial Commission such payment is possible. The council shall have power to review any action on the part of the council during the war, and to annul any obligation

<sup>6</sup> Note in original: 'Reservation by Japanese Ambassador.'

<sup>7</sup> Note in original: 'The underlined words are proposed by the British and Italian delegates, and referred by the French delegate to the Supreme Council for decision.'

<sup>8</sup> Cf. annex 1 below.



entered into by the council which, in its opinion, is prejudicial to the interests of the bondholders, and which was not in accordance with its powers.

#### *Article 22*

Any of the Powers who by this treaty are to contribute to the annual charge for the service of the Ottoman Public Debt, may, upon giving six months' notice to the Council of the Debt, redeem such obligation by payment of a sum representing the value of such annuity capitalised at such rate of interest as may be agreed between the Power concerned and the Council of the Debt.

The Council of the Debt shall not have power to require such redemption.

#### *Article 23*

The sums in gold to be transferred to the Allied and Associated Powers by Germany and Austria under the provisions of article 259 (1) and (2), and (4) and (7) of the Treaty with Germany, and under article 210 (1) of the Treaty with Austria, shall be placed at the disposal of the Financial Commission.

#### *Article 24*

The sums to be transferred by Germany in accordance with article 259 (3) of the Treaty of Versailles shall be placed forthwith at the disposal of the administration of the debt.

#### *Article 25*

The Ottoman Government undertakes to accept any decision that may be taken by the Allied Powers *in agreement when necessary with other Powers* regarding the funds of the Ottoman Sanitary Administration and the former Conseil supérieur de Santé and in respect of the claim of the Conseil supérieur de Santé against the Turkish Government, as well as regarding the funds of the lifeboat service of the Black Sea and Bosphorus.

The Allied Powers hereby give authority to the Financial Commission to represent them in this matter.

#### *Article 26*

The Turkish Government agrees with the Allied Powers that the German Government is hereby released from the obligation incurred by the latter Government during the war to accept Turkish Government currency notes at a specified rate of exchange in payment for goods to be exported to Turkey from Germany after the war.

#### *Article 27*

The high contracting parties agree that, so soon as their claims against the Turkish Government, as established in this chapter of this treaty, have been satisfied, and the pre-war debt of the Ottoman Empire has been liquidated, the Financial Commission shall determine. The Turkish Government shall then consider in consultation with the Council of the League of Nations whether any further administrative advice and assistance should in the interests of Turkey be provided for the Turkish Government by the Powers, members of the League of Nations, and, if so, in what form such advice and assistance shall be given.

#### *Article 28*

The legislative measures required in order to give effect to the provisions of this chapter will be enacted by the Turkish Government and by the Powers concerned within six months from the date of the signature of this treaty.

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 27, 1920.

# Annex I. Dette publique ottomane d'Avant-Guerre<sup>9</sup>

Livres turques or<sup>10</sup>

Emprunts (1)	Date du Contrat (2)	Intérêt (3)	Fonds d'amor- tissement (4)	Capital nominal originaires (5)	Capital existant au 5 nov. 1914 (5)	Annuité exigée (7)	Période d'amor- tissement (8)	Banque d'émission (9)
		Pour Cent.	Pour Cent.	L. tqs. or	L. tqs. or	L. tqs. or		
Dette unifiée.	1903 . . .	4	4644	42,275,772	1,887,375	1,887,375	..	..
Lots turcs . .	1870 . . .	..	..	15,632,548	270,000	270,000	..	..
Osmानी . . .	18/30 avr. 1890	4	1	4,999,500	249,975	249,975	1931	Banque Impériale ottomane.
3 pour cent 1896 .	29 fév./12 mars 1893	5	50	3,272,720	180,450	180,450	1946	Banque Impériale ottomane.
4 pour cent 1903 .	3 oct. 1888 .	4	50	2,640,000	119,097	119,097	1958	Deutsche Bank.
Pécheries . . .	21 fév./6 mars 1903	4	087538	2,376,000	97,120	97,120	2001	Deutsche Bank.
Bagdad, 1 <sup>re</sup> Série .	20 fév./5 mars 1903	4	50	2,750,000	124,059	124,059	1960	Banque Impériale ottomane.
4 pour cent 1904 .	4/17 sept. 1903	4	50	5,306,664	239,397	239,397	1961	Banque Impériale ottomane.
4 pour cent 1901-5	21 nov./4 déc. 1901	4	50					
	6/19 nov. 1903							
	25 avr./8 mai 1805							
Tedjizhat-Askerié	4/17 avr. 1905	4	50	2,640,000	119,097	119,097	1961	Deutsche Bank.
Bagdad, 2 <sup>me</sup> Série	20 mai/2 juin 1908	4	087538	4,752,000	200,500	200,500	2006	Deutsche Bank.
Bagdad, 3 <sup>me</sup> Série	20 mai/2 juin 1908	4	087538	5,236,000	220,550	220,550	2010	Deutsche Bank.
4 pour cent 1908 .	6/19 sept. 1908	4	50	4,711,124	212,000	212,000	1965	Banque Impériale ottomane.
5 pour cent 1914 .	13/26 avr. 1914	5	50	22,000,000	1,213,025	1,213,025	..	Banque Impériale ottomane.
Docks, Arsenaux et Constructions navales	2 déc. 1913 .	5½	1½	1,485,000	88,550	88,550	1943	..
Priorité Tombac .	26 avr./8 mai 1893	4	1	1,000,000	50,250	50,250	1934	Banque Impériale ottomane.
Quarante millions de francs (che- mins de fer orientaux)	1/13 mars 1894	4	35	1,760,000	76,751	76,751	1957	Deutsche Bank et son groupe, y compris la Banque internationale.
Douanes 1902 . .	17/29 mai 1886 28 sept./11 oct. 1902	4	50	8,600,020	387,976	387,976	1958	Banque Impériale ottomane.
4 pour cent 1909 .	30 sept./13 oct. 1909	4	1	7,000,004	350,864	350,864	1950	Banque Impériale ottomane.
Municipal ville de Constantinople 1909	3/16 nov. 1909	5	50	1,100,000	60,651	60,651	1958	Banque nationale de Turquie.
Municipal ville de Constantinople 1913	1913 . . .	5	50	1,100,000	60,500	60,500	..	Banque nationale de Turquie.
Hodeïda - Sanaa 1911	24 fév./9 mars 1911	4	098738	1,000,010	40,988	40,988	2006	Banque française.
Soma - Panderma 1910	20 nov./3 déc. 1910	4	16715	1,712,304	71,532	71,532	1992	Banque Impériale ottomane.
4 pour cent Doua- nes 1911	27 oct./9 nov. 1910	4	1	7,040,000	352,440	352,440	1952	Deutsche Bank.
Municipal ville de Bagdad	1912 . . .	6	14285	33,000	6,000	6,000	..	..
Bons du Trésor de la Banque Im- périale ottomane 1912	1912 . . .	6	33333	3,000,008	1,000,003	1,000,003	1915	Banque Impériale ottomane.
Bons du Trésor Périer et Cie.	1913 . . .	5	20	5,500,000	1,100,000	1,100,000	1918	..
Bons du Trésor 3 pour cent 1911 (achat de vais- seaux de guerre)	1911 . . .	5	..	1,778,587	125,058	125,058	..	Banque nationale de Turquie.
Avance Régie des Tabacs	..	..	..	1,700,000	110,000	110,000	..	..
Irrigation plaine de Koniah	..	..	..	818,970	50,006?	50,006?	1932	..
Total . . .	..	..	..	163,220,231	..	..	..	..

Chiffres à établir.

## NOTE EXPLANATORY OF ANNEX I TO THE FINANCIAL CLAUSES.

The figures in columns 5 and 7 are £T. Turkey now possesses a paper currency in place of a pre-war gold currency. At present rates of exchange the £T. paper no longer represents the pre-war ratio of the £T. gold to the currency in which the loans were subscribed, and in which the interest and the amortisation payments have to be paid in Europe according to the contract terms of the loans. (See article 1 of the 'Décret-Annexe' of September 1903, and Loan Contracts, *passim*.) The definition of £T. gold in these columns does not signify that the provisions for the coupons and sinking funds are to be made in gold, but that the figure in £T. has to be calculated according to such rate of exchange as will enable the bondholder to be paid in the currency to which he is entitled.

<sup>9</sup> Also annexed in the filed copy was Annex II, not printed. This annex was, subject to minor variation in drafting, the same as annex 2 to part VIII of the Treaty of Sévres.

<sup>10</sup> Note in original: 'Les chiffres de ce tableau sont indiqués sous réserve des [sic] corrections matérielles.'

I.C.P. 92.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors, held in Lord Curzon's Room at the British Foreign Office, Whitehall, London, S.W. 1, on Wednesday, April 7, 1920, at 4 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart; SECRETARIES, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Captain Abraham.

*France*: M. Cambon, M. Kammerer.

*Italy*: Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Galli, Don Ascanio Colonna.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

1. With reference to I.C.P. 90,<sup>1</sup> Minute 3, LORD CURZON asked whether M. Cambon had had any reply from his Government regarding the disposal of the ten ships which the British delegation proposed to exact from Turkey.

*Turkish  
Mercantile  
Shipping*

M. CAMBON said that he had had a reply, to the effect that M. Millerand shared the views of Signor Scialoja and thought it best to leave these vessels to Turkey.

LORD CURZON said that apparently the French and Italian Governments were opposed to the British proposal. It might perhaps be argued that these Governments were being generous with property that they were not likely to receive, as in all probability the ships would be attributed to Great Britain in accordance with any calculation of proportional losses. He himself rather wondered at the generosity shown to Turkey, which had certainly done little to deserve it. He hoped that his colleagues would not grudge a slight compensation to Great Britain for the great losses she had incurred in conducting the campaign against Turkey.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA argued that it was undesirable to deprive Turkey of all means of recuperating. The ten ships in question were the only ones belonging to Turkey that were capable of making a long voyage; all the rest were merely coasting vessels.

M. CAMBON asked whether these ships would be of any particular value to the Allies.

MR. VANSITTART said that, in the present penury of shipping, they would certainly have some value.

LORD CURZON asked Viscount Chinda what the view of his Government was.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that he had already agreed to the British memorandum after consulting the Japanese naval attaché, and he did not wish to modify the opinion he had previously expressed.

LORD CURZON observed that the conference was equally divided. If the French and Italian Government wished to insist upon their point of view,

<sup>1</sup> No. 76.

the matter would have to go to the Supreme Council. He doubted whether the question was worth it, and he could not believe that the case for showing any favour to Turkey was a strong one.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he understood the Supreme Council had decided that Turkey should not pay any reparations. His proposal had therefore been in accordance with their decision.

LORD CURZON said he understood the Supreme Council to have decided that Great Britain should not recover the £750,000<sup>2</sup> she had spent on fighting Turkey, and the British Government had no intention of going back on this. He did not think that all reparation was ruled out of the treaty with Turkey. If Signor Scialoja wished to maintain his suggestion, it would have to be discussed at some future date by the Supreme Council.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he reserved his decision pending consultation with his advisers.

M. CAMBON said that he had received instructions from his Government, to which he would communicate Lord Curzon's observations. He thought that even if Turkey made no very efficient use of the ships, she might well sell them and thereby obtain some liquid assets.

LORD CURZON said that the conference would wait until Signor Scialoja had consulted his advisers, and bring up the question again.

2. LORD CURZON suggested that the conference should, without discussing the main report of Marshal Foch on the military measures necessary to enforce the treaty with Turkey, take into consideration the reply of the military and naval representatives concerning certain matters referred to them; among others, that of the employment of Allied officers in the Turkish police forces. These matters were contained in Annex 3 of the report (A.J. 140) (see Appendix 1).

*Allied Officers in  
Turkish Police  
and Gendarmerie*

Paragraph 1 (a) was read.

After some considerable discussion as to whether 'Turkish police' and 'Turkish gendarmerie' were identical terms, it was decided—

To regard 'Turkish police' as distinct from 'Turkish gendarmerie' and as part of the Civil Administration of Turkey, and to ask the Drafting Committee to insert a clause in some appropriate place stipulating that foreign officers should be employed in it in the same manner and to the same extent as in the gendarmerie.

Paragraph 1 (b) was read and accepted.

Paragraph 1 (c) was read.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said he thought it was undesirable to establish both a minimum and a maximum, as suggested in the additional paragraph to be added to article 9. He thought it was very necessary to mention a maximum. If the Allies were unable to find the whole number it would be open to them

<sup>2</sup> The typescript text here read correctly '£750,000,000'.

to insist upon a working minimum. If the minimum were stated, the Turks would make use of it to resist any appointment of Allied officers in excess of that minimum.

LORD CURZON said he did not quite agree with this view. In any case, he thought it was unnecessary to send the clause back to the military advisers on so small a point, which appeared to be a matter of drafting.

Paragraph 1 (c) was then accepted.

Paragraph 2 (a) and (b) were read and accepted.

Paragraph 2 (c) appeared to be founded upon a misinterpretation of the reference; it was therefore left out of account.

The addition to article 15, however, was accepted, as well as the modifications proposed to article 20.

It was understood that the fourth paragraph to be added to article 20 referred to numbers rather than to proportions.

The secretary was instructed to inform the Drafting Committee accordingly.

3. The observations of the naval and military representatives<sup>3</sup> were read.

*Demilitarised Zone and the Islands of the Aegean* It was pointed out that the naval and military advisers did not attach much importance to the demilitarisation of the Island of Muskonisi.

MR. VANSITTART, however, pointed out that if this island were demilitarised, together with a portion of the coast adjacent to it, certain alterations would become necessary in the delimitation of the Smyrna area. The proposal, as it stood, unless this delimitation were revised, might deprive Greece of the town of Aivali, which was overwhelmingly Greek in population.

It was agreed—

Not to demilitarise the Island of Muskonisi, and to accept the views of the naval and military representatives, which were interpreted to be in this sense, and that the Drafting Committee should be instructed accordingly.

4. The report of the naval and military representatives<sup>3</sup> was read.

It was agreed—

*Report of the Commission on the Straits and the Sea of Marmora. Articles 1 and 8, and 22 to 27*

That they had not studied the text referred to them, and that the question they put to the conference need not be answered.

LORD CURZON said that the British Admiralty had certain objections to raise to the text proposed by the commission. He assumed that the British Admiralty would have had their views represented by Captain Fuller in Paris. This did not appear to have been done. He must therefore inform the Admiralty that they should take some opportunity of putting forward their views.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI asked whether the whole question of the Straits was to be reopened?

<sup>3</sup> See appendix 1 below.

MR. VANSITTART said that the British Admiralty would ask for a few verbal alterations in the proposed clauses, certain of these alterations being of some substance.

It was agreed—

That the subject should be discussed again on receipt of the views of the British Admiralty.

Mr. Vansittart undertook to communicate with the British Admiralty on the subject, on behalf of the conference.

5. The opinion of the naval and military representatives<sup>3</sup> was read.

*Disposal of certain Islands in the Sea of Marmora* LORD CURZON said that their opinion amounted to a recommendation that these islands should remain Turkish, seeing that there was no question of a mandate of the guaranteeing Powers.

It was agreed—

That these islands should be left to Turkey.

The secretary was instructed to communicate the above decision to the Drafting Committee.

6. LORD CURZON called attention to three articles relating to the waterways of the Straits and the Sea of Marmora, contained in Paper

*The Waterways of the Straits and the Sea of Marmora* A.J. 51A (extract) (see Appendix 2).

Article 5 was read and accepted.

Article 6 was read.

M. KAMMERER said that he thought the reservations could now be withdrawn.

Article 6 as drafted was accepted.

Article 11 was read.

M. KAMMERER observed that all the outstanding questions in relation to this article had been settled. All that was required was to fill in the blank references to article and chapter.

Article 11 as drafted was accepted.

The Secretary was instructed to inform the Drafting Committee accordingly.

7. The conference had under consideration a copy of a letter from the Armenian delegation to the president of the Peace Conference (A.J. 133) (see Appendix 3), dated the 25th March, 1920, putting forward a request for the liberation of Armenian women and children who had been seized by the Turks.

*Liberation of Armenian Women and Children seized by the Turks*

M. KAMMERER pointed out that this request was covered by the articles in the Treaty of Peace dealing with the protection of minorities.

It was agreed—

That a courteous reply should be sent to the Armenian delegation, acknowledging receipt of the letter and stating that the Allied Powers had endeavoured to make the necessary provision in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

The secretary was instructed to take the necessary action.

8. The conference had before them a copy of a letter from the Armenian delegation, dated the 25th March, 1920 (A.J. 134) (see *Forcible Enrolment of Armenians by the Turks* Appendix 4), addressed to the president of the Peace Conference, stating that information which they believed to be reliable had reached the delegation to the effect that the Turkish authorities were taking steps forcibly to enrol Armenians in the Vilayet of Angora, and asking the Supreme Council to take the necessary steps to meet the new danger which was menacing the Armenians.

It was agreed—

That the conference could take no action in the matter beyond instructing the secretary to acknowledge the letter.

9. The conference had under consideration a copy of a letter from the Georgian delegation to the president of the Peace Conference, dated the 25th March, 1920 (A.J. 135) (see Appendix 5), setting forth the claims of Georgia to Batum. *Batum. Georgian Claims*

After a brief discussion it was agreed—

That a letter of acknowledgment should be sent to the Georgian delegation stating that the question had been most carefully considered by the Peace Conference, and, indeed, that the Georgian claims were still under consideration by the Supreme Council.

The secretary was instructed to take the necessary action.

10. The conference had before them a copy of a letter from the Armenian delegation, dated the 31st March, 1920 (A.J. 139) (see *Minorities Treaty with Armenia* Appendix 6), to the British secretary of the Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, acknowledging receipt of a copy of the draft of the treaty regarding minorities in Armenia,<sup>4</sup> and asking that the following phrase might be added to article 5:—

‘Ces institutions de même que toutes les autres identiques, devant être sous le contrôle de l’État.’

M. KAMMERER pointed out that the article as it stood was a classical clause which had been introduced into all treaties, and it was undesirable, therefore, that any modification of the clause should be made in the treaty relating to minorities in Armenia.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 73, appendix 2.

This view was adopted by the conference, and the secretary was instructed to acknowledge the Armenian delegation's letter, regretting that, in the circumstances pointed out above, it was impossible to accede to the request contained therein.

11. The conference had under consideration a copy of a letter from M. Veniselos to the President of the Supreme Council, dated the 23rd March, 1920 (A.J. 123) (see Appendix 7), stating that it was understood that a meeting of the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Executive Commission was about to be held in London in order to discuss the allotment of the German mercantile marine among the Allied Governments, and asking that a representative of the Greek Government might be admitted to its sittings.

*Allocation of  
Enemy Tonnage.  
Allotment of the  
German Mer-  
cantile Marine  
among Allied  
Governments*

LORD CURZON said that he was not quite certain what this particular commission was to which M. Veniselos referred. He understood that it was a section of the Reparation Commission which sat in London and dealt with maritime affairs.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI thought that in any case the conference was not concerned with this particular question.

VISCOUNT CHINDA suggested that M. Veniselos might be referred to the Reparation Commission in Paris.

After a short discussion it was agreed—

That the secretary should ascertain exactly what was the commission to which M. Veniselos referred, and that, if it were discovered to be a section of the Reparation Commission, M. Veniselos should be advised to address himself to the chairman of that commission in Paris. If, on the other hand, it were an independent commission sitting in London, he should similarly address the chairman of that body.

12. VISCOUNT CHINDA said he wished to raise a point with reference to the reservation he had made at a previous conference when the composition of the High Commission to administer the Straits and the Sea of Marmora was under consideration by the conference.<sup>5</sup> The Japanese Government had taken the question into their further and serious consideration, in the light of the detailed report submitted by himself upon the previous discussion of the subject, but the Japanese Government felt unable to dissuade themselves from their original conviction that, having regard to the true nature of the commission, Japan should be entitled to a representative as one of the responsible parties to this treaty, and also as one of the principal State-members of the League of Nations. In these circumstances, Viscount Chinda said, it was his duty to submit the Japanese case once more to the consideration and decision of the conference.

*Administration of  
the Straits and  
the Sea of  
Ma[r]mora. Com-  
position of the  
High Commission*

<sup>5</sup> See No. 48, minute 1.



LORD CURZON said that the original decision had been that the commission should be composed of representatives of the three Great Powers, and of Roumania and Greece, and also, in due course, of Russia and Bulgaria if and when these two countries joined the League of Nations. At their previous discussion, when Japan had asked to be represented on the commission as one of the principal Powers, the conference had decided against this, as it was considered that Japan was hardly at all concerned in the matter, having regard to the strictly limited amount of her shipping tonnage and mercantile interests generally in that quarter.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that the principal grounds for preferring this request were, first, that Japan was one of the Great Powers responsible for the treaty, and, second, that she was one of the principal adherents to the League of Nations.

LORD CURZON enquired what were the views of the members of the conference on the subject.

M. CAMBON said that he had consulted the French Government, and they were prepared to accept this proposal.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA stated that he had already said, at their previous discussion, that Italy would raise no objection.

LORD CURZON said that His Majesty's Government would gladly follow the line which had been suggested by his colleagues. He would, however, ask whether Japan would be prepared, in the circumstances, to share any part of the military responsibility so far as this part of the world was concerned.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said he could not give a definite answer to this question without further reference to his Government. That Government had regarded it as a question of privilege, and for that reason they had not asked for a share in the military control. He would, however, refer the matter to Japan.

LORD CURZON pointed out that he made no definite proposal. The garrison of the Straits was to be provided by the three Great Powers. That was all that had been fixed at present; but in the future it might be difficult for those Powers to maintain the garrison at full strength. As, however, Japan was now claiming a voice in the control of the navigation of the Straits, was she taking up the position that she would prefer a claim or state her readiness to share in the military burden involved? He did not ask Viscount Chinda to give a reply that day, but merely to refer the matter to his Government. He understood that the Japanese claim was based only on the fact that she had been one of the Great Powers in the war, and one of the chief adherents to the League of Nations, and not on her shipping or commercial interests. Supposing, however, it might be necessary later for the Powers to take military measures to enforce the execution of the treaty, would Japan be prepared to contribute troops?

VISCOUNT CHINDA pointed out that Japan had not been asked to participate in the military control of the Straits.

LORD CURZON said that Japan was claiming certain privileges and advantages, but was undertaking no obligations in return.

VISCOUNT CHINDA enquired, in the event of Japan being ready to furnish

troops, would the Supreme Council, in that case, be willing to admit her to a share of the military control?

LORD CURZON said that this was really not the question at all. Japan was now, for the first time, claiming certain privileges, and he wished to know whether she would accept any obligations in return.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that Japan would certainly do her duty in the matter. It did not, however, necessarily follow that she would send military forces unless she, in turn, were admitted to a share of the military control of the Straits.

LORD CURZON said that the point he was trying to ascertain was, should the Powers find it necessary to employ troops to enforce the treaty, would Japan feel it her duty to contribute and send military assistance?

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that he did not think Japan would undertake this unless she were admitted to a share of the military control.

LORD CURZON said that what Japan stated was: 'For the first time a commission has been set up for the control of the Dardanelles, and we would like to play a part.' Did that mean that Japan would, in future, play a not inconsiderable part in Eastern Mediterranean politics, or was she merely claiming this privilege in order to satisfy the national pride?

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that Japan was asking for it in accordance with what had been adopted in the case of the other treaties; that is to say, that the five Principal Powers should assume joint responsibility. Japan did not ask to share in the military control of the Straits. Her present request had nothing to do with political or military affairs. Japan only asked it because she felt that representation on the commission was her due. If, however, Japan were expected to take part in military expeditions, she certainly ought to share the military control.

It was agreed—

- (a) That the Japanese Ambassador should refer the question to his Government.
- (b) That in the fourth line of draft article 4 for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, dealing with the administration over the waters of the Straits and the Sea of Marmora,<sup>6</sup> after the words 'the Italian Government' the words 'the Japanese Government' should be inserted; and in the tenth line of the same article the word 'Japan' should similarly be inserted after 'Italy.'

The secretary was instructed to inform the Drafting Committee accordingly.

13. The conference had under consideration a letter from the secretary to the War Office to the British secretary to the Supreme Council, the contents of which were as follows:—

*Treaty of Peace  
with Turkey.  
Military Clauses*

'I am commanded by the Army Council to inform you, with reference to the draft military terms of the Turkish Peace Treaty,<sup>7</sup> that the Foreign Office have pointed out the desirability

<sup>6</sup> See No. 40.

<sup>7</sup> See No. 65, appendix 1, document 2.

of including some expression in article 17 to make it quite clear that the principle of enlistment laid down in article 15 is also applicable to the appointment of officers.

'Also, with regard to article 27, that it should be made quite clear that it is the Turks who will be responsible for the destruction of the fortifications in the zone Trebizond-Erzinjan.

'I am to say that the Army Council endorse both the above suggestions, which they venture to propose might be dealt with direct by the Drafting Committee.'<sup>8</sup>

After a short discussion the conference agreed—

To accept both the above suggestions, and the secretary was instructed to inform the Drafting Committee accordingly.

2, Whitehall Gardens, April 7, 1920.

## APPENDIX I TO No. 78

### *Draft Treaty with Turkey<sup>9</sup>*

#### *Opinion of the Allied Military and Naval Representatives regarding—*

- I. The proposals submitted by the Committee for the Protection of Minorities in Turkey in the preamble to its report and amended by the Supreme Council at its meeting of the 12th March (letter from Mr. Lloyd George dated the 15th March).<sup>10</sup>
- II. The demilitarisation of the Island of Muskonisi and of the islets adjacent to the Islands of the Ægean, the demilitarisation of which was approved by the Supreme Council on the 21st February, 1920 (letter A.J. 63<sup>11</sup> of the 4th March from the British secretary of the Supreme Council, communicated by Mr. Lloyd George on the 15th March).
- III. Articles 1, 8 and 22-27 of the report of the Committee for the Administration of Waterways, the Straits and the Sea of Marmora (letter from Mr. Lloyd George of the 15th March).<sup>12</sup>
- IV. The allocation of the islands in the Sea of Marmora (memorandum from M. Veniselos, dated the 8th March, 1920, A.J. 83,<sup>13</sup> transmitted by Mr. Lloyd George's letter of the 20th March).

<sup>8</sup> In the typescript text this letter was headed: 'War Office, London S.W. 1, April 4, 1920. Sir, I am commanded', &c.; the letter in this text concluded '... the Drafting Committee. I am, Sir, Your obedient Servant, H. J. Creedy.'

<sup>9</sup> In the typescript text this document was further headed: 'Versailles Military Committee. Meeting of 27 March 1920.'

<sup>10</sup> Cf. No. 57, minute 3, and No. 58, minute 3.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. No. 58, minute 3.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. No. 44, minute 1.

<sup>13</sup> Appendix 3 to No. 63.

*Proposals of the Committee for the Protection of Minorities, amended by the Supreme Council.*<sup>10</sup>

1. Foreign officers nominated by Allied and Associated Powers shall be appointed to the Turkish gendarmerie and police, in a proportion not exceeding 25 per cent. of the total number of officers of that force; such officers shall have the same executive powers as Turkish officers.

2. In each district the police, gendarmerie and rural and forest guards shall be recruited and officered with due regard to the racial factors in the local population. The non-Moslem elements shall be chiefly represented in the important posts.

*Opinion of the Military and Naval Representatives*

1.—(a) The presence of Allied officers in the Turkish police would appear to be useless;<sup>14</sup> it would seem to be sufficient that Allied officers should be admitted to the Turkish gendarmerie, in conformity with the provisions already contained in article 9 of the draft military clauses prepared on the 12th March.<sup>7</sup>

(b) The above-mentioned article 9 specifies that Allied officers 'shall collaborate, under the direction of the Ottoman Government, in the command, in the organisation and training of the gendarmerie.'

This in itself will give them the same executive powers as the Turkish officers.

(c) The proportion of 25 per cent. of Allied or neutral officers to be admitted to the gendarmerie is a maximum which runs a risk of never being attained, since it would be equivalent to the employment of 625 such officers.

The proportion might better be kept at 10 per cent. to 15 per cent.

In view of the preceding remarks, it would merely be necessary to complete article 9 of the draft treaty (military clauses) by inserting the following paragraph at the end:—

'The total number of Allied or neutral officers to be admitted into the Turkish gendarmerie shall not exceed from 10 per cent. to 15 per cent. of the total strength of Turkish gendarmerie officers.'

2.—(a) The principle that account must be taken of the racial factors in the local population when recruiting the gendarmerie was laid down in the military clauses of the Treaty of Peace drafted on the 12th March, 1920, article 15 (second paragraph) of which is worded as follows:—

'The recruiting (of the legions) shall be in principle regional, and so regulated that the Musulman and non-Musulman elements of the population of each region may be, as far as possible, represented on the strength of the corresponding legion, and distributed within the territory of this region in accordance with the ethnic

<sup>14</sup> *Note in original:* 'This objection, which is of a purely military nature, in no wise refers to any decision which might be taken by the Supreme Council regarding the admission of Allied civilian officials into the Turkish police.'

and religious character of the populations of this territory.'

It would therefore be sufficient to specify that these provisions apply to the recruiting of the legions and the distribution of their cadres, as well as to the recruiting and distribution of the troops (see below).

(b) There is no objection to the extension of the same principle to the recruiting, officering and distribution of the police and rural and forest guards.

(c) With regard to the stipulation that the non-Moslem elements should be chiefly represented in the important posts, the acceptance of this would involve certain disadvantages. If enforced in certain important but entirely Moslem centres, for instance, it would in fact run the risk of being in opposition to the fundamental principle of recruiting set forth above; the tendency of this principle is, on the contrary, to make the composition of the gendarmerie and police correspond to the ethnical and religious conditions of each region or district.

As a result of the preceding remarks—

1. Article 15 should be completed by the following paragraph:—

'The provisions of the two preceding paragraphs apply both to the recruiting and distribution of the senior and junior cadres and to the recruiting and distribution of the men.'

2. Chapter V, article 20, should be altered as follows:—

*Title:* Instead of 'Customs Officials, Local Police,' read 'Customs Officials, Local Urban and Rural Police, Forest Guards.'

*Article 20:* Add a fourth paragraph worded as follows:—

'In each administrative district the local urban police and rural and forest guards shall be recruited, officered and distributed according to the principles laid down in the case of the gendarmerie in article 15, second, third and fourth paragraphs.'

## II.—*Provisions relating to the Islands in the Ægean*

### *Opinion of the Military and Naval Representatives*

The islets adjacent to the Islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace, Tenedos and Mitylene are of

*Proposals contained in Letter  
A.J. 63 of March 4 from British  
Secretary of Supreme Council.*<sup>11</sup>

On February 21, 1920, the Supreme Council approved the demilitarisation of the Islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace, Tenedos and Mitylene and of the islands in the Sea of Marmora.

It appears desirable that the islands mentioned above should include the Island of Muskonisi and the unnamed islets adjacent to the islands in the Ægean referred to above.

no interest from the naval and military point of view.

There is no objection to the demilitarisation of the Island of Muskonisi, provided the line marking the southern limit of the demilitarised zone in the Straits be extended along the southern coast of the Gulf of Adramyti as far as the western extremity of the peninsula of Tuz-Burnu.

### III

#### *Opinion of the Military and Naval Representatives*

Articles 1, 8 and 22 to 27 of the draft prepared by the Committee for the Administration of Waterways, the Straits and the Sea of Marmora.<sup>12</sup>

The naval representatives, after discussion of the articles referred to in the margin, have unanimously expressed the following opinions, with which the military representatives associate themselves:—

#### *Draft Regulations for the Straits*

It is impossible for the naval advisers to agree and to express an opinion on the proposed regulation[s] until they are aware of what is understood by 'freedom of the Straits.'

Does this mean freedom of navigation for warships and merchant vessels both in war-time and in time of peace, without distinction of nationality?

If so, the text submitted entails numerous restrictions of that freedom, the object and limits of which it would appear necessary to define.

*Commission.*—It would seem that the ordinary rôle of the commission is not consistent with its title of 'High Commission' and the power given it by article 8 of requisitioning the assistance of naval and military forces.

The most logical form of organisation would probably be to have High Commissioners (who might be the Ambassadors of each of the guarantor Powers) under whom there would be a Straits Commission preferably composed of administrators and technical experts, specially charged to ensure the application of article 7 and connected articles.

#### IV

*Proposals made by M. Veniselos  
in his memorandum of  
March 8, A. J. 83<sup>13</sup>*

The population of the western islands in the Sea of Marmora, enumerated in the annex to the memorandum being almost exclusively Greek

(33,205 Greek to 245 Turkish and 116 other races out of a total population of 33,566)

M. Veniselos requests that these islands should be annexed to Greece.

#### *Opinion of the Military and Naval Representatives*

The islands in question are situated in the centre of a zone which will be demilitarised under the superintendence and guarantee of [? the] three Great Powers.

By reason of the special importance of the portion of this zone surrounding the Sea of Marmora, the demilitarisation of the part in question cannot be effectually guaranteed unless the whole territory and all the islands situated therein are either placed under the mandate of the guarantor Powers, or left to Turkey, over whom the guarantor Powers will exercise joint control.

It is consequently considered, from the military point of view, that the proposals contained in M. Veniselos's memorandum of the 8th March are open to certain objections.

<i>France:</i>	<i>Great Britain:</i>
FOCH.	SACKVILLE-WEST.
LE VASSEUR.	FULLER.
<i>Italy:</i>	<i>Japan:</i>
BASSETTO.	WATANABE.
GRASSI.	TAGOSHIMA.

#### APPENDIX 2 TO No. 78

#### *Note by the British Secretary of the Supreme Council*

[A. J. 51A (extract)]<sup>15</sup>

The following extracts from the report of the Committee on the Administration of the Waterways of the Straits and the Sea of Marmora, with draft articles as amended by the Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, is [sic] herewith circulated for information:—

It is hoped that these two questions will be considered by the Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers to be held at the Foreign Office at 4 P.M. this afternoon.

#### *Article 5*

Each commissioner shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.  
The above article was accepted without amendment.

#### *Article 6*

The commission will exercise the powers given by this treaty in complete independence of the local authority. It will have its own flag, its own budget and its separate organisation.

<sup>15</sup> Supplied from the typescript text.

The above article was accepted by the British and Italian representatives, on the understanding that the whole of the financial arrangements therein contained would be reopened when the proposals for the financial conditions of peace with Turkey came to be discussed.

*Article 11*

Subject to the general control which is conferred upon the commission, the rights of any persons or companies now holding concessions as to lighthouses, docks, quays, or other matters shall be preserved; but the commission shall be entitled if they think it necessary in the general interests of the administration of the Straits to buy out or modify the rights of the holder of any such concession upon the conditions agreed upon in article<sup>16</sup> <sup>17</sup> of Chapter <sup>17</sup> of the present treaty.

It was agreed to reserve the consideration of the above article until it has been decided what economic powers are to be given to the Financial Commission.

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 30, 1920.

APPENDIX 3 TO No. 78

*Armenian Delegation to the President of the Peace Conference*

(A.J. 133.)

LONDRES, le 25 mars 1920

M. le Président,

Parmi les maux que la guerre et les débordements turcs ont infligés au peuple arménien, il est un point sur lequel nous nous permettons d'attirer la généreuse attention de la conférence, en raison de son importance et des réparations qu'il appelle.

Au cours des déportations, lorsque le peuple arménien, sans défense, était traité comme un véritable bétail humain, un grand nombre de femmes ou d'enfants, dont le total est évalué à plus de 100,000 âmes, ont été partagés entre les musulmans des régions turques et arabes. Ces malheureuses épouses se trouvent actuellement séquestrées chez leurs ravisseurs et attendent leur libération depuis 1915.

Nous venons donc prier la conférence de bien vouloir insérer, dans le Traité de Paix avec la Turquie, une clause prévoyant leur restitution immédiate à la nation arménienne et déterminant de façon précise les conditions de leur libération, avec des sanctions particulièrement sévères pour les détenteurs qui, sous une forme quelconque, se soustrairaient à l'obligation de restituer à la nation arménienne toute femme et tout enfant arménien vivant sous le joug de leurs ravisseurs.

Veillez, &c.,

A. AHARONIAN,  
*Président de la Délégation de la République  
arménienne à la Conférence de la Paix.*

BOGHOS NUBAR,  
*Président de la Délégation nationale  
arménienne.*

<sup>16</sup> Note in original: 'i.e., in the economic section of this treaty.'

<sup>17</sup> Omission in original.



#### APPENDIX 4 TO No. 78

##### *Armenian Delegation to the President of the Peace Conference*

(A.J. 134.)

LONDRES, le 25 mars, 1920

M. le Président,

Nous avons l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que, d'après des informations de source sûre, la population arménienne de Bogazliane, vilayet d'Angora, se trouve dans une situation particulièrement critique.

Les autorités turques procèdent à des enrôlements forcés des Arméniens échappés aux massacres, et elles ont constitué un soi-disant tribunal uniquement composé d'officiers, qui, après un jugement sommaire, condamne et emprisonne les Arméniens.

Ces nouvelles sont d'autant plus alarmantes que les faits qui nous sont signalés sont exactement la reproduction de ceux qui ont été le prodrome des massacres de 1915. Alors aussi on procédait à de soi-disant enrôlements; et les Arméniens emmenés sous prétexte d'être soumis au service militaire, étaient massacrés à peine à quelques kilomètres plus loin.

Ces faits plongent dans l'angoisse et le désespoir nos malheureux compatriotes et nous causent les plus profondes inquiétudes.

En conséquence, nous prions instamment le Conseil suprême de vouloir bien prendre les mesures qu'il jugera efficaces pour écarter le nouveau danger qui menace les Arméniens.

Veuillez, &c.,

A. AHARONIAN,

*Président de la Délégation de la République  
arménienne à la Conférence de la Paix.*

BOGHOS NUBAR,

*Président de la Délégation nationale  
arménienne.*

#### APPENDIX 5 TO No. 78

##### *Georgian Delegation to the President of the Peace Conference*

(A.J. 135.)

HOTEL CURZON, LONDRES, le 25 mars, 1920

M. le Président,

En se référant à ses notes précédentes concernant la question de Batoum<sup>18</sup> la délégation de la Géorgie croit devoir prier votre Excellence de porter à la connaissance du Conseil suprême ce qui suit:

1. Il appert des dépêches nouvellement reçues par la délégation que les élections municipales, qui eurent lieu à la fin du mois de février dernier à Batoum au suffrage universel et sur la base de représentation proportionnelle, ont donné les résultats suivants: Ont été élus membres du Conseil municipal sur la liste géorgienne vingt représentants, sur la liste grecque huit représentants, ensuite quelques Arméniens, Russes, &c., en tout vingt Géorgiens sur trente-six représentants.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. No. 71, appendix 2.

Il paraît que ce résultat, obtenu dans les conditions assez compliquées où la ville de Batoum se trouve actuellement, démontre clairement le caractère géorgien de la ville de Batoum, et confirme pleinement ce que les délégués géorgiens ont affirmé devant la commission instituée par le Conseil suprême pour l'étude des frontières de l'Arménie.

2. Les Gouvernements des grandes Puissances alliées n'ignorent pas la grande activité déployée par les nationalistes turcs dans l'Anatolie orientale. Disposant à Erzeroum d'une base politique et militaire fortement organisée, les Turcs tâchent de préparer un mouvement musulman dans la province de Batoum, dont la frontière est souvent franchie par des bandes irrégulières armées. L'occupation de Batoum et d'Ardahan est ouvertement réclamée dans les milieux nationalistes turcs, et une agitation énergique est poursuivie sans relâche dans ce sens. Ainsi, non seulement l'avenir de la province de Batoum devient tout à fait précaire, mais la Géorgie se trouve sous la menace d'un coup de main, sur toute l'étendue de sa frontière du côté sud-ouest. Pour juger de l'importance de ce danger, il ne faut pas perdre de vue qu'à cette occasion tous les éléments hostiles à la Géorgie et à son indépendance qui se trouvent dans ces parages font et feront cause commune avec les nationalistes turcs; tels sont surtout les partisans et les agents des bolcheviks d'une part, et les réactionnaires russes d'autre part, réunis cette fois dans leur haine commune de la Géorgie indépendante.

En se rendant compte de tous ces dangers, le Gouvernement de la République géorgienne estime que le seul moyen d'y parer serait, dans les conditions actuelles, fourni par l'occupation par les troupes géorgiennes des points stratégiques dans la province de Batoum, ce qui faciliterait au Gouvernement géorgien d'une manière très sensible la défense du territoire géorgien contre une agression. Dans le même but, l'occupation des districts d'Ardahan et d'Olty est aussi jugée nécessaire par l'état-major géorgien, dont les considérations techniques pourraient être soumises, s'il y a lieu, au Conseil suprême ou à ses experts.

3. La nécessité ci-dessus exposée de faciliter à la Géorgie la défense de son territoire du côté sud-ouest est d'autant plus sentie par le Gouvernement et par le commandement militaire géorgiens que le danger principal qui menace la Géorgie est et reste toujours le danger d'une invasion bolcheviste. La sécurité militaire de la Géorgie sera singulièrement compromise dans le cas où elle est attaquée simultanément des deux côtés. Il est évident que, pour mieux organiser la défense des accès qui mènent du nord dans l'intérieur du pays et par où les forces bolchevistes pourraient y pénétrer, la sécurité des frontières, susceptibles d'une attaque dirigée d'Erzeroum, doit être assurée par tous les moyens nécessaires, et parmi ces moyens le principal est l'occupation par les troupes géorgiennes des points stratégiques dans les localités ci-haut mentionnées, ce qui donnerait à la Géorgie un front facile à défendre avec des forces peu nombreuses.

4. Quant à la défense de la Géorgie contre l'attaque éventuelle des troupes des Soviets, les conditions de l'efficacité de cette défense ont été expliquées par les délégués géorgiens devant le Conseil suprême et ses experts militaires. A cette occasion, on a envisagé la nécessité urgente de venir en aide aux deux Républiques transcaucasiennes par l'envoi des munitions, du matériel de guerre et des céréales.

Depuis lors, deux mois sont écoulés, le danger bolcheviste est devenu plus imminent après l'occupation par les Soviets de la province du Kouban, et les deux Gouvernements transcauciens attendent toujours l'aide promise par les grandes Puissances alliées.

Le Gouvernement géorgien a donné des preuves suffisantes de sa stabilité et de

son ascendant sur les populations soumises à son autorité. Il sera en mesure de conjurer aussi le danger bolcheviste. Mais les moyens matériels lui manquent, et, s'il n'est pas secouru à temps, les conséquences qui s'ensuivront frapperont non seulement la Géorgie et la Transcaucasie, mais l'Asie antérieure tout entière.

Veuillez, &c.,

N. TCHEIDZE,

*Président de la Délégation.*

#### APPENDIX 6 TO No. 78

##### *Armenian Delegation to Sir M. Hankey*

(A.J. 139.)

LONDRES, le 31 mars, 1920

M. le Colonel,

J'ai l'honneur de vous accuser réception et de vous remercier de l'envoi que vous avez bien voulu me faire, de la part de Mr. Lloyd George, d'une copie du projet du traité concernant les minorités de l'Arménie.<sup>19</sup>

Conformément à votre demande de vous faire connaître les observations que ce projet pourrait suggérer à la délégation arménienne, je lui ai soumis le projet et nous avons l'honneur d'attirer la bienveillante attention de la conférence sur un seul point de l'article 5, à la fin duquel nous croyons qu'il serait utile d'ajouter la phrase suivante:

'Ces institutions, de même que toutes les autres identiques, devant être sous le contrôle de l'État.'

La délégation arménienne, en présentant ses vifs remerciements à la Conférence des Ambassadeurs, est heureuse de rendre hommage à la hauteur d'esprit qui a présidé à la rédaction du projet du traité dont il s'agit.

Agréé, &c.

A. AHARONIAN,

*Président de la Délégation de la République  
arménienne à la Conférence de la Paix.*

BOGHOS NUBAR,

*Président de la Délégation nationale  
arménienne.*

#### APPENDIX 7 TO No. 78

##### Document 1

##### *M. Veniselos to Mr. Lloyd George*

(A.J. 123.)

RITZ HOTEL, PICCADILLY, LONDON, March 23, 1920

Sir,

I am informed that a meeting of the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Executive Commission is about to be held in London in order to discuss the allotment of the German mercantile marine among Allied Governments.

<sup>19</sup> Note in filed copy: 'See A.J. 128.' (See No. 73, appendix 2.)

As you are aware, Sir, the Greek mercantile marine sustained exceedingly heavy losses during the war. The enclosed notice shows these losses of the Greek mercantile marine, and, further, gives the names of enemy steamers lying in Greek ports on the outbreak of hostilities and seized there in the course of the war by the Allied authorities.

In view of the importance of the Greek interests affected, I am extremely anxious that the Greek Government should be represented on the above commission during its meetings in London, and I venture to draw your attention to this matter and would have recourse to your kindness to recommend, on behalf of the Supreme Council, to the aforesaid Inter-Allied Commission that a representative of the Greek Government be admitted at its sittings.

I beg, &c.,  
E. K. VENISELOS

## Document 2

### *Statement showing the Losses of the Greek Mercantile Marine*<sup>20</sup>

En 1914: 350 vapeurs, 493,000 tonnes nettes, 820,000 tonnes brutes; 740 voiliers.

En 1915 (1<sup>er</sup> janvier): 474 vapeurs, 549,983 tonnes nettes; 884 voiliers.

Pertes subies par la Marine marchande hellénique à la suite de la Guerre sous-marine ainsi qu'il résulte des Déclarations de Dommages faites jusqu'en Octobre 1919.

	<i>Tonnes nettes</i>	<i>Dead- weight</i>	<i>Tonnes brutes</i>
<i>Vapeurs coulés.</i>			
3 vapeurs transatlantiques à passagers .	12,009	24,995	20,033
144 vapeurs transatlantiques cargo-boats .	238,237	621,307	376,817
14 vapeurs passagers . . . . .	5,370	13,303	9,576
16 vapeurs <i>séquestrés par l'ennemi</i> . . .	14,068	15,906	15,441
19 petits vapeurs coulés (remorqueurs, &c.)	10,073	10,332	10,139
8 vapeurs enfermés dans les ports de la mer Noire et pour cela vendus par leurs propriétaires à des prix tout à fait au-dessous de leur valeur .	10,019	25,327	15,761
5 vapeurs coulés par des sous-marins et se trouvant au service des Alliés .	930	2,421	1,673
Total: 209 vapeurs. . . . .	290,706	710,591 [sic]	449,440
<i>Voiliers.</i>			
277 voiliers . . . . .	14,853	32,134	..

<sup>20</sup> This heading was evidently a subsequent insertion in place of the following heading in the typescript text: 'Marine Marchande Hellénique'.

*Bateaux ennemis mouillés dans des Ports grecs et saisis par les Autorités alliées.*

*Allemands.*

1. 'Anatolia.'
2. 'Tinos.'
3. 'Serifes.'
4. 'Kytinos.'
5. 'Bogados.'
6. 'Malta.'
7. 'Bergens.'
8. 'Wilhelm.'
9. 'Bathilde.'

*Autrichiens.*

1. 'Marienbad.'
2. 'Corana.'
3. 'Sabatino.'

**No. 79**

I.C.P. 93.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors, held in Lord Curzon's Room at the British Foreign Office, Whitehall, London, S.W. 1, on Saturday, April 10, 1920, at 11 a.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: Mr. Vansittart; SECRETARIES, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Captain Abraham.

*France*: M. Cambon (*in the chair*), M. Kammerer.

*Italy*: Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Galli, Don Ascanio Colonna.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

1. The conference had before them a letter from the Armenian delegation to the President of the Peace Conference, dated the 27th March, 1920 (A.J. 142) (see Appendix 1), on the subject of the restoration of Armenian property by the Turks.

*Restoration of  
Armenian Property  
by the Turks*

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that he thought that what was requested had already been provided for in the treaty.

M. KAMMERER said that this was the case. The same would apply to the Armenians as to the Greeks. He suggested that a letter should be sent in reply to this effect.

It was agreed—

That the secretary should acknowledge the letter of the Armenian delegation, and say that the question had been considered by the conference and that provision had already been made to meet the case.

2. The conference had under consideration a letter from the Azerbaijan delegation to the President of the Supreme Council, dated the 31st March, 1920 (A.J. 143),<sup>1</sup> on the subject of the claims of the Azerbaijan Republic to Batum and Kars.

*Claims of the  
Azerbaijan  
Republic to Batum  
and Kars*

Pending the decision of the League of Nations,<sup>2</sup> this question was adjourned.

<sup>1</sup> Not appended to filed copy.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. No. 72, minute 5.

3. The conference had before them a letter and memorandum from M. Veniselos, dated the 1st April, 1920 (A.J. 144),<sup>1</sup> in regard to the allocation of Northern Thrace to Bulgaria, as proposed by President Wilson.<sup>3</sup>

*Allocation of  
Northern Thrace  
to Bulgaria, as  
proposed by  
President Wilson*

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that if the conference was not dealing with the reply to President Wilson, it was hardly worth while for it to consider M. Veniselos's views.

It was agreed—

That the secretary should acknowledge the letter, and that M. Veniselos should be informed that the conference had taken note of his views.

4. The conference had under consideration a letter from M. Veniselos to Sir M. Hankey, dated the 8th April, 1920 (A.J. 145) (see Appendix 2), on the subject of the Greek Minorities Treaty.

*Greek Minorities  
Treaty*

M. KAMMERER said that he had already explained to M. Veniselos that the second paragraph of article 7 had been modified by the conference. The modification was to the effect that there should be due regard for the interests of minorities. This formula, he believed, had relieved M. Veniselos's perplexities, which were aroused by the original draft of the commission. As to article 11, seeing that it only restricted the freedom of the Greek Government for two years, he thought that M. Veniselos was only protesting *pro forma*. There was one point, however, on which it might be desirable to answer M. Veniselos, who complained that Greece was being treated in a manner less satisfactory than Roumania and Jugoslavia. It might be pointed out to him that the situation in Turkey was totally different from the situation in Europe, with which those two countries were concerned. M. Veniselos, in conversation with him, had also raised another point. An arrangement had been made between Bulgaria and Greece for reciprocal emigration, the State from which emigrants set forth being burdened with their expenses. The treaty, as it now stood, made this arrangement applicable to Asia. M. Veniselos's consent had only been obtained to the scheme in so far as it concerned Europe. Any such policy in Asia Minor would involve great disturbances and very heavy burdens. Whereas in Europe there might be an exchange of some 60,000 persons, in Asia Minor the numbers interested might amount to 1,000,000. He thought it might be well to restrict the application of this arrangement to Europe.

M. CAMBON said that M. Veniselos believed he could remove all the Greeks from the Black Sea, Trebizond, &c., to Smyrna, and, to make room for them, expel the Turks from Smyrna.

MR. VANSITTART said that he would be disposed to leave the draft as it was, and to deal with difficulties as they arose.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI observed that M. Veniselos accepted the principle in Europe, where it suited him, and rejected it in Asia, where it did not. A principle should be a principle everywhere.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 75, minute 3.

M. KAMMERER said that the arrangement had been thought of in Europe in order to de-Balkanise certain limited areas. This process could not be effected as easily in Asia Minor.

After some further discussion it was decided—

To make no alteration in the text regarding reciprocal emigration.

It was further decided—

That the secretary should acknowledge the letter from M. Veniselos, and state that it had been considered by the conference.

5. A letter from the War Office to the Supreme Council,<sup>4</sup> dated the 1st April, 1920 (A.J. 146) (see Appendix 3), was read.

*Administration  
of Waterways of  
the Straits*

MR. VANSITTART said that the point raised by the War Office appeared to be unobjectionable. The conference had already decided that the High Commission of the Straits should be an independent body, and he thought it would be sufficient to refer the letter to the Drafting Committee.

This was agreed to, and the secretary was instructed to take the necessary action.

6. The conference had before them a note from the French Ambassador to the President of the Supreme Council, dated the 31st March, 1920 (A.J. 141),<sup>5</sup> on the trial of persons accused of breaches of the laws of war.

*Trial of Persons  
Accused of  
Breaches of the  
Laws of War*

Owing to the absence of the British Solicitor-General, this question was adjourned.

7. With reference to I.C.P. 92,<sup>6</sup> Minute 1, the conference had before them a memorandum by the British delegation (A.J. 98, Revise)<sup>7</sup>

*Surrender of  
Turkish Mer-  
cantile Marine*

on the subject of the surrender of Turkish mercantile marine. SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he did not insist upon the point he had made at the previous discussion on this subject.

M. CAMBON said that his instructions were to support Signor Scialoja; he would therefore follow him in his withdrawal.

It was therefore agreed—

That the ten ships should be disposed of in the manner proposed in the British memorandum (A.J. 98, Revise).

The secretary was instructed to communicate with the Drafting Committee accordingly.

8. The conference had before them a request by the Ruthenian delegation for an enquiry into the Polish atrocities in Ruthenia, dated the 11th March, 1920 (A.J. 119) (see Appendix 4).

*Polish Atrocities  
in Ruthenia*

As there was no information on the subject, it was decided to make no reply.

<sup>4</sup> The typescript text here read: '... to the British Secretary, Supreme Council'.

<sup>5</sup> Not appended to filed copy. See Volume VIII, No. 20, appendix 11.

<sup>6</sup> No. 78.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. No. 75, appendix 1.

9. The conference had before them the following paraphrase of a telegram from General Milne, at Constantinople, to the War Office, dated the 31st March, 1920, and received on the 3rd April, 1920:—

*The Security of  
the Mosque of  
Saint Sophia*

‘Reports are constantly being received that, in the event of the peace terms being unsatisfactory to Turkey, preparations are being made to destroy Saint Sophia. The mosque is occupied by Turkish armed guards, and any attempt to take military action would certainly lead to trouble and possibly to the destruction of the place. I suggest its security be made one of the conditions of peace, as I take no responsibility for its safety.’

MR. VANSITTART said that he saw no objection to inserting a clause in the treaty for the security of Saint Sophia.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that if the Turks meant to disregard the treaty they would disregard this clause in it. He thought the remedy suggested was not an effective one.

M. CAMBON said that he thought there was no other remedy but occupation by Allied troops.

CAPTAIN ABRAHAM suggested that it might be possible to protect the mosque by means of Indian Mahometan troops.

Mr. Vansittart was asked to convey this suggestion to General Milne.

The conference decided—

That it would be of no use to insert any special clause in the treaty for the safety of Saint Sophia.

10. With reference to I.C.P. 92,<sup>6</sup> Minute 4, the letter annexed as Appendix 5 was read.

*Report of the  
Commission on  
the Straits and the  
Sea of Marmora.  
Articles 1 and 8,  
and 22 to 27*

MR. VANSITTART said that he had informed the British Admiralty that the intentions of the conference regarding the freedom of the Straits were contained in a series of articles drafted on the subject. He thought the Admiralty should instruct their naval representative in Paris to study these articles, in order that a reasonable discussion should take place. He suggested that his colleagues should similarly instruct their naval departments.

M. KAMMERER said that the discussion which had taken place in the conference had been telegraphed to Paris.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said he had understood that the views of the British Admiralty would be communicated to the conference itself and discussed.

MR. VANSITTART said that the points were very technical. He thought it would be better to have them discussed by the naval experts in Paris.

After some further discussion it was decided—

That the conference could take no action beyond referring the points raised by the British Admiralty to the Allied naval representatives in Paris.

The Allied delegations undertook to inform their respective naval experts in Paris accordingly.



11. THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that he had received a communication from the Polish Government, which had doubtless been received by his colleagues, to the effect that Poland claimed a revival of the Capitulations in her favour.

*Revival of Capitulations in favour of Poland*

It was pointed out that the ancient Polish Republic had capitulatory rights in Turkey, and that the British Government, in claiming such rights, had based its claim upon the Polish model.<sup>8</sup> The text of article 1 of the draft economic clauses would only admit Poland if she were a signatory of the treaty, and it might be necessary to make a special clause.

M. KAMMERER said that all that would be required, should Poland not be a signatory of the treaty, would be to omit the words 'signatories to the present treaty' in the penultimate line of article 1.

It was agreed—

That this point should be referred to the Drafting Committee, and that the words 'signatories to the present treaty' should be maintained if Poland were one of the signatories, and suppressed if not; the purpose being to enable Poland to obtain capitulatory rights.

The secretary was instructed to take the necessary action.

12. M. CAMBON called attention to a letter written by M. Berthelot and sent to Mr. Lloyd George on the 8th April, 1920 (A.J. 147) (see Appendix 6), on the subject of the recognition of French protectorates over Morocco and Tunis. M. Cambon thought this matter would have been placed on the agenda. As his colleagues doubtless knew, the Sultan of Turkey still considered himself the Sovereign of Moslems all over the world, whether they were subjects of other Powers or resident in regions under the protectorate of other Powers. France exercised certain protectorates over Moslem countries, and therefore suggested a slight drafting alteration to articles 2 and 54 of the economic clauses.

*Recognition of French Protectorates over Morocco and Tunis*

MR. VANSITTART said that he had no instructions to deal with this matter. He felt no doubt, however, that the point could be settled very quickly at a later date.

M. KAMMERER observed that the French delegation had raised no objection to a clause drafted by their British colleague to cover the case of Egyptians. He thought Great Britain could scarcely object to a similar provision in favour of the French protectorates. The point was a small one, and could, he thought, be dealt with by the Drafting Committee without further discussion.

<sup>8</sup> See the correspondence of 1579-80 between H.M. Queen Elizabeth I and the Sultan Murad III, printed by Richard Hakluyt, *The principal navigations, voyages, traffiques & Discoveries of the English Nation* (Hakluyt Society, Extra Series, Glasgow 1903 f.) vol. v, pp. 169-89. See also the capitulations granted to Great Britain by the Sultan Mahomed IV in 1675, printed in Hertslet's *Treaties, &c. between Turkey and Foreign Powers 1535-1855*, pp. 247 ff.: cf. further Edward A. Van Dyck, *Report upon the Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire since the year 1150* (Washington, 1881), part 1, p. 16.

The proposal contained in M. Berthelot's letter regarding articles 2 and 54 of the economic clauses was accepted, subject to any observations to be made on the subject by the British delegation.

M. CAMBON said that the remainder of the document dealt with the desirability of inserting two articles requiring the recognition by Turkey of the French protectorates over Tunis and Morocco. This was a counterpart of what the French delegation had agreed to regarding Egypt.

MR. VANSITTART said that he was unable to discuss this question, which he thought should be reserved for the meeting of the council at San Remo.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he was ready to accept the proposal.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that if the proposal was in the same form as what had been stipulated in the treaty with Germany regarding Egypt, he had no objection.

The proposals contained in M. Berthelot's letter regarding the French protectorates over Tunis and Morocco were accepted, subject to a reservation by the British delegation.

M. KAMMERER observed that the French delegation had accepted the British proposal regarding Egypt without any reservation, assuming that the counterpart would be agreed to. The British reservation regarding this, of course, involved a French reservation regarding the article concerning Egypt.

M. CAMBON asked whether there were any objections to section 4 of M. Berthelot's letter.

There was no objection, and the secretary was requested to inform the Drafting Committee accordingly.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA, after thanking M. Cambon for presiding at the meeting, begged him to convey the thanks of himself and his colleagues to Lord Curzon for the courteous way in which he had presided over the conference, and to express the regret of the Italian delegation that he should have been prevented by illness from attending its last meeting.

M. CAMBON returned thanks on his behalf, and undertook to convey the thanks and condolences of the conference to Lord Curzon.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he would also like to express the thanks of the conference to the secretariat and the interpreter.

(This was agreed to unanimously.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens*, April 10, 1920.

#### APPENDIX I TO No. 79

##### *Armenian Delegation to the President of the Peace Conference*

(A.J. 142.)

LONDRES, le 27 mars 1920

M. le Président,

Dans les territoires qui seront laissés à l'État turc après la conclusion de la paix, l'on compte un nombre considérable d'Arméniens qui s'y étaient établis avant la

guerre, et qui sont morts victimes des massacres, déportations, sévices, épidémies, &c. Beaucoup d'entre eux ne laissent pas d'héritiers, ceux-ci ayant péri dans les mêmes circonstances. Leurs terres, immeubles et autres biens ont été, dans la suite, accaparés par les Turcs.

La conférence considérera, sans doute, injuste de laisser entre les mains de ceux qui furent les auteurs ou les complices des forfaits collectifs, ces biens appartenant à la nation arménienne. D'autre part, la déshérence ne devra, sous aucune forme, profiter en l'espèce à l'État turc.

Nous avons donc l'honneur de prier le Conseil suprême de vouloir bien insérer dans le Traité de Paix avec la Turquie une clause formelle exigeant :

1. La remise de tous ces biens à l'État arménien.
2. Le versement de leur contrevaletur au susdit État, au cas où leur restitution serait impossible par suite de la destruction de la propriété spoliée.
3. La restitution au même État des biens appartenant aux églises, monastères et établissements d'instruction publique arméniens, qui, d'après la loi turque elle-même, dite 'Loi sur les Biens abandonnés', devraient être conservés en dépôt par le Gouvernement turc et restitués à la nation arménienne. Les objets précieux, ex-voto, bijoux, &c., ont été vendus et les objets en or et argent ont été fondus pour la frappe de la monnaie par le Gouvernement turc. La restitution en espèces de leur contrevaletur est un droit strict, dont la nation arménienne ne devra pas être privée.
4. En vertu de la même loi, les loyers des immeubles revenant aux églises et monastères arméniens devaient être encaissés par les autorités turques, à charge pour celles-ci d'en remettre les montants, après la guerre, à la nation arménienne. Ces montants devraient être entièrement remboursés par le Gouvernement turc à l'État arménien.
5. D'après les dispositions de la même loi, les marchandises et biens meubles appartenant aux Arméniens déportés ont été vendus par les autorités turques et la contrevaletur en a été déposée dans les caisses gouvernementales sous l'inscription 'biens des inconnus'. Ces sommes devront également être versées à l'État arménien.

Il va de soi que les points susénumérés demeurent indépendants des dommages-intérêts, indemnités et toutes autres réparations dues par le Gouvernement turc à la nation arménienne et qui constituent l'objet d'un chapitre spécial du Traité de Paix.

Veillez, &c.,

A. AHARONIAN,  
*Président de la Délégation de la République  
arménienne à la Conférence de la Paix.*

BOGHOS NUBAR,  
*Président de la Délégation nationale  
arménienne.*

APPENDIX 2 TO No. 79

Document 1

*M. Veniselos to Sir M. Hankey*

(A.J. 145.)

GREEK DELEGATION, LONDON, *April 8, 1920*

Dear Sir Maurice Hankey,

I take the liberty to transmit to you herewith a memorandum containing my remarks on the minority clauses, which you were so good as to send me last week.<sup>9</sup>

I shall be obliged if you will kindly submit same to the Prime Minister.

Believe me, &c.,

E. K. VENISELOS

Document 2

*Memorandum by M. Veniselos*

Le 20 mars, la délégation hellénique a reçu communication du nouveau projet du traité de protection des minorités tel qu'il a été arrêté par le Conseil des Ambassadeurs et des Ministres le 27 mars dernier.

La délégation hellénique a relevé dans ce nouveau projet l'addition de trois articles qui ne figuraient pas dans celui du 22 octobre 1919,<sup>10</sup> sur lequel l'accord avait été fait entre le Gouvernement hellénique et la Conférence de la Paix. Ce sont les articles 7 (alinéa 2), 11 et 15. L'alinéa 2 de l'article 7 aurait pour but d'assurer les droits des minorités ethniques à la représentation nationale. A ce sujet, la délégation hellénique croit utile de rappeler que le régime constitutionnel en Grèce, un des plus libéraux, établit une égalité complète parmi tous ses ressortissants indistinctement de race ou de religion en ce qui concerne les droits à la représentation nationale. Seize Députés musulmans et deux israélites siègent actuellement dans le Parlement grec.

L'article 11 contient une restriction de la liberté d'action du Gouvernement hellénique en ce qui touche le régime foncier.

Il est vrai que cette restriction n'est que pour une période de deux ans à partir de la signature du traité, de sorte qu'elle ne causera pas beaucoup d'embarras au Gouvernement grec. Cependant la délégation hellénique ne peut s'empêcher de constater que la restriction que contiennent les articles 7 et 11 ne figure pas dans les traités analogues conclus entre les principales Puissances alliées et associées et les nouveaux États, ou la Roumanie et la Yougoslavie. Cela pourrait produire sur l'opinion grecque l'impression que la Grèce a été l'objet d'un traitement différent de celui réservé aux autres pays susmentionnés, quoiqu'elle ne leur soit inférieure ni au point de vue du libéralisme, ni à celui du progrès.

Pour ces raisons, la délégation hellénique souhaiterait que ces clauses restrictives fussent si possible évitées.

Au sujet de l'article 15, ayant trait au régime de la ville d'Andrinople, la délégation hellénique n'a aucune objection à formuler.

*Londres, le 7 avril 1920.*

<sup>9</sup> See No. 73, minute 1.

<sup>10</sup> See Volume II, No. 12, note 6 (cf. also in the present volume, No. 73, notes 2 and 3).

### APPENDIX 3 TO No. 79

#### *War Office to Supreme Council*<sup>11</sup>

(A.J. 146.)

WAR OFFICE, LONDON, *April 1, 1920*

Sir,

With reference to the draft articles of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey dealing with the administration of the waters of the Straits (enclosure to C.P. 926, forwarded on the 25th March, 1920),<sup>12</sup> I am commanded by the Army Council to point out that, in order to cover the establishment of the proposed local police under the High Commission of the Straits it will be necessary to insert wording in article 20, Chapter 5, of the military clauses to cover this increase in personnel.

The amendment suggested is the insertion, at the commencement of that article, of the words: 'Apart from the establishment of police required for service under the High Commission of the Straits . . .'<sup>13</sup>

Copies of this letter have been forwarded to the Foreign Office and to Major-General Sackville-West, in Paris.

I am, &c.,  
B. B. CUBITT

### APPENDIX 4 TO No. 79

#### Document 1

#### *President of Delegation of the Democratic Republic of Ruthenia (White Russia) to the President of the Peace Conference*

(A.J. 119.)

PARIS, *le 11 mars 1920*

M. le Président,

J'ai l'honneur d'attirer la bienveillante attention de votre Excellence sur la présente protestation contre les actes d'injustice inouïe et de cruauté perpétrés par le Gouvernement polonais dans la partie de la Russie-Blanche occupée par la Pologne, en vous priant de bien vouloir accorder votre aide et protection à la délégation de la Russie-Blanche dans la question de la nomination d'une commission internationale chargée de faire une enquête en Russie-Blanche sur les atrocités polonaises.

Je profite, &c.,  
(Pour le Président de la Délégation),  
LE COLONEL LADNOV

<sup>11</sup> In the typescript text this heading read: 'Secretary, British War Office to British Secretary, Supreme Council.'

<sup>12</sup> Cf. No. 40, appendix 1 and No. 71, minute 5.

<sup>13</sup> Punctuation as in original quotation.

## Document 2

### *Protestation*

En me basant sur des faits contrôlés et des données documentales que j'ai reçues du Gouvernement de la République démocratique de la Russie-Blanche, je me permets de dénoncer les actes d'injustice inouïe et de cruauté qui sont perpétrés par les autorités polonaises dans la partie de la Russie-Blanche occupée par les armées de la Pologne.

La liste des faits suivants peut donner une faible idée de ce qui se passe en Russie-Blanche:

1. Les représentants du peuple, qui siègent à la Rada<sup>14</sup> de la République démocratique de la Russie-Blanche et le Conseil des Ministres du Peuple, élus par le Congrès blanc-russien qui s'est réuni à Minsk 18-31 décembre 1917, sont privés de la possibilité d'exercer leurs fonctions et de défendre les droits et les intérêts du peuple blanc-russien, les réunions de la Rada et du Gouvernement étant interdites par le Commissaire polonais des Territoires orientaux (Russie-Blanche). Même les autorités militaires allemandes, en 1918, ne se sont pas permis de violer ainsi le droit international et de soumettre à pareille violence les représentants élus par le peuple blanc-russien. Lors de l'occupation allemande, la Rada de la République de la Russie-Blanche et le Gouvernement ont continué à exister et à fonctionner légalement.
2. Les membres de la Rada sont arrêtés. Des perquisitions et des saisies sont faites à leurs domiciles et ils sont déportés ensuite à Varsovie.
3. Les partis politiques blancs-russiens sont persécutés et leurs leaders arrêtés.
4. La population est privée de tous ses droits civiques et même de la liberté de conscience.
5. La formation de troupes nationales est défendue.
6. On oblige la population illettrée et peu cultivée à déclarer par écrit qu'elle est de nationalité polonaise et désire faire partie de l'État polonais. On n'hésite même pas à exiger de pareils documents des enfants. Pour une déclaration de ce genre, l'Administration polonaise promet du lard, de la farine et des graines de la provision que la Pologne a reçue de l'Amérique ou n'importe quelle autre faveur.
7. Le 23 novembre la Diète polonaise a voté une loi d'après laquelle dans les parties de la Russie-Blanche occupées par les troupes polonaises les élections pour la Diète de la Russie-Blanche doivent être faites aux frais du Trésor polonais, afin que le peuple blanc-russien puisse déclarer son désir d'appartenir à la Pologne. En même temps, les autorités d'occupation ont reçu des instructions secrètes du Gouvernement polonais leur ordonnant d'organiser les élections en une semaine seulement, afin que le nombre d'électeurs soit aussi restreint que possible, et leur enjoignant de faire élire des catholiques, des propriétaires et des prêtres ou des personnes qui leur sont recommandées comme des partisans avérés de la Pologne.
8. L'administration blanche-russienne a été partout remplacée par une administration civile polonaise.
9. Les églises catholiques-grecques sont fermées.
10. Les écoles nationales sont fermées également.

<sup>14</sup> i.e. assembly.

11. Les langues russe et blanche-russienne sont remplacées par le polonais, qui est proclamé la langue obligatoire pour la population.
12. La publication de journaux, de revues et autres journaux périodiques blancs-russiens est interdite.
13. Les ecclésiastiques catholiques-grecs sont surveillés par des gendarmes polonais.
14. Les églises orthodoxes qui n'ont jamais appartenu au culte catholique sont fermées ou transformées en églises catholiques-romaines.
15. Toutes les personnes instruites dans les villages, telles que les prêtres, les diacres, les maîtres d'école et les anciens officiers russes également, sont toutes sans distinction accusées de bolchevisme. Elles sont persécutées, battues, soumises à des arrestations, puis déportées on ne sait où.
16. Les personnes qui travaillaient autrefois dans les administrations publiques locales perdent leurs emplois et sont privées de leur gagne-pain si elles ne connaissent pas la langue polonaise.
17. A plusieurs reprises, la population de la République démocratique de la Russie-Blanche a été mobilisée afin de renforcer le contingent des troupes polonaises.
18. Sous forme de réquisitions, les troupes polonaises pillent la population, la privant de son dernier morceau de pain. Cette conduite des troupes polonaises a provoqué une critique publique de la part d'un archevêque polonais, Mgr. Losinski, qui a adressé un appel à ce sujet aux soldats polonais. (Cet appel a été publié dans le 'Kurjer Minski' dans son numéro du 9 décembre 1919.)
19. Toutes les tentatives faites par les hommes politiques pour informer l'Europe occidentale de l'injustice et de la cruauté avec laquelle le peuple blanc-russien est traité se sont terminées d'une façon fort triste pour les premiers. 'Les accusés', après avoir subi des perquisitions et leurs biens étant confisqués, furent déportés dans des camps de concentration destinés à une catégorie spéciale de prisonniers — les prisonniers dits 'prisonniers politiques'.

Toutes ces injustices commises par les troupes polonaises dans la partie de la Russie-Blanche qu'elles occupent, avec l'assentiment des autorités polonaises, ont provoqué une haine indescriptible contre les Polonais dans le peuple blanc-russien.

Poussée au désespoir, la population, qui en 1919 avait formé des détachements de volontaires dits 'troupes vertes' pour lutter contre les bolcheviks (un de ces détachements a soulevé un mouvement anti-bolchevik en juillet 1919 dans les environs de la ville de Minsk et s'est emparé de cette ville), attend avec impatience à l'heure actuelle l'arrivée des bolcheviks qui la délivreront du joug polonais.

En raison de ce qui précède et afin de protéger mon pays et mon peuple contre les horreurs de la guerre civile et pour éviter un soulèvement populaire contre des Polonais, j'ai l'honneur, en qualité de représentant du Gouvernement de la Russie-Blanche chargé de pleins pouvoirs, de m'adresser à la Conférence des Ambassadeurs avec la requête suivante: Je demande qu'une commission internationale, qui serait chargée de faire une enquête sur les atrocités polonaises en Russie-Blanche, soit nommée aux frais du Gouvernement de la Russie-Blanche. Des représentants du Gouvernement de la Russie-Blanche ou des personnes indiquées par ce dernier devront faire partie de ladite commission.

J'ai l'honneur de porter ce qui précède à la connaissance de la Conférence de la Paix à Paris.

(Pour le Président de la Délégation),  
LE COLONEL LADNOV

APPENDIX 5 TO No. 79

*Report of the Commission on the Straits and the Sea of Marmora—Articles 1 and 8  
and 22 to 27*

*Letter from Marshal Foch, dated April 8, 1920*

Par lettre du 27 mars, vous m'avez transmis le texte nouveau des articles 1<sup>er</sup>, 8 et 22 à 27 du rapport établi par le comité pour l'administration des voies d'eau des Détroits et de la mer de Marmara.<sup>15</sup>

Les représentants militaires et navals se sont réunis ce matin, 7 avril, pour examiner ce nouveau texte.

Les représentants navals ont renouvelé les observations présentées par eux à la séance du 27 mars, observations figurant au paragraphe 3 du rapport transmis du 29 mars.<sup>15</sup>

En conséquence, ils demandent qu'une réponse soit faite le plus tôt possible aux questions préjudiciables qu'ils ont posées dans ledit paragraphe.

Afin de permettre au Comité de Versailles d'entreprendre sans retard et sur des bases précises l'examen du rapport du comité des voies d'eau, je vous prie de vouloir bien donner satisfaction à cette demande le plus tôt possible.

FOCH

APPENDIX 6 TO No. 79

*M. Berthelot to Mr. Lloyd George*

(A.J. 147.)

LONDRES, le 8 avril 1920

M. le Président,

La revision détaillée du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie dans l'état où il se trouve actuellement a fait apparaître aux yeux de la délégation française certaines imperfections de détail en ce qui concerne la reconnaissance explicite, par la Turquie, du protectorat français sur le Maroc et la Tunisie, et de la qualité de ressortissants français des musulmans de l'Algérie, de la Tunisie et du Maroc. Aussi ai-je reçu l'instruction de demander au conseil l'insertion des modifications suivantes, qui sont de pure forme et d'ailleurs conformes aux clauses analogues proposées pour l'Égypte; elles ne changent rien aux principes sur lesquels sont d'accord les diverses délégations:

1. L'article 2 des Clauses économiques serait complété par l'adjonction des mots soulignés (*en italiques*)<sup>16</sup> ci-dessous:

'La Turquie renonce expressément à tous droits de suzeraineté ou de juridiction, de quelque nature qu'ils soient, sur les musulmans soumis à la souveraineté *ou au protectorat* de tout autre État que l'État turc.'

<sup>15</sup> Cf. No. 71, minute 5 and No. 78, minute 4 and appendix 1.

<sup>16</sup> Thus in filed copy.



2. L'article 54 des Clauses économiques serait complété par les mots soulignés ci-dessous :

'Le terme "ressortissant des Puissances alliées et associées" pour tout ce qui concerne la section financière et la section économique s'applique :

'(1) A toute personne physique ou morale possédant la nationalité *ou sujette* d'une Puissance alliée ou associée *ou ressortissant d'un État sous le protectorat d'une Puissance alliée ou associée.*'

La délégation française pense aussi que dans la rédaction ci-dessus les mots 'pour tout ce qui concerne la section financière et la section économique' pourraient être omis, afin de ne pas limiter la définition des 'ressortissants'.

3. Il y aurait lieu d'ajouter dans le traité, après la section sur l'Égypte, une section sur le Maroc et la Tunisie comprenant les deux articles suivants, qui ne visent que les relations de la Turquie avec ces deux protectorats, et non des questions à régler entre les Puissances alliées. Les dates à partir desquelles ces dispositions portent effet sont, selon la procédure adoptée par la délégation britannique dans l'article 1<sup>er</sup> de la section Égypte,<sup>17</sup> celles où le protectorat est devenu effectif par rapport à l'État protégé. Il est particulièrement nécessaire, en ce qui concerne la Tunisie, d'insérer une date antérieure à la guerre européenne, parce que la Turquie contestait depuis des années la qualité de ressortissants français aux sujets tunisiens.

#### *Articles proposés*

(1) La Turquie reconnaît le protectorat de la France sur l'Empire chérifien et en accepte toutes les conséquences. Les marchandises marocaines à l'entrée en Turquie seront soumises au même régime que les marchandises françaises. Cette reconnaissance prendra effet à dater du 30 mars 1912.

(2) La Turquie reconnaît le protectorat de la France sur la Tunisie et en accepte toutes les conséquences. Les marchandises tunisiennes à l'entrée en Turquie seront soumises au même régime que les marchandises françaises. Cette reconnaissance prendra effet à dater du 12 mai 1881.

4. La délégation française a reçu en outre instruction de signaler l'opportunité d'insérer un article spécial — qui ne paraît pas devoir soulever de difficultés entre les délégations — concernant l'Acte de Berlin et l'Acte de Bruxelles. Cet article serait rédigé comme suit :

'Le Gouvernement ottoman renonce à se prévaloir des dispositions de l'Acte de Berlin du 26 février 1885 et de l'Acte de Bruxelles du 2 juillet 1890.<sup>18</sup> Il accepte d'avance les modifications que les Puissances alliées jugeront utile d'apporter à ces actes.'

En raison du court délai qui doit s'écouler avant la séparation de la conférence actuelle et pour dégager l'ordre du jour de la Conférence de San-Remo, la délégation française vous serait obligée de bien vouloir faire circuler la présente lettre et d'en inscrire la discussion à la prochaine séance de la conférence.

Veillez, &c.,

BERTHELOT

<sup>17</sup> See No. 76, appendix 1.

<sup>18</sup> The texts of these acts of 1885 and 1890 are printed respectively in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vols. lxxvi, pp. 4-20, and lxxxii, pp. 55-81.

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